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eFFICE COP\, !1
~iP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PHILIPPINES
;.OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY APPEAL NO. 14-06-09 MACHINERY CO.~ LTD.~
Inter Partes Case No. 14-2004-00084 !
fPetitioner-Appellant, Petition for Cancellation: I -versus-
Registration No. 4-1999-005393 I
Date issued: 19 January 2004 iE.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES INC.,
ENGRACIO YAP~ ET.AL. TRADEMARK: VESPA (
Respondents-Appellees. f :;
"----------------~---------------------------------,,
NOTICE OF DECISION- ',
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III
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY MACHINERY CO., LTD.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
-versus-
KY. INDUSTRIAL SALES INC., ENGRACIOYAP, ET.AL.
DEL ROSARIO BAGAMASBAD & RABOCA Counsel for Appellant
Rosadel Bldg. 1011 Metropolitan Avenue, Makati City
REYES & SANTOS LAW OFFICES Counsel for Appellee Unit 1003
Manila Luxury Condominium Pearl Drive comer Goldloop Street Ortigas
Center 1605 Pasig City
APPEAL NO. 14-06-09 Inter Partes Case No. 14-2004-00084 Petition
for Cancellation:
Registration No. 4-1999-005393 Date issued: 19January 2004
TRADEMARK: VESPA
Respondents-Appellees.
}C--------------------------------------------------}C
NOTICE OF DECISION
DIRECTOR CORAZON T. MARQUESES Administration, Finance and Human
Resource Development Service Bureau Intellectual Property
Office
DIRECTOR CARMEN G. PERALTA Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau Intellectual Property Office
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I DIRECTOR ESTRELLITA B. ABELARDO DIRECTOR LENY B. RAZ It:;
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Bureau of Legal Affairs Director of the Bureau of Trademarks
Intellectual Property Office Intellectual Property Office
GREETINGS:
Please be informed that on 25 May 2007, the Office of the
Director General rendered a Decision in the above-titled case (copy
attached).
Makati City, 28 May 2007.
Very truly yours,
AT At ey Office of the Director General
Republic of tbe Pbilippines INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE
151 Sen. Gil Puvat Ave Malcati City 1200 Philinnines •
wwwjnonhiL2ov_nh
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PHiliPPINES
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
SHEN DAR ELEctRICITY Appeal No. 14-06-09 MACHINERY CO. LTD.,
Appellant, Inter Partes Case No. 14-2004-00084 Petition for
Cancellation
-versus- Registration No. 4-1999-005393 Date Issued: 18January
2004
E. Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC., Trademarlc VESPA ENGRACIOYAP, ET
AL.,
Appellees. x-------------------------------------------x
J
II
DECISION
SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY MACHINERY CO. LID. ("Appellant") appeals
the Decision No. 2006-40 rendered by the Director of the Bureau of
Legal Affairs ("Director") on 29 May 2006. In her decision, the
Director denied the Appellant's Petition for Cancellation of the
registration of the trademark VESPA issued in favor of E.Y.
INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC.
Records show that on 09 June 1997 the Appellant filed Trademark
Application Serial No. 4-1997-121492 for the mark VESPA, CHINESE
CHARACTERS & DEVICE for use on air compressor and spot welding.
More than two (2) years later, E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC. filed
Trademark Application Serial No. 4-1999005393 for the mark VESPA,
also for use on air compressor. E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC.
obtained Certificate of Registration No. 4-1999-005393 on 18
January 2004.
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On 21 June 2004 the Appellant filed a Petition for Cancellation
alleging among others, the following:
1. The registration of the mark VESPA in favor of E.Y.
INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC. was obtained fraudulendy or contrary to the
provisions of Sec. 123.1 par. (d), (e) and (f) of Republic Act No.
8293, known as the
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Intellectual Property Code ("IP Code");
2. The registration of the mark VESPA in favor of E.Y.
INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC. has caused and will cause great and
irreparable injury to the Appellant;
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3. The Appellant is the true and rightful owner of the mark
VESPA for air compressors and spot welding machines and as such is
entided to the registration thereof;
Republic of tbe Pbilippines INTELLECfUAL PROPERTY OFFICE
351 Sen. Gil PuvatAve.. Makati City 1200 Philiooines·
www.iooehil.eov.eh A I
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4. The Appellant's pending application for the mark VESPA
covering air compressors has an earlier filing date and should have
barred E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC's application;
5. Appellant first used the mark VESPA for air compressors in
the Philippines in June 1996 through its appointed distributor E.Y.
INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC;
6. All air compressors sold and delivered by the Appellant to
E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC bear the mark VESPA;
7. Not being the true and lawful owner of the mark VESPA, E.Y.
INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC committed fraudulent acts by appropriating it
and securing a registration;
8. The Appellant has a prior and exclusive right to use and
register the mark VESPA in the Philippines under the provisions of
the Paris Convention; and
9. The Appellant's products are widely sold and distributed in
the Philippines so there is no doubt that E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES,
INC intended and intends to ride on the popularity of the mark
VESPA.
In its petition, the Appellant likewise named as respondents
Engracio Yap who is the Chairman of E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC, and
some former and current officials and employee of the Intellectual
Property Office, namely, former Director General Emma C Francisco,
Director Leny B. Raz and Trademark Examiner Wilfredo Pulmano of the
Bureau of Trademarks, and Director Corazon T. Marqueses of the
Administrative, Finance and Human Resource Development Services
Bureau.
In their ANSWER to the petition, E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES, INC and
Engracio Yap (hereinafter, collectively referred to as the
"Appellees") denied the allegations of the Appellant and averred
the following:
1. The Appellees are the true and lawful owners of the mark
VESPA for air compressors, being its sole assembler and fabricator
in the Philippines since the early 1990's;
2. The Appellant has maliciously, falsely, and fraudulently
filed a trademark application for the mark VESPA for air
compressors and spot welding machines despite the fact that it does
not manufacture, assemble, fabricate, use or distribute air
compressors bearing the mark in the Philippines or in the Republic
of China and with full knowledge that the Appellees are the true
and lawful owner thereof;
3. The Appellant uses the mark SHEN DAR or SD for its air
compressors and spot welding machines and never the mark VESPA, the
same being owned and exclusively used by the Appellees for its air
compressors;
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4. The Appellant has never used the mark VESPA for air
compressors in the Philippines or elsewhere nor has the Appellant
ever appointed the Appellees as its distributor of VESPA air
compressors;
5. The Appellant only markets SHEN DAR or SD air compressors to
the Appellees and not a single VESPA air compressor;
6. The Appellees had acquired ownership over the mark VESPA for
air compressors through the actual use in commerce of the same;
being the true and lawful owner of the mark for air compressors,
the Appellees have the right to its exclusive use.
7. The Appellant could not validly claim any right to the mark
VESPA or avail of the provisions of the Paris Convention or the IP
Code, as it is not the owner thereof;
8. The Appellant has not sold even a single air compressor
bearing the mark in the Philippines or elsewhere; the Appellees
have no reason to ride on the popularity of the mark for air
compressors being the creator thereof; and
9. The Appellees have no obligation or duty to protect the
Appellant as the former is the true and lawful owner of the mark
VESPA for air compressors.
The other respondents, former Director General Francisco,
Directors Raz and Marqueses, and Trademark Examiner Pulmano, did
not file their answer(s). Instead, they filed a Manifestation and
Motion dated 06 August 2005, asking the Director that they be
dropped from the instant case.
After appropriate proceedings', the Director rendered the
assailed decision. Interestingly, the Director did not rule on the
Manifestation and Motion filed by Franscisco, et al. Instead, she
discussed and resolved the issue in her decision. The Director held
that Francisco, et aL
" ... do not have interest in the subject matter of the
proceedings, either in obtaining any relief, whatsoever or the
success of the private respondents, hence, they could not be
impleaded in this case."
Obviously not satisfied with the decision, the Appellant filed
the instant appeal alleging that the Director erred in finding
that:
1. the Appellant did not submit any evidence; 2. the Appellee's
mark was rightfully registered despite the fact that
Appellant's
application had an earlier filing date and covers the same goods
air compressor; and
3. the Appellee is the true owner of the mark VESPA..
1 Governed by the Regulations on InterPartes Proceedings, as
amended by Office Order No. 79, s. 2005
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The Appellant raises the following issues:
1. Under the "new rules" on Inter Partes Proceedings, the
petition, reply, dulymarked affidavits and the documents submitted
shall constitute its entire evidence, hence, there is no need to
resubmit the documents which have already been filed before the
Bureau of Legal Affairs;
2. The Appellees' mark is confusingly similar if not identical
to its mark;
3. The filing date of the Appellant's application was on 09 June
1997 - more than two years earlier than the 28 July 1999 filing
date of the Appellees' application;
4. Under Sec. 123.1, par. (d) of the IP Code, the Appellees'
application should not be allowed to mature into registration;
5. Substantial evidence, if not proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which it presented proves that it is the true and lawful owner of
the mark VESPA.
This Office issued on 08 August 2006 an Order giving the
Appellees thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to file their
comment to the appeal. The Appellees, however, did not do so.
Hence, this Office issued an Order on 31 October 2006 declaring
that the Appellees had waived their right to file their comment and
that the appeal was deemed submitted for decision.
Consequently, the Appellees filed on 17 November 2006 a "MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO ADMIT HEREIN ATIACHED COMMENT."
This Office in its Order dated 22 January 2007 denied the motion
for lack of merit.
On 27 February 2007 the Appellant filed a "MANIFESTATION"
reiterating that the appealed Decision be set aside. The Appellant
asserts that the Appellees' registration should be cancelled as it
was obtained through false and fraudulent misrepresentation,
pointing out that attached to the Declaration of Actual Use (DAD)
filed by the Appellees, is a brochure which shows that the
Appellees are not manufacturers of VESPA air compressors but are
merely retailers of the VESPA air compressors manufactured by a
certain company - Ming Tyan Iron Works Co., Ltd.
Finally, on 30 March 2007 the Appellees filed a "MOTION TO
EXPUNGE (pETITIONER-APPELLANT'S MANIFESTATION DATED FEBRUARY 20,
2007)" praying that the Appellant's Manifestation be expunged form
the records of the case.
On the first issue, the records show that while the Director
ruled that the Appellant did not submit its marked evidence in
compliance with the new rules on Inter
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Partes Proceedings.' she nonetheless considered the annexes
attached to the Appellant's Petition for Cancellation, thus:
"However, for the sake of being able to determine the
substantial issues of the case, we shall assume arguendo that
petitioner have (sic) submitted the annexes attached to its
petition to constitute its evidence.
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"This conclusion is belied by the evidence. We have gone over
each and every document attached as Annexes 'A', 'A' 1-48 which
consist of Bills of Lading and Packing/Weight List. Not one of
these documents referred to a 'VESPA' air compressor. Instead it
simply describes the goods plainly as air compressors which is type
'SD' and not 'VESPA'. More importantly, the earliest date reflected
on the Bill of Lading was on May 5, 1997. (Annex - 'A-1).
Petitioner also attached as Annex 'B' a purported Sales Contract
with respondent EY Industrial Sales dated April 20, 2002.
Surprisingly, nowhere in the document does it state that respondent
EY Industrial agreed to sell 'VESPA' air compressors."3
With respect to the second and third issues raised by the
Appellant, this Office finds these issues non-debatable. It has
been established that the competing marks are identical, or at
least confusingly similar; and that the Appellant's trademark
application has an earlier filing date than the Appellees.
This Office now resolves the contentious issues.
Considering that the Appellees filed the trademark application
on 28 July 1999, the provisions of the IP Code, which took into
effect on 01 January 1998, apply. The Appellant now insists that
the Appellees' Certificate of Registration No. 4-1999-005393 should
be cancelled pursuant to Sec. 123.1 (d) of the IP Code, to wit:
"SEC. 123. Registrability.- 123.1 A mark cannot be registered if
it: xxx xxx xxx (d) Is identical with a registered mark belonging
to a different proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or
priority date, in respect of:
(i) The same goods or services, or (ii) Closely related goods or
services, or (iii) If it nearly resembles such a mark as to be
likely to deceive or cause
confusion;"
Considering that the Appellant's trademark application preceded
the Appellees' trademark application by more than two years, should
the Certificate of Registration No. 4-1999-005393 be cancelled
pursuant to Sec. 123(d) of the IP Code?
In resolving this issue, there is a need to revisit the raison
d'etre underlying the trademark system. The essence of trademark
registration is to give protection to the owners of trademarks. The
function of a trademark is to point out distinctly the origin or
ownership of the goods to which it is affixed; to secure to him,
who has been instrumental in bringing into the market a superior
article of merchandise, the fruit of his
2 Office Order No. 79, s. 2005 (Amendments to the Regulations on
Inter Partes Proceedings). 3 DECISION, p. 8.
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industry and skill; to assure the public that they are procuring
the genuine article; to prevent fraud and imposition; and to
protect the manufacturer against substitution and sale of an
inferior and different article as his product."
Significandy, the Philippines implemented the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)
when RA 8293 took into force and effect on 01 January 1998. 5 Art.
15 of TRIPS Agreement reads:
"Section 2: Trademarks
Article 15
Protectable Subject Matter
"1. Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those
of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a
trademark. Such signs, in particular words including personal
names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of
colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible
for registration as trademarks. Where signs are not inherently
capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members
may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through
use. Members may require, as a condition of registration, that
signs be visually perceptible.
"2. Paragraph 1 shall not be understood to prevent a Member from
denying registration of a trademark on other grounds, provided that
they do not derogate from the provisions of the Paris Convention
(1967).
"3. Members may make registrability depend on use. However,
actual use of a trademark shall not be a condition for filing an
application for registration. An application shall not be refused
solely on the ground that intended use has not taken place before
the expiry of a period of three years from the date of
application.
"4. The nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is
to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of
the trademark.
"5. Members shall publish each trademark either before it is
registered or promptly after it is registered and shall afford a
reasonable opportunity for petitions to cancel the registration. In
addition, Members may afford an opportunity for the registration of
a trademark to be opposed."
4 Pribbdas J. Mirpuri v. CA, G.R. No. 114508, 19 Nov. 1999,
citing Etepha v. Director ofPatents, 16 SCRA 495 (1966), Gabriel v.
Perer, 55 SCRA 406 (1974).
5 The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco on 15 April 1994. The agreement recognises that widely
varying standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights and the lack of a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade
in counterfeit goods have been a growing source of tension in
international economic relations. Rules and disciplines were needed
to cope with these tensions. To that end, the agreement addresses
the applicability of basic GATT principles and those of relevant
international intellectual property agreements; the provision of
adequate intellectual property rights; the provision of effective
enforcement measures for those rights; multilateral dispute
settlement; and transitional arrangements.
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Art. 16 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement states:
"Article 16 Rights Conferred
"1. The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner's consent
from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for
goods or services which are identical or similar to those in
respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would
result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an
identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of
confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall not
prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the
possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of
use."
Significantly, RA 8293 adopted the definition of the mark under
RA 166, to wit:
"121.1. 'Mark' means any visible sign capable of distinguishing
the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise
and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods; (Sec. 38,
R.A. No. 166a)."
and provides:
"SEC. 138. Certificates of Registration.-A certificate of
registration of a mark shall be prima facie evidence of the
validity of the registration, the registrant's ownership of the
mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the same in
connection with the goods or services and those that are related
thereto specified in the certificate." (Emphasis supplied)
From this legal backdrop it is plain that, in this jurisdiction,
it is not the registration that confers ownership of trademark;
rather, it is the ownership of the trademark that gives rise to the
right to cause its registration and enjoy exclusive use thereof for
the goods associated with it. While RA 8293 does not contain
express references to ownership of marks as a basis for their
registration, the definition of the term "mark" implies that the
right of registration belongs to the owner.
Although the country's legal regime on trademarks shifted to a
registration system, thereby adopting the policy of "First-to-File"
rule, there are indications that it is not the intention of the
legislators not to recognize the preservation of existing rights of
Trademark owners at the time the IP Code took into effect." The
"First-to-File rule could not have been intended to justify the
approval of a trademark application just because it was the first
application to be filed regardless of another's better or superior
right to the mark applied for. The rule cannot be used to commit or
perpetrate an unjust and unfair claim. A trademark is an industrial
property and the owner thereof has property rights over it. The
privilege of being issued a registration for its exclusive use,
therefore, should be based on the concept of ownership. RA 8293
implements the TRIPS Agreement and therefore, the idea of
"registered owner" does not mean that ownership is established by
mere registration but that registration establishes merely a
presumptive right of ownership. That presumption of ownership
yields to superior evidence of actual and real ownership of the
trademark and to the TRIPS Agreement requirement that no existing
prior rights shall be prejudiced.
6 See Sec. 236 of the IP Code.
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I The law on trademarks (and tradenames) is based on the
principle of business
integrity and common justice. This law, both in letter and
spirit, is laid upon the premise that, while it encourages fair
trade in every way and aims to foster, and not to hamper,
competition, no one, especially a trader, is justified in damaging
or jeopardizing another's business by fraud, deceipt, trickery or
unfair methods of any sort. This necessarily precludes the trading
by one dealer upon the good name and reputation built up by
another.' A trademark being any visible sign capable of
distinguishing the goods of an enterprises connotes that the right
to register a mark belongs to its owner. Aptly, only the owner of a
trademark may apply for its registration."
The IP Code adheres to the existing rationale of trademark
registration. That is, certificates of registration should be
granted only to the real owners of trademarks. While the
"First-to-File" rule is the general rule for trademark applications
filed under and governed by RA 8293, it is not to be applied if
there is a determination in appropriate proceedings:
1. that the 'first-filer' is not the owner of the trademark or
is not authorized by the owner to procure registration of the
trademark in his, her, or its favor; or
2. that the adoption and/or use by the 'first-filer' of the
trademark, even in good faith, is preceded by an actual use by
another, also in good faith, prior to the taking into force and
effect of RA 8293."
To illustrate, assuming that, in spite the fact that the beer
products of San Miguel Corporation under the brand "San Miguel' has
been in the market for more than a century already, "San Miguel' is
not yet registered as a trademark. Another company - say, Company X
- also produces beer, appropriated the brand "San Miguel', and
filed a corresponding trademark application. That trademark
application, however, should not prosper even if Company X invokes
the "First-to-File Rule". The mark "San Miguel' used on beer
products is already owned by another entity, i.e, San Miguel
Corporation. Moreover, San Miguel Corporation has been using it on
the same or identical products way ahead of Company X, predating
the IP Code and even the old laws on trademark.
In the instant case, the parties submitted evidence to support
their respective claims of ownership of the contested mark. After
scrutinizing these pieces of evidence, this Office finds no reason
to depart from the conclusions of the Director that the Appellee's
claim of ownership is superior to the Appellant's, thus:
"On the contrary, respondent EY Industrial was able to prove the
use of the mark 'VESPA' in the concept of owner as early as 1991.
Although Respondent E. Y. indicated in its trademark application
that its first use was in December 22, 1998, it was able to prove
by clear and positive evidence of use prior to such date.
7 UI Chemise Lacoste, S. A. v. Oscar C Femandes, etal., G. R.
Nos. 63796-97, 21 May 1984. 8 See Sec.121.1 of the IP Code. 9 Unno
Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. General Miffing Corporation and
Tiburcio S. Evaffe, in his capacity as Director of Patents, G. R.
No. L-28554, 28 Feb. 1983.
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"In Chung Te v. Ng Kian Guiab and Director of Patents, L-23791,
23 November 1966, the High Court clarified: Where an applicant for
registration of a trademark states under oath the date of his
earliest use, and later on he wishes to carry back his first date
of use to an earlier date, he then takes on the greater burden of
presenting 'clear and convincing evidence' of adoption and use as
of that earlier date. (B.R. Baker Co. vs. Lebow Bros., 150 F. 2d
580).
"Private respondents witness, Benito Sy, owner of Starret
enterprise located in Pasig City testified that he bought VESPA air
compressors since 1991 from respondent EY Industrial.
(Exhibit-'388,) Benito Sy's company also sold SO air compressors
originating from EY Industrial. In fact, private respondents was
able to submit evidence showing the air compressors bearing the
'SO', 'Shendar' trademark on an advertising brochure of petitioner,
Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd. (Exhibit '382', '383'). A
perusal of the advertising brochures submitted by the respondent
which is contained in its filewrapper unequivocally prove that its
air compressors bear the 'VESPA' mark. 'VESPA' label is also
contained in the filewrapper of respondent-registrant. Witness
Josephine Macuja also testified that the NC Construction Supply, a
business located in Pasig City, wherein she was an employee bought
VESPA air compressors from EY Industrial once every two months.
(Exhibit-'387,).
''Based on the evidence, Respondent E.Y. Industrial is a
legitimate corporation engaged in buying, importing, selling,
industrial machineries and tools, manufacturing, among others since
its incorporation in 1988. (Exhibit '1). Indeed, private
respondents have submitted photographs (Exhibit '376', '377',
'378', '379') showing an assembly line of its manufacturing or
assembly process.
"More importantly, the private respondent's prior adoption and
continuous use of the mark 'VESPA' on air compressors is bolstered
by numerous documentary evidence consisting of sales invoices
issued in the name of respondent EY Industrial and Bills of Lading.
(Exhibits '4' to '375'). Sales Invoice No. 12075 dated March 27,
1995 antedates petitioner's date of first use in January 1, 1997
indicated in its trademark application filed in June 9, 1997 as
well as the date of first use in June of 1996 as indicated in the
Declaration of Actual Use submitted on December 3, 2001. (Exhibit
'385'). The use by respondentregistrant in the concept of owner is
shown by commercial documents, sales invoices unambiguously
describing the goods as 'VESPA' air compressors. Private
respondents have sold their compressors bearing the 'VESPA' to
various locations in the Philippines as far as Mindanao and the
Visayas since the early 1990's. We carefully inspected the evidence
consisting of three hundred seventy one (371) invoices and shipment
documents which show that 'VESPA' air compressors were sold not
only in Manila, but to locations such as Iloilo City, Cebu City,
Dumagete City, Zamboanga City, Cagayan de Oro City, Davao City to
name a few. There is no doubt that it is through private
respondents' efforts that the mark 'VESPA' used on air compressors
has gained business goodwill and reputation in the Philippines for
which it has validly acquired trademark rights. Respondent EY
Industrial's right has been preserved until the passage of RA 8293
which entitled it to register the same. The law provides:
'Section 236. Preservation of Existing Rights.- Nothing herein
shall adversely affect the rights in patents, utility models,
industrial designs, marks and works, acquired in good faith prior
to the effective date of this Act.'"
The Appellant's claim that it was the first to use the mark
crumbles under the weight of the substantial evidence submitted by
the Appellees. The Appellees submitted proof that they have been
using the mark VESPA as early as 1991.
Thus, if ever the trademark VESPA has been known to exist and
has established a reputation, it is because of the trade activities
of the Appellees. It is through the Appellees' efforts that the
mark has been introduced and made known to the relevant segment of
the purchasing public. In their Answer to the Petition for
Cancellation,
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Appellees even explained the circumstances on its use of the
mark and the fact that the Appellant only learned of the mark
through the Appellees themselves. In this regard, the burden of
evidence shifted to the Appellant to prove otherwise. The
Appellant, however, failed to do so.
While it may be true that the Appellees are importing air
compressors from the Appellant, there is nothing in the records
that shows that the air compressors have the mark VESPA. Even the
alleged "Sales Contract" between the parties did not indicate that
the air compressors sold by the Appellant to the Appellees bear the
mark VESPA. lO
What the records say is that the air compressors imported by the
Appellees from the Appellant are air compressors described as
"1YPE: SD-(NO.)"11 These refer to those products marked with "SD"
and "Shendar".
The Appellant presented the Affidavit-Direct Testimony of a
certain Manuel Sy to show its use of the mark VESPA. However, none
of the sales invoices and/or delivery receipts offered by the
Appellant to support Sy's testimony is dated earlier than April
2003.12 Moreover, if indeed the Appellant is the prior user and
owner of the mark VESPA for air compressor, it could have easily
presented documents showing its prior use of the mark VESPA in
Taiwan and in the People's Republic of China. These documents may
include a copy of the certificate of registration issued by its
home country indicating that it is the owner and user of the mark
VESPA or such documents which would prove that it is the originator
of the mark VESPA and that it has been using the mark VESPA for all
its air compressors manufactured, distributed and exported to the
Appellees.
On the Appellant's "MANIFESTATION" of 20 February 2007 and the
documents attached thereto, the rule is that the court or tribunal
shall not consider any evidence, which has not been formally
offered. 13 Moreover, the issue or the "subject" of the documents
were not even mentioned during the proceedings in the Bureau of
Legal Affairs. Neither the documents can be considered newly
discovered evidence, because through ordinary diligence and efforts
they could have been obtained by the Appellant and presented in the
earlier proceedings. And even if they were, they have no probative
value. None of these documents proves or supports the Appellant's
claim that that the Appellees obtained Certificate of Registration
No. 4-1999-005393 through fraud, or that the Appellees are merely
retailers of Ming Tyan Iron Works Co., Ltd.
Finally, this Office also noted that the records in the
Trademark Registry indicate that the Appellant was issued
Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997-121492dated 08 February 2007
for the trademark VESPA, Chinese Characters & Device for goods
air compressor and spot welding machine.
10 See Annex "B" of the Petition for Cancellation and Annex "F"
of the Appellant's Memorandum. II See Annexes "Al" to "A48"
attached to the Petition for Cancellation filed by the Appellant.
12 See Exhibit "N", Annex "G" of the Affidavit-Direct Testimony of
Mr. Manuel Sy marked as Exhibit "GU •
13 Concepcion v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 123450, 31 Aug. 2005,
citing Sec. 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
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The Bureau of Trademarks issued Certificate of Registration No.
4-1997-121492 while this Petition for Cancellation case, now on
appeal, is still pending. The Director had already decided and
determined the Appellee's superior claim of ownership of the
contested trademark over that of the Appellant's, a ruling which
this Office now sustains, renders the issuance of Certificate of
Registration No. 4-1997-121492 without legal basis, and therefore,
null and void.
Accordingly, while the instant case involves a petition to
cancel the registration of the Appellee's trademark VESPA, the
interest of justice requires that Certificate of Registration No.
4-1997-121492 be cancelled. While the normal course of proceedings
should have been the filing of a petition for cancellation of
Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997-121492, that would involve
critical facts and issues that have already been resolved in this
case. To allow the Appellant to still maintain in the Trademark
Registry Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997-121492 would
nullify the exclusive rights of Appellee as the true and registered
owner of the mark VESPA and defeat the purpose of the trademark
registration system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.
Certificate of Registration No. 4-1999-005393 for the mark VESPA
for air compressor issued in favor of Appellee is hereby upheld.
Consequently, Certificate of Registration No. 4-1997
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121492 for the mark VESPA, Chinese Characters & Device for
goods air compressor and spot welding machine issued in favor of
Appellant is hereby ordered cancelled.
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fLet a copy of this Decision as well as the records of this case
be furnished and returned to the Director of Bureau of Legal
Affairs for appropriate action. Further, let also the Directors of
the Bureau of Trademarks, the Administrative, Financial and Human
Resources Development Services Bureau, and the Documentation,
Information and Technology Transfer Bureau be furnished a copy of
this Decision for information,
tguidance, and records purposes.
SO ORDERED. !t
J MAY 25 2007 Makati City.
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