Female Empowerment in Northern India: Effects of the Political Reservation System on Gender Bias May 10 th , 2008 Sze-chuan Suen [email protected]314-853-1784 Under the direction of Dr. Anjini Kochar The government of India has attempted to address the low status of women in society though a constitutional amendment that mandates a woman must be elected as village leader every third election cycle. Several papers have shown that female reservations have significant effects on local policy decisions, but it is unknown whether the amendment is effective in its primary goal to erode discrimination against women. In my thesis I use uniquely- tailored household and village data to investigate whether political gender reservations can decrease sex bias by evaluating changes in female investments of those living in villages with female village leaders. Using OLS regressions, I find that only when a female village leader has financial resources are there changes in sex ratios, immunization rates, and school enrollment that are consistent with greater female bargaining power. However, I also find that maternal bargaining power is correlated to low sex ratios. These results show that political reservations for females must be supplemented with sound financial resources in order to increase women’s status and bargaining power, but doing so without changing maternal son- preference will not be effective in fixing the skewed sex ratio. Key Words: India, female sarpanch, son preference, female empowerment The author would like to express her heartfelt appreciation for Dr. Anjini Kochar for investing so much time and energy in this project. This would not have been possible without her. She would also like to thank SCID, the Rai Foundation, and the wonderful translators from Delhi Business School, and all the other mentors who contributed to the project.
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Female Empowerment in Northern India: Effects of the Political Reservation System on Gender Bias
The government of India has attempted to address the low status of women
in society though a constitutional amendment that mandates a woman must be elected as village leader every third election cycle. Several papers have shown that female reservations have significant effects on local policy decisions, but it is unknown whether the amendment is effective in its primary goal to erode discrimination against women. In my thesis I use uniquely-tailored household and village data to investigate whether political gender reservations can decrease sex bias by evaluating changes in female investments of those living in villages with female village leaders. Using OLS regressions, I find that only when a female village leader has financial resources are there changes in sex ratios, immunization rates, and school enrollment that are consistent with greater female bargaining power. However, I also find that maternal bargaining power is correlated to low sex ratios. These results show that political reservations for females must be supplemented with sound financial resources in order to increase women’s status and bargaining power, but doing so without changing maternal son-preference will not be effective in fixing the skewed sex ratio.
Key Words: India, female sarpanch, son preference, female empowerment The author would like to express her heartfelt appreciation for Dr. Anjini Kochar for investing so much time and energy in this project. This would not have been possible without her. She would also like to thank SCID, the Rai Foundation, and the wonderful translators from Delhi Business School, and all the other mentors who contributed to the project.
where i denotes individual, j village, and c cohort, and village characteristic can be shamlat
land, earnings, average village maternal education, or average village paternal education and
controls are as specified in equation (3). I am therefore able to determine whether the female
sarpanches with greater access to resources (shamlat land) are more able to influence sex
ratios than those who don’t and whether female sarpanches with wealthier or more educated
villages are more influential.
Background on the Datasets
In order to ask the question of whether female sarpanches can change the perceived
value of women in households, the reservation system must be effective in bringing a woman
into office. While compliance with the 73rd amendment is complete within the sample, there
is ample anecdotal evidence that female sarpanches do little to influence panchayat decisions.
Duflo has already shown that female sarpanches are effective in initiating policies that cater
to the needs of women in Rajasthan, which borders on Haryana on the west, but Rajasthan is
demographically dissimilar to Haryana. Punbaj, however, to the northwest of Haryana, is
quite similar in size, population, literacy rates, and other demographic measures (see Figure 1
and Table 1). I briefly compare the difference between various demographic measures
between Haryana and its neighbors (standardized by national standard errors) to see that
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Punjab is Haryana’s the most similar neighbor by far, and is actually very similar to Haryana
in absolute terms in many demographic categories as well.
Therefore Punjabi data from a subset of the CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal
Decentralisation, which includes panel data on 300 villages at the village level, is used to
examine the relationship between female sarpanch reservations and panchayat expenditures.
If the female sarpanches elected through the reservation system are effective in representing
female concerns, then their villages would be expected to have different expenditure patterns
than non-reserved villages. The survey data was collected at the village level, and includes
whether the sarpanch position was reserved for a female, whether the panchayat spent funds
on public goods (which are broken down into 13 categories) in 2004-2005 and if money was
spent, how much. Sarpanch elections were held in 1993, 1998, and 2003; legally, one third
of the villages were reserved for female sarpanches. The 2003 reservations are analyzed here,
and in compliance with the law, 32% of villages were reserved for a female sarpanch that
year. The dataset also includes measures of village resources and sources of funding as well
as the proportion of poor (as measured by land ownership, income) and needy in the village
(i.e., pension drawing status).
After finding whether panchayat spending was influenced by female reservations, I
turn to the question of whether female sarpanches are able to directly influence the perceived
value of women in society. For this question, data was obtained from household and village
surveys of nineteen villages in Haryana state (in Faridabad, Rohtak, and Sonipat districts),
outside Delhi, India. Surveys were verbally conducted and translated from Hindi.
Nineteen villages were randomly chosen from village lists obtained from block
development offices. Village surveys were verbally conducted with the panchayat or with
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the sarpanch. Survey information included village-level characteristics, such as panchayat
member characteristics and amount of various village resources. Since the 73rd amendment
was implemented, all villages have held elections once in 1994-1996 (exact year differs
between villages), 2000, and 2005.
Household surveys were conducted with 10-15 households in every village, except
one village which only had 4 households. At least two below poverty line (BPL) households
were included from every village to insure variation in income, and social economic group
variation was ensured by covering at least one household from every caste in the village.
Besides these variations, households were chosen randomly from the village resident list.
Household representatives were asked to give ages, relationships, educational characteristics,
and children of all household members along with other individual characteristics as well as
provide household level information (such as household income, landholdings, etc).
This dataset is uniquely tailored to answer the question of how gender ratios change;
all family members (including away or dead children) are documented by age, gender,
whether they were vaccinated, and educational level and status. The village and household
sex ratios over time can therefore be reconstructed using the ages of all household members,
even if they are currently away or dead. All individuals are assigned a cohort by the year
they were born and the village they were born in; the sex ratio (females born to total born) is
then calculated by village and cohort. In this way one can “look back in time” in the sex
ratio data to examine the sex ratios of cohorts born in villages before the sarpanch position
had been reserved for a woman and after.
Immunization rates are reconstructed in a similar manner, since immunization takes
place in the year after birth. The relationship between primary school enrollment (whether
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one currently attending or completed one year of primary school) and female sarpanch
exposure can also be determined if one makes the assumption that the decision to attend
primary school for all children is made when they are six years of age. I designate all
individuals who have had a female sarpanch by reservation in their village prior to age six as
having parents who have been exposed to a female sarpanch, and I can see whether there is a
difference between school sex ratios (percentage of 6-year-old females who will complete
primary school to the percentage of all 6-year-olds) of those cohorts which have parents who
have been exposed to a female sarpanch and those which do not have such parents.
The dataset therefore provides unique information needed in variable construction –
may datasets do not include immunization or prenatal checkup history for all individuals, for
example. It is for this reason that it is chosen over other public datasets which have larger
sample sizes. This dataset includes information on over 1600 individuals in 18 villages, but
the sample size shrinks as those without various control variables must be excluded, resulting
in a minimum sample size of 213 individuals for certain regressions. The sample size also
varies by dependant variable; while all individuals surveyed provided information on age and
education, vaccination data could only be obtained for individuals with a living parent in the
survey household, cutting the maximum sample size to just over 564 (may be less due to
omission of control variables used when regressions were run).
The source of the advantages for this dataset -- that the questions were tailored to
answer questions about sex ratios -- could have potentially generated biased answers since
there are legal and social repercussions to gender selection. Therefore all questions
concerning births and health of children were framed in the context of gathering general
household information instead of asking expressly about gender preference.
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Compliance with the 73rd amendment was close to complete: all but one of the
villages had a female sarpanch once in the last three terms, with only two exceptions to the
expected female sarpanch pattern. (The exceptions were one village which reported an non-
mandated female sarpanch in 1996 and mandated one in 2005, and another village which
reported a mandated female sarpanch in 1990, before the policy was implemented.) One
third of all panchayat members were female in all villages. Thus all villages are standardized
in that each had only one female sarpanch through the reservation system.
The third source of data used is the census of India. The census is taken every ten
years by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, and includes state, district,
and village level information on population and household size and number. 1991 census
data is chosen over other censuses for use in the controls since female sarpanches are only
assigned after the passage of the 73rd amendment in 1992, and changes in the villages
reflected in the 2001 census could be the direct result of sarpanch actions. The 2001 census
data is used to show that comparisons between Haryana and Punjab are valid; the two states
are demographically similar and effects of the reservation system should be comparable.
Section 5: Results
A graphical representation of the total number of children born by sex over time for
all villages is shown in Graph 1. There are significantly fewer girls born than boys after
around the 1980’s, and the absolute sex ratio over this period is lower than parity. Sex ratios
for all villages, by years normalized to the first year that a female sarpanch was in office, are
shown in Graph 2. A simple visual analysis of the graph may lead one to believe that if there
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changes due to female sarpanches the changes are not immediate or do not occur in all
villages, which motivates the sensitivity analysis.
Female Sarpanch Reservations and Expenditure patterns
The analysis of whether reservations for female sarpanches are able to influence
panchayat decisions confirms that reservations indeed make a difference on village
expenditures (See Table 3a, 3b, and 3c). I look at thirteen categories in which panchayats
can invest, and for each I examine whether the reserved or non-reserved sarpanches of
funded it and the amount they funded it by.
The regressions indicate that female sarpanches selected through reservations tend to
spend more on irrigation canals and tanks, drinking water and water works (significant at the
15% level), streetlights (significant at the 10% level), and salaries for panchayat members.
These sarpanches were also less likely to spend on hospitals and health centers, but those that
did spent more than their male counterparts (both measures significant at 10% level). Less of
the reserved villages spent funds on public buildings and community centers. (All
differences between the two types of villages are significant at 5% level unless otherwise
stated.) Therefore out of the thirteen expenditure types, six categories show differences
between non-reserved and reserved sarpanch positions.
This shows that reserved panchayats act differently from non-reserved villages, and
since female reservations are randomly assigned, this difference must be due to the
reservation system. Previous literature shows that women sarpanches are better able to
address the needs of women in the village; while this analysis does not show that these
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changes in Punjab cater to village women, they at least reflect the concerns of the female
sarpanch. These changes could potentially demonstrate to villagers that women have a role
in public office and decision-making positions in the home, thereby increasing the perceived
value of women. To see if they can, I must first determine whether female bargaining power
can influence the dependent variables I use in my analysis.
Sex Ratios and Bargaining Power
The first regression here determines whether maternal bargaining power can affect
sex ratios, where village average maternal and paternal education act as proxies for
bargaining power (see Table 4). The results show that both maternal and paternal education
are strong predictors of sex ratio at the 5% level, even controlling for village characteristics
such as village populations and households (and therefore household size). However, the
sign of the maternal education coefficient is negative, indicating that increases in maternal
bargaining power decrease the sex ratio (reduce the fraction of girls born). This is a contrary
result to that found in much of the literature, which shows positive correlations between
maternal bargaining power and child health. This anomaly could be due to attitudes specific
to Haryana, which is unique in having one of the lowest sex ratios in the country. However,
it could also be an effect of not having a direct measure of maternal bargaining power within
the home.
Since health and education sex ratios are also of interest, I also wish to find whether
female bargaining power is a force that can change girls’ health and education investment. In
the vaccination sex ratio regression, the maternal education coefficient is significant and
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positive, indicating that mothers with more bargaining power give daughters more
vaccinations.
The next regression shows that maternal bargaining power does not change
daughters’ primary school enrollment rates, and I therefore should expect no change in
primary school sex ratios if the female sarpanch influences the perceived value of women
through maternal bargaining power. Examining this female investment indicator is still
valuable, since it can act as, in the language of medical testing, a “negative control” -- it will
help identify when changes in female investment patterns are due to an affect on maternal
bargaining power or due to some other change in the village.
If the above analysis is correct, then if the female sarpanch were able to increase
female bargaining power within the home it might depress the sex ratio still further, although
vaccination ratios should rise. I explore whether that is the case in the next section.
Female Sarpanches and Sex Ratios
I examine whether female sarpanches influence the perceived value of women in
society by measuring changes in the sex ratio, an indicator of the desirability -- and by proxy
the social value -- of women. The sex ratio can be followed over time in Graph 1. In the
base case, the sex ratio (fraction of female individuals in the cohort, where a cohort consists
of all individuals born in the same year) is regressed on whether that village has had a female
sarpanch at the time of a cohort’s birth. These results are shown in Table 5 (regressions 1, 2,
and 3). The estimates indicate that there seems to be no relationship between having ever
had a female sarpanch and the sex ratio.
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Shamlat land does not significantly affect the sex ratio when village fixed effects are
taken into account; it would be reasonable to assume that shamlat land is not a fixed village
characteristic (as it may be sold or rented out in various quantities to provide income for the
panchayat) and therefore evaluating it with the inclusion of village fixed effects is correct.
One might be concerned that the accuracy of self-reported ages decreases with the
age of interviewee, causing measurement error and biased estimators; higher mortality rates
for older persons may also increase the variance of yearly sex ratio measurements even given
accurate reporting, which would influence the t-statistics. Therefore identical regressions
were run using only individuals born after year 1960. I find similar results regarding
coefficients and t-statistics, showing that the data from older people in the sample generally
reinforce the same trends in the data from younger people.
Over-fitting is not seen to be a concern even though the regression only uses 564 data
points for a considerable number of independent variables as the R value is actually quite low.
The regression suffers from some non-robustness, as the coefficients and significance levels
change dramatically as more variables are controlled for, but all the variables included in the
final regression are reasonable and theoretically justified. The amount of shamlat land
affects the degree of influence a sarpanch has by providing the ability to fund panchayat
projects. The village average income could reasonably be related to desirability of males
(necessity of old age support, etc). Individual characteristics such as savings and parental
education might be important for controlling for household-level characteristics. Village
population measures would also reflect the transparency and publicity of panchayat and
sarpanch actions (for instance, the smaller the village, the larger the fraction of constituents
the sarpanch may have had personal contact with) which would effect the degree to which
33
the sarpanch is able to influence public perception. This result, then, indicates that the
gender of the sarpanch is not able to elevate the perceived value of females enough to change
child sex preferences.
Sex Preference Indicators through Health Investment: Immunizations
A sufficient increase in the perceived value of females to overcome cultural and
social sex preferences might be difficult to achieve. Here, I examine changes in health
investment of female children that parents have already decided to have. This measure is
expected to vary independently of sex composition choices as parents may have more
autonomy over the level of investment in a child’s health than the sex of the child. Here, the
vaccination rate is an index of health investment
Vaccination rates have changed dramatically in rural villages. Out of the entire
sample, an average of 71% people are vaccinated against any sort of disease (the most
popular vaccinations include polio, diphtheria, BCG, and hepatitis B) while children under
the age of 14 had an average vaccination rate of 88%. Vaccinations are normally
administered at or soon after birth, with the child taking a series of booster shots that ends
before age two. Crucially, investment in vaccinations occur after the sex and health of the
child are known, so the sex of the child may well play a role in determining whether he or
she receives vaccinations or not. The bargaining power regressions show that mothers with
bargaining power favor giving vaccinations to their daughters, so there should be an increase
in the vaccination sex ratio if female sarpanches are able to increase female bargaining power.
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Even so, the regressions show there is no significant change in the proportion of
female vaccinations as compared to total vaccinations (see Table 6 regressions 1, 2, and 3).
Ever having a female sarpanch does not change vaccination behavior for women.
Sex Preference Indicators through Educational Investment: Primary School Enrollment
While households may not respond to a female sarpanch by changing health
investments for girls, they might change other types of investments. The analysis from
Punjab showed that villages reserved for female sarpanches were less likely to spend
panchayat funds on hospitals and health clinics; if the female sarpanch was catering to female
desires, as suggested by previous literature, then perhaps health investment is not a priority
for women in the household. Then more bargaining power for females would not result in
greater health investment for either sex.
I therefore turn to education, a measure of investment that happens later in a child’s
life. The increase in the child’s age also changes the factors behind the parental investment
decision, since the parent has now already invested in the child. This gives another reason to
believe that analysis of educational investment patterns will generate an additional dimension
of information on sarpanch efficacy. I estimate whether having had a female sarpanch in the
village changes the primary school enrollment sex ratio, defined (in the appendix) as the
percentage of females in the cohort who attend at least one year of primary school to the
percentage of all children in the cohort who attend at least one year of primary school. The
analysis finds that those parents who live in a village which has had a female sarpanch by
reservation before their child is six years of age (when they must make the decision whether
35
to send their child to primary school) are not any more or less likely to enroll their girls in
primary schools (see Table 7 regression 1, 2, and 3).
While this is consistent with the findings concerning maternal bargaining power,
where the analysis found that daughter’s education investments do not vary with mother’s
bargaining power, the results from the previous two sections showed that female sarpanches
were not able to change sex ratios or health investment ratios, which maternal bargaining
power is important in predicting. Therefore this negative result is likely due to the lack of the
influence of the female sarpanch, not a lack of response due to the inability of female
bargaining power to change educational sex ratios.
Sensitivity Analysis: Allowing for a Nonlinear Effect of Female Sarpanch Exposure
1. Sensitivity of the Sex Ratio to Time from Female Sarpanch Exposure
In order to more fully understand whether the female sarpanch reservation has an
affect on the sex ratio, I explore whether there is a linear or parabolic relationship between
the time since the female sarpanch took office and the sex ratio (wee Table 5 regressions 4-9).
There does not seem to be any relationship.
2. Sex Ratio and Heterogeneous Exposure to Female Sarpanches
I also separate out various village characteristics which might influence how
receptive the village is to a female sarpanch. If the sarpanch has more disposable income, for
instance, she might be able to enact more effective or more visible programs, which could
change villagers’ perceptions about her efficacy and the desirability of a woman in politics
36
(see Table 8a). Shamlat land is a large source of a sarpanch’s non-earmarked funds, so I use
this as a measure of the amount of resources the sarpanch has available. I find that the
interaction term between having a female sarpanch and amount of shamlat land has a
statistically non-zero effect on sex ratios at the 10% level. The sign of the coefficient
indicates that the wealthier the female sarpanches are, the more depressed the sex ratio
becomes, which is consistent with the effects of greater maternal bargaining power as seen in
the bargaining power estimations. This would then imply that the efficacy of the female
sarpanch in elevating female bargaining power is dependent on the financial resources she
has at her disposal.
The resources of the residents of a sarpanch’s village may also affect how effective
she is. I test whether female sarpanch reservations can change sex ratios for villages that are
on average wealthier, have higher average maternal education, and have higher average
paternal education in three separate regressions. I find no significance for any of them,
indicating that whether female sarpanches change the perception of women is independent of
village average income and parental education.
3. Sensitivity of the Health and Education Sex Ratios to Time from Female Sarpanch
Exposure
As with the analysis of the sex ratio, I wish to check for changes over time as well as
for sarpanch and village characteristics that might make it more likely for a female sarpanch
to have an affect on health and education investment decisions. There are no linear or
parabolic relationships for the health (see Table 6 regressions 4-9) or education sex ratios
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(see Table 7 regressions 4-9) over time since the female sarpanch was in office once village
fixed effects are controlled for.
4. Health and Education Sex Ratios and Heterogeneous Exposure to Female
Sarpanches
As in the sex ratio analysis, the amount of shamlat land a village has is an important
factor for female sarpanch efficacy (see Table 8b). The vaccination sex ratio increases with
shamlat land interacted with female sarpanch reservation while education investment does
not; this is consistent with the directions of change seen when maternal bargaining power is
increased. Along with the sex ratio results, this confirms that disposable funds are a crucial
factor influencing the ability for female sarpanches to change female bargaining power and
early-childhood investment decisions. This is result is reiterated with the education
regression, which shows that even female sarpanches with shamlat land do not change
education investment in girls (see Table 8c). The bargaining power analysis earlier showed
that maternal bargaining power does not influence girls’ educational attainment even while
being significant for the sex ratio and health regressions, so the fact that the sex ratio and
health investment patterns changed in villages with landed female sarpanches while
education did not is one clue that female sarpanches act through changes in maternal
bargaining power to affect these measures of female investment.
There are no changes in health or education investment patterns if the female
sarpanch village is wealthier or if fathers in the village are, on average, more educated.
However, if mothers are more educated in the female sarpanch village, there is a decline in
the vaccination sex ratio, indicating that fewer girls are vaccinated (see Table 8b). Therefore
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the affect of the sarpanch does vary slightly with maternal education in the village, although
only by affecting vaccination sex ratios and no other measures of female investment. The
sign of the change is also interesting; it is contrary to the results that an increase in female
bargaining power would give. The mechanism for this change is unclear, and this finding is
unsupported by the data in the other two sex preference variables.
While the direction of the effect of female sarpanches with shamlat land is consistent
with increases in maternal bargaining power, the magnitude of the effect is slight. In the
maternal bargaining power analysis I found that an additional year of maternal education
results in a -0.00998 change in the sex ratio, 0.0475 change in the vaccination ratio, and no
change in the education sex ratio. A female sarpanch reservation in a village with one
additional acre of shamlat land results in a -0.000381 change in the sex ratio, 0.00102 change
in the vaccination ratio, and no change in the education sex ratio. A rough evaluation of the
magnitudes shows the effects are roughly 25 to 45 times stronger respectively for an
additional year of maternal education than the effect of the female sarpanch. This would
roughly mean a female sarpanch would need roughly 45 more acres of shamlat land to have
the same effect on female bargaining power as an additional year of maternal schooling
(assuming that non-linear effects are still negligible at this range). This is a large difference;
82% of the individuals surveyed live in villages with 80 acres or less of shamlat land, and
70% in villages with less than 40 acres. So while the effect of a female sarpanch with land is
significant and increases female bargaining power in the village, the magnitude of the change
is small.
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Section 6: Conclusion
Several papers have shown that female reservations in the Indian panchayat
leadership system have significant effects on policy decisions and allow for greater
representation for women’s concerns. However, effective female governance may not
necessarily lead to the erosion of discrimination against women. In this paper I asked
whether political gender reservations can increase the perceived value of females by
evaluating changes in familial investment in girls living in villages with female village
leaders.
Looking at the discontinuity between villages before having a female sarpanch and
after having one, I confirmed that the female sarpanch reservation alters panchayat
expenditure patterns, showing that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence
panchayat decisions in the region of interest.
The average village maternal bargaining power is important in determining the sex
ratio and vaccination sex ratio, although not the primary school sex ratio. Even so,
reservations for female sarpanches alone are unable to affect village sex ratios or female
health and educational investments. Only in villages which have both a female sarpanch and
shamlat land are all female investment indicators consistent with an increase in maternal
bargaining power, and the size of the change varies linearly with the amount of shamlat land
the village has.
This shows that reserving sarpanch seats for females is not enough to change female
status and bargaining power in the village; the female sarpanch must also have disposable
income in order to be an effective leader and demonstrate that females belong outside the
40
home. Ironically, though, the policy would fail in achieving its goal of fixing the sex ratio
even if the government provided greater financial resources to female sarpanches -- greater
maternal bargaining power is correlated with lower sex ratios in Haryana. Political
reservations for females must be supplemented with sound financial resources in order to
increase women’s status and bargaining power, but doing so without changing maternal son-
preference will not be effective in fixing the skewed sex ratio.
While it is reasonable and expected that female sarpanches require resources in order
to be effective, it is somewhat surprising that female empowerment does not reduce son
preference. This is especially so in light of other studies, like Thomas’, which have shown
that female bargaining power increases investment in daughters. One possibility for maternal
son preference in Haryana is the unique level of dependence of mother’s on sons. As
reviewed earlier, females have very low status in northern India and have limited property
rights without male representation (Dasgupta 1995). This dependence is particularly striking
for widows who must rely on sons – unlike in the regions where Thomas and others based
their studies, widows in northern India often rely almost completely on sons for resources,
and therefore may show more son preference than fathers. It is therefore plausible that
increasing women’s bargaining power without addressing their financial dependence on sons
may increase gender bias.
This study focuses on villages in which there have only been one female sarpanch;
the literature shows that different results can be seen as a village is required to have a female
sarpanch more than once. Further studies need to explore the effect of repeated female
sarpanches on discriminatory attitudes. However, the present analysis shows that political
reservations alone are not an effective tool for changing discriminatory attitudes and should
41
be supplemented with financial resources if the goal is to allow female sarpanches to be
effective in increasing female bargaining power and social status. At the same time, this
result will be likely to exacerbate the sex bias problem, which is already of grave concern in
Haryana. I therefore see little hope that this policy will be able to address all measures of the
sex discrimination problem in India effectively.
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Section 7: Appendix
Definitions:
Regression set 1:
Y j = α + β1(d_reserved for female)j + β2(controls) j + ε j
• Where j denotes village. • Where Y can equal total panchayat income, or whether there were expenditures
on (13 regressions), or how large the expenditures on (13 separate regressions): o electricity supply • irrigation canals and tanks • drinking water and water works • sewage and drainage • roads • schools • hospitals and health centers • street lighting • panchayat buildings and community centers • anganwadi center • sports stadium • salaries • other
• d_reserved for female is a dummy variable for whether the village was reserved
for a female sarpanch.
• Controls are a vector of control variables listed in the regression tables.
where i is the index for the individual belonging to j for village and cohort c. Each cohort is made up of all children born in a particular year.
• y can equal the sex ratio, prenatal checkup sex ratio, immunization sex ratio, school attendance sex ratio, or educational quality sex ratio which are defined as follows:
• sex ratio = (females born in village j in cohort c) / (total children born in
village j cohort c)
• prenatal checkup sex ratio = (females given prenatal checkup in village j cohort c) / (total children given prenatal checkup in village j cohort c)
• immunization sex ratios = (females immunized in village j cohort c) / (total
children immunized in village j cohort c)
• school attendance sex ratio = (percentage girls who are in or will complete 1 year of primary school in village j in cohort c) / (percentage of total individuals who will enroll in or complete 1 year of primary school in village j cohort c)
• D_femaleLeaderVariable is a dummy variable that denoting whether a female leader
has been in office in the village before or during the year of the births, the time between the birth year of the individual and the year the female sarpanch took office, and time between the birth year of the individual and the year the female sarpanch took office squared.
• Shamlat is the amount of shamlat land the village has
• Controls is a vector of control variables (see regression tables for complete list) which
include characteristics of individual i and village j. 1991 Village Characteristics, as seen on the regression tables, is part of the control vector and contains village characteristics from 1991. They are: village land area, population, female population, male child and female child population, no. of houses, and no. of households.
44
Graph 1: Total Males and Females Born by Calendar Year
Total No. born in Haryana sample (5 yr MA by calendar year)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Calendar year
# bo
rn MalesFemales
Graph 2: total number born, by sex and calendar year for all villages. Graph is smoothed using a 5-year moving average to reduce visual noise. The total number of females born after the 1990’s (when the 73rd amendment was ratified and implemented) are smaller than the total number of males born then. The trend seems to begin before the 1990’s, and may be part of the reason that the policy was enacted. I will be looking for discontinuities in the sex ratio of each village at the time the female sarpanch took office, which are 1995, 2000, 2005, depending on the village.
45
Graph 2: Sex Ratios Over Time
3 yr MA Sex Ratios
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
-70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Normalized Years
Sex
Rat
io (g
irls/
tota
l bor
n)
Graph 1: Shows the sex ratio over time, using a three-year moving average of sex ratios to reduce visual noise, with years normalized to the year that the female sarpanch took office. All sarpanches serve for a 5 year term, so villages had a female sarpanch for years 0 - 5.
46
Figure 1: Map of Indian States
Haryana's neighboring states. Previous literature shows that female sarpanches in Rajasthan (to the southwest of Haryana) are able to effectively influence panchayat expenditures. I do the same analysis for Punjab (to the northwest of Haryana) and see the same results. Map modified from Census of India 2001 accessed at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/maps/india2.jpg on May 1, 2009.
Table 1: Demographics of Haryana and its Neighbors
* the difference between Haryana and state means in national standard errorsData from Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, Census of India 2001 accessed online at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/default.aspx on May 1, 2009
Himachal Pradesh Average
Diff. from Himachal (in national. s.e.)*
Rajasthan Average
Diff. from Rajasthan (in nat. s.e.)*
Mean of all states national s.e.
Haryana Average
Punjab Average
Diff. from Punjab (in national. s.e.)*
Uttar Pradesh Average
Diff. from Uttar Pradesh (in nat. s.e.)*
The demographics of India, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. We find the national standard error using data from all 28 Indian states, then use this as a standard by which we can use to compare the differences between Haryana and its neighbors. A visual inspection of the demographic distance between Haryana and its neighbors shows that Punjab is the most similar to Haryana -- most of Punjab's demographic measures are less than 0.1 standard errors away from Haryana's while the other states are much higher. We therefore use Punjabi expenditure data to confirm that reserved female sarpanches are able to affect panchyat expenditures and assume that this conclusion holds for sarpanches in Haryana.
Table 2: Average Village Statistics By Female Sarpanch Term In Haryana
AllNever 1995 2000 2005
Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 504.15 462.68 384.06 430.03 643.92Village Shamlat Land Amt 113.33 6.99 14.96 149 177.11Average VillIage Per Capita Income 1169.79 704.33 1257.87 1421.25 1094.71Ave. Rooms Per House 877.01 892.2 883.49 858.39 883.63Ave. TV Possession Rate 875.65 891.88 883.54 856.39 881.74Total Village Pop. in 1991 3175.7 1764.08 1834.5 2068.1 5575.41Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.46
1990Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 233 462.6828 501.9881 171 1322.9Village Shamlat Land Amt 233 6.987124 1.743166 4 8Average VillIage Per Capita Income 233 704.3257 106.2533 642.5867 886.4035Ave. Rooms Per House 233 892.1974 308.7298 0 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 233 891.8755 309.6595 0 999
Total Village Pop. in 1991 233 1764.077 213.5378 1640 2130Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 233 817.0129 103.2826 757 994
1995Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 132 384.06 253.9036 131.12 637Village Shamlat Land Amt 295 14.96271 18.90368 4 70Average VillIage Per Capita Income 295 1257.872 326.2619 716.6765 1703.704Ave. Rooms Per House 293 883.4881 319.3605 1 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 294 883.5442 319.8179 0 999Total Village Pop. in 1991 132 1834.5 391.9876 1444 2225Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 132 869.5 172.1533 698 1041
2000Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 412 430.0331 158.7298 200.32 650.32Village Shamlat Land Amt 412 148.9951 263.9359 0 750Average VillIage Per Capita Income 511 1421.251 1216.043 287.6812 4282.412Ave. Rooms Per House 510 858.3873 347.1542 1 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 511 856.3933 349.6559 0 999
Total Village Pop. in 1991 412 2068.097 1138.377 465 3967Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 412 957.2184 523.0696 215 1827
2005Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Village Area (Sq km) in 1991 401 643.9214 403.2707 187 1188Village Shamlat Land Amt 613 177.1062 221.2399 0 500Average VillIage Per Capita Income 613 1094.714 446.5239 452.6931 1668.317Ave. Rooms Per House 613 883.6346 319.0079 1 999Ave. TV Possession Rate 613 881.7406 321.6878 0 999
Total Village Pop. in 1991 401 5575.409 5581.774 821 13805Percentage of Village are Female in 1991 401 2577.823 2579.978 382 6385
Table 2 shows the village
demo- graphics of
Haryana villages for
those villages with female
sarpanches in 1995, 2000, and 2005 for comparison
across village types (top
box) and with more detail (sections
below). In general, the
three types of villages do not system- atically vary
by any particular
measure, and this justifies
our assumption that female sarpanch
assignment was indeed
random. Data from Registrar
General & Census
Commissioner, India,
Census of India 2001 accessed online at
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/default.aspx on May 1,
2009
In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:
In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:
In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:
In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:
In Villages with a Female Sarpanch in Year:
Table 3a: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Irrigation & Drinking Water Expenditures(1) (2) (1) (2)
In order to confirm that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence some measure of panchayat operations, we analyze whether villages reserved for female sarpanches allocate village expenditures differently. We here see that they do for irrigation/water tanks and drinking water. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ~ p<0.15. S.e. in parenthesis. Data from CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal Decentralisation..
Amt. of funds for drinking water
No. votes received by 2003 sarpanch winner
No. of shops generating revanue% landless village householdsNo. candidates for 2003 sarpanch
Total No. of OBC BPL HouseholdsTotal No. of SC BPL Households
Funds for Drinking water?
Rental revanue from shops?
Amt of Shamlat LandShamlat land use in past 5 years
Any fishing ponds?
Area of fishing ponds
Total No. of all BPL householdsTotal No. of General Caste BPL
Reserved For Female SarpanchSGRY funds at District LevelTotal Village Population 2001Total Village Population 1991
Funds for irrigation?
Amt. of funds for irrigation
Table 3b: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Lighting & Building Expenditures(1) (2) (1) (2)
In order to confirm that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence some measure of panchayat operations, we analyze whether villages reserved for female sarpanches allocate village expenditures differently. We here see that they do for the street lighting and panchayat building/community center catagories. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ~ p<0.15. S.e. in parenthesis. Data from CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal Decentralisation.
% landless village households
Amt of Shamlat LandShamlat land use in past 5 years
Any fishing ponds?
Area of fishing ponds
Amt. of funds for lighting
Funds for buildings?
Rental revanue from shops?
Amt. of funds for buildings
Total Village Population 1991Total No. of all BPL households
Reserved For Female SarpanchSGRY funds at District LevelTotal Village Population 2001
Funds for lighting?
Total No. of General Caste BPL Total No. of OBC BPL HouseholdsTotal No. of SC BPL Households
No. of shops generating revanue
Table 3c: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Health & Salary Expenditures (1) (2) (1) (2)
In order to confirm that female sarpanches are able to effectively influence some measure of panchayat operations, we analyze whether villages reserved for female sarpanches allocate village expenditures differently. We here see that they do for health clinics/hospitals and salaries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ~ p<0.15. S.e. in parenthesis. Data from CRRID-SCID Study of Fiscal Decentralisation.
No. of shops generating revanue% landless village householdsNo. candidates for 2003 sarpanch No. votes received by 2003 sarpanch winner
Total No. of all BPL householdsTotal No. of General Caste BPL Total No. of OBC BPL HouseholdsTotal No. of SC BPL Households
Shamlat land use in past 5 years
Funds for health?
Amt. of funds for health
Amt of Shamlat Land
Reserved For Female SarpanchSGRY funds at District LevelTotal Village Population 2001Total Village Population 1991
Amt. of funds for salaries
Funds for salaries?
Table 4: Female Bargaining Power and Dependent Variables of Interest(1) (2) (3)
We find whether female bargaining power, proxied here with maternal education, has the ability to change our dependent variables of interest: the sex ratio, the vaccination sex ratio, and the education sex ratio. We find that it does influence sex ratios and vaccination rates but does not change female school enrollment. Increases in maternal bargaining power decreases the sex ratio and increases the vaccination sex ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.
average education of mother with children born at time t in villageaverage education of fathers with children born at time t in village
Vaccination Sex Ratio
School Sex Ratio
log village average per capita income
amt. shamlat land in village
average education of fathers with children age 6 at time t in village
average education of mothers with children age 6 at time t in village
village female child population in 1991
village houses in 1991
village households in 1991
village has doctor
village land area in 1991
village population in 1991
village male population in 1991village male child population in 1991
Table 5: Female Sarpanch Reservations and the Sex Ratio(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio Sex Ratio-0.0122 0.00119 -0.00303(0.0205) (0.0267) (0.0377)
village land area in 1991 No No Yes No No Yes No No YesVillage Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes No No YesConstant 0.485*** 0.356 0.947*** 0.458*** 0.0501 0.0752 0.453*** 0.00181 3.215
landholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village
village has had a female sarpanch reservationtime since village had a female sarpanch
caste of individual i in village
time squared since village had a female sarpanch amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita incomeeducation of individual i in village We find whether female
sarpanch reservations can affect the sex ratio by regressing it on whether the village has had a female sarpanch, the time since having a female sarpanch, and the that time squared. We do not find that female sarpanch reservations can influence the sex ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.
mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in villagebirthorder of individual i in village
if individual i in village has been ill in past year
Table 6: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Vaccination Sex Ratios(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
We find whether female sarpanch reservations can affect the vaccination sex ratio by regressing it on whether the village has had a female sarpanch, the time since having a female sarpanch, and the that time squared. We do not find that female sarpanch reservations can influence the sex ratio after village fixed effects are taken into account. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.
number of sisters of individual i in villagebirthorder of individual i in village1991 Village characteristics?
landholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in villagemother's education of individual i in village
log village average per capita incomeeducation of individual i in village caste of individual i in village if individual i in village has been ill in past year
village has had a female sarpanch reservationtime since village had a female sarpanch reservationtime squared since village had a female sarpanch
amt. shamlat land in village
Table 7: Female Sarpanch Reservations and Education Sex Ratios(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1991 Village Characteristics? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes YesVillage Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes No No YesConstant 0.777*** -0.0629 -0.107 0.870*** 0.198 0.103 0.820*** 0.121 0.187
amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita income
Edu Sex Ratio
Edu Sex Ratio
Edu Sex Ratio
Edu Sex Ratio
village has ever had a female sarpanch reservationtime since village had a female sarpanch reservationtime squared since village had a female sarpanch reservation
Edu Sex Ratio
education of individual i in village
caste of individual i in village
mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in villagebirthorder of individual i in village
We find whether female sarpanch reservations can affect the school enrollment sex ratio by regressing it on whether the village has had a female sarpanch, the time since having a female sarpanch, and the that time squared. We do not find that female sarpanch reservations can influence the sex ratio after village fixed effects are taken into account. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.
if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village
Table 8a: Female Sarpanch Reservation Interactions and Sex Ratio
We find whether female sarpanch reservations interacted with shamlat land, average village earnings, maternal education, or paternal education have an affect on the sex ratio. We find that only the shamlat land interaction has significance, showing that female sarpanches must be properly funded to have any affect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.
birthorder of individual i in village
if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village
amt shamlat land * had a female sarpanch reservationlog village average per capita income * had a female sarpanch ave. maternal education * had a female sarpanch reservationave. paternal education * had a female sarpanch reservation
amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita income
education of individual i in village
caste of individual i in village
mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in village
Table 8b: Female Sarpanch Reservation Interactions and Vaccination Sex Ratio
We find whether female sarpanch reservations interacted with shamlat land, average village earnings, maternal education, or paternal education have an affect on the vaccination sex ratio. We find that only the shamlat land interaction has significance, showing that female sarpanches must be properly funded to have any affect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008
Vacc. Sex RatioVacc. Sex Ratio
mother's education of individual i in village
education of individual i in village
caste of individual i in village
number of sisters of individual i in village
birthorder of individual i in village
if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village
amt shamlat land * had a female sarpanch reservationlog village average per capita income * had a female sarpanch ave. maternal education * had a female sarpanch reservationave. paternal education * had a female sarpanch reservation
amt. shamlat land in villagelog village average per capita income
Table 8c: Female Sarpanch Reservation Interactions and Educational Sex Ratio
We find whether female sarpanch interaction variables can change the education sex ratio. We find no affect though the shamlat interaction variable showed significance for the other sex ratio measures. This supports our hypothesis that female sarpanch affects these sex ratio measures through increasing maternal bargaining power; since we found maternal bargaining power has no affect on school sex ratios. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Haryana SCID Gunn Internship 2008 Surveys.
Edu. Sex Ratio
Edu. Sex Ratio
mother's education of individual i in villagenumber of sisters of individual i in village
birthorder of individual i in village
if individual i in village has been ill in past yearlandholdings of individual i in villagefather's education of individual i in villagenumber of brothers of individual i in village
amt shamlat land * had a female sarpanch reservation
log village average per capita income
education of individual i in village
caste of individual i in village
log village average per capita income * had a female sarpanch ave. maternal education * had a female sarpanch reservationave. paternal education * had a female sarpanch reservation
amt. shamlat land in village
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