Federal Office of Communications OFCOM Telecom Services Summary of the Swiss Spectrum Auction ITU Regional Development Forum for Europe and Seminar for Europe and CIS, 7 – 9 May 2012, Warsaw, Republic of Poland Urs von Arx, Head of Section Mobile and Satellite Services, 9 May 2012
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Federal Office of Communications OFCOM Telecom Services Summary of the Swiss Spectrum Auction ITU Regional Development Forum for Europe and Seminar for.
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Federal Office of Communications OFCOMTelecom Services
Summary of the Swiss Spectrum Auction
ITU Regional Development Forum for Europe and Seminar for Europe and CIS, 7 – 9 May 2012, Warsaw, Republic of Poland
Urs von Arx, Head of Section Mobile and Satellite Services, 9 May 2012
2 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Overview
• Frequency situation• Existing licenses• New frequencies
• Tender process• Award alternatives• Licenses• Schedule
Current licenses will end within the next 2 - 4.5 years• Today's GSM-licenses (900 MHz and 1800 MHz band) will end at
31.12.2013 (former Tele2 frequencies in the 1800MHz band are already available).
• UMTS licenses (2.1GHz band) will end at 31.12.2016 former „Telefonica“ frequencies are already available
New frequency bands for mobile use available• 800 MHz band (digital dividend) from 2013 good propagation
• 2.6 GHz band (UMTS extension band): suitable for LTE
Why a tender?
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
4 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Spectrum Availability in Switzerland
from now from 1.1. 2014 from 1.1. 2017
band mode bandwidth
800 MH FDD 2 x 30 MHz
900 MHz FDD 2 x 35 MHz
1800MHz FDD 2x 8.6 MHz
1800 MHz FDD 2 x 75 MHz
2100 MHz FDDTDD
2 x 15 MHz1 x 5 MHz
2100 MHz FDDTDD
2 x 60 MHz1 x 20 MHz
2600 MHz FDDTDD
2 x 70 MHz1 x 50 MHz
Why RefarmingSituation in Switzerland
Small Refarming Tender Process ConclusionTechnologySituation in Switzerland
Objectives/ Challenges Tender Process Conclusion
from 1.1. 2013
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
5 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Award alternatives
• Direct assignment• Beauty contest• Auction
Auction chosen due to
• Transparency of the procedure
• Marked determines frequency values
• Marked determines the appropriate allocations not the regulator (small frequency blocks support tailor-made allocations to suit market needs according to the operators business models)
• Non discrimination of attendants (no privileges for incumbents and new entrants)
• Maximizing state revenue was not a target
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
6 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Licenses
• Period• Until end of 2028 (security of planning and investments); frequencies can be used from that
point in time when they are available
• Transition period for frequency refarming (900/1800 MHz)• Newly acquired spectrum must be available to operators nationwide by 01.01.2015. For
the regions Basel and Geneva a deadline of 01.01.2016 applies.• Operator proposal to ComCom
• Technology neutrality• Flexible usage with regards to the future evolution of transmission technologies (beside
GSM, UMTS and HSPA further new technologies HSPA+ and LTE)
• Obligations• Coverage obligations:
- 50% of population for frequencies < 1 GHz
- 25% of population for frequencies in the 1800 MHZ and 2.1GHz (FDD) band
- general utilization obligation for TDD frequencies and frequencies in the 2.6GHz band• No further obligations with regard to QoS (left to the operators)• Rights of use may be withdrawn without compensation (surveillance) if the required
coverage is not provided (end 2018 (800MHz), end 2020(900MHz), end 2020 (1800MHz), end 2021 (2.1GHz), end 2019 (others))
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
7 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Schedule
• Analysis, definition of strategy
2008 / 2009• Public consultation
2009• Opening the invitation to tender
30. November 2010• Postponement of the submission date
8. 2. 2011• Hearing
28. 2. 2011• Continuation of the invitation to tender
19. 6. 2011• Submission of candidature documents
30. 9. 2011• Decision on admission
Nov. 2011• Holding of the auction
6. – 22. February 2012• License award
May 2012
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
Examination of compliance with licence conditions and conditions for participation
Decision : acceptance of
candidature
Notification of definitive auction
rules
Start of auction procedure
Award of licenses
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
9 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Combinatorial Clock Auction: Key features
• Flexible format, nearly independent from number of bidders
• The number of licenses as well as their frequency endowments is determined by market needs
• Bidder can bid on combination (packages) of different frequencies (depending from their business model)
• Aggregation risk minimized
• Strategic bidding minimized, CC format requires disclosure of real bidding willingness
• Second price rule to motivate truthful bidding
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
10 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Combinatorial Clock Auction- the process
Lot application
Excess demand in any band
Clock rounds
Supplementary round
Excess demand in any band
Assignment round
Yes
Yes(increase price of band(s) with excess demand)
No
Principal Stage
No
Auction end
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
11 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Combinatorial Clock Auction• Principal stage/ clock stage
• Determination of the extent of frequencies that are to be awarded to each winning bidder and the base prices that have to be paid by winning bidders
• Bidder can bid on combination (packages) of different frequencies (depending from their business model)
• Limitations by spectrum caps
• Assignment stage• Follows the principal stage • Determination of the specific frequencies that are awarded to each winning bidder and any
additional prices that must be paid by bidders for being assigned specific frequencies.• single round of (sealed) bidding
• Winner determination• The winning bids are the combination of those bids that generate the highest total value• Second Price • At most one bid from each bidder
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
12 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Minimum bids
• Generally pricing is based on art. 23 OFMRL: Minimum bid must not be lower than the sum of the yearly frequency
license fees over the total license period plus the costs for the tender procedure
• For most attractive frequencies (800MHz and 900MHz band) the minimum bid is determined significantly higher
• Note: Candidates must submit a bank guarantee; the amount guaranteed by the bank corresponds to at least 50% of the value of the frequencies applied for relating to the minimum bid
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
13 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Spectrum packaging• Package size: mostly 2 x 5 MHz
Bid categoryFrequency block size
# blocks Minimum bid (CHF) per frequency block
Category A (800MHz)
2x5MHz 6 21.3 million
Category B (900MHz)
2x5MHz 7 21.3 million
Category C (1800MHz)
2x10MHz 1 16.6 million
Category D (1800MHz)
2x5MHz 13 7.1 million
Category E (2.1GHz TDD)
5MHz 1 4.15 million
Category F (2.1GHz TDD)
5MHz 3 2.7 million
Category G (2.1GHz FDD)
2x5MHz 3 8.3 million
Category H (2.1GHz FDD)
2x5MHz 9 5.4 million
Category I (2.6GHz FDD)
2x5MHz 14 8.3 million
Category J (2.6GHz TDD)
15MHz 3 12.45 million
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
14 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Spectrum caps
Motivation:• The acquisition of the total 900MHz spectrum by a sole bidder shall be
avoided• Suppression of any of the current operators shall be avoided• Current UMTS-operators should be enabled to acquire at least the same
amount of frequencies in the 2.1GHz band that they use today• No bidder shall be enabled to acquire the major part of today's GSM
spectrum (900 MHz, 1800 MHz) • No bidder shall be enabled to acquire more than 50% of the total FDD
spectrum
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
15 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Spectrum caps (cont.)
The following caps were determined:
• total 2x25 MHz over the two categories A (800 MHz) and B (900 MHz); i.e. the category A and B frequencies acquired must not exceed 2x25 MHz in total
• 2x20 MHz in category B (900 MHz)• total 2x30 MHz over the two categories G and H (2.1 GHz paired)• total 2x35 MHz over the two categories C and D (1.8 GHz) • maximum 2x135 MHz of the total available FDD spectrum (categories A, B, C,
D, G, H and I)
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
16 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Modalities
• Electronic auction via internet
• Auction server on the business premises of DotEcon in London
• Control of the auction by the auctioneer on the business premises of OFCOM in Biel, Switzerland
• Bidders can join the auction at their headquarters
• In order to avoid collusion between the bidders all information with regard to name of bidders, name of winners, frequency endowments as well as the auction price for the acquired frequency will be published after the auction has finished
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary
17 Swiss Spectrum Auction I Summary
Auction process
• 4 interested parties submitted a candidature document• 3 parties were approved by ComCom to take part in the auction
• Orange Communications SA, Sunrise Communications AG, Swisscom (Schweiz) AG
• Duration of the auction• 6 – 22 February 2012
• 51 clock rounds (8 days, 4 – 8 round per day)
• Increment of 5% in categories with excess demand
• 2 day break between clock rounds and supplementary round
• 8 hours for the supplementary round
• 1 day break between supplementary round and assignment round
• 2 hours for assignment round
Frequency situation Tender process Auction design Auction results Summary