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Round-based, where each round each consumer demands a bundle– Consumers only receive bundle after the last round
Greediness is calculated and fed back to consumers who should consider it for demand in the next round After last round every consumer receives demanded
bundle If resources are scarce, greediness is aligned: greedy
consumers are trimmed stronger– Incentive to consider feedback for next round/demand– Trimming to enforce fair leftover reallocation
A. Kumar et al “Almost Budget-balanced Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Resources”– allocation problem on the uplink multiple access channel – Only one resource and involves biddings
R. Jain et al: “An Efficient Nash-Implementation Mechanism for Divisible Resource Allocation“– auctioning bundles of multiple divisible goods (links)– Combined to path/ combination of multiple paths possible
S. Yang, B Hajek: “VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG […]”– network operator aims to select an outcome that is efficient
S. Brams. “Mathematics and Democracy”: p. 271 et seq.: Adjusted Winner– No resource dependcies
S. Brams et al. “The Undercut Procedure: An Algorithm for the Envy-free Division of Indivisible Items”– Two people constrained [TP, UC]
L. Schulman, V. Vazirani “Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences”– efficiency, incentive compatibility, and fairness properties – BUT lexicographic preference function