Federal-State Relations In Nigeria

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

BY

Victor Chidubem IwuohaDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Nigeria, Nsukka

A Contribution in a Text, titled "Dynamics of Intergovernmental

Relations: Nigerian and Comparative Perspective." Edited by E.A.

Obi & R.N. Nwankwo. Onitsha: Bookpoint Ltd, Onitsha. Date: 2013.

Introduction

Just very few words have evoked much more controversy in the discus of

politics than the word, federalism. The construct of federalism, which

originates with the concept of intergovernmental relations, dates back to

the Greek civilization. This was a period when long efforts were made to

identify the legal relationships between the Leagues and the City States

(Mogi, 1931:21). It should be noted, however, that the Leagues

significantly differ from modern federations in one respect: namely,

while the various governments freely interacted, no prosperous direct

contact between the populace of the various governments was permitted. It

was subsequently, not until after the American constitution of 1787, that

a new concept of federalism was introduced. From that date, the concept

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of federalism incorporated the idea of patterned contact at two levels:

at the governmental level between the participating units, and among the

citizens of these different units (Dare, 1979:26). Meaningful studies,

especially the comparative study of Vile, have significantly shown that

emerging challenges of conflict, cooperation and competition amongst

levels of government in classical federalist states such as U.S., Canada

and Australia, are important rationales for federating as well as the

hallmarks of federal government (Vile, cited in Jinadu, 1979).

Thus, federalism is mostly considered a tangible element for

coexistence, but much more, I think, as political syrup, for adumbrating

potent dislocations inherent in, and symptomatic of pluralist societies.

This understanding is also in tune with that of Jinadu (1979:15), who

insists that “Federalism is usually viewed as a form of governmental and

institutional structure, deliberately designed by political “architects,”

to cope with the twin but difficult task of maintaining unity while also

preserving diversity.” It is no news, therefore, that the peoples of

Nigeria are diverse in different respects – culturally, historically,

socially, religiously, educationally, industriously, and even

philosophically. For this alone, one thinks in consonance with the

conviction of dominant scholarship, that such clustering and bundling of

diverse identities in an amalgamative sense, in the case of Nigeria, is

too, an irreconcilable British experimentalism of the federal principle.

More importantly, certain heavy but blurred (or fluid) terminologies

that define or designate Nigeria’s federal principle, which are highly

pertinent to coexistence, have yet compounded the theoretical and

practical significance of federalism in Nigeria. For instance, such noun

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phrases like: nationality, nation, citizenship, identity, ethnicity,

ethnic group, indigene, state of origin, etc, are inherently conflict

laden, with abundant intellectual understandings. Not minding the general

relevance of these coinages, an arduous task lies in properly assessing

their specific impacts in a given political enclave. There may be no

point, of course, boring one’s moment with such lengthy activity of

working out their conceptual nuances. Indeed, whatever scholarly

connotations they bear, one strongly believes that they all enjoy one

clear focus. Mainly of telling who is who in a given society.

From the onset, Nigeria, like most of her federating peers, has faced

one major challenge in the course of her political voyage - the crisis of

“who is who.” Ordinarily and without much logicality, by ‘who is who,’

one means the problematic and destructive component of identity.

Everybody would likely agree that the conscious awareness and awakening

of the course of who is who invariably determines who gets what, perhaps

when and how. In the case of Nigeria - how the oil money will be

(in)judiciously dealt with. That is often the reason why some adherents

of Marx quarrel vehemently about such preordained classification such as:

haves and have-nots; and the liberal minds grappling with, insisting not

only that all hands are not equal, but that they must never, for

whatsoever reason at all, be made equal - believing that that would

tantamount to the highest injustice. Therefore, striking an acceptable

delicate balance between these two divides, has, time and again, become a

well known problematic world over. Put differently, revenue sharing has

become a recurrent crisis factor in Nigeria.

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Very often, the problem has appeared in twofold. First, how to

properly place peoples, better still - indigenes and ethnic groupings, in

their relevant socio-economic categories; that is, in line with the ‘oil’

windfalls. Secondly, are these groups well pleased, or do they at least

accept such ‘manipulative’ placements? Are there certain inherent and

primordial grievances and preferences? Is there high propensity or

likelihood of exclusion, marginalization and relative deprivation, which

was to engender obsessive mutual antagonism? In the first place,

therefore, the contemplation of a federal pact is one of an overwhelming

outcome of the emphatic need to handle the above concerns acceptably. It

is on this footing, herewith, that one can properly understand the

rational for, and theory of federalism, what and why certain trends theme

up federal-state relations in Nigeria, and the features of federal-state

relations in Nigeria. These we shall soon see, hereunder.

The Federal Principle in Nigeria

Two main analyses of the evolution of federalism in Nigeria suffice

(Osuntokun, 1979). First is that the British, in their imperial and

imposing wisdom, firstly lumped dissimilar peoples together, uninformed

and indiscriminately, without proper consultation or negotiation. The

ulterior motif being to maintain a neo-colonial hold of the country after

departure. It was speculated, however, that the British had sufficient

opportunity to de-emphasize the particularistic tendencies of the

different ethnic groups, by not giving any region a large share of

political autonomy. This therefore, generally led to the creation of

vested interests around certain structural imperfections, which yielded

to natural separateness, usually embedded in a pluralist society. This

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consequently made a unitary system unworkable in the country. The other

interpretation ardently holds that Nigeria couldn’t have worked with

other methods, particularly, in the fact that being a large and

culturally variegated country, there wouldn’t have been any possibility

to put things on hold, and for a very long time, from one central

authority. Therefore, as argued, the British rather had a compelling

circumstantial rethink on the earlier design of ‘North/South’ divide and

rule.

Of course, the British imperial history is themed clearly, to their

landmark ingenuity of cohabitating contiguous and disparate territories

under one sovereign authority. So if the British federalist experiment

had worked in U.S. in 1789 where it begun and in Canada in 1867, and

successful tried in Australia and encouraged in South Africa (Osuntokun,

1979), then, the thought wouldn’t have been anything less, here in

Nigeria - that the British were doing much good to the country. It may be

considered also, that the conglomeration of the Northern and Southern

Nigeria in 1914 became practically unavoidable, largely due to the

functional impossibility of maintaining artificial barriers between the

two regions. Take for instance, people speaking the same language and

sharing a common historical heritage, who finding themselves on different

sides of the North/South divide, naturally crossed at will either to see

relatives or transact business. That is why nobody was any surprised when

some of the would-be Nigerian leaders conceitedly spoke to appease the

thinking faculties of the British, their hopeful power benefactors. Look

at such momentous statement made by Chief Obafemi Awolowo:

Nigeria is not a nation: it is a meregeographic expression. There are no

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‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as thereare ‘English’ or ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’;the word Nigeria is merely a distinctiveappellation to distinguish those wholive within the boundaries of Nigeriafrom those who do not (Awolowo,1947:48).

Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa nursed the same thought:

Since the amalgamation of southern andnorthern provinces in 1914, Nigeria hasexisted as one country only on paper…itis still far from being united. Nigerianunity is only a British intention forthe country (Balewa, 1947:208).

Those they spoke their minds were, nevertheless, happy with their

comments. Sir Arthur Richard’s conviction in the desirability of the

federal therapy to the Nigerian constitutional problem is well rooted in

this speech:

…it is only the accident of Britishsuzerainty which has made Nigeria onecountry. It is still far from being onecountry or one nation socially or eveneconomically… socially and politicallythere are deep differences between themajor tribal groups. They do not speakthe same language and they have highlydivergent customs and ways of life andthey represent different stages ofculture (Milverton, 1948).

We must update Arthur Richard’s belief, that unlike before, now

therefore, there are Nigerians. So what presently, is the significant

utility of the British handiwork? Did we achieve the anticipated cordial

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unionist custom? Merely few years into the rehearsal of federalism in the

country, an ill feeling yet prevailed upon Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a

convinced federalist, to describe the British foisted federalism as an

“abominable, disrupting and divisive British heritage” (Awolowo,

1968:69). What then went wrong? Definitely, a mean deviation from the

federal principle must have occurred. This therefore brings us nearer to

a popular classical dictum of federalism, propounded by K.C. Wheare, an

American who ignited the contemporary discuss on federalism. From the

beginning, Wheare (1964:10) rigidly instructed:

I have put forward uncompromising acriterion of federal government- thedelimited and coordinate division ofgovernment functions- and I have impliedthat to the extent that to which anysystem of government does not conform tothis criterion, it has no claim to callitself federal…. By the federal principle I mean themethod of dividing powers so thatgeneral and regional governments areeach, within a sphere, coordinate andindependent.

Here, a reflection upon the best trick to approach the delicate child

of federalism is germane. Pertinently, Wheare’s compartmentalization of

power, in a grayish ‘coordinate’ and ‘independent’ mannerism, may have

raised a battered notion of what his federal principle stands for. What

and what misplacements, or of what mix-ups, if one should ask, are

enmeshed in such adjectival phrases like: quasi-federalism, cooperative

federalism, organic federalism, dual-federalism, confederation,

centralized federalism, decentralized federalism, this federalism, that

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federalism, etc. Their sensitive meanings aside, even though we may have

to accidentally talk about them later, the important question remains as

follows: are they mutually exclusive? Which type, in practice, is most

desirable for holding dissimilar people together for so long? Does the

temptation of prostituting such plentitude federal options lead into the

problematic of disunity? We shall return to this delicate matter later.

It should be admitted, however, that all these dangling federal sub-

types, in one way or the other, designate vital shades of federalism

(Jinadu, 1979). We are aware too, that scholars have made serious but

futile efforts to vouch of any identifiable iota of federalism anywhere,

which strictly tallies and conforms to whatever Wheare perfectly had in

mind. If these dusted concerns have anything to go by, then we can

genuinely ask: can the federal principle go for, or designate two or more

phenomena in distinct senses? Or can such complicated label -

‘federalism’ have more than one name impliedly embedded in itself, and by

implication, various derivable practical meanings - such that may

reasonably and largely distort its original intention, workability and

outcome? Practically, such innate confusions may have inversely

disfigured or defaced whatsoever that was to be taken as federalism in

the first place.

From the subsisting talks, one can willingly agree that Wheare’s

findings are crucial if federalism is not to become a sham, entirely. One

would, that in an attempt to run away from the temptation of theory and

practice fiasco, Wheare made careful effort to place things in distinct

category; talking about written and rigid constitution - involvement of

levels of government for its amendment, formal division of powers,

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bicameral legislature, existence of an unbiased supreme court,

independent electoral systems for both levels of government, multi-party

but preferably two party system etc. Yet, Wheare’s findings have been

enviously used against him by scholars, to say either that the features

he enumerated, some call it pitfalls, are not all true about a

federation, or that, such are still very true of other non-federations.

Most, if not all, insisting that Wheare lords the U.S. federal blueprint

on others (see Jinadu, 1979; Oyebode, 1979; Dare, 1979; Osaghae, 2001;

Ifesinachi, 2008). Amongst other opponents, Carl Fredrick was quick to

shift significantly from the scholarly circumference of Wheare, but

unknowingly to him, shadowing and beclouding the whole issue. He asserts:

“Any particular design or pattern of competencies or jurisdictions is

merely a phrase, a short-run view of a continually evolving political

reality…if thus understood as a process of federalizing, it will become

apparent that federalism may be operating in both the direction of

integration and differentiation” (Fredrick, 1963:9). Fredrick went ahead

to designate federalism:

Federalism seems the most term by whichto designate the process of federalizinga political community, that is to say,the process by which a number ofseparate political organizations, bethey states or any kind of associationenter into arrangements for working outsolutions, adopting joint policies andmaking decisions on joint problems orreversely, the process through which ahitherto unitary political community asit becomes differentiated into a numberof separate and distinct politicalcommunities achieve a new organization

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in which the differentiated communitiesnow separately organized become capableof working out separately and on theirown, those problems they no longer havein common.

Birch (1966:18), who disagreed to subscribe to Fredrick’s ‘process’ of

‘federalizing’ above; argues that, “to view federalism in this way is to

view it in a broad perspective, and if federalism is defined in such

general terms, there may be difficulty in deciding whether certain

political systems are to be regarded as federal at any particular time.”

In support and more clearly, Livingston (1956:1-2) dwells on

‘sociological factors’ or ‘federal characters of a society.’ He maintains

that:

The essential nature of federalism is tobe sought, not in the shading of legaland constitutional terminology, but inthe forces- economic, social, political,cultural- that have made the outwardforms of federalism necessary…theessence of federalism lies not in theinstitutional or constitutionalstructure but in the society itself.Federal government is a devise by whichthe federal qualities of the society arearticulated and protected….Federalism isnot an absolute but a relative term;there is no specific point at which asociety ceases to be unified and becomesdiversified. The differences are ofdegree rather than a kind.

These shreds of opinion draw us closer to the talks of ordering

relations in a federal system. For one thing, Wheare’s critics

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elaborately and successfully coaxed a team of scholarship into believing

that governmental powers may not practically be divisible, at least not

all times. Particularly, that a function assigned to one level of

government may overlap with, howbeit subtly, or require supporting

services from other levels of government. It is also to be taken that

such likelihood of the ascendency of federal level over state in respect

to financial matters, in other words, means subsidiary of the state to

federal over grants, and as such, consequent regulation of state

activities by the federal. Even, ironically, in trying to seek federal

partnership to re-stamp or re-launch its rightful statutory place in the

federal computation, the state becomes yet more susceptible to

subordination under a federal arrangement.

Most importantly, it has been found, as Dare notes, that in Nigeria,

and indeed in all federations, the citizens could be better served - if

both levels of government consulted with each other. Adamolekun (1983)

helps to confirm that administrative mechanisms had to be fashioned for

assimilating the multiple interactions among the officials of different

levels of government, with a view to entrenching certain degree of

cohesion. This, therefore, has been the very bases of cooperative

federalism.

That is why, “towards this end, most federal systems have set up

permanent machineries for intergovernmental and federal-state

cooperation” (Dare, 1979:33). As Elazar helpfully affirms:

Whether cooperative federalism wasintended by the fathers of the union ornot, it was quickly demonstrated to benecessary. Governments operating in thesame territory, serving the same people,

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generally sharing the same goals andfaced with the same demands could notmaintain a posture of dual federalism(Elazar, 1965:11).

Altogether, we are wont to admit that nothing any scholarly mind has

thought or confessed about federalism is bunkum entirely. Like a gigantic

elephant, federalism may confusedly appear amoebaic or chameleonic in

definition. No one can ever be perfectly sure or absolutely wrong in

testifying his evidence, and if so, nobody should be unnecessarily

attacked for doing so. Hence, federalism is a relative term.

What should agitate the mind, therefore and as in line with the

general intention of this chapter, is the level of the practice or

functional amenability of the federal principle in Nigeria, which is

usually described as cooperative federalism. We must point out strictly,

however, that in the cooperative sense of federalism, world over, the

pendulum of financial power has the peculiarity of not remaining in a

state of equilibrium. It rather tends to slope overwhelmingly in the

direction of the central government. If taken, therefore to require

perpetual and sustainable ‘coordinate power’ and ‘independence’ of the

various levels of governments is nearly to render the doctrine of

federalism impotent. These and more characterize the federal-state

relations in Nigeria. It may not be enough, all the same, to go ahead and

verify the wavering character (features) of Nigeria’s federal-state

relations, without firstly identifying certain compelling designs that

prevail on the nature of such relations. We may therefore need to briefly

point out certain dominant factors that shape the course of federal-state

relations in Nigeria.

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Dominant Factors that Shape Federal-State Relations in Nigeria

Most scholars have lavished quantum energy, every now and then,

quarrelling with the irregular and convulsive practice of federalism in

Nigeria. Others search endlessly for a true federalism, to import or at

least smuggle into the country. We believe, however, that certain trends

encroach compellingly, time after time, in federal-state relations in the

country. These trends dictate the ‘trueness’ or ‘faultiness’ of what we

have here. A transparent understanding of such prevailing factors makes

for better approximation of the situation. Therefore, effort is made,

herein, to classify such factors into two definite spectrums - external

and internal factors. Perhaps, the best way to approach things here is to

firstly talk of external factors - from the ‘unknown’ to known, against

popular practice. Why because Nigeria’s federal accident was externally

inflicted.

External Factors

(1)The Liberal/Neoliberal Dictation

Federalism is a Western articulation. The theory and practice of

federalism climaxed and culminated in the West before it was merely

redistributed, or naturally trickled down to the lesser orbits. Whereas,

the Nigerian federalism was a direct response to an instinctual fear of

ethnic domination (Oyovbaire, 1985), there may be verifiable evidence

that those in fear of domination, that is the acclaimed nationalists, had

also wanted a fair design that would guarantee them economic wealth and

wellbeing. If federal prototypes are fairly sound economically, then,

minor worlds wanting economic fortunes wouldn’t have longed for something

else. It is immensely marveling, for instance, that, “for the last four

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centuries, the richest nation in the world has been federal,” and that

“federal states are significantly wealthier than unitary states”

(Weingast, 1995:4; Bermeo, 2002:10). Federalist enthusiasts like James

Buchanan (1995), Barry Weingast (1995) and John Kincaid (2001), are

equally very optimistic that robust federal systems invariably promote

high, long-term economic growth and development. Weingast’s philosophy of

“market preserving federalism” underscores the intrinsic compatibility

between federalism and the market. As a matter of fact:

By giving diverse territorial groups andeconomic agents the relative autonomy tocreate their own opportunities andresources, both federalism and themarket engender the incentives tocompetition, experimentation,innovation, diversification andadaptation to lead economicproductivity, efficiency and prosperity(Onwudiwe and Suberu, 2005:7).

Having attempted to reconcile federalism with liberalism, the point to

be made, however, is that the dynamic patterns and oscillations of the

liberal principle have had consuming effects on the federal-state romance

in Nigeria. As we may have to agree, by 1960s, in view of the market

failure in the developing world, the dominant liberal paradigm had

emphasized the need for active government intervention in economic

activity to offset market failures (Ake, 1981), and later, not before

long, by early 1970s, the same liberal paradigm that supported state

capitalism, shifted grounds and stood by the new world capitalist order,

which was to be renamed neo-liberalism, to imposingly talk of

liberalization, privatization, commercialization, deregulation,

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corporatization free market etc. In effect, “most states in Africa were

hooked to the revolving capitalist orbit. Particularly, in Nigeria, where

the economy is yoked with its advanced capitalist states in a master-

servant relationship, successive political leadership…naturally

predispose the Nigerian state to subservience and domestic parasitism”

(Okolie, 2005:9).

The ripples of these outplay are many. The revenue generating capacity

of the Nigerian economy became erratic and elastic over period. Such

elasticity of national income means constant contest and clamour for

altering the predominant revenue sharing models amongst the levels of

government in the country, from time to time. We can directly say, that

the intrusion of foreign capital and multinational businesses, may have

more often than not, been to a considerable extent, the advantage of the

federal government. If that is so, then, the ascendency of federal level

over state in this regard, means greater propensity of predisposing the

states towards fiscal and financial stewardship to the federal level.

Even, any attempt by the states to seek federal alliance to claim

whatever it deems as her rightful statutory due in the federal

arrangement, rather makes them more vulnerable and susceptible to

subjugation and lasting cajolement. All this almost rendered the

workability of Wheare’s “…are each, within a sphere coordinate and

independent” in Nigeria, null and void.

(2) The Impact of Oil Resource

The power of Nigeria lies in her oil. Oil is the soul of Nigeria. In

fact, the Nigerian economy since the 1970’s is overwhelmingly dependent

on oil. Oil exports accounts for about 90 percent of Nigeria’s total

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foreign exchange earnings and more than 80 percent of domestic revenue

(Ikejiani-Clark 2007; Onuoha 2008). With the production of about 2.5

million barrels per day, Nigeria is the fifth largest oil producer in the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Human Rights Watch,

1999, p. 6), the largest in Africa and the seventh largest in the world;

supplying 11 percent of US total oil imports, nearly 46 percent of her

daily oil produce (Tell, February 18, 2008, p. 26). This shows that the

Nigerian oil has mostly been an external affair. The affair is not yet to

stagnate, as the Nigeria’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be 36

billion barrels; natural gas reserves pitched at about 184.2 trillion

standard cubic feet. While total gas production is put at 6.50 billion

cubic feet per day with 70% of the gas produced alongside crude, even

though about 30% is flared (US Bureau of Public Affairs, 2009; The

Guardian, February 13, 2008, p. 55). This shows that the oil industry is

of utmost strategic economic importance to the country.

The oil resource impact more directly and significantly, in a variety

of ways, on the fortunes of the fiscal regime in the country. We can

recount them. First, the infiltration of multinational oil firms

reformed, transformed and reoriented the state in Nigeria into somewhat

else - a rentier state. Otherwise put: a mere tax collector. This bulges

the disposable coins in the coffers of the federal government. States had

formerly behaved themselves, mannerly, under the lordship of the federal,

but that was not enough to make for ‘equitable’ redistribution. As time

prospered, the fear of fiscal manipulation and consequent imperilment

leavened serious calls for resource control by oil producing states.

Thereafter, revenue sharing parameters are, necessarily, redrafted

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without end. Second, oil revenue largely accounted for the segmental

development of major cities in the country - Abuja, Lagos, Kano, etc,

with enhanced business environments, companies built and foreign

investments primitively concentrated. Invariably too, capital, both local

and foreign, were caged in these ‘over-developed’ centers. This,

unknowingly to them, bred sweeping inequities across the nation. What

this means is that people at other overlooked settings become more

consciously aware, u know - alerted over relative deprivation. Ethnic

militias, indiscreet armed groups, individuals etc rose, as a matter of

conviction of this, to contest their own share of the proceeds from the

federal accord. That is why conflict, violence, and criminality against

the state, has characterized federal-state relations in Nigeria.

It can be argued again, that the pervasiveness of oil windfall

inclines the federal government into a questionable spending spree. Under

General Gowon, for example, the country knew nothing important to do with

oil money. During Obasanjo regime, the country was very ready to, and

actually, paid civil servants in dollars - Okonjo Iweala was an

outstanding beneficiary. But that is of little importance here. What one

have observed over time is that, with too much disposable petro-Naira(s),

the federal bureaucracy has ever since been bolstered and fortified

financially - I mean, in terms of pay and perks. A wide hole was,

therefore, inadvertently dung between federal and state employment

benefits, even though the employees of the two arms of government have

remained under a one national labour union. One should also think that

this development has direct link with the struggle over federal jobs,

everywhere. Everybody wants to have a juicy share in the big deal. This

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must be the very reason why a lot of political offices were unnecessarily

created, duplicated. Perhaps, this too gave rise, consequently, to the

introduction of certain palliatives - quota systems, federal character

principle etc. Indeed, here is where we can confidently make sense out of

the initial talk of ‘who is who,’ remember. Oppositely and as a reverse

effect, these developments have generated annihilating strife, arguments

and debates on how to, and actual reordering of federal-state regimes

from time to time. Let us quickly acknowledge this painful truth: that

the states would continue to contest the federal arrangement, and demand

more like Oliver Twist, if whatever obtainable for employees at the

federal echelon makes nonsense of what the states do for the individuals

under their respective employments.

Thirdly and finally on this oil matter, the overall impression of the

fluctuations and vacillations of the international oil market pricing

regime on the economy has not been mathematically approximated for the

benefit of public eyes. Neither has what is generally being done with the

monies well evaluated. We then believe so sincerely, that a rise in the

international oil market does not merely mean that Nigeria would earn

more in excess of its budgetary benchmarks; as this is where they would

want our knowledge of it to expire. But more critically, the two tiers of

government have discretionary spending powers over the excess crude fund

to be shared. This implies that out of the excess crude fund to be

languished, usually in favour of the federal, the federal would have more

powers to embark on various discretionary projects, not estimated in the

budgets. The question then becomes, how just would the distribution of

such optional federal projects across the various zones be? Has the

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federal been fair in doing that? All things being equal, even if every

other thing has been satisfactorily attended to elsewhere, I strongly

contemplate if the South-East roads have damaged enough, to the

conviction of the Federal Government, to qualify them to appear in their

whitepapers. In fact, at a point, Ikejiani-Clark was compelled by

circumstance to conduct a relevant study - where she quantified the

magnitude of federal revenue vis-a-vis federal presence in South-East

Nigeria. For what she saw, she queried:

…What has the region got to show forthis amount? A state of poverty andhopelessness! ...In terms ofinfrastructure generally, in the South-East, there is evidence of dilapidation.Deadly gullies connecting nerve centers,long stretch of busy roads withoutasphalt, bridges long overdue forrehabilitation, are seen everywhere. Theerosion sites are at Agulu, Nanka,Obosi, Ariara, Akara/Abiriba junction,Uturu, etc. some of these erosion siteshave submerged; most roads are in a badstate and health facilities wanting…(Ikejiani-Clark, 2007:19).

Our bias, however, is that even though oil resource has engendered

blessing for the country, the people therein are rarely fairly blessed.

This caricature of human existence hallmarks the resource allocation

conundrum in the country. All this therefore marks ‘compulsive conflicts’

and ‘neurotic intergovernmental infightings’ as defining moments and

regrettable highpoints of federal-state relations in Nigeria.

Internal Factors

(3) Personality Traits19

People’s temperaments reflect so much in what they do. If a leader is

robust in the mind, then he can be very decisive and proactive.

Therefore, we may consider it that successive Nigerian leaders have had

to nudge or import their personality into their dealings with the states.

In his treatise titled How President Obasanjo Subverted Nigeria’s Federal System,

Professor Ben Nwabueze practically illustrated how the former President

utilized his ‘iron fist’ to achieve his purposive federal design for the

country. Prof. Nwabueze, among other things, unhappily notes that the

‘warlord’ merely set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

(EFCC), as an instrument for bullying and whipping his political

opposites, who may question his tyrannical federal style. According to

the erudite scholar; Obasanjo illegally removed Governor Alamieyesiegha

of Bayelsa state from office, illegally removed Governor Rasheed Ladoja

of Oyo state from office, illegally declared state of emergency in

Plateau, illegally suspended the governor of the Plateau state – Joshua

Dariye, illegally declared state of emergency in Ekiti state, illegally

suspended the governor of Ekiti state – Ayo Fayose, made illegal attempts

to unseat Governor Chris Ngige from office, illegally did this, illegally

did that, etc (see Nwabueze, 2007).

Simply put, a giant-hearted and forceful leader, like former President

Obasanjo, may wield powers, even beyond his confines, to impose,

reconcile or personalize his federal ideology upon the country. While a

very soft hearted leader, like late President Yar’Adua, would rather be

more predisposed and controlled by reason and counsels, emanating from

federal debates and other demands of the people. Incidentally, some

leaders are characteristically neither here nor there, like the incumbent

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President Goodluck Jonathan who is neither obviously hot nor

understandably cool. Indeed, Dr. Goodluck has positively impacted on

Nigeria’s federalism, but at the same time he has, regrettably, watched

it collapse without doing anything meaningful. For instance, he has

confidently created more federal universities to balance the number

across the states; he has recruited Anambra into the club of oil

producing states (Niger Delta); he has improved the quality of the

electoral system; yet, he has failed to create more states as proposed;

he has appeared so weak in addressing insecurity in the Northern part of

the country, which is fuelled by the Boko Haram sect, not minding its

devastating impact on the federal outlook of the country, and so on. In

fact, most analysts believe that Jonathan has comprehensively failed in

areas it mattered most pertaining to the sustainability of the Nigerian

federal structure and coexistence.

However, we can generally infer that a forceful leadership is likely

to maintain consistent but chaotic federal-state relations over a long

time, and more likely - an over-centralized system. While a weak and

fragile leadership may not sustain a single consistent federal style, and

may encourage or promote more of decentralization and fragmentation.

(4) Incompatibility of the Nigerian Version of Democracy with Federalism

Many scholarly minds believe so ardently that federalism is akin to

democracy. It has been variously submitted, for example, that federalism

can help deepen, consolidate or improve democracy; by promoting

citizenship development through decentralized political participation,

more accountability, greater responsiveness of the political process to

local interests, more political access to marginal groups - enhancing the

21

quality and density of representation, generating multiple checks and

balances for political elite - for more sense of political moderation and

accommodation, etc (Diamond, 1999:121; Onwudiwe and Suberu, 2005:6). A

federal principle man, Wheare himself, equally had it in mind that, since

federalism is a form of constitutional government, it is, therefore,

incompatible with autocracy or totalitarian rule. His mind, indirectly

spoken, is that federalism is a sufficient condition for democracy, and

vice versa. His swift attempt to legitimately marry federalism and

democracy is captured hereunder:

Dictatorship, with its one-partygovernment and its denial of freeelection, is incompatible with theworking of the federal principle.Federalism demands forms of governmentwhich have the characteristics usuallyassociated with democracy or freegovernment. There is a wide variety inthe forms which such government maytake, but the main essential are freeelection and a party system, with itsguarantee of a responsive opposition(Wheare, 1967:46).

The confusion emerging from the speculation of the mutuality of

federalism and democracy is rampant and pervading, however. If we have to

be very objective, then we should ask: are there no probabilities of free

and fair elections, oppositions, two-party systems and so on, in a

unitary state? Even in dictatorial systems, which Wheare feared? Erudite

scholars such as Jinadu (1979), Elaigwu (1988), Oyovbaire (1985),

Saunders (1995) etc, have all granted that it is theoretically and

practically possible to have a meaningful federal system in a non-

22

democratic political regime. In this matter therefore, one is very

convinced that both federalism and democracy are cruelly tormented in

this country. There is only but a little truth about multipartism in

Nigeria, especially when the center has always been ‘divinely’ controlled

by one party since the travails of democracy. With the rubber-stamp

legislators, compellingly and overwhelmingly in favour of the ruling

party. Can there be any laudable clear cut power checks and balances

within the three arms but one party government? Again, therefore, in the

case of Nigeria, Wheare’s “…the characteristics usually associated with

democracy” is a mere anathema, only persuasive to the extent to which one

accepts his characterization.

In substance, the democratization process in Nigeria was improperly

monitored, or guided. The issue is that such hasty infusion of democracy

into a state whose prehistoric and aboriginal character has long been

perverted into antagonism and incivility, without prior character

reformation, is a disastrous oversight. Hence, the inserted democracy was

originally, inherently soiled and perverted from the onset. That is, in

its prima contact with the state. It is in the logic of this inchoate

framework that democracy was ignorantly fused, blended and synthesized

with the state-like character/culture of impunity, indifference,

corruption and primitive accumulation (Iwuoha, 2012). In content

therefore, democracy would rather mingle good with, or mean anything as

well, as other tyrannical and dictatorial forms of governments.

Certainly, as Ogban-Iyam (2005) concurred, periodic change of government

personnel (a president and his cabinet) or the replacement of politicians

by another set of politicians does not sufficiently mean democracy, not

23

at all. The accident of democracy upon an invincible leadership structure

does not satisfactorily wipe off, potentially, such intrinsic, imperious

and selfish characters of a despot. What about such persons that killed

to ride unto power in a democratic country: are they not as well as, if

not worse than despots? No matter their deceptive claims, corrupt ‘do or

die affair’ politicians, who, as a trend, arm political thugs, (to either

maim opponents or intimidate and deprive the citizens their democratic

rights of choice), on whose backs they (‘democratic leaders’) had ridden

to power could never become democratic sacrosanct. Neither could there be

any objective witness that they have shaded off their chronic brutal

personality.

The point being made in all this is that the so called ‘democratic

leaders’ in Nigeria, who, owing to their voluminous and insatiable

appetites for capital accumulation, have adamantly failed to timely

reconcile the rising expectations of ‘dividends’ of ‘true democracy’ with

the basic needs of the people in such a federal union; unwittingly

instigates the people into full blown revolution. There is already high

level stagnation of legitimacy supply from the citizens. This has

happened in many ways - calls for sovereign national conferences, revenue

allocation crisis, population census crisis, street rallies on democracy

days, etc. but worst still - volcanic violence and conflict eruptions,

here and there. These outcomes of a failed democracy, or failed state -

have negatively toned, or tuned down the output of federalism in the

country.

(5) State Creation

24

The creation of states in Nigeria has variously shaped the federal-

state relations in the country. In those days, when there were regional

governments, the regions were too powerful. For the fact that each nursed

domination fear, the need for amassment of power grew tremendously.

Remember, at a time, the regions were engaging in foreign relations. The

regions, thus, became so strong that there were talks of the ‘regional

tail’ wagging the ‘federal dog’. At this period, there was relative weak

center - decentralization. Actually, at various times the regions had

threatened to secede from the country. In 1964, for example, the Eastern

region was reported by the State House Diary, after the Federal

elections, to have threatened to secede (Dudley, 1966; Elaigwu, 1979).

The regional threats were, however, doused with state creation in the

country.

State creation in Nigeria has progressed from: 12 states by 1967; 19

by 1976; 21 by 1987; 30 by 1991 and 36 states, plus the Federal Capital

Territory by 1996. Correspondingly, there were also 301 Local Governments

by 1976, 450 from 1988; 587 by 1991 and later 774 (Onimode, 2003:163;

Suberu, 2005:297). Such proliferation of sub-units has, unlike when there

were few regions, weakened the powers of the units - pledging enormous

powers to the center, and by implication, absolute subordination of the

sub-units. But inversely, state creation may have ignited more ethnic

consciousness - via balkanization and polarization of constituent states’

populations into indigenous and non-indigenous communities with such

attendant abridgement of nation-wide citizenship rights. This fuels

conflicts that would question the utility of the federal pact.

25

(6)The Problematic of Nigerian Constitutions – {The Ambiguity in the

Definition of ‘Who is Who’}

The constitution is, theoretically, the pathfinder of the federal

modus in the country. Certain inherent blemishes, which largely typify

and feature in various constitutions which Nigeria have had, have

practically guided the course of Nigeria’s federalism from infancy to

adulthood. The major problem is that the concept of ‘who is who’ in the

country has been so vaguely defined in these successive constitutions.

Either that such problematic terms like: ‘indigene’ ‘citizenship’ and

‘place of origin’ are under-defined or over-defined. The 1963, 1979 and

1999 Constitutions inadvertently, though, expressly obscures and denies

persons who are assumed to be citizens of Nigeria in general, from being

seen, treated, and taken as genuine and valid citizens in their various

states of domicile other than the respective states of birth.

Section 25(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution blatantly, unambiguously and

assertively stated this about becoming a citizen of Nigeria by birth:

“Every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of

whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a

community indigenous to Nigeria: provided that a person shall not become

a citizen of Nigeria by virtue of this section if neither of his parents

nor any of his grandparents was born in Nigeria.” Section 25(1)(b) and

(c) go on to accommodate those born in and outside Nigeria respectively

after independence, but on the bases that either of their parents or

grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria. This provision, thus, defined

26

Nigerian citizenship, as in the status of parents/grandparents in section

25(1)(a) only in terms of indigenous attachments.

The clause narrowly accords and allows a person to become a bonafide

citizen of Nigeria only to the extent that either his or her

parents/grandparents belong or belonged “to a community indigenous in

Nigeria.” Again, there is no further attempt to distillate or clarify the

intransitive verb ‘belong or belonged’. Therefore, people that domicile

outside their states of origin are impotently rendered only but aliens in

such places, though maintaining a loosened and centralistic citizenship

of ‘Nigeria’, which in any case, does not make much sense to the landlord

states. The implication of this historical abnormality is that in most

cases, federating states find it very difficult to employ or entrust

peoples from other states/zones with important functions. To allow

another ‘citizen’ from elsewhere, though still within Nigeria, to vie,

not to talk of being elected, in a valid election is another kettle of

fish. This philosophy is dangerously imperfect. Such practice is not in

any way akin to developed countries that federate; wherefore, even

Nigerians are elected as premiers as in Canada, and where President

Barack Obama, who was born in Honolulu in Hawaii, an island state, became

a senator of Illinois, one of the most productive agricultural and

industrial states in the United States, outside his immediate state.

In effect, the vertical states in their inward discriminations and

protectionist orientations restrict and circumvent other fellow Nigerians

from benefitting from their individual finances and functions. Sometime

in recent history, the Abia state Governor, Governor Theodore Orji,

27

hiding under the federal principle problematic, expunged over 4000 ‘non-

indigenes’ from the state civil service. There were also further claims

that governments of Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Kogi etc. have done such in the

past. The negation, even, boomerangs into incessant indigene-settler

imbroglio within states (Plateau, kwara etc.), as a destructive reverse

effects of this ignorant over-magnification, glorification and

propagation of the logic of state lines.

Apart from the delinquency of ‘who is who’, it should be noted that

the constitution is the torchlight for the path of federal practice in

the country. Therefore, whichever one in vogue, at whatever time,

harbours the quarrelsome issues of contention and determines the channel

of federalism in the country.

(7) Power and Party Politics

We need not go at length here. Etzioni’s focus on power politics

clearly reminds us that power politics is a factor to be considered in

any process of national integration (see Etzioni, 1962). Fairly speaking,

“Politics is substantially about access to state resources, with rent

seeking and patronage to boot. This form of politics encourages predatory

behaviours or ‘indiscriminate and opportunistic power seeking…for its own

sake’ on the part of the elite (Shridaran, 2004:54). Power is, therefore,

the mostly contested element in human history. The swing of power,

particularly in a composite state, is an essential and quintessential

ingredient for determining the sustainability of the nature of power to

be retained at the center. We mean that the tilting of power towards an

‘undesirable geopolitical zone’, or, the inherent probability of power

28

intoxicating itself or undoing itself - by corruption and over longevity

of stay, is potentially a direct call for coup d’état , ethnic militia

war, sweeping conflicts, convulsive violence etc. All channeled to the

violation of the legitimacy of the regime in power. A widespread fear of

exclusion and marginalization, which pushed Niger Delta militants into

criminality, terrorism, Armageddon and so on, against the government, was

largely put to eternal rest a little while after a promising brother from

Bayelsa – Dr. Goodluck Jonathan ascended power. Who knows - Boko Haram

may be tacitly using actions, to imply that they want their ‘brother’ to

be in power by all means.

But outside this, there is high tendency that leaders and political

parties may be more disposed to predominately divert federal attention to

states that helped to ‘coup’ them into power, or, those that turned out

en masse to vote/rig them into power. Again, it has been suggested and

settled in literature that the ethno-regional character of the major

political parties, NPC for example, fatally contradicted and undermined

the increasing centralization and integration of the Nigerian federalism,

particularly in the First Republic. In other words, political parties

have the potency of swaying the balance and tranquility of federalism by

imposing their philosophical and ideological biases and sentiments upon

the federal solution.

(8) Sociological Factors

Already, Livingston has scholarly demonstrated the overriding impact

of the internal configuration and composition of the society upon

federalism. What we are to say again, is that, the varieties of

religious, socio-economic, political, environmental, cultural,

29

historical, ethnic and philosophical peculiarities that symptomize a

pluralist society impinge, rather than enhance, the federal deal. More

especially, the infusion of a federal framework into a primitive and

convulsive economy is enough alibis for the country to run amok. More or

less, the often wrongly hoped - unity in diversity, is only but a mere

original intention of federalism. In reality, it may be found, with all

these criminality, bombings everywhere, kidnappings, intense politics of

‘state of origin,’ ‘who is who,’ etc, that we have all along been

managing, surviving, suffering the dilemmas of ‘disunity in diversity.’

The message here is that in most developing nations like Nigeria, where

the elites/political class so much love primitive accumulation - making

poverty acute and pervasive; the federal intention of unity in diversity

is rather a cock-and-bull story. However, people are not all that

indolent and docile. They must, therefore, violently contest the

trivialization and peasantization of their individual and collective

destiny from the ‘indifferent’ political gamers.

Pathologies| Models| Features of Federal-State Relations in Nigeria, 1954

– till Date

(a) Dualistic Federalism - The Era of Ethnic Perversion and Partition

Dualistic Federalism refers to a period in the evolution of federalism

in which the demands of sub-national units for autonomy and

differentiation are strong (Elaigwu, 1979). Here, as at this period, the

forces of centrifugalism arrogantly challenged that of centripetalism.

However, the emergent political leadership at the center, made brave

attempts to centralize political power and belittle the efforts of the

regions. As nobody would ordinarily take, we found a delicate period

30

when, for the central power, the desire for ‘union’ abundantly overrode

that of ‘unity.’ Therefore, far from consistent comportment, Nigeria’s

federal experience, even since 1954, has been epitomized and typified by

significant historical distortions, discontinuities as well as inter-

disconnectedness. The trajectory of Nigeria’s federal archetype in the

late and immediate post-independence era (1954-66) involved a concoction

of democratic, Westminster-style, ethno-regional federalism etc. This was

a period in which the virgin federal principle was placed on test-run.

Fundamental structural irreconcilables - primarily of ethnic

differentiation, worked hard to scissor the British federal exercise in

the country.

The flaws included: the disproportionate geographical size (about 75

percent of the national total), official population (55 percent) and,

hence, voting strength of the Northern region, which fuelled and ignited

explosive and destabilizing fears of permanent political swallowing of

the federation by one section; the very small number of constituent

regions (only three units from 1954-1963, and four within 1963-66), which

all yielded to the polarization of ethnic-regional conflict and robbed

the federal system of the flexibility and fluidity that could have

resulted from a larger number of smaller constituent units; the erection

of the federation’s internal (regional) boundaries around the country’s

major tripartite ethnic fault-lines, thus, intensifying Hausa-Fulani,

Yoruba, and Igbo political hubris, rivalries, and ethno-nationalisms; and

the denial/non-recognition of the constituent units or regions to the

country’s many non-Hausa-Fulani, non-Yoruba, and non-Igbo ethnicities

(the regional minorities), which fostered violent minority agitations,

31

including the Tiv uprisings in the Northern Nigeria during 1962 and 1964

(Suberu, 2005:294).

In fiscal terms, the bisection of powers between the federal and the

regions reflected the skyrocketed autonomy of the regions. The 1960 and

1963 constitutions provided for three legislative lists: the exclusive

list (powers allocated to the federal government), the concurrent list

(powers allocated to both federal and the state), and the residual list

(powers allocated to the regions). Very importantly therefore, for the

fact that this era (1954-1966) (particularly during the First Republic)

represents a progressive shift from relative centralization to

decentralization or ‘quasi-federalism,’ the achieved federalist

constitutional settlement provided for re-allocation of a substantial

proportion of the federally collected revenue - import, export, excise,

company and mining taxes or duties, on the bases of regional derivation.

We can summarily say therefore, that the understanding of federalism

at this time was abashedly reduced into the equivalence of a mere safety

boot, for positively coercing and balkanizing unalike identities in the

country into elusive perpetual mutuality; rather than for enhanced

equitable resource distribution thereof.

(b)From Quasi-Federalism to Unitarism

On coming to power through a coup d’état, staged by Major Chukwuma

Nzeogwu, in January 1966, the military leadership of General Aguiyi

Aronsi quashed the legislative and executive institutions in the regions

and at the center. With this attempt, a quasi-federal structure was

entrenched – that is, a gray situation where the centripetal forces have

almost conquered that of centrifugal. Be that as it may, with Decree No. 1,

32

1966, the central power fully triumphed over the regions completely in a

unitarist sense. Accordingly, as the new decree in force provided, the

Federal Military Government was vested with “the power to make laws for

the peace, order and good governance of Nigeria or any part thereof, with

respect to any matter whatsoever” and “the military Governor of a region

could not “make laws with respect to any matter included in the exclusive

legislative list” nor could he “make law with respect to any matter in

the concurrent list” except “with prior consent of the Federal

Government” (Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1966). The decree

also defined the division of labour between the regional and Federal

Government. A military Governor could only tamper with the residual list.

Regional laws gained the expression of edicts, while federal laws were

called decrees. With these overarching stipulations, a unitary state was

therefore put in place in Nigeria. And the regions lost everything.

(c)The Creation of States - Reclamation of Federal Titanship

General Gowon, who dismissed Ironsi from power, regrouped the country

into a federal structure. He, however, feared the collision of three

regional giants. Thus, 12 new states were hastily improvised. It may be

taken and very importantly, that the political geography of the creation

of states ideally massaged and lubricated the strength of the center. The

former Eastern Region had accounted for 65.4% of the oil output by 1967,

and the Midwestern Region, 34.6%. Suddenly, the creation of new states

injured the political scene. The former Eastern Nigeria was split into

three new states and, therefore, also split were the areas of oil

production. After the state creation, the output of the oil-producing

33

states was in the following order: Rivers State, 57.1%; Midwest, 34.6%;

East Central, 2.8%; Rivers/East Central States, 5.5% (Elaigwu, 1979:169).

Therefore, the regions/states were geographically fragmented, and by

implication their financial quotas considerably trimmed down, that no

single ‘state tail’ could wag the ‘federal dog,’ not anymore. Remarkable,

however, some ‘orders’ that violated state powers were experienced,

mainly as a result of the protracted civil war and the creation of

states. But invariable, once such orders are taken, there could never be

reversal - thus elevating the constitutional powers of the federal

center. For instance, even though, the circulation of newspaper in a

region was a regional affair under the 1963 Republican Constitution, the

Federal Decree No. 17, 1967, irrationally empowered the Federal Military

Government to prohibit newspaper circulation - aimed at preventing the

Nigerian Outlook (later called Biafran Sun) from circulating in other parts of

the country. Similarly, the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and other Persons)

Decree No. 37, 29 July, 1968, gave the Federal Government the power to

inquire into assets of those politicians, who held public offices in the

civilian regime throughout the federation, even though such expansion of

federal authority was an encroachment on the powers held by former

regions, whose duty it was to probe its public officers. Decree No. 18,

1967 also empowered the Federal Government to make certain appointments,

in respect to newly administrative structures - vacuums thrown up by

state creation, which ordinarily falls within the jurisdiction of the

state. The Federal Military Council equally dwarfed the borrowing

capacity of the regions/states and their powers over marketing boards,

34

via the Decree No. 50 of September 18, 1968 (Central Bank of Nigeria Act Amendment

No. 3, 1968 Decree) (see Elaigwu, 1979:172).

(d) Federal Ego Boosted After Civil War – Exploitative Peasantization of the States’ Powers

The Nigerian Civil War of 1967 has one straightforward lesson – that

there was yet little more to be done, to perpetually de-feather the

‘states’ of their secessionist advantage. The mathematics on how to

toughen the ‘Titan’ very far beyond all the component units put together,

thus, overridingly became an important official duty for the federal

executive to tidy-up. Seemingly and realistically, the best means to

castrate the states of their secessionist power was by demobilizing their

pockets. Things turned out good for Gowon and his think-tanks as

anticipated. Wherein;

- Decree No. 13 of 1970, which was hurriedly dished out at the conclusion of

the war, to rally more revenue to the center, granted the federal 50% of

the revenue from excise duties, leaving mere 50% to be shared by all the

states. The decree equally thinned the share of the states from revenues

accruing from export duties (usually on 100% derivation to state of

origin), to a paltry 60%, while the federal retains 40% all alone.

- Decree No. 9 of 1975 forged ahead to deplete the fiscal power of the

states, diminishing the 45% mining rents and royalties due to the states

to a pitiable 20%, therein, retaining the principle of distribution of

revenue to states at 50% equality and population, 50%.

-Decree No. 7 of 1975 impolitely introduced uniform personal tax, thus,

stripped the states their power to vary the rate (Nwankwo, 2007:197).

Mention worthy is that the imputation of these draconian regimes peaked

federal absorption of the political capital of the states. Take for

35

example, on April 1, 1975; the Federal Government abolished the age-old

cattle tax - ‘Jangali,’ from which the Northern states derived their

local revenue. Suddenly in fact, the ‘Titanic’ at the center yanked

sizeable constitutional functions of the states, to its doorstep. In

November 1975, the ‘takeover’ of the New Nigerian Newspaper (formerly owned

by the Six Northern States) was discourteously announced. Further,

university education was quickly culled from concurrent to exclusive list

‘in the best interest of an orderly and well-coordinated educational

development in Nigeria’, as they put it. While secondary and primary

schools were leaped from residual list to concurrent list, so that the

federal could come in, and ideally, override state powers thereto. The

Federal Government equally hijacked Universal Primary Education (UPE)

from Lagos, Western and Midwestern states - the few states that operated

the scheme until 1976.

However, the contribution of the oil sector to Nigeria’s total foreign

exchange rose dramatically from 19.9% in 1967 to 89.9% in 1974. This

represented an increase of 451.7% over a period of eight years. The non-

oil sector contributed N508 million of the total value of exported goods

and services (83.43% of the total values of exports). With fattening

federal escrows, more grants were issued to the states, in a master-

servant relationship. In 1973/74 financial year, the Federal Government

allocated bout N160 million, and actually doled out N168 million as

grants to the states (see Budget Broadcast, 1973/74). In the 1974/75

budget, an estimated total sum of N350 million was allocated to the

states through the Distributable Pool Account (DPA) as grants. This was

an increase of 120% over the grants-in-aid to the states in the 1973/74

36

fiscal year. Thus, with the pervasive influence of petro-Naira in its

favour, the Federal Government that emerged was able to yoke the states

into statutory dependence on federally derived revenues in their yearly

budgeting.

Again, Elaigwu notes that in its reorganization of the federal-state

relationship, the new leadership of Murtala Mohammed, who came to power

in July 1975, created a Council of States, which became the rallying

point of all the state Governors and the Council. This, perhaps, was a

way of altering the previous arrangement, wherefore; the infiltration of

state governors into the Supreme Military Council rather inspired and

aroused informal relations, eroding the authority of the center. Thus,

during this period, the states began to complain bitterly about

everything - their new place in the scheme of things, but more

particularly, their financial dependence upon the federal government. Ex-

Governor Abba Kyari of North-Central State had stressed that “State

governments should not be treated as mere beneficiaries of federal

bounties but as entities entitled to receive legitimate shares. This is

the essence of federalism” (New Nigeria, 1970:7). In a similar vein, ex-

Governor Mobolaji Johnson appealed to Nigeria’s Commissioners of Finance

Conference in Lagos, to resolve the problems of revenue sharing from the

federal and state governments. He besought: “States may not suffer from a

feeling of financial cramp in the discharge of their normal activities

and in achievement of their legitimate aspirations” (Daily Times, May 23,

1974:13). Subsequently and somehow, states’ grievances against the

federal lordship grew radically, paralleling the awesome growth of the

oil returns.

37

(e) Era of Fetish Struggles for Resource Control – The Clash of Titans

Resource control is simply an attempt by the states, mainly the

South-South states, to control the proceeds of their oil endowment

(Ibeanu, 2000; Ibeanu, 2004; Obi, 2005). Fundamental questions have

been: Who owns the oil? How should the oil returns be equitably and

acceptably shared? How can the goose that lays the golden eggs remain in

affliction? These concerns pitched the states against the federal

authority, resulting in endless drafting and redrafting of the revenue

allocation module. It should be pointed out, however, that the struggles

were not only classified in formal debates, but also with high degree of

militancy in the Niger Delta, which formed a crucial part of the

untiring struggle. By extension and very ghastly, the militants

unleashed maximum mayhem upon the country. In other words, we have to

ask: is oil oiling the friction? All these therefore mark the period for

balancing the imbalance. The table attached further illustrates the

prevailing trends in revenue apportionment in Nigeria between 1977 and

2005.Table 1: A Summary of Revenue Allocation Formulas Adopted in Nigeria, 1977-2005

Item Date Federal Govt%

StateGovt %

LocalGovt %

Special Funds % Total %

AboyadeCommission

1977 57.00 30.00 10.00 3.00 100.00

OkigboCommission

1980 53.00 30.00 10.00 7.00 100.00

RevenueAllocation Act

1981 55.00 30.50 10.00 4.50 100.00

Danjuma Commission

1988 50.00 30.00 15.00 5.00 100.00

Pre-SupremeCourt-LegalDecrees/Law

Pre-April2002

48.50 24.00 20.00 7.50 100.00

38

Pre-SupremeCourt-RMAFCProposal

August2001

41.23 31.00 16.00 11.70 100.00

Supreme CourtRuling

April2002

Current Allocationruled unconstitutional

100.00

Post-SupremeCourt-ExecuteOrder No.1

May2002

56.00 24.00 20.00 0.00 100.00

Post-SupremeCourt-ExecuteOrder No.2

July2002

54.68 24.72 20.60 0.00 100.00

Post-SupremeCourt-RMAFCProposal

January2003

46.63 33.00 20.37 0.00 100.00

Latest RMAFCProposal

Submitted toPresident,Sept.20,2004

47.19 31.10 15.21 National PriorityServices Funds

Ecology-1.50;MineralDevt.-1.75

Agric Devt.-1.75Reserve Fund-1.50

Total-6.50{Joint FG/State/LG

management}

100.00

PresidentialProposal

Submitted toNASS,Jan.25,2005

47.19 31.10 15.21 Ditto+Horizontal formulas+State Derivation

Funds Board to manage13% derivation

100.00

Source: Adapted from Aluko, January 26, 2005; Obi, 2005.

The table above is no doubt battling with classic inconsistencies

and imbalances in parameters for monetary allocations. This signifies

that the sates have been clashing headlong with the federal power over

fiscal regime. Seemingly however, the states actually achieved so much –

that is, twisting the federal hand in redrafting the parameters of

revenue allotment, but with little or nothing to show for it.

Ironically, as in the Fourth Republic, the more the resource control

agitation mounts, the more the states received very little from the

Federation Account, since the agitation also encouraged and increased39

Local Government fiscal power. The only difference, perhaps, has been

that the positive alteration of the derivation principle proportionally

attracted more monies in favour of the South-South states in comparative

terms.

Concluding Remarks

The objective of this chapter has been to examine the federal-state

relations in Nigeria. But mainly, to reflect upon the determinant

factors that shape such relations and the predominant features that

define such relations. We have found that too many irreconcilable

contradictions compellingly design a convulsive course of federal-state

relations in Nigeria. Visibly, one important lesson is that the uniquely

thought sensitivity and amenability of the federal system towards unity

in diversity, has indeed, practically dashed into empty and fearful

hopes of disunity in diversity. In all, we wish to maintain that, since

things have refused not to fall apart in the federal calculation, the

alarm and debate should rather be refocused on how to get the various

tiers of government on their toes, to live up to the level of whatever

their constitutional financial and fiscal responsibilities may be. Why

because, in practical terms, there may only be a thin line between these

responsibilities among the tiers. Tasks performed are not mutually

exclusive but reinforcing and coordinately complementing.

Technically, in the final analysis therefore, what the people really

need or care more about is efficiency, accountability, responsiveness

and good governance, which will guarantee a good standard of living and

provide social amenities for them, from whatever level of government.40

Not per se, an unending and recurrent mathematization and redrafting of

the percentages of revenue allocation ad-infinitum. The sense here is

that, it is the same public/peoples’ resources/monies that circulate

across the various levels of government, though, in different titles and

managers. After all, if responsive governance is promoted simultaneously

at all levels, ethnic chauvinists may not find means to tap on the

porous conscience of the impoverished peoples to stage violence - which

they rather do for their selfish political interests.

Finally, on the issue of ‘who is who’, our constitution must have to

be reframed to correct certain conspicuous anomalies to that effect.

Particularly, Nigerian citizenship by birth should not be discriminatory

and narrowly defined in terms of state of origin alone, but in such a

manner that it should be on the bases of belonging to ‘any area

indigenous to Nigeria’ and not “to a community indigenous to Nigeria” as

cited in section 25(1)(a) of 1999 constitution. Discriminatory identity

regimes must be deemphasized - the federal character should not be over-

developed to negatively emphasize or pronounce identical dissimilarity,

thus, reawakening ethnic wars and possibilities of secessionist warfare.

In any case, Nigerians may be one people in a sense – our

calculations: People from various tiers of government (‘different

indigenes’) are hired and paid with federal funds, or, hired and paid

with various states funds. Projects executed across the federation -

roads, hospitals, stadia etc (be it federal or states funds) may be

easily accessed and enjoyed by ‘everyone’ no matter the ‘identity’.

Persons that claim or preferred that they are ‘federal’ or ‘state’

41

employees are helplessly tied unto one national labour union – this,

pathetically posing serious salary disparity and antagonism. We can go

on to mention them. Therefore, such schemes that prevaricate, circumvent

and gloss over the realities of our existence, such as lopsided and

skewed workers’ salary regime between the various tiers of government,

and the usual states’ protectionist treatment to fellow citizens of the

country, should be done away with. One happy or ugly thing is that, by

and large, the spontaneous market forces are damn insensitive to the

concept of ‘who is who.’

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