Fatwas on Ahmadiyya - Najib

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Contemporary IslamDynamics of Muslim Life ISSN 1872-0218 Cont IslamDOI 10.1007/s11562-013-0278-3

Treating minorities with fatwas: a study ofthe Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia

Ahmad Najib Burhani

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Treating minorities with fatwas: a studyof the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia

Ahmad Najib Burhani

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The term “minority religious community” in the Muslim country of Indonesiarefers not only to those embracing religions other than Islam, but also to minority groupslike the Ahmadiyya. Recently, the treatment of Ahmadis has been worse than thetreatment of non-Muslims. This article, therefore, intends to study the status of ‘deviant’groups under Islamic law and the treatment of them in Muslim society. Specifically, thisarticle addresses the following questions: How did ulama in the past define and treatminority groups? How do contemporary Sunni ulama define and treat the Ahmadiyya?What is the status of this group under Islamic law? Are they apostates, heretics, orunbelievers? And what are the legal consequences of these charges? To answer thesequestions, this article employs two methods. First, for theoretical treatment of minoritygroups in the past, this article focuses its analysis on al-Ghazāli’s Fays

˙al al-tafriqa and

Faḍā’ih˙al-bat

˙iniyya. Second, following a discussion of classical Islam, the article moves

to contemporary time by analyzing fatwas against the Ahmadiyya from five institutions:the Rābit

˙a al-‘Ᾱlam al-Islāmī, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Muhammadiyah,

Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation(OIC), and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This article argues that, first, fatwas against theAhmadiyya issued by these institutions were intended as a device to sustain orthodoxy ofumma and, second, orthopraxy or devoutness in observing religious rituals, as practicedby theAhmadis, does not exempt them from the charge of apostasy because theologicallythey are believed to deviate from orthodox beliefs.

Keywords Ahmadiyya .Orthodoxy-orthopraxy.Apostasy.Religiousminority.Fatwa. Ideological persuasion

Cont IslamDOI 10.1007/s11562-013-0278-3

A. N. BurhaniIndonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, Indonesia

Present Address:A. N. Burhani (*)Widya Graha Lt. 9, Jl. Gatot Subroto No. 10, Jakarta 12710, Indonesiae-mail: [email protected]

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Introduction

The first and most important problem in dealing with the Ahmadiyya 1 from theperspective of Islamic law is to determine whether the Ahmadis should be included inclassical fiqh categories of apostates (murtadd, pl. murtaddūn), masked-apostates(zindīq, pl. zanādiqa), heretics (mulh

˙id, pl. mulh

˙idūn), 2 innovators (mubtadi‘, pl.

mubtadi‘ūn), or unbelievers (kāfir, pl. kuffār).3 Ruling someone within these categorieshas legal ramifications. To deal with the religious status of the Ahmadis, this articleemploys the perspective of the Sunni Muslim since the Ahmadiyya themselves wouldnot consider themselves within the above categories, instead they see themselves asreformers (mujaddid, pl. mujaddidūn) of Islam. From an Islamic legal perspective, it isalso almost impossible to judge this theological issue from a ‘neutral’ perspective sinceit puts the observer in the position of John Locke when he says, “for everyone isorthodox to himself: these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marksof men’s striving for power and empire over one another, than of the church of Christ”(Locke 2003: 215).4 By taking John Locke’s pluralist position there would be no Islamiclaw that can be applied to the Ahmadiyya. Locke’s view is the stance that should betaken by secular government, not by a muftī (person who gives fatwa).

This article intends to understand the legal status of religious dissident groupsdeemed heretic in Islamic law and the treatment of them by a number of Musliminstitutions. Specifically, this article addresses the following questions: How didMuslims in the past define and treat ‘deviant’ minority groups? How do contemporaryMuslims define and treat the Ahmadiyya?What is the status of this group under Islamiclaw? Are they apostates, masked-apostates, heretics, innovators, unbelievers, or re-formers? And what are the legal consequences of these charges? In analyzing theAhmadiyya from the perspective of Islamic law, this article employs two methods.First, in a theoretical discussion of the place of the Ahmadiyya in Islam, this article willuse the criteria proposed by al-Ghazālī in his two books: Fays

˙al al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām

wa al-zandaqa (the criterion of distinction between Islam and zandaqa) and Faḍā’ih˙al-

bāt˙iniyya (the infamies of the Bāt

˙iniyya).5 Second, following the discussion on classical

Islam, this article moves to contemporary time, with insights from the past, by

analyzing six fatwas against Ahmadiyya from five Muslim institutions: the

Muhammadiyah, the Rābit˙a al-‘Ᾱlam al-Islāmī (Muslim World League)—henceforth

the Rābit˙a, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI—Council of Indonesian Ulama), the

Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

(OIC), and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

1 The Ahmadiyya referred to in this article are specifically the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, not the LahoreAhmadiyya, except where otherwise stated.2 The term mulh

˙id in contemporary Arabic usage is usually used as translation of atheist. Cf. Kudsi-Zadeh

(1972: 25).3 Sociological discussion on this issue commonly uses different terms such as orthodoxy, heterodoxy,heresy, orthopraxy, and apostasy. The discussion usually deals with the issue of whether the Ahmadiyya isan orthodox or heretical movement.4 John Locke’s A letter concerning toleration is originally published in 1689.5 The termBāt

˙iniyya refers to several groups including the Khurramites, theQarmatians, and the Isma‘ılıs, but

this term refers mostly to the last two (Jackson 2002: 137).

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Classical discourse on the boundaries of Islam

Since its establishment in 1889, the Ahmadiyya has posed quite a difficult problem forSunni Muslim jurists and theologians in determining whether they are still within theboundaries of Islam or if they can no longer be considered within the pale of Islam. Theissue of Ahmadiyya is different from that of the Baha’i Faith, which ulama almostunanimously agree cannot be regarded as Muslims because they have different religiouspractices and beliefs. Almost all religious rituals in the Ahmadiyya are the same as thepractices in Sunni Islam and they officially follow the Hanafi school of Islamic law.Their holy book is the Qur’an. They have the same declaration of faith (shahāda), theygo to Mecca and Medina for pilgrimage (hajj), they observe five daily prayers, and theyfast during the month of Ramaḍān. Some scholars even agree to the statement that theAhmadis are among the most devout Muslims in term of religious practices (Gualtieri1989: 59).

Of course this movement has some distinctive beliefs that they acknowledge publicly.Mahmud Ahmad, famously called the Promised Son6 within this movement, even askedAhmadiyya missionaries to show the distinctiveness of the Ahmadiyya to people whobecome their targeted mission (Mahmud Ahmad 2007a: 277–290, b: 9–32). Among thesedistinctive beliefs are the belief in the prophethood of GhulamAhmad, the belief in GhulamAhmad’s claim to be the Messiah, its opposition to warfare jihad, the system of caliphate,the doctrine of intra-community or intra-religious marriage, the prohibition to pray behindnon-Ahmadi imām, and the concept of chanda or candah (monetary donation). The mostimportant difference between this group and other Muslims, which often results in theAhmadiyya being harshly opposed by other Muslim groups, is in the belief that the founderof this movement, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is a prophet and the Promised Messiah.

To understand the place of the Ahmadiyya in Islam, particularly in Indonesian Sunniorthodoxy, it is useful to take insights from al-Ghazālī’s Fays

˙al al-tafriqa and Faḍā’ih

˙al-

bāt˙iniyya. Al-Ghazālī becomes the main figure here because his way of dealing with

heretics has some similarities with the way contemporary Indonesian ulama deal with thesame issue. Moreover, al-Ghazālī has a special place in Indonesian Islam, particularlywith traditionalist Muslims, as his religious stance has been a reference for the NU’sconception of Aswaja—an Indonesian version of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā‘a or SunniIslam (Burhani 2012).

In these two books, particularly the former, al-Ghazālī makes a criteria of distinc-tion between those who can be called Muslims and those who cannot. Because themain concern of al-Ghazālī in these two books is with the internal problem withinIslam or with dissident religious groups, his criteria could give a useful perspective onhow we should understand and place of the Ahmadiyya within Islam. Al-Ghazālī’sdiscussion on this issue revolves around three different categorical terms: apostate(murtadd), masked-apostate (zindīq), and unbeliever (kāfir). The term murtadd isused for those with a history of being Muslims either by conversion or by birth, butthen abandon Islam. ‘Unbeliever’ is the term for those who have no history of beingMuslims or never believed in Islam.7 Therefore, every person who commits apostasywill inevitably become an infidel, but not all infidels are apostates. Masked-apostate

6 Elaboration on this can be found in Zafrullah Khan (1978: 38–39).7 Al-Ghazālī defines ‘unbelief’ as those who reject anything brought by the Prophet as lies (1993: 25)

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denotes those who show outwardly that they are Muslims, while in their hearts theydo not believe in Islam.

As reflected in the title of the book, al-Ghazālī’s main concern in writing Fays˙al al-

tafriqa is to define a decisive criterion for differentiating between Islam and zandaqa;those who can be called Muslims and those who have transgressed the boundaries ofIslam and can no longer be called Muslims. The theological litmus test employed by al-Ghazālī to determine the religious status of his subject is to ascertain their belief in threefundamental principles of faith (us

˙ūl al-‘aqā’id or us

˙ūl al-īmān), namely: “(1) the

existence and oneness of God; (2) the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad; and (3)the reality of the Last Day” (Jackson 2002: 47 and 112; al-Ghazālī 1993: 61–62).8 Otherthan these three principles, al-Ghazālī considers secondary principles (furū‘) in whichdisagreement would not qualify someone to the charge of unbeliever. Some philosophers,in al-Ghazālī’s eyes, outwardly profess Islam, but their writings show that they doubt oneor more of these three fundamental beliefs. That is why he includes them in the categoryof zandaqa.9 Al-Ghazālī also considers the Bāt

˙iniyya apostates since their beliefs are

incompatible with Islamic creeds and their beliefs do not rely on the authority of anyprophet recognized by Islam (Ahmad 2007: 156).10

Belief in the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad requires someone to accept astrue anything brought by him and transmitted through diffusively congruent channels(tawātur). Rejecting this would qualify the charge of unbelief. However, since there isrequirement of tawātur in the transmission of prophetic traditions, people who disagreewith the isolated reports (akhbār al-āh

˙ād), for al-Ghazālī, cannot be classified as unbe-

lievers. Disagreeing with the ijmā‘(Muslim consensus) also does not qualify someone tobe included in the category of unbeliever (Jackson 2002: 114; al-Ghazālī 1993: 63). It is inthe context of accepting anything coming from the Prophet to be true that al-Ghazālīattacks philosophers, who in his view breach Islamic creeds such as denying the resur-rection of the body, the punishment of the Hereafter, and the belief that God knows thedetail of individual things and events (Jackson 2002: 109–110; al-Ghazālī 1993: 56).

Analyzing how al-Ghazālī treats philosophers, he appears far away from the criteria thathe defines on the outer limits of Islam. This can be seen from the fact that, besides hisemphasis that disagreement on the secondary issues on religion would not disqualifysomeone from his status as Muslim, al-Ghazālī in fact extends the charge of unbeliever fordisagreement on issues other than the above three fundamental principles. For the existenceof anything informed by the Prophet and for the interpretation of the scriptural texts, forinstance, he offers five criteria of acceptable interpretation; those who give interpretationbeyond these criteria would qualify for the charge of unbelief. These five criteria are: “(1)ontological (dhātī); (2) sensory (h

˙issī); (3) conceptual (khayālī); (4) noetic (‘aqlī); or (5)

8 The MUI makes quite similar criteria for those who can be called Muslim. Al-Ghazālī proposes threecriteria, while the MUI proposes ten. The more criteria applied, the stricter Islam would be or, usingJackson’s statement, “a narrower criterion would make it easier to increase the number of doctrines brandedas heresy” (Jackson 2002: 4; MUI 2009: 8).9 Al-Ghazālī considers philosophers to be ‘unbelievers’ if they believe in one of the following three views:“(1) the eternity of the world, (2) God’s ignorance of the particulars of the world, or (3) that bodies are notresurrected in the afterlife (Ahmad 2009: 160; cf. al-Ghazālī 1993: 56).10 Al-Ghazālī considers what the Bāt

˙iniyya do as ‘new heresies’ (bida‘mustah

˙datha) created by the groups

of ‘heretics’ (al-mulh˙ida) and masked apostates (al-zanādiqa) (al-Ghazālī 1964: 159). The fatwa from the

MUI and the Rābit˙a seem to adopt al-Ghazālī’s policy since they consider the Ahmadiyya apostates, not

heretics.

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analogous (shabahī)” (Jackson 2002: 94; al-Ghazālī 1993: 28). Interpretation of anyexistence or any text beyond these five limits should not be tolerated and those who dothat would be deemed unbelievers. This is why al-Ghazālī considers the interpretation ofthe Bāt

˙iniyya unacceptable since, for him, their interpretation is too speculative. An

example of this is the interpretation of some of the Bāt˙iniyya of the ‘calf’ of the

Samaritan (Q 20.85-7) in which they believe that it must be metaphorically interpreted(ta’wīl) because it is a figure of speech (al-Ghazālī 1993: 55; Jackson 2002: 109).

Actually, as emphasized by Sherman Jackson (2002), there are two motives behindthe writing of Fays

˙al al-tafriqa. The first is to stop the intolerance of the Muslim

extremists, from both Traditionalist and Rationalist Muslims, who easily brand thosewho disagree with them as unbelievers.11 The second is to stop the very broad criteria ofMuslim employed by philosophers and the zanādiqa. 12 Al-Ghazālī employs twodifferent methods in dealing with them. For the first group, he offers a minimalistcriterion for extremists who could be considered Muslims, so that he can includeMu‘tazila and Shi‘a in the Muslim band. For al-Ghazālī, any Muslim who disagreeswith the ijma‘should not be called apostate. For the second group, he gives maximalistcriterion for the zanādiqa, thus he excludes the Isma‘ili and some philosophers from thepale of Islam. Ahmad (2009: 167) calls al-Ghazālī’s first method an attempt to differ-entiate apostasy from heresy, while the second is to equate the concept of zandaqa withapostasy. Regarding the legal status of zandaqa in Islamic law, al-Ghazālī also appliesthe same legal status of zandaqa as the apostates, but the former is even worse than thelatter. Al-Ghazālī still applies the procedure of istitāba (giving the opportunity for anapostate to recant) for the apostate before being subjected to any punishment (Ahmad2009: 158). If they repent then their status and rights will be fully reestablished as beforetheir apostasy. This procedure of istitāba is not applied for zandaqa because theyconceal their infidelity with their outward appearance as Muslims.13

Reading the Ahmadiyya using al-Ghazālī’s perspective as written in Fays˙al al-tafriqa,

it seems that they could not be categorized as either apostates or ‘original unbelievers’.They never leave Islam, which at a glance disqualifies them from being called apostates.They certainly cannot be called ‘original unbeliever’ since they have no other religion nextto Islam, nor do they publicly claim of profess any other religion than Islam. The categoryclose enough to describe the Ahmadiyya is masked-infidelity (zanādiqa). However,application of the category of zanādiqa to the Ahmadiyyais quite problematic since theydo not embrace Islam merely as lip service as a way to avoid paying jizya (tax), as pastzanādiqa did, while still preserving and practicing their original beliefs. The mostappropriate category for the Ahmadiyya from among al-Ghazālī’s categories is Muslimswho deviate from what he considered the acceptable interpretation of Islam. In severalcases, the way the Ahmadiyya interpret the Qur’an is quite similar to the Bāt

˙iniyya,

11 “isrāfuhā fī takfīri ba‘ḍahā ba‘ḍan” (their excessiveness in charging and counter-charging of each otheras unbelief) (al-Ghazālī 1993: 27).12 In an Indonesian context, the first group could be represented by the Front Pembela Islam (FPI—Frontfor the Defense of Islam) and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI—Council of Indonesian HolyWarriors), while the second group could be represented by the Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL—LiberalIslam Network).13 In this context, al-Shāfi‘ī disagrees with al-Ghazālī. He equates the status of zandaqa with munāfiqūn.The legal status of munāfiqūn is ruled based on what they say, while what is in their hearts is given to God.The Prophet also does not punish munāfiqūn during his time until they clearly breach the law (Griffel 2001:346–347).

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namely using metaphorical interpretations. Examples of this are their interpretation of theNight Journey (Isrā’waMi‘rāj) (Q. 17.2) and the miracles ofMoses (Q. 2.60), which willbe discussed in the next part of this article. When interpreting the prophethood ofMuhammad, they also believe that the term khātam al-nabiyyīn (Q. 33.40) should notbe interpreted as the last or final prophet, but the ‘seal of the prophets’ or the ‘bestprophet’.14 This interpretation opens the possibility for the coming of another prophet, thatis Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

Looking at the way they give hermeneutical interpretation (ta’wīl) to the above verses,it could be seen that they go beyond the five accepted levels of interpretation proposed byal-Ghazālī. Even the way some Sufis interpret Islamic teachings, for al-Ghazālī, is notacceptable, let alone the interpretation of the Ahmadiyya. For al-Ghazālī, the harmcreated by some Sufis to religion is greater than the harm brought by apostates since“they open doors to libertinism that can never be closed” and, therefore, “executing oneof these people is better than killing a hundred (open) Unbelievers” (Jackson 2002: 115;al-Ghazālī 1993: 65). Al-Ghazālī’s opposition to the Bāt

˙iniyya and the philosophers is

clearly greater than his opposition to apostates and unbelievers since, for him, unbelieverwould not attract people to join them, while people like excessive Sufis, “they destroy thereligious law through religious law itself” (yahdamu al-shar‘ min al-shar‘) (Jackson2002: 115; al-Ghazālī 1993: 65).15

Fatwas against the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia

There are numerous fatwas against the Ahmadiyya issued by various Muslim insti-tutions and individual ulama, 16 but this article studies only six fatwas connecteddirectly with contemporary issues of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. These fatwas wereissued by the following institutions: the Muhammadiyah, the Rābit

˙a, the MUI, the

Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the OIC, and the NU.From the above five institutions, in term of chronology, theMuhammadiyah is the first

institution that issued a fatwa against the Ahmadiyya. This movement was established inYogyakarta in 1912 and is the second largest Islamic movement in Indonesia. It claims tohave 30 million members, mostly in urban areas. The fatwa on the Ahmadiyya from theMajlis Tarjih (the Council of Law-Making) of the Muhammadiyah was issued during the18th Muktamar (Congress) in Solo in 1929. This short fatwa is entitled “Hukum orangjang mengimankan pada Nabi sesudah Nabi Muhammad s.a.w.” (the law regarding thosewho have faith in the existence of a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad). It begins with

14 Discussion on the concept of khātam al-nabiyyīn can be found Yohanan Friedmann (1989), particularlythe chapter on “the finality of prophethood” (pp. 49–52).15 Sometimes, the terminological category used by al-Ghazālī to designate this group is unacceptableheretics (mulh

˙idūn), or those who create new unacceptable innovations. This term is different from the

deviation made by Shi`a and Mu`tazila that, for al-Ghazālī still acceptable, although they are located justinside the border of the outer limits of Islam. This term is also different from unsanctioned innovation(bid‘a) because bid‘a would not qualify as belonging to the category of unbelievers. However, in severalplaces, al-Ghazālī equates the term zandaqa with mulh

˙idūn.

16 Among them are fatwa from Hasanayn Muhammad Makhlūf in 1953 that can be found in hiscompilation of fatwas, Fatāwā Shar‘iyya wa buhūth Islāmiyya (1965), pp. 86–96, the fatwa from theSyaikh of al-Azhar, Gadul Haq Ali Gadul Haq, in 1983, and the fatwa from Maulana Ahmad Riza KhanBarelwi of India (1856–1921) (Sanyal 2005).

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quotation from a verse of the Qur’an (al-Ahzāb 33:40) and two prophetic traditions statingthat the prophet Muhammad is khātam al-nabiyyīn (the seal of prophets) and consequent-ly no prophet after him. After these quotations the fatwa declares that those who do notaccept this doctrine are ‘kafir’ (unbeliever) (PP Muhammadijah 1964: 9–10).

The above fatwa does not explicitly mention the Ahmadiyya as the object of fatwa, butthis fatwa was obviously issued in response to this movement since it was decided duringthe climax of the rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya. The mission-ary of the Ahmadiyya first made contact with the Indonesian people in 1920 whenKhwaja Kamal-ud-Din, one of the Lahore Ahmadiyya leaders and one of the mostsuccessful missionaries of this group, came to Surabaya and stayed there until 1921.However, the real missionary works of this movement did not begin until 1924, when twoLahore missionaries from India, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig and Maulana Ahmad, came toYogyakarta. The Muhammadiyah welcomed these missionaries with a warm receptionand treated the Ahmadiyya as older brothers. The cordial relationship between these twomovements even created a rumor that the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya weregoing to merge into one (Beck 2005: 221–222). The quarrel between them began when areligious teacher from India, Abdul ‘Ali Siddiq al-Qadiri, during his tour to Java inOctober-November 1927, showed the distinctiveness or incompatibilities of Ahmadiyyabeliefs with Sunni orthodoxy (Zulkarnain 2005: 190; Beck 2005: 236). Since then, theMuhammadiyah tried to disassociate itself from the Ahmadiyya, and to oppose theactivities of the Ahmadiyya, including the project of translating Muhammad Ali’s TheHoly Qur’an intoMalay (Ichwan 2001). The climax of this rupture was the issuance of theabove fatwa.

After Indonesian Independence from the Dutch colonial government in 1945, the firstfatwa on the Ahmadiyya that had nationwide repercussions was issued not by anIndonesian Islamic institution, but by the Rābit

˙a. This organization is an international

non-governmental Islamic organization. It was established in 1962 and has its base inMecca. During its annual conference in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Rabiul Awwal 14–18,1,394 H (April 1974), this organization issued a fatwā and a resolution against theAhmadiyya. The fatwa begins with the elaboration on the controversial beliefs of theAhmadiyya, such as Ghulam Ahmad’s claim as a prophet and the promised Messiah,revelations received by GhulamAhmad, and Qadian as Ahmadiyya’s place of pilgrimage.After that elaboration, this fatwa then refers to the decision of Pakistan that declares theAhmadiyya as a non-Muslim minority. Finally, the fatwa declares that the Ahmadiyya isobviously outside the pale of Islam (khārija ‘an al-Islām khurūjan kāmilan) and itsfollowers are infidels and apostates (kuffār murtaddūn ‘an al-Islām).

The resolution does not quote any verse from the Qur’an or prophetic traditions.Instead, it begins with an accusation that the Ahmadiyya was established by the BritishRaj in India with the purpose to deceive people from the true teachings of Islam and todestroy this religion from the inside. These ‘resolutions’ (qarārāt) then declare that theAhmadis or the ‘Qadiyanis’, as stated in this resolution, are infidels (kuffār) and ‘out of thepale of Islam’. This resolution then commands all Muslims to take the following actions:

Keep away from dealing with the Qadiyanis or the Ahmadis as they sometimescall themselves; boycott them economically, socially and culturally, and refrainfrom intermarriage with them or burying their dead in Muslim cemeteries, andconsider them as infidels. Islamic governments are asked to ban all the activities

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of the followers of the impostor Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, i.e., the Qadiyanis, andto regard them as a non-Muslim minority who should not be allowed to assumesensitive positions in the state. Publish Photostat copies of the Qadiyani distor-tions of the Holy Qur’an, take inventory of the Qadiyani translations of themeaning of the Holy Qur’an, highlight the distortions and ban the circulation ofsuch translations.17

The context of the issuance of these fatwa and resolution seems to have a strongconnection with two factors: first, the movement in Pakistan that culminated with the1974 Constitutional Amendment, in which the government, under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,declares “the Qadianis a separate community” or non-Muslim minority, and second, therise of Saudi Arabia as a petro-dollar country and their intention the spread the Wahhabiideology around theMuslimworld.18 After the issuance of this fatwa, the Rābit

˙a actively

disseminated it to Muslim countries, including Indonesia. In fact, one of the signatoriesof the fatwa isMohamad Rasjidi (1915–2001), formerMinister of Religion of Indonesiaand a leader of theMuhammadiyah and theDewanDakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII,Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation). Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993), the fifthPrime Minister of Indonesia and the founder and leader of the DDII, was also one of theleaders of the Rābit

˙a at that time.19 This is why the campaign against the Ahmadiyya in

Indonesia was carried out mainly by activists of the DDII, which was founded and led byMohammad Natsir. A number of books and articles attacking the Ahmadiyya werepublished in this institution and its magazine, Serial Media Dakwah (Ropi 2010: 298). Itwas amidst the influence of this propaganda that the MUI issued a fatwa againstAhmadiyya in 1980.

The fatwa from the MUI on the Ahmadiyya entitles ‘Ahmadiyah Qadiyan,’ whichmeans that it is directed specifically to the Qadiani faction of the Ahmadiyya, whilethe Lahore faction is excluded from it. This fatwa was issued during the secondMusyawarah Nasional (National Congress) of this institution in Jakarta on 26 May–1June 1980 and consists of two points: first, the Ahmadiyya is a community outsidethe pale of Islam; it is a deviant and misleading community (jama’ah di luar Islam,sesat dan menyesatkan). Second, in dealing with Ahmadiyya the MUI is expected toalways discuss with the government (Sekretariat MUI 2010: 41–42). This fatwa doesnot quote any reference, quotation from Qur’anic verses, or prophetic traditions. Itdoes mention that this fatwa was issued based on the study of nine books of theAhmadiyya, but it does not clarify the titles of the books used as the basis of theissuance of this fatwa. The signatories of this fatwa are Hamka (Haji Abdul MalikKarim Amrullah) as the chairman of the MUI and Kafrawi as the secretary.

In connection with the second point of the fatwa, however, the NewOrder governmentof Indonesia did not give any support for executing the fatwa in concrete andimplementable policy. This is actually quite understandable since the government under

17 This fatwa is available at http://www.anti-ahmadiyya.org/en/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=180. The Arabic version of this fatwa is available at http://alhafeez.org/rashid/rabita.jpg(accessed 25 December 2011).18 The context of the issuance of this fatwa still needs to be studied. Discussion on the 1974 ConstitutionalAmendment can be found in Saeed (2007).19 Mohammad Natsir assumed his role as the Secretary General of the Rābita in 1969. It is still not clear forthe present author how long he was in that office. However, what is clear is that he was an active member ofthat organization until his death in 1993 (Ma’mur 1995: 35; von der Mehden 1993: 61)

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Suharto was not interested in interfering in religious issues. This regime places emphasison national development and stability. They were not bothered with religious issues aslong as national stability remained intact. To appeal for the government’s involvement inthis issue, during the Rapat Kerja Nasional (National Meeting) on 4–7 March 1984, theMUI requested the government to review the legal status of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesiaas stated in the Decree from the Minister of Justice number J.A/5/23/13 on 13 March1953, and the announcement in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia number26 on 31 March 1953. The reason for this appeal was because they consider theAhmadiyya: “(1) create unrest and disharmony in society since its teachings contradictwith the teachings of Islam; (2) create divisions among Muslims, such as in rituals,prayers, marriage, and so on; c) it also creates danger to public order and state security”(Sekretariat MUI 2010: 41). Besides the appeal to government, the MUI also givesrecommendation to three elements of Indonesian Muslims; the ulama, the followers ofthe Ahmadiyya, and Muslim people in general. The MUI recommends that members ofthe MUI at all levels (nation, province, and district), non-MUI ulama, and Muslimpreachers to explain to the Muslim community that the Qadiani Ahmadiyya is a deviantgroup and outside Islam. To the followers of the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, the MUI asks themto return to the true teachings of Islam. And to all other Muslims, the MUI recommendsthem to be cautious and guard themselves in religious issues so that they are notinfluenced by this deviant Ahmadiyya.20

The fourth influential fatwa on the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia is the fatwa from theMajma‘al-Fiqh al-Islāmī (Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy) of the Organization ofIslamic Cooperation (OIC). 21 This fatwa was issued during the Second Meeting inJeddah on 22–28 December 1985 as a response to a fatwa request (istiftā’) submitted bythe Islamic Legal Council, Cape Town, South Africa, concerning the religious status ofthe Qadiani and the Lahore Ahmadiyya. After looking into the teachings of both factionsof the Ahmadiyya, particularly the claim of prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad andthe abolishment of jihād, the Council declares the Qadiani Ahmadis have committedapostasy, they are “murtaddīn khārijīn ‘an al-Islām” (apostates, exiting out of Islam)(Islamic Fiqh Academy 2000: 6–7). Despite their belief that Ghulam Ahmad is only azilli (shadow) and burūz (manifestation) of the Prophet Muhammad, the same chargeapplies to the Lahore.22 The difference between this fatwa and the fatwa from the Rābit

˙a

is that this fatwa is indiscriminate in perceiving the two factions of the Ahmadiyya,

20 Seeing the reluctance of the secular government of Indonesia to ban the Ahmadiyya, according to IsmatuRopi, some ulama then sent a petition to the Saudi government asking them to pressurize the Indonesiangovernment into helping the MUI implement the fatwa. As a sequel to this petition, in 1981 the IndonesianMinistry of Religion received a formal letter from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia requesting them to issue alegal prohibition of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. On 20 September 1984, the Ministry of Religion finallyissued a circular to its offices to keep their eyes open to the activities of the Ahmadiyya, that this movementcould preach only their beliefs within their own community (Djamaluddin 2011: 137–145; Ropi 2010: 300–301; Zaenal Abidin 2007: 183–184).21 Before 28 June 2011, the OIC stood for Organization of Islamic Conference. The OIC was established in1969 as a response to the attack to Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerussalem. General information regarding thisorganization can be found at http://www.oic-oci.org (Accessed 25 December 2011). Among academicdiscussion on the role of the OIC in Islamic world can be found in Eickelman and Piscatori (1996),particularly Chap. 6, “Muslim politics: a changing political geography.”22 The Arabic version of this fatwa is available at http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/qrarat/2-4.htm (Accessed25 December 2011).

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despite the fact that the Lahore Ahmadiyya have moved closer to ordinary Muslims andforgetting their distinction from orthodox Islam.

Interestingly enough, the fatwa from the OIC was used as one of the considerations ofthe issuance of the new fatwa of theMUI on the Ahmadiyya, which was issued during theMusyawarah Nasional (National Congress) on 26–29 July 2005. 23 This fatwa alsoadopted the way in which the OIC generalized the charge of apostasy for both theQadiani and Lahore Ahmadiyya. This fatwa reflects the shift in treatment of theAhmadiyya in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Previously, the Ahmadiyyacommunity had a relatively peaceful life. Unlike in previous decades, however, opposi-tion to this community from other groups has become more intense in recent years.Followers of the Ahmadiyya have become victims of constant physical attacks since thedownfall of the Suharto regime in 1998—a period known as the Era Reformasi. Theyhave been stigmatized and attacked by radical Muslims while the government has largelyoverlooked and ignored these hostilities. TheMUI fatwa in 2005 played a significant rolein the current opposition to the Ahmadiyya by providing ideological justification.

Th MUI fatwa in 2005 is entitled ‘Aliran Ahmadiyah’ (Ahmadiyya stream) andsigned by Ma‘ruf Amin as the head of Fatwā Commission and Hasanuddin as thesecretary. The core of the fatwa is not only a reaffirmation and restatement of the MUIfatwa that was issued in 1980, but also a radicalization of the previous fatwa.24 First,it cited a fatwa from a foreign country: the Organization of Islamic Cooperation(OIC)’s 1985 fatwa against the Ahmadiyya. Second, the MUI fatwa in 2005 did notdifferentiate between the Qadiani Ahmadiyya and the Lahore Ahmadiyya (somethingthe OIC fatwa did not do either), whereas the MUI fatwa in 1980 addressed only theQadiani Ahmadiyya. Third, the fatwa placed the government in a hierarchically lowerposition than the MUI by insisting that it enforce the fatwa. Fourth, the MUI fatwadid not only declare the Ahmadiyya beyond the pale of Islam, but also insisted thatthe government halt the spread of the Ahmadiyya movement, freeze its organization,and seal off all of its buildings (as did the 1974 Rābit

˙a resolution).

The fatwa consists of four parts: ‘reflection,’ ‘reminder,’ ‘consideration,’ and‘decision.’ In the ‘reflection’ part, the fatwa states that (1) although the MUI haveissued a fatwa condemning the Ahmadiyya in 1980 and that this movement has beenforbidden,25 the Ahmadiyya still exists and spreads its teachings in Indonesia; (2) theexistence and the activities of the Ahmadiyya have created unrest or disharmony insociety; (3) some people in society have requested the MUI to reaffirm the previousfatwa on the status of the Ahmadiyya because of the controversies and social actions

23 Actually, there was a debate in the forum on how Indonesian Muslims should respond to the OIC fatwa.However, at the end, the leaders of the MUI preferred to follow that fatwa since Indonesia is a member ofthe OIC (Karni and Alfian 2005).24 The transformation of the MUI from being a “servant of the state” (khādim al-hukūma) into a “servant ofthe umma” (khādim al-umma) can be found in Moch. Ichwan (2005). As elaborated in this article, one ofthe factors that contributed to the shift of MUI’s religious stance was the involvement of conservativeMuslims, such as from the MMI, in its officials.25 The meaning of ‘forbidden’ (telah dilarang keberadaannya) here is based on the MUI fatwa and has nolegal basis since there is no decree from the Indonesian government that forbids the Ahmadiyya. A fatwafrom the MUI does not have the status of law. There are a number of prohibitions to the Ahmadiyya issuedby some offices of District Attorneys such as Kejari of Sidenreng South Sulawesi, Kerinci Jambi, andMeulaboh in West Aceh, but these prohibitions are valid only for these districts (Susanti 2008; Crouch2009).

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related to this movement; (4) to answer the demand from society and to protect thepurity of Islam, the MUI concludes that it is needed to reissue the previous fatwa.

In the ‘reminder’ part, the MUI mentions several verses from the Qur’an (Q 33.40;6.153; 5.105) and prophetic traditions stating that Muhammad is the seal of the prophets(khātam al-nabiyyīn) and therefore there is no prophet after him.26 This reminder impliesthat whoever believes in the existence of a prophet after Muhammad, he lies, certainlynot following the right path, and can no longer be considered Muslim. Consequently,since the Ahmadiyya believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, then the MUI seetheir deviation as intolerable and, therefore, consider them leaving Islam. In the ‘con-sideration’ part, the MUI use the fatwa issued by the Majma‘al-Fiqh al-Islāmī of theOIC in 1985 that declares the Ahmadiyya commit apostasy and leave Islam, the fatwa ofthe MUI in 1980, and the opinion during the meeting of the C Commission–fatwadivision—in the 7th National Conference of the MUI in 2005 as references in issuing afatwa. There are three points of this fatwa: (1) the MUI reaffirms the fatwa of the MUIissued during the Second National Conference in 1980, declaring that the Ahmadiyya isoutside Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan (misguided andmisleading), and anyMuslimwhofollows the Ahmadiyya is murtad (apostate) or leaving Islam; (2) those who alreadyfollow the Ahmadiyya are required to return immediately to the true teachings of Islam,which is an Islam that is in line with the Qur’an and the Hadith; (3) the government mustprohibit the spread of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, freeze the organization, and seal offall places of their activities.27

The last fatwa to become an object of analysis of this article is the fatwa onAhmadiyya from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—the largest Muslim organization inIndonesia. The fatwa used in this article is the one entitled “Taushiyah: Sikap PBNUtentang Ahmadiyah” (Taushiyah: The stance of the Central Board of the NU on theAhmadiyya).28 This fatwa was issued during a Plenary Meeting of the Central Board ofthe NU in Bogor on 9–11 September 2005 led by four chairmen of the NU: Ma’rufAmin, Said Agil Siradj, Masdar F Mas’udi, and Rozy Munir. It consists of four points:(1) Ahmadiyya is a deviant sect (aliran sesat) and exiting out of Islam (keluar dariIslam) since they do not accept the Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet as obviouslystated in the Qur’an, al-Sunna, and the consensus (Ijmā’) of the ulama. However,regarding the activities of the Ahmadiyya community, it is forbidden for people to takethe law into their own hands. The ban of the beliefs and activities of the Ahmadiyya isfully given over to government discretion, and is obviously not the right of any people orgroup. (2) In expressing their objection to the activities of the Ahmadiyya in theirneighborhood, it is recommended for any people to express it in peaceful and politeways. (3) To the Muslim community, it is expected to study Islam comprehensively inorder to avoid mistakes and errors in their religious interpretations. (4) The government

26 A discussion on this issue can be found in the works of Yohanan Friedmann (1989, 1998, 2011), wherehe elaborates Islamic discourse on khatm al-nabiyyin from early Islam until contemporary time.27 These three points of the fatwa reflect three steps of implementation of law in classical fiqh: declaration,request for istitāba, execution or punishment. However, in modern times this last step could be imple-mented mostly only in civil law, not penal law.28 Taushiyah or taws

˙iya is usually translated as ‘non-legal recommendation’. Taushiyah is usually issued of

iftā’ institution after considering that issuing of such kind of fatwa is necessary, regardless of the existenceor non-existence of istiftā’ (request for fatwa) from umma. Discussion about various terms used in the fatwaor fatwa-like decisions in Indonesia can be found in Moch. Nur Ichwan (2005).

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is expected to have a firm and consistent policy in dealing with the existence of theAhmadiyya sect in Indonesia.29 As shall be elaborated in the next part, this fatwa reflectsthe view of al-Shāfi‘ī, the most influential school of law in the NU, in dealing withreligious identity.

From al-Ghazālī to the MUI: declaring deviant believers apostates

Analyzing the Ahmadiyya through the lens of the three litmus tests put forward by al-Ghazālī, it is clear that, from their outward public announcement, the Ahmadis do notdeviate or break-away from any of those litmus tests. They believe in the oneness ofGod, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the existence of the Last Day. Their profes-sion of Islam could not be categorized as merely lip service or, like zanādiqa, they hidetheir true beliefs behind their outward pronouncement.30 Their difference from main-stream Muslims, particularly Sunni orthodoxy, and the reason why the ulama in theabove mentioned five institutions to rule the Ahmadis apostates is not based on theirpublic beliefs on the above principles of faith, but on their distinctive beliefs andpractices, particularly on the following four issues: (1) they believe in the prophethoodof Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya, and justifying this belief witha new interpretation of the concept of khātam al-nabiyyīn; (2) they employ metaphoricalinterpretation of the Qur’an, particularly for the Lahore Ahmadiyya; (3) they allegedlyabrogate the duty of warfare jihād and change it with the ‘jihad of the pen’; and (4) theirprohibition for intermarriage with other Muslims and prohibition to pray behind non-Ahmadi imām in congregational prayer.

From al-Ghazālī’s perspective, particularly as he puts forward in his Fays˙al al-tafriqa,

the way the Ahmadiyya interpret the Qur’an and the concept of prophethood deviates fromthe five levels of acceptable interpretation proposed by him, namely: dhātī, h

˙issī, khayālī,

‘aqlī, and shabahī. The concept of khatm al-nubuwwa or khātam al-nabiyyīn (Q 33.40)commonly interpreted by Muslim commentators (mufassirūn) as the ‘last prophet’ or the‘seal of prophets’ is interpreted differently in the Ahmadiyya, namely, the ‘best prophet,’but not necessarily the last one.31 TheAhmadis believe that the legislative (tashrī‘ī) prophetwill not appear after the Prophet Muhammad, but the non-legislative prophet (ghayrtashrī‘ī) and ‘shadowy’ (z

˙illī) or ‘manifestational’ (burūzī) prophet will come after

Muhammad and that Ghulam Ahmad is that prophet (Mahmud Ahmad 1980: 43–7;Dard 2008: 829–43; Friedmann 1989: 132).

The Ahmadis also hold different interpretations to several verses of the Qur’an,such as on the miracle of Moses and the Night Journey (Isrā’ wa Mi‘rāj). For theLahore Ahmadiyya, the miracle given by God to Moses as mentioned in the Qur’an

29 This fatwa is available in Karni et al. (2010: 16) and at http://nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/6/12315/Taushiyah/Sikap_PBNU_tentang_Ahmadiyah.html (accessed 26 December 2011)30 Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, a son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the second caliph of theAhmadiyya, states, “So, while we of the Ahmadiyya Jama‘at declare ourselves Muslims, nobody has theright to say that our Islam is a pretence; that at heart we deny Islam or deny the Holy Prophet (on whom bepeace); that we subscribe to a new Kalima or turn to a new Qibla in our prayers” (Mahmud Ahmad 1980:5–6).31 The concept of the ‘seal of the prophets’ is also interpreted that there is not true claim of prophethoodwithout confirmation of Muhammad (Mahmud Ahmad 1980: 43–7).

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(2.60) must be interpreted metaphorically. Since they do not believe in miracles, thesupernatural incident that occurred to Moses and his people must be hermeneuticallyinterpreted. Muhammad Ali translates iḍrib bi‘as

˙āka-l-h

˙ajara as ‘March on the rock

with thy staff,’ while in other translation that phrase is translated as ‘strike the rockwith thy staff’ (Ali 2002: 30; Yusuf Ali 2008: 31). In the story of the Night Journey,as mentioned in the Qur’an (17.2), the Ahmadiyya has different understanding of theconcept al-masjid al-aqs

˙ā (the Distant Mosque). Traditionally, it is understood as the

mosque in Jerusalem, but for the Ahmadiyya this could be interpreted as the Masjidal-Aqs

˙ā in Qadian, “[It] may signify the Prophet Solomon’s Temple at Jerusalem, the

Holy Prophet’s Mosque at Medina or the Promised Messiah’s Mosque at Qadian”(Ghulām Farīd 2002, 1404; Sher ‘Alī 2004: 9). 32 The most important differencebetween mainstream Muslims and Ahmadiyya is their interpretation of the passage ofthe Qur’an on the concept of khātam al-nabiyyīn (Q. 33.40). The way the Ahmadiyyainterpret the Qur’an is quite similar to the Bāt

˙iniyya in al-Ghazālī’s time, in which for

him it was going too far from the acceptable interpretations.However, it is not merely their allegedly deviant interpretation that deems them

apostates by the ulama in the above institutions, but because they use that distinctiveinterpretation to justify their system of beliefs, which are clearly irreconcilable withorthodox Sunni Islam. In al-Ghazālī criteria, the Ahmadiyya interpretation could notbe categorized as intellectual dissent. It is theological and political dissent.33 It is inaccordance with this logic that the two above fatwas, i.e., the MUI fatwa in 2005 andthe OIC fatwa in 1985, also charge the Lahore Ahmadiyya with the crime of apostasy.

Discerning the charge ascribed to the Ahmadiyya, it is quite interesting to see the termused by the five fatwas in charging this group of people. The fatwas from theMuhammadiyah, the Rābit

˙a, and the MUI (1980) used the term kāfir or ‘outside the

pale of Islam’. The two other fatwas, i.e., the OIC and the NU, declare that the Ahmadishave committed apostasy (irtidād). The fatwa from the MUI in 2005 uses both of thetwo terms; kāfir for those who become Ahmadi by birth and murtadd for any Muslimwho converts to the Ahmadiyya. For some ulama, these two terms have different legalconsequences. The charge of apostasy would make someone liable for the capitalpunishment. The ascription of the status of unbelievers have different consequencesbetween ahl al-kitāb and non-ahl al-kitāb—the former were protected but must pay tax,while the latter became a subject of war.

Applying this traditional category to the context of this discussion, the term apostateindicates that the Ahmadis are not original unbelievers. However, if the term apostasy isused to imply that the Ahmadis once in their lives they have been proven to accept Islamas their religion and then publicly renounce it, then this is not quite the case of theAhmadis. Most of the Ahmadis are born as Ahmadi-Muslims and they never publiclyannounce their breaking-away from Islam. That is why the term ‘apostasy’ is a quiteambiguous term to apply to the Ahmadiyya. The more sensible way to read the term‘apostasy’ in this context is by understanding apostasy not to indicate the publicannouncement of the turning away from Islam (al-rujū‘ ‘an din al-Islām), but as a term

32 There is a different numbering system between the Ahmadiyya version of the Qur’an and the Sunniversion. The Ahmadiyya counts bismillāh in the beginning of sūra as the first verse. In the Sunni Qur’an,the quoted verse is Q. 17.1.33 This is also the view of Muhammad Iqbal (1974).

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used by a certain group of Muslims to charge other groups because they deviate from theacceptable standard beliefs of the orthodox. This is quite similar to charging heterodoxy orheresy with apostasy.

From Sunni orthodoxy, there are a number of beliefs or deeds that could makesomeone liable to the charge of apostasy without necessarily this person making adeclaration of apostasy outwardly, although they are always disputed. As stated by al-Ghazālī, not believing in the resurrection of the body and the punishment of theHereafter would entail philosophers with the charge of apostasy, even though they neverdeclare leaving Islam (al-Ghazālī 1993: 56). Believing in the createdness of the Qur’anor believing that the Qur’an is a cultural product could also be ascribed with apostasy asin the case of Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd (Hirschkind 1995; Saeed 2011: 35–6).34 Theapostasy of the Ahmadiyya in the views of ulama in the above five iftā’ institutionscould be included in this category of deviating from the standard Sunni orthodoxy,instead of the outright renouncement from Islam. This way of charging someone withthe status of apostasy is obviously different from that of al-Shāfi‘ī who gives aminimalist criteria of Muslim, namely pronouncing the declaration of faith (shahāda),and would not charge of apostasy for anyone who says it (Ahmad 2009: 159–160;Griffel 2001: 345).35 For al-Shāfi`ī, the law of apostasy cannot be applied to the case ofheterodoxy. Furthermore, the basis of the legal judgment for the belief of some people inthis world, in his view, should rely on what they state or profess publicly, not what is intheir hearts (Griffel 2001: 346–347).

It seems the above five iftā’ institutions analyzed in this study do not differentiateclearly between kufr and ridda or they just equate the two terms. This is similar to al-Shāfi`ī, who does not distinguish betweenmurtadd and kāfir (Griffel 2001: 348). Only thefatwa of the MUI in 2005 differentiates these two terms clearly. This fatwa declares that,in general, the Ahmadiyya is outside the pale of Islam and any Muslim who converts tothis belief system is “murtad (keluar dari Islam),” murtadd (exiting out of Islam).

One of the important concepts in the discussion of apostasy is istitāba. From the abovesix fatwas, three fatwas, namely the MUI fatwas and the fatwa from the Rābit

˙a, explicitly

mention the procedure of istitāba. The absence of explicit statement on istitāba in otherfatwas, however, does not imply that ulama in these three institutions do not accept thisprocedure. It seems the reason for this absence is simply because of the shortness of thefatwas and also because the objective of the issuance of fatwas is only to give answerregarding the religious status of the Ahmadiyya and not answering the question about thepunishment of this crime. This is different from theMUI fatwas that have another objectivebesides informing the religious status of the Ahmadis. The MUI fatwas intend to applypunishment to the apostasy of the Ahmadiyya, although this is limited to civil and notcriminal law. It is related to this objective that they explicitly mention the procedure of

34 Quoting Majma‘ al-anhur written by the Hanafi scholar ‘Abd al-Rah˙man ibn Muh

˙ammad, often called

Shaikh-Zādeh, Rudolph Peters and Gert J.J. De Vries (1976–1977) mention a list of sayings or acts thatcould bring someone to the charge of apostasy, including ridiculing scholars and celebrating Nawrūz. Ifsomeone follows this, everything could make someone apostate. Anybody can make their own distinctivecriteria of Muslim and non-Muslim. Abdullah Saeed mentions that there are a large number of ‘apostasylist’. Even a rejection to a ‘letter’ of the Qur’an could qualify someone with apostasy (Saeed 2011: 33).35 Both Ahmad and Griffel quote al-Shāfi‘ī’s al-Umm, but they use different editions. Ahmad uses the oneedited by Muhammad Zuhri al-Najjar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyyat al-Azhariyya 1961), 6: 156–7. Griffeluses the edition published by al-Matba‘a al-Kubra al-Amiriyya, 1903–08. I have not had a chance toconsult with these books.

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istitāba. Actually, there is something quite contradictory in the MUI fatwa in 2005. On theone hand, it considered that some of the Ahmadis are original non-Muslims. However, onthe other hand, it gave the procedure of istitāba indiscriminately to all of them, not only forthose who converted from Sunni Islam to the Ahmadiyya. Actually, this contradictionwould disappear if the terms apostasy and unbeliever in the MUI fatwas are understood asthe same thing and used interchangeably. But it seems the MUI differentiates betweenthem.

Still related to the procedure of istitāba, it is very likely that there is another reason whythe fatwas from theMuhammadiyah, theMUI in 1980, the OIC, and the NU describe onlythe religious status of the Ahmadiyya without talking any punishment. This is related tothe way these institutions perceive themselves. The Muhammadiyah and the NU seem toperceive themselves as simply the holder of religious authority, not political authority, andgive the authority to execute the decision regarding the Ahmadiyya to the government orjudicial discretion. This can be seen, for instance, for the fatwa issued by the NU, in whichthe ulama in this organization completely leave the authority to deal with the apostasy ofthe Ahmadiyya to government discretion and forbid people to appoint themselves as thepersecutors of deviant believers. This is different from theMUI fatwa in 2005 inwhich theulama in this institution seem to feel that they have authority to punish the Ahmadiyya orat least could insist that the government execute their decisions, particularly in civil law.Perhaps it is this point that motivates radical Muslims such as the Front Pembela Islam(FPI—Front for the Defense of Islam) to appoint themselves as the executors of the fatwasince the government does not respond quickly to the recommendations of the MUI.

Traditionally, the punishment of apostasy is upheld or emphasized because apostateshave created social and political disorder in society. And in the case of group apostasy, asallegedly committed by the Ahmadiyya, it was often considered as ‘bughāh’ (rebel) againstthe Islamic society or state.36 However, the studied six fatwas do not emphasize this issue.Instead, all of them indicate that the reason why they charge the Ahmadiyya with apostasyis their belief in the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad. Actually, the fatwa from the MUI in1980mentions that the Ahmadiyya has created unrest and disharmony in society, divisionsamongMuslims, and a danger to public order and state security. However, these are not thereasons why they issued a fatwa against the Ahmadiyya. These reasons were used toappeal to the government to revoke its decree that endorses the Ahmadiyya as a legalorganization in Indonesia. The fatwa from the MUI in 2005 refers to the previous fatwafrom the same institution, and also mentions that the Ahmadiyya has created unrest insociety, but this is only their minor or secondary reason and onlymentioned in passing. Themain reason for charging apostasy to the Ahmadiyya in this fatwa and all other five fatwasis the heretical beliefs of the Ahmadiyya. It is from here this article argues that the issuanceof fatwas against the Ahmadiyya is intended mostly to sustain Sunni orthodoxy, i.e., thatthe Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet and no prophet after him.

Conclusion

Although there is no indication that the fatwas from the above five institutions wereinfluenced by the works of al-Ghazālī, there are some similarities between them in

36 A discussion on collective apostasy can be read in Ahmad (2009: 151–153).

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their treatment of dissident groups. First, the fatwas ascribe the status of apostasy forthe crime of heresy or heterodoxy. This charge is not based on their rejection of Islamafter accepting it, but because they hold certain beliefs irreconcilable to the accepteddoctrines in the Sunni orthodoxy on the concept of khātam al-nabiyyīn. Second, thecharge of apostasy has been ascribed to the Ahmadiyya by three fatwas from thosefive institutions in order for them to be able to punish the Ahmadis since the charge ofunbelievers (kuffār) or original unbelievers does not have any legal consequence inmodern time. The charge of unbeliever would put the Ahmadiyya outside Islam. Andsince the old concept of dār al-Islām and dār al-harb is no longer applicable, thecharge of unbeliever certainly has no effect. The terms kufr and murtadd seem to beused interchangeably in some fatwas. Fourth, like during al-Ghazālī’s time, thecharge of apostasy is used by ulama to protect Islam from any deviation or to sustainorthodoxy. The difference between these two periods is the subject only of fatwas. Al-Ghazālī dealt with the growth of the Bāt

˙iniyya, while the contemporary ulama have to

face the growth of the Ahmadiyya.

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