Factors Influencing Risk Perception: A Housing Development Case Study

Factors Influencing Risk Perception: A Housing Development Case Study

By

Steven Worker

A.A. (Allan Hancock College) 1998 B.S. (California Polytechnic State University) 2001

THESIS

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

in the

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS

Approved:

Dr. Miriam Wells, Chair _____________________________________

Dr. Jonathan London

_____________________________________

Dr. Patsy Eubank-Owens _____________________________________

Committee in Charge

2007

-i-

Factors Influencing Risk Perception: A Housing Development Case Study

© Steven Worker

UC Davis Masters’ Thesis in Community Development 2007

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... iii Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... iv List of Figures................................................................................................................................ iv Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1

Methods ....................................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 2: Literature Review....................................................................................................... 8

Section 1: Definitions and Assumptions ..................................................................................... 9 A. Definitions........................................................................................................................ 10 B. Assumptions ..................................................................................................................... 11

Section 2: The Development of Risk Perception Theory .......................................................... 12 A. The Engineering Approach .............................................................................................. 14 B. The Psychology Approach................................................................................................ 16 C. The Anthropology/Sociology Approach........................................................................... 20 D. An Integrated Approach: Social Amplification of Risk Framework................................ 24

Section 3: Risk Perception in Housing Development................................................................ 30 Chapter 3: Context: Davis Character and History................................................................... 33

Section 1: The Composition of Davis........................................................................................ 34 Section 2: History of Davis Development ................................................................................. 36

A. History of Growth Struggles ............................................................................................ 38 B. Growth Control Tools....................................................................................................... 44 C. Prior Proposals for the Covell Village Parcel................................................................... 46 D. Davis’s Success ................................................................................................................ 48 Section 2 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 49

Section 3: Davis’s Socio-Cultural Values ................................................................................. 50 A. The Character of Davis..................................................................................................... 50 B. Environmentalism............................................................................................................. 51 C. Deliberative Democracy ................................................................................................... 53 Section 3 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 56

Section 4: Past and Current Events............................................................................................ 57 A. Urban Sprawl.................................................................................................................... 57 B. Institutional Mistrust: Radioactive Beagles and Biodefense ............................................ 59 C. Federal and State Impact .................................................................................................. 64 Section 4 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 66

Chapter 3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 66 Chapter 4: Process: Covell Village Campaign .......................................................................... 68

Section 1: Features of Covell Village........................................................................................ 69 A. Trust: New Urbanism ....................................................................................................... 71

-ii-

B. Trust: Affordable Housing................................................................................................ 73 C. Trust: Mitigations and Contributions ............................................................................... 76 D. Direct Risk: Fiscal Analysis ............................................................................................. 78 E. Direct Risk: Increased Traffic........................................................................................... 80 F. Direct Risk: Other Concerns ............................................................................................. 82 G. Direct Risk: Davis Growth ............................................................................................... 83 Section 1 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 84

Section 2: Key Actors................................................................................................................ 85 A. City and County Government........................................................................................... 85 B. Developers – Covell Village Partners .............................................................................. 89 C. Opposition - Citizens for Responsible Planning............................................................... 89 D. University Students .......................................................................................................... 91 E. Trader Joe’s ...................................................................................................................... 92 F. Sierra Club ........................................................................................................................ 93 Section 2 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 94

Section 3: The Risk Debate Process .......................................................................................... 94 A. Process Concerns.............................................................................................................. 95 B. Unethical Conduct ............................................................................................................ 99 C. Outcome: Election Results ............................................................................................. 104 Section 3 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 105

Chapter 4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 106 Chapter 5: Conclusion............................................................................................................... 107

Section 1: Implications for Social Science Theory.................................................................. 107 Section 2: Implications for Policy Implementation ................................................................. 111 Section 3: Future Research ...................................................................................................... 112

References................................................................................................................................... 114

Acknowledgements I would like to recognize the support and encouragement provided to me during my graduate education. Dr. Miriam Wells is an inspiration to all graduate students and helped shape my understanding of what it means to be an academic researcher. Thank you to Dr. London and Dr. Eubank-Owens for serving on my thesis committee and providing me with insightful feedback. Thank you to Dr. Carole MacNeil for her cheerfulness and advice in developing my academic awareness. The grammar in this paper is cleaner thanks to the wonderful editing of Cynthia Sperry. The staff at the State 4-H Office provided tremendous encouragement and support during my long writing absences. I appreciate the time and thoughts from those I interviewed in the community. Davis residents are by far some of the most civic minded.

-iii-

Abstract The contextual setting and risk debate process influence risk perception; people’s subjective judgments regarding the characteristics and severity of risks. Undervalued in most other risk perception literature, these three social level factors help shape risk perception: a) the context of a situation, including shared history, cultural values, and institutional trust; b) the risk debate process, including features of the proposal, key actors, and the mechanism for public input; and c) the interaction between context and process. This thesis applies risk perception theory to housing development. The proposed housing development situated in Davis, California provides an excellent case of risk perception analysis because of the disagreement on the amounts of types of risk posed by the housing development.

List of Figures Figure 1: Grid/Group Ways of Life in Cultural Theory Figure 2: Social Amplification of Risk Framework Figure 3: Chart of City of Davis Growth Conflict Figure 4: Crossroads Place Site Plan Figure 5: Muir Commons Cohousing facility Figure 6: Farmland on which Covell Village was to be built Figure 7: Revised Covell Village Site Plan Figure 8: Housing Costs According to the City of Davis Figure 9: Housing Costs According to the Citizens for Responsible Planning Figure 10: Comparison of Covell Village to Livermore Trails; used by the opposition Figure 11: 100-year Floodplain Figure 12: Graphic appearing in the Sierra Club Yolano Flame newsletter Figure 13: November 8, 2005 Yolo County Election Returns for Measure X Figure 14: Precinct map showing precinct voting for Measure X, Covell Village

-iv-

1

Chapter 1: Introduction

Individuals and organizations in today’s society face many risks. Nuclear power, oil spills, stock

market crashes, and other major natural and man-made disasters dominate the news. Risk

assessment experts use standard risk analysis procedures and deliver verdicts of the potential

costs and benefits of any given activity, which may or may not align with a wider public

perception of the danger. Understanding the dynamic process of public perceptions of risk has

consumed the interest of experts, decision makers, academic researchers, and lay-persons alike.

Traditionally, literature on risk has focused on those behaviors, procedures, disasters, and

technologies that contain a potential for loss to human life, finances, property, etc. Risk analysis

experts utilize scientific methods relevant to their specific field to obtain an estimate of risk.

Those in power determine an acceptable level of risk to society or subgroups. Although many

tools of risk assessment, measurement, identification, and evaluation have been developed for

various fields, numerous research studies and real life examples show that members of the public

often disagree with each other and with the experts on the extent and acceptability of risk events

(Pidgeon et al. 2003). Risk perception research began 30 years ago to help explain why public

perception of risk differed from expert analysis. Various theories, such as probabilistic, heuristic,

cultural, and others try to explain why public perception is heightened or diminished from what

experts claim is the true risk. However, all of these theories have their shortcomings, most

notably, ignoring the various social and group processes involved in influencing perceptions. The

theories also suffer from inadequacy in predicting how the public will respond to a risk event

(Breakwell & Barnett 2003, Wildavsky & Dake 1990, Marris et al. 1998).

Researchers have begun identifying additional factors that help explain why public responses to

risk events vary. Risk perception is neither objective nor static; to fully understand why people

2

have varying views on acceptable levels of risk one needs to understand contextual settings,

culture, and personal factors. When analyzing a situation with this in mind, a broader

understanding of discrepancies between experts and the public is brought to light. A lack of

knowledge, mistrust of a corporation, or general acceptability of benefits may be the cause of

increased or decreased perception of risk. With the emergence of larger societal and cultural

factors involved with risk perception, many researchers now deem that “risk decisions are,

ultimately, public policy choices” (Stern & Fineberg 1996: 26).

Even these new theories that better explain perception of risk, still only do so for the same types

of natural and man-made disasters (Kasperson & Kasperson I 2005: 117, Slovic et al. 1982: 86).

Theories on risk analysis have not typically addressed the potential for harm from everyday

worries such as increased traffic, values of community aesthetics, or social fabric of communities

and society. Few risk perception studies have investigated housing developments. However, the

public certainly does deem housing development as an activity containing risk, as seen in this

case study. The theories of risk perception may be applied to many settings not traditionally

considered by risk perception authors.

In this thesis, I will examine current understanding of risk perception and the impacts of risk

perception in both social science theory and policy implementation.

1. First, I will apply theories of risk perception to a new empirical domain: that of public

conflicts over land development. While such developments have not traditionally been

viewed through a risk perception lens, the ensuing analysis demonstrates that such

theories may be fruitfully applied in settings not previously considered. This application

not only expands the utility of social scientific theories of risk perception, but it also

3

informs the process of policy formation and implementation by increasing our

understanding of the factors shaping public reception of a development policy proposal.

2. Second, I will demonstrate that considering additional factors will help improve risk

perception literature. While integrative theories such as the Social Amplification of Risk

Framework (SARF) incorporate both individual and social influences, risk perception

research as a whole under-represents and even ignores key influences of context and

group process. I will demonstrate that three key factors help shape risk perception: a) the

context of a situation, including shared history, cultural values, and institutional trust; b)

the risk debate process, including features of the proposal, key actors, and the mechanism

for public input; and c) the interaction between context and process.

To help accomplish these ends, I will explore a proposed housing development, named Covell

Village, in Davis, California. Covell Village is an excellent case of risk perception because

experts and various entities in the public disagreed on both a) the acceptable level of risks, and b)

the benefits counterbalancing these risks. In November 2005, the residents of the City of Davis

were asked to vote on the future of a large parcel of undeveloped land adjacent to the city limits.

The project contained 1,864 residential units to be phased in over 10 years, a village center

containing commercial space and parks, 776 acres of permanent open space agriculture land

adjacent to the city’s border, and a host of other concessions. The City of Davis required a

citywide vote for any change in land designation away from agriculture or open space. This city

ordinance provided a mechanism for the citizens of Davis to evaluate the costs and benefits of a

proposed development over six months before the elections. During the ensuing political

campaign, the debate turned into one of perceptions. The project was voted down by the citizens

of Davis. Perceptions may be influenced by additional factors, those of context and of the risk

debate process, which are not currently considered in risk perception literature. Understanding

4

these variables may be useful in many settings to understand the choices and behavior of

individuals and groups.

The impact of this case establishes its economic and sociopolitical importance. According to the

final campaign finance filings for both the Pro Covell Village and Anti Covell Village groups

totaled up to almost half a million dollars - $474,850 in total, with Pro-Covell Village groups

spending $385,851 and Anti Covell Village groups $88,999 (City of Davis 2006). The campaign

polarized the Davis community. Numerous newspaper articles, paid advertisements, letters to the

editors and opinion-editorial pieces not only voiced endorsement or rejection of Covell Village,

but also waged personal attacks on elected officials, developers, and other prominent citizens.

The analysis of this thesis is organized into three main chapters. Each chapter helps build the

case that both a housing development may be considered in a risk perception lens and that

additional social factors are necessary to fully understand people’s perceptions of risk.

In Chapter 2, an overview is provided on the development of risk perception literature. Analysis

of the four major schools of thought reveals that risk perception theories do not emphasize social

process in their explanation of perception. While each theory originates from a different

discipline, they all miss the importance of context, process and the interaction between the two.

The engineering approach blames the public and views their behavior as irrational. The

psychology approach focuses on individual factors and ignores the wider social context. While

the anthropology/sociology approach emphasizes worldview it ignores the importance of event

context and risk debate process. Even the integrated approach builds primarily upon the

psychology research and is biased in favor of individual factors. It still only pays slight attention

social influences.

5

In order to demonstrate that context is an important variable of risk perception, Chapter 3

examines the environment and history in which the case study takes place. Four primary factors

served to shape the City of Davis resident’s response to Covell Village: a) composition and

demographic of residents; b) history of growth struggles; c) socio-cultural values; and d) past and

current events. Each of these contextual variables is relevant and necessary in order to fully

understand people’s perceptions of the risk Covell Village posed to the environment, economy

and social fabric.

Chapter 4 focuses on the campaign with the intention of establishing the significance of social

process in risk perception. Three aspects of the campaign uncover the import of process: a)

features of the Covell Village proposal; b) interplay of key actors in the debate; and c) the risk

debate process. This chapter illustrates that only when analyzing the interaction between

contextual and process factors is the outcome understood. Concerns with the risk debate process,

unethical behavior, and other incidents during the campaign caused people to evoke feelings of

suspicion, based on their cultural values and past events. The interaction between context and

process served to heighten the perception of risk and amplify opposition.

Methods

Academic research on risk perception was obtained through periodicals and research books.

Periodicals included such journals as Risk Analysis, Science, Annual Review of Sociology, and

the Daedalus. Research books represented the main theories in risk perception literature: Slovic

(psychometric), Douglas (cultural theory), and Kasperson (Social Amplification of Risk

Framework).

Information on Covell Village was obtained through numerous sources including newspaper

media, interviews and city documents. These sources include:

6

Comprehensive review of newspaper articles, opinion-editorials, and letters to the editor

from the Davis Enterprise (December 1989, March 1997 and December 2004 through

November 2005) and the California Aggie (January 2005 through November 2005).

Nine interviews of key actors using semi-structured interview methods. Interviews lasted

approximately an hour each. A list of topics was developed prior to the interview,

however, as other avenues of interest arose during the interview, additional questions

were asked. Those interviewed included:

o Three City Council members regarding the role of the City Council and city

government; two supporting and one opposing Covell Village.

o One city government planner who was the lead on the development proposal in

the City Community Development department. Information on the planning

application and Environmental Impact Report (EIR) process was obtained.

o One Covell Village Partner regarding reasons for building, expectations of the

project, and reflection on its rejection by voters.

o One City of Davis history expert from the UCD sociology department. This

person provided information on Davis’s history of growth and overall cultural

atmosphere.

o Four members of the opposition, Citizens for Responsible Planning, regarding

both prior anti-growth campaigns and the Covell Village conflict.

Review of public documents from the City including the Environmental Impact Report

(EIR), city ordinances, and other compiled information available on the city

government’s website from summer and fall 2005.

Examination of history books and documents on the City of Davis; primarily those

authored by John Lofland (2004) and Mike Fitch (1998).

7

Review of flyers, newsletters and mailings from pro- and anti-Covell Village groups such

as the Sierra Club, Citizens for Responsible Planning – No on X, and Smart Planning –

Yes on X from 2005.

Campaign finance filings, from the City Clerk, of pro- and anti-Covell Village

committees through January 2006.

Student research papers covering various aspects of Covell Village; one on housing (June

2006), another on housing, traffic and environmental issues (June 2005), and a graduate

paper on transportation issues (March 2005).

These sources of information provide a broad picture of the history of Davis; the city’s widely

held egalitarian principles, and multiple aspects of the Covell Village campaign. Qualitative

methods were used to cross-reference and validate data. While the findings do not statically

represent the general populace of Davis, perspectives from key leaders and from a variety of

letters to the editor paint a broad picture as to the factors influencing people’s perceptions of risk

and benefit.

8

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Risk, n. The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger. Danger n. The possibility of suffering harm.

Hazard n. A danger or risk. Harm n. physical injury, material damage, actual or potential ill effect.

Risk and danger are negative words used to describe undesirable outcomes. People label

activities with a potential for danger “risky.” Risk is at once a term for thrill-seeking individuals

seeking adrenaline rushes associated with rock climbing and skydiving; for potential financial

gains through high risk, high gain on the stock market; and for activities that impact something of

human value in a new technology, hazardous industrial plant or natural disaster. Risk abounds:

economic loss of revenue and increased liability; physical harm to people, buildings, and

property; to social fabric, culture, and values; and to the environment. Mary Douglas points out

the extreme fears of Americans: “the food they eat, the water they drink, the air they breathe, the

land they live on, and the energy they use.” (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982: 10). Risk has become

so important in our society that many organizations have risk management plans to help control

and mitigate potential risks. Some have theorized that the political environment is defined by risk

and that political legitimacy is being challenged. This calls for a new label, such as the risk

society (Althaus 2005). The collective reality: people are concerned with activities that may

cause harm.

This chapter discusses common risk definitions, assumptions underlying theories, and the four

main theories of risk perception. First, definitions of risk and danger are explored because of

their use in understanding how these concepts evoke strong feelings in people. The chapter also

provides an overview of the foundation assumptions of risk as both objective versus socially

constructed (subjective). Discussion will then move towards the four major theories of risk

9

perception. The disciplines offering theories on risk perceptions include engineering,

psychology, and sociology/anthropology. The fourth major theory is an integrated approach,

combining research in psychology, sociology, anthropology, communications and political

science.

Section 1: Definitions and Assumptions

The use of the term risk and its relation to the concept of danger has an interesting history. While

today risk and danger are synonymous, their original meanings differed. Danger has always had

a place in its definition as potential harm or hazard. Risks, however, have evolved throughout the

past few centuries. There is dispute regarding the origin of the word risk. Some believe that it

derives from the Arabic word “risq” meaning “anything that has been given to you [by God] and

from which you draw profit” while others believe it originates from the Latin word “risicum”

referring to “the challenge posed by a barrier reef to a sailor” (both quotes: Althaus 2005: 570).

In the seventeenth century, risk was used in reference to the specialized mathematical analysis of

chance, primarily in gambling. Risk was used to describe the probability of an event taking

place, combined with the magnitude of potential gains or losses. In the eighteenth century, risk

was used in the marine insurance industry to designate the perils that could compromise a voyage

(Althaus 2005). The chances of a ship being lost versus safely coming home were determined and

insurance values assessed. In its early conception, risk was value-neutral. Risk, being neither

good nor bad, merely described probabilities of large gains or losses.

This early meaning of risk became the basis for probabilistic methods of analysis. The term risk

became deeply entrenched in science. The concept of risk became partnered with its use as a

“forensic resource” in science and technology due to its use investigating probabilities (Douglas

1992: 24). Risk assessment now has standard applications in scientific methods. As the concept

of risk has evolved risk now means danger; high risk means a lot of danger (Douglas 1992). No

10

longer is risk a value-free term, but rather it connotes negativity and is used to describe only

potential losses and harm. Because risk has evolved through scientific and industrial applications

in its role of probabilistic assessment, risk has taken on a legitimate characteristic. Danger does

not have the association of precise, scientific application that risk does (Douglas 1992: 25). The

concept of danger does not have the type of rational and logical confidence that risk does.

A. Definitions

A debate continues on the relationship between risk and danger. There are four primary

definitions in risk literature: a) Risks are identified hazards while dangers are unperceived or

unknown by humans; b) Risks are related to conscious decisions while dangers are involuntary

exposure to hazards; c) Dangers are real while risks are perceived; d) risk and danger are

synonymous (Rosa 2003). Each definition has its conceptual basis derived from a particular

school of thought. Each serves to delineate the scope of its theory of perception while allowing

the broadest possible framework. However, in common terminology both risk and danger are

accepted as synonymous. This thesis takes the same approach, with no delineation between the

two.

Uncertainty is coupled with the concept of risk. Uncertainty is defined as the unknown, a thing

that has a lack of assurance, something that cannot be known positively. Uncertainty is so tightly

coupled with risk that it is impossible to talk about risk without pairing it with uncertainty (Rosa

2003: 56, Althaus 2005: 570). If the size, scope and outcome of risk were certain, a course of

action would be much easier to plan for. If outcomes were known, there would be fewer

arguments about the acceptability of hazards. There would be no debate about estimates of the

potential for technological failure or environmental damage from chemicals. Risk is coupled with

the concept of uncertainty, and any distinction of risk without uncertainty is meaningless.

11

Other concepts closely related to risk perception are risk assessment, identification, and

management. Much effort has gone in to developing these concepts over the past century. Most

notably, the business and scientific communities have put much effort into defining processes to

identify dangers and assess their scope, breath and probability of happening. These processes

provide organizations better information to help them make better decisions regarding hazards to

property, finances, and human welfare (Stern & Fineberg 1996). Many industries now operate

with risk management plans that contain contingencies for accidents and other uncertainties.

These risk management plans include preparing mitigation plans, assigning risk officers or teams

to reduce risks, and creating risk reporting channels. The National Research Council’s umbrella

term for these related terms is risk characterization (Stern & Fineberg 1996). However, these

processes differ from risk perception. Risk characterization is an industry-driven tool to help

control risks, but does not attempt to explain why the lay public perceives risks as they do.

B. Assumptions

In order to understand variances in risk perception theories, two key philosophical differences in

assumptions must be explained. From the engineering and psychology disciplines primarily

comes an objective view of the world, ontological realism, that states objects are real and

independent of human interpretation (Rosa 2003: 51). This assumption defines objects and truths

outside of human interaction and perception. The case for this argument invokes physical

constraints that are beyond human agency, such as gravity or the speed of light, and claims that

the world does exist beyond human interpretation. Even if our senses are unreliable, they are still

being activated by the world around us. Lay-people are ontological realists and treat risks as real.

Using an objective assumption in theory is most consistent with the lay use. If risks were socially

interpreted, an epistemological entity, then they could not be distinguished from risk perception.

12

The other assumption originates from the sociology and anthropology disciplines: social

constructivism. This assumption states that everything in the world is interpreted by humans

through cultural values, institutions, and the interplay between social agents. From this

perspective, the task is to explain how the perspectives of risk are created and adapted. Realist-

objectiveness definitions assume that risk objects are given and that perception needs to be

explained. Instead of objective assumptions, social constructivism confronts the issue,

establishing the “malleability” of the risk object to varying interpretations (Clarke & Short 1993:

379). This definition widens the possible solutions to hazards. Constructionist arguments tend to

focus on power; namely, the power to define objects and concepts. In risk perception the task of

social constructivism is to explain how power is used by key actors to define boundaries and

identify what is dangerous (Clarke & Short 1993: 379).

This paper follows a social constructivist assumption. Due to the nature of human perception,

discussing objects outside of that has little meaning. Without rooting observations within a social

framework, there is no human meaning - why ask what people’s perceptions are? Discussing risk

perception has meaning only within the lens of human awareness.

Section 2: The Development of Risk Perception Theory

The mid 1960’s saw the rapid rise of nuclear technologies and the promise for clean and safe

energy. However, public perception shifted against this new technology. Fears of both

longitudinal dangers to the environment as well as immediate disasters creating radioactive

wastelands turned the public against this new technology. The scientific and governmental

communities asked why public perception was against the use of nuclear energy when all of the

scientific experts were declaring how safe it really was. The problem, from the perspectives of

the experts, was a difference between scientific facts and an exaggerated public perception of the

dangers (Douglas, 1985: 22).

13

In trying to answer the question of why the public perceives risks they way they do, four main

theories of risk perception emerged1. In brief, the four theories include:

1. The engineering approach assumes that individuals behave in a rational manner,

weighing information before making a decision. Individuals have exaggerated fears due

to inadequate or incorrect information. Implied in this assumption is that additional

information can help people understand true risk and hence lessen their opinion of danger

(Douglas 1985). While researchers in the engineering school did pioneer research in risk

perception, by adapting theories from economics, it has little use in a practical setting.

Numerous studies have rejected the belief that additional information, alone, will shift

perceptions (Freudenberg 1993). The engineering approach ignores both individual

cognitive and social factors influencing people’s perceptions of risk.

2. The psychology approach began with research in trying to understand how people

process information. These early works maintain that people use cognitive heuristics in

sorting and simplifying information which lead to biases in comprehension. Later work

built on this foundation and became the psychometric paradigm. This approach identifies

numerous factors responsible for influencing individual perceptions of risk, including

dread, newness, stigma, and other factors (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Data is easy to

collect and analyze quantitatively; researchers have to identify the correct variables.

However, risk perceptions are rendered statically and the theory does not account for

shifting perceptions of risk. The psychology approach also ignores power and other

social and cultural influences.

1 The fifth approach from the biological/ecological school of thought, while not developed specifically for risk perception, does reference risk response and adaptability. Ecological research in the biological sciences started with an article by G.F. White in 1952 titled “Human Adjustment to Floods.” The ecological framework proposes that communities of humans develop through sequential stages, encountering and adapting to various hazards (Douglas 1985). This theory defines risks as separate from dangers; dangers being reacted to by populations while risk requires the intelligent response of populations. Humans acting as rational agents calculate risks before taking actions. The ecological theory emphasizes the subject’s coping mechanisms. This framework does not concern itself with individuals and instead focuses on larger population categories sorted for their perceived characteristics in varying populations.

14

3. The anthropology/sociology approach posits risk perceptions as produced by and

supporting social institutions (Wildavsky & Dake 1990). In this view, perceptions are

socially constructed by institutions, cultural values, and ways of life. In cultural theory,

four “ways of life” denoted by constrains in social role and boundaries of solidarity

influence how groups of people will view and respond to risks. Quantitative data

collection and analysis are challenging due to the difficulty classifying people into one of

the four ways of life. This approach ignores individual variables and is somewhat

restrictive in its explicit defining of only four ways of life. However, this work pioneered

efforts at demonstrating how social and cultural factors influence risk perception.

4. The integrated approach, or Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), combines

research in both the psychology and sociology/anthropology paradigms with

communications theory. SARF outlines how communications of risk events pass from

the sender through intermediate stations to a receiver and in the process serve to amplify

or attenuate perceptions of risk. All links in the communication chain, individuals,

groups, media, etc., contain filters through which information is sorted and understood

(Kasperson et al. 1988). These filters include the information signal itself, as well as

individual, social and institutional factors. The theory also explains how larger ripple

effects may impact social and economic processes. It integrates individual cognitive

factors with social variables; however, it still emphasizes individual factors. While the

theory includes brief descriptions of social processes influencing risk perception, it is

severely lacking in its detail.

A. The Engineering Approach

The engineering school of thought modified scientific processes of risk identification and

assessment to the social sciences (Douglas 1985). This approach assumes that factual

information can educate the populace and wash away fears. It believes that individuals are

15

independent, with little or no social interaction, and require information in order to make rational

decisions. One of the first articles published on risk perception was in 1969, when Chauncey

Starr wrote an article titled “Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk” and published it in

Science. Starr’s work, adapted from economics, uses a “revealed preference” theory to predict

what types of risk people will accept. In brief, he proposed four factors: 1) Limits of

acceptability: people will accept additional risk if benefits also increase; 2) natural levels of risk:

the public ignores risks below the natural hazard line; 3) voluntary risk: people will accept greater

risk if it is undertaken voluntarily; 4) Chronic and catastrophic risk: people view a distinction

between chronic and isolated risks (Douglas 1985). Starr’s “revealed preferences” method

assumes that societal expenditures reveal the policy preference of the public (Freudenberg 1993).

Starr opened the debate about irrational risk decisions made by the public. This fueled the

engineering assumption that people need to be educated.

The engineering approach assumes an ignorant and irrational public that may be overcome by

providing additional information to help allay fears (Freudenberg 1993: 910). However, human

perceptions are not driven solely by economic rational choice. Social institutions, family ties, and

values of justice and honor come into play when people are making decisions. The engineering

approach ignores these factors and thus is limited in its applicability to humans. Research

conducted on risk perception has proven that the public is not irrational; they have additional

criteria for evaluating risk acceptability (Slovic 2000).

Another criticism of this approach is with the proposed solution to lessening public perceptions of

risk. To the engineering school of thought, additional information is the key in helping people

understand and accept risk. However, in practice, the public uses the most efficient tool it

possesses – causes and emotions – and not information. The most effective strategy used by

protagonists in risk debates is appealing to social values and human emotions (Cole & Withey

16

1981: 152). Most members of the public are unaware of technical details and providing them

with additional technical information may not allay public fears associated with an activity or

proposed facility.

B. The Psychology Approach

The psychology approach may be split in two key time periods. The forerunner was research in

individual decision making, which resulted in theories of heuristics and biases (Tversky &

Kahneman 1974). Building upon that research, work in cognitive science produced in the

psychometric paradigm. The psychological approach dominates risk perception research. Its

foundations are that of psychology and various researches have since united themselves into what

is now called the psychometric paradigm. The work in cognitive studies began with early work

in heuristics by Kahneman and Tversky and continued with decision science work by Slovic.

This approach is grounded firmly in the realist-objectivist assumption of the world (Rosa 2003).

The focus of these theories is on the individual and those factors that influence individual

perception of risk. The theories do not place much emphasis on identifying the social factors

involved nor the context in which risk perception takes place (Douglas 1992, Clarke & Short

1993).

Heuristics and Biases - Early in the development of psychometric theory, the psychologists

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman formulated a theory of risk perception from expected utility

theory in a 1974 articled titled “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”. Heuristics,

they claim, are used by people to reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities (Tversky &

Kahneman 1974). The three most common heuristics, postulated are those of representativeness,

availability, and adjustment/anchoring.

17

The representativeness heuristic claims that the amount that an object is similar to another will

influence people’s assessment that the objects are related (Tversky & Kahneman 1974: 1124).

The availability heuristic maintains that the ability to recall an activity to mind will influence

people’s assessment of the probability of that activity (1974: 1127). The adjustment and

anchoring heuristic asserts that initial values will influence people’s assessment. (1974: 1128).

Others have suggested that three additional factors effect people’s assessments. Asymmetry

between gains and losses asserts that people are “risk seeking when faced with losses, risk

adverse when facing gains” (Heimer 1988: 497). Threshold affect states that people prefer to

move from uncertainty to certainty rather than a similar reduction in uncertainty that does not

lead to certainty (Heimer 1988). Another type of cognitive illusion, proposed by Thaler (1983), is

that of mirage. Mirage leads people to think that they have many choices when they have only

one choice.

Tversky & Kahneman’s assumptions of public irrationality are evident from their theory

regarding individual cognitive influences of lay person risk perception. Their work has

contributed significantly to the assumptions about public irrationality (Freudenburg 1993).

Although heuristics try to explain why people incorrectly estimate probabilities, its usefulness

may not be for our complex technological and scientific times. The theory also neglects expert

biases and limitations in technical knowledge (Clarke & Short 1993). If experts cannot agree, do

biases in public assessments even matter? Tversky & Kahneman’s theory ignores context and

simplifies the factors that influence perceptions. This theory advocates education which implies

that people are to blame for perceptions outside those stated by experts. While people are to

blame for their lack of knowledge, nothing addresses differences in values. The assumption that

information can resolve value conflicts is absurd. The legitimacy of their work is also challenged

by other psychologists, questioning the real-versus-perceived dichotomy of risk.

18

Psychometric - In the 1980’s, the cognitive science research started with the heuristic exploration

and moved into using “psychophysical scaling and multivariate analysis techniques to produce

quantitative representations or ‘cognitive maps’ of risk attitudes and perceptions” (Slovic 1987:

281). Led by a team at a non-profit organization called “Decision Research” including Paul

Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein and Baruch Fischhoff, this area of study started in heuristics and later

began to identify factors influencing people’s perceptions of risk. Their research aims were to

discover what people mean when they say something is risky, develop predictors of how people

respond to new hazards and develop processes for assessing the opinions people have about risk

(Slovic et al. 1982).

Slovic and team found that perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. People tend to view

current risk levels as unacceptably high for most activities (Slovic 2000). All things being equal,

the greater people perceived a benefit, the greater the tolerance for a risk (Slovic et al. 1982). If a

person derived pleasure from using a product, people tended to judge its benefits as high and its

risks as low. If the activity was disliked, the judgments were opposite (Gregory & Mendelsohn

1993, Slovic 2000). Research in psychometrics has proven that risk perception is highly

dependent on intuition, experiential thinking, and emotions (Slovic 2000: xxxi).

Psychometric research identified a broad domain of characteristics that may be condensed into

three high order factors: 1) the degree to which a risk is understood, 2) the degree to which it

evokes a feeling of dread, and 3) the number of people exposed to the risk. A dread risk elicits

visceral feelings of terror, uncontrollable, catastrophe, inequality, and uncontrolled. An unknown

risk is new and unknown to science. The more a person dreads an activity, the higher its

perceived risk and the more that person wants the risk reduced (Slovic et al. 1982: 87). Experts’

opinions tend not to be related to risk characteristics of dread, the unknown, and exposure, but

rather to scientific facts and statistics.

19

While experts typically identify human fatalities as more risky activities, laypeople incorporate a

broad multidimensional conception of risk such as voluntariness, controllability, catastrophic

potential, equity, and threat to future generations (Slovic 2000). However, when asked to

estimate the annual number of human fatalities, both the experts and laypersons had similar

accuracy. Inversely, both laypersons and experts tend to have similar biases (Slovic et al. 1982).

Research has found that expert’s opinions are prone to many of the same biases of lay persons,

especially when experts are asked to rely upon their intuition instead of available data (Slovic et

al. 1982: 85).

Trust in risk management has been found to relate with gender, race, and worldviews (Slovic

2000). Trust in institutions and government agencies play a large role in perceptions of risk.

Much of the public contest in risk characterization is attributed to a climate of distrust in

organizations and agencies responsible for managing hazards (Slovic 2000). Risks can be

amplified through our open and highly participatory democratic government, primarily through

the media. Special interest groups and the news media are quite skilled in bringing trust-

destroying news to the public attention. Also, the legal system pits expert against expert,

contradicting risk assessments which further destroys public trust (Slovic 2000).

While studying the proposed nuclear waste facility in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Slovic and

others found that stigma is closely related to the perception of risk (Slovic 2000). A positive or

negative feeling towards an object is the basis for perceived risk from that object. The key

dimensions of social stigma include concealability, course, disruptiveness, aesthetic qualities,

origin, and peril. Peril is the key link between stigma and perceived risk. (Slovic 2000).

Activities seen as morally objectionable, polluting and with other negative stereotypes are more

likely to be perceived as more risky than activities associated with positive or few stereotypes.

20

Research found that the news media are the greatest contributor to stigma, through the social

amplification process (Slovic 2000).

Slovic and others theorize a ripple effect due to an unfortunate event, impacting not only those

directly affected but also the responsible agency, and other industries (1987). The potential social

impact of an event is related to the characteristics of the hazard (1987). An accident that occurs

as part of a well understood system may produce little social disturbance while an event that

occurs in an unfamiliar system, even if few lives are lost, may produce immense social

consequences. These theories argued against an irrational public by linking people’s anxieties to

the characteristics of the unknown, dread, uncontrollable, inequitable, catastrophic, and likely to

affect future generations. This path led to a theory describing how psychological, social, cultural

and political factors interact to amplify and attune risks.

The psychometric paradigm has helped risk perception theories evolve from the early work of

Starr’s revealed preference theory. However, psychometric research has a few limitations. It

portrays perceptions statically, at one point in time (Rogers 1997). The survey research, on which

most of the findings are based, asks people to either rank risks or assess perceptions of risk. This

type of research does not allow for shifting perceptions based on new information, changing

social climates or additional accidents. The psychometric paradigm mainly focuses on individual

perception of risks and not the social processes responsible for influencing perceptions.

C. The Anthropology/Sociology Approach

A number of theories from anthropology, sociology and political science argue that risks are

produced by, and support social institutions. The first and prevailing theory was published in

1982 by anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. The theory,

called “cultural theory” of risk perception used worldviews to explain public reaction to risks.

21

This school of thought views risks as constructed by cultural influences and institutions. Cultural

theory focuses on cultural influences rather than individual psychological differences in risk

judgments. Individual and cultural biases are important in understanding why groups of people

perceive risks the way they do (Douglas 1990: 11).

In cultural theory, Douglas and Wildavsky outline four “ways of life” in a grid/group

arrangement. Each way of life corresponds to a specific social structure and a particular outlook

on risk. Grid categorizes the degree to which people are constrained and circumscribed in their

social role. The tighter binding of social constraints limits individual negotiation. Group refers

to the extent to which individuals are bounded by feelings of belonging or solidarity. The greater

the bonds, the less individual choice are subject to personal control (Thompson et al. 1990). Four

ways of life include:

Hierarchical – Those placing high reliance and trust on authority and regulation are

categorized by a hierarchical way of life. Setting “acceptable risk” at high levels is

tolerable as long as risk decisions are made by experts. Hierarchists fear crime,

delinquency and disruptions to the ordering of society (Marris et al. 1998, Douglas &

Wildavsky 1982). Studies have shown that hierarchists are personally risk adverse yet

societally risk taking especially with technology (Wildavsky and Dake 1990).

Individualist – Those placing value on market competition are classified with an

individualist way of life. Individualists see risk as opportunity, unless it might impair the

functioning of the market. They assume that unforeseen hazards will be mitigated by

new technologies. They have low concern for environmental and personal threats

(Marris et al. 1998).

Egalitarian (called “Sectarian” by Douglas) – Those placing great value on egalitarian

relationships are labeled by the Egalitarian/Sectarian way of life. These people join

voluntary associations where members are equal, value consensus decision-making, and

22

place great worth on information. Sectarians fear hidden, involuntary and low-

probability yet catastrophic risks such as environmental threats and genetic engineering

(Marris et al. 1998). Although egalitarians may suffer from unnecessary worry, they

often spot risks that others have missed. Studies have shown that egalitarians are

personally risk taking yet societally risk adverse (Wildavsky and Dake 1990).

Fatalist – People concerned about personal survival in the absence of any association are

characterized by a fatalist way of life. They feel a lack of control over their own fate.

They neither willingly take risks nor fear them. Others may try to impose dangers on

them because of the fatalists’ passivity.

Figure 1: Grid/Group Ways of Life in Cultural Theory (Thompson et al.1990).

The US is a primarily sectarian country organized around egalitarian principles. Douglas and

Wildavsky argue that sectarian ideals are more widely supported in the US due to a complex

23

historical pattern of social changes. The US is arranged with egalitarian principles demonstrated

through the democratic political system, importance of individual entrepreneurships, fear of

public authority (value of civil rights), history of escaping religious persecution and emphasis on

voluntary organizations (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982). Egalitarians see the dangers of technology

as high and associated benefits as small. The public controversy about nuclear technology,

genetically modified foods, and other new technologies seems to prove this point.

Cultural theory maintains that while trust in societal institutions is an important factor in people’s

perceptions of risk, trust is about cultural conflict (Wildavsky & Dake 1990). Trust is another

way to conceptualize cultural biases and corresponds with the ways of life paradigm. Wildavsky

cites numerous studies concluding that knowledge of actual dangers made no difference

whatsoever in the public’s perception. The most powerful variables were trust in institutions and

ways of life (Wildavsky 1991). One study found that environmental organizations were the only

common institutional source of information that was highly trusted by the public (Marris et al.

1998: 644).

Risk perception researchers have not widely accepted Cultural theory. Even Douglas says that

the theory is controversial; it poses a danger of moving out of the favored paradigm of individual

rational choice of which many researchers are comfortable (1992). In a criticism of ontological

realism, Douglas states that few theories incorporate “how a given set of moral principles affects

perceptions of risk” (1985: 3). She says that justice and morality in risk taking are not much

discussed in prevailing theories of risk perception. Cultural theory opens a door to thinking about

the wider factors influencing people’s perceptions of risk: cultural values, justice, morality, and

social institutions.

24

Cultural theory’s proposed power is its ability to predict who is likely to fear different kinds of

dangers (Wildavsky and Dake 1990: 52). However, studies conducted on cultural theory have

shown its limited applicability (Marris et al. 1998, Sjoberg 2000). One study finds that attitude

plays a prominent role in risk perception, but not in the general sense posited by cultural theory

(Sjoberg 2000: 9). Although many of the cognitive and psychometric theories ignore social

variables, cultural theory has the opposite problem in ignoring individual variables. Also, in

quantitative studies, it is almost impossible to classify people into only one of the four ways of

life, as most have elements of all of them (Marris et al. 1998). Lastly, the grid/group emphasis

places rigidity upon the application of the theory. Creating rigid boundaries between a very few

ways of life limits researchers from exploring how cultural variables may influence perception.

D. An Integrated Approach: Social Amplification of Risk Framework

In the late 80’s and early 90’s, researchers from Clark University (Kasperson, Renn, et. al.) and

Decision Research (Slovic, et. al.) developed a theory of risk perception that integrated the

fragmented nature of risk perception by partnering it with theories of communication. The

theoretical framework, named the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), is an attempt

to incorporate findings from media research, psychometric and cultural paradigms,

communication theories, and organizational studies (Kasperson et al. 2003, Kasperson 1988).

The theory attempts to explain the process by which risks are amplified, receiving public

attention, or attuned, receiving less public attention. The theory may be used to compare

responses from different groups in a single event, or analyze the same risk issue in multiple

events. In a single risk event, some groups may amplify their perception of risks while other

groups may attune, decrease, and their perceptions of risk. The main thesis of SARF states that

risk events interact with individual psychological, social and other cultural factors in ways that

either increase or decrease public perceptions of risk. Behaviors of individuals and groups then

25

generate secondary social or economic impacts while also increasing or decreasing the physical

risk itself (Kasperson et al. 1988: 178).

Communication theory, which describes signals and transactions, is suitable for analyzing risk

perception because of the distortion of perceptions during a risk event. In communications

theory, amplification means the intensifying or attenuating of a signal during transmission. It is

important to note that “amplification” may refer to either heightened (amplified) signal as well as

damped (attenuated) signal. In typical usage, however, amplified indicates a heightened signal.

The transmission of information goes from a sender through intermediate transmitters to a

receiver. The intermediate transmitters may be people, the media, etc. and each adds its own

filters and distortion to the signal. All components of the transmission system, including the

sender and receiver, interpret signals within a sociocultural context. Each message (signal) may

contain factual, inferential, value-related or symbolic meanings. The meanings of the signal are

interpreted through individual and social filters in order to be decoded and understood by the

receiver. The symbols present in messages are a key factor in prompting the attention of

receivers and shaping the decoding process. A number of factors influence the meaning of a

message and thus the amplification or attenuation of signals sent out by that station.

Three factors influence the amplification of signals during transmission: information, social

groups, and individual cognition. These stations provide filters and meanings through signals.

Kasperson et al. say much about informational and individual influences yet does not delve into

much depth in social and cultural factors.

Informational factors influence transmission of signals by a number of mechanisms. Information

may influence social amplification by the volume of information, the degree to which the

26

information is disputed, the amount of dramatization, and the symbolic connotations of the

information (Kasperson et al. 1988: 184).

High volumes of information may increase latent fears and enhance the recollection of

previous accidents. Concentrations of media activity and accessibility of information

shapes the issues and directs public attention towards particular risk issues.

Disputes among experts heighten public uncertainty. Conflict increases doubts about

whether the hazard is really understood by experts and whether the risk may be managed

successfully. Discord also decreases the credibility of experts.

Dramatization by the media and other news sources provide a powerful source of risk

amplification. Information is dramatized by reporting infrequent yet emotionally pungent

events, overstating the rate of occurrence of an event, or phrasing the message to impact

the emotional responses of viewers.

Channels of information are important. Through the two primary networks, media and

personal relationships, perceptions are shifted towards certain dangers. Since the news

media report dramatic events, it is no wonder that people’s risk estimates are related to

the amount of media coverage. Personal networks also provide reference points for

validation of the media. By hearing similar information repeated in multiple settings and

contexts, people are more likely to believe such information.

Social filters influence people’s risk perception and thus signal transmission. These filters

include social groups, the media, public agencies, influential opinion leaders and peers. In social

group relationships, the ideological interpretations of risk event are brought to the attention of the

general. Groups may influence member’s perceptions and the types of rationality brought to risk

issues (Kasperson et al. 1988: 185). Signal value, that is, how the informativeness of the signal

fits into an existing system, will influence its perception. If the risk event is new or ominous it

27

may trigger additional amplification. Stigmatization also influences people’s perception by

associating activities with negative images, thereby encouraging people to avoid such activities.

The second part of the SARF theory is the ripple effect caused by the amplification of risk.

Secondary impacts include, but not limited to, enduring mental perceptions, impacts on business

sales, and change in residential property values, changes in training and education, or social

disorder. These secondary changes are perceived and reacted to by individuals and groups

resulting in third-order impacts. As each higher-order impacts are reacted to, they may ripple to

other parties and locations. Traditional risk analyses neglect these ripple effect impacts and thus

greatly underestimate the adverse effects from certain risk events. Public distortion of risk

signals provides a corrective mechanism by which society assesses a fuller determination of the

risk and its impacts to such things not traditionally factored into a risk analysis (Kasperson et al.

1988).

28

Figure 2: Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Pidgeon, Kasperson, Slovic 2003)

29

There are a few limitations to SARF, which are acknowledged by Kasperson. A full theory

should explain why specific risk events undergo more or less amplification, yet SARF in its

current form has limited applicability (Kasperson et al. 1988: 181). While he admits SARF is still

a concept-in-work, a few baseline flaws may be noted. First, there is little predictive power

offered in SARF (Rayner 1988). The theory does not offer prediction about why a group may or

may not amplify a risk event. Second, SARF emphasizes an objective-realist measure of risk.

Through imperfect social means, signals are either amplified or attenuated from the baseline.

Experts are brought in to more accurately judge risks. Their estimation is then used as an

established baseline to measure the public’s amplification. A signal cannot be amplified or

attenuated without a baseline against which to measure it. In a more socially constructed view of

risk, all perceptions are valid; therefore signals cannot be amplified or attenuated because there is

no “true” signal to which one can to compare it. Perhaps “Social Interpretation of Risk” is a

better descriptor for the public’s transmission of risk signals. An individual’s filters distort

signals using a number of influences. Signals are modified in transmission and in decoding by a

number of individual and social variables. This would better suit a socially constructed

understanding of risk perception.

In 2006, Masuda and Garvin proposed that place theory helps connect social context to SARF. In

a study of a proposed industrial park in Alberta, Canada, these researchers conducted interviews

to determine what factors influenced residents perceived dangers of the plant. Four social

constructs grouped those responding to their study – sharing of similar outlooks in life, home,

prosperity and community. Those sharing similar cultural values also shared similar perceptions

of risk. They found that risk amplification occurs on the basis of place attachments. Locally-

based social networks influenced cultural worldviews which in turn influenced individual’s

perceptions. They theorize that space/location is an active dimension of social relations. Risk

perception “depends on experiences related to cultural worldviews that are underpinned not only

30

by one’s on place attachments, but those of others as well” (Masuda & Garvin 2006: 450). This

study suggests that ideologies, while tending to be shared by those in similar locations, also share

similar views of risk. Ways of life may be dynamic over time (and not just classified into cultural

theory’s four ways of life) as people move to different places. This is one of the few studies that

connect context and worldview to risk perception.

Section 3: Risk Perception in Housing Development

“Few sociologists have studied risks to the social fabric in the context of risk analysis.” James Short (1984: 716).

The task undertaken in this thesis is twofold: a) to demonstrate that housing development fits the

framework for risk perception theories and may be analyzed by such; and b) to provide additional

detail on how context, process, and the interaction between the two influence the public’s

perception of risk.

Housing development is not considered dangerous enough to list in many risk articles. There is

almost no mention of land use planning in any risk text. In a list of dangers, only a few examples

come close to the topic of land use. In a book by Kasperson the nearest events resembling land

use is soil erosion, deforestation and desertification (Kasperson & Kasperson 2005: 117). In a

chart by Slovic, home appliances and skyscrapers appear, yet are still no closer to land use

(Slovic et al. 1982: 86). While a land use is not a typical environmental or technological hazard

analyzed in the risk literature, it shares many common features. Certainly, people’s response to

housing development may be affected by non-risk associated factors, such as NIMBY’ism, class

concern, individual relationships with developers, etc. However, risks in housing development

abound: risks to the economy, environment, and social fabric.

The Covell Village housing development had many potential risks:

31

Financial risk to the developers, city government and to nearby housing prices (Sierra

Club 2005, Wagstaff, et al 10-2005). If estimates of housing prices were not accurate,

not only would the developers lose financially, the city would not gain the required

property tax revenue to pay for city services to the new development.

Increased traffic congestion leading to high delays and extensive queuing (Raney 2004,

Sierra Club 2005). This might result in increased air pollution from vehicles as well as

frustration for drivers.

Environmental risks resulting from developing agricultural land which then cannot be

used for farm production or wildlife habitat. Urban sprawl and paving over farmland has

become heightened in the public eye. Increased pollution from additional traffic,

construction and home emissions analyzed by one UCD professor were estimated to cost

$40 million in insurance costs and another $40 million from increased illnesses (Stumpf

6-1-2005).

A risk of flood damage to new houses by building in the 100 year flood plain (Sierra

Club 2005, Wagstaff et al. 2005).

Loss of the “small town community feel” that currently exists in Davis. Many were

afraid that the city would be growing too large and lose the sense of a university town

with people engaged in healthy civic lives.

Other dangers such as increased crime due to increased population and placing the city’s

wastewater treatment plant over capacity.

The items listed above contain uncertainty and fit the definition of risk. Underlying the Covell

Village case is a risk decision. While this decision is unlike similar decisions that are resolved by

one person, or a small group of policy makers, this risk event went to a vote of the public. As

authors in risk perception state, risk decisions are public policy choices (Stern & Fineberg, 1996:

26). Ultimately, in a socially constructed view of the world, when people define something as a

32

risk, it becomes one. In the Covell Village case, the numerous opponents to the project voiced

concerns over the dangers of the project, thereby establishing boundaries and baselines for risk

perception.

Comprehension of contextual setting, risk debate process, and the interaction between the two is

needed in order to fully understand why individuals and groups respond to risk events. The

development of theories over the past fifty years has revealed many characteristics involved in

risk perception. However, three of them emphasis individual traits, a third over generalizes

worldviews, and all of them either disregard or pay little heed to social processes. The context,

including shared history, cultural values, and past events interact with the risk debate process

including features of the event, people involved, and conduct of those people to cause the actions

and reactions of individuals and groups. In the Covell Village case, the campaign limited public

debate (process) frustrating Davis residents who hold strong participatory values (context) while

the behavior of the developers (process) evoked fears and anger based on past history and events

(context). Analyzing only the Covell Village campaign, without any knowledge of the situation,

history or background would only tell a partial story.

The next two chapters tell the story of Covell Village. Chapter 3 sharing information on Davis’s

a) history of growth struggles; b) cultural values of egalitarianism and environmental

conservationism; and c) past and current events damaging people’s trust in the developers and

city government. Chapter 4 delves into the campaign, demonstrating that the process and how it

interacts with the context shapes risk perception. This chapter focuses on a) the features of

Covell Village; b) key actors; and c) process and behavior of the actors.

33

Chapter 3: Context: Davis Character and History

This chapter provides background information on a variety of factors in the City of Davis.

Through the information presented here, one can better understand why a housing development is

so contested in the city. Not knowing this background hinders a full appreciation of why Davis

residents view land use as an activity laded with risk. In other municipalities with different

histories and cultural values, the response of the public to the risk event process may be much

different. Context provides a lens in which current activities, the process, is interpreted and

reacted to by the government, developers and other members of the public.

This chapter highlights four primary contextual factors:

1. The composition of Davis provides insight into several unique demographic factors:

highly educated populace, higher then average median income, and higher than average

rental occupied units.

2. The history of growth, the disputes surrounding them, and the ripple effects from them

demonstrate a populace very conflicted with land use. Past growth struggles have served

to create a core group of activists that know the issues, have experience in campaigns,

and are successful at heightening the perceived risks of housing development.

3. Davis’s socio-cultural values affect how people interpret and react to future activities.

Having strong feelings of preservation for the character of Davis, environmental ideals,

and deliberative democratic principles affects the outlook of residents. These norms

come into play through the Covell Village campaign by evoking feelings of mistrust, fear

and anger.

4. Institutional trust has been shaped by past and current events and resulted in decreasing

levels of mistrust by the public in the city government and University officials. Risk

34

perception is influenced by trust in an organization and that organization’s credibility.

The Covell Village campaign found themselves affected by these past events, when the

opposition questioned the credibility and truthfulness of city and developer claims.

Section 1: The Composition of Davis

The City of Davis has several unique composition factors, shaping its contextual setting. Median

income, educational attainment and rental occupied units are higher in Davis than surrounding

cities and California as a whole. The University of California, Davis also effects the composition

of Davis, contributing to a high degree of academic faculty residents to the city.

Davis is a small town between Sacramento and San Francisco. As of the 2000 US Census, Davis

was comprised of 67,407 residents. The median age in Davis is 24.8 years old with 21% of the

population between the ages of 20-24 years old. The median family income (in 1999 dollars) is

$72,616 while the median household income is $42,110. Forty-two percent of the population

works in educational, health or social services. These statistics confirm popular belief that Davis

contains a high proportion of UC Davis students and a non-student working population with

strong ties to the University. Out of the 25,366 total housing units in Davis, renters occupy

13,633 (approximately 53%), which is 22% higher than the national average. This indicates a

large transient student population. In terms of educational attainment, 32% hold a bachelor’s

degree and 36% hold a graduate or professional degree. In comparison, 69% of Davis residents

hold a bachelor’s degree or higher while only 27% of Californian at large have the same

educational attainment. These numbers prove a common belief: Davis is a “University Town.”

Davisville, California began as a rail town in 1868, as California Pacific Railroad laid tracks for

the transcontinental railroad through the San Joaquin Valley. At least 500 people began making

35

Davisville a town in the first few years as it became a center for shipping grain on the train

(Lofland 2004: 15). Davis was incorporated as a city in 1917 and shortly thereafter, in 1923,

began discussion of the need for a “City Plan.” This movement led to the creation of a City

Planning Commission which finalized a General Plan in 1927. While the movement of city

planning was becoming known throughout the country at the time, the citizens of Davis

recognized early that planning development was needed (Lofland 2004: 106).

Davisville followed patterns of development cycles similar to other towns and saw a boom in

building after World War II. Many cities saw their downtown districts decimated by allowing

peripheral shopping malls through the 1940’s to 1960’s. However, unlike other cities after World

War II, Davis was able to prevent peripheral shopping centers and concentrated on the “core

area.” (Lofland 2004: 65). The “core area” became part of the Davis lexicon and served to

sidestep perceptions of the downtown being traditional and old fashioned. Instead, people talked

about something “new” – the core area – allowing people to be trendy. At the time, economic

and political elites viewed business growth as a threat and residential growth at the edge of town

as safe; today, many in Davis view residential growth as negative yet economic development as

something to be encouraged.

Davis’s history has been tremendously influenced by the University Farm. Long before its

acceptance as a separate University of California campus, UC Davis was the University Farm at

Davis. In the early 1900’s, UC Berkeley sought a location for a University Farm to aid in

agricultural education. Davis was selected as the site for a few primary reasons. 1) The

legislative act listed features the site required, including good soil and irrigation and a location

along a major rail line. These provisions made Davis especially attractive while many other sites

lacked features. 2) Davis had an especially effective committee. In part, due to the committee’s

political connections and shrewdness, Davis was selected as the University Farm. (Lofland 2004:

36

47). The influence of the University on Davis can be seen in many ways. Approximately thirty-

five percent of the residents in Davis are university students (calculated from the 2000 UC

Census, the 2004 UCD Enrollment, and a report from the Sedway Group in 2004). Factor in

professors and staff, and the percentage of residents with ties to the University rises even more. In

general, a large proportion of the population in Davis is either highly educated (professors, staff)

or in the process of being educated (students). 1980’s USA Today ranked Davis as the second

most highly educated city in the country (Fitch 1998). As a center for education and research,

Davis generates innovations in environmental stewardship. It is no wonder that Davis attracts an

environmentally-conscious crowd.

In terms of political activity, of the 34,895 people registered to vote, 51% of those are Democrat

compared with only 20% registered Republican, 3% Green and 23% undeclared (Yolo Elections

Office 2005). In the last Presidential election, John Kerry received 59% of the Yolo County vote,

which is heavily influenced by Davis. If a generalization can be made from these statistics, it is

that Davis has a large liberal contingent.

A writer on Davis history, Mike Fitch (1998) offers this insight into Davis:

“My theory is that Davis is a city with an overabundance of middle-class, well-educated high-achievers out to save the world. Failing that, they at least want to save Davis from urban sprawl, suburban shopping malls, the nation’s love affair with automobiles and other afflictions of the modern world.”

Section 2: History of Davis Development

Past experiences help shape people's understanding and acceptance of current and future

activities. People involved in prior growth conflict in Davis are much more likely to be familiar

with the terminology of development and know effective strategies in combating development.

History has been important, especially in Davis, in uniting a core group of activists and, through

37

their experience in prior struggles, increasing their solidarity and capacity for challenging growth.

Past growth struggles are one of the ripple effects discussed in the Social Amplification of Risk

Framework (Kasperson et al. 1988). Prior campaigns have produced changes to behavior,

knowledge and future responses to housing development. The ripples from past housing

development proposals continue to influence public, developer and city response to new

proposals. This section guides one through the last forty years of growth conflict, city general

plans, and the public policy results of ongoing struggles. The section finishes with a brief history

of the parcel of land slated for Covell Village and a look at why Davis has been successful at

limiting growth compared with similar cities.

The City of Davis has seen both tremendous growth and the expectation of expansion over its 137

year history. A special census released in April 1969 showed that 60% of the county’s growth

had been in Davis (Fitch 1998). Davis grew 28.8 percent between 1990 and 2000 (John 9-14-

2005). In September 1967, the City Council agreed to expand the General Plan to allow Davis to

hold up to 110,000 persons, which has since been modified (Fitch 1998). Past proposals have

initiated coalitions to challenge additional residential expansion and also resulted in two primary

control tools now used in the city – the pass-through agreement and measure J. In reviewing the

chart (below), it becomes clear that Davis has had a unique history of growth struggles, especially

in the last three decades. To see how Davis’s past influenced the outcome of the Covell Village

debate, a few areas need exploration: a) the brief five decades of expansion struggles; b) the

affect of the general plan on city enlargement; c) establishment of growth control tools; d) prior

development proposals for the Covell Village parcel of land.

38

Figure 3: Chart of City of Davis Growth Conflict (S. Worker)

A. History of Growth Struggles

“Davis didn’t become a slow-growth champion by accident. Growth control was a natural reaction to the community’s rapid growth during the 1960’s, and the awareness that more growth

was inevitable as UC Davis added students.” - Mike Fitch (Fitch 1998:Ch 7)

Growth control emerged as an issue in the mid 1960’s as many residents became worried about

the pace of change and sensed that the character of Davis was at risk (Fitch 1998). Rapid

building after World War II pushed residential development westward across Highway 113, north

of Covell Boulevard, and south of interstate 80 (Fitch 1998). The University certainly provided a

huge force in the city’s expansion. As the University admitted additional students and hired new

faculty and staff, they needed places to live in Davis. Between 1958, when UCD became a

general campus, and 1969, the student population increased by more than 10,000. In the early

1960’s, a sewer-needs study assumed that Davis would have as many as 240,000 residents by

2010 (Fitch 1998). The 1970’s saw movement by the City Council to identify growth as an issue.

The 1980’s was a hot-bed of contested developments and referendum and agreements to try to

slow growth. The 90’s maintained that momentum. At the turn of the 21st century, Davis saw

innovated growth control tools being implemented as well as a heightened awareness of

preserving agriculture and open space by all of California.

39

1970’s - Many refer to the 1972 Davis City Council election as a political watershed and

indicative of an era of progressivism (Fitch 1998, Lofland 2004: 135). Three new City Council

members, Joan Poulos, Richard Holdstock and Bob Black, were elected in 1972 that could

achieve majorities sufficient to adopt innovative policies (Lofland 2004: 137). A mix of factors

came into play allowing progressive elements to come to power: a) the entire country was

questioning the legitimacy of authority; b) Davis had been growing at an alarming rate; c) only

one incumbent sought reelection for three empty seats; d) the minimum voting age had recently

been lowered and students were allowed to vote in the cities where they attended college; and e) a

Vietnam peace initiative was on the ballot, luring students to the polls (Fitch 1998). The 1972

City Council took steps to update the General Plan, approving in 1973 one that contained a

guiding principle of growth control. Davis and Petaluma were the only towns in California at the

time that tried to impost expansion limits. Davis relied on a housing allocation system, which

used a yearly survey to determine the amount of new housing needed (Fitch 1998).

Also in 1972, activists created the Greater Davis Planning and Research Group (GDPRG), a

volunteer and loosely organized association composed primarily of graduate students. The

GDPRG emphasized the conclusion of an ecology class that supporting and maintaining the

capability of the earth and minimizing environmental impacts were of extreme import (Dixon

2006: 18). The group strived not only to stop expansion, but also to educate the community of

the environmental impact of its actions (Dixon 2006: 19). The group was never formalized, but

relied on individual members to undertake projects.

The City of Davis started early with its city planning, adopting the first plan in 1923, and creating

the first Planning Commission shortly thereafter. General Plan updates have been contested,

especially since they contain cultural values, expectations, and mapping the future of the city.

40

City officials, residents, and others have to balance their desires along with the needs of others to

create a holistic plan that will work. A General Plan is comprehensive in its components,

addressing city wide needs in land use, transportation, housing, water, parks, education, the arts,

historical resources, and many other areas. A General Plan serves as a decision-making tool,

allowing residents and city officials to make decisions knowing that they represent agreed-upon

future assumptions. (Davis General Plan 2001: Section 1)

The 1973 General Plan can be said to have introduced the beginnings of growth control measures

to the City of Davis. At the time, the only other city in California with similar controls was

Petaluma (Fitch 1998). The plan called for limiting growth to internally generated housing needs.

To this end, yearly housing allocations were used to restrict the number of building permits issued

each year. In the first few years, the allocation was set at 300 houses per year, but in 1976 that

was cut to 150 houses (Lofland 2004: 138). The General Plan called for a target of 50,000

residents by 1990, although that was increased to 52,000 in 1981. In spite of these growth control

measures, 1977 saw almost $24 million in construction including 563 single-family homes

(Lofland 2004: 139).

If the 70’s could be described in one sentence, it would be from historian Shipley Walters: “Many

residents had started questioning the growth-for-growth’s-sake philosophy because of the need to

preserve prim agricultural lands, desire to avoid suburban sprawl and rising costs of providing

city services to outlying areas” (Fitch 1998: Ch 2).

1980’s - The 80’s saw development pushed onto Davis, while citizen’s struggled to slow down

the rate at which Davis was growing. The sphere of influence around Davis was kept very small,

due to expected slow construction. Having a small sphere, while not creating an expectation that

it might be urbanized, served to limit Davis’s control over peripheral development. In 1981,

41

developer Frank Ramos of West Sacramento proposed both a residential and commercial

development on the south east border of Davis called Mace Ranch. The City Council declined

both, and through political maneuvering, Ramos forced the city by threatening to gain approval

from the county into accepting the development. In effect, if the county granted approval, the

city would not gain tax revenue, but would have to cope with traffic and other problems

associated with the project (Fitch 1998). The development was approved, the General Plan was

amended and the experience left many in Davis feeling overpowered and outmaneuvered. Due to

the Mace Ranch incident, a tool of growth control was implemented in 1987 – the Yolo-Davis

Pass through Agreement.

In the same year, 1986, citizens approved two referenda on the ballot. Measure S prevented the

city from building a shopping center on what is now Central Park. The ballot initiative required

the city to extend the park (Fitch 1998). Measure L was sponsored by the Citizens for the

General Plan (another volunteer group) that advised the council on the feelings of the citizens: a)

Davis should grow as slowly as it legally could; b) future growth should be infill and not

peripheral development; and c) the county should not approve peripheral development without

the consent of the city.

In 1989, the City Council created the Urban Development – Agricultural Buffer Task Force. The

primary goal of this five member board was to protect city residents and surrounding farms from

each other. The impetus behind the board came from several goals: a) to expand the city’s parks

and greenbelts; b) to establish an urban line to Davis; and c) to help prevent residents from

suffering from agricultural pesticides, noise, dust and insects while protecting farmers from

lawsuits and vandalism (Fitch 1998). Although limited by funding issues regarding the purchase

of land, the concepts developed by this group were incorporated into the open space element in

the General Plan in 1990 (Fitch 1998).

42

The General Plan was revised in 1987 which called for a target population of 75,000 by the year

2010 (Fitch 1998). While growth control was still inherent in the plan at a 1.78% growth rate per

year, many controversial features were included (Lofland 2004: 138). The plan incorporated

several major housing projects to be built by 2010 in north Davis: Northstar, Crossroads and

Wildhorse. In 2005, only Crossroads (renamed to Covell Village) has not been built. The

General Plan was approved at a 2:00am on December 23, 1987. Critics maintained that the plan

was partially forced on the city by Ramos, with his Mace Ranch project, and did not include

enough public input (Fitch 1998).

The 80’s could be described as a rude awakening to the fact that “growth-control policies were

more fragile and more susceptible to damage from political forces beyond the city’s borders than

officials believed” (Fitch 1988 Ch 6).

1990’s - By the 90’s, growth control had become almost doctrine in Davis, yet it was sometimes

in conflict with financial need. In 1995, a large development, named Wildhorse, was proposed on

the northeast boundary of Davis. Activists sponsored Measure R which attempted to nullify the

development agreement (Fitch 1998). Even though Measure R passed, and Wildhorse was built,

this saw the formation of a core group of people fighting together to challenge expansion

(Nieberg 1-29-2007).

In 1997, the Davis Commons was proposed for the downtown area. Borders™ was caught in the

controversy because the popular bookstore wanted a 20,000 square foot store to anchor the center.

Many saw a large chain store as a threat to the still vital core area of Davis. While many other

cities lacked a downtown, Davis had been able to retain its historical charm over the decades.

43

Davis Commons was built and Borders moved in. Sympathy for the remaining independent

bookstores in Davis still lingers from the 1997 political battle (Price 1-26-2007).

2000’s - The turn of the century saw two growth control strategies implemented in Davis.

Measure J and Measure O both passed. Measure J required a city-wide vote for any changes in

zoning to urban use (this will be explained in more detail later). Measure O increased property

taxes by $24 per year for thirty years to fund open space purchases on the city’s border (Lofland

2004: 148). A citizen’s commission, named Open Space, was created to recommend purchases

and did so in 2005 (300-acre McConeghy Ranch) in partnership with other governmental bodies.

However, some citizens felt that the purchase of distant parcels, rather than land adjacent to the

city, is violated the intent of the tax (Lofland 2004: 148).

The update to the 1987 General Plan began in the early 90’s with over 200 citizens forming

twelve committees. Committees were composed of diverse representation of the city, including

city officials, general public, developers and many others (Bale, et. al. 10-9-2005, CVP 2003).

Ten of the twelve committees commented on the Covell Center plans. Nine out of those ten had a

majority of members voting in favor of keeping the Covell Center parcel for urban uses (CVP

2003). The Growth Management and Neighborhood Preservation Committee, composed of

eighteen people, did not believe the Covell Center/Village site should be annexed into the city

(Bale, et al. 10-9-2005). The General Plan preparation process moved forward with the Covell

Center parcel included. This caused ripple effects on planning for other areas, especially

financial projections, as it was assumed Covell Village would be built (Saylor 3-2-2006). In

2001, the City Council accepted the General Plan, but designated the Covell Village site for

agricultural uses instead of urban (CVP 2003). This caused some to claim that political

manipulation removed the site when it should have been left included in the General Plan.

44

The fight against city expansion has been a common struggle in Davis. These struggles have

provided the opportunity for a group of activists to build strong bonds and common tools for the

struggle. To provide a broader picture of growth struggles, three aspects of growth control will

be described in more detail. Davis General Plans impact the way city staff, the City Council and

residents plan for development. Over the course of the last several decades, General Plans have

been contested and revised. Two growth control tools – the pass-through agreement and Measure

J – were formulated. Finally, the proposal of development projects on the same parcel of land as

Covell Village started in the late 80’s and continued through to Covell Village.

B. Growth Control Tools

Several growth control tools allow Davis protection from external forces while allowing citizens

the final say on peripheral development. Two of these tools are most notable, not only because of

their innovative nature, but also because they played such a large role in the Covell Village

debate.

The Davis-Yolo Pass-Through Agreement allows Davis some assurance that the county will not

approve peripheral development without the city’s consent. Created by Mayor Rosenburg in

1987 due to the Mace Ranch incident, the pass-through agreement is an innovative means to

prevent the county from building without Davis’s assent. The agreement covers a planning area

of about 84 square miles, encompassing the County Road 27 on the North, the Yolo bypass on the

East, the County Road 25 and I-80 interchange at Pedrick on the South, and the County Road

97D on the West (Fitch 1998). The City of Davis Redevelopment agency receives property tax

revenue created by new developers in redevelopment zones. The county and local library district

receives a portion of redevelopment funds as long as they do not approve development within the

planning area without Davis’s approval (Fitch 1998). It is estimated that the county receives

approximately $1.7 million each year (John 10-26-2005). The County Board of Supervisors

45

keeps their legal rights to develop unincorporated lands in the planning area; however, if they do,

the agreement is negated. The Pass-Through Agreement was mentioned extensively in the

campaign by those for and against Covell Village. Those in favor raised fears that a future

developer may be able to offer the county more money than the agreement currently does. Those

against reaffirmed the city’s support of the agreement and the backing of the County Board of

Supervisors in doing the right thing (John 10-26-2005).

Municipal Code 40.41, Citizen’s Right to Vote on Future Use of Open Space and Agriculture

Lands, also known as Measure J, provides a final say to Davis citizens in peripheral

development not in the General Plan. Passed as a citizen initiative by 54% in 2000, it

demonstrates the common concern Davis citizens have in preserving open space, agriculture land,

and urban sprawl (Lofland 2004). Any requests to change land use designations from agriculture

or urban reserve, to urban use must be approved by a city vote (Davis Municipal Code 40.41).

Covell Center, the precursor to Covell Village, is specifically named in the text of the municipal

code. This leads one to suspect that there was vocal opposition to building on the Covell

Center/Village parcel during the passage of Measure J (2000) and subsequent approval of the

General Plan (2001).

Opinions on the effectiveness of Measure J vary. Some feel that the referendum provides a more

effective means to manage growth. Referendum voting is a form of direct citizen democracy,

where citizens vote to confirm or reject a decision of the City Council (Greenwald 2-2-2007).

Others state that Measure J behaves as planning by initiative and fears that campaigns may not

provide the full picture of a project (Souza 1-26-2007). While still others believe that Measure J

serves in the same capacity as referendum, but starts the campaign in a positive light. They think

that referendum is seen as negative attempts to slow growth (Bishop 1-29-2007, Nieberg 1-29-

2007). Regardless of how people view Measure J, and whether a referendum would have seen a

46

similar outcome in the Covell Village debate, the measure J process lead to the expectation of a

campaign ending with a citywide vote. The risk debate process, mandated by measure J,

structured the process differently than many other proposed facilities where a governmental body

is the final authority. The “public” had the final say in this instance, whereas in many other

facilities posing a risk, the public may only try to influence the governmental body. As will be

discussed in chapter 4, tactics used by both sides interacted with people’s expectations of a

citywide vote and thus influenced people’s perceptions of the project.

C. Prior Proposals for the Covell Village Parcel

The parcel of land where Covell Village was planned has a twenty-year history of development

proposals being rejected. In 1989, Crossroads was considered for the same spot, consisting of

230 acres with 1,406 residential units, parks, greenbelts, and 3 acres for commercial use (Covell

Village Raney 2004). During the preparation and review of the draft Environmental Impact

Report (dEIR), the city completed a revision to the transportation and circulation element of the

1987 General Plan. The dEIR based their figures on the older General Plan, so the dEIR had to

be updated. In 1991, the EIR was updated. However, the city did not certify either the 1989 or

the 1991 EIRs. (Raney 2004).

In 1992, the Crossroads development proposal was back with an expanded project consisting of

383 acres of 1,466 residential units, parks, greenbelts, a fire station, school site, and 24 acres for

commercial use. Once again, in 1993, the city adopted a new transportation and circulation

element of the 1987 General Plan, which required another study for the Crossroads dEIR. The

owners did not pursue the additional study (Raney 2004).

47

Figure 4: Crossroads Place Site Plan (McIntire 12-18-1989)

Sometime between 1993 and 1997, the Crossroads owner went bankrupt and the property was

purchased by the Covell Partners for only $3 million; “nickels on the dollar” as some have

described it (John 10-9-2005). The first proposal from the Covell Partners was in 1997, named

“Covell Center.” The project consisted of 386 acres total of 688 residential units, a 77 acre sports

complex, 22 acres for commercial use, 12 acres of light industrial, 4.5 acres recreational area, and

a fire station site (Raney 2004). There was intense political maneuvering during this period. The

draft Environmental Impact Report was not certified by the city, so the project was not approved.

The second proposal from the Covell Village Partners arrived in late 2003.

48

This brief history demonstrates a citizenry very conflicted regarding the land use for this

particular place in Davis. While surrounding neighborhoods, such as Northstar and Wildhorse

were built even with coalitions opposing them, the land between them has not been developed.

Due to the nature of the timing of proposals, composition of the city council, and city general

plans, no developer proposal had been successful.

D. Davis’s Success

Although some would say that Davis has not been as successful as it could have been in limiting

growth, when compared with many other places in the central valley, Davis is a beacon of slow

growth mentality. Given the pressure of a University of nearly 30,000 students and 29,000

faculty and staff, strengthens the argument that Davis has been successful in limiting

development.

Many wonder how Davis has limited its growth. City Councilor Greenwald theorizes that the

City Council along with an active community has been farsighted with planning, especially in the

city’s General Plans (Greenwald 2-2-2007). The factors involved, however, extend much farther.

Many attribute Davis’s success to the influence of the University (Wagstaff 2-1-2007, Price 1-26-

2007). Citizens in Davis have ties with the University, through studying, employment or event

attendance on campus. Everyone living or visiting Davis is touched by the University in some

manner. Even University alumni help to preserve the character of Davis (Wagstaff 2-1-2007).

As Professor Gumprecht of the University of New Hampshire writes, “…many college towns

have become bastions of liberal politics. They have been pioneers in the slow-growth

movement” (Gumprecht 2004: 16). Activism in Davis is definitely high, and has been proven

successful at limiting or preventing development in the cases of Central Park, Covell Village, and

others. One activist, Nancy Price, credits a core group of progressives greatly influencing the

49

path of Davis (1-26-2007). Another long-time Davis activist, Pam Nieberg, theorizes that without

the strong core of citizens who are deeply committed to neighborhood preservation, Davis would

be like other communities (Nieberg 1-29-2007).

Avoiding the “mallification” of the town, strip malls along the freeway, and focusing, instead, on

cultivating the downtown district as a primary retail and cultural center has also helped maintain

Davis’s character (Greenwald 2-2-2007). There are no freeway off ramps into the downtown

district, and people wishing to visit have to travel through a “transition zone” to visit (Wagstaff 2-

1-2007). This has resulted in the “core area” being able to retain links to the city, residents,

University, and developers. Having a mix of students and highly educated non-students “has led

to the development in many college towns of distinctive commercial districts, full of trendy

shops, coffee houses, ethnic restaurants and bars” (Gumprecht 2004: 13).

Section 2 Conclusion

Past experiences help shape the future of a place. For Davis, a history of growth conflict has

served to both limit residential construction while creating a group of activists that have

experience and knowledge in the struggle. The progressive toolbox, so to speak, has matured

with each conflict. Demonstrating ripple effects of past conflict, the Pass-Through Agreement

and Measure J was passed after many years of unsuccessful campaigns to prevent peripheral

growth. Both of these growth control tools would not have been created had there not been

concern by a large group of Davis residents that development poses a risk to the city. This

history, a piece of the Davis context, of continual growth conflict is necessary in understanding

the reaction of the core group of opposition to Covell Village. This history allowed a group

opposed to building houses on the Covell Village parcel to help increase people’s perceptions of

risk in the project.

50

Section 3: Davis’s Socio-Cultural Values

“Although mitigation through land swaps and cash sounds fine, they [Covell Village Partners] won’t ensure that the character of our community is preserved or enhanced.”

Carin Loy (2-25-2005).

Beliefs and values help shape people’s perceptions. Past experiences combined with values

provide filters in how people see the world and interact with it. Davis is produced both by its

physical makeup, its borders, residents, architecture and shops, along with the experiences of its

residents, students, visitors, and others who have a connection to the city. The values of a

population affect how activities influence people’s understanding and acceptance. In Covell

Village, the socio-cultural values of Davis residents (context) interacted with the campaign

(process) producing higher feelings of risk associated with the proposal. Four factors are

discussed in this section: a) character of Davis; b) history of environmentalism; and c) ideals of

deliberative democracy held by many Davis residents.

A. The Character of Davis

In the Covell Village conflict, both the developers and those opposed mentioned ways in which

Covell Village did or did not fit into the character of Davis. Some felt that the character of Davis

would be irrevocably altered by the addition of Covell Village, thus citing the proposal as an

undue risk to the city (Loy 2-25-2005). The character of Davis exists in many forms for different

groups in the city; it is hard to quantify. While there is not a common agreement on the full

“feeling” of Davis, most understand that Davis is a town with an atmosphere unlike many other

cities (Fitch 1998, Loy 2-25-2005). Many opposed to Covell Village felt that it posed a risk to

Davis’s character.

Residents of Davis like to remark on its “small town feel”; that people still know their neighbors

and see each other at the grocery store. A vibrant downtown area and the twice weekly Farmers’

51

Market help keep people connected. The Farmers’ Market takes place every Saturday morning

and Wednesday evening in Central Park, at the northwest corner of 5th and B streets. Davis

families, students and many others can be seen walking through the market, browsing local

produce, chatting, and generally having a good time. Many events are held throughout the year

both on and off campus. “Celebrate Davis”, an event sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce,

honors the business community with a festival in one of the city’s park. UC Davis’s Picnic Day

brings in between 20,000 and 30,000 alumni, parents and other visitors each year to view the

campus. UC Davis Whole Earth Festival provides organic food, charms and activities in a three

day weekend extravaganza. Performances at the Mondavi Center for the Performing Arts and

Aggie Pack sporting events appeal to the Davis residents and others throughout the region.

It is hard to imagine how adding 1,800 new homes over ten years would permanently destroy

Davis’s character. A group of approximately 5,000 new University freshmen arrive each year

and must be indoctrinated into this “character.” The atmosphere of Davis is hard to quantify, and

thus it is hard to prove or disprove claims that a future activity will alter that atmosphere.

However, opponents were successful in raising concern, the overall feeling of risk, regarding

building Covell Village.

B. Environmentalism

Davis has a long history of leadership in environmentalism. These environmental ideals have

become mainstay in the Davis community. Residents pride themselves in recycling, green

building, cohousing, and wildlife conservationism. These values of environmentalism cause

residents to object to activities that may damage or harm the environment. Activities, such as

housing development, pose a risk to the environment and thus are reviewed carefully by city

officials and residents alike.

52

In April 1970, a small group of Davis residents formed the Recycling Committee of Davis and

began placing newspaper recycling boxes throughout town (Fitch 1998). This was one of the first

recycling programs in both California and the nation. Beginning in February 1971, the group

became known as the Resource Awareness Committee of Davis and expanded their operation to

cans and bottles. Twice a month, between 9am and 1pm, residents were asked to drop off their

newspaper, cans and bottles at a local shopping center. The committee gathered momentum in

late 1971 when they sponsored an ordinance that would require deposits on some types of

beverage containers. The ordinance was accepted and the beverage industry agreed to transport

bottles to glass plants in Oakland (Fitch 1998). In 1974, the city contracted with Davis Waste

Removal (DWR) to cover collecting newspapers. Two years later, DWR took over all recycling

efforts. DWR estimates that in the mid 1990’s over 80 percent of households in Davis recycled at

least once a month. On an average month, the company recycled 350 tons of newspapers, 120

tons of boxes, 110 tons of glass, 7 tons of aluminum and 1,200 gallons of used motor oil (Fitch

1998).

Davis is also the modern example of communal housing, called cohousing. In addition to student

communal living on and off campus, there are a variety of cohousing complexes in Davis. One of

the most notable cohousing complexes is Muir Commons (Laurenson 2007). These houses and

communal center was built in 1991 and consists of 26 homes (ranging from 808 to 1381 square

feet) on three acres. The houses face inwards towards a Common House containing a large

kitchen, dining area, exercise room, play areas, and a shared woodshop. Muir Commons is

planned and managed by residents where most decisions are made by consensus. Residents share

household tasks, such as shared meals, to reduce consumption and living expenses.

53

Figure 5: Muir Commons Cohousing facility (Laurenson 2007)

The last example of Davis sometimes extreme environmental concern is the toad tunnel. In 1995,

the City of Davis spent approximately $14,000 to build a series of toad tunnels (each 18-21

inches wide) under a freeway overpass being built on Interstate 80 (Fitch 1998). Upon hearing

that the frogs would be migrating across the road each year, then Mayor Julie Partansky agreed to

the idea for the tunnel. There is debate regarding the effectiveness of the tunnel to this day. This

incident, among others, has led many Davis outsiders to wonder about the city’s sanity.

Environmental concerns, even for the frogs, are part of what makes Davis special.

C. Deliberative Democracy

“No on X. It’s poor planning and represents an erosion of participatory democracy.” Jean Jackman (10-13-2005)

Davis residents are intelligent and want to be involved in changes to their neighborhoods

(Nieberg & Bishop 1-29-2007, Wagstaff 2-1-2007, Greenwald 2-2-2007, Fitch 1998). Davis

54

residents are not only more involved in planning decisions, but actually expect to be engaged in

decisions that affect them (Wagstaff 2-1-2007). Residents hold values of deliberation, full access

to information, and legitimacy through open and accessible processes. There is much networking

in the Davis, through formal methods such as commissions, and informally through social

networks. The joke in Davis is that “the real rush hour is at 7:00pm when Davis residents bicycle

to community meetings” (Greenwald 2-2-2007).

The facts confirm claims that citizens want and expect to be involved in city planning. Fifteen

committees and nearly two hundred people were involved in the update to the 1987 General Plan.

The city has fifteen commissions, each composed of seven to eleven Davis residents volunteering

their time every month. Grassroots opposition of many development proposals, while not always

successful at preventing projects, demonstrates the eagerness of residents to be engaged in local

decisions. City planners note that although greater public involvement means a slower process, it

typically obtains greater community acceptance and commitment (Fitch 1998). The same general

principles of consensus-based decision making leading to greater commitment are confirmed by

research of effective meeting strategies (Interaction Associates 1997). Decisions that are reached

through broad discussion, compromise and agreement strengthen allegiance of all participants to

the outcome.

Davis history author Mike Fitch claims that citizens in Davis are great believers in participatory

democracy (Fitch 1998). Local activists say that Davis residents are intelligent. Just give them

accurate facts and let them make their own decisions (Nieberg 1-29-2007, Bishop 1-29-2007).

One resident stated “Davis voters get it right if they are given full and accurate information”

(Borack 5-20-2005). Community residents are highly educated and are accustomed to

independently analyzing facts and arriving at a conclusion. With a high percentage of people

connected to the University, most residents can conduct a careful study and analysis themselves,

55

if offered an accurate presentation of facts (Wells 2004). Due to the mix of progressive values,

high educational attainment, and expectations of being involved in local affairs, the citizenry

expects both the truth, presented fairly and without bias, and an open discussion to settle the

matter. The feeling is that local elected officials do not have the right to impose decisions that

have not been adequately discussed by the citizenry. In short, the general feeling is that of an

egalitarian town where decisions are made by public discussion based on objective information.

In the Covell Village debate, facts were debated in a way leading many to question all data and

analysis presented by the developers, city and opposition.

One particular model of participatory democracy that best describes Davis is what political

science defines as deliberative democracy. It is a form of participatory democracy, but involves

norms of egalitarianism and commitment to the process of dialogue. Direct democracy involves

participation of residents through initiative, referendum and recall, while deliberative democracy

is the assumption that legitimate lawmaking can only arise from the public deliberation of the

citizenry (Cohen 1989).

Deliberative democracy focuses as much, if not more, on the process as the results. Deliberative

democracy is organized around free dialogue among equal citizens; the outcome is secondary to

the process. Cohen (1989) defines the formal concept of deliberative democracy as the

following:

Ongoing and independent association: the members expect it to continue.

Members share commitment to coordinating activities that make deliberation possible.

Recognition of a pluralistic association: members have diverse preferences, convictions

and ideals concerning the conduct of their own lives. They may have divergent aims, but

all are committed to deliberative process.

Members view deliberative procedures as the source of legitimacy.

56

Members understand that each person is capable of deliberation. Everyone has equal

standing at each stage of the deliberative process.

A deliberate process is reasoned and focuses on the common good. Parties state their reasons for

advancing proposals and expect that those reasons will settle the fate of the proposal. Ideal

deliberation uses consensus to make decisions, but uses majority rule if consensus cannot be

achieved (Cohen 1989). The primary strength of the model is the generation of conditions of

impartiality, rationality and knowledge of relevant facts (Nino 1996).

Those valuing deliberative democracy and the ideals of equality, free dialogue, and consensus,

hold deliberative procedures as the source of legitimacy. Hence, these people are likely to view

breaches of the norms with frustration and mistrust. Violations to deliberative procedures appear

dishonest and unacceptable. As will be shown in chapter 4, in the case of Covell Village, many

expressed concern over process flaws. This suggests that the Covell Village campaign interacted

with people’s ideals of participating in decision making. When those norms were defied, people

saw a greater risk and amplified their opposition to the proposal.

Section 3 Conclusion

One may point out that the opposition caused confusion regarding the facts, thereby causing

people to question the legitimacy of both the proposal and process. However, as explained in

more detail in chapter 4, several concerns were voiced regarding flaws in the process and its

limitation of public debate. The strong values of deliberative democracy, held by the citizens,

served to trigger allegations of the process limiting debate, preventing public scrutiny and ample

time for input. This only added to the assessment of broken trust in the city.

57

Section 4: Past and Current Events

The wider sociopolitical context helps to shape perceptions at the local level. Events portrayed in

the media have been shown to influence perceptions of risk (Slovic 2000). Past events eroding

trust in institutions combined with current events leading to doubts of confidence in the

government can also shape thoughts on local issues. This section will describe a number of

issues: a) the current issue of urban sprawl; b) past events eroding trust in local institutions,

namely the radioactive beagles and biodefense lab proposal; c) actions of the federal government

casting doubt on its ability to listen to its citizens; and d) the November 2005 election atmosphere

in light of state initiatives.

A. Urban Sprawl

"Sprawl is now a bread-and-butter community issue, like crime, and Americans are divided about the best solution for dealing with growth, development and traffic congestion."

- Jan Schaffer, Executive Director of the Pew Center for Civic Journalism (Pew 2000)

The word “sprawl,” in the context of land use, was first used in a 1937 speech by Earle Draper,

then director of Planning for the Tennessee Valley Authority. "Perhaps diffusion is too kind of a

word. ... In bursting its bounds, the city actually sprawled and made the countryside ugly ...,

uneconomic [in terms] of services and doubtful social value." (Planners 2000). The public

became aware of the social problems of massive residential development, commuter towns, and

runaway growth with the publication of Joel Garreau’s (1991) publication “Edge City: Life on the

New Frontier.” A survey by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism found that in the four cities

they surveyed (one being San Francisco), issues of sprawl, runaway growth and traffic congestion

were the overwhelming concern, topping traditional issues such as crime, the economy and

education (Pew 2000). While threats of terrorism may now top that list after the events of

September 11, 2001, the survey demonstrates that growth is a concern of American families.

58

Growth is debated at the local through the federal level by policy makers concerned with the

negative effects: loss of open space, air pollution, and traffic congestion (Wassmer 2000).

In the Covell Village campaign, citizens saw the terms “open space” and “farmland preservation”

appear in literature from the Citizens for Responsible Planning (Wagstaff et al. Oct 2005). The

threat of urban sprawl was not the largest issue publicized in the campaign, but it appeared in

many articles and letters to the editor. Many did not feel that urban sprawl was a key point in the

debate; nevertheless, because these issues have become part of the common lexicon, they are

linked to the negative effects of development. The issue has such high importance in Davis that

the Covell Village Partners were required by the Davis municipal code to preserve twice as much

agricultural land as was developed as part of the development agreement (Davis municipal code

40A.03.030). In a progressive town such as Davis, the preservation of open space and prevention

of sprawl’s negative consequences serve as a rally call.

59

Figure 6: Farmland on which Covell Village was to be built (Looking North West from the corner

of Covell and Pole Line. Photo by S. Worker 19 Mar 2007.)

B. Institutional Mistrust: Radioactive Beagles and Biodefense

Trust affects people’s perceptions of risk. The lower the trust is held in an organization, the more

likely people are to amplify the risks posed or discussed by the organization (Stern & Fineberg

1996, Slovic 2000, Wildavsky & Dake 1990). Actions that destroy the public trust shape

responses to future activities and claims. Two key events, both emanating from the University

campus, shook people’s trust in both University and city authorities. The radioactive beagle

incident, resulting in an EPA superfund site, and the biodefense lab proposal both served to erode

trust in campus and city administration. When these same institutions began to distribute

information in the Covell Village campaign, people were less inclined to trust these sources.

60

Radioactive Beagles

“The no fault agreements with DOE and UCD seem to have removed responsibility, accountability, motivation, incentive, quality and care at this site.”

Julie Roth, Executive Director of Davis South Campus Superfund Oversight Committee (Roth 1996)

Established in the 1950s and lasting until 1989, the 15 acre Laboratory for Energy Related Health

Research (LEHR) on the UC Davis campus was used to study long-term effects of low-level

radiation on laboratory animals, mainly beagles (EPA 2005). A section of Putah Creek located

south of Interstate 80 contains three decommissioned landfills, dry wells, waste burial holes and

disposal trenches and boxes (Springgay 11-3-2003). An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

investigation in the early 90’s found that the soil and groundwater were contaminated by

chemical and radioactive waste. The site was declared an EPA Superfund site in May 1994,

citing possible contaminants in groundwater. Initial action was taken by the Department of

Energy (DOE) in removing 100 drums of radioactive bioparts, 40,000 gallons of radioactive

waste sludge, 3,000 cubic feet of radioactive waste, and demolishment and/or decontamination of

on-site facilities (EPA 2005). UCD and DOE conducted a site investigation, made remedial

decisions and conducted public meetings. However, the Davis community was not included in

the process.

Outraged residents in south Davis worried about contamination of the groundwater formed a

group, naming it the Davis South Campus Superfund Oversight Committee (DSCSOC). The

Committee received an EPA grant in 1995. The grant was renewed in 1995 for $50,000 (Kay

2001). Technical assistance grants are designed to assist communities in becoming more active

in the Superfund process. The grant allows residents to hire technical experts and help residents

interpret complex technical information. The Committee hired Dr. G. Fred Lee & Associates to

assist the community in analyzing and scrutinizing actions taken by the EPA, DOE and UCD.

61

The DSCSOC and Dr. Lee stated in numerous reports that the process was plagued with

bureaucratic responses and abdication of responsibility between DOE and UCD (Roth 1996). In

reports by DSCSOC and Dr. Lee over the course of the last ten years cite numerous concerns

including a) missed timelines by UCD and DOE; b) errors in work; and c) unreliable information.

Even in 2007, over fifteen years after the closure of the laboratory and ten years since being

declared a Superfund site, there is still community concern over the clean-up and monitoring

efforts of UCD (Lee 1-24-2007).

The “glowing beagles” have become something of UC Davis student lore. However, the long

struggle for adequate clean-up by south Davis residents has been anything but pleasant. Many

residents living near the site feel that UCD and DOE do not care, are not responsive, and have

attempted to prevent public scrutiny of the clean-up efforts. This incident has caused many to

lose trust in both the University administration and the government.

Biodefense Lab

“The biolab prompted some people to question the assumption that for the most part, UCD officials could be trusted to do the right thing and to act reasonably.”

Professor John Lofland, sociology, on the proposed Level 4 Laboratory (2004: 152).

In fall 2002, the University administration publicly announced a proposal to city and campus

officials for a National Biocontainment Laboratory with biosafety level-4 (Fell & Bailey 2005).

In October 2002, the National Institute of Health issued a formal request for proposals to build a

laboratory. Two public meetings were held, one on campus and one at a Davis City Council

meeting, in January 2003. The campus submitted the final application in February 2003. The

opposition formed to challenge the proposal in February and continued until the campus was

notified it was not selected as a site in September 2003. Many expressed their concerns that the

62

campus acted in bad faith in proposing such a dangerous facility with so little time for public

review (Lofland 2004: 152).

Those in the campus administration supporting the facility, primarily the Offices of the

Chancellor, Provost and Department of University Communications, maintained that they placed

a high priority on communicating with the public in an open and accessible way (Fell & Bailey

2005). Their strategy consisted of convincing elected officials in the state, county and city

government to endorse the idea and expecting residents to follow their elected official’s lead. In

an article reflecting on the incident, Fell and Bailey were left perplexed that the proposal raised

such opposition despite support from elected officials (Fell & Bailey 2005). However, as many

know, Davis citizens are highly educated and expect to be involved in decisions affecting their

community.

The primary concerns with the laboratory itself, may be split into three distinct groups:

Safety – Accidents at the laboratory or in transport could release micro-organisms into

the surrounding community.

Security – Terrorist attacks might target the facility, or security procedures might change

the nature of the town.

Research – Classified research could be conducted at the facility against the norms of

academic review.

The safety and security concerns served to mobilize Davis residents, while the research

apprehension mobilized many University faculty. Debate still exists whether the University falls

under the provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002.

The Act holds that in the interests of national security, federal agencies may not disclose

information about an agency even in the event of loss, theft or accident (Fell & Bailey 2005).

63

Concerns regarding the possibility of classified research increased the number of University

professors questioning the necessity for UC Davis, a public organization, to manage the facility.

This case demonstrates several characteristics with the nature of Davis residents through the real

concern about this project. Residents, as well as many faculty, considered the proposal with

skepticism, irritation, anger, mistrust and opposition, due to a number of socio-historical contexts

(Wells 2004).

The communication strategy employed by the University administration consisted of a single

source for multiple recipients. Though the administration claimed to value communicating with

the public, residents of Davis and the University faculty were not asked if they wanted such a

dangerous facility nearby. There were no opportunities for an “exchange of ideas” to reach an

amicable agreement. Residents expect to be consulted on potential changes in their town and

decide for themselves whether the benefit is worth the risk (Wells 2004). The University

administration seemed to spurn Davis citizens’ capacity for rational thought. The information

provided was simplistic and contained little or no depth. In a town with such a highly educated

populace, this was seen as insulting by many (Wells 2004).

With the apparent lack of democratic process in the federal government during this time (i.e. the

controversial war in Iraq), having a similar incident at the local level irked some residents.

Democratic principles held dear to residents and faculty were disregarded by the University

administration in proposing a dangerous facility with little time for public review and dialogue.

Whether this was due to the University administration arrogantly and ignoring the town’s

concerns or simply being unsure of how to structure an authentic public participation process, the

result was to reinforce the tension between the University and the town.

64

Lack of institutional trust in the University over past events, such as the radioactive beagles and

the widely publicized University of California (UC) mismanagement of National Laboratories,

affected the University’s ability to claim “no risk” in a level 4 Biocontainment Laboratory (Wells

2004). Many residents did not trust the University to manage such a dangerous facility (Nieberg

1-29-2007). Due to this doubt, many felt that the facility posed a much greater risk than

advertised to the community.

In a list of “Lessons Learned” in the article by Fell & Bailey (2005), no awareness of socio-

political differences are raised. Creating a committee may create greater credibility, anticipating

potential problems may help formulate responses, and expecting opposition will prepare

proponents. None of these will address fundamental differences in socio-political values. Davis

residents expect to be presented with accurate information, to conduct independent analysis

uninfluenced by elected officials, and to be able to engage in a dialogue that will produce change.

The process used by the University administration in the Biodefense Lab case only served to

increase the public’s perception of risks.

C. Federal and State Impact

“First we have the Bush administration distributing its political position in the form of actual television new reports. Now we have the Covell Village

Partners distributing their message in the form of an actual newspaper article.” Don Schwartz (4-1-2005)

Federal - The “War on Terror” and the invasion of Iraq by US forces were well underway during

the Covell Village debate. Many in the Davis community were distressed by a perception of

dishonesty from the federal government, particularly in President Bush’s declarations of Iraq’s

having “weapons of mass destruction” (Wells 2004). Some felt that the federal government was

being as restrictive and non-responsive to the American people as during the civil rights

movement (Wells 2004). Many in Davis felt that for the federal government, the outcome

65

justified the process and massaging of the facts. As in the Biodefense Lab incident, some

residents felt that they couldn’t make a difference on the national level, but they could have an

impact on the local level by preventing the Biodefense Lab and Covell Village from being built in

Davis (Wells 2004).

Opponents against Covell Village claimed numerous times that the Covell Village Partners were

conducting an unethical campaign (explained in detail in the campaign section). The Citizens for

Responsible Planning frequently used the terms “false and misleading,” “unethical,” and “scare

tactics” when referring to the Covell Village Partners campaign (CRP 11-6-2005, CRP 10-30-

2005, CRP 10-23-2005). Similar terms were used to describe President Bush’s war in Iraq in

major media outlets. Having a local company use questionable tactics similar to those seen on

the federal level may have decreased trust in the Covell Village Partners and their project. Many

residents doubted the claims of low levels of risk (e.g. traffic congestion, financial instability).

Having doubt cast on the Covell Village Partners process did not help the developer’s assertions

of appropriate mitigations for the project’s impacts.

State - During the November 2005 elections, eight propositions appeared on the California ballot

for a variety of issues: school teachers, union dues, budgetary restrictions, redistricting,

prescriptions, and others. Four of them were promoted under the governor’s call for “reform”

and created intense opposition. Voters were inclined to oppose all of the ballot measures due to

massive campaigning against the propositions (Chorneau 11-2-2005). While some campaign ads

specified particular propositions, others just said “Vote No” on Election Day. A negative

atmosphere was observed by voters going into the November 2005 elections. The election

returns proved that opposition campaigning worked; all eight propositions were rejected by Yolo

County residents. The Enterprise headline the day after elections read “Voters just say no” (John

11-9-2005). It is hard to tell what the negative atmosphere did to the outcome of Covell Village,

66

but one can reasonably assume that if it did not increase the number of residents voting no, it was

definitely not a positive influence.

Section 4 Conclusion

Past and current events taking place at the local, state and federal levels help shape perceptions.

Unethical behavior and a negative atmosphere at the national and state level, respectively, were

seen as paralleling the campaign by the Covell Village Partners. The resemblance between them

served to sensitize people and hence, amplify mistrust even more than might have been without

comparable events at the state and national levels. Institutional trust has been shown to be related

to perceptions of risk (Slovic 2000). Claims by the developers and city officials met a level of

skepticism due to past events damaging trust in these institutions. Had these events not taken

place, information distributed by the city might have elicited greater confidence of residents.

Chapter 3 Conclusion

Davis character and history, the context for the Covell Village case, is an important piece in

understanding why residents felt the proposed development posed too much risk. The

demographics of Davis are a mixture of highly educated residents along with a large student

population. That combined with socio-cultural values of environmentalism, preservation of the

character of Davis, and expectations of deliberative process resulted in a unique worldview of

many residents. A history of growth conflict surrounding other housing developments and

general plans has created tools: Measure J and the Pass Through Agreement. This is a strong

indication that residents want to limit growth in the city. Past events, such as the radioactive

beagles and biodefense lab have decreased trust in city and University officials. Information

regarding the safety and benefits of Covell Village were not as trusted as they might have been

had these two events not taken place.

67

While the contextual framework outlined by this chapter set the stage for the Covell Village

campaign, it was in the campaign that the full intensity of these variables was felt. The campaign

fell in direct opposition to many of the cultural values held by residents, while a history of growth

conflict prepared a core opposition group in fighting a very large proposed housing development.

A lack of awareness of these past activities and cultural values only paints half a picture of why

people perceived Covell Village too risky for Davis. These contextual variables are necessary in

understanding the complete picture of risk perception.

68

Chapter 4: Process: Covell Village Campaign

“Four City Council members, a bevy of local developers, and a lot of Davis residents say the risk is worth the benefits Covell Village would deliver”

Claire St. John, Davis Enterprise Staff Writer (10-5-2005).

This chapter looks at the risk debate process in the Covell Village campaign. Shaping the

public’s perceptions of risk happens through the features of the project and the debate process

itself; including mechanisms for public input, ethical conduct, and trustworthiness of information.

The campaign also reveals how perceptions of risk are influenced not only by the major actors,

such as city officials, developers and those opposed, but by environmental organizations,

University students and commercial businesses. The most noteworthy finding is that not only

does the process influence risk perceptions, but interactions with the contextual setting

significantly intensifies the public’s response.

This chapter highlights three primary process factors:

1. The features of the proposed housing development contributed to an increased perception

of risk and decreased trust in the developers. Perceptions of risk were increased due to

debates regarding the impact of project components and adequacy of mitigations. This

open dispute led to confusion among many regarding who was correct and what

information to trust.

2. Actions by major actors interacted with Davis’s history and values, resulting in increased

perceptions of risk in Covell Village. Campaign tactics, by the developers and City

Council, was questioned by the opposition, causing many to doubt the motives of the

developers. Also, Davis’s history with growth struggles has led to the creation of a core

group of activists with experience in fighting proposed growth. This group capitalized on

69

questionable campaign tactics to shift public perceptions of risk to a point where many

felt the project was a danger to the city.

3. The risk debate process demonstrated inconsistencies between the Davis environment and

the methods used by the developers in trying to attain approval for the project. Many felt

that the process limited public input which contradicted the values of deliberative

process. Public claims of unethical behavior evoked memories of institutional distrust

from past events. This section describes how the interaction between the process and the

contextual setting influenced perceptions of risk.

In late 2004, well known local developers proposed a residential and commercial development to

the City of Davis. Named Covell Village, the project was a 1,864-unit residential and

commercial project proposed on 383 acres of land both adjacent to the City of Davis and zoned

for agriculture and light industrial use. In 2000, the City of Davis passed “Measure J”, which

required a city-wide vote for any change in the city’s General Plan modifying land use

designation from “agriculture” or “open space” to “urban” use. The Covell Village proposal was

the first development to trigger a Measure J vote. After a long campaign, voters of Davis rejected

the proposed development with 58.7% voting “no.”

Section 1: Features of Covell Village

“I’ve always envisioned that this part of land was fated to be developed on.” Stephen Souza, Davis City Councilmember (Becker 7-25-2005)

The Covell Village design plan, the developer mitigations and the conflict arising out of differing

definitions served to heighten people’s perceptions of the project’s risks while decreasing trust in

the developers. Some of the debate was aesthetic in nature, and not related to risk, however, even

in these conflicts vocal argument led to confusion of the facts. The opposition was successful in

casting doubt on the truthfulness of developer assertions. This mistrust of the developers,

70

combined with concerns of the process and allegations of unethical behavior, described in Section

3, caused many people to believe the project contained more risk then the developers maintained.

The next section will cover the major and most contested features in Covell Village.

The developers of the project, incorporated as the Covell Village Partners (CVP), touted both the

new urbanism design style and the numerous contributions offered for the site and to the City of

Davis. The opposition was loosely organized into the Citizens for Responsible Planning – No on

Measure X campaign (CRP). They disputed these assertions and claimed that the project would

impact Davis beyond what mitigations resolved. The vocal and well publicized dispute of these

features caused many to doubt the claims of both and led to confusion of the true facts.

The Covell Village site proposal was located on the northern boundary of Davis, situated between

Pole Line Road on the east, Covell Boulevard on the south, F Street on the west and roughly

aligning with the northern borders of the Wildhorse and Northstar subdivisions. The site did not

include the Con Agra/Hunts cannery site (blank in the diagram below). The project consisted of

1,864 residential dwelling units, a village center, parks and open space, and a number of related

mitigations and contributions. The entire project was to be phased in over ten years with no more

than 175 residential units granted within a year (Yolo Elections Measure X Handbook 2005).

71

Figure 7: Revised Covell Village Site Plan (Raney 2004)

A. Trust: New Urbanism

“The Congress for the New Urbanism views … the spread of placeless sprawl, … environmental deterioration, loss of agricultural lands and wilderness, and the

erosion of society’s built heritage as one interrelated community-building challenge.” Congress for the New Urbanism (2001)

One of the key aspects of the project was the new urbanism style of development. In many of the

mailings, elections materials, and other advertisements, Covell Village was advertised as being

designed with new urbanism principles. Residents having strong environmental values, tied with

the town’s past success at socially-oriented neighborhoods and cohousing, makes new urbanism a

72

concept that fits well into the values of the Davis community. The developers knew this cultural

value of Davis residents and designed a project with many, but not all, of the tenets of new

urbanism. A group of progressive activists, the opposition, cast doubt on whether the project

adhered to these ideals. This caused confusion as to the facts, while leaving many wondering

who to trust for correct information.

New urbanism, a movement started in the early 1990’s, strives to challenge placeless sprawl,

separation by race and income, loss of agricultural lands, and the erosion of society’s heritage.

New Urbanism advocates for diverse, compact, pedestrian-friendly, and mixed-use

neighborhoods, universally accessible public spaces, and places designed to celebrate local

heritage (CNU 2001).

The most visible spokesperson and architect for Covell Village was prominent local designer,

Mike Corbett. Having completed his nationally renowned Village Homes in 1975, Corbett is

known for innovations in ecological and community innovation. Village Homes, also in Davis,

integrates numerous elements into its socially-oriented neighborhood including extensive

pathways for pedestrians and bicycles, community gardens, and community buildings (Fitch

1998). Plans for Covell Village incorporated many aspects of Village Homes in their modern

incarnation of new urbanism: walkable neighborhoods, mixed use development, a range of

housing types, centrally located public spaces, bicycle and pedestrian friendly pathways, and a

respect for nature (Yolo Elections Measure X Handbook 2005).

The opposition did not believe Covell Village followed the guidelines of new urbanism. Several

shortcomings supported the opposition’s claims that the project missed several key characteristic

of new urbanism. First, principles of new urbanism state that infill development, building within

the city limits, should be developed prior to peripheral expansion (CNU 2001). There are several

73

sites (e.g. Con Agra, PGE, etc.) within the boundaries of Davis available for infill development,

which the opposition to Covell Village pointed out during the campaign (Bishop 1-29-2007,

Nieberg 1-29-2007). Second, two principles regarding mixed-use development and having

residential units within walking distance of many daily activities were partially met. The Covell

Village site plans called for assorted use development in the southern portion of the site, fitting

principles of new urbanism. However, the middle and northern portion of the project called for

varying sized housing, with little diverse development. The commercial center was located in the

southern portion of the site and houses in the northern part would not be within an easy walking

distance. The third concern was the developers selling land for individual development and not

building residential units themselves. Without any design guidelines, the possibility of clashing

styles and confusing aesthetics arose. Principles for new urbanism state that “individual

architectural projects should be seamlessly linked to their surroundings” (CNU 2001: 2).

B. Trust: Affordable Housing

“Davis prides itself in being an intimate, slow growth town accessible to people from all income ranges”

(Covell Village Planning Application 2003)

The Covell Village project consisted of 1,864 residential units, including many units adhering to

the City of Davis affordable housing ordinance. While the number of units influenced people’s

perception about the project (e.g. “too large”), the issue of affordable housing caused confusion.

From a lay perspective, there was confusion over the amounts and types of affordable housing

offered. Each of the three major actors, developers, opposition and city government, offered their

own analysis. The debate surrounding affordable housing in Covell Village confused many while

increasing the doubt of developer claims. Affordable housing disagreement kept leading many

residents to wonder what the truth was and who to trust. While confusion over affordable

housing, alone, may not have had a direct connection to risk, it does involve trust issues. This

74

was another factor leading people to believe opposition claims of significant risk associated with

Covell Village.

The City of Davis passed an affordable housing ordinance in 1990 in order to provide housing for

its local workers. Developments for purchase containing five or more units were now required to

make twenty-five percent of their units affordable to households with incomes ranging from 80%

to 120% of the Yolo County median income. Projects totaling twenty or more units for rent must

provide twenty-five percent at rates affordable to households with gross incomes at or below

eighty percent of the Yolo County median income (from City of Davis Municipal Code 18.05).

The developers designed Covell Village to fit within the Davis affordable housing ordinance

while still ensuring that the city obtained enough revenue in order to provide services to the new

development. To many, the varying levels of rental-owner and lower-moderate-market prices

made this project very attractive. When looking at the chart (below), created by the City of Davis

Community Development Department, one may see the types of rental and ownership units

available. Covell Village was touted as offering residential units for people that lived in Davis,

with multiple tiers of pricing for middle income families. To the city, the fiscal analysis needed

to show either a gain or no net loss to the city for providing services to the new development,

after bringing in new property tax revenue. The market rate houses would have offset the lower

revenue brought in by the affordable housing.

75

Figure 8: Housing Costs According to the City of Davis (John 9-21-2005)

To opponents, these numbers were misleading. One letter to the editor of the Davis Enterprise

asked whether a local teacher with children and no spouse who made between $55,000 - $60,000

a year could afford to purchase a home in Covell Village (Ziser 10-17-2005). These type of

questions spurred the opposition to raise concern over renting versus purchasing the residential

units in Covell Village. For those in a very low or low income bracket, only rental units would

have been available. Ownership options would begin at a higher income. Concern was raised

over this fact and the fear that many of the expensive houses (808 units) would not be inhabited

76

by local people, but by those from out of town. A member of the opposition stated that that

someone would need to make almost twice the Yolo County median income and spend up to 40

percent of one’s income on housing to afford a Covell Village unit. The opposition created

another chart (below) which seemed to conflict with the chart created by the City of Davis.

Assumptions in market rates, ownership versus rental, and other financial factors may be

modified resulting in projections that paint a different picture.

Figure 9: Housing Costs According to the Citizens for Responsible Planning (Wagstaff et al. 7-

17-2005)

C. Trust: Mitigations and Contributions

Some of the contributions advertised by the developers were actually a property tax assessment

for future Covell Village residents. These semi-truthful claims were another factor influencing

people’s trust in information distributed the developers.

Money for schools, a fire station, a community center and other contributions were part of the

development agreement negotiated by the city. The developers advertised these contributions,

dedications and obligations throughout the campaign. Many were outright contributions of the

developers to the city, such as the fire station, community center, and community amphitheatre.

77

A few amenities were mitigations or other requirements such as agricultural preservation. Some

were tax assessments on future residents living in Covell Village, such as the funding for schools

and bus use by residents.

Critics of the project were fast to point out that the “$60 million for schools” billed by developers

was actually a property tax assessment to be paid over thirty years by future Covell Village

residents. School board members stated that the money for schools would pay for educating

students in Covell Village, but not provide additional revenue for the district (John 10-19-2005).

Campaign brochures supporting Covell Village quoted school board members saying that this

was the best deal the school district had ever gotten from a developer before. However, this was

the first time the district had ever received full mitigation; the additional money for schools

would not burden the district, but also not yield extra income (John 10-19-2005). Other

opponents feared overcrowding, diminished test scores and overburdened school administration

with 791 to 1,155 extra students (Fowler 3-29-2005). However, Davis has seen a decrease in new

students at local schools, even prompting the school board to consider closing an elementary

school (Saylor 3-2-2006).

Sue Greenwald, a City Councilor spearheaded a comparative analysis of amenities, contrasting

Covell Village with the Livermore Trails proposed development. Her chart (below) did not

mention the risks of Covell Village, but instead asked Davis residents why they did not receive

even more benefits from the Covell Village Partners. People’s perception of the risks associated

with Covell Village may not have been swayed by this advertisement, yet it may have influenced

people’s ideas of equity and fairness: if another city could get more benefit for the risks, why

can’t Davis?

78

Figure 10: Comparison of Covell Village to Livermore Trails; used by the opposition.

(Greenwald 11-6-2005)

D. Direct Risk: Fiscal Analysis

“Most studies conclude that housing development represents a net fiscal loss because of the service costs that residents require.”

Sociologists John Logan, Brown Univ & Harvey Molotch, New York Univ (1987: 86)

The Covell Village fiscal analysis was one of the most debated components of the project. The

public debate served to heighten people’s perceptions of the financial risk of the project. Vocal

groups included the City of Davis Finance Director, the Finance and Budget Commission, the

79

City Councilors, developers and opponents. Debate centered around three key issues: a) a

number of financial assumptions in the fiscal analysis, b) the city-county tax sharing agreement,

and c) the equity of existing homes. The Finance and Budget Commission, composed of seven

commissioners appointed by the City Council, had several concerns regarding the analysis and

did not endorse the project. The opposition advertised the concerns of the Commission and their

non-endorsement, suggesting that Covell Village posed serious financial risk to the city.

Although the City Finance Director found the project “fiscally neutral,” the fiscal analysis was

highly sensitive to a number of economic assumptions (John 10-5-2005). Differing applications

of the model could produce gains or losses to the city. The City’s Finance Director recommended

to the City Council to base their votes on the overall project and not on the fiscal analysis (Curda

1-9-2005). Using various numbers, Covell Village was projected to either cost the city at worst

$615,000 or net the city at best $344,000 per year (Curda 5-16-2005). These scenarios were

modeled using the 1987 city-county tax sharing agreement. The final agreement, finalized on

October 4, provided an unexpected and additional 2.15 percent (up to 17.48%) of revenue to the

city (John 10-5-2005). The scenarios also assumed that the park tax and sales tax are re-approved

after their sunset date. No scenarios were conducted with a decrease in house appreciation

values, as Finance Director said that this was unlikely to occur over a number of years (Curda 5-

16-2005). Other Davis residents vocalized their support of the positive fiscal analysis scenario,

also due to some of the developer mitigations and contributions that were not factored into the

report (Clumpner 2-14-2005). These mitigations would provide additional revenue to the city to

offset specific negative impacts, but would not go to the city’s general fund.

The Finance and Budget Commission and other critics of the project felt there remained several

unanalyzed questions. After the developer mitigations/contributions to parks, fire service, and

other services expired, the city would need to support these services financially (Curda 6-3-2005).

80

Once again, concerns over the wastewater treatment plant were brought up. The Commission

expressed its concern over the possible need to expand the plant due to Covell Village bringing it

over capacity (Curda 6-3-2005). The city-county tax sharing agreement and home equity were

two additional concerns of the Commission. Early fiscal analysis used the percentages contained

in the 1987 agreement, which provided the city with 15.33% of property tax revenue. Several

debates ensued about “financial riskiness” in not knowing what the final negotiations would

bring. Although the final agreement was approved on October 4, only a month before the

election, the public debate served to heighten the perception of financial risk. The final

agreement provided for 17.48% to the city, an increase of 2.15% over the 1987 agreement.

The Finance and Budget Commission voiced concern that the fiscal analysis did not take into

account the potential for diminished property values in the city (Curda 6-3-2005). Others

estimated that one-percent decrease in house prices throughout the city could end up costing the

city $10 million (John 10-5-2005). Other critics pointed out that Woodland (a city 15 minutes

north of Davis) was building a 4,000 residential unit subdivision called Spring Lake on Pole Line

10 minutes north of the proposed Covell Village site. They claimed that this would likely affect

the regional housing market. These new units in cities close to Davis were addressed in the EIR

but not in the fiscal analysis (John 10-5-2005). However, proponents of the project agreed that

there would always be a financial risk with change. With continued growth in Davis set by the

City Council at a goal of 1% per year, property values would be just as affected by Covell Village

as they would with inevitable growth anyway; the impact of new homes on existing property

values was not a specific issue to Covell Village (Curda 5-18-2005).

E. Direct Risk: Increased Traffic

“Rising traffic congestion is an inescapable condition in all large and growing metropolitan areas. … Peak-hour traffic is a result of the way modern societies operate.”

Dick Dorf (12-22-2004).

81

The opposition was successful at increasing a worry of increased traffic and inadequate

mitigations. As with any increase in people, there is a corresponding increase in the amount of

traffic. Covell Village is no exception, and the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) analyzed

expected traffic impacts and provided mitigation options. The EIR contained several instances of

projected Level of Service F peak-hour intersection traffic, meaning “Extreme traffic delays …

extensive queuing. Conditions are intolerable for most drivers” (Raney 2004: 4.4-14). This text

was repeated in numerous letters to the editor and campaign materials by the opposition.

Mitigations for increased traffic on the major intersections consisted of traffic signals,

roundabouts, and turn pockets, while mitigations for major roadways was street widening (Davis

FAQ #3 2005). The developers and the City Community Development department felt the traffic

mitigations reduced the impact to an acceptable level.

Impacts to traffic were one of the main challenges opponents used to illustrate the risks Covell

Village posed to the city. The EIR did not assess traffic impacts on the whole city, leading

opponents, and one city council member, to question what the impacts on downtown and other

roadways would be (John 10-12-2005). Greenwald, a city council member, feared the mitigation

funds from the developers would not be enough to fund the road widening, underpasses, and

other improvements in the town required of Covell Village developers.

One critic used a study in similar cities to project the number of accidents and injuries over the

next ten years. An additional 520 more traffic accidents, three traffic deaths and 280 traffic

injuries over ten years would cost an estimated $7.6 million dollars (Fowler 2-25-2005). Whether

these numbers are accurate is irrelevant. The numbers provided people with an opportunity to

become aware of a fact they already knew; additional traffic would lead to an increase in

collisions. Another letter pointed out that the firm conducting the traffic analysis polled a third of

82

the intersections in early September 2004, before the majority of UC Davis students returned

from summer break. This may have provided lower numbers of vehicular traffic used in analysis

(Gilad 1-31-2005).

F. Direct Risk: Other Concerns

The opposition voiced several other concerns over the impacts of Covell Village – an increase in

crime, building in the 100-year flood plain, and overburdening the wastewater treatment plant –

that only served to increase the public fear of the project. The accuracy of these claims isn’t the

primary concern, but rather, that they served to increase the perception that Covell Village was

just too dangerous.

Crime - Projecting additional criminal activity with 1,800 new residential units, UCD political

science professor James Fowler estimated a 3,250 incident increase in property crime and a 500

incident increase of violent crime per year costing the City of Davis approximately $28 million

(Fowler 10-1-2005). The accuracy of these numbers is questionable; however, no one debated

that increasing the number of residents would see an increase in criminal activity.

Flood Plain - Building on the 100-year flood plain became one of the recurring concerns voiced

by the opposition. A map of the proposed site of Covell Village was overlaid by the 100-year

floodplain and became widely disseminated. One could ask about the safety of surrounding

subdivisions already built. Concerns about flooding damage increased the perception that Covell

Village was too risky.

83

Figure 11: 100-year Floodplain (Wagstaff et al. 7-17-2005)

Waste Water Treatment Plant - Citing various studies and numbers, a controversy arose over

the capacity of the Davis waste water treatment plant to handle an additional 1,800 units. Early in

the process (May 2005, six months before the vote), the Davis Enterprise ran a story about how

the plant needed an overhaul and people should be prepared for fee increases. When the issue

surrounding the capacity of the plant to handle Covell Village arose during a Davis Planning

Commission meeting, people were already alarmed. The Davis Planning Commission did not

endorse Covell Village, citing concerns that the wastewater treatment plant would be put over

capacity. However, according to reports, the plant is rated for 7.5 million gallons per day (mgd)

while the city is currently creating an average of 6.25 mgd. The Covell Village EIR asserts that

the new development would add between 0.46 and 0.48 mgd, leaving capacity for .79 mgd –

enough for approximately 8,000 people (Curda 6-15-2005).

G. Direct Risk: Davis Growth

The risks of future growth influenced both sides of the debate: some feared that Covell Village

would open a flood gate of development while others feared that a sprawl of traditional housing

84

would be built by a less savory developer if Covell Village was not approved. In 2003, the City

Council agreed upon a 1% growth cap each year to meet regional housing needs (John 9-14-

2005). Covell Village was to be phased in over ten years, with 175 residential units approved

each year.

Critics feared that offering one developer a monopoly on residential development would prevent

the city from looking at other, better, options (Angermann 10-14-2005). Others argued that the

city didn’t need a large project to meet its growth target (John 9-14-2005). Many opposed felt

that approving Covell Village, one of the largest developments in Davis’s history, would set a

precedent for similar growth. They felt that the City Council did not respect citizen desires to

keep Davis “a small, safe neighborhood-oriented community” (Wagstaff et al., 2005).

There was a fear that another developer could obtain approval from either the city or county to

build a sprawling housing development on the periphery of Davis (Souza & Saylor 10-23-2005).

A fear of getting something worse that Covell Village may have influenced people to support it.

Some members of the City Council saw Covell Village as offering stability, and hence less risk of

forced development, to the planning process by providing approximately 60% of the housing

growth each year (Saylor 3-2-2006, Souza 1-26-2006). By knowing where expansion is

expected, the city would be better able to order and manage services and other construction

projects in the city.

Section 1 Conclusion

Concerns regarding features of Covell Village served to heighten the public’s perception of risks

and lower the credibility of the developers. The developers and the City Council strived to

include many amenities and contributions into their project and the development agreement. The

burden of proof of the benefits of Covell Village was on the developers. Their task was difficult

85

– trying to convince the public that the benefits of the development outweighed the potential for

harm or loss. The opposition created a heightened awareness of risks; some justified and some

based on uncertain assumptions. In the final vote, the public believed the risks outweighed the

benefit.

Section 2: Key Actors

Individual actors can play key roles in perception. The behavior of actors in the campaign

interacts with the contextual situation to amplify or attenuate perceptions of risk. This section

will discuss the actions of the three major actors: a) city and county governments; b) developers;

c) organized opposition; as well as three minor, yet influential actors: d) University students; e)

Trader Joes; and f) the Sierra Club.

The extent to which community members are mobilized into long-lasting groups can generate

additional opposition. Davis has a history of grassroots citizen’s efforts in combating growth and

other activities seen as having ill effects to the character of the city. Most ad hoc groups of Davis

residents, with little or no formalized structure, around either a specific or a broader issue, end up

dissolving once the issue has passed (Dixon 2006). Davis has seen many such groups, with a few

being the Greater Davis Planning and Research Group, the Recycling Committee of Davis, the

East Davis Neighborhood Committee that while recognized formally by the media did not have

formal structure.

A. City and County Government

“The commissions studied the analyses. The contrast between their advice and the council's push to develop is troubling — and underscores the council's

failure to respect the citizens' vision for Davis.” Ken Wagstaff and colleagues (7-17-2005)

86

The city and county governments play a crucial role in the development process. City staff

accepts and analyze building permits while the city council and county board of supervisors

review proposals and either approve or reject them. To help in the analysis process, the City

Council relies on its many City Commissions to analyze portions of the proposal and provide

recommendations.

City Staff - City staff, most notably the City Community Development Department were

responsible for quite a few tasks in the Covell Village Proposal. This department accepts

applications, hires consultants to complete the Environmental Impact Report paid for by the

developer, review information, obtain commission feedback and have the City Council approve

or reject the proposal.

In the Covell Village campaign, due to the very public and vocal campaign, city staff created a

website dedicated to Covell Village documents. The department posted all public documents

pertaining to Covell Village on the website including the EIR, all analyses, minutes from

commission meetings, and reports. In an effort to provide factual information to Davis residents,

city staff developed “Covell Village Fact Sheets” on affordable housing, traffic, fiscal impacts,

and other project components. The Fact Sheets were intended to be neutral, reflecting the city

staff’s role as a facilitator of the process, and reflect information from both the EIR and the fiscal

analysis. However, prior events with University and city officials might have reduced the level of

confidence Davis residents placed in these documents. Also, the documents were only available

on the website, unlike campaign materials from the developers and the opposition which were

widely available through the mail and newspaper.

City Commissions - City commissions are designed to analyze specific issues and provide

recommendations to the City Council. In the Covell Village debate, however, two commissions,

87

the Planning Commission and the Finance and Budget Commission, became highly politicized.

The Planning Commission, responsible for all land use decisions, raised concerns about the

wastewater treatment plant and other issues. The Commission neither endorsed nor rejected the

project by voting 3-3. The Finance and Budget Commission had concerns with three aspects of

the fiscal analysis: a) it not addressing the impact on existing homes; b) a scenario where homes

dropped in value; and c) a final city-county tax sharing agreement not being in place. The

Commission voted 6-2 to tell the City Council that they were “uncomfortable with parts of the

fiscal analysis” but did not vote on the project as a whole (Curda 6-3-2005).

Opponents were quick to use both Commissions’ votes to claim that the commissions did not

approve Covell Village (Dorf 8-17-2005). Stating that the City Council did not heed the

recommendations of its Commissions served two purposes: a) it strengthened the feeling that the

City Council was not listening to residents and served only its own ends, and b) increased the

perception of risk in the project. Many commissions still hold certain values of credibility with

Davis residents. The commissions are composed of fellow residents, volunteering their time on

commissions to review documents and conduct analyses. Stating, incorrectly, that these

commissions rejected Covell Village helped legitimize the fear of danger from the project.

City Council - The City Council utilizes feedback from city staff and city commissions in order

to make decisions. In development proposals, the City Council negotiates a development

agreement, holds public hearings, certifies the EIR, and votes to approve the proposal. The City

Council as a whole drew much anger from opponents as well as fellow City Councilor Greenwald

for a variety of reasons. Greenwald stated multiple times that she did not think the process

allowed adequate time for review and public input (Greenwald 2-20-2005, 2-2-2007). Many

Davis residents felt that the “City Council majority” were not adequately representing the views

of the Davis populace (Wagstaff et al., 2005).

88

However, the City Council is responsible for looking at overall community issues, whereas city

commissions and many city residents focus on only a few (Saylor 3-2-2006). Not all issues can

be resolved at an optimal level to all. Even so, the opposition raised the general perception that

the City Council was not respecting residents. Since similar events were taking place at a state

and national level, this angered many residents. After the campaign, when results were reported,

one columnist reported that now “80 percent of the City Council is out of step with 60 percent of

the voters” (Dunning 11-10-2005).

County - The County’s responsibility for Covell Village was primarily two-fold: a) The Board of

Supervisors had to negotiate a property-tax sharing agreement between the city and county and b)

the Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) had to approve the annexation of land into

the boundaries of Davis if Covell Village was approved by the voters. The first responsibility

was completed on October 4, finalized in an agreement by the Board of Supervisors and City

Council. Unexpected involvement by the Board of Supervisors came in the form of concerns

over whether other developers could go against Davis desires and gain county approval to build

on the periphery of Davis if Covell Village was rejected. A controversial letter authored by

Supervisor Helen Thompson sparked debate on the amount of concern there was for other

developers bypassing the city and its Measure J requirements. The letter drew much criticism

from opponents who said it was a “scare tactic” and “red herring,” with “no basis in fact”

(Wagstaff et al. 2005). The Yolo-Davis Pass Through Agreement along with confirmation of

support from other County Supervisors made Thompson’s allegations appear deceitful. It may

have convinced people of questionable tactics used in the campaign.

89

B. Developers – Covell Village Partners

The developer team, named Covell Village Partners, was comprised of eight people with ties to

Davis. Most moved to Davis in the late 60’s and 70’s and have since become active in the

community. Three co-founded Tandem Properties, a company that owns over fourteen rental

properties primarily occupied by students. Several have won awards for environmentalism,

innovations in building, and historic preservation (Whitcombe 3-7-2006). Two have served as

presidents on the Davis Chamber of Commerce. Lead designer, Michael Corbett, is world

renown for his Village Homes development. The Covell Village team undoubtedly had strong

connections to and feelings for the character of Davis and its citizens. The developers felt that the

Covell Village project served two causes: a) providing environmentally and affordable housing to

Davis and b) acting as a illustration to the nation on how to provide eco-friendly development that

makes environmental sense (Whitcombe 3-7-2006).

One commonly held view by both the developers and the opposition was the error of the Covell

Village Partners’ campaign. The developers hired an outside consultant, Capitol Campaigns,

based in Sacramento, to run the campaign. While the consultants had much experience with

similar campaigns in other cities, the history and atmosphere of Davis is not similar to many other

cities. The consultants turned down grassroots support and were arrogant in their tactics

(Whitcombe 3-7-2006). The campaign manager from Capitol Campaigns asserted that there

could never be enough direct mail. The first pieces were lacking quality and then there was too

much direct mailing. As many said (explained in greater detail in Section 3), it gave the

perception that the Covell Village Partners had “money to burn” (Whitcombe 3-7-2006).

C. Opposition - Citizens for Responsible Planning

The primary organized opposition came from a group named Citizens for Responsible Planning.

The organization relied on grassroots support from many individuals living in Davis. There were

90

around thirty people involved in strategy meetings, many with strong personalities (Nieberg &

Bishop 1-29-2007). These residents were from various contingents in Davis, some involved in

prior campaigns against development while several were younger citizens with dreams of home

ownership (Wagstaff 2-1-2007). The group relied on individual donations from Davis residents

gathering many hundreds of donations from $1 to $5,000. Over 150 donations of $100 or more

were accepted by the group (Davis Finance Filings 2006). This type of political organizing takes

massive amounts of volunteer time but is also very successful in Davis culture.

The campaign manager was voted into his position by the organization approximately a month

before the election. Before that, the group was disorganized, had a challenging time getting

decisions made, and was divided into factions over strategy (Wagstaff 2-1-2007). The Citizens

for Responsible Planning were effective due to three factors:

Strong leadership increased the efficiency of the organization in developing overall

strategy as well as pinpoint tactical decisions. Many confirmed that the campaign

manager helped structure the group into focused committees (strategy, tactical, etc.) that

were able to make decisions much more easily (Wagstaff 2-1-2007, Nieberg 1-29-2007,

Bishop 1-29-2007).

The competence of the group to respond quickly to changing conditions helped it achieve

success. For example, being able to issue a response to Supervisor Helen Thompson’s

letter within an hour demonstrated the group’s ability to understand and analyze new

information (Wagstaff 2-1-2007).

Many people had worked on campaigns in the past. This core group of activists knew the

issues, had proven commitment, and had experience working in campaigns (Wagstaff 2-

1-2007). Having this accessible agency served well to address similar growth issues in

an efficient manner.

91

Overall, the opposition was able to raise people’s doubts as to the benefits of the project versus

the potential risks. They were able to raise uncertainties over developers’ claims that the dangers

were either non existent or could be mitigated. Other groups with legitimacy, such as the Sierra

Club and California Aggie, also opposed the project and added to the perceptions of risk.

D. University Students

“The student interest has been relatively silent and, in effect, largely ignored” California Aggie Editorial Board (Stone et al., 10-11-2005)

The University was not directly involved with the Covell Village campaign; however, the student

population was targeted by campaigning and participated in the debate. Although the student

newspaper, the California Aggie, had been running articles on Covell Village periodically,

student debate really started with an editorial a month before the campaign. The editorial

criticized the University administration for not bringing the debate to campus and allowing

students to become more familiar with Covell Village. Students were encouraged to participate

because, although the particular individuals would not likely still be in Davis to see the project

through, the aggregate student interest was unlikely to change (Stone et al., 10-11-2005).

From that point forward, students began to engage in discussions and debate both in letters to the

editor of the student newspaper and on the popular website http://www.daviswiki.org. The

Covell Village Partner campaign focused efforts to win the student vote, including hiring students

to help register other students to vote (Malvin 10-26-2005). Opponents disapproved of this tactic,

claiming that the project did not primarily pertain to students and increasing voter registration for

the group was a tactic to gain votes. Members of the student government, Associated Students of

the University of California at Davis (ASUCD), disagreed on whether to engage in the debate.

The External Affairs Commission refused to vote on Covell Village, saying that it would pit

students against the community without adding anything to the debate. They declared that

92

engaging in the debate would only ensure the loss of student voice in this and future issues

(Gimbel 10-13-2005). However, the ASUCD Environmental Policy and Planning Commission

endorsed Covell Village.

The student newspaper, the California Aggie, opposed Covell Village in an editorial. The

editorial cited their opinion that the negative consequences did not outweigh the benefits for

students. It raised fears of student concern, distinct from those used by the Citizens for

Responsible Planning, including inconvenient housing, insecure bike paths, strained the Unitrans

bus lines with expansion, and intensified student-community relations (Stone, et al., 10-25-2005).

This opposition, coming from a media outlet reaching thousands of UCD students, may have

influenced perceptions of the project.

E. Trader Joe’s

On October 6, Trader Joe’s, the popular specialty grocery store, became an actor in the Covell

Village debate. Trader Joe’s signed a lease for space in Covell Village across the street from the

Nugget grocery store, if Covell Village was approved. Many residents of Davis have been vocal

in their desire for the popular grocer for a long time (John 10-6-2005). The principle designer,

Michael Corbett said that a Trader Joes “completes our vision for the neighborhood” (John 10-6-

2005). However, many opponents expressed concern over potential competition with the Nugget

and increasing traffic as people from the city and nearby towns drove to the store. Trader Joes is

important because of it being seen as a political trick by the developers (John 10-6-2005). With

only one month before the election, many perceived the developers to be dangling an incentive

for voters to approve Covell Village, even though the grocer had other potential sites in Davis.

This reinforced many opinions about questionable campaign tactics used by the Covell Village

Partners.

93

F. Sierra Club

The local Sierra Club Yolano chapter management committee voted to oppose Covell Village in

September 2005. The group cited concerns similar to those of the Citizens for Responsible

Planning, including City Council disregard for commission recommendations, fiscal instability,

traffic congestion, expensive housing, and violation of smart growth principles (Nieberg et al,

2005). With a large contingent of Sierra Club members in Davis, and recognizing Davis’s values

of environmentalism, the Sierra Club’s recommendation helped to legitimize fears. “In Davis, the

Sierra Club means something” (Nieberg 1-29-2007, Bishop 1-29-2007). According to risk

perception research, environmental organizations are a strong institutional source of trusted

information (Marris et al. 1998: 644). Having the Sierra Club repeat information from the

opposition’s campaign, Citizens for Responsible Planning, helped to legitimize concerns. Now,

instead of a small grassroots group of activists debating risks, a nationally recognized

environmental organization verified them. Having local activists on the management committee

of the Sierra Club also closely tied with the Citizens for Responsible Planning campaign probably

helped in information transfer and corroboration between the two groups.

Figure 12: Graphic appearing in the Sierra Club Yolano Flame newsletter (Sierra Club 2005).

94

Section 2 Conclusion

The composition, leadership and actions of the actors served to influence levels of trust. Actions

were interpreted by residents from their inherent socio-cultural values and through a lens of

history. The developers demonstrated ineffective leadership in turning down grassroots support

from a well established town of participatory ideals. The opposition, however, had effective

leadership that encouraged and relied on grassroots support. In comparing the two organizational

structures weighing in Davis’s values of deliberative principles, the one that involves people is

likely more effective.

Two city commissions’ non-endorsement, yet non-rejection, were used to increase concern with

the project. Students were targeted by developers, while there would be little future connection

of individual students to Covell Village. Trader Joes, a popular grocer, was used increase the

apparent benefits to the project, but this only ended up looking like a political gimmick by the

developers. The Sierra Club, a well respected environmental organization released information

almost identical to the opposition. This served as a source of confirmation for many residents of

what the opposition was alleging.

Section 3: The Risk Debate Process

“We’re hoping to get beyond what can happen in a political situation, which is the oversimplification of issues.”

Bill Emlen, Community Development Director (Becker 1-10-2005).

It was the campaign that thoroughly brought to light inconsistencies between cultural values held

by residents and the way that the developers advertised the project. While other factors such as

growth struggles and past events decreasing institutional trust in city officials played an important

part in influencing people, the campaign played a critical role. It was through the campaign that

95

people began to view the Covell Village Partners’ campaign as unethical. The Covell Village

campaign was a drawn-out political battle that polarized issues, confused voters, and divided the

community. A key difference in the debate over Covell Village, as opposed to prior conflicts,

was the expectation of a citywide vote in compliance with Measure J. The debate started after the

draft Environmental Impact Report was released in December 2004 and continued to heat up

through Election Day in November 2005. Three major issues will be analyzed in this section: a)

process concerns; b) allegations of unethical conduct; and c) the final election return outcome.

A. Process Concerns

“If the project is as beneficial to the city as the developers claim, why does the process limit public scrutiny?”

Michael Saxton (1-16-2005)

Davis residents and City Councilor Greenwald complained about the lack of public input, barriers

to participation, and limited City Council review. This, they said, rushed the process without

time to consider key issues of Covell Village (Forbes 12-30-2004, Saxton 1-16-2005, Greenwald

2-20-2005). Process-related concerns were raised starting in December 2004 and continued until

the election. Hindering public participation in a city with ideals of a deliberative process causes

frustration and resentment. Even while arguments over certain features of Covell Village were

occurring, debate regarding appropriate venues and amounts of public input raged. Most public

participation took place during public comment periods at Commission and City Council

meetings. Many commissions discussed features of Covell Village related to their specific

commission focus, yet many residents did not see these as opportunities to engage in a dialogue

regarding Covell Village. Distress with the process used to approve Covell Village served to

influence people regarding the content of the proposal itself.

96

Public Input through the City Council – One City Councilor requested separate meetings that

would focus on major components. The City Council member felt, as did many residents, that

there was insufficient open, public opportunity to help shape project features (Greenwald 2-20-

2005, Curda 1-20-2005). One suggestion was that the process should start with public

discussions actively establishing needs of the city, rather than the City Council passively

accepting a proposal from developers (Greenwald 2-20-2005). Some people questioned why the

City Council was trying to rush the project, noting that there was only benefit to the developers

but little to the city in doing so. Whether the Council was rushing or not is debatable. However,

the perception quickly spread that the City Council was limiting public involvement and

hastening the project through the approval process. Some called for the City Council and city

government to be neutral facilitators, given that the project would go to a citywide vote (Borack

5-20-2005). With the perception of obstacles standing in the way to public input, the only option

for citizens in the planning process was a vote. In essence, it was a vote “yes’ affirming Covell

Village or a vote “no” regarding the process saying “try another way” (Gelber 9-18-2005).

Public Input through the Commissions - City commissions had no formal role in the approval

process for Covell Village. However, specific components related to commission’s area of

responsibility were sent to eight commissions (out of fifteen). Some commissions received

specific questions to answer while others were only solicited for feedback and opinions (Heck 10-

3-2006). None of the commissions were asked to endorse the project as a whole. By January

2005, there had been over 20 public meetings on several aspects of Covell Village (Curda 1-20-

2005). However, critics continued to say that citizen-commission experts were rushed through

their examinations. There were charges of critical comments being buried in hard to access

documents. These accusations raised doubts as to whether commissions even had enough time to

thoroughly review Covell Village (Jackman 10-13-2005). Three commissions reviewed

components of Covell Village on the same date, January 10, 2005, at separate locations. The

97

Open Space Commission started at 6:30pm and Finance and Budget and Social Services both

began at 7:00pm. The assertion that there was ample opportunity for public input is

unconvincing. Holding overlapping meetings makes it impossible for residents to provide input

on multiple topics. Several large components were not returned to commissions for comments,

even after the developers modified them (Gelber 9-18-2005, Saylor 3-2-2006). By not providing

an opportunity for, at the very least, commissions to address new features, demonstrates a lack of

commitment for public input.

Public Input through the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) - The California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was adopted in 1970, requiring state and local agencies to

identify significant environmental impacts of their actions and to avoid or mitigate impacts (14

CCR §15060). An Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is required by CEQA when a proposed

project may pose direct physical change or indirect physical change in the environment.

However, economic and social changes are not considered as significant effects on the

environment. Community spirit and character are not considered in the EIR, even though they

too may be impacted by a project. A municipality could add these as categories to the EIR, but if

the analysis turned out to be incorrect, the city would be open to lawsuits (Heck 10-3-2006).

One commonly voiced concern with the Environmental Impact Report process is that the major

site features and design must be completed before an EIR can be produced. Developers plan the

project, complete an EIR, and then ask for public comments. There is little opportunity for public

input into the project design. The method of holding public comment periods after most of the

work in reaching a decision has been done is a “cause for resentment of risk decisions” (Stern &

Fineberg 1996: 78). The public comment process is prescribed by law (CEQA) and thus is

considered a formal process. It is not the time for residents to discuss project or opinions, but

rather comment directly on the EIR alone and its potential failure to address significant impacts to

98

the environment. The EIR process does not provide meaningful dialogue, enough time to stop the

project, or assurance that it meets community needs.

After the draft Environmental Impact Report is publicly released, a forty-five day public

comment period is required by law. For Covell Village, the dEIR was released on December 10,

with comments due by January 28, giving the public fifty days for public comment. One hundred

thirteen letters were received and replied by the city. Releasing the EIR over the winter holidays

was considered by some to be a “dirty trick” (Saxton 1-16-2005). During this public comment

period, residents were able to respond to inadequacies or other problems in the analysis.

However, the document contained complex technical jargon and terms not commonly understood

by laypeople (Angermann 1-24-2005). References to other reports, not easily accessible,

hindered residents. Examples of these include SB 610 Water Supply Assessment, City of

Davis/UC Davis Joint Water Supply Feasibility Study, 2000 Urban Water Management Plan, and

the City of Davis Deep Aquifer Study. Fifty days to become familiar with technical concepts

before being asked to point out inadequacies in the analysis was perceived to be not enough.

Opportunities for Input - Developers and many members of the City Council felt that

commission and City Council meetings offered plenty of opportunity for public input (Curda 1-

20-2005). One of the developers declared that Covell Village was the result of a decade of public

input, design, planning, review, and negotiation (Curda 5-15-2005). There is little academic

agreement on which public participation techniques work best. However, one finding agreed

upon by all risk perception studies is the ineffectiveness and often alienating result of public

involvement through public hearings (Kasperson & Kasperson, 2005 Vol I: 27). This case saw

many residents troubled with public involvement centering only on commission and City Council

public comment periods. In one case, a single City Council meeting lasted six hours, with public

comment starting at 11:30pm (Curda 1-26-2005).

99

Larger, more complex projects have less definition for the process needed in order to review and

approve them (Heck 10-3-2006). Larger projects occur less frequently and thus do not have

established routines. However, providing a mechanism for public review and modifications to

the design based on that review is needed, especially in an environment with ideals of public

participation. The interaction between the review and approval procedure for Covell Village

(process) interacted with the deliberative democracy of residents (context). The result was

unhappy people, decreased trust in the City Council, and ultimately a vote that rejected the

proposal. The campaign manager for Citizens for Responsible Planning, the primary opposition

group, confirms by saying “forget the issue; it [winning the campaign] was in the process”

(Livingston 1-24-2007).

B. Unethical Conduct

“I don’t like being manipulated and lied to – either by the developers or certain members of the City Council.”

Jim Leonard (9-28-2005)

The opposition alleged unethical and questionable campaign tactics by the developers.

Fabrication of information, too many direct mailings, and scare tactics served to influence people

into believing that the risks of the project were being hidden. People polarized the conflict to that

between a big corporation versus a hometown grassroots group. Trust was decreased due to

perceived connections between past events reducing credibility in city institutions, such as the

biodefense lab, and concerns with actions of the federal government.

The opposition group was accused of creating an excessive perception of risk. While it was the

responsibility of the developers to promote the benefits of their project, the opposition had only to

raise doubts and create confusion (Whitcombe 3-7-2006, Saylor 3-2-2006). However, many of

100

the activities conducted by the Covell Village Partners themselves in the campaign served to cast

doubt and influence perceptions.

Mailings – One of the most commonly held views, by all participants, was one of too many direct

mailings to Davis residents (Whitcombe 3-7-2006, Saylor 3-2-2006, Livingston 1-22-2007,

Nieberg 1-29-2007, Bishop 1-29-2007). The overabundance of mailings caused three reactions:

1. Suspicion that the Covell Village Partners had too much money. This caused people to

question the amount of money the developers stood to make on the project. By trying to

convince the voters this hard, the Covell Village Partners would make enough money to

cover the campaign and hence, even more then that.

2. Annoyance at both the number of mailings and the paltry amount of factual information

contained in each piece. Full-color, well-designed graphic flyers, contained pictures of

developments with features that would not be contained in Covell Village. Text was

typically brief and overused phrases such as “New Urbanism,” “smart planning,” and

“over $60 million for schools.”

3. Concerns over the environmental commitment of the Covell Village Partners. The

mailings did not indicate that they were printed on recycled paper and only a few asked

people to “Please recycle.” A similar election, in which one of the participants sent

massive amounts of mail, led one Davis resident to comment, "Any company that has to

mail hundreds of thousands of pamphlets to convince people of its environmental

stewardship clearly doesn't know the definition of environmental stewardship” (Williams

2006).

Fabrication of Information – Numerous critics expressed displeasure at what they saw as

inaccurate information provided intentionally by the Covell Village Partners. Many letters to the

editor and op-ed articles described the information released by the developers as “deceptive,”

101

“half-truths,” “false,” and “misleading” (Hunter-Blair et al. 10-23-2005). The general feeling of

the Citizens for Responsible Planning was that the Covell Village Partners published polished

fabrications that underestimated the intelligence of voters (Nieberg 1-29-2007, Bishop 1-29-

2007). In many cases, the mitigations were described as benefits, such as the “$60 million for

new schools,” which was to be an additional property tax on Covell Village residents (John 10-

19-2005). These allegations caused people in Davis to question the information provided about

the project. There was confusion about correct information and who people could trust to provide

correct information. People turned to sources they thought they could trust, such as

environmental organizations (like Sierra Club) and informal social networks, including friends.

On-Campus Polling Station – Nicknamed, “PizzaGate,” two separate incidents involving the

early-voting station at the UCD Memorial Union cast the Covell Village Partners in a negative

light in the last week to Election Day. People were angry that the Covell Village campaign was

handing out pizza coupons to students for voting, on October 31. The goal was to increase

student voting, but Yolo County Clerk-Recorder Freddie Oakley determined that it would

influence votes and ordered the activity to cease (John 11-1-2005). Covered on the front page of

the Davis Enterprise the following day, the incident became a strong incident demonstrating

unethical behavior by the Covell Village Partners. On the same day, a well-known supporter of

Covell Village campaign, Norbie Kumagi, was asked to step aside from working at the MU

polling station (John 11-2-2005). Oakley determined that having well-known supporters of

Covell Village serve as precinct workers might unduly influence voters. A few days later,

another supporter of Covell Village was asked to resign as a poll worker. While the two poll

workers had not violated any laws, their recognized support and campaigning for Covell Village

caused questions of partisanism. The incidents triggered a cry of alarm from opponents as they

perceived the occurrence of unethical practices. While many knew this was not a planning issue,

they saw it as a tool for the fight against Covell Village (Wagstaff 2-1-2007).

102

Scare Tactics - Steve Gidaro, a developer from Sacramento, became involved in the campaign as

the “bogeyman” alternative if people rejected Covell Village (Dunning 10-26-2005). Two

projects of Gidaro’s had already been turned down by the City Council. Supervisor Thompson

and City Councilors Saylor and Souza released similar letters warning against the threat of Gidaro

approaching the county for approval to build. If this happened, Measure J would not apply,

although the Yolo-Davis Pass Through Agreement would be voided. The letters warned that

Gidaro would bankroll a recall election of County Supervisors if they did not approve his

development (Souza & Saylor 10-23-2005). Opponents of Covell Village quickly labeled this

threat as “scare tactics,” a “dirty trick,” and the creation of a “bogeyman” (Malvin 10-28-2005,

CRP 2005, Dunning 10-26-2005). This incident backfired and did not increase support for Covell

Village. It only confirmed people’s mistrust of city/county officials, raised suspicions of

unethical behavior, and heightened the negative atmosphere of the campaign. It may even have

made people feel sorry for Gidaro (Dunning 10-26-2005).

Other Incidents – Other events during the debate raised questions of appropriate campaign

practices:

In July 2005, a mailing from the Covell Village Partners mislabeled Kevin Wolf’s as

associated with the Friends of the River organization. This incident appeared deceitful,

even though an apology was issued by Michael Corbett in the form of a letter to the

editor.

In late October 2005, Tandem Properties, which owns and manages approximately

fourteen apartment complexes, posted “Vote Yes on X” signs at each complex (Malvin

11-4-2005). Three Covell Village Partners were co-founders of Tandem Properties.

Many residents, mostly students, voiced their anger at the signs appearing to misrepresent

103

their political views, although they knew the company had the legal right to do so

(Malvin 11-4-2005).

Covell Village Partners hired student workers to conduct voter registration efforts. They

manned a table near the Memorial Union, where passerby students were asked to register

to vote and information about Covell Village was provided. Many critics saw this as a

deceitful way to obtain votes for the project.

A few days before the election a large crowd of Covell Village supporters gathered by the

Northstar development pond (John 11-7-2005). Although meetings of Covell Village

supporters happened frequently, this particular public assembly, attended by many of the

Covell Village Partners, sang a few bars of “We Shall Overcome.” The song became

popular during the civil rights movement of the 1960’s and is commonly used during

protests and peace rallies. Having wealthy developers sing a song about overcoming

challenges is ironic. Many saw it that way (Livingston 1-22-2007, Nieberg 1-29-2007,

Bishop 1-29-2007).

These incidents diminished trust in information provided by Covell Village Partners. People may

have been more inclined to believe information published by the Citizens for Responsible

Planning, especially when it was repeated by the Sierra Club.

Questionable campaign tactics alone would cause frustration and reduce trust in many

circumstances. By having socio-cultural norms of public participation, environmentalism, and

similar past and current events, the impact of these unethical tactics increased significantly.

Perceptions of risk amplified due to these interactions, such as: a) disturbing tactics perceived as

similar to those on the federal level; b) lack of environmental commitment because of massive

amounts of direct mail; c) limiting public review in a city with significant public participation.

104

C. Outcome: Election Results

Covell Village was defeated, with 12,578 (58.7%) people voting no and 8,843 (41.2%) people

voting yes. The margin of victory, nearly 20%, was not anticipated by either side before the

campaign and came as much of a shock. Despite the massive amount of elections materials the

turnout for the Covell Village election was only 60.7% of eligible voters. In comparison, the

following election in June 2006, two new City Councilors were elected and only 47.3% voted.

However, the election establishing Measure J in 2000 was 69.5%. A year after the Covell Village

election, in November 2006, the issue of a big box store, Target, coming to Davis, saw a voter

turnout of 65.9%. (Yolo County Elections Office). The vote for Covell Village did not turn out

record numbers of people. Perhaps there was an overload of information and many just tuned

out.

Davis Measure X, Covell Village

Votes Percent

Yes 8,843 41.2

No 12,578 58.7 Figure 13: November 8, 2005 Yolo County Election Returns for Measure X

The following results were found looking at voting patterns, on Measure X, as a function of

distance from the proposed site,

For the eight precincts bordering the Covell Village parcel, the average percentage of

residents voting “no” were 62%.

For the precincts in the middle of Davis, not bordering the Covell Village parcel and not

along an outside border, the average percentage of residents voting “no” was 58.7%.

105

For the fourteen precincts on the West, South and East Border, not including those

bordering UC Davis, the average percentage of residents voting “no” was 56.4%.

The chart demonstrates that all except two precincts rejected Measure X: Covell Village.

However, as the percentages indicate, people closer to the proposed development may have been

more likely to perceive higher risk than those residing farther away. Residents living most

closely to the proposed site were more inclined to vote no on the project than those farther away.

Figure 14: Precinct map showing precinct voting for Measure X, Covell Village

(Yolo County Elections Office 2005)

Section 3 Conclusion

The campaign made people question the process used to solicit voter approval of Covell Village.

These concerns surfacing over the process and campaign had little to do with the features,

mitigations, or content of the Covell Village proposal. Instead, they served to both reduce

institutional trust in the Covell Village Partners and city officials and increase doubts over the

accuracy of information provided to residents. Cultural values of deliberative democracy were

broken. Many felt that residents were not given enough time to analyze critical documents, such

as the EIR and fiscal analysis, and provide their input to the developers and City Council. The

106

available public input was conducted in formal commission and City Council settings, which was

not conducive to dialogues.

Chapter 4 Conclusion

The Covell Village campaign revealed multiple variables involved in shaping risk perception:

features of the project, key actors, and the debate process. These process variables were

interpreted by the public in concert with the context: shared history, cultural values, and past

events. Davis has seen its share of conflict over growth. This time, however, was different in

several important aspects. The process used by Covell Village contained limited mechanisms for

public input while people were questioning the ethics of tactics employed. The opposition was

able to point these out which decreased overall trust in information released by supports of Covell

Village. The opposition was also able to sufficiently raise enough concerns over potential risks

and limited benefits. Without these process variables, the contextual settings would not have

been as important. Both context and process are needed in order to fully understand variables

influencing risk perception.

107

Chapter 5: Conclusion

“Social effects that may need to be considered in a risk decision include neighborhood disruption and issues of social equity and stigma.

Some risk decisions can significantly alter a community’s character” Risk Perception Researchers Paul Stern and Harvey Fineberg (1996: 46).

This thesis demonstrates how expanding risk perception research impacts both social science

theory and policy implementation. First, that risk perception is dependant upon social processes.

The contextual setting, risk debate process, and the interaction between the two are key variables

in shaping people’s perceptions. The Covell Village campaign evoked strong emotions based

upon shared history and values of residents. Both context and process are needed to fully

comprehend why people responded the way they did. The interaction between the two

heightened the perception of risk in Covell Village and amplified opposition. Second, risk

perception theories may be applied to land use conflict. Risk researchers have not analyzed

housing development with a risk perception lens. The response of the public in the Covell

Village campaign helps establish the applicability of risk perception theories.

Section 1: Implications for Social Science Theory

As the Covell Village campaign demonstrates, contextual variables of shared history, current

events, and socio-cultural values interact with the debate process. Through the experience of risk,

groups and individuals both experience the potential for physical harm and undergo a process of

learning to create their own interpretations of risk. These interpretations are used to frame and

respond to future risk events (Kasperson 2003: 15). Through Davis’s history of growth struggles,

residents have formed expertise and insight into ways to challenge development. The principles

of deliberative democracy and environmentalism caused residents to mistrust the process of site

design and City Council approval. Without knowledge of the cultural values of Davis residents

108

or background in growth struggles, understanding perceptions of risk in the Covell Village debate

would be ineffective.

Theories in risk perception original from various disciplines but all share a common flaw:

discounting the importance of group process in shaping the public’s perception of risk. The

engineering and psychology approaches emphasis individual factors of risk perception. The

anthropology/sociology approach emphasizes worldview yet ignores the importance of context

and risk conflict. The integrated/communications approach builds upon earlier theories

emphasizing individual traits. While the integrated theory posits the influence of social factors,

the theory does not include much, if any, information on how this effects people’s perceptions of

risk.

Four contextual and three process factors shaped Davis resident opinions and responses to Covell

Village. Contextual factors included: a) composition and demographic of residents; b) history of

growth struggles; c) socio-cultural values; and d) past and current events. Process factors

included: a) features of the Covell Village proposal; b) interplay of key actors in the debate; and

c) the risk debate process, the campaign. Only when both context and process are analyzed is the

outcome understood. Each of the variables is relevant in understanding how people’s perceptions

of the risk Covell Village posed were influenced and shaped.

A. Context: History – Past growth and land-use struggles have bonded residents into groups that

developed agency over a number of years. Had Davis not contained a core group of residents

with experience in preventing growth, the campaign would not have been as politicized;

information disputes and dramatization would have decreased and process concerns may not have

been observed and advertised. The role of shared history in Covell Village suggests that: a) past

experience of a core group in having campaigned against a risk event may increase the likelihood

109

of strong opposition in a similar future event; and b) risk events that are comparable to those in

the past may amplify opposition.

B. Context: Cultural Values – The values held by individuals and groups affect how they will

interpret and understand risk events. The process used to design and market Covell Village may

not have garnered such opposition had Davis residents not a) held expectations of being involved

with decisions; b) valued being fully and accurately informed; c) held egalitarian ideals; or d)

been highly conscious of environmental impacts. Because these ideals were perceived to have

been broken in the process, people lost trust in the information distributed by the developers. The

opposition was able to capitalize on this and increase people’s awareness and perceptions of risk.

The role of socio-cultural values in Covell Village suggests that: a) risk events imposed by

entities seen as self-serving or mistrusted are more likely to increase opposition; b) risk events

imposed through methods seen as coercive, unethical or corrupt are likely to amplify perceptions

of risk; and c) dangers to the environment are likely to be opposed by populations that value

environmental conservation.

C. Context: Past and Current Events – Events occurring in the wider world will affect risk

events taking place at a local level. Urban sprawl and the negative effects of development have

gained widespread media attention. Prior events in Davis have damaged trust in both government

and university institutions. Dishonest and upsetting events on the federal and state levels were

seen to mirror those on the local level. The role of past events in Covell Village suggests that: a)

past events destroying trust in an institution will likely cause people to doubt information

disseminated in future events by that institution; b) dangers on a local level similar to those that

are highly publicized are more likely to increase opposition; and c) disreputable events happening

at a state or federal law affect how people view local events. If local risk events are being

imposed through similar methods, they may be more contested.

110

D. Process: Features of the Project – The design plans, developer mitigations, and public

conflict decreased trust in the developers while heightening people’s perception of the project’s

risks. The opposition was successful at using diminished trust in the developers to raise the

overall level of doubt in the features of the project. Much of the heightened concern with project

features struck a discord with resident’s socio-cultural and environmental values. Many residents

perceived high levels of risk to the economy, transportation grid, waste water treatment plant, and

Davis’s future growth. These high levels of perceived risk were a result of both natural

apprehension with any housing development, and loss of credibility of developers and the city in

appropriate mitigations. The role of project features in Covell Village suggests that: a) inherent

risks in any housing development may perceive to be heightened if trust in developers declines;

and b) public conflict over project features and mitigations may cause confusion over who to

believe.

E. Process: Key Actors – The actions of individuals and groups in the Covell Village campaign

influenced people’s perception of risks. Actions were interpreted through a contextual lens which

built support for the opposition’s grassroots structure. The opposition was composed of a core

group of activists, sharing a history of prior growth struggles, but also incorporating many new

faces. The group was robust, vocal and effective at increasing the perceptions of risk that Covell

Village would bring if built. The developers turned-down grassroots support and were seen by

many at limiting public scrutiny of the project. The role of actors in the Covell Village case

suggests that: a) the opposition of a robust vocal group are likely to increase broad public

opposition; and b) risks created by organizations that are sustained by activities causing those

risks will be seen as self-serving and are more likely to be contested.

111

F. Process: The Risk Debate Procedure – The campaign brought to light many of the

inconsistencies between socio-cultural norms of Davis residents and the tactics employed by the

developers. Concerns regarding the project planning process served to reduce trust in the

developers and increase doubts over the accuracy of information in the proposal. Cultural values

of public participation were perceived by many as being ignored. Public comment periods during

City Council and Commission meetings were not conducive to deliberation and took place after

major design features had already been planned. The campaign clearly demonstrates how the

process used in Covell Village interacts with values of deliberate participation resulting in

amplified opposition. The role of the risk debate process in Covell Village suggests that: a) a

process must be structured such that they best fit the environment in which they take place. In

Davis, a participatory/deliberative process will likely have the best success in building support; b)

trust is important in communicating the risks, mitigations and benefits of a project; and c)

opposition may be amplified if a process limits participation in a population expecting to be

involved in decisions that affect their lives.

Section 2: Implications for Policy Implementation

“Many risk decisions may impose risks on future generations that require a different kind of consideration from risks to people living today”

Risk Perception Researchers Paul Stern and Harvey Fineberg (1996: 46)

This thesis may help address the common question of why some proposals are supported and

others are not. The interplay between actors, such as politicians, city staff, developers and the

public is dynamic yet still based on the contextual setting. Policy decisions need to respect the

environment in which they are made. In a town with a well known history of growth struggles,

values of environmentalism and deliberative democracy, public policy has to conform to these

values if it is to succeed. Big money with professional public relations doesn’t always succeed.

112

The Covell Village case suggests likely interplay between context and the development process.

Developers and city officials must take the socio-cultural environment into account when

designing proposals and the review and approval process. The city staff may want to structure a

process of deliberation that strives to capture and synthesize diverse opinions. City staff, as the

primary agents responsible for structuring the review and approval process, may want to design a

process that determines what residents want in future housing and what they expect in the review

and approval process. Even though developers are private commercial enterprises and thus less

accountable to the public than city staff, they may find more acceptance of their proposals with a

process valuing public participation at the very beginning stages of design.

Risk research offers valuable advice in structuring a review and approval process in risk events.

Future housing development proposals may benefit from using an analytic-deliberative process

allowing for interactions of interested and affected parties, public officials and experts (Stern &

Fineberg 1996). This process would allow for both expert analysis and deliberation involving

social values, cultural norms, and other contextual settings to influence risk decisions. Early and

continuing public involvement is an essential step in the risk decision process (Kasperson &

Kasperson, 2005 Vol I: 22). Public involvement helps to build trust in governmental agencies

which leads to decrease in conflict while constructing better outcomes.

Section 3: Future Research

Several opportunities abound to broaden the applicability of risk perception research and conduct

comparative studies. The analytical framework for risk perception could be applied to many non-

traditional settings in addition to housing development. New insight may be gleaned by viewing

conflict over proposed facilities, with or without high levels of inherent danger or in activities that

may not pose direct potential human harm. A comparison between Covell Village and other

housing development is needed to determine if the contextual and process variables identified

113

here remain consistent. A study of particular interest could determine if the interaction between

variables is consistent across demographics.

Additional steps could be used to conduct a quantitative study in the Covell Village case. While a

qualitative approach was used in this thesis, it does lack statistical significance. Administering a

city-side survey could yield additional influences on the individual level of factors that influenced

perceptions. Social science theory could benefit from merging of individual cognitive variables

used in decision making with the large social-level analysis presented here. The psychometric

approach has identified key individual factors involved in risk perception. Major steps could be

taken in risk perception research by studying the impact of those individual factors on social

processes.

“Both Measure X campaigns should remember that all Davis residents have the city’s best interest at heart. We all have different visions of how to make this town great and should pool our resources to create a new plan on

which more people can agree.” - The California Aggie Editorial (Stone 11-10-2005)

114

References 14 CCR §15060. Official California Code of Regulations. Title 14, Chapter 3, Article 5. Althaus, Catherine E. “A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk” Risk

Analysis 25(3) (2005): 567-588. American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin

Company, 2004. 13 Mar 2007. <http://dictionary.reference.com/>. Angermann, Till. “10-year deal would be locked in.” Davis Enterprise 14 Jan. 2005. Angermann, Till. “Please, more time.” Davis Enterprise 24 Jan 2005. Ashendel, Carrie, Ted Buehler, Justin Kable, Kenneth Kwong, David Kuperman, Julia Silvis.

“Covell Village Transit Plan: A Proposal.” UC Davis Transit Systems Analysis 289A. March 11, 2005.

Bale, Andy, Cindy Clark, Elaine Fingerett, Davis Johnson, Anand Mamidi, Eileen Samitz, Ken Wagstaff. “Planning should be citizen-based not driven by developers.” Davis Enterprise 9 Oct 2005.

Becker, Lauren. “City council meets to discuss Covell Village Project budget.” California Aggie 10 Jan 2005.

Becker, Lauren. “Covell Village campaign begins” California Aggie 25 Jan 2005. Bekele, Dereje, UC Davis Resident Services Unit. Phone Interview. 10 Jan 2007. Bishop, Holly, No on X Campaign. Personal Interview. 29 Jan 2007. Borack, Gene. “Give Davis voters facts.” Davis Enterprise 20 May 2005. Breakwell, Glynis M. & Julie Barnett. “Social amplification of risk and the layering method.”

The Social Amplification of Risk. University of Cambridge, 2003. 80-101. Chorneau, Tom. “Polls: Voters turned off by governor.” Davis Enterprise 2 Nov 2005. Citizens for Responsible Planning (CRP). “Covell Village’s Costs to Davis Outweigh the

Benefits.” Davis Enterprise 6 Nov 2005. Citizens for Responsible Planning (CRP). “Covell Village: Trick or Treat?” Mail USPS 30 Oct

2005. Citizens for Responsible Planning (CRP). “Don’t be Swayed by Scare Tactics” Advertisement.

Davis Enterprise 23 Oct 2005. Citizens for Responsible Planning (CRP). “Do You Care About Davis.” Half-page, glossy

handout. No date. City of Davis. Municipal Code: 40.41 Citizen’s Right to Vote on Future Use of Open Space and

Agriculture Lands. 2000. City of Davis. Municipal Code: 18.05 Affordable Housing. 1990. City of Davis. Campaign Finance Filings for Measure X, Totals for 2005. Compiled 11 Oct 2006. City of Davis. City of Davis General Plan Update. May 2001. City of Davis. Planning Application: Covell Village Partners “Covell Village.” 22 Nov 2003. City of Davis. Development Agreement (DA): “Development Agreement Between the City of

Davis and the Covell Village Company.” 21 June 2005. City of Davis. Covell Village Facts Sheet #3: Traffic and Roadways.

<http://cityofdavis.org/covell/outreach.cfm> 18 Aug 2005. Clarke, Colin B., et al. “Covell Village: You Decide!” Final Paper for CRD 151 for Dr.

Bernadette Tarallo, UC Davis. June 2005. Clarke, Lee, James Short, Jr. "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies.”

Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-399. Clumpner, Greg. “Big benefits.” Davis Enterprise 14 Feb 2005.

115

Cohen, Joshua. "Deliberative Democracy and Democratic Legitimacy." The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Ed. Hamlin, A. and Pettit, P. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 17-34.

Congress for New Urbanism (CNU). “Charter of the New Urbanism.” 20 Feb 2001. <http://www.cnu.org/sites/files/Charter.pdf>

Cole, Gerald & Stephen Withey. “Perspectives on Risk Perceptions.” Risk Analysis 1(2) (1981): 143-163.

Covell Village Partners (CVP). “Applicant Narrative to the City of Davis Application Form.” 22 Nov 2003. <http://www.city.davis.ca.us/covell/pdfs/scoping/05Attachment_C_Applicant_Narrative.pdf>

Covell Village Partners (CVP). “The Consequences of Your Vote on Measure X.” Advertisement. Davis Enterprise 1 Nov 2005.

Creswell, Cathy E. “2005 Income Limits” State of California – Business, Transportation and Housing Agency. Department of Housing and Community Development. 25 Feb 2005.

Curda, Beth. “Denser Covell Village Pitched: 7-hour workshop focuses on plan.” Davis Enterprise 9 Jan 2005.

Curda, Beth. “Higher density desired: Tension mars Covell Village talks.” Davis Enterprise 26 Jan 2005.

Curda, Beth. “Covell Village meeting set.” Davis Enterprise 20 Jan 2005. Curda, Beth. “Covell Village Plan takes shape.” Davis Enterprise 15 May 2005. Curda, Beth. “Project’s fiscal analysis still neutral: But Covell Village assumption are based on

outdated tax-sharing pact with county.” Davis Enterprise 16 May 2005. Curda, Beth. “Council gets Covell update: Public meetings set.” Davis Enterprise 18 May 2005. Curda, Beth. “Commission deadlock on Covell Village.” Davis Enterprise 26 May 2005. Curda, Beth. “City panel can’t back Covell plan: Finance commission says it is uncomfortable

with the city’s fiscal analysis.” Davis Enterprise 3 June 2005. Curda, Beth. “Early nods for Covell proposal.” Davis Enterprise 15 Jun 2005. Dixon, Carol M. “Davis Politics 1971-72: Dynamics of an Incipient Social Movement.” Davis

Historical Society Davis, CA (4). 2006. Dorf, Dick. “Creativity needed to fight congestion.” Davis Enterprise 22 Dec 2004. Dorf, Dick. “Commission’s roles are misstated.” Davis Enterprise 17 Aug 2005. Douglas, Mary. "Risk as a Forensic Resource." American Academy of Arts and Sciences

(Daedalus) 119(4) (1990): 1-16. Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger. New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 1966. Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky. Risk and Culture. University of California Press, 1982. Douglas, Mary. Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences. Russell Sage Foundation,

1985. Douglas, Mary. Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural theory. New York: Routledge, 1992. Dunning, Bob. “Covell Village: A project good enough to eat.” Davis Enterprise 22 Mar 2005. Dunning, Bob. “X supporters count on bogeyman for votes.” Davis Enterprise 26 Oct 2005. Dunning, Bob. “K failed, but the sun still came up in the east.” Davis Enterprise 10 Nov 2005. Fell, Andrew H. and Patricia Bailey. “Public Response to Infectious Disease Research: The UC

Davis Experience.” Institute for Laboratory Animal Research Journal 46(1) (2005). Fitch, Mike. Growing Pains: Thirty Years in the History of Davis. City of Davis, 1998. Forbes, Jack. “Good, hard look.” Davis Enterprise 30 Dec 2004. Fowler, James. “Outrageous Claim.” Davis Enterprise 25 Feb 2005. Fowler, James. “Don’t be fooled by claims.” Davis Enterprise 29 Mar 2005. Fowler, James. “Covell Village: Let’s do the math.” Davis Enterprise 1 Oct 2005. Freudenburg, William R., “Risk and Recreancy: Weber, the Division of Labor, and the

Rationality of Risk Perceptions.” Social Forces 71(4), (June 1993): 909-932.

116

Garreau, Joel. Edge City: life on the New Frontier. Anchor. 1991. Gelber, Erik. “Council failed negotiations.” Davis Enterprise 18 Sep 2005. Gilad, Debbi. “Traffic concerns.” Davis Enterprise 31 Jan 2005. Gimbel, Jeremy. “Research Measure X.” California Aggie 13 Oct 2005. Greewald, Sue. “The Covell Village Process is broken: We have time to fix it; let’s reopen this

review from the very beginning.” Davis Enteprise 20 Feb 2005. Greenwald, Sue. “If Measure X fails, we will get something better.” Advertisement. Davis

Enterprise 6 Nov 2005. Greenwald, Sue, City of Davis Councilmember. Personal Interview. 2 Feb 2007. Gregory, Robin & Robert Mendelsohn. “Perceived Risk, Dread, and Benefits.” Risk Analysis

13(3) (1993): 259-264. Gumprecht, Blake. “The American College Town.” College Town Life, Oxford, Ohio. 2004. Heck, Katherine, City of Davis Principle Planner. Personal Interview. 3 Oct 2006. Heffernon, Gerald. “The place (most of) you can’t live.” Davis Enterprise 25 Oct 2005. Heimer, Carol A. "Social Structure, Psychology, and the Estimation of Risk." Annual Review of

Sociology 14 (1988): 491-519. Hunter-Blair, Julia, Lamar Heysteck, Dick Livingston, Jim Provenza, Ken Wagstaff, Natalie

Wormeli. “Covell Village: Smart growth or Trojan horse? Beware of developer promises and misleading ads.” Davis Enterprise 23 Oct 2005.

Interaction Associates, LLC. “Essential Facilitation: Core Skills for Guiding Groups.” San Francisco. 1997.

Jackman, Jean. “Participatory democracy eroded.” Davis Enterprise 13 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “Who gets to live in the village?” Davis Enterprise 21 Sept 2005. John, Claire St. “Growing concern: Does Covell Village conform to the city’s 1 percent housing

cap?” Davis Enterprise 14 Sept 2005. John, Claire St. “Who gets to live in the village?” Davis Enterprise 21 Sep 2005. John, Clarie St. “No crystal ball: Plenty of opinions on project’s fiscal impacts.” Davis Enterprise

5 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “Trader Joe’s inks deal: Covell Village woos the popular grocer.” Davis

Enterprise 6 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “Measure X supporters, foes spend differently.” Davis Enterprise 9 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “Covell Village’s cars are a challenge.” Davis Enterprise 12 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “There’s a little give and a little take: Covell Village’s quality of life issues

examined.” Davis Enterprise 19 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “What happens if X fails? Opinions different about city borders.” Davis

Enterprise 26 Oct 2005. John, Claire St. “Pizza for votes? Yes on X halted.” Davis Enterprise 1 Nov 2005. John, Claire St. “Worker at polls removed: Clerk feared he’d influence voters.” Davis Enterprise

2 Nov 2005. John, Claire St. “Last pitch for Village: Voters will decide project’s fate Tuesday.” Davis

Enterprise 7 Nov 2005. John, Claire St. “Voters just say no: Covell Village rejected by a 20-point margin.” Davis

Enterprise 9 Nov 2005. Kasperson, Roger E., Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Halina Brown, Jacque Emel, Robert Goble,

Jeanne Kasperson, Samuel Ratick. “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework.” Risk Analysis 8(2) (1988): 177-187.

Kasperson, Jeanne X., Roger Kasperson, Nick Pidgeon, Paul Slovic. “The social amplification of risk: assessing fifteen years of research and theory.” The Social Amplification of Risk. University of Cambridge, 2003. 13-46.

Kasperson, Jeanne X., Roger E. Kasperson. The Social Contours of Risk. Volumne I: Publics, Risk Communication & the Social Amplification of Risk. Earthscan, Virginia. 2005.

117

Kay, Leo. “EPA Gives $50,000 Grant to group monitoring UC Davis cleanup” US Environmental Protection Agency. 8 Feb 2001. < http://yosemite.epa.gov/ > Laurenson, Brian. “Welcome to Muir Commons: Cohousing Community.” Accessed 23 Feb 2007

< http://www.muircommons.org/> Lee, Fred G. Personal Letter to Julie Roth, DSCSOC Executive Director. 24 Jan 2007. Leonard, Jim. “I’m voting No on Measure X.” Davis Enterprise 28 Sep 2005. Livingston, Richard, No on X Campaign Manager. Email Interview. 24 Jan 2007. Logan, John R. and Harvey L. Molotch. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place.

University of California Press, 1987. Lofland, John. Davis. Radical Changes, Deep Constants. Arcadia Publishing, 2004. Lofland, John, UCD Professer Emeritius. Personal Interview. 25 Jan 2007 Loy, Carin. “Here’s what I want.” Davis Enterprise 25 Feb 2005. Nieberg, Pam, No on X Campaign. Personal Interview. 29 Jan 2007. Nino, C. S. The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

(1996) Malvin, Justin. “Yes on X signs posted on Tandem Properties’ grounds: Some residents say

boards misrepresent their political views.” California Aggie 4 Nov 2005. Malvin, Justin. “Letter on Covell Village sparks debate.” California Aggie 28 Oct 2005. Malvin, Justin. “Yes on Measure X campaign appealing to students for support.” California

Aggie 26 Oct 2005. Marris, Claire, Ian Langford, Timothy O’Riordan. “A Quantitative Test of the Cultural theory of

Risk Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm.” Risk Analysis 18(5) (1998): 635-647.

Masuda, Jeffrey and Theresa Garvin. “Place, Culture, and the Social Amplification of Risk.” Risk Analysis 26(2) (2006): 437-453.

McIntire, Steve. “Plans unveiled for Crossroads Place project in N. Davis.” Davis Enterprise 18 Dec 1989.

Payne, Linsey. “Effects of Growth Management on Housing in California.” University of California, Davis, Lanscape Architeture Senior Project. 2006.

Pew Center for Civic Journalism. “Sprawl Now Joins Crime as Top Concern.” 2000. Accessed 25 Feb 2007 <http://www.pewcenter.org/about/pr_ST2000.html>

Pidgeon, Nick, Roger E. Kasperson & Paul Slovic, editors. The Social Amplification of Risk. University of Cambridge, 2003.

Planners Commissioners Journal (2000). Sprawl Guide. Retrieved 17 July 2007. <http//www.plannersweb.com/sprawl/define.html>

Price, Nancy, No on X Campaign. Personal Interview. 26 Jan 2007. Raney Planning and Management, Inc. “Draft Environmental Impact Report – Covell Village

Development Proposal.” Dec 2004. Rayner, Steve. “Muddling Through Metaphors to Maturity: A Commentary on Kasperson et al.,

The Social Amplification of Risk.” Risk Analysis 8(2) (1988): 201-204. Rogers, George O. “The Dynamics of Risk Perception: How Does Perceived Risk Respond to

Risk Events?” Risk Analysis 17(6) (1997): 745-757. Rosa, Eugene A. “Metatheoretical foundations.” The Social Amplification of Risk. University of

Cambridge, 2003. 47-79. Roth, Julie. “Town Meeting Report.” Davis South Campus Superfund Oversight Committee.

October 1996. Accessed 26 Feb 2007. <http://members.aol.com/dscsoc/1996/julie1.htm>

Savage, Ian. “Demographic Influences on Risk Perception.” Risk Analysis 13(4) (1993): 413-420.

Saylor, Don, City of Davis Councilmember. Personal Interview. 2 Mar 2006. Saxton, Michael J. “What’s the rush?” Davis Enterprise 16 Jan 2005.

118

Schwartz, Don. “Pseudo journalism rankles.” Davis Enterprise 1 Apr 2005. Sedway Group. A Study of the Economic Impact of the University of California, Davis. Fiscal

year 2001-2002. UC Davis, 2004. Sierra Club Yolano Group. Nieberg, Pam, Holly Bishop, Susan Pelican, Bob Schneider, Bern

Kreissman, Don Mooney, Marc Vayssieres. “Covell Village – Do We Need It?” Yolano Flame Num 100, Sept 2005: 1-3.

Shaheen, Susan, Caroline Rodier, Rachel Finson. “University of California, Davis Long-Range Development Plans: A Davis Smart Mobility Model.” California Partners for Advanced Transit and Highways (PATH) Research Report. October 2003.

Short, James F., Jr., “The Social Fabric at Risk: Toward the Social Transformation of Risk Analysis.” American Sociological Association, 1984 Presidential Address.

Sjoberg, Lennart. “Factors in Risk Perception.” Risk Analysis 20(1) (2000): 1-11. Slimak, Michael & Thomas Dietz. “Personal Values, Beliefs, and Ecological Risk Perception.”

Risk Analysis 26(6) (2006): 1689-1705. Slovic, Paul. “Perception of Risk” Science 236(4799) (Apr 1987): 280-285. Slovic, Paul, ed. The Perception of Risk. Earthscan, Virginia. 2000. Slovic, Paul, Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein. “Why Study Risk Perception?” Risk

Analysis 2(2) (1982): 83-93. Souza, Stephen, City of Davis Councilmember. Personal Interview. 26 Jan 2007 Souza, Stephen and Don Saylor. “Measure X vote is about how, when and where we grow.”

Davis Enterprise 23 Oct 2005. Springgay, Jessica. “Radioactive research site no longer hazardous: Toxic Substances agency

urges regular testing for contaminants in well water.” California Aggie 3 Nov 2003. Stern, Paul C. & Harvey V. Fineberg, National Research Council. Understanding Risk.

Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society. The National Academies Press, Washington DC. 1996.

Stone, Daniel, et. al Editorial Board. “The Covell Village Debate: Students silent, interests ignored.” California Aggie 11 Oct 2005.

Stone, Daniel, et. al Editorial Board. “Covell Village: No on Measure X” California Aggie 25 Oct 2005.

Stone, Daniel, et al. Editorial Board. “Measure X: An open letter to Davis.” California Aggie 10 Nov 2005.

Stumpf, Vanessa, Aggie Staff Writer. “Citizens group says Covell Village will be harmful to city.” California Aggie 1 Jun 2005.

Thaler, R. H. “Illusions and mirages: public policy” Public Interest 73 (1983): 60-74. Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, Aaron Wildavsky. Cultural theory. Westview Press, Boulder,

Colorado, 1990. Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.”

Science 185(4157) (September 1974): 1124-1131. US Census 2000. Fact Sheet for Zip Code Tabulation Area 95616.

<http://factfinder.census.gov> UC Davis. “Student Population Headcount, Fall 1996-2006” Accessed 12 Feb 2007.

< http://facts.ucdavis.edu/student_population_headcount_fall.lasso> UC Davis. “Employee Headcount, Fall 2006.” Accessed 22 Feb 2007.

<http://facts.ucdavis.edu/employee_headcount_fall.lasso> EPA. US Environmental Protection Agency. “LEHR/OLD CAMPUS LANDFILL (USDOE)

Laboratory for Energy-related Health Research (USDOE and UC Davis).” Updated 8 Feb 2005. Accessed 25 Feb 2007 <http://yosemite.epa.gov/>

Wagstaff, Ken, No on X Campaign. Personal Interview. 1 Feb 2007 Wagstaff, Ken, James Folwer, Stan Forbes, et al. “Davis can’t afford Covell Village” Davis

Enterprise 17 Jul 2005.

119

Wagstaff, Ken, Sue Greenwald, Mark Siegler, Jim Provenza, Mark Dupree. “Don’t be swayed.” Mailing. October 2005.

Wassmer, Robert W. “Urban Sprawl in a U.S. Metropolitan Area: Ways to Measure and a Comparison of the Sacramento Area to Similar Metropolitan Areas in California and the U.S.” Sacramento State University. 12 Oct 2000. <http://www.csus.edu/indiv/w/wassmerr/region.pdf>

Wells, Miriam. “Cultural and Socio-historical Variables, Biodefense Lab Controversy and Campaign.” Unpublished notes. 9 Feb 2004.

Whitcomb, John, Tandem Properties Owner. Personal Interview. 7 Mar 2006. Wildavsky, Aaron. “Letter to the Editor: Risk Perception” Risk Analysis 11(1) (1991): 15. Wildavsky, Aaron and Karl Dake. “Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?”

American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Daedalus) 119(4) (1990): 41-60. Williams, Althaea. “Peoples Republic of East Davis Voter Guide.” Deviant Recipes, 3 Nov 2006

<http://www.archive.org/details/PRED_voter_guide_11-06> Yolo County Elections Office. November 8, 2005 Elections Results.

http://www.yoloelections.org/sites/elections/archives/20051108/davis_archive.html Accessed 11 Dec 2006.

Yolo County Elections Office. “City of Davis Measure X”, 8 Nov 2005. Elections Handbook. Yolo County Elections Office. “Report of Registration – State Report Districts.” 31 Mar 2005. Ziser, Carrie. “The American Dream is fading.” Davis Enterprise 17 Oct 2005.