F I C BURDEN SHARING AND THE WAR IN IRAQ

FRIENDS INDEED? COALITION BURDEN SHARING AND THE WAR IN IRAQ

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Government

By

Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, M.S., M.A.

Washington, DC August 5, 2008

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Copyright 2008 by Daniel F. Baltrusaitis All Rights Reserved

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The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government.

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FRIENDS INDEED? COALITION BURDEN SHARING AND THE WAR IN IRAQ

Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, M.S., M.A.

Thesis Advisors: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. Robert Lieber, Ph.D. Jay M. Parker, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Why do states contribute to ad hoc security coalitions and what factors influence

their level and composition of support? What factors influence states’ decisions to

contribute and the type of contribution? What motivated countries such as South Korea

to contribute significantly to the Iraq War “coalition of the willing” while steadfast

partners such as Turkey and Germany resisted U.S. efforts to include them as coalition

partners? Given the potential for coalition, rather than alliance military action, coalitions

are understudied as a tool of grand strategy. This research examines the conditions that

influence state burden sharing behavior for ad hoc security coalitions and examines the

decision making model developed by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny

Unger.

In an analysis of South Korean, Turkish, and German contributions to the current

Iraq War coalition, this research tests an integrative model to explain the spectrum of

constraints and opportunities defined by the dynamics of the international system, as well

as the capabilities to account for domestic political constraints. The leaders of coalition

nations must act within the spectrum of constraints and opportunities that are defined by

each nation’s domestic political structures. When domestic political considerations are

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not included in the study of foreign policy, researchers are limited to developing a set of

necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for foreign policy decision making. Burden

sharing is an integral part of foreign policy decision making and hence requires

knowledge of the international environment in which states make decisions and the

domestic environment where policy makers translate decisions into action. As is readily

apparent in the foreign policy literature, but sometimes lacking in the greater

international relations literature, states rarely act as unitary actors. State decisions to

commit resources to a military coalition are influenced by the ability of the government

to extract those resources from the society. Incorporating state-societal measures in

theory-making allows one to gain a better appreciation of the size and composition of

state resource expenditures.

This study finds that domestic structure—in the form of the relationship between

the state executive and legislature—significantly influences a given state’s burden

sharing behavior. Executive authority and parliamentary accountability appreciably

affects the ability of a state to contribute military forces to an international coalition,

especially in instances where threat or collective action pressures are low. States with

strong executive power in the area of military oversight are less constrained in providing

military forces, while states with considerable parliamentary freedom are likely to show a

much lower level of commitment. This study fills a gap in the international relations

literature in that it explains the influence of state structure on state coalition burden

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sharing decisions and formalizes the influence of domestic structure in the decision

making model.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation required a great amount of burden sharing to accomplish. I can

easily say that this work is the culmination of a long effort where I was able to “stand on

the backs of others” in an effort to explain the decisions of states to join military

coalitions. Many people contributed to this effort and made it a much finer work than it

would have been had I accomplished it alone. I owe a profound debt of gratitude to my

mentor and research advisor Professor Andrew Bennett, who inspired the idea to work on

burden sharing and provided continuous guidance throughout the research and writing

process. He provided substantial assistance during an incredible trying time in his life

and I am very grateful for his precious time.

I would also like to thank the remainder of my dissertation committee, Professors

Robert Lieber and Jay Parker. Professor Lieber provided an excellent sounding board for

ensuring that my dissertation would be useful from both a theoretical and policy

perspective. He provided feedback that focused me to the task on hand and kept me

looking at the end goal—completion. Professor Parker used his extensive contacts with

the International Studies Association to put me in touch with scholars such as Patricia

Weitsman. He provided excellent guidance on the influence of public opinion on policy,

as well as the ability of elites to influence public opinion. As a retired Army Colonel,

Professor Parker was an excellent sounding board on numerous military topics. Most

importantly both became friends and colleagues whose counsel I will continue to enjoy.

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This dissertation was made much easier thanks to my dissertation study group, or

DSG. The DSG is wholely responsible for my sanity throughout the writing process. I

would especially like to thank Liz Grimm who is the engine behind our study group. Liz

is a terrific sounding board and the most tireless editor I’ve met. Liz read every page of

this dissertation and surely improved the readability by several orders of magnitude.

Sarah Cross provided laser sharp insight and reminded me that there is more to

international relations than the realist notions of anarchy and power. John Sawyer

remained enthusiastic throughout the many trials and tribulations of the dissertation

process and reminded me daily of the joy of discovering something new. I especially

enjoyed alliance discussions with Trish Bacon-Gonzales who is applying alliance

principles to terrorist networks. Finally, I am indebted to Hamutal Bernstein who

brought the tools and techniques of a comparativist to our international relations group.

She provided numerous ways to looks at problems that was essential in determining the

domestic influences on foreign policy. I am deeply indebted to the DSG; this would not

have been such a deep and rewarding experience without the weekly interaction with the

group.

This project would have been impossible without the numerous others that made

my graduate experience possible. I would like to thank the Air War College for

sponsoring my graduate degree. Tom Hughes, Mark Conversino, Colonel Steve

Wolborsky, Steve Fought, Colonel Stef Eisen, and Colonel Kurt Schake were noteworthy

in encouraging me to pursue a PhD. Dusti Jayne, Angela Varner, and the Air Force

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Institute of Technology provided fantastic administrative support. Steven Pennington,

Greg Kern, and the Air Force Operations Group provided me with valuable office space

and computer support while I have been an “officer without a unit.” I would also like to

that my graduate school colleagues who helped in one way or another on this project.

Andy Loomis, Alarik Fritz, and Hyon Joo Yoo provided invaluable material that made

my research easier.

Last, and certainly not least, I would like to give special thanks to those that

suffered most during the dissertation process. My parents William and Marian

Baltrusaitis inspired me to always do my best and gave me a thirst for learning. My

children Becky and Melissa, who looked at the back of my head while I was writing and

editing, missed numerous fun weekends with dad so that I could finish another chapter or

edit. I am immensely proud of the women you have become and your drive to be the best

that you can be. I finally want to thank the love of my life Jan who showed amazing

patience and always insured that I did not take myself too seriously. I am deeply sorry

for the number of weekends that I said “I have to work on my dissertation.” This work is

more representative of my family’s love and support than my effort. To all of you I am

especially thankful. Of course, any faults are entirely my own.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE. Coalitions: Enduring, But Understudied ................................................... 1

Coalitions – Many Faces, Many Motives, Differing Contributions ................................ 5

Security Coalitions as a Field of Study ......................................................................... 22

Are Coalitions Different From Alliances? .................................................................... 28

Summary ....................................................................................................................... 35

CHAPTER TWO. Theoretical Framework For Analyzing Coalition Burden Sharing ......... 40

Systemic Theories of Alliance and Burden Sharing ..................................................... 42

Bringing the State Back In -- State-Level Theories ...................................................... 70

Bringing the Man Back in – Individual Influences on Foreign Policy ......................... 82

The Role of Legitimacy ................................................................................................ 93

Summary ..................................................................................................................... 101

CHAPTER THREE. Integrative Foreign Policy Models And Methodology ...................... 106

Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger Security Model ............................................................ 109

Methodology ............................................................................................................... 153

CHAPTER FOUR. South Korea: Between Iraq and a Nuclear Crisis ............................... 166

South Korean Government and Politics ...................................................................... 169

The Timing, Size, and Mix of South Korea’s Contributions ...................................... 182

Explaining South Korean Contributions ..................................................................... 196

The Role of Legitimacy .............................................................................................. 242

Summary and Conclusions .......................................................................................... 245

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CHAPTER FIVE. Germany: Non-Coalition but Cooperating ........................................... 249

German Government and Politics ............................................................................... 254

The Timing, Size, and Mix of Germany’s Contributions ........................................... 264

Explaining German Contributions .............................................................................. 297

The Role of Legitimacy .............................................................................................. 336

Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 340

CHAPTER SIX. Turkey: Involuntary Defection and Eventual Rapproachment .............. 345

Turkish Government and Politics ................................................................................ 352

The Timing, Size, and Mix of Turkey’s Contributions ............................................... 363

Explaining Turkey’s Contributions ............................................................................. 381

The Role of Legitimacy .............................................................................................. 426

Summary and Conclusions .......................................................................................... 429

CHAPTER SEVEN. Conclusion: Coalition Burden Sharing as an Area of Study ............. 433

Domestic Influence on Foreign Policy ........................................................................ 436

The Influence of Legitimacy on Burden Sharing Decisions ....................................... 457

Implications, Limitations, and Areas of Future Research ........................................... 462

Appendix A – Coalition Summary .................................................................................. 468

Appendix B – Research Questions .................................................................................. 469

Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 472

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Coalition Strength for Stabilization Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 – February 2007 ....................................................................................................... 12

Figure 2. Percentage of Non-U.S. Participation in Iraq Coalition, May 2003 – February 2007 ................................................................................................................................... 13

Figure 3. Integrated Model of Coalition Burden Sharing .............................................. 114

Figure 4. Security Decision Making Model .................................................................... 149

Figure 5. South Korean Security Decision Model ......................................................... 246

Figure 6. Germany Security Decision Model................................................................. 341

Figure 7. Turkey Security Decision Model .................................................................... 430

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Military Contribution to Persian Gulf War, 1991 ................................................ 6

Table 2. Major Economic Contributions to Persian Gulf War, 1991 ................................ 7

Table 3. Military Contribution for Combat Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19 – May 1, 2003............................................................................................................... 10

Table 4. Military Contribution to Stability Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom .......... 14

March 2003-March 2007 ................................................................................................... 14

Table 5. U.S. Support to Non-U.S. Coalition Troops ...................................................... 17

March 2003-March2007 .................................................................................................... 17

Table 6. Major Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction .................................................. 18

Table 7. Cortell and Davis Typology ............................................................................... 77

Table 8. Predicted Burden Sharing Based on Balance of Threat, 2002 ......................... 125

Table 9. GDP and Military Spending, 2002 ................................................................... 128

Table 10. Theories of Foreign Policy Formulation ........................................................ 145

Table A-1. Non-U.S. Coalition Countries Providing Troops to MNF-I, Dec 2003 - May 2007 ................................................................................................................................. 468

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CHAPTER ONE

COALITIONS: ENDURING, BUT UNDERSTUDIED

Why do states contribute to ad hoc security coalitions and what factors influence

their level and composition of support? What factors influence states’ decisions to

contribute and the type of contribution? What motivated countries such as South Korea

to contribute significantly to the Iraq War coalition while steadfast partners such as

Turkey and Germany resisted U.S. efforts? This research examines the conditions that

influence state burden sharing behavior for ad hoc security coalitions. Significant

international relations scholarship has focused on burden sharing decisions; however, the

majority of this canon is based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

experience. This highly institutionalized model may be insufficient, since Post Cold War

experience suggests that ad hoc coalition, rather than alliance, burden sharing is

becoming increasingly important. Although these terms are used interchangeably

throughout international relations literature, significant differences exist between the two

terms.1 Coalitions, typically, are defined as ad hoc and temporary. This short nature of

coalitions distinguishes them from relatively permanent, treaty-based alliances or

standing international institutions.2

1 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan argue that the lack of accepted definition of alliance is an indication that there is a lack of scholarly agreement on the characteristics of alliances, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 3. 2 Andrew J. Pierre, Coalitions Building and Maintenance: The Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2002), 15.

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Several factors influence the proliferation of military action within coalitions

rather than alliances. First, the United Nations Security Council has become more active

in collective security and peacekeeping operations. Since the end of the Cold War,

Russia and China have approved numerous operations that would have previously

garnered a veto.3 These United Nations (U.N.) authorized security missions are typically

implemented through ad hoc coalitions since the U.N. maintains no standing security

agreement. Second, with the end of bipolarity and the superpower standoff, the United

States has been more active in its use of military power to resolve disputes. Finally, the

increasing number of democracies in the post-Cold War era may also contribute to the

use of coalitions rather than alliances. The ratification process required for democracies

to enter treaties may lead states to consider coalitions, which carry little legislative

burden compared to formal alliances.4

Given the potential for coalition, rather than alliance, military action, coalitions

are understudied as a tool of grand strategy. Most examinations of coalitions have

remained in the military realm with military officers writing operational level doctrine to

codify the tactical difficulties of multinational operations. This thread of literature

addresses the operating challenges in coalition warfare rather than the strategic

3The number of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations has increased by more than 400% since the end of the Cold War. Since 1948 there have been 61 U.N. authorized peacekeeping operations,47 have been authorized since 1998. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations., United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet (United Nations, 2007 [cited October 1 2007]); available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf. See also Bruce M. Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1970), 322. 4 George Sprowls, "States and War Coalitions: A Study of the Gulf War" (Dissertation, West Virginia University, 1998), 5.

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motivations of why states choose to join that coalition in the first place.5 However, little

scholarly research exists to address state motivation to support coalition operations.

This research seeks to fill the gap in burden sharing literature by applying the

Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security burden sharing model to explain state burden

sharing behavior in the 2003 Iraq War coalition. Recognizing the failure of alliance

literature to explain burden sharing outcomes in the first Gulf War coalition, Andrew

Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger proposed a multi-level security decision

model that considered international, domestic, and cognitive factors affecting coalition

burden sharing decisions.6 They argued that existing alliance burden sharing literature

failed to incorporate sub-systemic causal factors and thus lacked explanatory value. To

that end, they employed structured, focused, case studies of the policy processes of the

major contributors to the 1991 Gulf War coalition using the dominant realist, neo-liberal,

and cognitive-driven theories as an analytical framework. Significantly, they found that

no single theoretical strand could explain every state’s burden sharing motivations.

Parsimonious explanations ranging from balance of power theory to domestic

bureaucratic theory could not singularly explain state burden sharing motivations.

5 For a review of the U.S. military literature see Nora Bensahel, "The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation" (Dissertation, Stanford University, 1999). See also John D. Becker, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience," Military Review 73, no. 11 (1993), Patrick Cronin, "Coalition Warfare: Facts, Fads, and Challenges," Strategic Review 22, no. 2 (1994), Jacob L. Devers, "Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations," Military Review 77, no. 1 (1997), Thomas Durell-Young, "Command in Coalition Operations," in Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, ed. Thomas J. Marshall (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), Martha Maurer, Coalition Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994). 6 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War," International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994), Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

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Their research did not discredit any theory of alliance, since each theory

explained its most likely case. The United States case was the collective action theory

most likely case for contribution and the U.S. did commit to defend Saudi Arabia before

the international community pledged to help. Balance of threat theory helps explain the

lack of free riding from the Gulf States. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

Emirates, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, all provided robust support in part due to the threat

that Saddam Hussein posed. Finally, the alliance dependence hypothesis helps explains

the participation of states that experienced no direct threat from Iraq. Germany, Japan,

and South Korea all contributed to the U.S. led coalition with expectation of support in

regional alliances.7

However, the burden sharing outcomes observed challenged the literature in that

existing theory did not adequately explain other than the most likely cases. First, though

collective action and balance of threat theories explained some Gulf War contributions,

they did not explain other key contributions from major participants. Despite a real and

proximate threat, Iran and Jordan elected not to contribute. More significantly, countries

such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway contributed to the coalition despite the

lack of any significant threat from Iraq. Second, due to the uncertainty in the

international system after the Cold War, Bennett, et al, found a very strong incidence of

alliance dependence, based on expected future benefits of being part of a U.S.-led global

bloc Instead of acting out of threat, or a need for collective action, states allied with the

7 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 346-48.

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United States for hedging motivations. Hedging states were showing a commitment to

the U.S. with the expectation that their support would curry favor while ensuring that

potential rivals were blocked.8 Third, domestic politics theories, seldom seen in alliance

theorizing, possessed causal significance in explaining the timing and type of

contribution. Finally, systemic and state-level variables interacted to shape coalition

contributions heretofore unanticipated by existing theory.9 The Bennett, et al, model thus

attempted to capture these interactions by integrating the major theoretical threads into a

single explanatory and predictive framework.

Coalitions – Many Faces, Many Motives, Differing Contributions

The military, economic, and diplomatic coalition contributions highlight the

significant differences between the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. The

Iraq War saw limited or no participation from states that were significant contributors to

the first effort. Additionally, a large portion of those that did participate in the second

coalition had no direct stake in the conflict. Why was the burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq

War markedly different from Operation Desert Storm? In the current conflict, Persian

Gulf War contributors were not only absent, but also actively tried to disarm the second

intervention. Typically staunch allies, Germany, and Turkey made active efforts to derail

U.N. passage of a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, while Japan

aggressively lobbied Security Council members for passage. What motivated countries

8 For a discussion of hedging motivations see Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 9 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 349-51.

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such as South Korea and Poland to contribute significantly to the current effort, while

steadfast partners such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia resisted the United States? Why were

former Soviet republics unanimously in support of military intervention? This study aims

to explore state motivations to participate in the U.S. led Iraq War coalition.

In 1991, the first Bush administration led a coalition, under a United Nations

mandate, to war against Iraq after its unlawful invasion of Kuwait.10 The coalition that

freed Kuwait was diverse in composition and level of support. This coalition included

significant military partners such as Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as partners

that contributed outside of the military realm. Financial partners such as Japan and

Germany significantly contributed to the coalition by providing financial support for the

United States and its military partners. This diversity of burden sharing support shows

the many methods in which states can and will contribute towards a security goal. Many

states contributed primarily military resources. Table 1 illustrates the top five military

10 United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, by a vote of 12-2-1 demanded that Iraq comply with Resolution 660 by withdrawing its forces from Kuwait, and set the deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to comply. The resolution requested all states to use all necessary means to uphold Resolution 660.

Table 1. Military Contribution to Persian Gulf War, 1991

Country Troop Strength % Total Active Armed Forces

United States 697,000 34.3% Saudi Arabia 100,000 130.7% United Kingdom 45,400 15.1% Egypt 33,600 8.0% Syria 14,500 3.6%

Note: Saudi Arabian percentages reflect the need for both nations to generate reserves for operation Desert Storm. Source: "Gulf War Veterans: Measuring Health" by Lyla M. Hernandez, Jane S. Durch, Dan G. Blazer II, and Isabel V. Hoverman, Editors; Committee on Measuring the Health of Gulf War Veterans, Institute of Medicine. The National Academies Press 1999; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (London, 1992)

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contributors to the Persian Gulf War. This table shows that although the United States

provided a significant element of military capability, the regional forces of Saudi Arabia,

Egypt, and Syria, as well as the United Kingdom robustly provided military capability.

In addition to military participation, the Persian Gulf War coalition displayed a

robust level of economic compensation to the United States for leading the collective

action. Table 2 illustrates the top five financial contributors to the Persian Gulf War

coalition. Japan and Germany, who were constitutionally limited from supplying military

forces, supported the coalition by underwriting a significant portion of the expenses for

military action. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that burden sharing contributions may have

several dimensions. States that offer financial offsets to allies making military

contributions, or those that give assistance to allies that are hurt through trade disruptions

with the adversary; all make key contributions to the coalition objectives. Military

participation describes only one dimension of state support.

This robust coalition of diverse states conflicted with realist and liberal theories

concerning alliance formation and burden sharing. Realist theories of balance of power

and balance of threat predict that states would be hesitant to join U.S. efforts to check

Table 2. Major Economic Contributions to Persian Gulf War, 1991

Country Pledges

(Millions) Receipts

(Millions) Saudi Arabia $16,839 $16,854 Kuwait $16,056 $16,059 Japan $10,012 $10,012 Germany $6,572 $6,455 UAE $4,088 $4,088

Source: Richard Darman, “US Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such Costs, as required by Section 401 PL 102-25,” Office of Management and Budget Report to the U.S. Senate, October 15, 1992

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Iraqi aggression.11 Since the U.S. possessed ample military capability alone to stop Iraq,

realist theory would expect rising powers such as Japan and Germany to sit on the

sidelines rather than join the U.S. effort. Britain, Germany, and Japan neither balanced

against U.S. power, nor possessed a direct reason to balance against Iraq as a threat; but

they contributed significantly to the coalition. Arab states such as Egypt and Morocco

bandwagoned with the United States although they suffered no direct threat from Iraq.

Liberal and institutional theories of alliance also failed to explain the first Gulf

War intervention. Constructivist theories argue that alliance formation is deeply related

to the ideational structure domestically as well as internationally.12 These theories

suggest that like-minded states will ally against a potential aggressor because of a threat

to international norms and beliefs. These theories however fail to explain why states with

differing norms and beliefs would participate in a security coalition. Illiberal monarchies,

such as Saudi Arabia, and dictatorships, such as Syria aligned with the democratically

liberal U.S. to reinstate an illiberal monarchy. Clearly these states joined the coalition for

different normative interests. Interdependence theories also argue that states that trade, or

have like interests such as collective security interests, are likely to ally against threats to

11 For balance of power theory see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For balance of threat theory see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 12 Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88 (1994), Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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that trade.13 Interdependence theories fail to explain why states like Syria, which had

little trade with the U.S., participated in the coalition. Overall, states that should have

supported collective security arrangements were slow to act and required U.S. pressure,

while other states that had marginal stake in the credibility of international institutions

but had significant private incentives, such as Syria, participated robustly in the coalition.

Twelve years after Desert Storm, events in Iraq precipitated an international crisis

and a U.S.-led security coalition. The coalition composition for the 2003 Iraq War

differed significantly from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2003, the international

community was unified in its assessment that Iraq had violated its Security Council

mandate to disarm, but was divided on the appropriate course of action. Security Council

Resolution 1441 directed Iraq to allow weapons inspections warned Iraq that it would

face serious consequences if it continued violations of its obligations to disarm.14

Although this resolution passed unanimously, the United States was later unable to

convince the Security Council to authorize the use of force to disarm Iraq. Coalition

patterns and burden sharing in Operation Iraqi Freedom exhibited a marked difference

from Desert Storm. The United States commenced combat operations in Iraq on March

19, 2003 with a “coalition of the willing” comprised of 40 countries that publicly

13 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996), David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997), Gerald L. Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994). 14 United Nations Security Council., Resolution 1441 (United Nations, 2002 [cited October 12 2007]); available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement.

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committed to the war effort. This coalition provided a variety of support, including

logistical and intelligence support, over-flight rights, or humanitarian and reconstruction

aid.15 The support from the “coalition of the willing,” however, did not necessarily

include direct military support for combat operations. Table 3 illustrates military

contribution to the coalition for combat operations. Only six coalition members (besides

the United States) provided military support to conventional combat operations, and only

four committed troops to combat.

Table 3. Military Contribution for Combat Operations, Operation

Iraqi Freedom, March 19 – May 1, 2003

Country Troop Strength % Total Active Armed Forces

United States 250,000 17.5% United Kingdom 45,000 21.2% Australia 2,000 3.7% Spain 900* 0.6% Denmark 300* 1.3% Poland 180 0.1% Bulgaria 150* 0.3%

*Provided non-combat mission support outside Iraq such as chemical decontamination and logistic support units. Sources: Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, (Washington DC, 2003),16, 37-40; Katzmann Economic and Military Support for the U.S. Efforts in Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007), 9-10; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (London, 2004), 353-358.

The military contribution to the 2003 Iraq War again highlighted several

anomalies not explained by existing alliance theory. Once again, since the United States

showed a willingness and capability for unilateral action, therefore collective action

theory predicts that the coalition should see numerous instances of free riding. Although

free riding was much more prevalent, some states provided significant military 15 George W. Bush, President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (The White House, 2003 [cited September 17 2007]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html.

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contribution to the effort. Most significant in this regard, the United Kingdom provided a

considerable portion of its military capability to the military coalition. The British

contribution of 45,000 troops was equal to its contribution to Desert Storm. This

represented a six percent larger fraction of its total active duty armed forces compared to

Desert Storm. Significantly, this military burden was greater for the British armed forces

than for the U.S. military, in terms of percentage of active force deployed. Another

observation is the lack of direct military support from robust supporters of Desert Storm,

such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was the most significant contributor

based on economic and military contributions in the Persian Gulf War, but chose to play

at best a secondary role in the 2003 Iraq War.16

Duration of a military conflict is likely to affect the level of burden sharing

support. Democratic states must continually justify putting citizens at risk for coalition

goals. Public support for the coalition is expected to wax and wane over the length of a

prolonged operation revealing coalition dynamics that are not present in shorter

operations.17 One critique of the Bennett, et al, analysis of the Persian Gulf War was that

it failed to test for coalition dynamics over the length of a prolonged operation.18 The

duration of the Persian Gulf War was so short that burden-levels were relatively static

from the initiation to termination of the conflict. The Iraq war presents an opportunity for

16 Madawi al-Rasheed, "Saudi Arabia: The Challenge of the US Invasion of Iraq," in The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, ed. Rick Fawn and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 17 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," International Security 30, no. 3 (2005/6). 18 Gerald Steinberg, The American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (1998).

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examining the effect of war duration on burden sharing. Figure 1 presents the aggregate

military support for stabilization operations in Iraq since May 2003. These data reflect

coalition support to Iraq stability operations after the conclusion of conventional combat

operations and the fall of the Hussein regime. By May 2003, the United Kingdom and

the United States had redeployed significant combat strength on the assumption of a

pacific occupation. Figure 1 aggregate troop levels show the level of material burden of

the Iraq War between the United States and its coalition partners. These data show that

while U.S. forces responded to changing security conditions in Iraq, non-U.S. coalition

contributions remained relatively steady. U.S. burdens fluctuated to the security

Figure 1. Coalition Strength for Stabilization Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom,

May 2003 – February 2007

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

180,000

200,000

Ma

y-0

3

Au

g-0

3

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v-0

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6

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v-0

6

Fe

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7

Ma

y-0

7

Non-U.S. Coalition U.S.

13

situation, while coalition partners were insulated from these changes and maintained a

steady level of burden.

These data also illustrate a steady decline of non-U.S. military contributions since

December 2005. As of May 2007, the number of coalition forces has declined by 47.5

percent, from a high of 24,000 in December 2003 to 12,600 in May 2007. Figure 2

shows the percentage of the military burden shared by the coalition partners. Non-U.S.

coalition contributions peaked at 17.3 percent of the total effort in February 2004 and

steadily declined to 7.5 percent by May 2007. One possible explanation for this

phenomenon is that the costs of the operation were exceeding the benefits for

participating nations. An alternative explanation may be the increasing capability of Iraqi

military capabilities; however, one would also expect a drawdown of U.S. forces if Iraqi

Figure 2. Percentage of Non-U.S. Participation in Iraq Coalition,

May 2003 – February 2007

Source: The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, September 10, 2007

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

18.0%

20.0%

Ma

y-0

3

Au

g-0

3

No

v-0

3

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b-0

4

Ma

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4

Au

g-0

4

No

v-0

4

Fe

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5

Ma

y-0

5

Au

g-0

5

No

v-0

5

Fe

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6

Ma

y-0

6

Au

g-0

6

No

v-0

6

Fe

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7

Ma

y-0

7

14

military capability were replacing coalition capability. If Iraqi military capability was

substituting for coalition military capability, all forces in Iraq should be drawing down.

Therefore, these data indicate that the mild support for nation building operations is

suffering under the weight of an ongoing military operation. The United States seems to

be suffering from the “classic” collective action predicament; because it has significant

military forces in Iraq, it is expected to maintain a disproportional amount of military

burden.

Coalition support has not only decreased over the duration of the conflict, but

coalition composition has also significantly changed. Table 4 illustrates the level military

support, by year, of the top contributors to the Iraq coalition. Appendix A shows all non-

U.S. participation to the Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), from December 2003

through May 2007.

Table 4. Military Contribution to Stability Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom

March 2003-March 2007

Coalition Military Contribution

Country March 2003 March 200419 March 200520 March 200621 March 200722 Fatalities23 United States 250,000 138,000 150,000 133,000 142,000 3,461 United Kingdom 45,000 8,220 8,000 8,000 7,100 149 South Korea 675 3,600 3,270 2,300 1 Italy 3,000 3,000 2,900 0 33 Poland 180 2,500 1,700 900 900 20 Ukraine 1,650 1,500 0 0 18 Spain 900 1,300 0 0 0 11 Netherlands 1,307 0 0 0 2 Australia 2000 850 900 900 550 2 Romania 500 800 860 600 2 Denmark 300 500 530 530 460 7 Japan 200 500 600 0 0 Georgia 800 900 900 0 Source: The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, Multiple Issues

15

As evidenced by these data, the military coalition has evolved over the life of the

Iraq War. The United Kingdom rapidly downsized its 45,000 strong invasion force and

installed a relatively stable, yet significantly smaller, contingent of peacekeepers in the

south. Poland robustly supported peacekeeping operations initially-- even leading

coalition operations south of Baghdad-- but since has reduced its support to providing a

battalion sized combat element and a divisional headquarters.24 Spain also initially

provided robust support to the reconstruction effort, but terminated that support following

the March 2004 Madrid train bombing when the Socialist government of Prime Minister

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was elected into power on a pledge to pull Spanish troops

from Iraq. South Korea has remained a firm supporter of military operations; however,

recent events suggest that their support is beginning to wane. The above discussion on

coalition contributions and timing suggest that the Iraq War should provide a robust test

of the Bennett, et al, security model due to the variation of military support over the

duration of the coalition.

19 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, March 17, 2004 (The Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2004 [cited September 18 2007]); available from http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20040317.pdf. 20 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, April 18, 2005 (The Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2005 [cited September 18 2007]); available from http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20050418.pdf. 21 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, April 27, 2006 (The Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2006 [cited September 18 2007]); available from http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20060427.pdf. 22 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, May 31, 2007 (The Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2007 [cited September 18 2007]); available from http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20070531.pdf. 23 Ibid. 24 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, Significant Issues Series (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2003).

16

Bennett, et al, found that financial support is also an essential element of coalition

burden sharing. They demonstrated that states would support military efforts financially

when they are domestically unable or unwilling to contribute military forces. During the

1991 Gulf War, Japan and Germany, constitutionally limited from deploying military

personnel, were the third and fourth largest financial contributors to the coalition,

underwriting many U.S. military expenses. Financial support by coalition partners varied

significantly in the second conflict. The limited support the United States has received

financially for the current Iraq War stands in stark contrast to the 1991 Gulf War. In that

conflict, the U.S. was reimbursed almost entirely for its military expenses. The U.S.

collected approximately $74 billion in 2007 dollars from coalition partners for U.S.

military support.25 In contrast, the U.S. is directly bearing the costs for its current

military operations in Iraq. In contrast to the first war, the U.S. is not only funding its

own operations, but it is also directly funding several coalition partners’ participation.

Table 5 presents a list of countries receiving U.S. assistance to participate in the military

coalition. These countries that provided personnel to the multinational force in Iraq were

not financially able to support their troops in the field for extended periods and therefore

required financial assistance to prepare their troops for the operation. Since 2003, the

25 Congressman Bill Delahunt, opening comments; Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Economic and Military Support for the U.S. Efforts in Iraq: The Coalition of the Willing, Then and Now, First Session, May 9 2007, 2.

17

United States has provided approximately $1.5 billion to 20 countries to support non-U.S.

coalition troops in Iraq.26

Table 5. U.S. Support to Non-U.S. Coalition Troops

March 2003-March2007

Country Total

(Millions) Percent Poland* $988.4 66.2% Jordan $295.0 19.7% Georgia $63.1 4.2% Ukraine $12.5 0.8% United Kingdom $5.6 0.4% Romania $3.0 0.2% Bosnia $2.0 0.1% Mongolia $1.3 0.1% Other Nations $123.3 8.3% Total $1,494.2 100%

* Funding to Poland included funding for troops operating under its command. Source: GAO-07-827T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007)

The current coalition also requires a significant financial investment for the

reconstruction of the government and infrastructure of Iraq. The United States not only

had to assemble a military coalition to topple Saddam Hussein, but also had to build a

financial coalition to rebuild the war-torn state. Table 6 illustrates the major financial

donors to Iraq reconstruction. International donors other than the U.S. have pledged

approximately $14.9 billion to support Iraq reconstruction. This total is significant,

however, worldwide pledges do not even equal the $18.6 billion that the United States

alone pledged towards Iraq reconstruction, and pale in comparison to the $189 billion that

the U.S. has budgeted in 2008 for military operations and reconstruction.27

26 Joseph A. Christoff, "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments," ed. United States Government Accountability Office (Washington DC, GPO, 2007), 10. 27 William H. McMichael, "Crs: Iraq War to Cost $189b in '08," Defense News, October 1,, 2007.

18

Approximately $11 billion, or 70 percent, of the $14.9 billion pledged is in the form of

loans. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Iran, and Japan are the major

contributors of loans for reconstruction.

Donors have provided about $2.3 billion in bilateral grants to Iraq for reconstruction.

The grants include $1 billion from Japan, $775 million from the United Kingdom, $153

million from South Korea, $110 million from Canada, and $100 million from Spain.28

These contributions show a high level of international commitment, but in comparison to

28 Christoff, "Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments," 14-15.

Table 6. Major Donor Pledges for Iraq Reconstruction

Donor Madrid Pledge

(Millions)

Post Madrid Pledges and Donations

(Millions) Form of Pledge United States $18,649 Grant

Japan $4,914 $1,500 Grants $3,400 Loans

Iran $5 $1,000 $5 Grant $1,000 Loan

United Kingdom $452 $198 Grant Kuwait $500 Grant Saudi Arabia $500 Loan Spain $220 $28 Grant Italy $236 Grant UAE $215 Grant Republic of Korea $200 Grant European Commission $236 $687 Grant IMF $2,550-4,250 Loan World Bank $3,000-5,000 Loan Sources: GAO-07-827T, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007); The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, January 19, 2005. Note: Bolded countries also contributed troops to the multinational coalition.

19

the Persian Gulf War, the United States is shouldering the majority of the economic

burden.

Diplomatic support also varied across the coalition. The United Kingdom and

Spain were strong advocates in the Security Council for military intervention in Iraq.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair significantly influenced U.S. war deliberations,

convincing the Bush administration on the need for a Security Council Resolution in

order to garner domestic and international legitimacy for the use of force. British and

U.S. efforts were critical in garnering a unanimous consensus for Security Council

Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002), which called Iraq in “material breach” of the of the

ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. This resolution put the onus

on Iraq to prove that it did not have Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and warned

Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its

obligations.29 This resolution solidified international support to engage Iraq, but left

doubt on the meaning of “serious consequences.” The unanimous vote on Resolution

1441 disguised a number of fundamental policy differences among the Security Council

Members.

While the U.S. saw Resolution 1441 as a stepping-stone for military action,

France and Germany interpreted the resolution as a pretext for more aggressive weapons

inspections. In early March 2003, the governments of France, Russia, and Germany

informally rejected a second U.S.-British draft resolution advocating the use of force.

29United Nations Security Council., Resolution 1441.

20

Germany initially led international efforts against a war. German Chancellor Gerhard

Schröder won reelection in national elections the previous September based on his

rejection of U.S. adventurism in Iraq. He undermined U.S. efforts to build a military

coalition by rejecting German participation in a war even with a Security Council

Resolution.30 France supported diplomatic action and weapons inspections, but

eventually joined with Germany in a diplomatic blocking effort in the Security Council,

once it was clear that war was likely.31 In the diplomatic buildup to the second

resolution, Germany and France applied significant pressure on the former Soviet states

of Eastern Europe to repel U.S. advances to participate in a coalition.

In a late January 2003 rebuke of the assertion that Germany and France were

speaking for Europe, eight NATO members issued an open letter of support for U.S.

policy towards Iraq. The eight included Great Britain, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands,

Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Portugal. The letter from the NATO-Eight

was followed by another endorsement from Eastern European nations aspiring to NATO

and EU membership. The group, known as the Vilnius 10, included Albania, Bulgaria,

Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In an

open letter, dated February 5, 2003, the group declared, “Our countries understand the

dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our

30 Robert J. Pauly and Tom Lansford, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2004), 73-75. 31 Rick Fawn, "The Iraq War: Unfolding and Unfinished," in The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, ed. Rick Fawn and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 3-5. Pauly and Lansford, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, 98-99.

21

shared values.”32 They claimed that it was already clear Iraq was in breach of U.N.

Security Council Resolution 1441. The Vilnius group gave the Bush administration a

diplomatic boost by stating, “In the event of non-compliance, we are prepared to

contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of

Iraq.”33 The former Communist States provided necessary support to U.S. efforts to build

a large diplomatic coalition.

Japan was very supportive of this “second” draft resolution authorizing the use of

force against Iraq and launched a diplomatic effort to persuade undecided members of the

Security Council to support the resolution. Tokyo warned France on the dangers of

splitting the international community and the Security Council over the resolution. In an

official statement Japan warned, “[i]f the international community divides, it will not

only benefit Iraq, but also place in doubt the authority and effectiveness of the United

Nations.”34 Japan also offered financial assistance to states bordering Iraq, including

$1.3 billion to Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.35

The second resolution became a “trial of strength” between Paris and the United

States. France went to great lengths to dissuade the U.S. and U.K. from presenting a

32 Pauly and Lansford, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, 96. 33 Ambrose Evans, Ten Eastern European States to Join in War (2003 [cited September 21 2007]); available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/02/06/weur06.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/02/06/ixnewstop.html. 34 Quoted in Pauly and Lansford, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, 97. 35 Ibid.

22

second resolution to the Council.36 In the end, the diplomatic efforts of France and

Germany–and to a lesser extent Russia and China–assured that the second resolution was

not brought to a vote. The coalition formed without a U.N. mandate for the use of force

to disarm Iraq.

This summary of military, economic, and diplomatic contributions to two U.S. led

coalitions in Iraq highlights the significant differences burden sharing outcomes in the

two conflicts. The 2003 Iraq saw limited or no participation from state that were

significant contributors to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Additionally, the U.S. gained

numerous coalition partners that had no direct stake in either conflict. Puzzling was the

drastically different coalition makeup in the second effort, even though many major

structural factors were similar to the first. A striking feature of the second coalition is the

lack of Arab participation and the limited amount of coalition military participation for

the initial invasion. Local participation from states that should be considered threatened

by Iraq was fairly absent. On the other hand, states that should have had no overt interest

in participation were partners in the second coalition. This dissertation aims to explain

these variations by the U.S.’s coalition partners.

Security Coalitions as a Field of Study

Military coalitions are an enduring feature in international relations. From

Athenian and Spartan participation in the Peloponnesian War to American involvement

36 Jolyon Howorth, "France: Defender of International Legitimacy," in The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, ed. Rick Fawn and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 55.

23

in the current Iraq War, great powers have often conducted warfare as members of

multinational coalitions and alliances. U.S. military operations since World War II

demonstrate that the United States typically engages in military operations within some

type of coalition.37 Recent U.S. security doctrine underscores the need for multilateral

capability to face the problems of arms proliferation and terrorism. The 2006 National

Security Strategy stresses the need to address these problems through “effective

international action,” but at the same time cautions, “the international community is most

engaged in such action when the United States leads.”38 Military doctrine also highlights

the enduring requirement to operate multilaterally. U.S. military doctrine instructs

commanders to “be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from

other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition.”39 One feature of these

multinational efforts is that they are often executed in the framework of ad hoc coalitions

rather than standing military alliances. Significantly, the United States has fought only

two military actions since World War II as a member of a standing military alliance.

Rather it chooses to engage in military action unilaterally or as a member of a coalition.40

37 For a discussion of American coalition experience see Becker, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience.", Allan Reed Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, Rev. and expanded. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994). 38 United States. and George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: White House, 2006), 22. 39 United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff., Jp 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub; 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), II 4-8. For a argument on the dangers of automatically pursuing coalition partners see Patricia A. Weitsman, "Fighting with Friends: The Dynamics of Coalition Warfare," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, IL: 2007). 40 The U.S. participated with alliance partners in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, even these actions were somewhat ad hoc since Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was not activated. Participation by NATO states was voluntary for these military actions. Terry J. Pudas, "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 3 (1993/1994). In non-Article V operations no one can know with certainty the

24

The termination of Cold War alignments and alliances will continue to contribute to a

less rigid and more dynamic structure of international security favoring coalition versus

alliance military action. “Coalitions of the willing” will need to be formed to answer to

security dilemmas not anticipated by formal alliance structures. When a sense of urgency

combines with sufficient international support for undertaking joint military action,

coalitions, rather than alliances are more likely to distribute costs among military

members, and politically provide a sense of legitimacy and common purpose for a given

action.41

Significant scholarly attention in international relations focuses on alliance

formation, and a smaller amount on alliance burden sharing; however, the large majority

of this canon fails to answer the question of why – and how much – do states contribute

to ad hoc coalitions. In addition, why do states fail to contribute when they have an

immediate stake in the outcome?

The inability of alliance literature to explain coalition burden sharing is partially

due to its overemphasis on capability aggregation. The capability aggregation model –

where states ally to increase power capability – dominates the theoretical focus of

literature on alliances.42 George Liska argues, “states enter into alliances with one

extent to which NATO members ultimately will contribute, see David P. Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo," International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2004). U.S. participation in Afghanistan is separate from NATO stabilization operations. 41 Pierre, Coalitions Building and Maintenance: The Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the War on Terrorism, 13-14. 42 James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991).

25

another in order to supplement each other’s capability.”43 Kenneth Waltz’s structural

balance of power theory argues that “imbalances” in the balance of power are corrected

through the capability aggregation of alliances. “External balancing” involves increasing

one’s overall capability by including the capabilities of an ally.44 Stephen Walt further

states “The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members’ capabilities in

a way that furthers their respective interests.”45 When studied as an aggregation problem,

the differences between alliances and coalitions are minor. However, the capability

aggregation model overlooks the fact that that alliance and coalition membership can

serve state interests tangentially to the immediate military crisis.46 The current Iraq

conflict highlights the fact that coalitions are often formed for reasons other than

capability aggregation.

Another influential body of literature has sought to explain state alliance burdens

in terms of economic factors, particularly the economic incentives that are created when a

common interest is pursued collectively. The economic theory of alliances is an offshoot

of collective goods literature and was first used by Mancur Olsen and Richard

Zeckhauser to explain NATO burden sharing.47 The collective goods hypothesis offers

an explanation for two important aspects of alliance burden sharing. First, it explains the

tendency for the larger and wealthier members to supply a disproportionately large share 43 George Liska, Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore,: John Hopkins Press, 1962), 26. 44 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 161-70. 45 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 157. 46 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, 1-9. 47 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," The Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (1966).

26

of the defense burden. Second, it explains the tendency against collective action unless a

powerful actor can generate initial support.48 Olsen and Zeckhauser, along with

successive collective security theorists, argue that small states will tend to free ride or

contribute minimally to an alliance because their limited resources will have little impact

on the amount of security provided, while large states will shoulder the majority of

defense burdens. Additionally, they argue that no collective action is likely amongst

equals in a collective arrangement because of the large amount of resources required to

begin the collective effort.49 Pure collective action requires a hegemon that can provide

incentives or costs to encourage participation.

The existing collective security literature has two empirical weaknesses when

explaining the burdens of an ad hoc security coalition. First, the theory was intended to

describe burden sharing in the broad definition of alliances that would include ad hoc

coalitions as well as treaty-based alliances. However, empirical analysis has

concentrated predominately on burden sharing in alliances more rightly defined as

international organizations or regimes. Existing burden sharing literature is almost

exclusively based on NATO, which assumes a formal alliance structure to provide

mechanisms for sharing costs among states. Alliance structure, combined with a high

level of institutionalization, guarantees that group members make some contribution to a

common effort. They help to embed international commitments in domestic politics and

48 Wallace J. Thies, "Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987), 298-99. 49 Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

27

institutionalize cooperation. They also provide a focus for pressure on reluctant

governments by agreeing to norms and targets of support. These structures provide a

means to persuade domestic political actors to provide the necessary resources.50 Burden

sharing in a coalition environment is not necessarily shaped by these same institutional

dynamics to share costs. Ad hoc coalition leaders must convince participants that the

military adventure is worth the domestic costs. Burden sharing research thus needs to be

extended into less institutionalized settings.

The second empirical weakness is that the existing burden sharing literature

examines only military defense spending and ignores contributions to distinct events.51

Mechanisms for burden sharing are couched in an overall defense burden rather than

costs associated with a particular military operation. This anomaly exists because

collective action literature assumes that “deterrence” and “defense” are the collective

goods rather than an “offensive” goal such as regime change or Middle East stability.

Since collective action theory is based largely on the NATO experience, this assumption

is logical. However, burden sharing literature needs to account not only for alliance

defense burdens, but also for the operational burdens of a specific contingency. The

Bennett et al. security model is the first attempt to explain security burdens for specific

contingent events.

50 Malcolm Chalmers, "The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate -- Widening or Fragmenting?," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 77, no. 3 (2001), 570, Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armon, NY: M.E. Sharp, 2002). 51 Several recent efforts have aimed to expand burden-sharing to individual operations. See Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."

28

Are Coalitions Different From Alliances?

The terms alliance and coalition are often used interchangeably, which causes

confusion and misspecification when used by political science scholars for theoretical

analysis. Although these terms are often used synonymously throughout international

relations literature, significant differences exist between the two terms.52 Both terms

refer to forms of multinational military cooperation, yet neither term has a commonly

accepted definition. This section explores the differences between alliances and

coalitions and proffers the theoretical differences based on these distinctions.

Alliance study has long been a staple of international relations scholarship, but the

term describes a wide range of alignment behavior from loose security alignments to

institutionalized international organizations such as the NATO. Scholarly literature

typically highlights two commonly accepted differences between alliances and coalitions.

First, alliances are generally characterized as more formal arrangements than

coalitions. The major works regarding alliance characteristics emphasize the formal

nature of alliances. Robert Osgood in his study of alliances and American foreign policy

remarks that alliances are, “a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using

their military resources against a specific state or states…”53 Hans Morgenthau stresses

that an alliance adds precision – in terms of a formal agreement – to an existing

52 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan argue that the lack of accepted definition of alliance is an indication that there is a lack of scholarly agreement on the characteristics of alliances, see Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 3. 53 Robert Endicott Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).

29

community of interests. According to Morgenthau, an alliance “makes policy and action

explicit and operative.”54 Osgood stresses that alliances “pledge states to co-operate in

using their military resources against a specific state or states.”55 Alliances oblige one or

more of the signatories to use force, or threaten to use force, in specified circumstances.

Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, in their exhaustive study of alliances, stress that an

alliance must be made by formal treaty so that it can be separated from accidental or

temporary coordination of foreign policy acts.56 Finally, Glenn Snyder, in his

authoritative work on alliance politics defines alliances as, “the result of a formal

agreement of some sort that makes explicit the contingencies in which military

cooperation will occur.”57 Snyder underscores that alliances must be theoretically

separate from less formal arrangements because it is useful to stipulate their different

obligations.58 Formal alliances introduce an obligation on the signatories that is not

present in a tacit arrangement. The formalization adds elements of specificity, obligation,

and reciprocity that are lacking in informal arrangements. Reneging will severely

damage the credibility of future promises to allies.59 The political reality lies not in the

54 Hans Joachim Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 198-99. 55 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 17. 56 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 3-4. 57 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4. 58 Ibid., 6-8. 59 James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994).

30

formal contract itself but in the expectations that are supported or created by that

contract.60

Other scholars conflate alliances and coalitions; coalitions are seen as the

younger, less developed sibling of the alliance. Stephen Walt, in his seminal work The

Origins of Alliances, defines an alliance as, “a formal or informal relationship of security

cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”61 Barnett and Levy offer a similar

definition in their study of domestic factors that influence alliance decisions.62 These

scholars assume that coalition behavior is structurally similar, and therefore,

interchangeable with alliance behavior. Scant scholarly effort has been expended to

bridge the gap in theoretical reasoning and explore their differences.

One would expect the dynamics of burden sharing to be different in an ad hoc

situation compared to a highly institutionalized alliance such as NATO. NATO has

developed an accepted process for assessing burdens on member states. Although

compliance with burden assessments is somewhat questionable, NATO maintains a

formalized process to adjudicate defense burdens.63 NATO’s Defense Planning

Committee and Defense Review Committee oversee the force planning process and

coordinate national defense plans towards NATO Force Goals. Allied defense planning

60 Interestingly, Stephen Walt, in one of the most notable works on alliance behavior, deviates from this tradition and defines an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. Although he does not stress the formal nature of the agreement, he does stress that an alliance assumes some level of commitment. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 1. 61 Ibid. 62 Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991). 63 Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO.

31

is reviewed annually and given direction by NATO Ministers of Defense in an Annual

Defense Review. The Annual Defense Review assesses the contribution of member

countries in relation to their respective capabilities and constraints in the context of the

Force Goals assigned to them. Specific defense planning targets for each member

country are developed based on this ministerial level guidance. Member states

implement agreed defense planning procedures, which provide the methodology for

determining and reporting on the forces levels necessary to implement Force Goals. The

NATO international staff monitors and assesses countries’ actions in response to the

required forces and capabilities placed on them by this force planning process and reports

to the Defense Planning Committee on state compliance.64 NATO’s highly

institutionalized process insures that states have a forum for addressing defense burden

targets. Although states attempt to “burden-shift” within the NATO force planning

process, a governing process exists for addressing defense burden issues.

Ad hoc coalitions, on the other hand, have no equivalent process for establishing

defense burdens for a particular operation. In contrast to the highly institutionalized

process seen in NATO, ad hoc coalition burdens are determined as a result of a bilateral

bargaining process with the coalition initiator. Rather than addressing burdens within a

committee structure, burdens are determined individually on a case-by-case basis. Since

coalitions tend to be in response to an already ongoing crisis, potential allies will have

significant leverage against the coalition initiator to extract concessions for their support.

64 North Atlantic Treaty Organization., NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 149-51.

32

States bargain their support levels in a bilateral environment rather than through a

bureaucratic structure.

Second, whereas the structure of ad hoc coalitions is different from alliances, so is

their purpose. Alliances are typically formed in the anticipation of future events, while

coalitions are formed in response to a specific crisis that has already emerged. Osgood

indicates that alliances pledge state action to cooperate in circumstances that are specified

in advance.65 Bueno de Mesquito and Singer extend this argument by stating that

alliances are “for the putative purpose of coordinating their behavior in the event of

specified contingencies of a military nature.”66 Glenn Snyder argues that alliances are

formal agreements to use military force “in specified circumstances.”67 Common in the

definition of alliance is the assumption that the alliance function is to prepare its members

for a future contingency that may or may not occur. Alliances may be designed to deter

aggressors, to defend in the event of war, or to initiate military action; however, their

temporal function is future oriented. Alliances are considered state level “promises” or

pledges of future cooperation.68

Coalitions, on the other hand, are by definition ad hoc and temporary. The short

nature of coalitions distinguishes them from relatively permanent, treaty-based alliances

65 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 17. 66 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer, "Alliances, Capabilities, and War," Political Science Annual 4 (1973), 241. 67 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 4. Emphasis in the original 68 Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.", Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs."

33

or standing international institutions.69 States form coalitions to address a particular

crisis, with no expectation of broader cooperation in other areas or continued partnership

once the immediate situation is resolved. States are free to join and exit at will; therefore,

coalitions are far less restrictive or inhibiting than alliances.

Having highlighted the differences between an alliance and coalition, for the

purposes of this study, a coalition is defined as a grouping of states that provide political,

material, or military support to meet a specific contingency at a particular time in the

absence of an alliance requirement to do so, with no commitment to a durable

relationship.70

Since coalitions and alliances differ in formality and duration, the following

assumptions apply to coalitions. First, a coalition is more likely to have members enter

and exit – based on short-term costs and benefits – since transaction costs are not locked

in by a long-term agreement. A significant cost in a standing alliance is the risk of

having to come to the aid of an ally when one would not normally have done so in the

absence of commitment. Breaking an alliance commitment involves high audience costs

since treaty based alliances are formal regimes. On the other hand, it should be less

costly to break a commitment to an informal coalition since there is no formal obligation

69 Pierre, Coalitions Building and Maintenance: The Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the War on Terrorism, 15. 70 This definition incorporates the significant facets of DOD, Pierre, and Sprowls definitions. This definition captures three critical features of coalitions for this study, (1) the arrangement is ad hoc and temporary, (2) the main actor is the state, and (3) aid can be financial, political, or material.

34

to act.71 Cooperation does not cast the long shadow of the future as in an alliance;

therefore, coalitions should be less entangling.

Second, potential coalition partners will have significant bargaining leverage over

the coalition leader due to the short timeframe generally available for coalition building.

Relative bargaining power will turn on perceptions of comparative dependence and

intensity of interest in the bargaining situation. A coalition, in most instances, will need

to be assembled quickly since it is in response to an existing crisis, therefore, a bargainer

who wants an agreement soon will be at a disadvantage in dealing with someone who has

a temporal advantage.72

Finally, since coalitions have less time to prepare, capability aggregation will be

less effective than in formal alliance. Coalitions have much less time to prepare

operational plans and train as a coherent force. As preparation time decreases, military

efficiency decreases due to a lack of time to reconcile different doctrines and coordinate

campaigns.

This section is not intended to build a comprehensive theory of coalitions; rather

it is to highlight the critical distinctions between alliances and coalitions. For the

purposes of this dissertation, these distinctions between alliances and coalitions are

crucial. The factors which influence burden sharing, in a time critical crisis situation, are 71 For alliance reliability see Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," International Organization 57, no. 4 (2003), Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (2000), Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models,, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1979). 72 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 75.

35

expected to differ from those that influence standing alliances. Leaders in democratic

states may find it easier to commit their armed forces to coalitions rather than alliances.

Even though leaders must still legitimize their decisions to the public, media, and

government, the deployment of armed forces is likely through an expedited process

compared to treaty ratification. Coalition burden sharing becomes an area of negotiation

between states that is not governed by a standing agreement. Burden sharing behavior

should be different based on the formality of an agreement. Finally, coalitions form for

more than aggregated military capability. The U.S. coalitions of the last two decades

were influenced more by the political need for legitimacy rather than inherent military

capability of any individual coalition partner. The addition of the Egyptians and Syrians

to the Desert Storm coalition had less to do with capability and more with the political

goal of participation. In this instance, the level of burden sharing is less important than

the legitimizing effect of claiming coalition partners.

Summary

This dissertation is aimed at discovering if the Bennett, et al, security model is

generalizable to situations in which international support was lacking and the United

States was willing to act more unilaterally. The 2003 Iraq War provides a unique

opportunity for testing the security decision making model. In both the 1991 Persian

Gulf War and the current Iraq War, the U.S. was the hegemonic leader of a coalition, but

U.N. approval and war legitimacy differed. In both conflicts, the U.S. military possessed

enough military power to pursue objectives unilaterally, but the current conflict showed

36

many more instances of free riding. The dependent variable – amount of material,

financial, and diplomatic support to the coalition – varies from the first to second conflict

among the major contributors and varies longitudinally across the Iraq War. The Iraq

War coalition provides an excellent situation to test the robustness of the Bennett et al.

security model in explaining coalition burden sharing decisions. As there were

significant cases of non-participation and “free riding,” along with different political

motivations for participating in the coalition, I expect different causal paths to be excited

in the model, testing its explanatory power and validity.

Chapter two presents the theoretical framework for analyzing ad hoc security

coalitions. It traces the development of the burden sharing canon with a literature review

of the existing economic theory of alliances. Once the limitations of an economic only

approach are illustrated, the chapter continues with a wider review of alliance and

coalition literature and demonstrates that the existing theoretical structure makes

unjustified assumptions about the similarities of alliances and coalitions. Finally, the

chapter proffers an integrated solution to studying coalition behavior, which explains

divergent state motivations for burden sharing choices, where international pressures are

influenced by domestic politics.

Chapter three then presents a detailed discussion of the Bennett, Lepgold, and

Unger security decision making model. The theoretical foundation and contingent

predictions of the model are explored. Alternate predictive frameworks for analysis as

well as limitations to the Bennett, et al, model are also discussed. Chapter three

37

concludes with a methodological discussion about the cases selected for detailed analysis.

This discussion includes a methodology for determining the influence of international

legitimacy on the model assumptions.

The next four chapters provide an empirical analysis of the security decision

model. Chapter four presents an analysis of South Korea’s support of the coalition. The

Republic of Korea (ROK) was the third largest provider of military forces for a

significant portion of the stabilization effort. Korea’s economic participation was also

significant. Korea’s contribution of over $250 million to the Iraq reconstruction fund

marked it as a significant donor, within the top ten states providing monetary support to

Iraq.

Chapter five presents an analysis Turkey’s decision to remain on the sidelines of

the Iraq War effort. The Turkey case provides a robust test to coalition burden sharing

theory because its contribution to the Iraq War was markedly different from the Desert

Storm coalition. Turkey was a key state in the U.S. strategy for regime change in Iraq;

however it maintained preferences opposite of the first war under intense pressure from

the U.S. The Bush administration’s inability to win Ankara’s approval for a northern

front in the Iraq War significantly affected U.S. Iraq war plans and dealt a serious blow to

U.S.-Turkish relations.

Chapter six analyzes the German decision to lobby against the U.S. position

concerning Iraq. Within a year of declaring Germany’s unqualified support to the U.S.

global war on terrorism, he became the first Western leader to issue a categorical “no” to

38

the Bush administration for participation in the Iraq War. The Schröder government not

only declined to make a direct German contribution to the war in 2003, but moreover

engaged in active counter-coalition-building by lobbying France and Russia to support

Germany’s resistance to the U.S. “adventure.” Germany abandoned its traditional policy

of balancing between Washington and Paris, and instead created a counter-coalition with

Russia and France against the United States. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. led

coalition, regardless of the Security Council’s position, seriously undermined the

diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against

Iraq.

Finally, Chapter seven discusses the major theoretical implications of this

research. The evidence provided in the empirical chapters demonstrates that the Security

Decision Model is a valuable tool for analyzing coalition burden sharing decisions. This

research had two significant findings. First, state burden sharing decisions are influenced

by a complex interaction between international and domestic factors. Burden sharing is

an integral part of foreign policy decision making and hence requires knowledge of the

international environment in which states make decisions and the domestic environment

where decisions are translated into action. Second, as is readily apparent in the foreign

policy literature, but sometimes lacking in the greater international relations literature,

states rarely act as unitary actors. State decisions to commit resources are always based

on the ability of the government to extract resources from the society. By incorporating

state-societal measures in theory-making one can gain a better appreciation of the size

39

and composition of state resource expenditures. The Security Decision Model is a useful

tool for determining the significant elements that affect burden sharing behavior.

40

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING COALITION BURDEN SHARING

A profusion of scholarly attention focuses on alliance formation –a smaller

amount on alliance burden sharing – yet the vast majority of alliance theory fails to

answer the question of why and how much states contribute to security coalitions. This

chapter summarizes the common theoretical arguments concerning alliances and

coalitions. Each school of thought has important insights regarding alliance formation

and burden sharing, however, this dissertation argues that understanding coalition burden

sharing behavior requires an integrative theory that draws on the insights of these

competing research programs, specifying the contingent conditions when each research

program provides explanatory power for predicting and explaining outcomes. Integrative

models, arguably, better reflect the complexity of real-world decisions. They provide the

means to advance theoretical debates by building bridges across existing theories. This

integration of theories provides a more accurate means for explaining coalition dynamics

and provides a predictive framework for policy decision and analysis.

I start with a review of the burden sharing literature and argue that the dominant

collective action -- or economic approach – to explain alliance burden sharing

fundamentally ignores other causal factors that influence a state’s level of burden in

security operations. This discussion highlights the tendency for economic approaches to

assume a formal alliance structure containing treaty or institutional mechanisms that

affect state burden sharing levels; mechanisms that may be much different in less

41

formalized security arrangements. In order to provide a more complete picture of the

influences on state burden sharing behavior, I then examine the broader canon on

alliances – based primarily on realist assumptions of power, threat, and material

capability – that characterizes alliances as a means to manage anarchy in the international

system. The discussion of realist approaches illustrates the role of threat on state

motivations for forming and participating in security arrangements. However, due to the

realist overemphasis on material capability motivations for alliance behavior, the realist

argument overlooks other motivations for coalition formation and participation, such as

international legitimacy. Another weakness of the realist approach is its relative

ignorance of domestic factors that serve as important influences on coalition behavior.

The review of realist theory demonstrates the need to account for these weaknesses to

explain state-level decisions on burden sharing. I then review the emerging literature on

the influence of domestic politics and decision making influences on foreign policy

outcomes. This theoretical review challenges the traditional chasm between international

and domestic theoretical approaches and demonstrates that international and domestic

politics are intertwined; each contributes to state foreign policy making. I argue that no

single theoretical approach is sufficient to explain state-level policy and a multi-causal,

integrated model is necessary to explain the complexities of state burden sharing

decisions. Finally, since critics of the Iraq War coalition claimed that legitimacy,

provided by a U.N. Resolution, was an essential influence in coalition decisions I review

42

the literature on legitimacy in order to develop a research method to determine the

influence of legitimacy on state burden sharing decisions.

Systemic Theories of Alliance and Burden Sharing

Economic Theory and Burden Sharing

While the issue of cost distribution has always existed in alliance relationships,

the burden sharing debate emerged in the wake the aftermath of World War II. The

creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), followed by U.N. military

operations in Korea, prompted a debate on the uneven distribution of security burdens

within alliance systems. The theoretical foundation for collective action theory – and

hence burden sharing theory – is Mancur Olson’s collective goods theory, which seeks to

explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. In his 1965 seminal work, The

Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Olson contends that

although groups do join collective agreements striving for a common purpose, there is no

shared perspective on how to distribute the costs of their collective action. Ultimately, a

small group of states assumes the majority of the burden, or the collective action is never

initiated due to the high initiation costs.

Olson’s findings suggest that large organizations tend to assume a significantly

larger burden providing public goods than smaller organizations.1 Public goods are

marked by two identifying factors: the benefits must be non-rival and non-excludable.

Non-rivalness implies that one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce the

1 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard Economic Studies, V. 124 (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1965), 21.

43

amount available to anyone else. For instance, one’s use of the public good “clean air”

does not reduce the amount available to other members of an alliance. Non-excludability

suggests that it is impossible to prevent relevant constituencies from consuming the

good.2 Similarly, one cannot easily exclude another from gaining the public benefits

from “clean air.” As no organization can reap all the benefits of a collective, or public,

good that they have produced, insufficient incentives exist to produce it voluntarily.

First, consumers can take advantage of public goods without contributing sufficiently to

its creation. Second, small groups are more likely than large groups to undertake

collective action. Because free riding is easy and collective goods are non-excludable,

large groups require separate and selective incentives to stimulate individuals to act in a

group-oriented way. Individuals in large groups will gain relatively less per capita of

successful collective action, whereas individuals in small groups will gain relatively more

per capita through successful collective action. Hence, in the absence of collective

incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large

groups are less able to act in their common interest than small ones.

One year after The Logic of Collective Action, Olson – along with Richard

Zeckhauser – specifically addressed issues of collective action in the security realm.

They proffered a model of security cooperation integrating Olson’s economic theory with

an empirical analysis of NATO defense expenditures. Their work employed a simplified

economic model that characterized nuclear deterrence as a pure public good and alliances

2 Hardin, Collective Action, 17-18.

44

as the main vehicle for providing that good. Although they admitted that alliances have

some private benefits, they state, “above all alliances provide public goods.”3 As

expressed earlier, to qualify as a pure public good, deterrence must satisfy two

requirements, non-excludability and non-rivalness. Non-excludability in this context

means it is impossible to prohibit any alliance members from enjoying the benefits of

deterrence, even to those alliance members that do not contribute. For example, France

continued to enjoy the benefits of NATO deterrence even after it resigned from the

Integrated Military Command in 1966. The public good must also be non-rival, meaning

that one individual may consume the good without preventing simultaneous consumption

by others. In the case of NATO, West Germany’s deterrence of the Soviet Union was not

diminished by Denmark’s deterrence under the NATO nuclear umbrella. Thus,

according to Olsen and Zeckhauser, NATO’s deterrent effect met the requirements of a

public good.

Since spending on collective defense competes with other spending priorities,

Olson and Zeckhauser argued that states have incentives to underpay for a public good if

another provides it in adequate supply. Since the benefits of any collective action such as

defense also goes to others, states acting independently do not have an incentive to

provide optimal amounts of defense, but have an incentive to wait for others to provide

defense for them. Contributing to a collective defense effort requires a reprioritization of

funding for participating states. A state contributing to an alliance must determine the

3 Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," 272.

45

value it places on collective defense as well as the value of other non-defense items that

must be sacrificed for the collective defense. As spending on collective defense

competes with other spending priorities, Olson and Zeckhauser argued that states have

incentives to underpay for a public good if another state provides it in adequate supply.

Since defense outlays in a collective action goes to all states in an alliance, states acting

independently have no incentive to provide optimally to a collective defense, but rather

have an incentive to wait for others to provide defense for them. Using empirical data

from NATO defense contributions, Olson and Zeckhauser demonstrated that individual

states acting independently would not promote their common interest optimally. This

tendency to rely on other states for a public good is known as the “free-rider” problem.

They found that wealthier allies assumed a greater defense burden than poorer allies, as

measured by the ratio of military expenditure over gross national product (GNP). Thus,

their research empirically confirmed the hypothesis that, within the NATO alliance

structure, a consistent tendency existed for exploitation of the “great states” by the “small

states.” To confirm that these “exploitation” effects were a result of alliance burden

shifting, these results were also tested against defense burdens of non-alliance states.

Olson and Zeckhauser found that non-aligned states did not share a similar exploitation

effect.4 They concluded that larger actors placed a greater value on collective defense

because they had more to lose if collective defense failed.

4 Gavin Kennedy, Defense Economics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 45-70.

46

In 1970, however, Bruce Russett observed that the “exploitation effect” seemed to

be diminishing; smaller states appeared to be assuming a larger share of the NATO

defense burden in the late 1960s.5 This change in correlation between defense

expenditure and GNP suggested that NATO no longer conformed to the original

assumptions specified by Olson’s collective action theory. Successive scholars

postulated a joint product model when appraising NATO defense burdens, which refined

collective action hypothesis by relaxing the assumptions of non-excludability and non-

rivalness.6 The joint model would account for the decline in free riding by arguing that

defense expenditures by military partners could accrue both public and private benefits.

Assuming “publicness” as a key tenet of the original theory, joint product theory argues

that by relaxing the public good assumption one could explain increased spending ratios.

Two possibilities emerged for the apparent decline in free riding; the goods provided by

NATO may be either exclusive or rival. The first explanation for the decline in free

riding is the possibility that defense expenditures may increasingly reflect exclusive

benefits withheld from the alliance as a whole. State defense expenditures were

producing military power that was either partially or totally private and not shared by the

alliance. Some defense expenditures were totally private; Portugal funded colonial

5 Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense. 6 See Ibid. Francis A. Beer, The Political Economy of Alliances: Benefits, Costs, and Institutions in NATO (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972). Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, "On Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution 19, no. 2 (1975). John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990). Glenn Palmer, "NATO, Social and Defense Spending, and Coalitions," The Western Political Quarterly 43, no. 3 (1990). Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

47

occupation forces that privately benefited Portugal, but provided no benefit to the NATO

alliance. Some defense expenditures provided multiple benefits to both the state and the

alliance. For instance, funding for NATO infrastructure would benefit both the alliance

and the host nation. A significant infrastructure improvement, such as building additional

airbases would provide a public benefit to the alliance and private benefit to the host

state. Alternately, a second explanation for diminishing free riding may be that the

alliance was producing products that were rival. Alliance forces – especially ground

forces – stationed in one geographic area are unable to defend against aggression in a

geographically separate area of the alliance. A state’s peace resulting from nuclear

deterrence did not reduce its benefit to others, but the actual defense of territory required

that forces be deployed to one geographical area, inherently meaning they were not

available to physically defend other areas of the alliance. In this case, the product of

defense was not purely public, but rather “impure,” meaning that it possessed qualities of

both public and private goods.7 The alliance in later years may have been supplying a

good that had characteristics of both a private and public good. In essence, deterrence

violated the assumptions of non-excludability and/or non-rivalness.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Todd Sandler and several associates refined

Olson’s original argument by relaxing the assumptions of the pure public good model in

7 John R. Oneal and Mark A. Elrod, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989), 440. See also Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense, 96-99.

48

favor of impure public goods and joint products.8 They developed a joint product model

that describes products that provide both public and private benefits. These scholars

argued that military expenditures provided multiple benefits including deterrence,

damage limiting protection in wartime, and nation specific interests. According to

Sandler, the changed emphasis in NATO from nuclear deterrence to territorial defense

invalidated Olson’s assumptions of “publicness.” In contrast to nuclear deterrence,

conventional territorial defense is joint public good for which the allies gain partly

private benefits. Joint products explain a state’s motivation for higher levels of defense

spending. State defense expenditures in the NATO alliance thus could have an element

that is excludable and rival between alliance partners. Although Olson recognized this

distinction in his initial formulation, his empirical analysis assumed the effect on defense

expenditures was negligible.9

Sandler and his colleagues attribute the decrease in free riding to joint products to

the strategic doctrine of NATO. After 1967, the shift from the mutually assured

destruction (MAD) doctrine to the flexible response doctrine made collective defense a

more private product, invalidating some of the original assumptions of the Olson-

Zeckhauser model. During 1949-1966, NATO ascribed to a strategic doctrine of MAD in

which any Soviet aggression involving NATO allies would trigger a devastating nuclear 8 Sandler and Cauley, "On Economic Theory of Alliances." Todd Sandler, "The Design of Supranational Structures: An Economic Perspective," International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1977). James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982). 9 Olson and Zeckhauser identified the private benefits inherent in collective defense, but argued that predominately public goods were produced. Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," 272.

49

retaliation by the United States, Britain, and France. The alliance depended on nuclear

deterrence for collective security and, as such, shared mostly purely public benefits,

supporting the Olson-Zeckhauser model. During the late 60’s, however, NATO altered

its strategy to flexible response, in which a Soviet aggression would be met with a

commensurate response. The measured response would be conventional or nuclear based

on the type and scope of Soviet aggression. Because of this doctrinal change,

conventional forces became a much more important deterrent and defensive force. The

shift from nuclear deterrence to conventional defense changed the “publicness” of the

NATO defense posture, as conventional military forces were excludable and rival.

NATO allies on the Warsaw Bloc periphery failing to deploy sufficient conventional

defense forces would likely become the point of a Soviet attack; therefore, states

increased their individual conventional defense spending. Flexible response’s reliance on

conventional and nuclear forces meant that defense activities within NATO yielded joint

products with varying degrees of publicness.10

John Oneal and Mark Elrod in 1989, however, offered conflicting interpretations

on the decline of free riding in NATO. Their critique of Sandler argued that little

evidence exists that the European allies adjusted to the changes in NATO nuclear

doctrine. Instead, they suggested that two other influences were responsible for the

apparent decline in free riding. First, they argue that the greater pursuit of private

10 Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature XXXIX (2001), 879.

50

interests by Portugal, Greece, and Turkey skewed NATO defense expenditure data.11

Portugal’s colonial wars, and the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, drastically

increased these states’ defense spending, which – in aggregate – appeared in the burden

sharing analysis as a willingness of smaller states to contribute larger burdens to the

NATO alliance.12 Second, regional economic independence caused an increase in

cooperation among European allies. Oneal argued that a shift occurred in NATO from a

competitive allocation process that incentivized free riding to one of cooperation and

more equal defense burdens for European allies. Wallace Thies disputes this hypothesis

and argues that the private benefit arguments more adequately applied. According to

Thies, NATO members attempted to shift burdens for public goods to other partners

while concentrating on maximizing their defense budgets on supplying private benefits.13

Mark Boyer broadened the scope of the burden sharing debate in his

reformulation of the economic theory of alliances. Boyer developed a model that

accounts for burden sharing across multiple issue areas and therefore accounts for

multiple public goods. Boyer’s analysis suggests that nations specialize in the production

of those alliance goods (diplomatic, economic, or military) for which they possess

comparative advantage. Therefore, state alliance contributions will tend to be in their

areas of specialization. For example, the United States will tend to contribute military

forces, while Japan leans to economic support for international efforts. Although a nation

11 Oneal and Elrod, "NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change." 12 Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO." 13 Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO.

51

appears to be free riding on security contributions, that nation may not be free riding due

to its contributions in the area of foreign aid.14 This hypothesis seems to be born out in

recent coalition operations. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States and United

Kingdom undertook a large military burden, while Japan and Germany shouldered a

larger economic burden.15 Boyer’s analysis suggests that burden sharing initiatives that

attempt to force all nations to increase contributions in a particular category are

counterproductive for alliance efficiency. Security provision is likely to be optimal when

alliance nations specialize rather than when forced to contribute in one security

dimension. In light of this research, burden sharing initiatives should focus on

discovering and utilizing the comparative advantages of each individual alliance member.

Although Sandler, Oneal, and Boyer disagree on the causal mechanisms behind

decreased free riding, their research confirms that states have conflicting interests

between private interests and the collective goods, and states have an interest to

contribute in areas where they have a competitive advantage. Additional research

suggests that the pure public model is inaccurate and that “impurities” will always exist

in the public good model that lend more credence to the joint model formulation in which

states are motivated by private and public incentives.16 For collective action theory, the

14 Mark A. Boyer, "Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 4 (1989). 15 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War." 16 Goldstein argues that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, second-rate powers developed nuclear capability even when under the collective umbrella of great power sponsors. This strategy hedged against the risk of a totally “free-ride.” Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995). For a discussion of the impurity of public goods in UN peacekeeping operations, see Davis B. Bobrow and Mark

52

joint product model suggests different hypotheses compared to the pure public goods

model.17 First, the joint product model predicts defense burdens sharing more in

accordance with the private benefits received. The model suggests that the more private

benefits alliance nations receive because of their contributions to the collective defense,

the more they will tend to contribute to the alliance. The presence of ally-specific private

benefits, and excludability, motivates allies to share defense burdens based on self-

interest as well as collective interest. Small allies that receive substantial excludable

benefits may assume a large burden despite their wealth position.18 Second, alliance

membership restrictions based on rivalry of benefits received become relevant. If rivalry

is not an issue, alliances can continue to add members since new members will not

exhaust the public good. If rivalry is an issue, however, then alliances have a size

limitation. Additional alliance members decrease the amount of collective good for each

individual member; therefore, pressure will exist to exclude new allies that do not

enhance the alliance’s defense capability. The individual incentive not to contribute

increases with group size, therefore a minimum willing coalition must be found.19 Third,

A. Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 6 (1997). 17 Van Ypersele de Strihou pointed to specific defense benefits that are private to a specific ally and do not support the public good. For instance, defense expenditures used to maintain control over a state’s colony, provide purely private benefits to the state, but yield little or no benefits to the other allies. Jaques van Ypersele de Strihou, "Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies," The Review of Economics and Statistics 49, no. 4 (1967). See also Todd Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993). 18 John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 2 (1994). 19 This is commonly known as the “size principle.” Assuming private incentives, side-payments will need to be made to entice coalition members. Therefore, participants will create coalitions just as large as they

53

burden sharing initiatives should focus on specializing in areas of comparative advantage

of each individual alliance member. Security provision and defense burden is likely to be

optimal when alliance nations specialize rather than when forced to contribute in one

particular security dimension. Finally, an ally's demand for defense may depend on

factors not applicable to the pure public good model.20

Although the security burden sharing literature has matured significantly since

Olson and Zeckhauser’s original formulation forty years ago, the economic theory of

alliances currently contains two significant weaknesses. First, it remains somewhat

disconnected from other areas of international relations research in that the collective

goods model, the joint production model, and the comparative advantage model are all

somewhat apolitical. All of these economic models of alliances assume that alliance

agreements are, in an important sense, enforceable contracts guided by the “invisible

hand” rather than political through political maneuvering. These models fail to account

for ally shopping, bargaining, and motivations for support other than economic

efficiency. Second, as the bulk of alliance economic theory is based on the highly

institutionalized NATO, the ally does not account for security options outside the

alliance.21 Burden sharing literature almost exclusively models static behavior within an

existing formal alliance structure rather than the dynamic nature of bargaining for

believe will ensure winning and no larger. William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1962), 32-46. 20 Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey." Sandler and Hartley, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," 878-79. 21 Songying Fang and Kristopher W. Ramsay, "Burden-Sharing in Non-Binding Alliances," Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference (Chicago: 2004), 2.

54

coalition partners. Most efforts to test the efficacy of economic theory have empirically

relied on the highly institutionalized alliances formed after World War II, particularly

NATO. Because NATO is the most significant alliance in recent history, and due to the

ready availability of defense spending data, most empirical studies of burden sharing

have focused on it. Due to questionable economic data from the former Soviet Union,

significantly less research examines the Warsaw Pact.22 Scant analysis exists on the

security burden sharing decisions outside the realm of highly institutionalized alliances

such as NATO. Scholarly research exists on peacekeeping burden sharing, but this

literature still typically explains NATO contributions within a peacekeeping context.23

The focus on the highly institutionalized NATO in the burden sharing literature

overlooks the possibility that burden sharing motivations may be different for ad hoc

coalitions. The coalition leader has the option of shopping for coalition partners, and

potential partners may join the coalition for a variety of private and/or public motivations.

The initiator of an allied action can search for ad hoc partners in the international

community if contributions from alliance partners are too expensive, or insufficient for a

given action. In addition, the coalition building process becomes a “two front”

22 John A. C. Conybeare, "The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994), William M. Reisinger, "East European Military Expenditures in the 1970s: Collective Good or Bargaining Offer?," International Organization 37, no. 1 (1983), Harvey Starr, "A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after Czechoslovakia," International Organization 28, no. 3 (1974). 23 Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu, "Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. And NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 2 (1998), Sandler and Hartley, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action.", Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, "Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6 (2002). Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."

55

bargaining problem for the initiator with the existing allies on one side and potential new

partners on the other. The “bargaining” view of alliance initiation highlights several

weaknesses of economic theory to explain coalition burden sharing decisions. First,

states may assume a level of burden in exchange for future private benefits.24 Second,

coalition leaders may offer incentives outside of the security domain to participate in a

coalition. Incentives may be in an area that is difficult to quantify as defense related for

an economic analysis. For instance, a coalition leader may offer trade benefits in

exchange for military participation in a coalition. Finally, geostrategic position should

affect a states level of burden for a particular operation. States that are threatened

directly are expected to contribute more to a coalition than those that are relatively safe

under a collective action umbrella. This discussion highlights the need for a wider

theoretical approach to explain state burden sharing decision.

The following sections outline the wider motivations for participating in a

security coalition missed by the economic models. Although economic benefits are

important, states also join coalitions for reasons of threat, interest, and domestic concerns.

The following theoretical discussion aims to provide greater context and explanatory

power to explain state burden sharing decisions. Most importantly, the degree of threat

by a potential adversary greatly influences a state’s burden sharing motivation. The

section begins with a discussion on the influence of power and threat on alliance

24 Patricia Weitsman discusses how states will hedge their alliance choices in the expectation of future potential benefits, see Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Glenn Snyder discusses the bargaining element of alliance formation in Snyder, Alliance Politics.

56

decisions, followed by analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of a threat-based

approach as an analytical construct. Finally, the theoretical debate will be extended to the

influence of domestic factors on burden sharing outcomes.

Realist Approaches to Alliances

As discussed earlier, the collective goods theory of alliances explains why some

states are tempted to “free ride” on the efforts of others. Realist theory, however, suggest

that states will experience strong countervailing pressures to avoid this alliance

dependence. Rather than “ride free,” states in an anarchic international system must

balance against large power concentrations as a matter of survival. Classical realism

emerged after World War I as a set of theories associated with a group of thinkers who

aimed to distinguish themselves from Wilsonian idealists. The basis of their belief was

the centrality of power for shaping international politics and the danger of basing foreign

policy on morality. Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr argued most influentially that

foreign policy is based on interest and power than moral and ethical considerations.25

The realist paradigm refers to the following shared assumptions. The first assumption is

that nation-states are the most important actors in international relations. Second,

international relations take place in a state of anarchy. Third, power is the fundamental

feature of international politics. Finally, politics are a function of power rather than

25 Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2001), Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.

57

ethics or morality.26 In the realist approach, international relations is largely a realm of

power and interest alliances are traditionally imagined as tools for a state to augment its

power capabilities.27

According to realists, the interstate system is anarchic, and thus lacks the ordering

mechanisms of a domestic government. Thus, states must rely on self-help mechanisms

to ensure their own survival. In an international system where there is no reliable

authority to enforce contracts, commitments are inherently uncertain, and states who

would depend on others must worry about the risks of abandonment.28 In an anarchic

system, the state is the final repository of political power and there is no authority above

the state capable of imposing a system of morality, rules or norms on the state.29

Therefore, states must always prepare for the possibility that others may use force against

them in the pursuit of their national interests. Because states have to be prepared to

defend against the use of force, they are preoccupied with issues of security and survival.

Imbalances in the distribution of power push states to develop either additional military

capability or to seek allies. State behavior is thus a consequence of state desire to

maximize material capabilities as a method to gain their security in an anarchic world. 26 Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, ed. John A Vasquez and Colin. Elman, Prentice Hall Studies in International Relations: Enduring Questions in Changing Times (New York: Prentice Hall, 2003). 27 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, Themes in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. 28 For a review of the realist view of anarchy see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Anarchic Structure of World Politics," in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005). See also Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," 39. 29 Carr and Cox, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 160-61.

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The quest for power, and therefore alliances, is central to this concept. Since building

internal capability is time consuming, external balancing through alliances is the most

expedient method to counter an imbalance of power. Consequently, alliances form

because they are security-maximizing tools. The primary function of an alliance is to

maintain the stability of a particular balance by deterring or defeating any challenger(s).

Realism – and its balance of power theory – has been the most dominant

theoretical thread in international relations theory, since the first historical account of

warfare, for explaining alliance formation and behavior. Realist theories of alliances

claim that international competition in the form of balance of power – or more recently

balance of threat -- provide the motive for state alliance action. In the seminal account of

the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides describes the conflict between Sparta and Athens as a

result from a power imbalance, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian

power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”30 With this balance of power outlook,

alliances become an invaluable tool for maximizing a state’s security. Building on the

arguments of Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau articulates the role of alliances to balance

power. In Politics among Nations, he describes alliances as “a necessary function of the

balance of power.”31 In his classic work on alliance politics, Robert Osgood further

argues that alliances are “one of the primary means by which states seek the cooperation

30 Thucydides, Rex Warner, and M. I. Finley, History of the Peloponnesian War, [Rev. ed. (Harmondsworth, Eng., Baltimore]: Penguin Books, 1972), 49. 31 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 197.

59

of other states in order to enhance their power.”32 According to these classical realists,

states ally to enhance their power position relative to other states. Anarchy, or the lack of

an international ordering principle, requires states to balance power in order to ensure

their security.

It follows from the realist understanding of the anarchic system, and role of

power, that alliances do not arise from an economic conception of “community of

interests,” but rather from the need to ward off common threats to state security.

Alliances are merely strategies used to enhance one’s material capabilities to counter an

imbalance of power. Reliance on “community” or “morality” for security is dangerous

for without power, a community of interest cannot survive.33 Alliances then become

“against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”34 According to Morgenthau,

the purpose of an alliance is to aggregate capability to counter an imbalance: “A nation

will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the

burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the

advantages to be expected.”35

When alliances do form, classical realists expect them to be a temporary

phenomenon. An alliance is most likely to emerge to counter a power or threat

imbalance and is thus most likely to endure when the interests underlying it are 32 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 17. 33 According to realists, since there is no coercive institution above the state, the rule of law must be guaranteed by the powerful. See Carr and Cox, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 162, Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 253-56. 34 Liska, Nations in Alliance; the Limits of Interdependence, 12. 35 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 197.

60

significantly stronger than the underlying threat.36 The natural conclusion to classical

realist thinking is that an alliance cannot outlive a significant change in the balance of

power. When a powerful threat recedes, states begin to pursue self-serving policy

interests and the balance of power dictates that alliances will realign. Classical realists,

such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, acknowledge that other factors influence

international behaviors, but they concentrate primarily on the role of state interest

through power as the determinate of state behavior.

Structural realism emerged in an effort to add theoretical rigor to the historicism

of classical realism. For structural realists, international structure, rather than human

nature, forces states to pursue power. Neo (or structural) realism is guided by an attempt

to make the study of international relations more scientific and theory-driven.

Additionally, it was an attempt to simplify the complexity of classical realism. Kenneth

Waltz, the foremost structural realist, argues that a theory must simplify complex

phenomena to further understanding of essential elements in play and indicate the

necessary relation of cause and interdependency. Structural realists identified the

distribution of power as a major factor determining the stability of the international

system. They strengthen the balance of power argument by positing that most

international behavior can be explained and predicted based on the distribution of power

capabilities across states in the international system. Since the distribution of power is

36 Arnold Wolfers, Douglas T. Stuart, and Stephen F. Szabo, Discord and Collaboration in a New Europe: Essays in Honor of Arnold Wolfers (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1994), 29.

61

the key consideration for structural realists, domestic politics within states is seen as

largely irrelevant to international politics.37 By assuming that the state is the central actor

– and that it is unitary and rational – structural realism argues that domestic factors are

significant, but do not dictate international political outcomes.38 Structural realists

discount factors essential to classical realism such as the role of public officials, elites,

and bureaucracies. Since states are considered undifferentiated units, they are considered

to be driven by external “market forces” rather than internal dimensions.39 In this sense,

states are governed by balance of power politics, as they must balance against the

strongest potential rival in order to survive.

The tendency to balance poses analytic challenges for realist arguments since

bandwagoning behavior, the behavioral opposite of balancing, is also common in the

international system. Bandwagoning is siding with the actor who poses the greatest

threat or has the most power.40 This behavior is deviant according to realist theory since

an alignment with one’s potential adversaries threatens state survival, and to the extreme

would promote the creation of world hegemony. Since the international system is a

competitive realm, once cannot align with a stronger power due to the risk to survival.

By aligning with the weaker side, a state is protected against being exploited by a

37 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 10. 38 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Neorealism's Logic and Evidence: When Is a Theory Falsified?," in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, ed. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (New York: Prentice Hall, 2003), 167-69. 39 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 61. 40 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21-22, Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 79.

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stronger ally.41 One significant weakness of realist literature based on balance of power

is that it fails to explain why states failed to balance against, and in many cases

bandwagon with, the United States at the end of the Cold War.42 To explain

bandwagoning behavior, realist arguments typically dismiss it as a tool for small, weak

states to gain security43 or as a means for states to make temporary gains.44 These

arguments undercut the central realist premise that balancing is the dominant tendency;

powerful states should provoke others to align against them.

In Origins of Alliances, one of most significant modifications to the structural

realist framework, Stephen Walt, alters the structural realist argument by offering an

innovative solution to the bandwagoning observation. Walt argues that alignment

decisions are not based on the distribution of capabilities or power, but rather on

imbalances of threat. According to his balance of threat theory, aggregate power is only

one of several factors that make a particular state or coalition threatening. Additional

considerations for Walt include geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive

intentions.45 States are more threatening if they have significant military power massed

on the border, rather than around the world. Treat requires more than an imbalance in

military and material capability. Walt finds that when an imbalance in threat exists – or

41 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126-27. 42 Some realist scholars argue that balancing is in progress, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000). 43 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 125-26, 73-78. 44 Schweller argues that states bandwagon when the status quo starts to deteriorate causing states to align with the new winning coalition in the international system. This argument is in direct conflict with the realist paradigm that states will balance against a rising power. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994). 45 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21-26.

63

is perceived to exist – states will form alliances or increase internal efforts to reduce their

vulnerability. With balance of threat theory, Walt explains bandwagoning behavior by

arguing that states do not balance if not threatened. Applying Walt’s approach explains

why balancing behavior was not seen at the end of the Cold War; as long as the United

States is not perceived as threatening, states are not motivated to balance against it. In

this manner, Walt introduces domestic influences such as the role of threat in determining

national interests.46

Patricia Weitsman, in Dangerous Alliances, extends the threat perception debate,

initiated by Walt, by arguing that bandwagoning behavior is generated by asymmetric

threats. States that bandwagon are allying with their enemies because they cannot

overcome the extreme level of threat. Similar to Walt, the domestic perception of threat

provides explanatory power to the theory; state’s alliance behavior and level of

commitment are attributable to threat perceptions in the domestic realm.47 As the

structural realism research program on alliances evolved, it included domestic theoretical

perspectives such as domestic perceptions to explain foreign policy outcomes.

In summary, Waltz’s structural theory provided a parsimonious theory for

predicting and explaining state behavior based on the power structure of the international

system. Neo realism provides a theory of alliance that argues that systemic conditions 46 One critique of Walt is that by combining exogenous changes in power and state perceptions of the intentions of others into a single variable, Walt’s “balance-of-threat” approach excludes virtually no potential cause of rational balancing short of irrational, altruistic, or incoherent state action and therefore becomes a source of fundamental indeterminacy. See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999). 47 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War.

64

motivate states to enter alliances. According to these structural perspectives, states form

and dissolve alliances due to changes of power or threat within the system. Once a

preponderant threat or power is eliminated, states are expected to disband their alliance

relationships. Structural realists have no explanation for alliance persistence unless a

new threat emerges. Unfortunately, NATO’s persistence at the end of the Cold War

provides a significant theoretical challenge to structural realism. From a structural realist

perspective, the transition from a bipolar to hegemonic power structure should be

accompanied with balancing behavior against the United States. Instead, NATO remains

a robust alliance contrary to neorealist predictions.

Neoclassical realist viewpoints emerged in the early 1990s in response to the

limitations of a purely structural focus to explain state behavior.48 Realist scholars

recognized realism’s inadequacy to explain foreign policy decisions and argued that

realism must be revised so that it would “pay more attention to interactions between

international and domestic politics.”49 Neoclassical realism emerged because structural

realism is strictly a theory of international politics, and thus makes no claim to explain

foreign policy.50 This literature attempts to reintegrate some of the sophistication of

classical realism while also achieving a more rigorous and systematic body of theory. It

48 Although the term “neoclassical realism” was not coined until 1998, the structural realist research program began accounting for domestic influences in the early 1990s. I mark this as a divergence from the neorealist research program and the beginning of a new theoretical brand of realism. 49 Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 319. 50 Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).

65

seeks to bridge the gap between classical and structural realist theory. Neoclassical

realism, like previous forms of realism, contends that state foreign policy is primarily

driven by its relative material power. Yet the theory contends that the influence of power

capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex; systemic pressures are influenced

by unit level variables such as statue structure and leader preferences. For neoclassical

realists, understanding the relationship between power and policy requires examination of

both the international and the domestic contexts where foreign policy is formulated and

implemented.51 Fareed Zakaria, an early neoclassical realist suggests, “a good account of

a nation’s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences,

specifying what aspects of policy can be explained by what factors.”52 Neoclassical

realists claim that power directly shapes only the generalities and not the specifics of

foreign policy, and that the theory is therefore loose enough to make mid-range

theorizing practicable.

The neoclassical cannon is limited, but it provides insight to alliance motivation

previously unexplained in the realist tradition. By borrowing from the liberal,

institutional, and constructivist research programs, they aim to explain the influence of

factors such as domestic politics and ideology on foreign policy behavior. In “Chain

Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” Thomas

51 Some have coined the term “Neoclassical Realism” to capture the influence of domestic influences, although it is still considered part of the neorealist research program. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998), Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World - Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002), 149-50. 52 Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (1992), 198.

66

Christensen and Jack Snyder argue ultra parsimonious systemic theories need to be cross

fertilized with other theories to make determinate predictions at the unit level. They

contend that state perceptions of offensive or defensive military advantage give rise to

either chain-gang or buck-passing foreign policy behavior. They introduce domestic

variables when they argue that these perceptions are rooted in patterns of domestic civil-

military relations and the engrained lessons of formative experiences.53 In his

comprehensive study of alliances, Alliance Politics, Glenn Snyder maintains that

systemic variables such as the distribution of capability and conflict determines the

inherent worth of prospective alliances to their members, while who aligns with whom

and under what terms is ultimately decided by a bargaining process significantly

influenced by state perceptions of value and credibility. According to Snyder, alliances

are best considered relationships that are affected by international structure, but that have

other quasi-structural effects based on internal variables such as interests and

interdependence.54 Finally, in Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of

World Conquest, Randall Schweller builds on realist theory by incorporating the

influence of interests on alignment behavior. He extends beyond Walt’s balance of threat

theory by more openly addressing domestic influences on intent such as ideology and

53 Christensen and Snyder attribute the differing pre-1914 and pre-1939 alliance patterns to different perceptions about the inherent superiority of the offense or defense. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990). 54 Snyder, Alliance Politics.

67

goals on foreign policy actions.55 These scholars highlight the role of domestic audiences

and decision makers in both assessing and adapting to systemic changes. Their

propositions have extended structural realist arguments by specifying and developing the

causal processes, and linkages at the domestic and international levels that influence

foreign policy behavior.

Neoclassical realists highlight the problems experienced by decision makers in

assessing and adapting to structural changes. Their theoretical insights do not generally

contradict the propositions of structural or classical realism but rather complement and

extend realist arguments by specifying causal processes and contingent conditions at the

domestic and international level implied by structural theories such as balance of power

or balance of threat. Neoclassical realist scholars aim to explain how domestic factors

such as social cohesion, elite politics, and elite-mass linkages impede or further states’

efforts to fit their behavior to the predictions of systemic theory.56 Criticism of the

neoclassical approach is that other analytical paradigms such as liberal and constructivist

approaches explain the same phenomena without resorting to ad hoc explanations. The

new variables are not drawn from the core assumptions of realism but rather are

borrowed to explain deviant outcomes resulting in a patched-up development rather than

a coherent positive heuristic.57

55 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 56 Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 341. 57 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?.", John A Vasquez, "Kuhn Versus Lakatos? The Case for Multiple Frames in Appraising International Relations Theory," in Progress in International Relations

68

Realist theoretical developments share two analytical themes in regards to

alliances. The first premise is that alliances are formed due to the consequences of

anarchy. Anarchy is a persistent condition that cannot be transcended and that states will

continue to develop internal capability or ally to provide security. Coalitions or alliances

exist to balance against a growing power or threat. Although bandwagoning

circumstances occur, they evolve due to the lack of threat, or a continuity of interests.58

In response to an asymmetry, states will look for alliance choices to balance with other

states to counter the threat posed by that power. The second premise is that military

alliances form for capability aggregation. Alliances combine the military capabilities of

member states, thus making them more capable and more secure. The central value of

alliances is from the enhanced defensive, or offensive, capability inherent in the

aggregated capability. The need for alliance ends when the threat passes.

The majority of realist literature treated the state as a unitary and rational actor in

the attempt to explain alliances as a response to imbalances of power or threat.

Simplification of state influences allowed the development of system level theories that

explained macro level systemic behavior. Stephen Krasner in 1978 argued that societal

cleavages are unimportant in “foreign political policy-making” because of the

“independence of decision makers from particular pressures” within that realm.59 One

Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003). 58 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, Snyder, Alliance Politics, Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 59 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 70,346.

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weakness of this approach, however, is that assessments focused narrowly on structural

and material factors do not accurately account for state behavior.60 Therefore, the realist

literature generally provides an overly narrow explanation for why states choose to form

alliances. The capability aggregation assumption overlooks the fact that alliance

membership can serve other state interests, such as legitimacy benefits, foreign policy

objectives, or organizational doctrines and routines that call for international military

cooperation.61 Another disadvantage of the aggregation focus is that it has difficulty

explaining neutrality, or instances in which states prefer not to align at all. Finally, the

aggregation focus does not address issues of burden sharing. For most quantitative

capability assessments, the entire state military defense outlay is assumed to benefit the

alliance. National and alliance power comparisons of A.F.K. Organski, Jack Kugler,

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, assume that the majority of alliance capability is predicted on

the overall material capacity of member states, but this view does not address the issue

that significant levels of capability may be reserved for future use, or situated in an

entirely different theater of operations.62 Realist alliance literature does not address how

much of a state’s capability will be committed to a given contingency. Although

neoclassical approaches are a step in the right direction for explaining foreign policy

60 Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, "Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 61 Bensahel, "The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation", 12. 62 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

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behavior, this area of scholarship is limited in its view that domestic audiences respond to

external conditions. Additional theoretical approaches are necessary to explain how

domestic influences constrain or influence the international environment.

Bringing the State Back In -- State-Level Theories

In contrast to realist theories, classical liberal theories of international relations

rely on the core assumption that domestic actors or structures strongly influence foreign

policy interests as well as foreign policy behavior. Liberal approaches consider domestic

properties as crucial explanatory variables that determine policy outcomes. This is

reflected in the outlook of Peter Katzenstein, “the consistency and the content of foreign

economic policies result at least as much from the constraints of domestic structures as

from the functional logic inherent in international effects.”63 Domestic structure and

coalition-building approaches have proven useful and are well established in the study of

international political economy, but they are far less common in the area of security

studies.64 Liberal approaches provide a means to explain the influence of domestic

constituencies on foreign security policy. These methods tend to be second image

approaches, in that explanations for international outcomes are located at the level of the

state, rather than the system. Each type of liberal theory explains international politics

63 Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976). 64 David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, "Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy," in The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, ed. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 36.

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through the influence of domestic and transnational actors and group on underlying state

preferences.

Although there is no one single theory of liberalism, these theories share the core

assumption that the crucial variables that explain state behavior at the international level

reside at the domestic level. The liberal research program contains three common

assumptions. The first assumption is that the fundamental actors in international politics

are individuals and groups who organize to promote their interests. This view promotes a

“bottom-up” theory of politics where the demands of individuals and societal groups are

the causes of state interests. Second, rather than being a unitary entity, the state

represents some segment of domestic society, whose preferences constitute the state

preferences that officials pursue in their foreign policy. Domestic institutions and

processes represent the method for transmitting social preferences into state policy. The

third core assumption is that the configuration of state preferences shapes state behavior

in the international system. Liberals view the distribution of preferences, rather than

capabilities or information as the systemic characteristic that shapes foreign policy

strategies.65 The liberal research program emerged to explain the relationship of public

opinion, institutional structure, pressure groups, and culture as a cause of variation in

state foreign policy outcomes.

65 Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment," in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 161-67.

72

Domestic Structural Approaches

Structure-centered liberalism emphasizes in institutional features of states in order

to explain international behavior. Domestic structure theories focus on the domestic

polity, or the influence of society on policy based on the domestic structure.66 These

approaches examine the nature of the political institutions constituting the “state,” basic

features of the society, and the institutional and organizational arrangements linking state

and society and channeling societal demands into the political system. Domestic

structures determine how the state responds to societal demands.67 The primary

assumption of the domestic structural approach is that domestic political processes are so

ingrained in foreign policy decision making that it encroaches significantly on the

international system.68

Early structural approaches highlighted the degree of centralization of policy

making processes. In Between Power and Plenty, Peter Katzenstein developed the notion

of “weak” and “strong” states to represent the influence of society on government

decisions. The more fragmented the policy-making apparatus and the more unified the

society, the weaker the state relative to society. Fragmented policy institutions allow the

government to be open to pressure from societal interest groups and political parties.

Weak states ability to impose policies on society and to extract resources from it is fairly 66 Panke Diana and Risse Thomas, "Liberalism," in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 67 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," World Politics 43, no. 4 (1991). 68 Joe D. Hagan, "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness," Mershon International Studies Review 38, no. 2 (1994).

73

limited. Conversely, strong states exhibit the reverse tendencies; the state may make

policy choices while ignoring the influences of society. They are able to preserve a high

degree of autonomy and resist public demands.69 David Auerswald incorporates the

strong versus weak state distinction to predict burden sharing outcomes in wars of choice.

By limiting himself to wars of choice, Auerswald is able to isolate the influence of

domestic structure from other independent variables such as threat. State decision to

support a coalition is based on the influence and independence of the executive in the

burden sharing decision. Auerswald finds that institutionally weak executives are

reluctant to use join coalitions requiring force because of domestic political calculations.

On the other hand, strong states do not need to factor in domestic circumstances such as

public opinion into their decision calculus. Strong executives will base their decisions on

international factors.70 However, the parsimonious “strong” and “weak” state distinction

is too simplistic to account for the variations between domestic structures. Weak states

like the U.S. are sometimes able to conduct highly efficient policies, whereas strong

systems might not always pursue coherent and potent foreign policies.71

Thomas Risse-Kappen refined the “strong versus weak state” approach by

incorporating coalition-building processes within the state strength analytical construct.

He focuses on “policy networks,” that allow representation by political parties and

interest groups to link the societal environment to the government. His research shows

69 Peter J. Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 70 Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." 71 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," 485.

74

that domestic structure and coalition-building process influences the impact of domestic

public opinion on foreign policy decisions. Previous research on the policy impact of

public opinion treated the domestic decision making process as a black box by directly

comparing opinion polls with policy outcomes.72 Risse-Kappen’s findings, on the other

hand, strongly indicate that domestic structures predict the influence of public opinion on

foreign policy.73

In Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International

Relations, Helen Milner constructs a model of the interaction between domestic and

international politics in formulating trade agreements. Milner’s model incorporates the

literatures on strong and weak states, presidential versus parliamentary systems, and the

importance of societal actors versus political institutions. Her model specifies the

contingent conditions and causal mechanisms through which legislative and societal

actors influence foreign policy. It presents a theory of the interaction of domestic and

international politics through the use of “two-level games” pioneered by Robert

Putnam.74 Milner demonstrates that societal preferences and legislative cleavages affect

the ability of the executive to enter into cooperative agreements. The main disadvantage

of Milner’s model, however, is that it is difficult to operationalize. Its level of

72 Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986), Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983), James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; an Operational Formulation (New York,: Random House, 1961). 73 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." 74 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988).

75

abstractness and technical sophistication do not generate sufficiently different

observations compared to approaches that are more parsimonious.

In an effort to capture the influence of domestic influences, while maintaining a

parsimonious theory of domestic influence, domestic structure theory emerged. An

extension of the work of Katzenstein and Risse-Kappen, domestic structure theory argues

that domestic structure affects the states’ capacity to mobilize resources based on the

influence of society on government and of leaders on legislatures.75 Elements of

international theory, state strength, government influence, and state society relations are

encompassed in domestic structure theory. It allows simplifying assumptions concerning

the interaction of the executive and the state, and the state and society, to predict likely

foreign policy outcomes. These structural approaches fundamentally seek to explain the

role of the interaction of state political institutions with a given state’s society. Harold

Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen suggest that, “Domestic structures determine the

selectivity of political systems with regard to societal demands.”76

75 For the influence of domestic structure on foreign policy and vice versa see Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978), Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States.", Jeffrey W. Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy, Cambridge Studies in International Relations; 60 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Lisa L. Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), Susan Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.", Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Patricial A. Weitsman and George E. Shambaugh, "International Systems, Domestic Structures, and Risk," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 3 (2002). 76 Harold Muller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "From the Outside in and from the inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy," in The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and

76

Domestic structure analyses present parsimonious hypotheses for explaining state-

societal interaction. Statist and societal approaches portend differing expectations

regarding the interests that drive foreign policy. Statist approaches assume that national

interests – whether derived from systemic or domestic cultural sources – provide the

primary criteria for judging policy choices. Societal approaches, however, assume that

foreign policy is the product of particular societal interests.77 Mixed approaches account

for both institutional structures and coalition-building processes, combining the

influences of policy structures, coalition processes, and societal influences.

In his study of anti-nuclear movements, Herbert Kitschelt formalized a typology

on the relationship of political opportunity structures based on the degree of state

centralization and societal interaction with government. According to his typology, states

differ significantly with regard to the government’s autonomy within the political

systems and their societal environments. Kitschelt finds that political opportunity

structures – and protest strategies – differed in the anti-nuclear movement according to

domestic political structure. A decentralized political system combined with an active

societal structure allows societal actors significant influence over policy because political

movements can work through established institutions. Since decision making is

decentralized, society can access the policy process through multiple points of access. In

contrast, centralized political structures have considerable capacity insulate themselves

Foreign Policy Formulation, ed. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 77 Skidmore and Hudson, "Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy," 12-13.

77

from societal threats because access to the decision making structure is limited. Kitschelt

shows that government policy reaction to nuclear protest movements was shaped in

certain pre-established ways by the channels and opportunities that political regimes

offered to policy opponents.78

Andrew Cortell and James Davis extended Kitschelt’s typology to explain the

influence of domestic structure in embedding international norms into state policy. Table

7 illustrates the Cortell and Davis typology of pattern of state society relations versus

state structure. They argue that the domestic impact of an international rule or norm is

highly contingent on the domestic structure affecting the policy debate and the domestic

salience of the norm or rule. In Type I or Type II structures where government decision

making is centralized, government officials’

Table 7. Cortell and Davis Typology

Pattern of State Society Relations

Structure of Decision

Making Authority Distant Close

Centralized

Type I

Type II

Decentralized

Type III

Type IV

Source: Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly (1996)

78 Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (1986).

78

preferences are likely to translate into policy outcomes. The former Soviet Union

represented an extremely state-controlled domestic structure with a highly centralized

decision making apparatus. Its top leadership controlled which voices it wanted to listen

to domestically; therefore, policy reflected the leadership’s preferences.79 In contrast,

when decision making authority is decentralized, the impact of individual appeals on

policy choice will depend on the domestic salience of the international rule or norm.

When state-societal relations are close, such as a Type II state, societal appeals are

expected to influence decision makers’ policy preferences; conversely, when they are

distant, as in a Type III state, bureaucratic battles ensue.80 In a type III structure, decision

making authority is dispersed across functionally differentiated arms of the government.

Since state-societal relations are distant in this structure state behavior is contingent on

the actions and interests of government officials. One advantage of Cortell and Davis’s

typology is that it is not limited to liberal democratic states. Autocratic regimes are also

represented in their analysis by their degree of centralization and openness to societal

demands. Research by Daniel Thomas, Jeffrey Checkel, and Matthew Evangelista affirm

that structural approaches that link domestic salience to regime type are applicable to

79 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996), 455-56. 80 Ibid.

79

both democratic and non-democratic regimes.81 Domestic structural analysis is a useful

tool for mapping the influence of executives, elite coalitions, the legislature, and society.

Later, Susan Peterson and David Auerswald extended Cortell and Davis’s

research to demonstrate the direct influence of state structure – and society’s influence

thru that structure – on international security outcomes.82 Peterson argues that the

international bargaining and negotiating process is influenced by domestic political

factors determined by the state structure. Her model of domestic influence is measured

across two dimensions. The first is the ability of the state to respond to a conflict

depends on the “structure of the foreign policy executive.”83 This dimension defines the

executive’s autonomy from the government bureaucracy. Executive autonomy affects

the freedom of action of the executive; the greater number of government offices with a

decision making role, the less freedom of action of the executive. The second dimension

– the “degree of executive autonomy from the legislature” – defines the organization of

foreign policy authority. The legislature exerts influence in two ways. National

81 Thomas states that the human rights component of the Helsinki Accords empowered societal groups in Eastern Europe during the Communist era, in Daniel C. Thomas, "Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2 (2005).. Checkel argues that the impact of in Russia and the Ukraine human rights norms were significantly influenced by each country’s domestic structure, in Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999). Evangelista finds that variations in Soviet Union and Russian domestic structure account for differences in the impact of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty on security policy, in Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union," International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995). 82 David P. Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict. See also Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Schultz convincingly demonstrates the influence of domestic politics on signaling in crises. 83 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 25.

80

legislatures may possess the authority to make foreign policy during a crisis. The

legislature also exerts control over the executive through the executive’s dependence on

the legislature for tenure in office. In this manner, the legislature serves as the conduit

for societal pressures on the executive. Although this seems to be an ineffective measure

of societal influence, Peterson argues that in the area of crisis decision making private

actors can only exercise binding influence through the national legislature.84

The significant feature of Peterson’s work is that it makes specific determinations

of state policy processes based on a state’s typology. She distinguishes four types of

domestic political structures, each producing a different kind of bargaining behavior. By

distinguishing between types, she predicts when cognitive or bureaucratic theories should

dominate the domestic debate. Peterson’s theory convincingly demonstrates the

influence of domestic political structure and processes on foreign policy formulation.

One key point inherent in domestic structural theorizing is that variation in

structural context will exist based on the policy debate. For instance, in the American

case, foreign security policy reflects a fairly centralized structure while U.S. trade policy

reflects a more decentralized structure with more congressional and special interest group

participation.85 Accordingly one must identify the proper domestic structure for the

given policy debate.

84 Ibid., 27-28. 85 Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 458. G. John Ikenberry, "Market Solutions for State Problems," in The State and American Foreign Economic Policy, ed. G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939.

81

Domestic structure research convincingly argues that states’ foreign policies are

not simply the result of international constraints defined by power, but also vary with

regard to the executive’s willingness and political ability to respond to systemic

necessities. The research demonstrates that domestic political processes help to shape a

state’s definition of the national interest and its ability to implement it. Content and

consistency of foreign policy result as much from the constraints of domestic structures

as from international systemic influences. One must determine the influence of both

international and domestic factors for an adequate analysis of international political

interaction. Domestic and international analyses are complementary in explaining

international outcomes. The political causes and consequences of international problems

should be explained from the perspective of domestic politics, as well as from the

perspective of systemic influences.

The discussion of structural approaches highlights the need to understand the

beliefs and biases of key leaders. As shown in Peterson’s typology, the beliefs and

interests that are shared by a state’s leaders – and its support groups form an important

motivational basis for the overall direction a state will take in its foreign policy. One

cannot understand a state’s foreign policy only through structures, but must also

understand the biases and influences of key constituencies in the foreign policy process.

Structure determines the key constituencies for a given issue.

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Bringing the Man Back in – Individual Influences on Foreign Policy

Most scholarship on alliances and burden sharing assume a homogeneous unit of

action or – if heterogeneous units are posited – assume a rational actor as decision maker.

However, the images that elites and publics hold of other actors, and about ends, means,

and effective strategies, are important sources of international behavior.86 This argument

extends the cognitive arguments first proffered by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin that

recognize that state outcomes are actually the result of the sequential decisions of leaders

who actually constitute the state. Rather than assume that states are monolithic and have

well-defined interests, Snyder, et al, called for an “examination of the beliefs, values, and

goals of decision making elites who act as the state in foreign policy.”87 Instead of

international outcomes, one must look at actual foreign policy decisions to determine

why states behave as they do. Foreign policy, in this view, can best be described as an

unending sequence of problem-solving tasks accomplished by goal-oriented elites who

operate within organizational and cognitive constraints. This problem-solving

perspective implies that decision makers consider goals, policy alternatives, and a

feedback or monitoring system to estimate progress toward achievement of those goals.

Due to their complex nature, foreign policy problems are rarely if ever “solved,” but

rather produce consequences that serve as the seed of new problems.88 Additionally,

86 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 14. 87 Richard Carlton Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making; an Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 63. 88 Brian Ripley, "Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory," Political Psychology 14, no. 3 (1993).

83

decisions are not rational, but rather a collection of biased decisions. In this view, the

appropriate means of achieving a particular foreign policy objective is influenced by

decision maker beliefs of other actors, ends, means, and effective strategies. Since

national elites are influential in determining courses of policy, the influence of cognition

and historical learning are critical to understanding nation-state foreign policy decisions.

Developments in political psychology and learning theory can inform systemic and state

level arguments on the influences of cognitive constraints on rational decision making.89

Cognitive Influences – Historical Analogy and Learning

The effect of historical learning and cognition has received increasing attention in

international relations literature.90 The psychology of analogical, or historical, reasoning

begins with the recognition that human beings are cognitively limited when trying to

reason through complex situations. Leaders often face considerable uncertainty and

complexity when trying to predict the outcomes of foreign policy actions. In order to

understand how leaders make foreign policy, it is necessary to address how leaders deal

with uncertainty.

A growing body of scholarship is emerging to understand elite beliefs through the

role of learning and historical analogy. Learning in this context means the application of

information from past experience to facilitate understanding of a particular policy 89 J.M. Goldgeier and Philip Tetlock, "Pshychology and International Relations Theory," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001). 90 For an excellent review of the literature see Philip Tetlock and Charles McGuire, "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy," in Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War, ed. Ralph White (New York: 1986). For a review of the rational choice, cognitive debate see Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz, eds., Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).

84

question.91 This scholarship posits that national security and foreign policy decisions are

influenced heavily by the formative experiences of key policy makers.92 Policy becomes

the product of individual political actors who influence government decisions through

their roles and influence in the decision making structure. Decision makers learning from

similar or analogous situations provide insight into their beliefs and their view of the

international system.

Robert Jervis highlighted the need to incorporate cognitive learning into the

analysis of decision maker policy choices. By illustrating that decision makers are

influenced by historical events and cognitive biases he demonstrates that the rational

assumption of economic and realist approaches is somewhat questionable.93 Leaders

often face considerable uncertainty and complexity when trying to predict foreign policy

91 Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 19-20. 92 George W. Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, Learning in U.S. And Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), William W. Jarosz and Joseph S Nye, "The Shadow of the Past: Learning from History in National Security Decision Making," in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, ed. Philip Tetlock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994), Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1986), Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, Scott Douglas Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 1984), Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. 93 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. For additional psychological approaches see Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), Eric Singer and Valerie M. Hudson, Political Psychology and Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

85

outcomes. In order to understand foreign policy behavior, one must address how leaders

and elites deal with uncertainty. The cognitive influence through learning literature

provides a means for determining the influence of decision makers’ experiences on

foreign policy processes and outcomes.

The cognitive influence literature shares one core assumption, that decision

makers use mental knowledge structures – or schema – to cope with incomplete

information and complexity. A schema is a person’s individual theory about how the

social or political world works. It is typically derived by generalizing across experiences.

This schema provides the knowledge structure where decision makers sort and interpret

information. Schemas are necessary for interpreting information and for forming

understanding from that information Schemas not only allow decision makers to

interpret incoming information, but they also allow him to go beyond the information

given, and “fill-in” for missing information allowing a more complete picture.94

Schemas explain how decision makers reduce complex cognitive tasks into more

manageable set of diagnostic tasks. The complexities of the international environment

place heavy information processing demands on decision makers. Decision makers are

hampered by too little information, or a blizzard of information on which they must make

inferences. Information is never perfect with regard to the motives or intentions of other

actors, and therefore decision makers are forced to draw inferences from available

94 Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, 25-28.

86

information.95 Decision makers’ limited capacities for processing this conflicting and

ambiguous information lead them to become cognitive misers in that they tend to resort

to cognitive “shortcuts” to understand their environment. This process tends to order an

otherwise incomprehensible mess of information and experience. Decision makers

develop shortcuts, rules of thumb, and “heuristics” from their schema for organizing mass

amounts of information into a usable form.96 They allow one to analyze a phenomenon,

extract cues from the environment, and then develop an explanatory framework from

based on analogy.97

Historical analogy is the method that decision makers build and test these

cognitive schemas. Decision makers tend to draw lessons from experience to help cope

with difficult choices.98 Learning and attribution theory contends that previous

experience in similar circumstances affects learning behavior shaping future

perceptions.99 Individuals tend to rely on historical analogies, a comparison of some past

95 Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making; an Approach to the Study of International Politics, 102. 96 H. Tamashiro, "Algorithms, Heuristics, and the Artificial Intelligence Modeling of Strategic Statecraft," in Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, ed. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (New York: Praeger, 1984). 97 Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, 21-22. 98 Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994), 491. See also 99 Jarosz and Nye, "The Shadow of the Past: Learning from History in National Security Decision Making.", Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Kristen R. Monroe, Political Psychology (Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum, 2002), Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Philip E. Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?," American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999), Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings," International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986).

87

experience with a current decision problem, so that some important aspect of the past

experience may lend insight into the current problem. Experimental studies have found

that, when faced with complex situations requiring significant cognitive effort, subjects

will use analogy to a previous significant event to facilitate generalization.100 Analogies

become intellectual devices called upon by policy makers to perform a set of diagnostic

tasks relevant to political decision making.101 They help policy makers perform critical

diagnostic tasks crucial to the political decision making process. These tasks include

helping to define the nature of the situation, helping asses risk, provide prescriptions,

predict chances of “success,” evaluating moral “rightness,” and warning about the

dangers of other options.102 These decision making heuristics can be both a powerful

means of dealing with a complex environment and a major source of misperception and

error.103

In the first major work on the use of analogy, Thinking in Time: The Uses of

History for Decision Makers, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May discovered that major

U.S. governmental decisions of the past fifty years revealed a chronic avoidance or

misuse of historical precedents. Drawing upon knowledge derived from a decade of

teaching a course titled “Uses of History,” they proffered a primer on analogy for

decision makers. Through process tracing and case study evidence, they observed that

100 Stephen J. Read, "Once Is Enough: Causal Reasoning from a Single Instance," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45, no. 2 (1983). 101 Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, 12-14. 102 Ibid., 10. 103 Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

88

good historical analogy was presented in policy debates but was eventually ignored or

misused by senior decision makers. To more correctly implement analogy in policy

discussions, they focus on a set of analytical techniques for separating known facts from

presumptions. Their observations claim that presumptions, rather than facts, all too often

become the determinants of government policy. To correct this problem they argue for a

rigorous methodology that make these presumptions explicit, allowing analytical

exploration.104 Decision makers should use history to visualize issues as time-streams

rather than isolated events. Seeing the numerous historical events that influence a current

event can reframe the decision maker to see “other possible futures.”105 This work

provided an excellent tool for helping decision makers sharpen their use of analogy, but

falls short in providing a theoretical framework for understanding how to predict the

influence of analogy on decision making.

Yuen Khong, in Analogies at War, demonstrated that historical lessons are used

for more than advocacy. Khong finds that analogies – regardless of whether they are

correctly drawn or not – matter greatly. Historical learning and analogy provides an

influential methodology for individual and group decision making in the selection and

rejection of policy options.106 Khong analyzes in detail the influence of analogy on

Johnson administration selection and evaluation of Vietnam policy options. Khong

extends the arguments of Neustadt, May, and Jervis on how policymakers misuse the

104 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, 232-46. 105 Ibid., 247-70. 106 Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, 253.

89

“lessons of history” by showing convincingly showing how analogies enter into the

decision making process and more importantly by providing a theoretical explanation.

Khong uses cognitive theory to show that the same analogical reasoning that produces

gross policy error enables people to comprehend and process information about the world

in complex situations. When no knowledge structure fits observed events, decision

makers may invoke close matches to understand the situation. Khong directly confronts

the counter-argument that analogies are merely post hoc justification of policy options.

Using public and private deliberations of the Vietnam policy debate, he convincingly

finds that officials repeatedly used analogies in private, even when others challenged

their relevance.107 Although Khong provides an excellent framework for explaining the

use of history – especially poor uses of history – in the policy process, however, this

framework provides no predictive capability to highlight which historical events would

be salient to decision makers.

Dan Reiter further extends early learning theory into the alliance realm by

developing a theory of learning that assists one’s understanding of how and why small

states make the alliance choices they do. In Crucible of Beliefs, Reiter advances three

learning propositions: 1) lessons are drawn infrequently; 2) they are most often taken

from high-impact, politically significant events; and 3) when drawn, lessons reflect the

desire to repeat past successes and avoid past failures.108 He argues that a state’s

individual experience in a formative event (in this case major wars) often determines

107 Ibid., 251-63. 108 Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, 3.

90

alliance choices in future years. Small states, especially, will learn from alliance

successes and failures – previous “success” causes a state to maintain a course of action

(alliance or neutrality), while “failure” will change their course of action. Reiter

supplements learning theory by developing parameters where historical learning will

translate into policy outcomes. He maintains that high-impact – vivid -- formative events

shape decision makers beliefs to the point where they strongly influence thinking about

international relations and foreign policy behavior.109 He argues that a state’s political

system and domestic structure has a significant effect on the influence of formative

events on foreign policy decisions.110 Like Khong, Reiter finds that use of past

experience does not necessarily make better policy, only that policy dilemmas are framed

as repetitions of past formative experiences. Using past experience is often disastrous

due to unrecognized changes in pertinent political or military factors. Reiter adds a

predictive element to learning theory by teasing out the elements of formative events.

Events significant in political and human terms are more likely to be formative.111

The dominating effects of a formative experience on alliance policy can last for

decades after the formative event. Unfortunately, framing a current decision problem

based on past experience can be disastrous because of unrecognized changes in important

political or military factors. Not only is analogous learning dangerous, but states do not

seem to learn from others' experience. While states draw heavily on their own individual

109 Ibid., 35. 110 Ibid., 183-202. 111 Ibid., 210.

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experiences, they pay little attention to those of other states in the same formative event.

In effect, decision makers ignore pertinent information that does not accrue from their

own collective experience. 112 These findings have important implications for

international relations scholarship. If formative events do drive beliefs, then our theories

should account for the role of beliefs and learning in forming foreign policy. Reiter’s

analysis provides a predictive framework for predicting the effects of learning. Vivid,

recent, formative events are likely to frame foreign policy decisions.

Although a significant contribution to learning theory, Reiter’s analysis contains

several weaknesses. One significant weakness of his learning hypothesis is that he does

not thoroughly explain his unit of analysis. Reiter’s analysis of learning suggests that it is

the state that learns lessons from formative experiences rather individuals. He makes this

assumption to provide a parsimonious theory of historical learning, however, this

assumption begs the question of what happens when decision makers within a state learn

divergent lessons from a formative event. Missing in his analysis is a causal mechanism

through which diverging lessons are aggregated into foreign policy. Additionally,

Reiter’s learning theory only applies to small powers. Although he posits that this theory

ought to apply to great power interactions, Reiter provides no analysis of this

hypothesis.113 Additionally he fails to specify when systemic, or state level factors,

would influence decision makers more than learning. Reiter fails to specify when

112 Ibid., 203-04. 113 Ibid.

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external factors, such as level of immediate threat, may overcome decision maker bias

based on learning.

Scholars who work with cognitive approaches contend cognitive and attribution

theories explain outcomes that cannot be explained only by systemic factors.114

However, neither of these cognitive approaches proves adequate to provide a theory of

foreign policy behavior individually. Instead of replacing the realist or liberal paradigms,

cognitive theories more stringently specify the conditions in which realist or liberal

predictions should dominate. The learning thesis helps explain why like states react

differently in similar circumstances. Each largely explains decision making behavior in

the context of existing systemic and unit level constraints. The results of the cognitive

research tradition encourage the conclusion that one must account for decision makers

experiences and beliefs to explain state foreign policy behavior.

The scholarly literature examining the interaction between domestic politics,

foreign policy, and international relations indicates a growing consensus emerging among

scholars on the need to integrate individual-level, unit-level, and systemic-level variables

to understand state actions in the international environment. Most existing empirical

research does not incorporate multi-level methodology but rather chooses the

international environment, domestic politics, or decision making processes as the primary

frame of reference to explain foreign policy behavior. As a result, parsimony is valued

over decreased explanatory power. The process of learning makes strategic assumptions,

114 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

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historical analogy, or beliefs a potentially relevant intervening variable for the study of

coalition burden sharing behavior.

The Role of Legitimacy

Concerns about international legitimacy play an integral role in burden sharing

decisions. For example, legitimacy concerns dominated the criticisms of the U.S.

involvement in the 2003 Iraq war; critics of the intervention argued that the U.S. failure

to gain legitimacy in the form of a United Nations Security Council mandate to use force

resulted in an unacceptable aggression on the part of the United States. The argument

continues that military participation was limited—compared to the 1991 Persian Gulf

War—due to the influence of legitimacy, as states did not want to participate in an

illegitimate military intervention. Though this argument has received robust attention in

popular media circles, however, it fails to sufficiently explain the instances participation

in the Iraq coalition. If legitimacy concerns dominate a state’s decision to enter a

coalition, this research should find that decision making elites were concerned with

gaining international sanction. Based on this assumption, one would expect to see greater

participation in the Iraq War coalition once the UN Security Council approved

international participation. This section probes the influence of legitimacy on multilateral

coalitions. I first review the relevant literature defining legitimacy and its influence on

state interaction. I then outline an analytical approach for determining the influence of

legitimacy on foreign policy outcomes. The aim of this section is to separate the

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influence of legitimacy concerns from other influences such as material interest and

power.

For the purposes of this research, legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an

actor that a rule or institution should be obeyed.115 Legitimacy may gain its influence

from the substance of the rule, termed substantive legitimacy, or from the procedure or

source by which it was constituted, termed procedural legitimacy. Substantive legitimacy

reflects the belief that international norms are an important element of social behavior.

This social theory of normative influence emerged in the wake of the Cold War to

understand the social dimensions of international relations and the possibility of change.

Constructivism extends the social theory argument by focusing on the constitutive role of

norms and shared understandings, as well as the relationship between agency and

structure.116 According scholars subscribing to the substantive argument, states abide by

international norms because those norms reflect and constitute acceptable behavior in a

society of states.117 Martha Finnemore, a proponent of the idea of substantive legitimacy,

argues that a norm is emerging requiring the multilateral use of military force.

Finnemore equates unilateral use of force with naked aggression; wide collaboration with

a community of states is necessary to ensure that force is used responsibly within the

international community. International politics expects that states ought only to use 115 This definition contains several critical aspects which separate legitimacy from other motives for state behavior. Essential is the distinction that a rule OR institution may provide the normative belief. See Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999), 381. 116 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 117 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).

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military force with the approval and participation of other states, or they will likely face

condemnation from other states.118 Essential in Finnemore’s distinction is that the

unilateral use of force for interventions is normatively rejected. This model of action

recognizes that a state’s participation in a coalition reflects their approval of the military

action. This normative argument, however, is undermined if those norms and ideas are

simply the beliefs and dictates of the most powerful states in the international system.

Empirically one must separate normative interests from material interests to argue the

strength of normative beliefs. Policy responses perceived as legitimate may be guided by

considerations of relative power and national interests rather than genuine normative

beliefs. Additionally, normative arguments suffer when prevailing norms in the

international system conflict with each other.

In contrast, procedural legitimacy arguments reflect the neo- liberal

internationalists’ view point that behavior is legitimated when it is approved by legitimate

international institutions.119 Inis Claude, Jr. argues that international institutions such as

the United Nations provide political authority through collective legitimization. In this

school of thought, states are keenly conscious of the need for consensus by a large and

impressive a body of other states to provide multilateral endorsement of their positions

118 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 81. 119 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

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providing collective legitimization.120 According to Claude, “the world organization

[United Nations] has come to be regarded, and used, as a dispenser of politically

significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states,

including, but going far beyond, their claims to status as independent members of the

international system.”121 U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan reflected this view when he

declared, “When states decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international

peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United

Nations.”122 In terms of procedural legitimacy, however one must again separate

interests based on power versus interests based on legitimacy. The policies and

procedures necessary to gain procedural legitimacy often amount to little more than

ceding individual power to others. Analytically, one must separate power motivations

from those based on the legitimating effect of the process. Does the U.N. provide

legitimacy because of an internationally recognized process for approving force, or

because it constrains the great powers?

Though substantive and procedural legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, they do

invoke different arguments to justify the use of force and therefore should influence

burden sharing differently. The use of military force in Kosovo highlights the significant

differences between these two ways of thinking about legitimacy. NATO’s military

120 Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," International Organization 20, no. 3 (1966), 370. 121 Ibid., 367. 122 United Nations., Press Release Sg/Sm/8378 Ga/10045 (2002 [cited October 25 2007]); available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm.

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action in Kosovo was legitimized primarily on substantive grounds under the argument

for human rights and self-determination; however, it lacked procedural legitimacy since

the intervention never garnered the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council.

The Kosovo scenario highlights that sources of—and arguments for—legitimacy must be

unpacked to determine the causal role of legitimacy on influencing state behavior.

Understanding the causal role of legitimacy arguments is essential to understanding the

bargaining behavior and ultimately the burden sharing behavior of states. If legitimacy

arguments are truly normative, one should not expect any support for a security coalition

deemed illegitimate. On the other hand, if legitimacy arguments are instead intended to

increase audience costs, then illegitimacy merely increases the bargaining stakes.

The role of legitimacy rests on the foundation of state motivation for action: do

states support coalitions because of the legitimacy that it provides, or do they support for

state material interests? Realist scholars argue that state behavior is most often

influenced by narrowly defined self-interests and that legitimacy arguments are intended

to bind the power of stronger nations through the controlling authority of international

institutions.123 To determine the influence of legitimacy on burden sharing, one must

examine state motivations for supporting or opposing a given coalition effort.

The idea of social control is central to understanding the motivations for

legitimacy arguments. Social control refers to the social mechanisms that regulate

behavior, leading to conformity and compliances to the rules of a given society or social

123 Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004).

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group. Max Weber introduces the influence legitimacy on social control and order.124

For Weber and later social theorists, political authority is strengthened by a population’s

belief that the authority is legitimate. In the absence of legitimacy, political actors have

to rely on more costly social control mechanisms as a means of control. Social control

literature outlines three motivations for rule following:

(1) The actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers; (2) The actor sees the rule as in its own self-interest; and (3) The actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be

obeyed.”125

Each of these motivations activates a different compliance mechanism with distinct

distinguishing characteristics.

The first motivation for compliance identified in social control literature is fear of

punishment from the stronger power; in the absence of legitimacy, political actors have to

rely on more costly methods, such as punishment, to encourage participation.

Punishment is the use of asymmetrical power, or threats, to change the behavior of

weaker states. A state obeys a rule because it is motivated by the fear of punishment

from the stronger power. The rule itself is irrelevant except as a signal for what

behaviors will and will not incur a penalty. This conception of authority is paramount in

Steven Waltz’s conception of the international system. According to Waltz, “states

nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal 124 Max Weber, Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 125 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 379. See also Robert F. Meier, "Perspectives on the Concept of Social Control," Annual Review of Sociology 8 (1982), Edward Alsworth Ross, Social Control; a Survey of the Foundations of Order (Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969).

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rules to develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them.”126

Strong states set the rules and coerce weaker states to comply due to power asymmetries.

Coercion is a simple form of social control; however, it is inefficient because it does not

provoke voluntary compliance. Empirically, compliance based on coercion should be

easy to observe. In coercive situations, one should see threats to generate compliance.

For example, Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact was based primarily on the threat of

punishment rather than legitimacy.

The second possible motivation for compliance with rules in social control

literature is the belief that compliance promotes one’s self interest. This view suggests

that rule following is the result of an instrumental and calculated assessment of the net

benefits of compliance.127 The task of governing authorities is to structure incentives so

that members comply because it is the most attractive option. If the system correctly

manages incentives, self-interest should encourage rule following. Social interaction is

seen as an exchange and social obligations as contracts; the fundamental political act is

consent to a contract. Self-interest needs to be carefully defined so that it does not

subsume all other categories of social control. Self-interest motivations differ from

coercive motivations in that self-interest is a positive incentive where coercion is a

126 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 94. 127 Self-interest is the basis of rational choice theory. All rational choice theories assume individuals choose the best action according to stable preference functions and constraints facing them. See Ferejohn John and Debra Satz, "Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory," Critical Review 9, no. 1/2 (1995), Robert O. Keohane, "Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations," The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (2002), Alexander Thompson, "Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls," The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (2002). For a critique see Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).

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negative incentive. A self-interest perspective leaves the actor better off by taking the

rule obeying path, while coercion leaves the actor worse off for deviating from the

desired rule. Self-interest involves self-restraint while coercion requires external

restraint.128 Actors making decisions based on self-interest will exhibit certain

characteristics. Actors will constantly assess the costs and benefits of a system and will

stand ready to abandon it immediately should some alternative provide greater utility. In

this sense, self-interested actors are inclined towards revisionism rather than the status

quo.129 David Beetham highlights the weakness of the self-interest approach: “To

explain all action conforming to rules as the product of a self-interested calculation of the

consequences of breaching them is to elevate the attributes of the criminal into the

standard for the whole of humankind.”130

Finally, compliance with a rule may result from the belief in the normative

legitimacy of the rule, or in the legitimacy of the organization that generated the rule.

Compliance becomes voluntary when an actor believes that the rule itself is legitimate.

Compliance is no longer motivated by fear of retribution, or by a calculation of self-

interest, but rather by an internal sense of moral obligation.131 Legitimacy as a method of

128 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 385-87. 129 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 130 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, Issues in Political Theory (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991). 131 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 387.See also Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, "Alternatives To "Legalization": Richer Views of Laws and Politics," International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001), Thomas M. Franck, "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium," The American Journal of International Law 100, no. 1 (2006), Peter G. Stillman, "The Concept of Legitimacy," Polity 7, no. 1 (1974). This has also been

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social control has efficiency advantages over coercion and self-interest. According to

Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, “legitimacy is not indispensable to all control.

Nevertheless, lack of legitimacy imposes heavy costs on the controllers.”132 This

efficiency advantage was noted by Hans Morgenthau, “Power exercised with moral or

legal authority must be distinguished from naked power…legitimate power has a better

chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power.”133

Additionally, Morgenthau affirms that international organizations, such as the U.N.,

confer legitimacy on a military effort, “Power exercised in self-defense or in the name of

the United Nations has a better chance to succeed than equivalent power exercised by an

‘aggressor’ nation or in violation of international law.”134 The Security Council is an

exemplar for demonstrating the effect of legitimacy since its leverage resides almost

exclusively in the perceived legitimacy its decisions grant to forceful actions. States

appear more willing to cooperate voluntarily once the Security Council has approved a

use of force.135

Summary

This review of international relations literature demonstrates that no single

analytical outlook can explain state alliance behavior. Systemic theories such as

economic or realist theories describe the systemic forces that define a state’s decision described as output legitimacy Friedrich Kratochwil, "On Legitimacy," International Relations 20, no. 3 (2006). 132 As quoted in Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 388. 133 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 32. 134 Ibid. 135 Erik Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005), 528.

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space, but these theories do not explain decision outcomes. Systemic theories are unable

to explain the foreign policies of individual states because they explain away the effects

of state level variation. For instance, balance of threat theory predicts that states will

balance against an external threat, but it cannot explain how a state is perceived as a

threat in the first place. Balance of threat theory treats threat perception as an exogenous

variable rather than something that is constructed over a period of time. Economic theory

explains the problems initiating and executing a collective action event. Small states are

likely to take advantage of large states because the contributions of smaller states are less

likely to influence the outcome of a security effort. The weakness of economic

approaches is that they are agnostic to political reasons for allying. It fails to explain

significant contributions as a result of side-payments, bargaining, or alliance dependence.

For coalitions, states engage in a series of negotiations that determine the level of burden

sharing. Turkey was willing to lend significant support to the U.S. coalition in Iraq as

long as significant side payments were paid for their support.

In most coalition burden sharing situations, states have choices that can be

explained in terms of domestic politics and goals of key actors. State-level analytical

approaches are necessary to explain the influence of domestic politics and society on

foreign policy decisions. Domestic structure research convincingly demonstrates the

influence of differing domestic structure on state foreign policy. States’ foreign policies

are not simply the result of international constraints defined by power, but also vary

according to the executive’s willingness and political ability to respond to systemic

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necessities. The research demonstrates that domestic political processes help to shape a

state’s definition of the national interest and its ability to implement it. Content and

consistency of foreign policy result as much from the constraints of domestic structures

as from international systemic influences. However, one cannot understand a state’s

foreign policy merely through structures. Scholars must also understand the biases and

influences of key constituencies in the foreign policy process to determine how structure

translates these influences into policy. A theory of individual influence is necessary to

complete the picture since foreign policy is the culmination of many individual lessons

from history that form decision maker’s beliefs

Finally, individual and cognitive theoretical approaches explain the influence of

individuals’ beliefs on foreign policy. Cognitive approaches provide a methodology for

exploring the influence of decision maker experience and beliefs the formulation of

effective foreign policy strategies. John Lewis Gaddis maintains that every U.S.

presidential administration has “certain assumptions about American interests in the

world, potential threats to them and feasible responses, which tend to be formed before or

just after an administration takes office.”136 This highlights the influence of past

experience on future policy choices; decision makers may be predisposed to certain

coalition choices regardless of systemic pressures. Common ideologies, perceptions of

threat, domestic and societal influences, and individual motivations all affect foreign

policy outcomes in some respect.

136 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), ix.

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Scholarship since the end of the Cold War reflects the general attitude that the

facts of international relations are multidimensional and therefore have multiple causes.

This conclusion supported, and in turn was supported by, the related view that multiple

interdependent theories are required to explain the complexity of state relations. This

discussion of alliances and coalitions suggests that parsimonious theories of alliances do

not adequately explain coalition or alliance burden sharing decisions. Holsti, Hopmann,

and Sullivan, in their exhaustive quantitative study of alliances suggest that a generalized

theory of alliance has limited validity. They suggest that theories provide a useful

starting point but one must examine the effects of intervening variables in order to define

the scope and limits of alternative explanations of causes and effects.137 To generalize to

the highest level, parsimonious theories often miss relationships among variables, or are

not expected to explain the complexities of foreign policy decisions.138 To determine

foreign policy behavior, multi-causal analysis is necessary to explain causal relationships

found in foreign policy decisions. Integrated models offer a methodology to explain

foreign policy behavior by determining the contingent conditions when a particular

theory is applicable. An integrated model offers a method to explain complex behavior

by allowing the scholar to extend mono-causal approaches to the multifaceted nature of

real-world decisions.

137 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 219-26. 138 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 60-61.

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The next chapter explores an integrated model developed to explain burden

sharing behavior. The model incorporates the dominant theories discussed to explain the

contingent conditions when each theory applies. The biggest drawback with this

integrative model – and integrating models in general -- is their lack of parsimony.

Integrated theories are complex, but so is foreign policy formulation.

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CHAPTER THREE

INTEGRATIVE FOREIGN POLICY MODELS AND METHODOLOGY

Since burden sharing decisions lie at the intersection of domestic and international

politics, only an integrative model can explain the spectrum of constraints and

opportunities defined by the dynamics of the international system, as well as the

capabilities to act accounting for domestic political constraints. As shown in chapter two,

the leaders of coalition nations must act within the spectrum of constraints and

opportunities that are defined by each nation’s domestic political structures. When

domestic political considerations are not included in the study of foreign policy,

researchers are limited to developing a set of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for

foreign policy decision making.1 The foreign policy decision maker must answer to an

international audience that includes other political leaders, international organizations,

and regional institutions. The international arena establishes the attributes of the

executives menu of available choices for a particular foreign policy decision. Systemic

theories, based only on the international environment, however are incomplete because

they do not explain domestic constraints on choices and ignore domestic forces that

motivate state executives. Domestically, the executive must answer to an audience that

includes supporters, critics, agents responsible for execution of policy, and most

1 Joe D. Hagan, "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, ed. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), Douglas Van Belle, "Domestic Imperatives and Rational Models of Foreign Policy Decision Making," in The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, ed. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

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importantly, challengers for the leadership position.2 However, domestic models alone

do not explain national motivations for foreign policy choices. The domestic audience

shapes and is shaped by the international environment, but each alone only partially

explains why states make the foreign policy decisions that they make.3 Integrated models

provide attractive choice for explaining multifaceted decisions, particularly when

simpler, existing theories have an uneven track record in explaining complex outcomes.

Two burden sharing models currently exist that attempt to explain the influence of

domestic and international factors on security decisions. In “Wars of Choice: An

Integrated Decision Model of NATO policy in Kosovo,” David Auerswald presents an

integrated model explaining state decisions for participation in the 1999 Operation Allied

Force. He examines the variation in burden sharing in NATO’s intervention using four

relatively sparse, existing approaches to foreign policy analysis: theories of collective

action, balance of threat, public opinion, and government institutional structures. In his

analysis, Auerswald developed a simple, integrated, decision making model that

incorporates the core concepts from each existing explanation in a staged, conditional

manner. Auerswald’s research demonstrates that the integrated model is more

explanatory than each theory individually.4 Although Auerswald’s model provides a

parsimonious explanation for NATO burden sharing in Kosovo, it suffers from two

significant weaknesses. First, Auerswald’s analysis is limited to “wars of choice” where

2 Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 3rd ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1989), 21-25. 3 See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." 4 Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."

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direct threat is insignificant. He states, “I assume that no group member’s survival is

threatened, an assumption consistent with the vast majority of contemporary

interventions of choice by western powers.”5 Although this restriction was valid for the

Kosovo intervention, it limits the generalizability of the model. Since the model fails to

account for threat, it does not account for the dynamics of burden sharing where the

adversary directly threatens some members of the coalition. The integrated model does

not explain Saudi Arabia’s participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, since it was not a

war of choice for the kingdom. The second limitation of the model is that it assumes

knowledge of the “K-Group,” or collective action core group, in advance. Outcomes

significantly change whether one is a member of the collective action core, but the

designation of the group is tautological in Auerswald’s analysis. K-Group membership is

exogenous to the model, but determination of group membership is typically determined

by level of support for a particular intervention. Determining K-Group members in

advance is difficult methodologically. Membership in the core of a collective action

group is often the product of “strategic behavior” that Auerswald admits is missing from

the model.6 In total, Auerswald’s model is a useful, but limited, analysis tool.

The second burden sharing model was proffered by Andrew Bennett, Joseph

Lepgold, and Danny Unger to explain burden sharing decisions in the 1991 Persian Gulf

War. The Bennett, Lepgold, Unger model is a typological theory that accounts for these

international, domestic, and cognitive influences. It incorporates the same external

5 Ibid., 643. 6 Ibid., 658.

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factors as the Auerswald model, but also accounts for threat in a state’s decision calculus.

The strength of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model is that it accounts for a greater

range of interventions than the Auerswald model. This model accounts for complex

interactions between independent variables, and provides multiple causal paths to

outcomes. It is not limited to a certain subset of interventions and therefore is

generalizable to a wider range of security interventions.

This chapter introduces the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security decision model

and discusses the operationalization of the model for this study. The strengths and

weaknesses of the model will be reviewed. Finally, I offer a modified model that

accounts for the weaknesses of the current model and enhances its predictive value.

Finally, I address methodology and case selection in evaluating the security model.

Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger Security Model

Recognizing the failure of any single existing literature to explain the first Gulf

War burden sharing decisions, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger developed a coalition

decision model that integrates the dominant theories of alliance burden behavior.7 The

Desert Storm episode presented empirical anomalies for theories of collective action and

burden sharing. According to collective action theory, or the economic theory of

alliances, small states will ride free or give minimal contributions to an alliance because

their limited resources will have a small impact on the amount of security provided.

Even in cases where a state has a large stake in the outcome they will tend to free ride

7 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War. For an earlier version of the model see Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War."

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because the largest alliance members would provide the collective good. Free riding is

especially prevalent in cases where the benefits are non-excludable and indivisible.8 The

existence of free riding results in three logical outcomes. First, collective action is very

difficult to initiate when there is a large coalition, with no dominant member, that

provides the public good. When the group interested in a public good is large, and the

share of the total benefit that goes to any single actor is small, no individual has an

incentive to contribute to provide the good. Second, collective action arrangements

typically provide a Pareto suboptimal amount of security. Sub-optimality occurs because

a contributor to a public good can obtain only part of the marginal utility from one more

unit of contribution to that good. As a result, each contributor only increases the total

level up the point where marginal utility is equal to marginal cost which is lower than the

optimal level for the group.9 Finally, the burden will likely be disproportionately borne

by the member states that are significantly larger than the rest. This occurs because

contributions of those states can significantly affect the outcome of a collective action

effort. In contrast, a small contributor can only make marginal contributions to the

common effort.10 As shown in Chapter 2, even under the joint product and impure public

good economic models, there is wide agreement that relative economic size correlates

well with alliance contributions. However, burden sharing is likely to be more

8 See discussion of collective action theory in Chapter 2. 9 See Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," 270-71. 10 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 169. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances."

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proportional in alliances offering private or semi-private goods, since states may then

enjoy the alliance benefits exclusively, thereby motivating a larger contribution.11

Unfortunately for collective action theory, the 1991 Persian Gulf War was a

striking example of robust burden sharing across the war coalition. Major financial

contributions from Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait virtually offset all U.S.

military financial costs. Combined with the large military contributions by Saudi Arabia,

the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, and Syria, it is difficult to argue that the United

States shared a disproportional burden. The United States organized a collective action

coalition and committed itself to leading a major military operation against Iraq before

the pledges of military support or reimbursement from potential partners. After

committing so publicly to the reinstatement of Kuwaiti sovereignty, collective action

theory predicts that the United States would be forced to bear a disproportionate cost for

the operation since the U.S. committed a significant operational capability to the effort.

Instead, coalition nations robustly supported materially, diplomatically, and financially.

The Gulf War episode demonstrated that foreign policy decisions rarely adhere to a

single theoretical conception, but rather are complex interactions which are influenced by

numerous competing factors.

Bennett, et al, in their qualitative study of the Gulf War coalition, concluded that

no one general theory of alliance behavior applied evenly across the coalition. Realist

11 Todd Sandler, Jon Cauley, and John F. Forbes, "In Defense of a Collective Goods Theory of Alliances," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 3 (1980). Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense.

112

theoretical perspectives most adequately described the actions of those states that were

threatened by Hussein’s action, while alliance dependence factors influenced states that

were predicted to ride free. Collective action theory, the foundation of most burden

sharing theory, explained the U.S. initial commitment to defend Saudi Arabia, but fared

poorly in explaining other state behavior with the exception of Iran, who benefited by

weakening a revisionist Iraq. Once the United States committed to military action, other

states had the opportunity to ride free as the U.S. had the capability to pursue their shared

goals unilaterally. Yet many countries contributed to the coalition, even when it was not

in their direct national interest. Bennett, et al, found that the U.S. was able to exploit the

uncertainty in the structure of the international system to influence states to contribute to

the coalition. American leaders, anticipating free riding, preempted it by offering a series

of incentives and disincentives for coalition participation, arguing that Congress would

not look favorably on non-participating allies, and promising future benefits for those that

participated. U.S. pressure for support was hard to ignore in light of the uncertainty in

the international system. Process tracing evidence indicated that several contributors

were motivated by the expectation of future dependence on the United States in the post

Cold War shift of power. After forty years of firm alignments, the structural

discontinuity caused by the end of the Cold War produced anxiety, uncertainty, and

hopes of reaping strategic rewards of new alignments.12 For instance, President Özal of

Turkey strongly supported the coalition, against the wishes of an anti-war public, in

12 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 345-49.

113

hopes that this would cement Turkey’s role as an indispensible partner to the U.S.13

Bennett, et al, concluded that a complex confluence of external threat, domestic

influence, executive leadership, and alliance dependence influenced the timing and

composition of state burden sharing decisions.

To explain the contingent, complex interactions inherent in a burden sharing

decision, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, developed an integrated, multi-level model that

incorporates the dominant theories of alliance contribution to explain coalition burden

sharing decisions. This model represents a significant contribution to the study of

coalition behavior, but it has been relatively untested in coalitions other than the first

Gulf War.14 Figure 3 presents the security decision making model. It is a typological

theory that offers an alternative to prevailing alliance theories that only examine systemic

or state level facets of a burden sharing decision. The model accounts for complex

interactions between independent variables, and provides multiple causal paths to

outcomes.

13 William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 68, no. 4 (1992), George S. Harris, "U.S.-Turkish Relations," in Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). 14 Only one study has compared the suitability of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security model, but robust theory testing remains incomplete, see Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, did perform a test of the model against UN action in Bosnia, however, the model has not been rigorously tested. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War.

114

Independent Variables

The blocks depicted in the first three columns of the security decision making

model represent the independent variables affecting foreign policy outcomes. Following

is a discussion of the theoretical foundation supporting each block.

Cognitive Factors

Historical Learning. Chapter two demonstrated that most scholarship on

alliances and burden sharing assumes that the nation-state is the significant unit of

political action. However, studies employing a cognitive approach that focus on beliefs

and images held by political elites provide a powerful source for understanding foreign

Outcomes and Effects

Security is a public good provided by others in sufficient quantity even if the state does not

contribute

OUTCOME 1:

No Contribution

OUTCOME 2: Contribution in area(s) with public or state support

OUTCOME 3: No Contribution in area(s) with public or state

opposition

State autonomy vs. society and executive autonomy vs.

bureaucracy

State Keeps

its Distance

State Keeps

its Distance

State Free-Rides

State Free-Rides

State Reveals its Preferences

and Pays

State is entrapped and pays anyway

Public Opinion Supports Contribution

Alliance

Dependence?

Historical Lessons/ Learning

State Perceives Threat (good is partially private)

Domestic Factors International Factors Cognitive Factors

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes No

No

No

No

No

Figure 3. Integrated Model of Coalition Burden Sharing

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policy behavior.15 As discussed in chapter two, cognitive theory emerged to explain how

decision makers deal with complexity and uncertainty. Process models can be applied to

decision structures such as government to illustrate the influence of cognitive schema and

biases on state decision making.16 In this construct, the state evolves from a strictly

rational decision maker to one influenced by cognitive biases. State decisions become

the accumulation of the sequential decisions of leaders and elites who constitute the

decision making structure for a particular issue area.17 Foreign policy, in this view, can

best be described as an unending sequence of problem-solving tasks accomplished by

goal-oriented elites who operate within organizational and cognitive constraints. The

appropriate means of achieving a particular foreign policy objective is influenced by

decision maker beliefs of other actors, ends, means, and effective strategies.

Since national elites are influential in determining courses of policy, the influence

of cognition and historical learning are critical to understanding nation-state foreign

policy decisions. Policy makers rely heavily on historical analogy to simplify and

understand complex situations. A historical analogy provides a comparison of some past

experience with a current decision problem, so that some important aspect of the past

experience can provide an insight into the current problem. Analogy helps decision

makers define the nature of the situation, assess the stakes, and provide policy 15 Jerel A. Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, ed. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), 55. 16 John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 14. 17 Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making; an Approach to the Study of International Politics, 63.

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prescriptions. Unfortunately, this use of analogy is often, resulting in poor policy

choices. Policy makers tend to oversimplify complex lessons neglecting an important

historical detail that leads to inappropriate analogizing and misguided policy choices.

Additionally, vivid personal events are more likely to guide decision makers rather than

other more relevant events. Decision makers tend to “learn” from events in which they

were personally involved, rather than from others’ experiences.18 Historical learning

through analogy can explain foreign policy outcomes that seem irrational when

considered merely by systemic factors.

For this study, learning is the application of historical analogy from past

experience to facilitate understanding of a particular policy question.19 Given the

complexity of measuring cognitive beliefs and values, this study incorporates a simplified

cognitive model that can offer useful predictions of state beliefs concerning coalition

burden sharing. This analysis makes four assumptions on the influence of beliefs and

choice heuristics on actors in their use of analogies to make decisions. These

assumptions draw heavily on the methodology of Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger.20 First, a

key component of beliefs consists of the lessons or analogies drawn from the past.

Second, individuals rely on their particular society’s experiences as sources of lessons

18 Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. 19 This definition builds on the work of Khong and Reiter in that it recognizes that decision-makers use analogy to simplify complex cognitive problems and that lessons are “learned” from past experience. See Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. 20 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 14-17.

117

and analogies. Third, lessons and analogies are more likely to be influential if they

involve events that are recent, vivid, evocative, personal, or of significant historical

importance. Finally, decision makers who undergo similar experiences will tend to share

dominant sets of analogies and lessons.

With these assumptions in mind, the case study analysis will consider the

following beliefs in the historical lessons and learning module. First, the study will

assess the motivation for collective action. Beliefs on the threat of Hussein to regional

stability, and his capability to proliferate nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to

terrorist organizations should affect perceptions of the public good of collective action.

Beliefs about the likelihood of free riding should matter as well since state burden sharing

decisions are influenced by expectations of the collective effort. Second, coalition

contributions should be shaped by beliefs about the influence of force and diplomacy on

external threats. Each state decision has the potential to be shaded by whether each

state’s most important and recent experiences of using force were successful. Third,

decisions should be influenced by perceptions of alliance dependence. States that

recently experienced entrapment by an ally should be reluctant to contribute to the Iraq

coalition. Conversely, states that experienced abandonment should be more likely to

contribute if they believed that a failure to support an ally in an earlier case led to their

abandonment. Additionally, states that suffered abandonment after supporting an ally

should be even less likely to support another coalition without extreme guarantees.

Finally, leaders should be more likely to contribute if they believed a failure to do so in

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an earlier instance led to a domestic backlash. Conversely, if recent military intervention

led to domestic backlash leaders should be wary of making major contributions to

another coalition.

This study examines lessons, stated above, that chief executives, interest groups,

government organizations, and the general public “learned” in previous burden sharing

efforts.21 Since this study is concerned with historical lessons that influence the U.S. led

intervention in Iraq, previous U.S. led military interventions in Kuwait/Iraq (1991, 1998),

Bosnia (1994), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001) should be noteworthy in their

influence on decision making. These interventions should provide a backdrop for most

decision makers since one could expect costs and rewards for the Iraq effort to be

influenced by outcomes from the previous coalitions. In particular, this study analyzes

how participation or non-participation in the first Gulf conflict, Bosnia, and Kosovo

affected beliefs on the cost benefit analysis for joining the U.S. in another coalition.

Learning beliefs will vary across constituencies; therefore, I will concentrate on the

effects of the beliefs of key constituencies on decision makers such as chief executives.

The influence of learning on the model is to determine how leaders embody and respond

to the “lessons” of key constituencies, including public opinion.

According to the learning hypothesis, leaders will be more likely to contribute to

an effort if they gained full participation rights, influenced decision making, and received

compensation in the form of increased influence with the coalition leader, or material

21 This will be a limited conception of learning, for more detail on a learning research program see Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield."

119

benefits, for their participation in previous efforts. Leaders will be less likely to

contribute if they recently experienced alliance entrapment or abandonment. Leaders

should be more likely to contribute if they believed a failure to do so in an earlier

instance led to a domestic backlash, conversely, they would be less likely if participation

generated domestic backlash.

Historical learning is expected to not only influence whether a state supports a

coalition, but it is likely to affect the method and timing of support. Past “mistakes” or

“successes” influence the makeup, duration, and timing of support. One lesson is the

influence of timing on past coalition efforts. Early or late support to a coalition can

influence the ingrained lessons learned. Early support runs the risk of entrapment in an

action that grows well beyond the initial level of commitment. Additionally, joining a

coalition too early runs the risk that a state’s effort is taken for granted because it did hold

out in bargaining for a larger share of the coalition benefits. Late support, on the other

hand, can be seen by the coalition leader as a lack of support, thereby running the risk of

abandonment. On the other hand, late support may have saved a state from entrapment in

a failed intervention.

For the Iraq War coalition, beliefs about the threat of Iraqi force compared to the

possible destabilizing effects of a Middle East war should weigh heavily on decision

makers. For Germany and Japan, the influence of being labeled “checkbook” participants

in the first Gulf War should influence their level of military vice economic support.

Since Britain was a full scale partner in the first intervention, and subsequent

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interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, the learning hypothesis predicts robust military

support. In contrast, Turkey’s support is expected to be highly contingent since the first

Gulf War set off a series of economic disappointments and contributed to an ongoing

insurgency with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

International Factors

International, or systemic factors, are those broad factors that define and shape the

international environment and explain the interaction of external inducements and

constraints on states foreign policy behavior. Systemic theory allows the understanding

of the context of action before explaining unit level variation.

Balance of Threat. Since private versus collective incentives significantly

influences burden sharing, the balance of threat block in the security decision model

seeks to explain whether an ally considers the action a “war of choice,” or a necessary

intervention to counter an existential threat. This block of the model aims to identify

state motives for action. If a collective action, one can expect to see states attempt to free

ride. On the other hand, if states consider the coalition as countering a significant threat,

one can expect to see states robustly supporting the effort. Since collective action

problems can be overcome when states have private incentives, the balance of threat

block aims to explain contributions that are too large for the collective action

proposition.22

22 The determination of threat is critical to determining the amount of publicness of the security intervention. A non-threatened ally will likely display collective action motivations, while a threatened ally

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Based on Stephen Walt’s reformulation of balance of power theory, balance of

threat theory identifies four factors—military capability, geographic proximity, offensive

power, and aggressive intentions—that affect states’ perceptions of threat, allowing for a

more nuanced understanding than balance of power theory of balancing motivations.23

This theory argues that states act to protect themselves from tangible threats instead of

mere power differentials. Therefore, the main determinant of private benefits for a

security action is the threat posed by the adversary. If the adversary threatens a particular

state then that state has a “private good” explanation for contributing to a security

coalition.

The question of how states identify threats is relevant to this study. Walt takes

threat as given; threat is a composite of four factors; aggregate power, geographic

proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. There seems to be an assumption

that the source of greatest threat is obvious to decision makers. Yet the question of how

states actually identify threats is much more complex.24 Walt provides no guidance to

how states prioritize among the four elements of threat: “One cannot determine a priori . .

. which sources of threat will be most important in any given case; one can say only that

will more likely participate fully with a countering coalition. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 10. 23 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21. 24 See David A. Baldwin, "Thinking About Threats," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 15, no. 1 (1971), Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976).

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all of them are likely to play a role.”25 When analyzing an environment of multiple

potential threats to a state, it is essential to unpack the bundle of independent variables

Walt designates as encompassing threat. The differentiation of threat better defines the

environmental conditions in which policy is formulated. The type of threat and adversary

will have an obvious impact on policy choices.26

Bennett, et al., incorporate Walt’s aggregate definition of threat in their security

decision making model. Using the Walt model they assume that the most threatened

states, and therefore most likely to share defense burdens, are those that are closest to

Iraq.27 In the light of the strategic environment before the first Gulf War, that was a

logical assumption; Iraq had just invaded Kuwait and seemed eager to annex Saudi oil

fields. However, as the above discussion argues, threat perception is a function of the

ordering of multiple sources of state threat. Walt’s elements of threat need to be

disaggregated to ascertain what really drives alliance decisions.28 When disaggregated,

studies support constructivists’ assertion that identity and ideas are as important as

material power in determining the influence of threat. States overwhelmingly identify

ideological and political threats to internal stability, emanating from abroad, as more

salient than threats based upon aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive

25 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 26. 26 Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, 24. 27 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 10-11. 28 Scott Cooper, "State-Centric Balance-of-Threat Theory: Explaining the Misunderstood Gulf Cooperation Council," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2003/4), Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991), F. Gregory Gause, III, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2003/4), David Preiss, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretive Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (1996), Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars.

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capabilities. Internal unrest threatening the existing government is perceived as

dangerous as a direct invasion.29 Therefore, for many Persian Gulf states, a resurgent

Iraq may not be as threatening as an Iran, ideologically bent on causing domestic

disturbance to further its political agenda. Similarly, a weakened Iraq that does not check

Iranian influence may be more threatening to Gulf States than an Iraq under Saddam

Hussein. This argument does not discount the typical realist depictions of threat, but

rather emphasizes the influence of domestic and transnational political identity factors in

explaining threat perceptions. It looks to additional factors to help explain state choices

in an indeterminate structural environment.

This paper operationalizes the threat as a factor of material capability and

intentions to influence a state internally and externally. If military defeat is seen as the

most serious threat to regime security, then state decision makers should seek to balance

against the local state which is geographically closest and whose aggregate military

power capabilities are greatest. Even if that state’s intentions are not immediately hostile,

its power presents the most serious threat to state security because intentions can change

drastically and rapidly. Since the first Gulf War diminished Iraq’s power projection

capability, balance of threat effect should be most visible in states where Iraq could

potentially threaten with offensive WMD.30 If, on the other hand, ideational factors are

29 Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73.", Cooper, "State-Centric Balance-of-Threat Theory: Explaining the Misunderstood Gulf Cooperation Council," 310, Gause, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf," 274. 30 Although it is now known that Iraq did not have WMD capability for some time, overtly Iraq maintained the threat of WMD that was seen as credible by many parties. This threat can be accounted for in balance of threat theory. Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, "Saddam's Delusions: The View

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seen as the most serious threat to security, then state leaders should balance against the

state that manifests the most hostility toward their regimes, regardless of that state’s

aggregate power and geographic proximity. Hostile intent is defined as public attempts

by one state to destabilize another state’s ruling regime through propaganda, or support

by one state for domestic or exile political groups opposed to another state’s ruling

regime, or threatening with military or economic sanctions.31 In this instance, leaders do

not see military capabilities by themselves as threatening, but rather view external

threatening challenges to their domestic legitimacy and security as being more serious

than threats based simply upon a preponderance of military capabilities. Hence, “five

hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the U.S. than five North Korean

ones.”32

In order to sharply between private and collective motivations for supporting a

coalition, threat does not include public goods. Therefore, threat will be a function of

Iraqi capability to influence, destabilize, or attack potential allies. Anxieties concerning

Iraqi threats to world oil market stability will be included since oil destabilization could

affect domestic stability.

from the Inside," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006). For a detailed review of the delusion throughout Iraq’s military regime see Kevin M. Woods and Joint Center for Operational Analysis (U.S.), Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership (United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2006 [cited October 11 2007]); available from http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS68139 31 This method of coding threat is seen in Gause, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf." 32 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 255.

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Table 8 shows the predictions of Middle East burden sharing based on balance of

threat theory. The table disaggregates threat from hostile intentions. The first column

shows the relative military strength in numbers of personnel in the active forces, reserves,

and paramilitary organizations for the respective states. This represents the material

Table 8. Predicted Burden Sharing Based on Balance of Threat, 2002

Country

Active, Reserve, and Paramilitary

(000) Aggregate Power

Threat Aggregate Intentions

Threat

Predicted Burden Sharing

Iraq 1082 Turkey Iran United States 2726 Iraq Iraq Strong Iran 910 Iraq Iraq, Saudi Arabia Strong Israel 595 Syria Syria, Iraq, Iran Strong Bahrain 21 Iran Iran (weak) Minimal Jordon 145 Iraq Saudi Arabia, Syria Minimal Kuwait 46 Iraq Iraq Strong Saudi Arabia 215 Iraq Iran Mixed Syria 781 Turkey, Iraq Israel Minimal Turkey 1043 Iraq, Iran PKK (Iraq), Greece Mixed Qatar 12 Iran Saudi Arabia, Bahrain Minimal United Arab Emirates

42 Iran Iran (Weak) Minimal

Sources: Military Balance 2002-2003; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Studies 2003.

capability for threatening local regimes. The second column illustrates the predicted

balance arrangements based only on geographic proximity and military strength.

Interestingly, based on material capability alone, Turkey becomes a threatening state due

to the large size of its military forces. The third column shows hostile intent in the

region based on ongoing disputes or claimed interference in domestic politics. Iran is a

significant producer of hostile intent due to its desire to topple and replace Sunni

monarchies with fundamentalist states. Incorporating capability and intentions, balance

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of threat theory predicts one can expect a significant contribution from the United States,

Israel, Iran, Kuwait, and lesser contributions from the remaining states.33

Collective Action. As shown in chapter two, lacking private incentives (threat),

collective action theory aims to explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. The

second block in the security decision making model determines the level of private

incentive for a particular situation. If a state perceives a threat, it is more likely to

participate fully than if governed by collective security concerns. If collective action

motivations dominate, however, small states are less likely to contribute to the collective

good. Their burden sharing contributions are expected to be in an amount smaller than

their size would suggest. The reason for the smaller expectation is due to how size

affects marginal gains calculations. A state acting rationally is expected to increase the

supply of a good until its marginal cost equals its marginal gain. However, when such

reasoning leads a powerful state to contribute, less powerful states will be tempted to ride

free because their efforts cannot be expected to secure much more of the collective good

than what will be already supplied by the larger states.

Although collective goods theory predicts an under-contribution by smaller states,

the theory says nothing about the relative contributions that states make in providing the

public good. Neither does it make any predictions concerning the types of contributions.

Most studies of collective action have concentrated on defense spending, although recent

33 The United States is included because it considered Iraqi WMD linked with Islamic terrorism a strategic threat.

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studies have also looked at peacekeeping, and coalition contributions.34 The collective

goods theory also does not account for the differing values that states will attach to the

particular good in question.

According to collective action theory, the value of the collective good should

influence state participation in a collective coalition. Those states that highly value a

public good are expected to contribute significantly towards obtaining that good. Much

of the political disagreement with the U.S. in the buildup to the Iraq War concerned the

value or worth of the “public goods” for potential coalition allies. States clearly did not

value the collective action equally. This observation conflicts with most of the existing

literature on collective burden sharing. The majority of collective action studies of

NATO assume that states equally value the “good.” In the Iraq War, however this

assumption was not valid. To determine the collective benefits of the Iraq War, this

study identifies three collective goods. First, the disarmament of Iraqi offensive weapons

of mass destruction (WMD), second, the stability of global oil markets, and finally, the

stabilization of the region through the removal of the Hussein regime. This study does

not take that assumption as a given, in fact states are expected to have divergent views on

the value of the “public good” the United States was positioned to provide.

34 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War.", Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, Bobrow and Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations.", David Dickins, "Can East Timor Be a Blueprint for Burden Sharing?," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002), Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World."

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The collective action hypothesis predicts that dominant states, measured in

economic size and military spending, will pay more to secure the collective good.35 In

the Iraq War case, the United States repeatedly demonstrated that it was willing to act

unilaterally, thus smaller states are expected to ride free. Table 9 shows the 2002 defense

spending for the top 10 nations in dollars, percent of GDP, and military strength.

Clearly, based on defense expenditures, the U.S. dwarfs all coalition and potential

coalition nations in military spending, comprising 111% of the next nine spenders

combined, and nearly seven times the second largest spender (China). This fact should

encourage a coalition partners to free ride, or keep their distance altogether, since the

U.S. has more than enough military power to provide the public good.

35 Hegemonic stability theory also suggests that the dominant power will pay disproportionately more to secure a public good, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Table 9. GDP and Military Spending, 2002

Country Rank Defense Expenditures $M

% GDP Active and Reserve Military

(000) United States 1 329,616 3.3 2673.3 China 2 48,380 4.1 2820.0 Russia 3 48,040 4.8 3388.1 France 4 38,005 2.5 360.4 Japan 5 37,070 1.0 286.9 United Kingdom

6 35,249 2.4 467.1

Germany 7 31,465 1.5 686.3 Italy 8 24,210 1.9 282.0 Saudi Arabia 9 20,981 12.0 199.5 India 10 13,073 2.7 1833.0 Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 2003-4 (London, 2004)

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Russell Hardin suggests that the size the subgroup that is capable of providing the

collective good is a significant indicator of participation in collective actions. He argues

that the smaller the group that is capable of providing the collective good (K-group), and

would benefit from doing so, even if no other group member contributed good

themselves, determines the likelihood that the good gets provided. A small K-group

fosters transparency, reduces coordination problems, and thereby decreases the chances

of free riding among K-group members. Conversely, with large K-groups, responsive

collective action is hindered as each member waits for the others to act first.36

Significantly, non-group members know that the benefits of the collective good in

question cannot be denied to them even if they do not participate. They have no

motivation to pay for the collective good if someone else is willing to.37

The collective action hypothesis predicts that the United States and United

Kingdom would provide a majority of coalition forces while other partners would provide

a minimum. Since the U.S./U.K. bloc was willing and capable for a near-unilateral

action, other states had a motivation to ride free. Based on Hardin’s K-group hypothesis,

the United States, along with the United Kingdom was capable of disarming Iraq with a

two state coalition. Since the small K-group assured a collective action, other nations had

a diminished collective action motivation to participate. The collective action hypothesis

provides a puzzle for the Iraq War. Since the U.S. was willing and capable for near-

unilateral action, why would states that have a chance to free ride contribute? Moreover,

36 Hardin, Collective Action, 40-48. 37 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 14-16, 21.

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if they did contribute, why would they commit troops, risking domestic resistance, rather

than other commodities such as economic or political support? Since a successful

collective action requires significant leadership, did the U.S.—feeling more powerful in

2003 than 1990—ask for less help, offer fewer inducements, and make fewer concessions

on goals and tactics to coalition allies?

Alliance Dependence. Another external dynamic that affects coalition formation

and burden sharing is the concept of the alliance security dilemma. Potential allies face a

security-autonomy tradeoff when entering into a defense pact; if an excess of “security”

exists a state may opt to trade some of the excess for more autonomy, by loosening

alliance bonds or by reducing support to the ally on some issues, potentially risking the

ally’s support on future security issues.38 However, the security-autonomy trade-off

creates a tension between two fears, the fear of abandonment and the fear of

entrapment.39 This “alliance security dilemma” recognizes that each ally has alternative

alliance choices and may opt for one of them if it becomes dissatisfied with the present

allies. Therefore, a pervasive aspect of alliances is the constant fear about being deserted

by one’s ally. Exercising too much autonomy runs the risk of abandonment, or defection,

by allies. Abandonment can range from realigning with one’s adversary, de-aligning

from the standing alliance, failing to make good on explicit commitments, or failing to

38 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181. 39 Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 150-51.

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provide support in contingencies where support is expected.40 The most common form of

abandonment is the failure to support the ally diplomatically in a dispute with its

adversary, when support was expected.41 Being dependent on an ally risks entrapment.

Entrapment occurs when a state becomes entangled in a conflict central to an ally’s

interests but peripheral to its own, in the hope that the gains in preserving the alliance

will outweigh the risks and costs of future war. Entrapment occurs when one state values

the preservation of the alliance over the cost of fighting for its ally’s interests.42

The risks of abandonment and entrapment tend to vary inversely. A possible

hedge against abandonment is to increase one’s commitment to an ally, thus increasing

the ally’s security and reducing its temptation to defect. However, this increases the

likelihood that one will be entrapped by the ally. Concerns about possible entrapment

may be reduced by limiting commitment to the ally or by withdrawing support in specific

crises. However, this risks devaluing the alliance for the ally and causing its defection.

Acting to reduce one’s own alliance concerns tends to increase the ally’s concerns.

The alliance security dilemma arises because reducing the risk of entrapment

tends to increase the risk of abandonment; the greater one’s dependence on the alliance

and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment.43 These

pressures apply even without a formal alliance if weaker coalitional partners are

40 Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984), 466. 41 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 182. 42 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 12. 43 Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 466.

132

vulnerable to security threats that they cannot deal with alone.44 Weaker states,

dependent on a dominant ally for security, are significantly influenced by future promises

as much as threats of abandonment. Future promises provide the motivation to

participate in peripheral security coalitions.45

Dependence is not limited to the security realm; states may also be dependent

economically or politically. States will be more likely to support an ally that can impose

costly adjustments to existing relationships. Additionally, allies may also support an

effort in response to incentives, such as military aid or debt forgiveness. Hence, alliance

dependence refers to a state’s susceptibility to arm twisting and the conditioning of

incentives by coalition leaders.

The alliance security dilemma also influences inter coalition bargaining

considerations. A strategy of strong commitment and support will have the undesired

effect of reducing bargaining leverage over the ally. Conversely, bargaining power over

the ally is enhanced when support is doubtful because one can make credible threats of

non support. Alliance bargaining thus favors the strategy of weak or ambiguous

commitment.46

44 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger found that several states in the Desert Storm coalition were motivated not so much by actual dependence on the United States, but rather expected future dependence. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 347-48. This behavior is consistent with a hedging strategy, see Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. 45 Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000). 46 Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 467.

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The severity of the alliance security dilemma, and the intensity of fears of

abandonment and entrapment, is determined largely by commonality of interests, level of

dependence, and commitment to the ally. Thus, the dilemma will be mild when the allies

have a high proportion of common interest. The allies will have little fear of

abandonment because of shared interests, and since the threat of abandonment has little

credibility, they will have little bargaining advantage over each other. In contrast, the

alliance security dilemma will be most severe if the allies do not share common interest

in the conflict, or if they face the same adversary but have different conflicts with that

adversary. Then both the likelihood of abandonment and the cost of entrapment will be

high. The allies will simultaneously be skeptical of the other’s commitment and anxious

against being trapped into a widening conflict.47

The decision making model operationalizes alliance dependence by analyzing a

state’s susceptibility to demands and incentives from the coalition leaders. The most

important determinant for this study is the relative dependence of a potential coalition

partner on U.S. provided security. Additionally, trade and economic dependence on the

U.S. should also factor into state burden sharing decisions. The more dependent a state is

the more likely the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of

abandonment.48 In the Iraq War case, the greater a state’s dependence on the United

States relative to entrapment concerns, the more it should have contributed to the anti-

Hussein coalition. This study measures coalition member’s dependence in terms of

47 For an excellent discussion on the intensity of the alliance dilemma see Snyder, Alliance Politics, 186-92. 48 Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 471-72.

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military and economic ties or other assistance that would be hard to replace with other

partners. Britain would be expected to strongly support America because of the shared

interests and close diplomatic, economic, and military ties between them. Japan and

South Korea are also likely to strongly support due to the U.S. balancing role against

China and North Korea in East Asia. Due to the diminished threat of Russia to Western

Europe, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Canada should show a reluctance to be

entrapped in a U.S. incursion into Iraq. Finally, according to this theory, Iranian,

Chinese, and Russian participation should be zero. The effects of alliance dependence

are clearest when states make contributions unrelated to any collective action pressures or

immediate Iraqi threat.49 Evidence of alliance dependence is most likely to be seen in

bargaining considerations and U.S. arm-twisting to generate support.

U.S. arm-twisting is expected to be highly visible when it becomes part of a “two-

level” bargaining game between an ally’s leadership and domestic constituency.50 As

part of a “two-level” bargaining situation, the leadership of an ally will use international

pressure to gain concessions from domestic constituencies. Conversely, potential allies

will use domestic pressure to gain leverage with the coalition lead in the alliance or

coalition bargaining situation. An ally’s negotiators may invoke domestic pressure

concerns to soften the coalition lead’s demands, or might use international pressure to

garner domestic support.

49 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 13. 50 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."

135

Internal Factors

Systemic theories are unable to explain or predict the foreign policy behavior of

particular states because they assume away the effects of state level variation. The

Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model incorporates domestic variables to highlight the

contingent conditions where domestic politics will play a role in determining state burden

sharing decisions.

Public Opinion. Public opinion plays an important role in the formation of state

preferences and the introduction of those preferences into policy choices. Most of the

available literature on the interaction between mass public opinion and elites in the

foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies can be categorized into to three

broad concepts, a “bottom-up” approach, a “top-down” approach, and a “structural”

approach where public opinion influence is shaped by issue, domestic structure, elite

coalitions and cleavages.

The first concept, the "bottom-up" approach, assumes that public opinion is often

a proximate cause of policy.51 In this mode, leaders follow mass beliefs. This approach

assumes the Kantian notion of democracy in which domestic opinion has a great impact

on foreign policy. The public has a strong influence on foreign policy because the people

will be the ones that bear the brunt of a given foreign policy decision.52 However, the

51 Page and Shapiro statistically show public opinion leads policy outcomes, but fail to determine the mechanisms in which public opinion affects elite behavior, see Page and Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." 52 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 2-4.

136

empirical record for the “bottom-up” thesis shows mixed results. Numerous cases exist

where elites have made crucial foreign policy decisions in the absence of public

consensus. Examples include the U.S. decisions favoring an active international role post

World War II, the West German decision to rearm and join NATO in the early 1950s, the

French decision to build an independent nuclear force and leave NATO military

structure, and more recently the military surge in Iraq.53

A second approach, the “top-down” approach of public opinion posits a more

realist orientation where public consensus is more a function of elite consensus that

trickles down to the mass public. This approach assumes a state centered approach to

foreign policy. It presumes the public is easily manipulated by political leaders in the

foreign policy realm because of the low salience of security issues compared to domestic

issues, combined with the low degree of public knowledge on foreign policy issues.54 In

this view, public officials tend to respect their constituents’ preferences on domestic

issues, but feel unconstrained on issues pertaining to foreign affairs.55 However, scholars

have reported a high degree of consistency between American public opinion and foreign

policy, including a high degree of congruence between shifts in public opinion and

53 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." 54 Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; an Operational Formulation. 55 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963).

137

changes in foreign policy. Additionally, researchers have also shown public opinion

shifting before policy changes, suggesting the weakness of the “top-down” hypothesis. 56

Finally, due to empirical difficulties with the first two theories of public opinion,

a third approach argues that the role of public opinion varies across issue area, domestic

institution structure, and coalition-building process among elites.57 This approach

assumes that “bottom-up” or “top-down” theories ignore the rich diversity in the ways

that public opinion influences policy decisions. Simplistic theories tend to ignore that

public opinion and societal groups may influence the policy-making process in several

ways and at different stages. The public can directly affect decision making by changing

policy goals or how those goals are prioritized or by narrowing the range of policy

options. Moreover, the public may also indirectly affect policies by influencing the

coalition building processes among the elites. It can influence the positions of

bureaucracies or single actors within the government.58 Jacobs and Shapiro, in their

review of the state of the discipline in studying public opinion, suggest that domestic

structure and societal interaction with the government influence foreign policy.

According to their hypothesis, public and elite opinion interacts with each other and is

transformed into policy decisions differently depending on the issue area, domestic

56 Douglas C. Foyle, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997), 142. 57 Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." 58 Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies."

138

structure, leadership preferences, and elite coalition building processes.59 Thomas Risse-

Kappen and Ole Holsti, in their studies of public opinion on foreign policy, have

demonstrated that understanding domestic structures and coalition-building processes is

essential to explain the impact of public opinion on the foreign policy. With these

developments in mind, the next section discusses the interaction of public opinion with

domestic institutions and politics and their effect on burden sharing outcomes.

Domestic Institutions and Politics. Many foreign policy scholars recognized that

theories of the international system, as developed by Waltz, were inadequate to predict

foreign policy behaviors of particular states. To develop his systemic theory, Waltz

argued that microeconomic theories of the market are possible precisely because they

abstract away from variation at the level of the firm. Accordingly, Waltz agreed that

market theories would be inadequate to develop a systematic theory of foreign policy

behavior. However, this preclude theories of the firm; to fully understand the behavior of

individual firms, or in our case, states, one must develop a theory of the firm, rather than

a theory of the market. Domestic political theory allows consideration of the ways that

politically organized social groups seek to influence policy and how state decision

makers either cooperate with, resist, or compromise with such groups.60

59 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Studying Substantive Democracy," PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (1994). See also Tamar Hermann, "Grassroots Activism as a Factor in Foreign Policy-Making," in The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, ed. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 60 Skidmore and Hudson, "Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy," 3-6.

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The Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model domestic institutions and politics block

represents the influence of domestic institutions and structure on foreign policy

outcomes. It aims to explain the influence of public opinion on shaping domestic actor’s

preferences for coalition support. This block seeks to explain the influence of public

opinion, national legislatures, and domestic political processes on executive decision

making. Proponents of these theories argue domestic politics and structure is important

because they represent the relationship between state and society, or public opinion and

political outcomes. Domestic structure affects the capacity of states to mobilize

resources based on the influence of society on government and of leaders on

legislatures.61 The domestic influence block in the Bennett, et al, burden sharing model

is an amalgam of hypotheses on the influence of the executive, bureaucratic politics,

legislatures, political elite, and society as a whole on foreign policy. Following is a

discussion of the influence of domestic politics as embodied in the model.

The first element of the model’s domestic block is the influence of the chief

executive on the policy making and execution processes. The hypothesis assumes that,

“holding preexisting beliefs constant, leaders of executive branches should be more likely

than other domestic actors to want to participate in a coalition, if only because they are

61 For the influence of domestic structure on foreign policy and vice versa see Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.", Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States.", Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy, Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation, Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.", Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Weitsman and Shambaugh, "International Systems, Domestic Structures, and Risk."

140

directly exposed to pressure from other coalition members, especially the United

States.”62 Building on the work of David Lake on the influence of the chief executives in

foreign policy, the model posits that executives are more responsive to international-level

encouragement and negative pressure than the public or legislatures, since executives are

directly responsible for foreign policy.63 Legislatures, on the other hand, are more likely

to follow public opinion unless an election is not imminent, since the public, in general, is

more concerned with domestic issues than international ones.64 According to Bennett, et

al, these assumptions suggest leaders will have a longer strategic vision, react to long-

term strategic threats, and be more responsive to requests for burden sharing demands

from allies they depend upon for security.65 Depending on the international context, this

can make leaders more or less willing than the public to contribute to a coalition.

Therefore, despite state incentive to free ride, state leaders may lean towards coalition

support without the requisite domestic support due to external pressure by other coalition

leaders. Conversely, state executives of coalitional governments are expected to be more

attuned to public opposition and are expected to be more reactive to public opinion.

The next element in the model’s domestic influence block is the role of

bureaucratic politics in affecting foreign policy choices. The bureaucratic politics

literature suggests that officials’ stands on policy issues are shaped by their roles and

62 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 17. 63 Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939. See also 64 Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. 65 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 17.

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organizational interests. The theory asserts that stances on issues stem from the

institutional positions that elites occupy. For instance, military elites are more likely to

advocate policy options that place the military in a favorable position. Foreign policy

elites, similarly, are likely to recommend diplomatic policy options. Bureaucratic theory

recognizes that organizations have significant influence in policy formulation and

execution, and their executives tend to generate policy options that support core missions

and resources.66 Bureaucrats bargain with each other to define the “national interest” and

are often the results of parochial concerns. For supporting the Iraq War coalition, this

theory suggests that German and Japanese military officials should have favored a

contribution to continue to legitimize a wider role for their organizations based on the

critiques of the first Gulf War.

The next issue addressed in the Bennett, et al, domestic institutions and politics

block is the autonomy of the state leader’s preferences from legislative and societal

pressures. To predict policy outcomes, the model must determine actors’ preferences,

and the degree to which actors can achieve their preferences when conflicts exist. To

establish the ordering of preferences, one must be concerned with “1) the state’s

autonomy with respect to the preferences of civil society, most often reflected by

legislators, but including less institutionalized forms of political expression; 2) the 66 Ibid. The seminal work on the influence of bureaucratic politics is Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). See also Graham Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, ed. Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1972). For a critique of the bureaucratic hypothesis see Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences 4, no. 4 (1973), 467-90, Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 24-28.

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executive’s autonomy vis-à-vis other state actors; and 3) the legislature’s autonomy from

public opinion.”67 The goal is to determine which actors’ preferences will predominate in

the burden sharing debate.

Following the ordering logic, if the executive’s preferences overlap with those of

society, autonomy is not an issue and the executive should be relatively unconstrained in

joining a coalition. However, if public preferences differ from the executive,

contributions will occur only in those areas where the state can mobilize coalition

resources without the legislature.68 Likewise, bureaucratic actors can help or constrain

the executive based on their policy preferences. An executive’s ability to override

bureaucratic concerns will be a function of autonomy as well as informal bases of

executive power.

According to Bennett, et al, two factors determine the executive’s autonomy for a

specific issue. The first is the state’s constitutional structure, and the second is the

strength of the political coalition in power. Their observations conclude that

constitutional structure should be a strong determinant of the preferences in foreign

policy outcomes. States with strong executives should generate policy that reflects the

executives’ preferences, while states with weak executives should reflect societal

preferences. This argument reflects the domestic structure hypothesis of Peter

Katzenstein, which argues that the constitutional structure determines whether a state’s

67 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 18. 68 Ibid. See also Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo."

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executive is responsive to societal pressure.69 For example, French executives are strong

in relation to their respective legislatures and civil society. Conversely, the American

president is weaker due to an independent legislature combined with constitutional

limitations on federal powers. Katzenstein remarks, “France embodies the principle of

political concentration, the United States the principle of social pluralism.”70 The

autonomy from society determines the constraining effect of society itself. The second

factor determining executive autonomy is the political strength of the executive’s party.

States whose executive and legislature are from the same party are more likely reflect the

executive’s policy preferences states who are divided politically. Conversely, states with

split legislatures or strong opposing parties are less likely to reflect the chief executive’s

policy preferences unless he can mobilize resources autonomously.71

The following predictions emerge from the domestic institutions and politics

hypotheses. Chief executives of alliance dependent states will contribute to a coalition in

response to pressure from the alliance leader unless preexisting beliefs, a threat to key

national interests, or domestic opposition dictate otherwise. Support will be minimal in

areas where the chief executive lacks autonomy and fails to win public support for

contributions.72

69 Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States." 70 Ibid., 15. 71 Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. 72 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 20.

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The domestic institutions and politics hypothesis presents some problems for the

researcher trying to predict state burden sharing behavior. The conceptualization, as

presented in the security decision making model, provides a rich, nuanced approach to

the influence of society on foreign policy decisions. However, the interaction of the

theories is difficult to operationalize into a predictive framework. Due to the complex

interactions of the domestic variables, predictions are indeterminate.73 To improve the

predictive capability of the model, these state-societal factors may be simplified using

assumptions developed recently in the area of domestic structure theory.

Chapter two demonstrated that domestic structure theory allows for simplifying

assumptions concerning the interaction of the state and society allowing the prediction of

likely foreign policy outcomes. Domestic structure approaches aim to explain the role of

the interaction of state political institutions with a given state’s society. They determine

the selectivity of political systems to societal demands.

One recent advancement of the domestic structure literature is directly applicable

to the security decision model. Susan Peterson applied Cortell and Davis’s framework to

explain state strategies for crisis bargaining. In this significant innovation, Peterson

evolves the domestic structure argument by identifying a typology of bargaining

strategies based on decision making centralization and degree of societal influence.

Using the same domestic influences as Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, Peterson’s

73 David Auerswald notes that he had to simplify the complicated methodology in Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." Gerald Steinberg in a review of Friends in Need notes “the heavy weapons of social science were too powerful for the issues at hand” in Steinberg, 743-44.

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formalizes theoretical predictions based on domestic structural elements. Table 10 shows

Peterson’s typology of dominant foreign policy theories based on state structure.74

By formalizing a typology of state-societal relations, Peterson has created a

framework for predicting outcomes based on domestic structure theory. The organization

of decision making authority varies along a continuum from centralized to decentralized

based on the number of bureaucratic agencies, ministries, and other governmental offices

that have authority over a given issue. A centralized configuration exists when foreign

policy decision making is restricted to relatively few government officials. The second

74 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict.

Table 10. Theories of Foreign Policy Formulation

Degree of Executive Autonomy from the Legislature Structure of the Foreign

Policy Executive Autonomous Non-autonomous

Centralized

Type I

Cognitive Explanation:

The beliefs of a chief executive determines the burden sharing strategy

Type II

Societal Constraints:

Policy is formulated by a chief executive whose

preferences reflect public and legislative pressures

Decentralized

Type III

Elite Coalition Building:

The state’s policy is determined by intra-elite

bargaining

Type IV

Elite Coalition Building

Subject to Societal

Constraints:

Policy is the outcome of compromise and coalition

building among elites whose preferences reflect

societal pressures

Source: Susan Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State, (Ann Arbor, 1996)

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element, degree of executive autonomy from the legislature defines the executive

autonomy vis-à-vis society. The greater the executive autonomy the less control the

legislature can exert over the content of a state’s foreign policy. The legislature exerts

control through two possible causal paths. First, the legislature may possess the authority

to make policy for a specific issue area. For instance, the Turkish parliament must

approve the stationing of foreign troops on its soil. Second, the executive may be

responsible to and dependent on the legislature for tenure in office. A foreign policy

executive that is not constrained by the legislature is considered autonomous, while and

executive constrained by the legislature is considered non-autonomous.75

In a Type I structure, decision making authority is restricted to relatively few

government officials and the chief executive enjoys near total autonomy from legislative

scrutiny. In a Type I environment, foreign policy depends on the strategic beliefs of the

chief executive.76 According to Peterson, cognitive explanations describe the foreign

policy decision making process. Cognitive explanations distinguish between those who

view the international system as conflictual and those who see a more harmonious

world.77 While the structure of decision making authority determines that the chief

executive is responsible for decision making, the content and rigidity of the leader’s own

beliefs explains how the state responds to burden sharing requests.78

75 Ibid., 24-30. 76 Ibid., 31. See also Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 455-56. 77 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics., chap. 3. 78 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 31-36.

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In a Type IV state domestic political factors have the greatest influence on foreign

policy decisions. A Type IV structure exists when the foreign policy decision process is

composed of a number of different offices that share responsibility for foreign policy

decision making, and when the legislature performs a significant oversight function. In

this type of state, national leaders’ preferences are shaped by domestic pressures, and the

state’s policy response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Unable to act

alone, individual policy makers must recognize domestic opponents who may appeal

directly to the public. Interest groups, political parties, the media, and public opinion

shape the policy-making process because the foreign policy executive is responsible to

the legislature and, indirectly, to the public. Because of the many hands formulating

policy, even the most powerful leaders must build a coalition of support for their

preferred policy. State institutions shape national policy preferences by allowing societal

actors a voice in the process. State structure determines that policy will be the outcome

of domestic bargaining and coalition building.79

Decision making in a Type III state resembles that of the Type IV state with one

exception. An internal process of coalition building and compromise among bureaucratic

agencies exists, however, the executive branch benefits from significant autonomy from

the legislature. Therefore, societal constraints do not enter the decision making process.

Foreign policy elite actors appeal to various bureaucratic or institutional constituencies,

since a direct appeal to the public or interest groups would be ineffective. No

79 Ibid., 36-38.

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representative element exists to channel public opinion into the policy-making process.

Coalition politics prevail in a state where foreign policy is created by a multitude of

actors.80

Finally, Type II states are characterized by need for the large-scale coalition

building by the chief executive. The chief executive cannot ignore domestic

considerations created by the executive-legislative relationship. Thus while a centralized

cadre formulates foreign policy, the existence of administrative, regulatory, or legislative

procedures enable societal influences to assume a legitimate role in the government’s

policy process.81 Policy preferences will reflect not only the executive beliefs, but will

also reflect the pressures exerted by political parties, interest groups, public opinion, and

the legislature. One would expect the executive to give attention to societal groups’

interests.82

The two components of the state determine the avenues through which foreign

policy is made, but do not determine outcomes. The structure of executive decision

making authority and the degree of legislative oversight together determines the

contingent conditions where cognitive, bureaucratic, or domestic bargaining theories

dominate. In all cases, it still remains necessary to determine the preferences of the

decision making elite and society to determine the executive influence on outcomes.

80 Ibid., 38-40. 81 Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 457. 82 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 40-41.

149

Figure 4 illustrates the security model using the domestic structure typology to

predict burden sharing outcomes.

The Peterson typology provides a predictive framework on the influence of

domestic politics on foreign policy. The Bennett model was indeterminate in explaining

the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy behavior. Peterson’s structural

framework provides a predictive and explanative model for determining state strategies in

the foreign policy arena. The insights reached by the Peterson model easily fit into the

Bennett, et al, framework. Type I states are expected to make contributions in response

to pressure from the alliance leader unless preexisting beliefs, or a threat to key national

interests exist. Conversely, Type IV states are likely to keep their distance or ride free

Outcomes and Effects

Security is a public good provided by others in sufficient quantity even if the state does not

contribute

OUTCOME 1:

No Contribution

OUTCOME 2: Contribution in area(s) with public or state

support

OUTCOME 3: No Contribution in area(s) with public or state

opposition

Domestic

Structure

State Keeps its Distance

State Keeps

its Distance

State Free-

Rides

State Free-

Rides

State Reveals its Preferences

and Pays

State is entrapped and

pays anyway

Public Opinion Supports

Contribution

Alliance Dependence?

Historical Lessons/

Learning

State Perceives Threat (good is

partially private)

Domestic Factors International Factors Cognitive

Factors

Yes

Yes

Yes

Type I Type III

Yes No

No

No

Type II

Type IV

No

Figure 4. Security Decision Making Model

150

due to the influence of societal pressure and the need to build an elite consensus for

coalition participation. Type III states are expected to support the coalition to the level of

support determined by elite consensus, while Type II states are expected to be support to

the limit of public and legislature support.

By replacing the Bennett, et al, domestic institutions block with the Peterson

typology, the security model is improved in four ways. First, the Peterson typology

formalizes the link between public opinion and foreign policy. It explicitly stipulates the

causal mechanisms in which public opinion becomes codified in foreign policy decisions.

Second, the Peterson typology make explicit predictions on which decision making

theories dominate based on state structure and relations to society. Third, the Peterson

typology makes firm predictions of foreign policy biases based on government structure.

And finally, the Peterson typology simplifies understanding the domestic interactions that

influence foreign policy decision making.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a state’s relative contribution to the Iraq War coalition.

Coalition contributions are measured as military, economic, and diplomatic contributions

to the Iraq coalition, and post war stability operations. The participation level is

predicated on the degree of political and military risk incurred at the level of

involvement. Coalition contributions are ranked according to the level of commitment to

the coalition. This paper will operationalize the level of commitment in the following

manner. Nations that provided military into Iraq proper show the highest level of

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commitment since stationing troops within Iraq could generate the largest domestic

backlash, and therefore incur the greatest amount of political risk. The next highest level

of support would go to those states that provided personnel into areas surrounding Iraq,

significant financial contribution, allowed basing of coalition personnel, and/or

diplomatically supported the U.S. position in the U.N. The next level of support includes

states that provided nominal military support such as over-flight rights or refueling

privileges, provided a minimum level of economic support, or eventually diplomatically

supported the Iraq coalition. Finally, the lowest level of commitment includes those

states that provided no support, or were outspoken diplomatically in their opposition to

the U.S. led coalition.83

The security coalition model has three contribution outcomes indicating a state’s

contribution or lack thereof towards the coalition objective. The model accounts for

equifinality; therefore, there may be more than one path to a given outcome. The

outcomes include: (1) no contribution, or negative contribution; (2) the state contributes

robustly in areas with public or state support; and (3) the state supports minimally and

does not contribute in areas with public or state opposition. The outcomes depicted in the

model are meant to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. States are categorized as to

whether they had direct (collective action or balance of threat) or indirect (alliance

83 I rely on the typology of support developed in Sprowls, "States and War Coalitions: A Study of the Gulf War".

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dependence) external incentives to cooperate in the coalition, and their level of

contribution given the external incentives.84

These three outcomes generate four possible explanatory effects that match a

state’s contribution, or lack thereof, to the coalition. States will either (1) keep their

distance; (2) free ride; (3) show their preferences and pay; or (4) pay due to entrapment.

A state “keeps its distance” if it neither shares the public or private security

“good,” and does not contribute to the coalition. This situation is likely if a state does not

benefit from the coalition and is not alliance dependent on coalition members. States that

do not share the public good but are alliance dependent (such as on NATO) may also

“keep its distance” due to domestic constraints, but they risk alliance abandonment in the

future.

A state “free rides” if it perceives security to be a private or public good but does

not contribute. Free riding is likely when a state believes other states will provide

adequate security without its contribution and if the state is not dependent coalition

members. Free riding also occurs when a state under-contributes to the coalition. States

are likely to free ride when domestic pressures limit involvement. Similar to the “keep

the distance” effect, alliance dependent states risk abandonment if they free-ride.

Two effects occur when a state contributes robustly to a coalition, they “reveal

their preferences” or are “entrapped and pay.” States “reveal their preferences and pay

up” when they share in the public or private good and fear that it will be undersupplied

84 Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 21.

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by the coalition. In this instance, they will reveal their preferences for the public or

private good and supply support appropriately. Conversely, states are “entrapped and

force to pay,” when they do not highly value the good but are highly dependent on a

coalition partner.85 States seeking favor from a dominant power may be forced to support

a coalition even if they have no direct stake security good.

Methodology

This dissertation applies a structured, focused, qualitative comparison of state

burden sharing decisions using of the security burden sharing model as a theoretical

framework. Structured, focused comparison allows comparison across cases in a way

that yields useful generic knowledge of decision making processes. By using a

structured, focused methodology, individual case studies can be truly comparative. The

aim of this method is to draw the explanations of each case study into a broader, more

generalized theory.

The research is “structured” in that it employs a structured data collection

approach for each case that asks a set of standardized research questions developed to

illuminate the research objective and theoretical focus of the study.86 The use of a

standard question set ensures the acquisition of comparable data across cases and an

orderly cumulative development of knowledge.

85 An excellent description of model outcomes is in Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War." See also Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, 21-24. 86 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72.

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In addition to being “structured,” the study is “focused” in that it will consider

only state coalition burden sharing decisions. One danger of multiple case studies is that

they lack a clearly defined and common focus. The case studies will be focused on the

causal processes, theoretically derived, that influenced coalition burden sharing

outcomes. The standard question set used for this study is located in Appendix B.

One issue with comparative studies is “situating” the research in the context of a

research program. To ensure that this research builds cumulatively upon previous

research, this study builds self-consciously upon the variable definitions and research

design employed by Bennett, et al. The intent is to maximize comparability across cases

with their previous case studies. However, in the area of domestic institutions and

politics this study formalizes the influences of society on state action using the

methodology developed by Susan Peterson. Bennett and Peterson both develop their

theories from the same theoretical lineage; therefore, the substitution should not

substantially change the theoretical base of the Bennett, et al, model while at the same

time improving the predictability and usability of the model.

I review each coalition member’s material contribution to the Iraq War, and state

discussions leading up to the conflict to determine the relative capabilities devoted to the

conflict and the internal and external influences on burden sharing. Diplomatic,

economic, and political activities are also examined as they are an important signifier of

support. As a result, I explore the relative willingness of each state in my case studies to

use force, and support the U.S. led coalition as expressed in official statements, press

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reports, biographies, and secondary accounts. I rely on a diverse set of source material to

avoid basing assessments merely on public speeches or one individual’s interpretation of

events. At the same time, I assume that rhetoric states use during a high-stakes

intervention may be particularly important because it influences the expectations of allies

and adversaries. Critical to analysis of intention is considering “who is speaking to

whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances. (Emphasis in original)87 I

employ process tracing to test the contingent generalizations of the security model, and to

verify if the processes and outcomes are as the theory predicts. To determine the

appropriateness of the model this study will use in-case process tracing to identify the

causal chain between the dependent variable (political, economic, and military coalition

contribution) and independent variables (need for collective action, threat perception,

etc.).88 The goal of process tracing in this study is to link observations to constitute an

explanation for observed coalition behavior. This study employs a detailed narrative,

framed against the six hypotheses in the coalition behavior model, to explain state

coalition decisions.89 Process tracing specifically highlights the dominant factors for

states’ burden sharing decisions. The role of process tracing is to confirm the

conclusions of the burden sharing model on the circumstances when a particular theory

will dominate outcomes.

87 For a discussion on the reliability of source material, and suggested research techniques see Ibid. especially chapter 5. 88 For a discussion of causal mechanisms see Ibid., 136, James Mahoney, "Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method," Sociological Forum 16, no. 3 (2001). 89 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 205-11.

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One critique of the Bennett et al. study is that it did not account for the effects of

duration on the burden sharing process. Due to the short duration of the first Gulf War,

this shortcoming is understandable. This research will use in-case comparison to control

for the effects of duration on burden sharing outcomes. Due to the protracted nature of

the current conflict, this study will incorporate duration effects in its analysis from the

initiation of war plans in October 2001, until the national elections of January 30, 2005.

This time period was selected to gauge the impact of several factors over time. The

lengthened time allows the study to look at the influence of differing levels of

international legitimacy; the coalition initiated the war without a U.N. resolution

authorizing force, but the U.N. later designated the coalition as a lawful occupation force.

Additionally, the protracted timeline allows the study to control for the effects of

casualties and sustained cost on coalition participation.

Determining the Influence of Legitimacy

The interaction between coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy—and their

relationship to foreign policy decision making—is complex as states are rarely motivated

by one single incentive. Foreign policy decisions likely contain elements of all three

motivations. Claude noted in 1966, “The process of legitimization is ultimately a

political phenomenon, a crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is

unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles.”90 The empirical

task for this study is to separate and isolate these motivations to determine if legitimacy

90 Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," 369.

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arguments for foreign policy decisions were genuine, or instead based on a calculation

that the policy would advance a state’s material interests.

At its base, my research seeks to examine if institutions and rules affect burden

sharing decisions or if those decisions are primarily based on self-interest or coercion.

Identifying the method of social control is not easy because doing so requires knowledge

of actor motivations that may not be clear to the actor himself.91 This study will use the

following techniques—drawn from Ian Hurd’s work on delineating motivations for rule

compliance92—to determine the influence of legitimacy on participation levels in a

particular security coalition.

First, this study will try to separate rhetorical compliance from actual compliance

by examining a state’s compliance for a given rule. To determine if a state holds a rule or

institution legitimately it should show compliance in similar instances where the rule

would apply. Legitimacy arguments are supported if in similar instances a state followed

a rule when such action would be counter to short term interests. For coalition burden

sharing and the use of force, this study will ask, did the state in question comply with

international rules and procedures for similar uses of force? For instance, do states go to

the Security Council regularly to support their own uses of force, or do they use force

unilaterally when in their self-interest? For instance, Turkey’s rhetoric that a U.N.

resolution authorizing forces is suspect, since Turkey regularly violated Iraq’s borders in

its campaign against Kurdish terrorists. The weakness of this measure is that states

91 Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," 390. 92 Ibid., 390-93.

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comply with international rules for a variety of reasons – compliance does not indicate

that legitimacy was the controlling mechanism.

Second, to determine the normative influence of a rule, this study will look at

reasons given for compliance with a given rule. This question asks, what do decision

makers say is their motivation for complying with the rule in question? Reviewing

executives’ statements on motivations for following a rule will highlight, at least,

rhetorical motivations for compliance. Although public statements are somewhat

unreliable, they shed light on the reasons states give for compliance. Executives’

statements during closed deliberations and hearings are likely to show the executive’s

preferences since those deliberations have some expectation of privacy. Overall, these

sources give an insight into rhetorical arguments, but other sources of information, such

as insider accounts and investigative reporting, will be necessary to determine state

motivation for compliance. This method is limited in that actors are motivated to distort

accounts of their motives to shape the history of the event.

In addition, this study will examine reasons given for noncompliance: what do

decision makers say when knowingly breaking the rule in question? This technique has

the same disadvantages of the one above given that states are likely to shield true

motivations within a rhetorical shell. However, this approach has advantages because

rhetorical language for a non-compliant actor can give insights into the legitimacy held

by that norm. When rhetorical responses continue to conform to the international norm,

they support the notion that the norm is legitimate in the eyes of the international

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community. This “giving of reasons” is an important political act and much can be

learned comparing use of language to actual compliance.93 If nations explain their

actions as conforming to the rule in question, the rule is arguably embedded in the

international discourse, while arguments that the rule no longer applies argues that the

norm no longer holds a normative value.

In addition to Hurd’s three measures, Arthur Stinchcombe suggests that the

researcher examine whether other centers of power come to the aid of the institution or

rule under threat.94 In the case of interpretation of international law, if member states do

not come to the defense of the U.N. when it is being criticized as an ineffective

institution, the U.N. may possess little legitimacy. As with many of these techniques,

more information is required to determine if the support is motivated by threat, self-

interest, or legitimacy.

Finally, the combination of methods above combined with plausible alternate

explanations should provide insight into state motivation for rule compliance and non-

compliance. This study will look into alternative explanations, other than legitimacy and

norms for state rule compliance. This is an attempt to explicitly examine alternate

explanations such as coercion or self-interest as a state motivation for compliance.95

None of these methods provides explanations that are individually compelling because 93 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 94 As quoted in Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." See also Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York,: Harcourt, 1968). 95 Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting The "Failure" Of Internationalism," International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997).

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they are not falsifiable. These methods highlight alternate explanations on the influence

of legitimacy in foreign policy decisions, and the combination of methods help explain

the most influential motivations for state policy action.

Legitimacy concerns influence state burden sharing levels in important and

meaningful ways. If rules and institutions are based primarily on coercion and self-

interest, the coalition leader can structure incentives for following or abandoning a rule

fairly easily. According to Weber, Morgenthau, and Claude, the higher level of

legitimacy afforded to the particular institution or rule, the higher the cost for abandoning

it. Determining the motivations of interested actors should give an indication of the costs

and benefits for a coalition action based on the legitimacy placed on that action by the

international community. If legitimacy is valid, sanctioned events should require less

“arm-twisting” for participation; conversely, costs should be high for the coalition lead of

an unsanctioned action.

Case Selection

The major theoretical innovation I propose to the security model is the

substitution of Susan Peterson’s domestic structure framework into the domestic

institutions and politics block of the original Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger security

model. This innovation is an attempt to improve the predictive and explanatory

capability of the security model. To determine the suitability of this advance, this study

incorporated three case studies—each case representing a different cell in the each

Peterson typology—to determine the influence of domestic structure and society on

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burden sharing decisions. Since this dissertation is most concerned with the influence of

state domestic structure, it attempts to control for other influences such as level of threat

and public opinion by choosing cases that are most similar in those independent

variables.

This study incorporates in-depth qualitative analysis on state burden sharing

decisions—each case from a different typological group—to determine the predictive and

explanatory capability of the improved security model. Additionally, cases were selected

to compare states with similar legislative constraints, but differing state society relations

to highlight the influence of domestic structure under similar constraints. Finally, cases

were selected to examine the influence of duration on coalition participation. Cases were

selected to determine the influence of duration on different combinations of domestic

structure. The goal of case selection is to determine the influence of the Peterson

typology on the Bennett, et al, model.

The Type I case requires a state structure that is centralized while the executive is

autonomous from the legislature. The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea)

provides an excellent example of this case type. The Republic of Korea represents a

weak Type I domestic structure in the Peterson typology, where decision making

authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief executive

enjoys near autonomy from legislative scrutiny. In a Type I environment, the chief

executive has significant influence over foreign policy, relatively free from legislative

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oversight.96 The political culture of Korea, though substantially democratized in the past

two decades, still favors strong executive leadership where the President sets the tone and

agenda for the National Assembly.97 Although executive prerogatives usually gain

traction in the National Assembly, the introduction of civic groups and an opposition

legislature made the government a weak Type I state.98 The Korean president enjoys

significant influence over the legislature, especially in the area of foreign policy.

Additionally the assembly members are relatively independent from society and reflect

the interests of their party rather than their constituents. According to the Peterson

typology, chief executive beliefs should dominate burden sharing decisions and cognitive

theory should have significant influence over executive decision making. South Korea

was also selected as a case study to determine the effects of duration on coalition

contributions.

Germany was selected to explore the influence of a Type IV state that was also

constitutionally limited in using force. As a Type IV state, German politicians and

bureaucrats are more responsive to social movements and civil institutions. Additionally,

German foreign policy decision making is typically diffuse due to Germany’s federal

96 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 31. See also Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 455-56. 97 Byoung-kwon Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy," The Korea Herald, February 12, 2008. 98 Katharine Moon, "US-South Korean Relations," in The Future of US-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power, ed. John Feffer (New York: Routledge, 2006).

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arrangement.99 However, due to the influence of German national elections, incumbent

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government reflected a Type II rather than a Type IV

domestic structure. Schröder was able to commandeer the foreign policy process and

imprint his preferences on German policy by appealing directly to public attitudes during

his re-election campaign concerning the use of force in Iraq. Since Schröder’s stance

resonated well with the public, he was able to accomplish a policy coup and develop a

policy position individually, rather than through the typical collaborative process. The

appeal to mass public opinion resulted in less coalition building and policy coordination

than would normally be seen in a Type IV typology. German support for the Iraq war

provides an interesting contrast to its support to the Afghanistan coalition. The

differences in support are expected to highlight the influence of legitimacy on coalition

burden sharing efforts.

Finally, Turkey was selected to explore the influence of a Type II government.

Although Turkey reflected Type I tendencies in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the country

evolved into a Type II state as a result of public unease with the outcome of the war.

Chronic inflation combined with chronic problems with the insurgent Kurdistan Workers

Party generated a change in government. Turkish press and political activists gained

access to the government throughout the late 1990s. November 2002 elections signified a

major realignment of the Turkish political landscape. Members of parliament were

99 Steve Chan and William Safran, "Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies’ Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom," Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2006), 144.

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fractured from their party leadership and held more accountable by their constituents. 100

Turkish foreign policy was historically forged in a highly centralized manner that did not

necessarily reflect societal interests, reflecting a Type I structure in the Peterson

typology. Due to national elections in November 2002—which prompted a change of the

ruling party, and a restructuring of the national assembly—Turkey acted rather as a Type

IV state in the Peterson typology. During the approach to the Iraq War, Turkey showed

decentralized decision making was dominated by the influence of a newly elected

National Assembly. Turkey is also a critical case for this study for three reasons. First, it

was a steadfast ally in other U.S. interventions and a steady NATO ally therefore the U.S.

expected it to robustly support the intervention. Second, Turkey’s participation was

critical to the initial U.S. war plan, therefore one can expect that the U.S. would apply

significant pressure for Turkish participation. Finally, Turkey counted on U.S. support

for inclusion into the European Union. For these reasons Turkey’s non-participation in

the coalition should highlight the influence of domestic politics on international

outcomes.

This research design contains several weaknesses, but it is sufficient to determine

the suitability of the enhanced security decision model. One weakness of this research

design is that I only explain coalition burden sharing in a U.S. led environment. The

research program may be better informed with a study of a non-U.S. instance of burden

100 Barak A. Salmoni, Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2003 [cited November 10 2006]); available from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/july03/middleEast.asp.

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sharing. Additionally, this design does not explore the contributions of Gulf States to the

coalition. As a second phase of research I intend to extend the suitability of the enhanced

security model under differing conditions of threat and alliance dependence. However,

time constraints will limit this study to the cases selected above.

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CHAPTER FOUR

SOUTH KOREA: BETWEEN IRAQ AND A NUCLEAR CRISIS

South Korean cooperation in the Iraq War coalition provides a compelling case to

test the Security Decision Model, as well as the influence of domestic politics, on state

use of force decisions. The Republic of Korea (ROK) support for the Iraq War coalition

is puzzling in two dimensions. First, the ROK had no direct stake in the Iraq War, yet it

was the third largest provider of military forces to the post-conflict stability operations.1

South Korea was not threatened by Saddam Hussein, possessed a reliable source of oil,

and was not expected to contribute troops as a member of a collective security

organization. Only 15 percent of South Koreans surveyed in the summer of 2002

considered terrorism to be a national priority, one of the lowest figures for major

countries surveyed. Additionally, 72 percent of South Koreans opposed the U.S.-led war

on terrorism.2 Second, the newly elected liberal government campaigned on a pledge of

assertiveness against the asymmetric alliance relationship with the United States, and

exploited a wave of anti-Americanism. President Roh Moo-hyun was elected president

over his pro-U.S. conservative opponent based on a platform that called for a Korea that

would not “kowtow” to the United States.3 Roh’s victory reflected public anger towards

1 The size of the ROK contingent of 3,600 troops was significant, making it the third largest contingent after the United States and United Kingdom. This also marked the first time the ROK has sent combat forces overseas in nearly 40 years when ROK forces constituted the second largest contingent in Vietnam. 2 Victor D. Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," in Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, ed. National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.) (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 148-49. 3 "South Korean Policymakers Hold Meeting on Iraq Troop Dispatch," Yonhap News Agency, June 14, 2004, 268-69.

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the United States concerning President Bush’s aggressive policy regarding North Korea

and the acquittal of two U.S. servicemen in a traffic accident that killed two South

Korean schoolgirls.4 Unlike most South Korean political leaders, Roh had no ties to the

United States and had not even visited before he assumed office, which is rare for

politicians of national stature in Korea.5 During the fall 2002 presidential campaign, Roh

promised to be more assertive with the United States concerning alliance issues and

resolved to solve the problem of North Korea’s nuclear programs through dialogue rather

than force.6 Given the lack of threat, President Roh’s stance in the election, and rampant

anti-Americanism at the time, Korea’s support to the Iraq War coalition is puzzling. Why

would an administration, which was elected on an anti-American platform, provide the

third largest troop contingent to post-war stabilization operations and commit those

forces during the combat phase of the conflict?

This chapter demonstrates that domestic structure and alliance dependence

explain South Korea’s policy towards the Iraq War coalition. The Republic of Korea

represents a weak Type I domestic structure in the Peterson typology, where decision

making authority is restricted to relatively few government officials and the chief

executive enjoys near autonomy from legislative scrutiny. In a Type I environment, the

4 Seung-hwan Kim, "Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment toward the United States, 2001-2004," in Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance, ed. Derek J. Mitchell (Washington D.C., Seoul: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Yonsei University, 2004). 5 Sung-Bin Ko, "South Korea's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy," Journal of Contemporary Asia 36, no. 2 (2006). 6 Gregory F. Treverton, Eric Larson, and Spencer H. Kim, "Bridging the ‘Open Water’ in the US-South Korea Military Alliance," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XV, no. 2 (2003).

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chief executive has significant influence over foreign policy and is relatively free from

legislative oversight.7 The political culture of Korea, though substantially democratized

in the past two decades, still favors strong executive leadership in which the President

sets the tone and agenda for the National Assembly.8 Although executive prerogatives

usually gain traction in the National Assembly, the introduction of civic groups and an

opposition legislature made the Roh government a weak Type I state.9

The Roh Moo-hyun government defied strong opposition from its core political

constituencies and committed non-combat troops during the invasion of Iraq as a method

to gain leverage over U.S. nuclear policy towards the North. However, Roh was able to

overcome public discontent by linking the troop deployment to U.S. policy towards North

Korea. By making a timely promise of his “active support” of the unpopular Iraq War,

Roh attempted to repair damage that had been done by anti-American protests in an effort

to soften the U.S. stance towards North Korean nuclearization.10 South Korea’s alliance

dependence, combined with a strong executive allowed the government to support the

coalition with an outcome of “State is Entrapped and Pays” in the Security Decision

model.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of Korean governmental structure, showing

that a strong executive combined with a party influenced unicameral legislature provides 7 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict, 31. See also Cortell and Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," 455-56. 8 Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy." 9 Moon, "US-South Korean Relations." 10 Young W. Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 328-29.

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the executive with nearly unchallenged influence over government decisions. Following

this discussion, I summarize South Korea’s contributions to the Iraq War. Korean

contributions were substantial considering that it had not participated in a U.S. led

coalition with combat troops since the Vietnam War. These contributions are then

analyzed in the framework of the Security Decision Making Model, developed in chapter

three, to determine the significant external and internal influences on the Roh government

regarding support to the Iraq War coalition. Next, I address legitimacy arguments and

show that the Korean government was not significantly influenced by international

legitimacy and, in fact, made most decisions for coalition assistance before the U.S. had

gained UN sanction. Finally, I comment on the suitability of the Security Decision

Model in explaining the ROK support to the Iraq War coalition.

South Korean Government and Politics

Whereas, the Republic of Korea is a presidential democratic republic, its

democratic track record has been mixed. The ROK has had a “nominally” democratic

form of government since 1948; however, before 1968, Korean politics had been

dominated by a string of dominate presidents that sought to exert total control over all

aspects of the political process. The strong role of the president is reflected in the current

constitution but the influence of legislative and judicial checks is increasing. It was only

after 1988 that Korean national leadership instigated genuinely democratic institutions

that respected the rule of law and emphasized reform. Previously, Korea was ruled by a

series of military elite that invoked democratic principles, but actually ruled in a very

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authoritarian manner.11 Korean government reflects a state-centered approach where a

powerful state was required for economic development and defense against the

Communist North. Although there is a movement for local democratization this effort

has been unsteady and regional governments are still hierarchically dependent on the

central government.12 By 2003, the Korean government could be categorized as a

consolidating democracy where the roles of the executive, legislature, and civil society

were in a state of transition and the roles of political parties, the judiciary, and the

legislature as a check on executive power were still being institutionalized. Overall,

Korean government reflects a majoritarian democratic approach where the government

derives its power from majority rule and the political process is based on the

concentration of power.13

South Korea’s president maintains a considerable amount of power and authority

compared to the other branches of government. The president—directly elected for a

single five-year term—serves as the head of state, chief executive, and the commander-

in-chief of the armed forces. Government policy is formulated by the State Council, or

cabinet, which is directly appointed by and includes the president. Members of the State 11 Ibid., 310. Sung Deuk Hahm and L. Christopher Plein, After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997). 12 Hahm and Plein, After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy, Jung In Kang, "Reflections on Recent Democratization," in Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification, ed. Jung In Kang, Sallie W. Yea, and Byong-Man Ahn (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002), Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture. Instead of consolidating democracy, the Republic of Korea, may be represented as an “Organizing Democracy” where liberal principles are accepted, but democratic institutions are immature, see Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?," Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998). 13 Majoritarian democracies have electoral systems with only two major political parties or coalitions, single-party cabinets, unicameralism, and unitary and centralized governments. See Scott Mainwaring, "Two Models of Democracy," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3 (2001).

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Council are collectively and individually responsible to the President only. The National

Assembly, or legislature, is unicameral and is directly elected every four years for a four

year term.14 Local governments, though gaining autonomy, are highly influenced by the

executive branch and thus are often indistinguishable from the central government.15 The

three branches of government are interwoven into a hierarchical relationship in which the

executive branch and the president form the center pillar of Korean government.16 The

weak legislature and the unstable party system contribute to the president’s substantial

influence on Korean government and politics.17

The president is the only national executive that is directly elected. The president

serves one five-year term and is constitutionally limited to only a single term. This

single-term limitation is a response to past abuses of presidential power from the 1950s

through the 1970s, during which presidents, once in power, would prolong their terms in

office for extended periods. In his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces,

the president has extensive authority over military policy, including the power to declare

war, declare a state of emergency, or martial law, subject to the National Assembly’s

14 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. South Korea," (London: The Economist, 2003), 5. 15 Chung Mok Chung, "A New Perspective for Korean Local Government," in Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification, ed. Jung In Kang, Sallie W. Yea, and Byong-Man Ahn (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002). 16 Byong-Man Ahn, Elites and Political Power in South Korea (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003). 17 Hahm and Plein, After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy, 215, David C. Kang, "The Institutional Foundations of Korean Politics," in Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction, ed. Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).

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subsequent approval.18 Article 74 of the Korean constitution marks the president as

commander in chief and Article 73 gives the president authority to negotiate and ratify

treaties, and to declare war. The president unilaterally appoints the prime minister and

the State Council according to Articles 86 and 87, who by Article 89 are the designated

members that formulate foreign policy and war decisions. Finally, Article 77 gives the

president the authority to declare martial law.19 The president maintains significant

influence over the legislature. Articles 72, 75, and 76 allow the president to submit

important decisions directly to a national referendum, issue presidential decrees, and in

time of crisis, issue orders having the effect of law without concurrence of the National

Assembly. However, he does not have the power to dissolve the assembly as is typical in

parliamentary governments. Presidential appointments to the cabinet and high

government office are usually from within his political party ranks and from close friends

and associates. Former classmates and regional relations constitute the bulk of

presidential appointees; therefore the president maintains significant influence over

cabinet decisions.20 Additionally, the president appoints three influential cabinet-level

staff members (chief of staff, chief policy secretary, and chief national security secretary)

18 Korea (Republic), The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987) (Seoul: Office of Legislation, 1987). 19 Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, 139. Korea (Republic), The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987). 20 Doh-jong Kim, "Corrupt Political Culture Erodes Competitiveness," The Korea Herald, January 17, 2008.

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who do not require assembly approval, but who oversee the cabinet and bureaucracy and

play an important role in formulating public and foreign policy.21

Day to day operations of the executive branch is overseen by the prime minister,

who assists the president in his duties. Unlike the prime minister under a traditional

parliamentary system where he or she is the chief executive, the prime minister of Korea

is the principal executive assistant to the president. Constitutionally, the president is

popularly elected and represents the people, while the prime minister is appointed by the

president and serves as his chief administrator.22 The prime minister is not required to be

a member of parliament and is usually filled by the president with a political confidant.

The prime minister is approved by the National Assembly and supervises government

ministries and independent agencies. He or she also has the power to recommend the

appointment or dismissal of cabinet ministers; however, they are typically chosen by the

president and traditionally follow the president’s prerogatives.23 In the event that the

president is unable to fulfill his duties, the prime minister assumes the position of acting

president.24 Rather than providing a check on executive power, the ROK prime minister

in actuality consolidates presidential power.

21 Hahm and Plein, After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy, 134. 22 Young-jae Jin, "Lee Brings Back 'Strong Presidentialism': President-Elect Seeks to Curtail the Power of the Prime Minister and the Number of Ministries," The Korea Herald, January 21, 2008. 23 Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, South Korea: A Country Study (Washington DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990). 24 During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the prime minister acted as chief executive while President Roh was considered for impeachment from March to May 2003. Sung-ho Kim, "The Constitutional Soul of Korea's Democracy," The Korea Herald, December 25, 2007.

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The State Council—the highest executive body—is composed of the president,

the prime minister, and the heads of executive ministries. The Council deliberates on

major policy decisions that fall within the power of the executive; its meetings are

chaired by the president and officiated by the prime minister.25 Although the Council has

no power to make final decisions, the Constitution requires that certain matters be

brought to it before final decisions are made. These include drafts of constitutional

amendments, declarations of war, budget proposals, government restructurings, and

emergency orders. South Korean political observers have noted that the president uses

his appointment powers to the cabinet as an important political tool for balancing

factional interests within his party and for rewarding loyalty. Therefore, the president has

almost unfettered influence over the State Council and government ministries.26

Individual minister ability to influence and control policy under a “strong” president is

considerably limited. Ministry heads tend to have little influence over policy due to

frequent reshuffling of ministry positions by the president, or forced resignations due to

public scandals. Under the Kim Young-sam regime (1993-98), the average term for the

prime minister was only 10 months, while the average term for ministers of economy,

internal affairs, health, general affairs, and political affairs averaged about seven to eight

months. This trend continued in the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-08).27

25 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 217, 38. 26 Savada and Shaw, South Korea: A Country Study. 27 Jin, "Lee Brings Back 'Strong Presidentialism': President-Elect Seeks to Curtail the Power of the Prime Minister and the Number of Ministries."

175

The most influential executive body as of late is the National Security Council

(NSC). The NSC is the primary decision making body for security issues. The NSC

consists of the prime minister, the director of the Agency for National Security Planning

(ANSP), and the ministers of national defense, foreign affairs and trade, home affairs,

and finance. During the Roh administration, the NSC was effectively led by the Vice

Chief rather than the National Security Advisor. During the Roh administration, the NSC

was Roh’s primary advisory and decision making body on most issues, especially those

involving the United States.28

The 1987 Constitution attempted to restrict the power of the president by

divesting the power concentrated in the executive and balancing it with the legislature.

According to the constitution, the legislature has many powers with which to check and

scrutinize the executive. As stated above, it has the right to consent to the conclusion and

ratification of treaties; control of taxation and budgeting; the right to investigate public

affairs and inspect government offices; the right to request the prime minister, ministers,

and government delegates to attend the legislative session and answer questions; the right

to pass a recommendation for the removal of the prime minister or a state council

member from office; and finally the right to pass motions for impeachment of the

president, the prime minister, members of the state council and other public officials, in

case they have violated the constitution or other laws in the performance of official

duties.

28 Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications," Korea Observer 36, no. 4 (2005).

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The legislative branch consists of the unicameral National Assembly. Similar to

most Western national legislatures, the major role of the Assembly is passing laws,

representing national sentiment, and overseeing the executive body. According to Article

60[1][2] of the constitution, the Assembly possesses the right of consent to treaties,

declarations of war, and military deployments.29 The Korean legislature is intended to

balance the power of the executive, but historically this separation has been effectively

disabled by strong presidents who maintain significant control over party appointments.

Only recently has the opposition controlled the legislature and moderately checked the

power of the president.30 Under Korean law, assembly members are both directly elected

and appointed by the political parties in proportion to the number of seats the party wins

in the national election held every four years. In the 2000 election, 227 assembly

members were directly elected, while the remaining 46 were appointed based on the

proportional formula.31 Sessions of the Assembly may be either regular (once a year, for

no more than 100 days) or extraordinary (by request of the president or a caucus for no

29 Korea (Republic), The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987). See also Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force, 139. 30 Since the National Assembly is unicameral, the president is often supported by his own party and retains significant control. Likewise, when the National Assembly is from the opposition party, the president is often able to gain votes in the legislature by offering personal incentives to ministers to switch parties. Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 315-16. President Kim Dae-Jung secured a majority in the National Assembly in 1998 by enticing a large number of opposition lawmakers to defect through abuses of his executive power, Hong Nack Kim, "The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (2000), 895. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge, UK New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3. The National Assembly actually rejected two nominees for the Prime Minister position that were presented by President Kim Dae-jung, in 2002. Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 284-85. 31 The 2000 election is significant, because it determined the Assembly composition during the deliberations approaching the Iraq War.

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more than 30 days). These sessions are open to the public by default, but can be closed

by majority vote or by decree of the Speaker. In order for laws to be passed in any

session, a quorum of half the members must be present.32

The legislative process in the Assembly has several distinctive features that favor

the executive. First, bills may be introduced by the executive or by assembly members;

however, the constitution provides the executive with streamlined procedures for

introducing legislation.33 Bills must pass through legislative committee before they reach

the floor for a vote; however, before they reach committee, they must already have

gained the support of at least 20 members. Bills introduced by the executive branch, in

contrast, do not require a threshold value to be introduced to committee. Second, the

executive bureaucracy maintains an advantage over legislative committees on policy

expertise and agenda setting. Since committee chairs and members change every two

years, members have little opportunity to develop policy expertise. Additionally, the lack

of a well-developed committee assignment process hinders committee specialization.

Committee assignments are distributed under the direction of the party leadership and

reflect political pork-barrel politics rather than policy expertise.34 Third, the assembly

may pass laws contrary to the president’s policies, but those bills may be vetoed.

Overriding a veto requires a two-thirds majority of assembly votes and must be

completed within 15 days of the veto. Fourth, according to Article 54[3] the president

32 Korea (Republic), The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (as Amended in 1987). 33 Ahn, Elites and Political Power in South Korea, Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy." 34 Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."

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formulates the budget, and the legislature cannot hold the budget hostage to his

performance on foreign policy issues, nor can it force the president to fund unwanted

initiatives based on Article 57. Finally, the Assembly only recently gained an

independent capability for research and analysis. Committees previously had little ability

to counter the highly coordinated position advocated by the executive’s bureaucracy.

The executive advantage is also reflected in the high passage rate of bills

introduced by the executive versus the legislature and the lack of oversight over

executive functions. Prior to the onset of the democratic transition in 1987, bill-

proposing power had been almost completely monopolized by the executive branch. The

preeminence of the executive branch as the initiator of policy was accepted as a necessary

condition for hastened economic development in a short time, but that preeminent status

of the executive branch has continued in a less explicit but still prevalent fashion.35

Under Article 62[2] the Assembly can question the prime minister or State Council, but

has no power to call the president for questioning. Likewise, the Assembly may only

recommend that the prime minister or a council member be removed based on Article 63.

Furthermore, according to Article 65[1] the Assembly may impeach the president, but

only for constitutional or legal violations. All considered, the Assembly falls short of

fulfilling its role representing society and checking the power of the executive.

Sound party politics, if they represented the will of the public, would provide a

crucial bridge between society, the Assembly, and the president, but this bridge is

35 Ibid.

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missing in Korea. Political parties are weak in Korean politics and have not become

institutionalized, nor have they served to connect voters with actual policy choices.36

Political parties in Korea do not reflect the aggregated interests of its members, but rather

function as instruments of political leaders to further their individual interests. Parties are

top-down rather than bottom-up organized and tend to serve elite interests while merely

providing insincere efforts to promoting public and general interests.37 They represent

the political opinions of party members rather than constituents.38

Korean lawmakers follow their party leader’s decisions almost all the time.

Cross-party voting is rarely found in Korea’s national and local assemblies, which

demonstrates a high level of party loyalty, but not ideological cohesiveness.39 Party

discipline is extremely rigid, meaning that dialogue and negotiation does not occur

between Assembly members, but rather party bosses determine policy.40 To that end, the

center of policy debate is not the Assembly but the political party. If an individual

legislator does not follow party guidelines in a critical floor vote, he or she may be

punished by being deprived of various privileges within the party, including nominations

36 Kang, "The Institutional Foundations of Korean Politics," 83-86. Byong-Man Ahn, "Korean Political Parties and Political Development: Crucial Elections and the Institutionalization of the Political Party System," in Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification, ed. Jung In Kang, Sallie W. Yea, and Byong-Man Ahn (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002), Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 317-19. 37 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 317. 38 Jin-min Chung, "The Aspects of Genuine Party Reform in Korea," The Korea Herald, January 2, 2008. 39 Chae-han Kim, "The Ideological Affiliations of Political Parties," The Korea Herald, January 7, 2008. 40 Seong-ho Lim, "Creating Balanced President-Assembly Relations," The Korea Herald, January 25, 2008, Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."

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and committee assignments.41 Political leaders or specific political elites founded or

dispersed political parties for their political purposes and interests; therefore, the party

became a method to extract rent from the state on behalf of party elites in exchange for

favored policies.42 In this way, political parties have functioned to organize and

manipulate society from above.43

Since political parties tend to be manipulated by party leaders for self-interested

reasons, they frequently dissolve and merge at the behest of political leaders and elites.

Korea’s political parties are not subsequently enduring entities and have very short

lives.44 As long as the party functions in a manner acceptable to the party leader, the

leader continues his association with the organization. However, stability has been rare

in Korea, since founding personalities have often dismissed their parties or renamed

them. Therefore, the average lifespan of parties has been exceptionally short, and

numerous political parties have been created and dissolved.45

The effect of the weakened party system has been to further the power of the

president and powerful politicians at the expense of societal interests. The ROK federal

government and local governments still tend to aggregate demands of large powerful

41 Jong-bin Yoon, "Causes and Consequences of Assembly Deadlock," The Korea Hearld, January 28, 2008. 42 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 317. 43 Soong Hoom Kil and Chung-in Moon, eds., Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction, SUNY Series in Korean Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 83. 44 Kim, "The Ideological Affiliations of Political Parties." 45 Kang, "The Institutional Foundations of Korean Politics.", Dong-yoon Lee, "The Dynamics of Party Politics in Korea " The Korea Herald, January 1, 2008.

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groups, ignoring constituent needs and desires.46 Furthermore, the president’s single

fixed term gives him little direct electoral incentive for aligning policy with public

opinion. Additionally, Articles 8 and 21 give the government significant power to quell

dissent. Limited methods exist for voters or interest groups outside the executive inner

circle to influence policy or make their preferences known. Voters dissatisfied with the

status quo have a choice between submission and violent mass protest.47 Non-

governmental organizations (NGO) and civic action organizations have emerged as a

means to influence policy; however, since Korean NGOs are heavily subsidized by the

government they are often reluctant to challenge government positions.48

Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) have

voluntarily attempted to increase the influence of the Assembly and limit the powers of

the president; however, these changes reflect personal policy preferences rather than

structural constraints on the executive. The legislative process in the Assembly is still

marked by deep involvement from the executive branch, exceptionally strong party

leadership, and a confrontational mode of interaction between the governing party and

the opposition parties.49 The political culture of Korea, though substantially

democratized in the past two decades, is not yet mature enough to give priority to a

balanced partnership between legislative and executive branches. Due to legislative

46 Jin, "Lee Brings Back 'Strong Presidentialism': President-Elect Seeks to Curtail the Power of the Prime Minister and the Number of Ministries." 47 Kil and Moon, eds., Understanding Korean Politics: An Introduction, 88. 48 Kyudok Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," Journal of International and Area Studies 12, no. 2 (2005), 37-38. 49 Sohn, "Addressing Limits of Parliamentary Democracy."

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gridlock, influence peddling, and executive dominance, and a lack of means to influence

policy, Korean citizens maintain an ambivalent attitude toward the ability of the National

Assembly to represent their interests. The balance of power is skewed toward a president

equipped with unilateral executive powers, and Assembly members’ active involvement

in policy issues often generates gridlock in governance which is overcome by executive

prerogatives.50 This strong presidential leadership and control of the bureaucracy,

combined with a weak legislature, marks South Korea as a Type I state in the Peterson

typology.51

The Timing, Size, and Mix of South Korea’s Contributions

Korea walked a diplomatic tightrope with the United States in the approach to the

Iraq War. The ROK government did not want to commit to a costly military intervention

with the potential to alienate Arab oil suppliers.52 At the same time, the Kim and Roh

governments attempted to balance U.S. requests for military support against their need

for U.S. cooperation in the North Korean nuclear standoff. To obtain U.S. consent to the

“Policy for Peace and Prosperity,” the Korean NSC encouraged the government to join

the Iraq War effort with the eventual dispatch of 3,600 troops by summer 2004. South

Korea provided a significant number of military personnel supporting the Iraq War

coalition in two phases. The first phase involved the dispatch of approximately 650

medical and engineering personnel in the immediate aftermath of declared combat

50 Lim, "Creating Balanced President-Assembly Relations." 51 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict. 52 "Korea Walking Diplomatic Tightrope over War on Iraq," Korea Times, September 14, 2002.

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operations. The second dispatch of an additional 3,000 troops occurred in response to the

U.S. request for forces to support stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq.

Korea’s diplomatic support was less noteworthy. Politically, South Korea remained on

the sidelines in 2002 and early 2003 while the Bush administration attempted to forge a

coalition of the willing against Iraq. However, once military intervention was inevitable,

Seoul provided political support to the intervention. Economically, Seoul’s contributions

were significant. Seoul provided approximately $275 million in assistance, soft loans,

and grants through UN organizations and bilaterally.53 The following sections describe

the timing and composition of ROK political, economic, and military contributions to the

coalition of the willing.

Political Contributions

Seoul’s political strategy in the approach to the Iraq War was to walk the fine line

between supporting U.S. efforts to condemn the Hussein regime while not angering Arab

oil suppliers. Korea imports the bulk of its oil from the Middle East, and the region is an

important export market for Korean goods as well. Seoul’s political strategy hinged on

encouraging a UN mandate until it was inevitable that the U.S. would implement a

military strategy in Iraq.

Under the administration of President Kim Dae-jung, Korea maintained a strategy

of ambivalence towards the U.S. efforts aimed at Iraq. This ambivalence mirrored the

53 United States Department of State., Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, April 2008 [cited May 16 2008]); available from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105341.pdf. Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 148.

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South Korean attitude towards contributing to the 1991 Gulf War coalition; the ROK

government maintained a diplomatically neutral stance until asked by the United States to

support the coalition.54 The Blue House (Korean White House) refrained from either

endorsing or disapproving U.S. policy and offered no reaction to President Bush’s

September 12 speech to the UN General Assembly accusing the Hussein regime of

developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). According to a ROK government

official, Seoul’s strategy was to not publicly reveal its stance on Iraq until necessary.55

Considering the anti-American climate in South Korea, and the lack of international

consensus regarding Iraq, Seoul maintained diplomatic neutrality in an effort to not

inflame its domestic or international constituencies.

President Kim encouraged a UN mandate in private conversations with President

Bush. In a September 2002 phone conversation, Kim expressed his support for U.S.

intentions to gain a UN resolution on Iraq before resorting to the use of force. Seoul’s

stance was articulated publicly at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), September 22-24,

2002, when President Kim and leaders of 24 ASEM member countries called on

Washington to work within the UN framework regarding military action in Iraq.56

According to a presidential aide, “Kim’s support doesn’t cover a unilateral U.S. move.”57

However, Seoul had to maintain a moderately pro-U.S. diplomatic stance so that it could

54 Jeffrey R. Lord and Kristin M. Lord, "Additional Cases from the Gulf Crisis and Burden Sharing in Unprofor," in Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, ed. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). 55 "Korea Walking Diplomatic Tightrope over War on Iraq." 56 "Seoul against US Moves on Iraq," Korea Times, September 27, 2002. 57 Ibid.

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coordinate North Korean policy.58 The same aide declined to answer whether Korea

would support the U.S. if it eventually pursued unilateral action against Iraq.

In late November 2002, the Bush administration allegedly requested military

support from Seoul for the Iraq coalition; however, the government did not publicly

acknowledge this request until February 2003. According to an anonymous senior

Korean government official, “There has been a US request for a ‘usual level of support’

in case a war breaks out in Iraq.” The official added, “We have not yet decided our

position regarding this.”59 In anticipation of a visit to Seoul by Deputy Secretary of State

Richard Armitage in December, the ROK government continued to announce that it had

not yet received a specific request from the United States for assistance in the event of

military action.60 Regional experts stated that with the current anti-American mood in

Seoul, combined with North Korea’s nuclear declaration, a direct request from Armitage

would put the Kim administration in a tough position.61

By early February 2003, alliance dependence concerns seemed to overcome

Korean reluctance to support the coalition of the willing. In late January, in a response to

President-elect Roh’s markedly anti-American campaign and Korean demands for a

change of the Status of Forces agreement, James Baker reputedly gave a disturbing

58 "Kim to Hold Summit with Bush," Korea Times, September 27, 2002. 59 "Official Says US Requests Support If Military Action Taken against Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, November 21, 2002. 60 Charles Whelan, "Armitage Heads for Seoul for Talks on Iraq, Anti-Americanism," Agence France Presse, December 10, 2002. 61 Ibid.

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assessment for a delegation of South Korean national assembly members visiting the

United States:

When Corazon Aquino asked U.S. troops to leave we left without any second thought…When China seized some Filipino islands by force, she telephoned to ask whether we will let China get away with this. I said there were no U.S. soldiers in her country to prevent any such Chinese aggression…The same applies to Korea were she to opt for U.S. military pullout.62

Within two weeks of this visit, the ROK government openly announced its support for

the coalition of the willing, although its commitment was limited to non-combat forces.63

On February 10, the outgoing Kim government declared that Seoul would likely provide

support to the impending U.S. military action if requested. Prime Minister Kim Suk-soo

stated to the National Assembly that Seoul could send troops to the Middle East to show

support for the U.S. military action.64 Brig. General Hwang Young-soo, from the

Defense Ministry, added, “If the U.S. asks for soldiers [in non-combat areas], we will

consider it by following the precedents set during the Gulf War and the war in

Afghanistan.”65

Finally, at the urging of the United States, the newly seated Roh government

pledged its support to the coalition of the willing. On March 11, nine days before the

start of the war and two days before the U.S. and United Kingdom withdrew demands for

62 Byung-Kook Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," in Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Anthony Jones (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 223. 63 "Seoul to Throw Support for US War on Iraq," Korea Times, March 11, 2003. 64 "Faction Opposes Use of S.K. Troops in Iraq," Korea Herald, February 17, 2003. 65 "Defense Ministry Reaffirms Non-Combat Troop Dispatch," Korea Times, February 12, 2003, "Seoul to Throw Support for US War on Iraq."

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a new U.N. Security Council vote on war with Iraq, South Korea officially accepted the

U.S. request to assist in its war effort against Iraq. A Chong Wa Dae (Office of the

President of the Republic of Korea, or Blue House) spokesman said that Washington

conveyed a request that Seoul express its support of the coalition by providing it with

medical assistance to deal with the anticipated refugee flow.66 Another official stated,

“We are not in a position to sit idle, when our ally is sending a desperate call,” however

he cautioned that, “We will first issue a statement pledging our support but in a way that

will minimize misunderstanding in the Arab world.”67 In a March 13 telephone

conversation with President Roh, President Bush affirmed that he needed Seoul’s

outspoken support for its possible war on Iraq.68 In return, Roh gained Washington’s

confirmation that the United States would seek a peaceful solution to its nuclear standoff

with North Korea.69

Diplomatically, South Korea remained on the sidelines until compelled by the

Bush administration to support the war effort. The Kim Dae-jung administration

attempted to maintain a position of neutrality by maintaining that it would not get

involved in the Iraq issue. The only stance that the administration took was that it

encouraged the United States to seek a UN mandate for a military mission. The

successor Roh administration attempted to maintain its distance, but increasing tensions

66 "Seoul to Throw Support for US War on Iraq." 67 Ibid. 68 "Roh, Bush Show Signs of Reconciliation," Korea Times, March 15, 2003, Hyun-jin Seo, "Both Roh, Bush Score in Phone Talks," The Korea Herald, March 14, 2003. 69 "Roh, Bush Show Signs of Reconciliation.", Seo, "Both Roh, Bush Score in Phone Talks."

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on the peninsula, combined with U.S. pressure to participate, influenced Seoul’s decision

making.

During the approach to the Iraq War, Seoul was considerably more concerned

with tensions emanating from North Korea’s declaration that it would restart its nuclear

program rather than the implications of U.S. action in the Middle East. Initially, the Roh

administration aimed for de-escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis through a

continuation of sorts of President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” as the “Policy for

Peace and Prosperity.” Roh unveiled his “Policy for Peace and Prosperity” in his

February 25, 2003 inauguration address. The Policy for Peace and Prosperity advocated

the normalization of relations between North Korea and the international community as a

means of developing a durable peace regime on the Korean peninsula.70 Roh stressed

that a peaceful resolution through dialogue was the only solution, and that heightened

military tension must be avoided at all costs, undermining the U.S. strategy of

confrontation.71 Roh’s continuation of the “sunshine” approach was in direct conflict

with the Bush strategy of confrontation. The ROK’s continued engagement with North

Korea made it appear to be a “spoiler” of the U.S. nonproliferation policy, making up for

North Korea’s lack of resources with aid, regardless of DPRK actions.72

Until February 2003, Seoul declined to give clear-cut answers on whether the

government would support a possible U.S. action without UN approval; however, the

70 Republic of Korea., "The Policy for Peace and Prosperity," ed. Ministry of Unification (2003). 71 In-duk Kang, "Toward Peace and Prosperity: The New Government’s North Korea Policy," East Asian Review 15, no. 1 (2003), 4. 72 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator."

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fledgling Roh administration realized that non-cooperation could lend a fatal blow to

South Korean efforts to defuse the tension catalyzed by North Korea’s nuclear

declaration.

Economic Contributions

In terms of economic assistance, Korea’s economic pledges have earned it a

position as a major donor for Iraq Reconstruction, but its $260 million of support pales in

comparison to the $4.9 billion pledged by Japan. The Republic of Korea’s initial pledge

of $10 million in economic assistance earned it a position on the Donor Committee of the

International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). The UN sponsored IRFFI

has been one of the principal vehicles for delivering international donor assistance to

Iraq. IRFFI is a multilateral mechanism made up of two Iraq trust funds, one managed by

the UN Development Group and the other by the World Bank. The Donor Committee

consists of countries that have committed at least $10 million to the fund facility and also

includes two rotating representatives from countries that have committed less than $10

million.73

Korea’s initial pledge of $10 million in April 2003 towards humanitarian

assistance for Iraqi refugees was increased to $60 million by the time of the Madrid

Donor Conference in October 2003.74 This aid was distributed through international

organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, and the World

73 United States Department of State., "Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction," (Washington DC: Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2005). 74 "Korea Commits $200 Million to Iraq," The Korea Herald, October 25, 2003.

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Food Program.75 Seoul eventually pledged an additional $200 million over five years at

the Madrid conference.76 Washington acknowledged South Korea’s contribution at the

2003 Security Consultation Meeting. According to ROK Defense Minister Cho Young-

kil, “Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his appreciation for President Roh Moo-hyun’s

decision to provide both additional forces in Iraq and $260 million in reconstruction

funds from 2003 to 2007.”77

These contributions were seen as a means to display to the Arab community that

Korea was supporting the coalition of the willing as a means to reconstruct Iraq rather

than as part of an occupying force. The Roh administration underscored these financial

contributions to Arab leaders as a means to foster an atmosphere favorable to Korean

troop deployments to Iraq. On February 17, 2004, President Roh hosted a group of

envoys from 13 Arab nations to seek their support for South Korea’s plan to send 3,000

troops to Iraq. During the meeting Roh urged the envoys to play a role in persuading

their constituencies that Korean military efforts were geared towards gaining security and

rehabilitating Iraq.78 Since most Arab nations opposed any additional troop deployment

that was not led by the United Nations, Seoul felt that Korea needed to explain their

contributions directly to the Arab public. In that effort President Roh provided interviews

75 "Seoul to Offer $10 Mil. For Iraqi Refugees," Korea Times, April 4, 2003, "Seoul to Provide $10 Mil. To Iraq for Humanitarian Assistance," Korea Times, April 7, 2003. 76 Paul Knox, "October 23, 2003," The Globe and Mail, October 23, 2003, "Korea Commits $200 Million to Iraq." 77 "US Respects Seoul's Decision on Troop Dispatch to Iraq: Rumsfeld," Korea Times, November 18, 2003. 78 "South Korean Leader Pledges Additional Aid to Iraq in Meeting with Arab Envoys," Yonhap News Agency, February 17, 2004.

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to Al Jazeera, Egypt’s Middle East News Agency, and Iran’s Islamic Republic News

Agency.79

In addition to Madrid pledges, a number of countries made new pledges to help

Iraq at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, at the launching of the International Compact with Iraq

(ICI or Compact) in May 2007. South Korea’s pledge included a $200 million soft loan

provided by Korea’s Economic Development and Cooperation Fund to help rebuild and

develop Iraq’s oil industry.80 Finally, the ROK and Iraq also reached agreements to

strengthen economic ties through construction, energy, and information technology

sharing. South Korea’s contribution to Iraq reconstruction marks it as one of the six

major donors of foreign aid.81

Korea’s economic assistance compares favorably with its economic role in 1991.

In that effort South Korea was forced through U.S. pressure to contribute $115 million to

international assistance efforts and $45 million to the United Kingdom, Egypt, and

Morocco for their military forces. In both the 1991 and 2003 efforts, Korean assistance

was provided after U.S. pressure.82

79 Ibid. 80 Troy Stangarone, Taking a Larger Role in International Affairs: Korea's Growing Efforts in Peacekeeping Missions and Development Aid (Korea Economic Institute, August 2007 [cited May 19 2008]); available from http://www.keia.com/Publications/Insight/2007/august%2007.pdf. 81 The six major donors include: Japan, ROK, UK, Sweden, Canada, and the EU. Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development., Report on Donors' Contributions to Reconstruction Efforts up to March 2008 (The Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB) International Cooperation Department, 2008 [cited May 20 2008]); available from http://www.mop-iraq.org/mopdc/resources/pdf/DAD/DAD%20Reporte_april.pdf. 82 Lord and Lord, "Additional Cases from the Gulf Crisis and Burden Sharing in Unprofor," 329-30.

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Military Contributions

The ROK government deployed military personnel to Iraq in two phases, both in

response to pressure from the Bush administration. The first deployment of troops was in

response to a February 2003 request to Seoul to assist militarily with post-war

reconstruction, combat operations, and humanitarian assistance. Seoul initially hesitated,

in light of domestic opposition to the U.S. action. However, considering the importance

of the ROK-U.S. alliance and increasing tensions between the United States and North

Korea, Seoul finally decided to send troops in levels similar to the assistance given to

Operation’s Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). During the 1991Gulf

War, Seoul deployed a 150-member medical team, five C-130 transport aircraft, and 150

transportation personnel. Similarly, the ROK government sent 150 medical personnel,

350 transportation personnel, and a team of 150 military engineers to Afghanistan.83 In

April 2003, Seoul dispatched 670 military engineers and medical personnel to Iraq

supporting the U.S. military mission.84 Significantly, these troops were pledged to the

U.S. war effort in March 2003—before combat operations began—and they arrived in

theater in April, while the U.S. was still engaged in combat against the Hussein regime.

83 "Defense Ministry Reaffirms Non-Combat Troop Dispatch." 84 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 33, Kwang Sub Kwak, "The US-ROK Alliance, 1953 – 2004: Alliance Institutionalization" (Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2006), 247-48.

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After the end of the conventional combat phase of the war, these units moved to

Nasiriyah to assist the reconstruction of Iraq.85

In an effort to put a more “international face” on the American led occupation, the

Bush administration aggressively solicited for additional coalition troops in an effort to

replace some American forces.86 This request resulted in the eventual deployment of an

additional 3,000 ROK military personnel in August 2004. U.S. requests for assistance

were reported in the Korean press throughout July and August 2003 provoking rumors

across Korea that additional ROK forces might soon be sent to Iraq to assist the

American forces already there.87 At the fourth Future of Alliance (FOTA) talks in Seoul

on September 3 and 4, and in a meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense

Wolfowitz and ROK Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan in Washington September 5,

the U.S. requested that Korea deploy a sizable military contingent to Iraq.88 In response,

Minister Yoon hinted that his government would comply with the U.S. request.89 On

October 17, 2003 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1511 which

urged UN members to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Roh government quickly

took advantage of this event and on October 18, Roh announced that he would send

85 United States Central Command., Coalition Countries: Republic of Korea (U.S. Central Command, 2008 [cited May 15 2008]); available from http://www.centcom.mil/en/finance/93.html. President Bush declared the end to combat operations and “mission accomplished” on May 1, 2003. 86 Eric Schmitt, "Up to 30,000 Troops from a Dozen Nations to Replace Some G.I.'S in Iraq," The New York Times, June 19, 2003. 87 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 32. 88 Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 269. 89 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 33.

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additional troops to Iraq.90 The U.S. requested 5,000 ROK combat troops to be deployed

to Mosul to replace the 101st Airborne Division; the Roh administration, however, opted

to send a contingent consisting primarily of support troops to provide reconstruction aid

rather than the security that was desperately needed.91 Although the government

committed itself to the additional deployment in October, the deployment was repeatedly

delayed due to the increased violence in Iraq and domestic resistance at home.92 The

Korean deployment was conditioned that the ROK send mostly a peacekeeping force

rather than a combat force, and that the U.S. find a safe location for the ROK area of

operations. The ROK government, already concerned about domestic unrest, cited

security concerns in Mosul and U.S. pressure to participate in “offensive operations” for

its delay.93 The U.S. complied with Seoul’s requests and the ROK dispatched the Zaytun

unit to the Arbil province in August 2004. This unit was composed of 1,400 combat

Marines and Special Forces commandos and 1,600 military engineers and medics

responsible for security and reconstruction of the Kurdish Autonomous Region centered

in Arbil.94 The Zaytun deployment was South Korea’s largest troop dispatch since the

Vietnam War, when it deployed over 300,000 personnel over a twelve-year period. In 90 Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 269-70. 91 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 31, Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, "U.S. Requested Dispatch of S.K. Light Infantry to Iraq: Official," Yonhap News Agency, September 15, 2003, Yu Wong-won, "Which Unit Will Be Dispatched to Iraq? Possibility of Dispatching Special Commando Brigade," Choson Ilbo, September 29, 2003. 92 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 31, "Over 5,000 ROK Soldiers Likely to Head to Iraq," Korea Times, October 20, 2003. 93 "ROK Delays Dispatch of Troops Earmarked for Iraq," China Daily, March 20, 2004, "U.S. Requests Brigade-Level Combat Troop Deployment to Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, September 15, 2003. 94 Balbina Y. Hwang, South Korean Troops to Iraq: A Boost for U.S.-ROK Relations (The Heritage Foundation, 2004 [cited May 19 2008]); available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm427.cfm.

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fact, Korea’s presence was the third largest military contingent in the coalition of the

willing until late 2007.95 The Zaytun division’s mission was to reconstruct roads and

infrastructure, offer vocational training assistance, provide medical treatment to local

residents, and provide training to Iraqi Security Forces.96 Later, in March 2006, the unit

assumed guard and escort missions for UN officials in the region, but was constrained by

its parliamentary mandate from participating in offensive military operations throughout

the deployment.97

Though the ROK National Assembly has repeatedly extended the Zaytun unit’s

mandate, the number of Korean troops in Iraq has steadily decreased to approximately

650, as of May 2008.98 The Korean National Assembly voted for the first significant

troop reduction December 20, 2005 in reaction to anticipated domestic pressure to

withdraw from the Iraq coalition and the planned drawdown of U.S. and British forces.

Seoul unilaterally scaled back its force level by 1,000 personnel as part of their plan for

extending deployments in Iraq, which require parliamentary approval each year to gain

approval.99 In a blow to the Bush administration, the first indication of the troop

95 Ibid, Kwak, "The US-ROK Alliance, 1953 – 2004: Alliance Institutionalization". 96 Major General Eui-Don Hwang, "Republic of Korea Forces in Iraq: Peacekeeping and Reconstruction," Military Review LXXXV, no. 06 (2005), Dae-woong Jin, "Korean Troops Welcomed by Kurds in Iraq," The Korea Herald, March 19, 2006. 97 Hwang, "Republic of Korea Forces in Iraq: Peacekeeping and Reconstruction.", Dae-woong Jin, "Korean Troops Mark Two Years in Iraqi Kurdistan Town," The Korea Herald, February 23, 2006. 98 Kwak, "The US-ROK Alliance, 1953 – 2004: Alliance Institutionalization", "New Commander to Take Command of Troops in Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, April 15, 2008, "S. Korea to Decrease Activity of Troops in Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, December 29, 2007. 99 Jae-soon Chang, "South Korea Plans to Withdraw One-Third of Troops from Iraq," Associated Press, November 17, 2005, Al Kamen, "Coalition Members Look for an Exit," The Washington Post, November 17, 2005, A17, "No Friction in Alliance over Iraq Troop Cut," Korea Times, November 25, 2005, "South Korean Minister Seeks to Resolve Dispute with US over Iraq Troop Cut," Yonhap News Agency, November

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reduction was from the Korean media.100 The next force reduction was bundled into the

approval bill the next year. The government gained parliamentary approval for extending

the deployment for another year by reducing the size of the contingent from 2,300 to

1,200. Additionally, in a concession to the ruling Uri party, the government agreed to

present a plan for a complete withdrawal of all Korean troops by the end of 2007 in order

to gain approval of the National Assembly.101 The Assembly did not specify any

specific timetable for troop pullout, and the Roh administration extended the troop

mandate for an additional year with a reduced troop level, hoping to gain economic

benefits and strengthening ties with the United States for continuing support.102

Explaining South Korean Contributions

The Republic of Korea’s contribution to the Iraq coalition is noteworthy, since the

country provided the third largest military contingent from 2003 through 2006. This

level of support was initiated and maintained in the face of significant criticism from the

public, who elected the Roh administration on a platform of independence and greater

autonomy within the ROK-U.S. bilateral relationship. Shortly after his inauguration, the

24, 2005, "Talk of South Korean Troop Reduction Points to Uncertainty of Iraq Coalition Future," Associated Press, November 18, 2005. 100 "US Learned of South Korean Troop Reduction from Media," Yonhap News Agency, November 21, 2005. 101 Dae-woong Jin, "Korea Notifies U.S. Of Iraq Troop Pullout," The Korea Herald, December 6, 2006, "S. Korea's Ruling Party Will Back Troop Extension in Iraq," Associated Press, November 24, 2006, "S.Korea to Withdraw Iraq Troops Next Year," United Press International, November 30, 2006, "South Korea Appoves Extension of Troops in Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, December 22, 2006. 102 The governor of Arbil hinted that his provincial government would give an oil concession to South Korean firms for the country's successful efforts to help rebuild the region. Sung-ki Jung, "S. Korea Delays Decision on Fate of Troops in Iraq," Korea Times, June 28, 2007. See also Dae-woong Jin, "Troop Deployment in Iraq Emerges as Key Campaign Issue," The Korea Herald, October 23, 2007, Sung-ki Jung, "Extension of Iraq Troop Deployment Hits Snag," Korea Times, May 21, 2007, Sung-ki Jung, "Think Tank Calls for Extending Zaytun Mission in Iraq," Korea Times, May 31, 2007.

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Roh administration made an abrupt policy reversal and acquiesced to U.S. requests to

assist the Iraq coalition. At the same time, Roh’s policy towards North Korea hardened

to a policy contingent on North Korean concessions. Why would an administration

striving for greater autonomy and independence from the United States become such a

willing participant in the coalition of the willing?

The alliance dependence and domestic political structure hypotheses of the

Security Decision Model best explain the ROK’s contribution to the Iraq coalition.

President Roh himself aptly describes the forces that converged to encourage

participation by Korean military forces, “Cooperation from the U.S. is essential to the

security of Northeast Asia and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Amid the

unpredictability surrounding the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, the importance of

a closer South Korea-U.S. alliance cannot be overemphasized.”103 Alliance dependence

influenced Korean decision making towards the Iraq coalition. Seoul felt obliged to

submit to U.S. requests in order to gain influence over U.S. policy towards North Korea.

President Roh attempted to link deployment of ROK troops to progress on defusing

tensions on the Korean Peninsula over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK) nuclear ambitions. While alliance dependence pressures motivated Seoul to

participate in the coalition, the influence of public opinion on the government explains

the timing, composition, and level of military support both in the dispatch of troops and

the eventual drawdown. Public discontentment with the troop deployment influenced

103 "South Korea to Extend Troop Stay in Iraq but Cut Presence by Half," Yonhap News Agency, October 23, 2007.

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government decision making in a very indirect manner after the U.S. request for a

substantial troop deployment in the fall of 2003. The Blue House and the NSC were

concerned that putting troops at risk would have a negative impact on President Roh’s

public ratings. To manage public opinion concerning the deployment, the NSC advised

President Roh to limit the troop deployment to 3,000 consisting of primarily non-combat

troops.104 Accordingly, the Blue House considered it necessary to offer troop reductions

in order for the National Assembly to continue the Iraq troop mandate. The troop

reductions were preventive in nature in anticipation of domestic backlash concerning the

deployment to Iraq.

The following sections analyze the influence of external and domestic factors

using the revised Security Decision Model.

Historical Learning

Since national elites are influential in determining courses of policy, the influence

of cognition and historical learning are critical factors in understanding nation-state

foreign policy decisions. Policy makers rely heavily on historical analogy to simplify and

understand complex situations. According to the learning hypothesis, leaders are more

likely to contribute to a military effort if they gained full participation rights with the

coalition leader, influenced decision making, and received compensation in the form of

increased influence with the coalition leader or material benefits, for their participation in

104 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39, "South Korea Says Saddam's Arrest Reduces Uneasiness over Sending Troops to Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, December 15, 2003.

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previous efforts. The South Korean case demonstrates a shift in attitude in the decision

making elite, learned not from combat operations, but “unlearned” in the ROK

government attempt to have a more favorable relationship with the DPRK.

Since the United States defended the Republic of Korea in the Korean War and

the ROK provided the second largest contingent of soldiers that supported the United

States in Vietnam, one might assume that these previous wars would shape decision

making towards the Iraq intervention. However, scant evidence exists that these

experiences influenced elite decision making. Rather, with the introduction of the Roh

Administration, a new generation of political leaders, known as the “386 generation” has

risen to power with little if any direct recollection of the Korean conflict and no

allegiance to the virtually uncontested acceptance of the Korean-American alliance by

previous generations.105 Unlike their parents who held the United States in high regard

due to its role in the Korean War and the ensuing Cold War, this group views the United

States as a supporter of the authoritarian governments in South Korea from the 1960s to

1980s and therefore complicit in numerous military crackdowns, including the massacre

at Kwangju in 1980.106 These formative experiences provide a frame of reference

105 The so-called “386 generation” is a reference to the 386a computer chip which became prevalent while the generation acted as pro-democracy activists in the 1980s. 386ers are those college educated Koreans in their 30s and early 40s, who went to college and fought in the pro-democracy movements in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s. According to one 386 activist, “My generation, the 386 generation, were in the streets fighting in the 80s against the military dictatorship. Now, 20 years later, we are combat-ready with our internet.” Caroline Gluck, South Korea's Web Guerillas (BBC News, 2003 [cited May 23 2008]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2843651.stm. 106 In May 1980, hundreds of civilians were massacred by soldiers in the south-western city of Kwangju after rising up against military rule. Although it was brutally suppressed, the Kwangju Uprising is now seen by many as a pivotal moment in the South Korean struggle for democracy in the long period of

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significantly altered from the Korean War generation. While the political agenda for the

Korean War generation was economic sustenance, security, and survival, the younger,

more affluent, and higher-educated generation is more concerned with quality-of-life

issues including labor rights, environmental issues, urban congestion, and the status of

U.S. forces in the Korean legal system.107 Overall, the 386 generation regards the United

States less as the country that fought for Korean independence than as the country that

backed past military dictators. Although more conservative policy makers were integral

to Roh’s foreign policy apparatus, the 386 influence significantly altered the view of U.S.

policy in high government circles.

The election of President Roh Moo-hyun marked the ascendency of the 386

generation into Korean national politics. Roh entered politics in 1988 with an activist

agenda, grilling the government over corruption allegations and the 1980 Kwangju

Massacre. His election as President in 2002 marked the most liberal government to be

voted into office since the ROK’s inception in 1948.108 The Roh administration policy

preferences reflect Roh’s 386 influences, such as the desire for a more even footing in the

ROK-U.S. bilateral alliance and independence in policy concerning the DPRK. First, the dictatorship following the Korean War. The final toll of those who lost their lives is still unknown, as it is believed the military dumped bodies in mass graves or lakes, however, estimates today range from 500 to 2,000. At the time of the Kwangju uprising, a U.S. general retained ultimate operational control over combined U.S. and South Korean forces, therefore activists hold the U.S. complicit in the massacre. Becky Branford, Lingering Legacy of Korean Massacre (BBC News, 2005 [cited May 23 2008]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4557315.stm. 107 Victor D. Cha, "South Korea: Anchored or Adrift?," in Strategic Asia 2003–04, ed. National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.) (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 113-14, Norimitsu Onishi, "U.S. And South Korea Try to Redefine Their Alliance," The New York Times, December 26, 2003. 108 Chung Min Lee, "Reassessing the ROK-US Alliance: Transformation Challenges and the Consequences of South Korea’s Choices," Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 2 (2003), 284.

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administration reflected a “post-Cold War mindset” that framed North Korea as a Korean

problem rather than a continuing confrontation, moving away from conventional notions

of threat toward an affirmation of North Korean vulnerabilities as Pyongyang sought to

balance regime survival with domestic reform. Second, the administration advocated a

parallel need to foster a more equal partnership with the United States. Throughout his

race for the presidency in 2002, Roh portrayed himself as a leader who would be able to

send a strong message to Washington that “business as usual” would no longer be

considered to be the norm in the ROK-U.S. relationship. Roh stressed the need for an

alliance relationship that would mature into a more reciprocal and equitable relationship.

Lastly, the influence of the 386 generation is significant considering that the Roh

administration tended to formulate policy based on the advice of 386 generation

progressives rather than from those with significant domestic and foreign policy

experience.109

Based on the experiences of the 386 generation, the learning hypothesis predicts

that the ROK would not be an active participant in the Iraq coalition. Seoul would be

expected to distance itself from the Bush administration in order to gain a greater degree

of independence from the United States. According to University professor Kim Il

Young, “The younger generation believes more in self-reliance and independence. It feels

that in the long term, South Korea should strike a balance between the United States and

109 Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications."

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China and adopt a more neutral position toward the United States.”110 The Iraq War

provided an excellent opportunity for the Korean government to demonstrate

independence from the United States and to court potential regional allies. Participation

in the coalition would not be predicted unless the Korean government was afforded an

influential role in Iraq policy, or unless the ROK could significantly influence U.S. policy

bilaterally in regards to the DPRK.

Balance of Threat

Since private versus collective incentives significantly influence the degree of

burden sharing, the balance of threat block in the Security Decision Model seeks to

explain whether an ally considers the action a “war of choice” or a necessary intervention

to counter an existential threat. This dissertation operationalizes threat as a factor of

material capability and intentions to influence a state internally and externally. If military

defeat is seen as the most serious threat to regime security, then state decision makers

should seek to balance against the state that is geographically closest and whose

aggregate military power capabilities are greatest. Given South Korea’s distance from

Iraq and the lack of any threatening intentions from Saddam Hussein towards the ROK,

the balance of threat hypothesis fails to directly explain Korean participation in the Iraq

War coalition. However, when the scope of threat is enlarged to include proximate

threats to South Korea, balance of threat theory provides some explanatory power for

Korean motivation to join the coalition of the willing. The U.S. war on terrorism—

110 Onishi, "U.S. And South Korea Try to Redefine Their Alliance."

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including the inclusion of North Korea in the “axis of evil” and the Bush doctrine of

preemptive war—raised serious concerns in the ROK government that hard-line U.S.

policy towards North Korea could easily catalyze an all-out war on the Korean

peninsula.111 The Roh administration considered this U.S. policy stance threatening to

ROK security interests and sought to influence U.S. policy by deploying military forces

in the Iraq coalition.112

South Korean perceptions of threat, and attitudes toward North Korea and the

U.S., have changed substantially as a result of President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine

policy” and his subsequent summit in Pyongyang in June 2000.113 As a part of this

engagement strategy, the ROK government engaged in a campaign to convince the South

Korean public that the North was a country to be pitied rather than feared. This

campaign included removing remarks of North Korea as a threat in military documents

and framing the North Korean famine as an economic problem rather than an issue of

authoritarian control.114 As a result, the public and much of the decision making elite—

111 Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds., The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 4, Robert Marquand, "Rethinking US Troops in S. Korea," Christian Science Monitor, March 10, 2003. 112 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 212-15, "Roh to Walk Diplomatic Fine Line over Nk," Korea Times, February 26, 2003, "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US," Korea Times, March 13, 2003, Seo, "Both Roh, Bush Score in Phone Talks." 113 The sunshine policy emphasized peaceful cooperation, seeking short-term reconciliation as a prelude to eventual Korean reunification. Eric V. Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes toward the U.S. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 27, Gi-wook Shin and Paul Y Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations," in The Future of US-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power, ed. John Feffer (New York: Routledge, 2006). 114 The ROK stripped North Korea of the title “main enemy” in the 2004 Defense White Paper. Seung-Ho Joo, "US-ROK Relations: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension," in The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century, ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo (Aldershot, England ; Burlington,

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especially the 386 generation—appeared much less concerned with the threat from the

North than reason would otherwise dictate.115 Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy fostered a

psychological metamorphosis in the South by framing North Korea as an underprivileged

sibling rather than existential threat. In a national survey, 75 percent of South Koreans

regard citizens of the North as “brothers.”116 Ignoring Korean War history, many in the

South see the North as incapable of starting a war against its “brothers” in the South.117

At the same time, an increasing number of South Koreans came to perceive the U.S. as a

bully, a threat to peace, and an obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation and unification.

President Bush’s hard-line policy toward North Korea, combined with President

Kim’s sunshine policy, created tension and friction in ROK-U.S. relations. The first

ROK-U.S. summit between Bush and Kim Dae-jung, held in Washington, D.C. in March

2001, highlighted the great separation of policy preferences between the two leaders.

Instead of endorsing his partner’s sunshine policy, Bush lectured Kim about Kim Jong-

VT: Ashgate, 2006), 52, Cheon Seongwhun, "North Korea and the ROK–U.S. Security Alliance," Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 1 (2007). 115 President Kim communicated two mega messages: that his administration’s goals would be peaceful co-existence, not unification; and that its policies would seek to reassure the North Korean regime of, not undermine confidence in, South Korea’s good intentions. The Sunshine Policy was a new attempt, a departure from the cold war containment policy, to transform an inter-Korean zero-sum game into a nonzero-sum game for a desirable future on the Korean peninsula. Ralph A. Cossa, U.S.-ROK: Diverging Threat Perceptions of North Korea? (The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 2005 [cited May 28 2008]); available from http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/program_pdfs/rok_us_cossa.pdf, Ko, "South Korea's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy.", Eundak Kwon and Jae-Cheon Lim, "Crossing the River That Divides the Korean Peninsula: An Evaluation of the Sunshine Policy," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6, no. 2 (2006), Hong Soon-young, "Thawing Korea's Cold War: The Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (1999), 10. 116 Shin and Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations," 47. 117 James Brooke, "South Opposes Pressuring North Korea," The New York Times, January 1, 2003, Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux.", Joo, "US-ROK Relations: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension," 51, Sung-han Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XV, no. 2 (2003).

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il’s untrustworthiness.118 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the subsequent attention to

the threat of nuclear terrorism, Bush’s stance further hardened toward North Korea. As

the U.S. foreign policy goals focused on curtailing WMD and preempting potential

terrorist acts against the United States, President Bush designated North Korea as part of

the “axis of evil” and displayed a personal distaste against dangerous autocratic regimes.

During his February 2002 visit to South Korea Bush revealed to Kim that he would not

let the world’s “most dangerous regimes” acquire its “most dangerous weapons.”119

South Korean reaction to this position was largely negative. The majority of South

Koreans felt the Bush administration’s hard-line policy towards the North effectively

encouraged its nuclear weapons development.120 The Bush administration’s perceived

proclivity for unilateralism, regime change policy, and preference for military rather than

diplomatic solutions, was considered threatening to peace on the Korean peninsula.121

These fears were all ignited when the U.S. confronted the DPRK over its covert nuclear

development program.

The fall 2002 nuclear crisis brought ROK-U.S. relations and the ROK public trust

in U.S. intentions to a new low. In a visit to North Korea, arranged by Seoul to re-engage

118 Ralph A. Cossa, U.S.-Korea: Summit Aftermath (Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 16 2001 [cited June 26 2008]); available from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0111.pdf. 119 Kwak and Joo, eds., The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century, 3-4. 120 Sook-Jong Lee, "Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XVII, no. 1 (2005), 84. 121 Hyeong Jung Park, Divergent Threat Perceptions on North Korea (The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 2005 [cited May 28 2008]); available from http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/program_pdfs/rok_us_park.pdf, Shin and Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations."

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U.S. bilateral relations with the DPRK, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly accused

North Korea of developing uranium enrichment capabilities (a potential building block

for nuclear weapons) in violation of the 1991 Joint Denuclearization Declaration and the

1994 Agreed Framework.122 According to news accounts, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister

Kang Sok-joo acknowledged the program and responded that North Korea had been

“compelled” to begin a uranium enrichment program for self defense after being branded

a member of the “axis of evil” by President Bush.123 Thus, what began as a fact-finding

mission to resume long-stalled talks with the reclusive Stalinist North Korea turned into

unproductive and failed diplomacy. Suspicions regarding U.S. motives in confronting

Pyongyang on its nuclear weapons program and the continued U.S. refusal to yield to

North Korean demands, helped raise anti-American sentiments to new heights in the

South.124 North Korean motives seemed to be accepted as legitimate, while U.S. motives

in confronting the DPRK were questioned less frequently.125 They feared that Bush

would not have the patience to engage in dialogue with the North, and that a tough U.S.

122 During a visit to Pyongyang in April 2002 South Korea’s National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won tried to persuade Kim Jong -il to receive a special envoy from the United States. North Korea decided to resume the bilateral dialogue and Assistant Secretary of State Kelly’s visit to the DPRK was the first round of the renewed talks. Christoph Bluth, "Between a Rock and an Incomprehensible Place: The United States and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XVII, no. 2 (2005), 89. 123 Ibid, John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2005). 124 North Korea demanded bilateral talks with the U.S. in an effort to establish a non-aggression pact between the two countries. The U.S. countered that the Korean War was a multilateral effort that required multilateral talks. In a 60 Minutes interview, younger Koreans accepted that President Bush is more threatening than Kim Jong-il. See Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, "The Korea Crisis," Foreign Policy, no. 136 (2003). 125 Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 141, Ralph A. Cossa, "US-DPRK Nuclear Stand-Off: Anatomy of a “Crisis”," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XV, no. 1 (2003).

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reaction would cause crisis on the peninsula.126 These views were expressed by President

Roh when he stated that “success or failure of a U.S. policy toward North Korea isn’t too

big a deal to the American people, but it is a life-or-death matter for South Korea” and

“therefore, any U.S. move should fully consider South Korea’s opinion.”127 In general,

South Koreans feared a preemptive war against North Korea by the United States to

resolve the nuclear crisis.128

South Korea judged its primary threat to be the possibility of a military

confrontation or regime collapse, not Pyongyang’s WMD capabilities.129 For this reason,

easing tension between the U.S. and the DPRK and preventing any potential crisis that

could threaten South Korean prosperity became the first priority of the government.130

The economic consequences of a North Korean regime change, or collapse, caused much

concern in Seoul. Seoul’s lessons from German reunification were hardly positive.131

Balance of threat theory does not directly explain the ROK assistance in Iraq;

however, when viewed from the perspective of South Korea’s security priorities, the

theory provides explanatory power to the ROK contribution. President Roh used a

contribution to the Iraq coalition to gain influence over U.S. policy towards the DPRK

126 Kim, "Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-US Alliance.", Seongho Sheen, "Grudging Partner: South Korea," Asian Affairs, an American Review 30, no. 2 (2003), 98. 127 Brooke, "South Opposes Pressuring North Korea." 128 Lee, "Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes," 99. 129 The Seoul metropolitan area was already within range of thousands of North Korean chemical artillery tubes and therefore did not consider a nuclear capability a significant increase in threat. 130 Sheen, "Grudging Partner: South Korea," 98. 131 The National Unification Board has estimated that the cost of Korean reunification could be between $200–500 billion over 10 years. Yeon Bong Jung, "Strategy on Stilts: The U.S. Response to the North Korea Nuclear Issue," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XVII, no. 2 (2005).

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and lessen the threat of direct confrontation on the Korean peninsula. By the time of

Roh’s inauguration in February 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was imminent and there

was a widespread concern among South Koreans that North Korea would be the next

target for U.S. attack.132 To gain U.S. acquiescence to a more measured strategy with the

DPRK, President Roh and the National Security Council accommodated global U.S.

security policy by joining the Iraq War coalition and maintaining the peacekeeping

operations even after the other U.S. allies began disengagement.133

Collective Action

As stated in chapter two, lacking private incentives such as threat, collective

action theory seeks to explain how groups unite to fulfill a common action. The second

block in the security decision making model determines the level of private incentive for

a particular situation. If a state perceives a threat, it is more likely to participate fully

than if governed by collective security concerns. If collective action motivations

dominate, however, small states are less likely to contribute to the collective good. Their

burden sharing contributions are expected to be in an amount smaller than their size

would suggest. This paper identifies one collective good for the second Iraq War case:

the disarmament of Iraqi WMD. This research demonstrates that South Korean decision

makers were not concerned with Iraq as a proliferator of WMD and regional instability,

but rather were motivated by private concerns with U.S. policy towards North Korea. If

132 Kwak and Joo, eds., The United States and the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century, 5, Shin and Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations." 133 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 215-16.

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Seoul had been motivated by collective action concerns, it would be predicted to limit its

effort to a token contribution.134 Instead, the ROK government submitted to U.S.

requests for significant participation in the larger stabilization operations. Threat and

alliance dependence concerns motivated the Roh administration to support the war

coalition as a means to gain leverage over U.S. policy. Though Korea provided the third

largest contingent to the Iraq coalition in an effort to be marked as a major contributor to

U.S. counterterrorism efforts, its contribution reflected alliance dependence concerns

rather than a desire to be an integral element of a collective action.

Alliance Dependence

As stated in chapter three, allies face a security-autonomy tradeoff when entering

into a defense pact; if an excess of “security” exists, a state may opt to trade some of the

excess for more autonomy, by loosening alliance bonds or by reducing support to the ally

on some issues, potentially risking the ally’s support on future security issues.

Conversely if “security” is needed, a state may tighten alliance bonds or support an ally

on an issue important to that ally.135 This security-autonomy tradeoff creates a tension

between two fears, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment. This “alliance

security dilemma” recognizes that each ally has alternative alliance choices and may opt

for one of them if it becomes dissatisfied with the present allies. 136 The Roh

134 Katharina Coleman argues that the global norm of multilateralism provides an incentive for states to engage in tokenism, or the dispatch of token forces as part of a multilateral coalition. See Katharina P. Coleman, "The Significance of Token Forces" (paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, March, 2008). 135 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181. 136 Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima, 150-51.

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administration’s support for the Iraq War coalition reflected alliance pressures on foreign

policy decisions. Domestically, Roh’s “386” backers assessed that the ROK was strong

enough to allow for more autonomy in the ROK-U.S. alliance.137 Roh campaigned for

the presidency on a platform that argued for increased independence in the alliance. In

addition, he portrayed himself as a leader who would be able to send a strong message to

Washington that “business as usual” would no longer be considered to be the norm in the

ROK-U.S. relationship.138 However, the 2002-2003 North Korean nuclear crisis

highlighted the need for Seoul to maintain strong alliance ties with the United States in

order to influence U.S. policy on Iraq.139 Instead of loosening the alliance in an effort to

gain more autonomy, Seoul was entrapped into supporting the Iraq War coalition in an

effort to gain U.S. concessions towards North Korea.

The liberal leadership under Roh reflected Korea’s increased national confidence.

Roh’s 386 generation led transition team posited that the ROK’s economic status as

twelfth worldwide, combined with an armed force that numbered over 600,000 soldiers,

should allow Korea significant influence over U.S. policy towards the DPRK. They

believed that South Korea was indispensable for U.S. global security strategy, while at

the same time more capable in dealing with threats emanating from the North. Moreover,

137 Balbina Y. Hwang, "The U.S.–Korea Alliance on the Rocks: Shaken, Not Stirred," Heritage Lectures, no. 970 (2006). 138 Doug Bandow, Time for a Korean Divorce (National Review Online, January 6 2003 [cited June 3 2008]); available from http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-bandow010603.asp, Lee, "Reassessing the ROK-US Alliance: Transformation Challenges and the Consequences of South Korea’s Choices." 139 Ko, "South Korea's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy," 262-63, Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes toward the U.S., 37.

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indoctrinated into radical leftist ideologies during college years, the transition team

dismissed conservative warnings that increased independence from U.S. policy would

lead to alliance problems as Cold War paranoia.140 During the fall 2002 presidential

campaign, the Roh camp capitalized on the fear among the South Korean public and

many in the government that South Korea would be entrapped in a military conflict

precipitated, at least in part, by U.S. unwillingness to pursue a more flexible policy

toward Pyongyang.141 Against the backdrop of the developing nuclear crisis with the

DPRK and the accidental death of two Korean schoolchildren by a U.S. armored vehicle,

Roh leveraged nationalistic themes to bring ROK-U.S. alliance politics to the forefront of

the December presidential election. Roh secured the election by a 2.3 percent margin,

emphasizing alliance reform as one of the main themes of the election.142 Once elected,

however, the Roh administration realized that it was trapped by U.S. policy towards the

North, which necessitated a strategy of concessions concerning the alliance relationship

in an effort to gain leverage over U.S.-DPRK policy.

Roh’s Policy for Peace and Prosperity was in direct conflict with the Bush

strategy of confrontation. While Roh was promoting a policy of engagement with the

North, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld used the most provocative language toward North

140 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 213-14, Lee, "Reassessing the ROK-US Alliance: Transformation Challenges and the Consequences of South Korea’s Choices.", Lee, "Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes.", Shin and Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations." 141 Scott Snyder, "South Korea's Squeeze Play," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2005), 99. 142 Hoon Jaung, President Roh Moo-Hyun and the New Politics of South Korea (The Asia Society, February 2003 [cited May 30 2008]); available from http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/update_korea2.html#election, Shin and Chang, "The Politics of Nationalism in US-Korean Relations."

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Korea since President Bush included it in his “axis of evil.” Rumsfeld, at a committee

hearing in the House of Representatives, called the North Korean government a “terrorist

regime.”143 U.S. and ROK policy differences were highlighted when Roh’s transition

team was hosted by U.S. government leaders in early February. One of President Roh’s

personal advisors, at a private dinner with U.S. policy makers, was quoted as saying that

“the incoming government would prefer that North Korea had nuclear weapons to seeing

it collapse.”144 This statement reflected that the Roh administration’s willingness to

tolerate a nuclear North in exchange for stability on the Korean peninsula.

Unfortunately for the Roh’s Policy of Peace and Prosperity, the DPRK engaged in

a series of escalatory measures that ensured that the U.S. would remain engaged on the

Korean peninsula: Pyongyang announced that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty; it reactivated its nuclear facilities and announced that operations

were proceeding “on a normal footing;” a North Korean jet violated South Korean

airspace over the Yellow Sea; and on the eve of Roh’s inauguration, North Korea test

fired an anti-ship missile that landed in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and

Japan.145

Seoul’s effort to mediate the crisis resulted in growing distrust between the U.S.

and the ROK on the value of the alliance. Seoul’s efforts at mediation confirmed the 143 Howard W. French, "Reversals in U.S.-South Korea Links, and Some Jagged Fault Lines," The New York Times, February 11, 2003. 144 Ibid., 17, "Roh to Walk Diplomatic Fine Line over Nk." 145 Sang-hun Choe, "North Korea Launches Anti-Ship Missile," Associated Press, February 24, 2003, Howard W. French, "North Taunts Seoul with a Missile Test," The New York Times, February 26, 2003, Ihlwan Moon, Mark L. Clifford, and Stan Crock, "The Politics of Peril," Business Week, February 24, 2003, "Roh Faces Foreign Policy Challenges," Korea Times, March 6, 2003.

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perception of many in Washington that their South Korean allies were flirting with the

enemy, betraying the spirit of the alliance by acting as mediators rather than taking sides

with the United States.146 Richard V. Allen, president of a U.S. consulting firm that

serves U.S., European, and Asian-based companies seeking access to South Korean

markets, spoke for many Americans when he said that South Korea’s option was either to

side with its U.S. ally or to take “another path.”147 Reacting to highly visible anti-U.S.

demonstrations in South Korea, many Americans voiced displeasure in the alliance and

some even demanded a possible reduction and relocation of American troops stationed in

South Korea. As described earlier, former Secretary of State James Baker warned a

visiting delegation from the National Assembly in February that a pull out of U.S. troops

would reflect less U.S. commitment towards ROK concerns on the peninsula. Secretary

of Defense Rumsfeld stated in Congressional testimony that he was ready to discuss

issues of restructuring and relocating U.S. forces in Korea and floated the idea of moving

forces off the Korean peninsula.148 Shortly after Roh’s inauguration, the U.S.

ambassador in Seoul, Thomas Hubbard, suggested that the U.S. was considering reducing

the number of American combat troops in Korea, an unusual move in a time of crisis.149

146 Snyder, "South Korea's Squeeze Play." 147 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 213-14. 148 On March 6, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted that the South “has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of upfront deterrent that's needed” and further suggested that the American military could play a more supportive role on the Korean peninsula by arranging its forces at an “air hub” and “sea hub,” and as off-peninsul reinforcements for South Korean front-line troops. James Brooke, "Musing on an Exodus of G.I.'S, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence," The New York Times, March 8, 2003. Dong Shin Kim, "The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Where Is It Headed?," Strategic Forum (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2003). 149 Geoge Wehrfritz and B.J. Lee, "A Life-or-Death Issue," Newsweek, March 3, 2003, 38.

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The diplomatic onslaught by the Bush administration conveyed the message that the

United States was prepared to disengage from the ROK-U.S. alliance at a time of

significant importance for South Korea.

Roh’s change in attitude appears to be in reaction to spiraling tensions between

the DPRK and United States, combined with U.S. threats to withdraw U.S. Forces Korea

(USFK) personnel away from the demilitarized zone. On March 1, 2003, North Korean

fighter aircraft intercepted an American reconnaissance aircraft in international waters,

reportedly “locking on” to the American aircraft with its fire-control radar, which is

considered a hostile act.150 In response, U.S. repositioned 24 long-range B-52 and B-1

bombers near North Korea and hinted that it may send fighter escorts with surveillance

planes.151 In this way, the U.S. signaled that it would not be distracted by Iraq and still

retained enough military capability in the theater to pressure the Kim Jong-il regime

against their nuclear ambitions.

The ROK reaction to the spiraling tensions, especially Roh’s defense of the

DPRK intercept caused significant tension in the ROK-U.S. relationship. U.S. military

and defense officials were upset by the failure of South Korea to offer firm support for

U.S. surveillance flights near North Korea or to condemn the interception of a U.S. spy

plane. Instead, South Korea’s Defense Ministry said nothing, while President Roh

exacerbated U.S. sensitivities in an interview with The Times of London, saying that the

150 Eric Schmitt, "North Korea Mig's Intercept U.S. Jet on Spying Mission," The New York Times, March 4, 2003. 151 Matt Kelley, "U.S. Repositioning Bombers near North Korea, May Send Fighter Escorts with Surveillance Planes," Associated Press, March 5, 2003.

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spy plane episode was part of “a very predictable chain of events.”152 In response, the

Bush administration signaled that it was willing to disengage militarily from the

peninsula. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld remarked that South Korea “has all the

capability in the world of providing the kind of upfront deterrent that’s needed to events

on the peninsula.”153 The U.S. response to events on the peninsula illustrated to the Roh

government that by playing a neutral role, it risked degrading the bilateral relationship

and any subsequent means to influence U.S. policy.

Roh’s advisers recognized that by allowing a rift to develop with the United

States, South Korea may have encouraged the North to believe that its aggressive tactics

were successful. Roh’s advisors consequently determined that a change of policy was

necessary to defuse tensions.154 Within two weeks of gaining office, South Korea’s

fledgling administration executed a political about face as it called on Washington not to

withdraw its troops, while at the same time pledging support to the Iraq War coalition.

Senior figures surrounding President Roh were concerned that the U.S. moves were the

initial steps towards a U.S. pre-emptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities.155 The

timing of Rumsfeld’s comments, combined with the bomber deployment, generated

speculation in South Korea that the purpose of the USFK redeployment below the Han

152 Don Kirk, "Seoul Makes Case for U.S. Presence; 'Trip Wire Should Remain' against North," The International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2003, 1, Richard Lloyd Parry, "I Urge the US: Don't Go Too Far," The Times, March 7, 2003, 6. 153 Brooke, "Musing on an Exodus of G.I.'S, South Korea Hails U.S. Presence." 154 "Expecting Trouble?," The Economist, March 15, 2003. 155 Richard Spencer, "S Korea Urges US Troops to Stay," The Daily Telegraph, March 8, 2003.

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River was to place U.S. forces out of range of North Korean artillery fire.156 In response,

at the March 6 NSC meeting, Roh charted a new course for his administration stating,

“The international standoff over the North’s nuclear programs should be resolved

peacefully. The top priority of our government policy dealing with this issue should be

placed on the reduction of the chance of war on the Korean peninsula.”157

With the nuclear standoff as a backdrop, the United States requested that the

South Korean government no longer remain neutral towards Iraq. This request was

forwarded by U.S. Secretary of State Powell at Roh’s inauguration February 25 and

reportedly presented to the senior presidential staff sometime before March 10.158

National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil reported the U.S. request on March 10 during a

meeting of advisers and senior presidential staff at the Blue House.159

The Roh administration responded with what they thought was a strategy of

asymmetrical exchange with the United States. In order to obtain U.S. acceptance to

Roh’s engagement strategy towards the DPRK Seoul accepted a significant role in the

Iraq War coalition.160 Local news reports indicated that the NSC principals discussed

assistance options for a possible U.S. war in Iraq in the period between March 6 and

156 Marquand, "Rethinking US Troops in S. Korea." 157 Yong-chin Oh, "Roh Puts Top Priority on Preventing War," Korea Times, March 7, 2003, FBIS-EAS-2003-0306. 158 Doug Struck, "Powell Makes Few Gains on Asia Tour; Secretary Unable to Win Pledges of Support on North Korea, Iraq," The Washington Post, February 25, 2003, A16, "U.S. Asks for Help in Iraq War," The Korea Herald, March 11, 2003. 159 "U.S. Asks for Help in Iraq War." 160 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 212-13, "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US.", "South Korean President Chairs National Security Council Meeting," Yonhap News Agency, March 20, 2003.

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March 13. Blue House spokeswoman Song Kyoung-hee stated in a press briefing March

12 that four Iraq support plans were discussed at the last NSC meeting and that South

Korea was considering sending non-combat troops to help the U.S. in the event of war

with Iraq. She continued by emphasizing that no decision had yet been made concerning

the size of the force.161 At the same time, Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan

acknowledged on a local radio program that the ROK government intended to dispatch a

contingent of non-combat troops to Iraq in support of the coalition of the willing.162

The Roh administration defended its support of the Iraq coalition in alliance

dependence terms. The administration argued that, for the purpose of national security, it

was imperative to maintain a close alliance relationship with the United States, whose

cooperation was essential to resolve the tension in the Korean peninsula.163 Ryu In-tae, a

top political aide of President Roh, framed the deployment as a means to gain influence

with the U.S. in a meeting with opposition civic leaders, “The troop dispatch plan is

unavoidable, in order to influence U.S. to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis

peacefully through dialogue.”164 Pointing out Korea’s “alliance duty to help the United

State when it is in difficulty,” President Roh affirmed, “by fulfilling such a duty rather

161 "Korea yet to Decide Level of Support for U.S.-Led War with Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, March 13, 2003, FBIS-LAT-2003-0313. 162 "Korea to Send Engineering Troops to Support U.S. War with Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, March 13, 2003, FBIS-EAS-2003-0313, "ROK Foreign Minister on DPRK Nuclear Issue, USFK, ROK Troop Support in Iraq," KBS Radio 1, March 12, 2003. 163 Howard W. French, "A Nation at War: The Asian Arena; South Korea Agrees to Send Troops to Iraq," The New York Times, April 3, 2003, "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US.", "South Korean President Chairs National Security Council Meeting.", "South Korean President Seeks Bipartisan Support for Troop Deployment to Gulf," Yonhap News Agency, March 19, 2003. 164 "Roh Tries to Soften Opposition to Troop Dispatch," Korea Times, March 27, 2003.

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than by directly confronting the U.S. on the question of the war’s legitimacy, we can

better serve our national security objective of the peaceful resolution of the North Korean

problem.”165 Roh acknowledged in his first speech to the National Assembly that the

troop dispatch was a quid pro quo to repair damaged ROK-U.S. relations, “I decided to

dispatch troops, despite ongoing antiwar protests, because of the fate of our country and

the people…In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, it is important

to maintain strong cooperation with the United States.”166 South Korean political

analysts described President Roh’s decision to push for the troop deployment—despite

his own antiwar views and public opposition to the war—as part of a shrewd but risky bid

to preserve the alliance with the United States.167 By making a timely promise of his

“active support” of the unpopular war, Roh was betting on the chance to rescue the

damaged U.S.-Korea alliance that he regarded as indispensable not only to deter a

potentially devastating war on the peninsula, but also to pursue inter-Korean

reconciliation.168

165 French, "A Nation at War: The Asian Arena; South Korea Agrees to Send Troops to Iraq." 166 Ibid, "South Korea's National Assembly Approves Bill on Troop Dispatch to Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, April 2, 2003, "South Korean President's Speech Finds across-the-Board Support at Assembly," Yonhap News Agency, April 2, 2003. 167 "Seoul's Decision to Send Troops Assures US of Alliance," Korea Times, March 31, 2003. 168 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 328-29, Yong-chin Oh, "Is President Roh Turning Pro-United States?," Korea Times, March 31, 2003, "S. Korean Government, Parties Hope Troop Bill to 'Solidify' 'Alliance' with US," Yonhap News Agency, April 2, 2003, "Seoul's Decision to Send Troops Assures US of Alliance."

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While Roh’s linkage strategy did appear to influence the Bush administration’s

North Korean policy, it was also seen as an early domestic defeat for Roh.169 In their first

summit meeting in May 2003, President’s Roh gained Bush’s agreement that a peaceful

resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis was achievable. However, Bush highlighted

that further inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation should depend on North Korean

behavior and increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require

“consideration of further steps.”170 Roh accepted this position, making engagement

contingent on North Korean nuclear concessions rather than the “sunshine” position of

unconditional support. This abrupt change in policy, combined with ROK support of the

Iraq coalition, was criticized as a renunciation of Roh’s campaign pledge to forge a

foreign policy independent of the U.S.171 The fact that public opinion was decidedly

against the Iraq War, damaged Roh’s populist image. As a populist head of state who

had a weak partisan power base in the National Assembly, he had to be at least aware of

public opinion so that his party could gain a majority in the 2004 general election. Even

more critical for Roh was that the nation’s anti-war movement was spearheaded by the

same reform-minded lawmakers and civic groups that supported his presidential 169 In a March 13, 2003 phone conversation with Roh, Bush quelled South Korean fears of military intervention. Bush is quoted as stating that the United States would seek a peaceful solution to its nuclear standoff with North Korea. Bush also denied speculation that the United States is pursuing its military options in deliberating over the matter. In response, Roh pledged Seoul’s active support for the U.S. efforts to resolve the Iraqi issue. "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US.", Seo, "Both Roh, Bush Score in Phone Talks.", "USA Reiterates Support for South Korea's "Sunshine Policy"," Yonhap News Agency, March 14, 2003. 170 Treverton, Larson, and Kim, "Bridging the ‘Open Water’ in the US-South Korea Military Alliance," 169. 171 Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux.", "Divisions Deepen as Protests over Iraqi War Intensify," Korea Times, March 31, 2003, Ko, "South Korea's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy.", "Young Rebel against Roh on Iraq War," Korea Times, March 28, 2003.

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campaign only months prior. Those citizens most active against the Iraq war aid were the

same ones who voted him into office the previous December.

Although Roh sought to extract concessions on U.S. policy towards North Korea,

Roh’s linkage strategy failed to resonate with U.S. policy makers. As seen by many U.S.

strategists, South Korea’s dispatch of peacekeeping forces to Iraq was an act of duty

expected of military allies in times of crisis, not a concession on the part of South Korea

to be repaid by the United States in the form of support for the Peace and Prosperity

Policy. The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty had reciprocity as its central organizing

principle, and according to the interpretation of that treaty by U.S. policy makers, South

Korea’s assistance to U.S. war efforts in Iraq was a payment in kind for U.S. guarantees

of South Korean security.172 Rather than moderating its Korean policy, the Bush

administration announced plans to redeploy U.S. troops from the Korean demilitarized

zone to south of Seoul. The plan to reduce force levels and shift troops south on the

peninsula was unilaterally accelerated by the U.S. in the spring 2003, even after Seoul

announced its support to the Iraq coalition. U.S. officials announced a reduction of the

U.S. military presence in Korea as part of the U.S. Global Posture Review while at the

same time continuing its strategy of confrontation with the DPRK.173 In a May 2003

interview, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith stated that nearly all U.S. 172 Kim, "North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator," 215-16. 173 Doug Bandow, "The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Equality, Mutuality, and International Security," East Asian Review 17, no. 2 (2005), 53, Joo, "US-ROK Relations: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension," 48, James I. Matray, "Alliance of Convenience," Donga Ilbo, April, 2003, Jonathan D. Pollack, "US Strategies in Northeast Asia: A Revisionist Hegemon," in Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Anthony Jones (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 72-73.

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forces deployed in East Asia could be reassigned to new locations for operations very

different from their traditional missions.174 Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz

quickly disavowed these remarks, but the U.S. accelerated discussions with the ROK

government concerning the movement of USFK troops.175 The U.S. adopted a take-it-or-

leave-it attitude, presenting USFK troop relocation as nonnegotiable on the principle that

it was only the U.S. president, as commander in chief, who could determine the

deployment of US military troops. Consequently, many South Koreans viewed the

Pentagon decision to reposition and reduce U.S. forces on the peninsula as “punishment”

for their recent protests against the U.S. troops and foreign policy.176 The realignments

were initiated despite the continued military confrontation with the North and without

weighing the implications of a nuclear North Korea, potential instability on the peninsula,

or the prospect of unification.177

The threat of troop withdrawal again gave the U.S. leverage in alliance matters

and highlighted Seoul’s dependent position in ROK-U.S. bilateral relations when, in the

fall of 2003, the U.S. again asked for additional troops to assist in quelling the developing

insurgency in Iraq. Seoul accommodated the request, again framing the deployment in

terms of alliance dependence. The ROK government deployed an additional 3,000

soldiers, mostly non-combat personnel in August 2004, to meet with the Bush 174 Esther Schrader, "The World; U.S. To Realign Troops in Asia; the Pentagon Is Shifting to Smaller, More Mobile Forces to Confront New Challenges. Among the Changes, It May Seek to Base Ships Off Vietnam.," Los Angeles Times, May 29, 2003, A1. 175 "Korea, U.S. To Hold Second Round of Alliance Talks," Yonhap News Agency, June 4, 2003, FBIS-EAS-2003-0604, Pollack, "US Strategies in Northeast Asia: A Revisionist Hegemon," 72. 176 Moon, "US-South Korean Relations," 42. 177 Pollack, "US Strategies in Northeast Asia: A Revisionist Hegemon."

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administration approval. Korean contributions were unprecedented and were

acknowledged as such by the United States. In a major policy address on terrorism by

President Bush on the one-year anniversary of the war against Iraq, the U.S. president

singled out both Japan and South Korea for their “historic commitments” of troops and

materiel to the war on terrorism.178 Korea subsequently also gained a reprieve from the

threatened drawdown of USFK forces. In the immediate aftermath of the decision to

augment troop deployments to Iraq, the U.S. agreed to extend the U.S. withdrawal from

the peninsula by another three years.179

Overall, in the wake of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the ROK decision to

support the Iraq coalition was formulated based on alliance dependence concerns.

Although President Roh campaigned on a stance reflecting a more equal relationship in

the alliance, when confronted with escalating tensions and a potential U.S. troop

withdrawal, Seoul was trapped. Seoul provided numerous alliance concessions with the

aim of influencing the Bush administration’s stand on North Korea. Seoul committed

troops to the Iraq war and subsequently expanded that commitment in response to U.S.

requests for a larger role for Korea. At the same time, Seoul conceded to a repositioning

and eventual drawdown of U.S. forces on the peninsula.180 Seoul’s commitment to Iraq

did not reflect commitment to U.S. global counter-terrorism policy, but rather a linkage

strategy to gain influence over a senior alliance partner. According to Korean policy

178 Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 148. 179 Pollack, "US Strategies in Northeast Asia: A Revisionist Hegemon." 180 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq.", "US Asks ROK to Send Light Infantry Division to Iraq," Korea Times, September 16, 2003.

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expert Victor Cha, Seoul’s support can be viewed as a bargaining chip to gain favors

from the U.S. rather than a commitment to U.S. objectives in the global war on

terrorism.181 Seoul’s support for the Iraq War reflects alliance dependence since the

government continues to justify it as an alliance obligation rather than an international

obligation. Ironically, alliance dependence concerns caused President Roh, initially

skeptical of the justification for the ROK-U.S. alliance, to provide the third highest level

of support to the Iraq War coalition, while at the same time accommodating a major troop

reduction and realignment of USFK forces on the peninsula.182

Domestic Structure and Politics

Although alliance dependence issues motivated Seoul to support the U.S. led

coalition in Iraq, domestic structure and politics highly influenced the timing and

composition of the Korean effort. As stated earlier, the Republic of Korea is a Type I

state where decision making is centralized and the executive is fairly independent from

legislative and societal pressure. In the Security Model, a Type I government under

alliance dependence pressure is expected to contribute substantially to the coalition

because the chief executive is likely to respond to external pressure without being

significantly influenced by the legislature or public. This section will articulate that Roh

did exert significant influence over the ROK burden sharing strategy, but that domestic

reforms implemented by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations

weakened executive influence, allowing some consideration towards legislative support

181 Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 150. 182 Tong Kim, "Irony of Roh Moo-Hyun," The Korea Times, February 24, 2008.

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and public opinion on the composition and timing of Korea’s contribution. Ultimately,

however, once President Roh determined the size and disposition of the Korean troop

dispatch, public opinion and the legislature had little effect on decisions to deploy

soldiers to Iraq. Roh was able to deploy and maintain a sizable military contingent to

Iraq while public opinion was, at least initially, significantly opposed to the conflict.

President Roh Moo-hyun—the most liberal President in the republic’s history—

stunned his supporters by brokering the deployment of 670 military personnel to Iraq

within two month of assuming office. His troop dispatch plan was a very politically risky

move as he was elected on a promise to devolve Seoul from the U.S.-oriented foreign

policy orbit. Additionally, South Korean public opinion data consistently showed

ambivalence towards U.S. intervention in Iraq. In the summer of 2002, polling data

shows that only 15 percent of South Koreans surveyed considered terrorism to be a

national priority—one of the lowest figures for major countries surveyed—and 72

percent of South Koreans opposed the U.S.-led war on terrorism. During the run-up to

the war in Iraq, 81 percent of the general public in South Korea opposed U.S.-led military

action against Iraq and only 10 percent supported it. Additionally, 76 percent opposed

the deployment of ROK combat troops to Iraq and only 16 percent supported it. 183

Clearly, Roh’s decision to deploy troops would meet with public opposition.

The first deployment decision was the result of the influence of conservative

elements on Roh’s national security team and Roh’s weak position for influencing the

183 Cha, "Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux," 148-49.

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conservative national assembly. Roh presided over a yoso yadae government in which

the governing party was the minority in the assembly.184 Party distribution in the

National Assembly at the time of Roh’s election was 111 seats for the Millennium

Democratic Party (MDP), 129 seats for the conservative Grand National Party (GNP),

and 14 seats divided between the conservative United Liberal Democratic Party (ULD)

and Independents. This situation of a “divided” government between the executive and

legislative branches necessitated a brand of politics and presidential leadership in which

Roh had to court the conservative GNP with skill and tact to overcome political stalemate

in national politics.185 The GNP was very supportive of the ROK-U.S. alliance and

concerned that the liberal Roh government would damage relations by not supporting the

Iraq coalition.186 Additionally, an influential number of Roh’s key foreign policy

advisors reflected the conservative agenda of the GNP. National Security Advisor Ra

Jong-yil was a strong advocate of a closer South Korea-U.S. alliance.187 National

Defense Adviser Kim Hui-sang maintained a critical stand on the sunshine policy and

had strong U.S. connections. Lastly, Foreign Policy Advisor Ban Ki-mun was a career

diplomat who has spent more than 30 years in the Foreign Ministry, 70 percent of whose

priorities lie with the United States.188 A pragmatic politician, Roh navigated a middle

course politically that reflected the need for the ROK to address the crisis on the 184 Kim, "The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," 894. 185 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 16-17. 186 Yong-chin Oh, "Roh Assures US That Troops Will Be Sent as Promised," The Korea Times, March 31, 2003, Yong-pae Shin, "Roh Makes Final Appeal over Troop Bill," The Korea Herald, April 2, 2003, "Two of Roh's Decisions Expected to Have Major Implications," Yonhap News Agency, March 28, 2003. 187 Oh, "Is President Roh Turning Pro-United States?." 188 Chong-rok Sin, "Who Moves President Roh? Trio Quickly Rising," Choson Ilbo, March 26, 2003.

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peninsula by pursuing a more conservative agenda with the United States. According to

a political observer, “Roh realized that the North Korean nuclear crisis is his most

pressing task whose outcome can make or break his presidency.”189

In a response to a U.S. request for military support in Iraq, senior advisors on the

NSC recommended a moderately sized deployment of non-combat troops to demonstrate

support for the U.S.-led coalition. Additionally, they formulated a public campaign that

stressed that the deployment was in the national interest of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan expressed the deployment as an alliance “duty”

expected of an ally on a Korean radio program.190 National Security Advisor Ra Jong-

yil, together with Roh’s top defense advisor Kim Hee-sang, explained to the press that,

“The U.S. war on Iraq is justifiable. Besides, helping an ally in need is what the South

Korea-U.S. alliance is all about.”191 In public statements, Roh stressed the importance of

the South Korea-U.S. alliance as a means to justify the deployments. He emphasized that

Seoul had accepted the U.S. request to resolve the North Korean issue. Meanwhile, the

administration immediately framed the scope of the deployment as consistent with

previous ROK efforts. Roh immediately pledged that, “The scale of the assistance is not

expected to surpass that of our support made during the Gulf War in the early 1990s.”192

189 Oh, "Is President Roh Turning Pro-United States?.", "Roh Appears to Be Winning Some U.S. Hearts and Minds," Yonhap News Agency, April 1, 2003. 190 "Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US." 191 Oh, "Is President Roh Turning Pro-United States?." 192 "Seoul to Throw Support for US War on Iraq."

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On the recommendation of MDP chairman Chyung Dai-chu, Roh formed a supra-

partisan committee of party leaders in the National Assembly to aid policy coordination

and to suppress opposition within the Assembly. Roh personally assured them that the

Cabinet approved of the deployment measure, and he met with lawmakers from the

Assembly’s National Defense Committee to coordinate legislation for the Iraq

deployment.193 Roh acknowledged the domestic anti-war sentiment and, with statements

of support from political leaders of the two major political parties, he expected the

authorization bill to face little opposition.194

Though Roh fast-tracked the deployment legislation, a vocal opposition within his

own party emerged to impede administration efforts to pass the mandate. Roh’s public

relations efforts failed to impress liberal members of the MDP, who saw the deployment

as supporting the “inhumane invasion of Iraq.”195 A group of reformist lawmakers from

the ruling and opposition parties issued a statement opposing the government plan to

dispatch troops to Iraq. A statement by a group of 18 ruling and opposition lawmakers

stated, “There is[are] no grounds to participate in the war of aggression, which lacks a

UN resolution, in the name of (the US-Korea) alliance.”196 The authorization vote was

delayed while the MDP attempted to consolidate support for the assembly vote. Public

protests mounted outside the National Assembly and civic action groups threatened to 193 Hyung-jin Kim, "Roh to Meet Party Leaders on Iraq," The Korea Herald, March 19, 2003, "South Korean President Seeks Bipartisan Support for Troop Deployment to Gulf.", "South Korean President, Parties to Discuss Cooperation in Event of Iraq War," Yonhap News Agency, March 18, 2003. 194 "Gov't Fast-Tracks Troop Dispatch," Korea Times, March 22, 2003. 195 Ibid. 196 "South Korean Assembly Postpones Vote on Dispatch of Troops to Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, March 25, 2003.

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take retribution against lawmakers in the next general election.197 Nosamo, an internet

based group that had supported Roh’s presidential bid, announced that it would mount

opposition campaigns against lawmakers in the next general election if they voted for the

deployment.198 In response, civic groups supporting the alliance with the United States

spearheaded a drive to block lawmakers from seeking re-election if they voted against the

bill proposed by the government.199 In light of this domestic turmoil and in an effort to

relieve legislator’s concerns against retribution, the MDP allowed its lawmakers to cast a

vote “free” from the party endorsement, an unusual move in Korean politics.200 Each

MDP lawmaker could thus cast his or her vote based on local concerns rather than party

recommendation.

While MDP support for the resolution began to falter, the GNP grew concerned

that it would be held politically responsible for the authorization bill. To gain support for

the measure, Roh courted the conservative opposition to approve the troop deployment.

At a dinner with ruling and opposition party leaders, Roh asked floor leaders to, “deal

with the motion as soon as possible.” The opposition GNP floor leader Rhee Q-taek

responded that the president had to make tangible efforts directly to the public first.201

The GNP leadership promised a positive vote only after President Roh, “reaches out to

197 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq." 198 "Troop Dispatch Cuts President Roh's Support Group in Half," Korea Times, March 31, 2003. 199 "Divisions Deepen as Protests over Iraqi War Intensify." 200 "South Korean Assembly Postpones Vote on Dispatch of Troops to Iraq." 201 "Roh Tries to Soften Opposition to Troop Dispatch."

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the public himself and his persuasion efforts show results.”202 GNP members did not

oppose the deployment per se, but were concerned with being blamed for an unpopular

resolution.203 Conservatives generally backed the decision to send troops to Iraq on the

grounds of national interest and strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance. Since the MDP

had authorized a free vote, the GNP grew concerned that an approval of the deployment

would be seen a GNP policy rather than a Roh administration decision.204

Roh resisted efforts to make a public appeal for the dispatch, relying instead on

administration officials to make public statements for the troop deployment. Advisors to

Roh urged civic organizations to exercise restraint in their attempts to pressure

lawmakers over the Iraq deployment issue.205 After a second delay for the authorization

vote, amid rising opposition, Roh directed his aides to intervene to ensure the bill’s

passage. Presidential Chief of Staff Moon Hee-sang and political advisor Ryu In-tae

contacted dissenting lawmakers and pressured them to support the bill. The MDP

leadership intensified efforts to persuade lawmakers opposed to the presidential motion.

Party chairman Chyung Dai-chul held a news conference at the party headquarters to call

for cooperation to pass the bill.206 Finally, Roh appealed to his own and opposition party

members in his first speech to the National Assembly. Roh’s public campaign seemed to

convince the public that the troop deployment reflected ROK national interests. By April 202 "Parliament Delays Vote on Non-Combat Troop Dispatch to Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, March 28, 2003. 203 "Roh to Appeal to Nation for Troop Dispatch Bill Today," Korea Times, April 2, 2003. 204 Hyung-jin Kim, "Assembly to Vote on Troop Dispatch Bill Amid Protests," The Korea Herald, March 28, 2003. 205 "Parties Blast 'Rejection Campaigns' for Troop Dispatch to Iraq," Korea Times, March 31, 2003. 206 "Roh to Appeal to Nation for Troop Dispatch Bill Today."

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1, public opinion polls showed that 55 percent of the public supported the government’s

troop deployment decision while approximately 43 percent did not.207

Roh’s speech to the National Assembly gave the GNP the necessary political

cover, while at the same time convincing a portion of the MDP that the authorization bill

was necessary to defuse the nuclear crisis and restore Korean economic stability. Roh’s

acceptance of responsibility for the deployment decision seemed to quell lawmaker’s

concerns. He appealed to the members “to be courageous and endorse the bill.”208 Roh’s

arguments to the Assembly stressed the need to resolve the peninsula crisis by deploying

troops to Iraq. Roh stated:

I have reached the conclusion that assisting the United States in its time of difficulty and solidifying the Korea-U.S. relationship would be much more helpful in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issue than driving relations to worse terms.209

Additionally, the deployment was framed to quell economic uneasiness. Roh stated,

“Our decision to deploy forces to Iraq is contributing to clearing the anxieties of the

business community, especially foreign investors, about possible discord between Seoul

and Washington.”210 Further, he stated that even if the Iraq War was without

justification, the deployment was necessary for upholding solidarity with the United

States.211 He acknowledged that the Iraq deployment marked a reversal of his equal

207 "83.8 Percent of Koreans 'Understand" Roh's Troop Dispatch Decision," Yonhap News Agency, April 1, 2003. 208 "South Korea's National Assembly Approves Bill on Troop Dispatch to Iraq." 209 "South Korean President Appeals for Support on Troops Dispatch to Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, April 2, 2003. 210 "Roh Appeals to Nation to Back Troop Dispatch," Korea Times, April 3, 2003. 211 Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas.

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partnership goals, but he noted, “it would be absurd to endanger the lives of the people in

order to put the two countries’ relations on an equal partnership.”212 The National

Assembly eventually approved the deployment with 179 voting in favor, 68 against, and

9 abstentions, with 256 out of 270 legislators casting votes.213

Roh’s Assembly appeal decision won support from a number of Korean

editorialists, despite the uncertainty about the wisdom of the war. The conservative

Chosun Daily said, “The president and the Assembly have acted responsibly and in a

practical manner by setting aside for a moment their ideals or opinions that the war in

Iraq may be unjust.”214 JoongAng Daily, an independent paper, determined that sending

troops would help quell investor concern about the possibility of a split in the ROK-U.S.

alliance. It also called for Koreans to accept the lawmakers’ decision in the national

interest, “Now is the time to show national maturity...further debate on this matter would

be waste of the nation's time and energy.”215 A similar call came from another daily

newspaper, Dong-A, which said the administration now had to demonstrate united

leadership, while anti-war groups should respect and accept the lawmakers’ decision,

“We live in a democratic society where, once a decision is made by the approval of the

majority, the rest should respect and carry out the decision together.”216 Notwithstanding

212 "Roh Vows Closer Ties with US," Korea Times, April 3, 2003. 213 "South Korea's National Assembly Approves Bill on Troop Dispatch to Iraq." 214 Patrick Goodenough, Flood of Volunteers after South Korea Okays Troop Dispatch (CNSNews.com, April 3 2003 [cited June 12 2008]); available from http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPrint.asp?Page=\ForeignBureaus\archive\200304\FOR20030403b.html. 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid.

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the calls for universal support, Roh was severely criticized by his base for giving up on

his ideal of an equal partnership with the United States.

While the opposition parties applauded Roh’s adoption of pro-American agenda,

those who supported Roh said he failed to secure a U.S. pledge to rule out any military

option to end the eight-month nuclear standoff with North Korea.217 After his May 2003

summit with President Bush in Washington, Roh’s performance was criticized by his

former supporters as a “diplomatic humiliation.”218 Young and progressive supporters

posted angry remarks and attacked Roh on the internet for retreating from his campaign

promises and kowtowing to the United States.219 Roh weakened his engagement strategy

with the North by linking economic assistance to positive developments in

denuclearization.220 Roh acknowledged that he sidestepped contentious issues in the

summit, choosing instead to dwell on the strengths of their alliance; but these rapid policy

reversals caused him to lose support in his own MDP.221

In September 2003, President Roh was again put to the test when the U.S.

officially requested South Korea to deploy an additional brigade sized (3,000-5,000)

combat force. The Bush administration made the request in several venues in

217 Jong-heon Lee, "Summit Feared to Cloud Inter-Korean Ties," United Press International, May 15, 2003. 218 Jang-jin Hwang, "Roh Feels Anguish over 'Culture Clash'," The Korea Herald, May 24, 2003. 219 Lee, "Summit Feared to Cloud Inter-Korean Ties.", "Roh's Controversial Performance in Summit Theatrics," Korea Times, May 19, 2003. 220 Jang-jin Hwang, "Roh Shifting N. Korea Strategy: Says Inter-Korean Ties to Be Linked to Progress in Nuke," The Korea Herald, May 17, 2003, Hyun-jin Seo, "South Flexes New Negotiation Muscle," The Korea Herald, May 24, 2003. 221 Christopher Torchia, "South Korean President Says He Avoided Sensitive Issues in Bush Meeting with Bush," The Associated Press, May 15, 2003.

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Washington and Seoul on September 4-5. The government again convened an NSC

meeting September 18 to discuss the timing and composition of possible ROK support.

While Washington did not specify the exact number of troops it wanted South Korea to

dispatch, it requested a dispatch of a unit that could form the core of a multi-national

division. U.S. officials cited the 2,500-member combat unit from Poland as an

example.222 It was widely speculated that Seoul would deploy at least 5,000 troops,

mostly combatants, to Mosul in northern Iraq to replace the U.S. 101st Airborne Division.

Mosul at the time was one of the most dangerous spots in Iraq with numerous insurgent

attacks by supporters of Saddam Hussein.223 Public opposition in the wake of the

increasing violence in Iraq forced progressives in the Blue House to seek a reduction in

the number of troops who would be deployed to Iraq, despite objections from the

Ministry of National Defense (MND) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

(MOFAT).

The MND and MOFAT were very supportive of efforts to increase the ROK

presence in Iraq according to the U.S. request. The MND suggested dispatching 5,000

elite troops from the southern region of South Korea to minimize the disruption of forces

on the peninsula. Korean Army leaders judged that small numbers of troops were not

222 "Sources Say US Requesting 5,000 South Korean Troops for Iraq Mission," Yonhap News Agency, September 27, 2003, "South Korean Security Council to Meet 18 September on Troops for Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, September 16, 2003, "US Wants Korea to Command Multinational Division in Iraq," Korea Times, September 19, 2003. 223 "U.S. Wants South Korea to Send Troops to Mosul, Official Says," Yonhap News Agency, October 2, 2003.

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appropriate in dealing with the missions requested by the United States.224 MOFAT

agreed with the deployment as an effort to strike a decisive blow to the skeptics among

the American public and opinion makers that questioned Korea’s role in the ROK-U.S.

alliance. Foreign Minister Yoon, along with the ROK ambassador to the United States

Han Sung-joo and other adherents of the “alliance faction” argued in support of the

request in light of Korea’s strategic and diplomatic concerns.225 MOFAT officials

expressed concern that Korea should not be left behind when more and more nations

were participating in the coalition of the willing.226

The Blue House and the NSC, however, did not share the optimism of the MND

and MOFAT. In this instance the more progressive elements, led by NSC Vice Chief Lee

Jong-seok, gained control over deployment deliberations.227 Lee, who was deeply

involved in the formation of Roh’s progressive inter-Korean and foreign affairs platform,

was concerned that putting Korean troops in danger would have significant negative

fallout on President Roh’s public opinion ratings.228 The Blue House further noted the

significant public opposition to the first deployment in their arguments to minimize the

size of the deployment.229

224 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39. 225 Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 269. 226 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq." 227 Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications.", Yong-chin Oh, "Roh-Lee Combination Spells Danger," Korea Times, November 18, 2003. 228 "South Korean Defense Minister Denies Number of Troops to Iraq Decided," Yonhap News Agency, October 28, 2003. 229 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39.

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Public opinion stabilized and became steady once the United Nations adopted

Resolution 1551 authorizing the international community to assist Iraq stabilization and

reconstruction effort. According to a poll conducted by Hankook Ilbo on October 23,

2003, 64.9 percent of those polled favored the idea of sending additional troops. 230 An

additional survey illustrated that 73.9 percent of Koreans polled approved of the UN

resolution.231 Additionally, the Korean public urged the government to not yield to

terrorist demands after the death of a Korean civilian in Baghdad. Public opinion was not

universally supportive of the additional deployment. From September 23 to October 18,

2003, civic action committees organized more than twelve street demonstrations to

protest Seoul’s support to the Iraq conflict, which became a concern for Assembly

members. A spokesperson for the Roh administration attempted to defuse critics when he

stated, “the Korea-U.S. relationship, the national interest, and the recent passage of UN

resolutions were all considered in making the decision.”232 Noting the civic group

activity, Blue House aides sought to minimize the size of the deployment, taking into

account significant public objections to the deployment. The progressives on the NSC

actively managed the size, timing, and composition of the deployment in an attempt to

preempt public opposition to the larger deployment.

The Blue House became sensitive to the term “combat troops” after it became

clear that Washington wanted troops similar to the Polish-led multinational, light infantry

230 Ibid., 36. 231 Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 270. 232 Ibid.

236

division.233 National Security Advisor Ra hinted October 1 in a radio interview that

sending combat troops was unthinkable saying, “because the war in Iraq is over, we are

not thinking about sending troops that might be involved in violent conflicts.”234 Lee

Jong-seok, Vice Secretary-General of the NSC, ended administration discussions on

troop strength when he declared that Korea would send no more than 3,000 additional

troops to Iraq.235 The NSC formally announced that Korea would support the U.S. troop

request one day after the passage of UN Resolution 1551.

President Roh’s decision to send no more than 3,000 additional troops to Iraq

symbolized a victory for the progressive Blue House staff over the conservative

ministries that favored a larger deployment.236 The two factions inside his administration

had been locked in a power struggle since the first troop deployment decision. The NSC

led the charge to minimize the number of troops to be sent to Iraq and to staff the

contingent mainly with non-combat soldiers, while the MND and MOFAT tried to fulfill

the U.S. request for a large combat-capable force. Sources in the administration noted

that the fierce opposition led by groups who had supported Roh during the presidential

election campaign influenced Roh’s decision making.237 Roh felt a sense of crisis in

anticipation of the upcoming 2004 general elections if he chose to side with the U.S.

233 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39. 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid., 35, Jong-heon Lee, "S.Korea May Send Fewer Troops to Iraq," United Press International, November 4, 2003, "Roh-Lee Combination Spells Danger," Korea Times, November 18, 2003. For a discussion on Jong’s influence see Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications." 236 "Roh-Lee Combination Spells Danger." 237 "Progressives Prevail in Roh's Administration," Korea Times, November 15, 2003.

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concerning the deployment of additional troops.238 The cap on the troop deployment

caused concerns in the MOFAT that the reduced contingent would harm ROK interests

with respect to the United States. South Korean diplomats were quoted as saying the Roh

administration was “naive and unrealistic” in its dealings with the United States. Others

said that dealing with members of the NSC and its chief, Lee Jong-seok, was like dealing

with the Taliban, as they were so radical and reactionary. This accompanied speculation

that some within the administration, specifically the NSC, were North Korean

sympathizers.239 Consequently, the Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan was

forced to resign and the NSC gained greater control over South Korean foreign policy.240

The NSC advised President Roh to hold a vague position—while recognizing in

internal discussions a 3,000-troop limit—and to repeat that he needed more time to make

such an important decision. Roh presented this position to President Bush at a meeting in

Bangkok on October 20.241 In negotiations with U.S. defense officials on November 5-6,

the Korean delegation could not be dislodged from the 3,000-soldier cap due to the NSC

imposed limit. Roh’s decisions concerning the second troop deployment were based not

on alliance concerns, but rather on the predicted domestic backlash to the large Korean

deployment. Once the decision regarding the troop deployment was made, the Blue

238 Ibid. 239 David Scofield, Clearing the Nuclear Fog over North Korea (Worldpress.org, January 22 2004 [cited June 27 2008]); available from http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/1768.cfm, "South Korea to Investigate Diplomats for Questioning Policy," Yonhap News Agency, January 12, 2004. 240 Bechtol, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of Korea: Background and Implications," 618. 241 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 39, Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 269.

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House maintained strict control over the government ministries to ensure the message to

the public was managed.

The Blue House secretariat coordinated with the National Assembly leadership to

ensure a smoother passage of the required second authorization bill. The administration

briefed details of the troop dispatch plan to the leaders of the four ruling and opposition

parties on December 11 and 12 and a final decision on timing and composition was made

at a December 14 meeting with Roh, Defense Minister Cho Young-kil, and Presidential

National Security Adviser Ra, and the four party leaders.242 Roh’s newly formed Uri

Party leadership expressed concern that the bill would splinter the young party.243 The

Uri Party, composed of the progressive lawmakers from the MDP, shared a similar

agenda with the civic groups that threatened to boycott lawmakers in the upcoming April

general election who supported the deployment. The Uri Party was effective at delaying

the bill until it could convince a majority of its members to support the decision.244 The

conservative GNP, which by February 2004 controlled 149 seats in the 273-member

parliament, publicly supported the second dispatch bill. Chough Soon-hyung, leader of

the former ruling MDP, finally told his party's lawmakers during a pre-session meeting to

vote for the dispatch; despite this instruction most members of the MDP voted against the

measure.245 With the leaders of the major parties supporting the deployment, the

242 "South Korea Plans to Dispatch 3,200 Troops to Iraq," Choson Ilbo, December 11, 2003. 243 The Uri Party was formed in late 2003 from a left-leaning faction of the MDP. It gained a slim majority in the National Assembly after the April 2004 legislative elections, but lost it in subsequent by-elections. 244 "Uri under Fire for Stalling Iraq Troop Dispatch Bill," Korea Times, February 11, 2004. 245 Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, "Vote on Troop Dispatch Delayed Again," Yonhap News Agency, February 9, 2004, 271.

239

National Assembly finally scheduled a vote on the measure on February 13. The

Assembly ratified the deployment plan easily by a 3 to 1 margin (155 to 50 members)

with a majority of members from the Uri Party and GNP supporting the decision.246

Deployment of the troops was initially scheduled for late April, but it was delayed

for weeks as Seoul and Washington failed to agree on where they would be located and

the timeframe. The Roh government deliberately postponed the deployment in order to

deploy the forces to a relatively safe area of Iraq.247 The NSC estimated that the 30-70

casualties expected in Mosul would constitute an unbearable political setback for Roh;

therefore avoiding casualties became the first priority in the deployment. At a meeting in

Baghdad on March 18, the U.S. finally accepted the Korean request to change the

deployment destination.248

The deployment was also delayed due to the March 12 impeachment of President

Roh on charges that he had inappropriately backed his breakaway Uri Party in the

parliamentary elections in violation of election laws.249 These charges and the ensuing

scandal caused an immediate suspension of Roh’s presidency; the Prime Minster,

246 Sang-mee Bak, "South Korean Self-Identity and Evolving Views of the United States," in Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the U.S.-ROK Alliance, ed. Derek J. Mitchell (Washington D.C., Seoul: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Yonsei University, 2004), 47, Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 270-71. 247 Ko, "South Korea's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy," 264-65. 248 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 42. 249 S. Korea Votes to Impeach Roh (CNN, May 5 2004 [cited June 27 2008]); available from http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/11/skorea.roh.fighting/.

240

traditionally powerless, assumed the duties of the presidency. 250 South Korea’s

Constitutional Court rejected the impeachment charges May 14 stating the charge of

illegal electioneering “was not serious or grave enough to justify the unseating of the

president.”251 No official in the government wanted to facilitate the deployment for the

two months in which the Korean Constitutional Court decided on the legality of the

impeachment.

In the meantime, the U.S. announced that it would deploy to Iraq a brigade of the

2nd Infantry Division that was garrisoned in Korea. Additionally, Washington informed

Seoul at the 10th Future of the Alliance Talks (FOTA) on July 22, 2004, that 6,000 U.S.

troops would be pulled out of South Korea by 2004, and 6,000 more by the end of

2005.252 These deployment decisions generated speculation in Korea that the moves

were punishment for the delay of the ROK troops.253 Once the U.S. announced its

decision to transfer the brigade off the peninsula, the Korean government accelerated its

efforts to deploy its troops. The Korean government, with the support of the ruling Uri

party, deployed the first troops in July 2004 and the main contingent in August.254

250 For a review of the impeachment see Youngjae Lee, "Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-Hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective," New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, no. 4 (2005). 251 Anthony Faiola, "Court Rejects S. Korean President's Impeachment," The Washington Post, May 14, 2004, A12. 252 Yongho Kim and Myungchul Kim, "North Korea’s Risk-Taking Vis-À-Vis the U.S. Coercion in the Nuclear Quagmire," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XIX, no. 4 (2007), 62. 253 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq.", "Seoul Will Send Iraq Troops," Korea Times, May 20, 2004. 254 Hong, "The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq," 43.

241

The continued deployment of Korean soldiers to Iraq was considered a concern

for the Roh administration. Civic action groups such as the Citizen’s Action against

Deployment to Iraq, a coalition of 351 NGOs, proclaimed that they would work to deter

any attempt to prolong the tenure of the Korean troops in Iraq.255 Interestingly, they did

not take any direct action against the Uri Party for supporting the deployment decision.

In fact, due to a number of factors including the GNP’s impeachment of Roh, the Uri

Party gained a significant number of seats in the 2004 general election.256 The lack of

serious opposition is likely due to the preemptive drawdown of troops with the yearly

mandate renewal. As discussed previously in this chapter, the Roh administration made

anticipatory concessions on troop withdrawals in an attempt to disarm public opposition

to the deployment. This approach seems successful, since as of May 2008, the Korean

government still has approximately 650 personnel deployed to Iraq. The renewal

mandates have been successful; however the opposition vote has risen over the length of

the deployment.257

In summary, domestic politics significantly influenced the composition and

timing of South Korean support to the Iraq War coalition. The Roh administration

255 Ibid. 256 South Korea’s ruling Uri Party (UP), formed in 2003 by defectors from the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), captured 152 seats. The Grand National Party (GNP), won a landslide victory in its traditional stronghold in the Kyungsang provinces, including Pusan and Taegu, but lost its majority in parliament. Wonbin Cho, "The General Election in South Korea, April 2004," Electoral Studies 24, no. 3 (2005). 257 The renewal votes for 2005-2007 are as follows: 2005 (110-31-17), 2006 (114-60-16), and 2007 (146-104-6). Bo-mi Lim, "South Korean National Assembly Approves Iraq Troop Reduction Plan," Associated Press, December 30, 2005. "South Korea Approves Extension of Troops in Iraq," Yonhap News Agency, December 22, 2006. Hyung-jin Kim, "South Korean Parliament Approves Iraq Troop Extension for Another Year," Associated Press, December 28, 2007.

242

showed strong leadership in influencing the decision to deploy Korean soldier to Iraq, but

this decision was somewhat influenced by resistance to the deployment in Roh’s own

MDP and Uri parties. The Peterson typology predicts that decision making in South

Korea would be heavily influenced by the preferences of the chief executive and this case

study supports those predictions. Once President Roh publicly committed to the coalition

of the willing, legislative and societal pressure failed to alter the level or composition of

Korean commitment to the coalition of the willing. This is not to say, however, that

public opinion had no influence over national decision making. The Roh administration

frequently anticipated public attitudes and intentionally constrained its assistance to the

Iraq coalition in an effort to alleviate public concerns. In this manner, the Roh

administration acted like any authoritarian regime that had to balance resource extraction

against domestic interests.258 Rather than allowing public opinion form the policy, Roh

managed domestic expectations so that he could commit the necessary resources to the

coalition to meet Korea’s foreign policy goals.

The Role of Legitimacy

Although legitimacy arguments were raised in Roh’s political circles, legitimacy

arguments affected only the composition and timing of military support rather than the

decision to join the Iraq War coalition. Although President Kim Dae-jung advised the

Bush administration to pursue a UN mandate on Iraq, this advice was based on national

concerns rather than the pursuit of international legitimacy. President Kim encouraged a

258 Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73."

243

UN mandate in private conversations with President Bush and encouraged a UN based

multilateral action at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Copenhagen, however, the

ROK government never attempted to withhold political, economic, or military support to

the coalition based on legitimacy concerns.259

After the ROK government publicly committed to the coalition of the willing, a

select group of National Assembly members protested the action on legitimacy grounds.

A group of reformist lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties issued a public

statement opposing the government’s plan to dispatch troops based on the legitimacy of

the operation: “There is no grounds to participate in the war of aggression, which lacks a

UN resolution, in the name of (the ROK-U.S.) alliance.”260 Ultimately, discussions in the

NSC and in the National Assembly hinged on national security concerns rather than the

legitimacy of the Iraq War effort. President Roh, in his address to the national assembly,

admitted that the Iraq effort was lacking a full international mandate. Roh argued that

even if the Iraq War was without justification, it was nonetheless necessary for South

Korea to participate for the sake of upholding solidarity with the United States.261

Legitimacy issues affected Korean deployments to the extent that the contribution

was shaped in an effort to demonstrate that Korea was not participating in potentially

illegitimate combat operations, but rather a more legitimate peacekeeping effort. The

first deployment of soldiers was framed as a humanitarian effort to aid in the Iraq refugee

259 "Seoul against US Moves on Iraq." 260 "South Korean Assembly Postpones Vote on Dispatch of Troops to Iraq." 261 Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, 268.

244

effort. Roh made his support known for dispatching a non-combat engineering unit of

600 soldiers and approximately 100 medical personnel to support coalition forces and

also to take part in postwar rehabilitation efforts.262 After noting the public objections to

the first deployment, the Roh administration ensured that the second deployment

consisted of a peacekeeping rather than a combat mission. The Roh administration

clearly sent the message to the public that the additional soldiers were being dispatched in

order to maintain peace and public order in Iraq and not for a war against the Iraqi

people. Once the stabilization operations gained the legitimacy of a UN mandate under

Resolution 1551, the ROK government quickly committed to the coalition of the willing.

Additionally, the government rejected a combat mission for its sizable deployment and

instead negotiated for a location that nearly guaranteed that the Korean contingent would

see little combat.

Unlike many countries in the international community, Korean concerns about

contributing to the coalition of the willing were not based on the international legitimacy

of the operation, but rather on pragmatic concerns about the influence of Korean

causalities on domestic politics. This research found no evidence that the ROK

government used legitimacy arguments to condition its responses to the United States.

Instead, this study finds that deployment decisions were geared to gain leverage over U.S.

policy towards the DPRK.

262 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture, 328.

245

Summary and Conclusions

This South Korean case study illustrated that the Security Decision Model is a

useful framework for analyzing state burden sharing decisions; however, the model still

possesses some limitations in predicting state support for a particular coalition. South

Korea’s burden sharing decisions in the Security Decision Model are shown in Figure 5.

The inclusion of external and internal variables provides a detailed and nuanced

framework for determining influences on state burden sharing decisions. South Korea

was particularly influenced by alliance dependence on the United States. With increasing

tensions between the DPRK and the United States, the Roh administration departed from

its anti-American course and accepted a role in the coalition of the willing. This support

sought to reduce spiraling tensions on the peninsula and to demonstrate support to its

U.S. ally in the international community. Domestic structure and politics subsequently

influenced the nature of support that the ROK government provided to the coalition. This

research demonstrated that even Type I regimes, which have significant autonomy from

the legislature, must make controversial decisions with an eye towards domestic unrest.

Due to the significant influence that the Korean President has over the national

government and democratic institutions, the public’s main means of influencing policy is

typically through organized mass protest.263 Although the Roh administration was able to

build

263 The recent mass protests against imported beef demonstrates that protest has become the primary means for Korean citizens to influence government decisions. For discussion on the influence of political protest on the ROK government see Jaehyun Joo, "Explaining Social Policy Adoption in South Korea: The Cases

246

support for the deployment in an opposition-held parliament, it also had to scale the troop

contingent considering the amount of domestic unrest present. The Roh government

made a series of anticipatory concessions with the public and its own party by limiting

the scope and mission of the deployments. In that manner, the administration could

demonstrate that it was considering the demands of society. An interesting observation,

however, is that once deployment decisions were formulated within the NSC, public

opinion had little effect on changing the government’s decision. No decision regarding

of the Medical Insurance Law and the Minimum Wage Law," Journal of Social Policy 28, no. 3 (1999), Aie-Rie Lee, "Down and Down We Go: Trust and Compliance in South Korea," Social Science Quarterly 84, no. 2 (2003).

Outcomes and Effects

Security is a public good provided by others in sufficient quantity even if the state does not

contribute

OUTCOME 1:

No Contribution

OUTCOME 2: Contribution in area(s) with public or state support

OUTCOME 3: No Contribution in area(s) with public or state opposition

Domestic

Structure

State Keeps

its Distance

State Keeps

its Distance

State Free-Rides

State Free-Rides

State Reveals its Preferences

and Pays

State is entrapped and pays anyway

Public Opinion Supports Contribution

Alliance

Dependence?

Historical Lessons/ Learning

State Perceives Threat (good is partially private)

Domestic Factors International Factors Cognitive Factors

Yes

Yes

Yes

Type I

Type III

Yes No

No

No

Type II Type IV

No

Figure 5. South Korean Security Decision Model

247

troop deployments to Iraq was modified after the public announcement of a government

decision was made.

South Korea’s support of the Iraq War coalition is also a case of alliance

entrapment. During the transition from the Kim Dae-jung to the Roh Moo-hyun

administrations, advisors sought to implement Roh’s campaign goal of a more equal

alliance partnership with the United States. This goal was quickly abandoned when the

ROK government found that it had little influence over the confrontational U.S. policy

towards the North Korean nuclear ambitions. Faced with increasing tensions and the

prospect of a U.S. troop drawdown on the peninsula, the Roh administration rapidly

reversed course and supported the coalition of the willing in an attempt to gain leverage

within the ROK-U.S. alliance. The ROK government maintained a weak bargaining

position and made numerous concessions to the United States in an effort to change U.S.

policy towards the DPRK. The U.S. ultimately extracted concessions from Korea by

threatening to make significant reductions and realignments to its military presence on

the Korean peninsula.

The use of the Peterson typology to determine the influence of public opinion on

government decisions was a useful tool in explaining state behavior, but in isolation does

not adequately predict the likely direction a government will take on a given decision.

According to Peterson, a Type I government will reflect the preferences of the chief

executive. Using the rhetoric of Roh’s presidential campaign, one would predict that

Roh’s preference was for a loosening of the ROK-U.S. alliance relationship. Preferences,

248

however, are shaped by one’s external environment and the North Korean nuclear crisis

dramatically reordered Roh’s preferences concerning the ROK relationship with the

United States.264 Once Roh’s preferences were known, Peterson’s typology did

accurately depict the level of Korean burden sharing. The Security Decision Model thus

provides an important framework for improving the predictive capability of Peterson’s

domestic structure typology. The model highlights external influences on executive

decision making, thereby giving the researcher a basis upon which to determine executive

preferences.

264 According to Andrew Moravcsik, states seek to realize their distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states in the international system. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997).

249

CHAPTER FIVE

GERMANY: NON-COALITION BUT COOPERATING

After the devastating 9/11 attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was

quick to promise uneingeschränkte Solidarität (unlimited solidarity) in all necessary

measures against global terrorism.1 Within a year of Schröder’s unqualified declaration

of support, he was also the first Western leader, however, to issue a categorical “no” to

the Bush administration for participation in the Iraq War. The Schröder government not

only declined to make a direct German contribution to the war in 2003, but moreover

engaged in active counter-coalition-building by lobbying France and Russia to support

Germany’s resistance to the U.S. “adventure.”2 Germany abandoned its traditional policy

of balancing between Washington and Paris, and instead created a counter-coalition with

Russia and France against the United States. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. led

coalition—even under a UN mandate—seriously undermined the diplomatic position of

the Bush administration in building an effective coalition against Iraq. Philip Gordon and

1 Schröder’s statement can be translated as either ‘unlimited’ or ‘infinite’ solidarity. In either case, the lack of qualification surprised many German observers that feared an entanglement in a wide-ranging military intervention. See Scott Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003), 192. Schröder later qualified his statement stressing that Germany would not participate in any “adventures.” See Gerhard Schröder, "Die Anschläge in Den USA [the Strikes in the USA]," (government declaration: 2001). Quoted in Tuomas Forsberg, "The Debate over German Normality: A Normal German Debate?," in Political Thought and German Unification: A New German Ideology, ed. Howard Williams, Colin Wight, and Norbert Kapferer (London: Macmillan, 2000), 217, Sebastian Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," German Politics 13, no. 1 (2004). 2 Schröder looked to coordinate his position with Russia and to use the new ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia that included a regular government consultation process. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005), 340, Graham Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," in The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, ed. Rick Fawn and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 67.

250

Jeremy Shapiro, in Allies at War, contend that Schröder’s declared refusal to support the

use of force against Iraq—even if authorized by the UN Security Council—was, simply

put, “irresponsible.” They add, “Germany’s decision to stand with France in blocking

NATO’s preparation for the possible defense of Turkey in the context of an Iraq war was

also difficult to defend.”3 The Chirac-Schröder strategy stripped the U.S.-led

intervention of the legitimacy of a UN Security Council mandate and unintentionally sent

false signals to Saddam Hussein on the probability of armed intervention, weakening US

crisis management, and actually increasing the danger of war.4

Open government opposition to U.S. foreign policy measures is unusual for

Germany. It is not abnormal for France to seek to counter the United States in

international politicking; however, France typically uses this strategy to extract

concessions from the United States before joining in on a common action.5 Germany, in

contrast, has rarely and reluctantly differed openly with the United States on major

issues.6 This pattern was shattered when Chancellor Schröder broke with U.S. policy in

August 2002, and later encouraged Europe and the Security Council to break with the

3 Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 175-76. 4 Germany’s stand on Iraq in the UN Security Council allowed Saddam Hussein to assume that U.S. invasion plans were merely posturing. See "German Stand on Iraq Weakens US Crisis Management, Heightens War Risk - Paper," Die Welt, August 28, 2002. Saddam Hussein spent great effort gaining service contract for France and Russia to build a pro-Iraqi bloc in the Security Council and to avert support for an American war effort, see Woods and Joint Center for Operational Analysis (U.S.), Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership. 5 Daniel Benjamin, "Germany: A Questionable Ally," in America and the World in the Age of Terror: A New Landscape in International Relations, ed. Daniel Benjamin (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 53. 6 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era.

251

U.S. preferred action. Germany, with France, would consequently work together to

frustrate U.S. efforts in the Security Council.

Germany’s position concerning Iraq is puzzling in two dimensions. First, why did

Germany stake out such an extreme foreign policy position when it could have quietly

withheld support? Typically, German foreign policy rejects the notion that it would be

either advisable or even promising to tackle foreign policy problems unilaterally; in this

case, however, Germany’s position was firm and uncoordinated.7 As Germany was

scheduled to occupy a temporary seat on the Security Council, why did it make its anti-

war stance so public when it could have gained the same result through quiet diplomacy?

Secondly, why did Germany cooperate with the United States in so many others aspects

of the war effort while at the same time thwarting U.S. efforts diplomatically? In the area

of military cooperation, for example, Germany was a much more supportive ally than

NATO ally Turkey; Germany put no limitations on the use of U.S. military bases and

actually supplied German soldiers to guard U.S. bases so that U.S. military forces could

deploy to Iraq. This level of support contrasts directly with the assistance initially

provided by Turkey, which provided very limited logistical support. This level of

support contrasts greatly with German support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. As

of March 2008, some 3200 German soldiers were serving in Afghanistan, and Germany

7 Sebastian Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," in Germany's New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, ed. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2001), 303.

252

had suffered 26 fatalities.8 Thus, why did Germany provide essential support to the U.S.

war effort, while at the same time maintaining a hardened diplomatic stance against war

preparations?

Two explanations of Germany’s Iraq policy have emerged. One group of scholars

stresses the role of the September 2002 federal elections, arguing that Schröder and the

Social Democratic Party (SPD) exploited widespread German public skepticism for a

military intervention in Iraq to turn the tide in their faltering electoral campaign.9 A

second group of scholars argues that ideational factors, particularly Berlin’s “culture of

restraint” concerning early use of military force, explains Germany’s Iraq policy.10

Unfortunately both of these arguments are underspecified and do not completely explain

Germany’s early stance against a military intervention in Iraq.11

This chapter will demonstrate that both domestic explanations, combined with a

continued dependence on the United States within NATO and the greater international

community, explains Germany’s policy stance towards the Iraq War. Chancellor

Schröder’s early public opposition against military ventures in September 2001, and

8 The List: Who’s Left in Afghanistan? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008 [cited June 25 2008]); available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4235. 9 See William Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections," German Politics and Society 21, no. 1 (2003), Patricia Hogwood, "The Chancellor-Candidates and the Campaign," German Politics 13, no. 2 (2004), Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), Martin Walker, "The Winter of Germany's Discontent," World Policy Journal 19, no. 4 (2002/2003). 10 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," Survival 45, no. 1 (2003), Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), Kerry Anne Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, Issues in German Politics (Manchester [UK] ; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave, 2004), Akan Malici, "Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior," Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2006). 11 See Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict."

253

categorical “no” for a military intervention in Iraq policy, can be best understood by

taking into account Schröder’s role in preserving the SPD-Greens coalition government

in the face of considerable public opposition to a foreign military intervention in Iraq.

Schröder felt obliged to rule out any military participation by Germany (even before the

Bush administration had committed itself to military action), as this would have spelled

the likely demise of his government.12 Germany however, complied with numerous Bush

administration requests as long as they did not require parliamentary approval. Due to

Schröder’s weak domestic position vis-à-vis parliament and the public, Germany could

only provide support only in those areas in which the executive maintained control.

Schröder was motivated to participate in these areas to maintain U.S. support in NATO

and other regional and international institutions.

First, I begin with a discussion of German government and politics using a

structural approach developed by Susan Peterson. Peterson’s domestic structure typology

is intended to provide simplifying assumptions concerning the interaction of the state and

society, thus allowing the prediction of likely foreign policy outcomes. The analysis of

German government structure will show that German foreign policy decision making

typically reflects a Type IV structure in the Peterson typology where the foreign policy

decision process is composed of a number of different offices that share responsibility

while the legislature performs a significant oversight function. In this type of state,

national leaders’ preferences are shaped by domestic pressures, and the state’s policy

12 Ibid., 2-3.

254

response is the result of internal bureaucratic bargaining. Following this, I summarize

Germany’s contributions, both positive and negative, to the Iraq War coalition and then

draw on the Security Decision Model to explain Germany’s burden sharing decisions.

This analysis suggests that German foreign policy was influenced primarily by domestic

issues, due to the lack of perceived direct threat by Saddam Hussein. Significantly, this

analysis concludes that electoral politics significantly altered the influence of the

executive, and society, on governmental decisions; in this case enabling an independent

Schröder to formulate a more radical populist policy towards the U.S. on Iraq. In this

manner, Germany reflected a Type II rather than a Type IV state in the Peterson

typology.

Following the model analysis, I also address the role of international legitimacy

and demonstrate that German policy, though shrouded in legitimacy arguments, were

actually motivated by short-term political gain. Finally, I summarize and offer

conclusions.

German Government and Politics

Germany is a federal republic, in which the president (Bundespräsident)

maintains largely a ceremonial role and the chancellor (Bundeskanzler) is the head of

government and of a plurality multi-party system. The president is elected every five

years on May 23 by the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung), a special body

convened only for this purpose, comprising the entire Bundestag and an equal number of

state delegates selected especially for the election, in proportion to election results for the

255

state legislatures.13 The chancellor heads the Federal Cabinet (Bundesregierung) and

thus the executive branch of the federal government. The position of chancellor is

equivalent to that of a prime minister and he or she is elected by—and responsible to—

the lower chamber of parliament, the Bundestag.14 The chancellor cannot be removed

from office during a four-year term unless the Bundestag has agreed on a successor; this

constructive vote of no confidence is intended to avoid a situation in which the executive

would not have enough support in the legislature to govern effectively.15 Except during

the periods 1969–72 and 1976–82, when the Social Democratic Party of Chancellors

Brandt and Schmidt came in second in the general elections, the chancellor has always

been the candidate of the largest party, usually supported by a coalition of two or more

parties with a majority in the parliament. The chancellor appoints a vice-chancellor

(Vizekanzler), who is a member of his cabinet, usually the foreign minister. When there

is a coalition government, the vice-chancellor usually belongs to the smaller party of the

coalition. The chancellor also selects the cabinet members who are typically influential

members of the ruling coalition parties. Their primary political allegiance is to the

chancellor’s policies and not to the federal parliament.16 The German cabinet is not a

“working cabinet”—as in the role of the U.S. cabinet—in which government policy is

openly discussed, debated, and finally determined. Rather, the German cabinet’s role is

limited to a final political check on the general lines of government policy; the cabinet

13 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. Germany," (London: The Economist, 2003), 17. 14 David P. Conradt, The German Polity, 6th ed. (White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1996), 195. 15 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. Germany," 16. 16 Conradt, The German Polity, 195.

256

typically approves rather than makes decisions.17 The structure of the executive branch,

as long as a coalition government exists, ensures that executive decision making is

typically based on bargaining between the coalition party leaders.

Federal legislative power is vested in both the government and the two chambers

of parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The lower house, the Bundestag, is

elected every four years under a system of mixed direct and proportional representation.

The Bundestag is the main legislative body and is solely responsible for electing the

chancellor. The members of the Bundestag constitute part of Germany’s political elite

with the chancellor, almost all cabinet ministers, and all parliamentary state secretaries

drawn from its ranks.18 The upper house, the Bundesrat, represents state governments

and must approve all federal legislation affecting policy areas for which the Basic Law

grants the states concurrent powers and for which the states must administer federal

regulations. Each of Germany’s sixteen state governments has between three and six

votes in the Bundesrat depending on the size of its population. Since the political

orientation of the Bundesrat depends on the various state elections that occur

independently of the federal elections, parties in opposition to that of the Bundestag quite

frequently control the Bundesrat. In recent years, the Bundesrat has evolved into a forum

for the opposition parties to have influence over government policy and legislation.

The judiciary of Germany is independent of the executive and the legislative

branches. The courts maintain a powerful check on executive and legislative action and

17 Ibid., 199. 18 Ibid., 186.

257

almost all state actions are subject to judicial review. For constitutional issues, the

Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) retains jurisdiction; the sole

task of this court is judicial review. A variety of political institutions, including the

governments of the German states (Bundesländer), federal institutions, and individual

members of the Bundestag, may bring a law passed by the federal legislature before the

court if they consider it unconstitutional. The court is empowered to declare public acts

unconstitutional and thus render them ineffective. It is the most powerful constitutional

court in Europe, having the authority to not only to find a law unconstitutional, but also to

deactivate it and replace it with its own regulations.19

The German Basic Law, which originated as the West German constitution,

includes two consistent themes: the effort to construct legal obstacles to ensure that

totalitarianism and Nazism can never rise again and a federated political system where

power is distributed among states so that no government entity gains a considerable

amount of power. A two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature is required to

change the Basic Law and certain fundamental provisions—such as the commitment to

human rights and the federal structure—cannot be changed at all. The Basic Law

provides wide scope for judicial review. Individual state governments or a defeated

minority in the Bundestag with at least one-third of the Bundestag members can

challenge a law in the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition, the federal structure also

19 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. Germany," 17. Geoffrey K. Roberts, German Electoral Politics, Issues in German Politics (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave, 2006), 28-31.

258

limits the power and influence of the federal government. Germany is a federal republic

with sixteen states that constitute the republic. Each state has its own constitution, a

democratically elected parliament, a government, administrative agencies and

independent courts. Each state government has representation in the Bundesrat;

therefore, major legislation requires the consensus of the federal and state government

who often represent competing interests. 20 This power sharing arrangement ensures that

political decisions are reached by consensus rather than through the centralization of

power. As a result, Germany maintains a less centralized government than the

parliamentary democracies of either Britain or France.21 The Basic Law clearly states the

primacy of the Bundestag as the only institution directly legitimated by the public. This

primacy is expressed through the formal election of the chancellor, the constitutional

limits on executive decrees, and the principle that “essential” decisions on legislative

issues may not be delegated to the executive.22

Not only is state power limited constitutionally, but the government must also be

responsive to the public due to the influence of party politics on policy decisions.

Germany has been termed a party state, in the words of German political scientist Kurt

Sontheimer, meaning: “All political decisions in the Federal Republic are made by the

parties and their representatives. There are no political decisions of importance in the

German democracy which have not been brought to the parties, prepared by them and

20 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile. Germany," 16. 21 Conradt, The German Polity, 181. 22 Ulrich Sieberer, "Agenda Setting in the German Bundestag: A Weak Government in a Consensus Democracy," German Politics 15, no. 1 (2006).

259

finally taken by them.”23 The party exerts considerable influence because, as a rule, the

chancellor and the government ministers also hold leading party functions and can be

considered as “party representatives of sorts in the government.”24 Understanding the

positions and debates within and between political parties is especially critical, as parties

are the nexus between the public and elites. They are the vehicle that individual

politicians use to achieve power.

Primarily two political blocs have dominated politics in Germany since World

War II. The first bloc is “the Union” comprised of the Christian Democratic Union

(CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU). The center-right CDU has been traditionally

the most influential party in German politics. The CDU supports a free-market economy

and social welfare programs, but is conservative on social issues. It has also been a

strong advocate of European integration while at the same time cultivating close relations

with the United States. The CSU is the Bavarian affiliate of the CDU; although the CSU

has its own leadership, organization, and fund-raising structures, it does not run

candidates outside Bavaria. The CSU takes a more conservative stance than the CDU on

social issues. In parliament, the two parties maintain a common caucus with co-chairmen

representing each party; for federal purposes they may be considered one party—the

Union.25

23 Kurt Sontheimer, The Government and Politics of West Germany (New York,: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 95. Conradt, The German Polity, 115-16. 24 Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," 195. 25 Conradt, The German Polity, 119-23.

260

The center-left SPD heads the second political bloc. The SPD was the only major

Weimar political party to reemerge in the Federal Republic, but it mainly played an

opposition role in early West German politics due to doubts concerning its commitment

to NATO and pro-Western policies. In 1959, the SPD abandoned its commitment to

Marxism and approved a new party strategy that advocated the modernization of the

economy to meet the demands of globalization as well as stressing the importance of

addressing the social needs of workers and society's disadvantaged.26 In 1966, it entered

a grand coalition with its chief rival, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and from

1969 to 1982, the SPD governed as the dominant coalition partner with the Free

Democratic Party (FDP). The SPD remained out of power at the national level from

1982 to 1998, suffering four successive election losses. In 1998, the SPD—led by

Gerhard Schröder—was able to win a governing coalition with the Green Party based on

a centrist agenda that favored lowered taxes and cuts in government spending.

The FDP and Greens 90 Party complete the list of major political parties that

combine in coalition to form the federal government. For almost 50 years, the FDP

enjoyed the position of kingmaker by forming coalitions with the large parties, the

CDU/CSU and the SPD. The FDP’s ideology combines beliefs in individual liberty

combined with a limiting the size of government to the minimum necessary to provide

basic services. It promotes a market economy, with traditional features of the German

social welfare system. Its location as ideologically between the CDU/CSU and the SPD

26 Ibid., 124-30.

261

has ensured the party’s survival. The Free Democrats have never received more than 13

percent of the party vote in any national election, yet the party has played a role in the

political system far exceeding the size of its electorate. The FDP can sometimes decide

which of the two larger parties will provide the chancellor and form a governing

coalition.27 In foreign policy, the FDP supports European integration and the

transatlantic partnership. The Green Party traces its origins to the student protest

movement of the 1960s, the environmentalist movement of the 1970s, and the peace

movement of the early 1980s. Initially a pacifist movement, the experience of

Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to a restructuring of this position. The party was severely

torn by the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999, which party leader Joschka Fischer

strongly supported.28 The party moved from a pacifist leaning to one that supported

military intervention for humanitarian reasons.

Procedures in the Bundestag are mainly structured by parliamentary party groups

(Fraktion). The government is restricted from offering legislative amendments in the

Bundestag; only individual ministers or Fraktion can propose amendments to legislation,

thus further limiting the influence of the government. Once a bill is introduced to

parliament, the government has to rely exclusively on its party groups to guide it through

27 Roberts, German Electoral Politics, 122. 28 See Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 169.

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the legislative process.29 This means that party positions over time are an important

indicator of the contest and basic “battle lines” within German politics.30

In Germany, coalition government is the norm, as it is rare for either of the

dominant parties, the CDU/CSU or the SPD, to win an unqualified majority in a national

election. Thus, at the federal level, governments are formed with at least one of the

smaller parties. This lack of a party majority in parliament requires constant coordination

and persuasive efforts for government stability.31 Government policy requires

comprehensive coalition negotiations in which many party positions are qualified until a

compromise policy position is reached.32 Radical policy adjustments are rare, and

reforms tend to be incremental and marginal to avoid electoral backlash.33 The discipline

and restraints imposed by electoral politics serve as an important constraining factor on

the government and the parties in their exercise of power.34

In the realm of foreign policy making, the most important figures in Germany are

the chancellor and the foreign minister; however, due to party influences and electoral

politics, foreign policy is a result of party negotiations and consensus building since the

chancellor and foreign minister are traditionally from different parties and may therefore,

29 Sieberer, "Agenda Setting in the German Bundestag: A Weak Government in a Consensus Democracy." 30 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 14. 31 Judith Siwert-Probst, "Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy," in Germany's New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, ed. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2001), 25. 32 Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," 197. 33 Roberts, German Electoral Politics, 120. Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political-Economic Context and Partisan Strategies in the German Federal Elections 1990-2002," Western European Politics 26 (2003), 134. 34 Roberts, German Electoral Politics, 126.

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represent different subcultures and interests.35 Controversial issues of foreign policy are

usually decided by parliamentary resolution after the appropriate debate in party and

parliamentary forums. This corporate view towards policy has avoided perpetuating deep

rifts in the population and the political elite over basic foreign policy issues.36

A further limitation for the government in the foreign policy arena is the

requirement in German law for Bundestag approval of every military engagement that is

not self-defense related, as well as extensions of existing military operations.37 In its

ruling of 12 July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that the deployment of

German armed forces abroad requires the consent of the Bundestag.38 This ruling ensures

political discussion on the merits of any deployment and limits the chancellor’s power to

deploy military forces independently. The Christian Democrats argued that this provision

limits the executive’s decision making ability in times of international crisis; however,

they have been unable to garner the necessary votes in parliament to overturn the rule.

Therefore, politically, the Bundeswehr’s role in an international crisis remains a highly

contested issue domestically.39

This discussion of German politics demonstrates that the German government is

severely constrained by domestic politics and coalition building, especially in areas

requiring the use of the military. The Basic Law was written to limit the abuses and 35 Malici, "Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior." 36 Joachim Krause, "The Role of the Bundestag in German Foreign Policy," in Germany's New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, ed. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2001), 159. 37 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 191. 38 Krause, "The Role of the Bundestag in German Foreign Policy," 162. 39 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 79.

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dangers caused by the centralization of government. The German political system is a

democracy with multiple veto players and strong consensus elements, making it a Type

IV state in the Peterson domestic structure typology. Neither the executive branch nor the

governing parties in parliament are able to control unilaterally policy-making in Germany

and thus policy-making is the result of negotiation and compromise. This does not mean

that policy does not change, but rather that changes tend to be small and incremental

rather than radical.40

This review of German politics is instructive because it defines the environment

in which Chancellor Schröder had to formulate his Iraq policy. After this discussion, I

analyze German support for the Iraq coalition using the Security Decision Model as a

framework. Especially instructive is the role of domestic politics and NATO alliance

influence on Germany’s Iraq policy.

The Timing, Size, and Mix of Germany’s Contributions

Political Contributions

Germany was the first Western power to issue a categorical “no” to the Bush

administration for participation in the Iraq War. While refusing to participate in any U.S.

intervention, the Schröder government aggressively countered the Bush administration in

40 The changes of “use of force” policy discussed later are instructive. In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, German policy-makers realized that they needed to expand the possible roles and missions of the Bundeswehr. To expand the domestic mandate for Bundeswehr deployments, the government engaged in a series of political and legal debates that gradually expanded the acceptability of the use of force. The policy change was significant, but was the result of a long process of conciliation and coalition building between the ruling coalition and the opposition parties. The process has resulted in a significant “normalization” of German foreign policy, but one that still reflects a high degree of domestic constraint.

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international venues such as the United Nations Security Council and NATO.41

Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. led coalition—even under a UN mandate—

seriously undermined the diplomatic position of the Bush administration in building an

effective coalition against Iraq, and incited a European policy split that threatened

viability of both the United Nations Security Council and NATO. Schröder’s anti-war

coalition ensured that the U.S. did not gain the legitimacy of a UN Security Council

mandate, thereby allowing Saddam Hussein to assume that military action was unlikely.42

Germany’s diplomatic response to Bush administration objectives began in the

immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

Schröder pledged Germany’s “uneingeschränkte Solidarität” (“unlimited solidarity”)

with the United States in the fight against international terrorism. This statement

surprised many in Germany, and he soon qualified his remarks by stating that there

would be no participation in any foreign “adventures.” He stressed that any military

action within the NATO framework would require consultations between members. In

his remarks to the Bundestag requesting a vote of solidarity with the United States, he

stated:

Naturally: Every right corresponds with a duty. But this, of course, also applies the other way around, which means information and consultation. What do we want to achieve as Germans and Europeans: unlimited solidarity with the United States in all

41 Schröder looked to coordinate his position with Russia and to use the new ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia that included a regular government consultation process. Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 340, Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 67. 42 "German Stand on Iraq Weakens US Crisis Management, Heightens War Risk - Paper."

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necessary measures. Risk, including military, will be shared by Germany but she is not prepared for adventures. These are not asked for by the American administration, because of its considerate position after the attacks, and they will certainly not be asked for in the future.43

Schröder was asking the Bundestag to support NATO, but assuaged their fears that that

support would be unrestricted. According to Schröder, effective alliance management

required the consultation of equals.

Germany defended the NATO decision to evoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty

legitimizing military action and promised support to the United States under the auspices

of NATO, but endorsed a legalistic version of support, which did not necessarily commit

military forces.44 German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping stated, “It [NATO

support] does not mean we are at war.” According to Scharping, the NATO treaty

requires assistance, but does not specify exactly the type of assistance member states

must provide.45 Reacting to Schröder’s request of solidarity and the lack of request for

military support, the German parliament passed a resolution with 611 out of a possible

666 votes expressing full solidarity with the United States, only the ex-communist Party

of Democratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the measure.46

43 Schröder comments to the Bundestag, September 19, 2001, quoted in Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 6. 44 Article 5 states that any attack on a member state will be considered an attack against the entire group of members. North Atlantic Treaty Organization., The North Atlantic Treaty (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4 1949 [cited March 10 2008]); available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 45 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 193. Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 61. 46 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 193.

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Washington’s response to NATO’s Article 5 declaration suggested that Germany

did not have to fear being drawn into military action. Washington was quick to rebuff a

NATO led response, instead opting for a tailored military coalition that proffered a

greater degree of U.S. control. The U.S. government did not initially request German

military support. The German government, however, continued to prepare for a NATO

intervention. With the challenges of commanding a NATO force in Kosovo fresh in

American minds, NATO could not be allowed to hinder any U.S. military response in

Afghanistan.47 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced, “If we need

collective action, we will ask for it; we don’t anticipate that at the moment.”48 Secretary

Rumsfeld further clarified the U.S. position by stating, “The mission determines the

coalition. The coalition doesn’t determine the mission.”49 German officials were

alarmed by this unilateral tone. “It is safe to say that Germans after 9/11 expected that

the attacks would lead to greater multilateralism,” according to one German diplomat.50

Nonetheless, to support a possible NATO role in Afghanistan, Schröder insisted on—and

won—a Bundestag mandate in November 2001 authorizing an out of area deployment of

3,900 Bundeswehr troops.51 This request reflected a decade-long trend for Bundeswehr

47 Heiko Borchert and Mary N. Hampton, "The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or Bust for Transatlantic Security," Orbis 46, no. 2 (2002). 48 Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, "All Dressed up and No Place to Go," Parameters (2002/3), 52. 49 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Stakeout in Washington (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001 [cited December 19 2007]); available from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1926. Johnson and Zenko, "All Dressed up and No Place to Go," 51. 50 Benjamin, "Germany: A Questionable Ally," 57. 51 Ibid., 58, Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 350, Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 193-94, Harnisch, "German Non-

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participation in NATO military actions, but was met with staunch domestic opposition

who questioned the role of military interventions outside Europe.52 Schröder’s coalition

government was nearly toppled by the vote, and eventually required a vote of confidence

for passage.53 Although German domestic support existed for the United States in

general, the government was fiercely challenged by the opposition The Left (PDS) party

in Bundestag debates and even the SPD showed little enthusiasm to have German troops

engaged in what was seen as a risky campaign.54 The vote of no confidence is noteworthy

as it marked a turning point in the German use of military force; it was the first time in

post WWII history that German combat troops would be authorized to deploy combat

forces outside of Europe. The deployment vote illustrated that the governing coalition

remained far from united regarding Germany’s role in the U.S.-led war on terror.

The Iraq War began to emerge onto the international agenda in early 2002 with

President Bush’s declaration of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address.55 The

German public and elite were critical of the declaration of “rogue states” and were

Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 6, Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," SAIS Review XXV, no. 2 (2005), 30, Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 17. 52 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict.", Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification. 53 Schröder won the vote of confidence with 336 votes, only 2 more than the simple majority that he needed. 54 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 108, Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 84. 55 George W. Bush, President Delivers State of the Union Address (The White House, 2002 [cited December 19 2007]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

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uncomfortable with the idea of aggressively policing of states that harbor terrorism.56

Bush, however, assured Schröder that there were no plans for attack and the NATO

alliance partners would be informed of any military preparations.57 Although Schröder

held reservations that the United States was not adequately consulting with the NATO

allies, he remained mildly supportive of U.S. objectives within a multilateral framework,

while continuing to warn against ill-conceived military ventures.58

The annual Munich Security Seminar in February 2002 became the first public

forum for the Americans and Europeans to voice their opinions on future military

operations regarding the war on terrorism. The American representatives clearly

articulated their position: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that the

United States was still at war after the September 11 attacks and that the new threats

meant that Washington had to act preventatively. In the words of Secretary Rumsfeld, the

United States was prepared “to take the war to the enemy.”59 Senator John McCain

clarified the U.S. position by mentioning that the “day of reckoning” was approaching for

56 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance.", Martin Gehlen, "German Skepticism About America's Intent and Goals in Iraq," Nieman Reports (2003), Ingrid A. Lehmann, "Exploring the Transatlantic Media Divide over Iraq: How and Why U.S. And German Media Differed in Reporting on UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq, 2002-2003," The Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics 10, no. 1 (2005). 57 "German Chancellor Says Strike against Iraq Not on the Agenda," DDP News Agency, February 18, 2002. Peter Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," Survival 47, no. 1 (2005), 142. 58 Lally Weymouth, "The Importance of Having Friends: Schroder on Bush, the Terror War and His Woes at Home," Newsweek, February 11,, 2002. Peter Ford, "United against Terror, Divided on Trade, Coalition Strains," Christian Science Monitor, March 8,, 2002. 59 Paul D. Wolfowitz, Speech at the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy (Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2002 [cited December 19 2007]); available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2002=&id=69&sprache=en&.

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Iraq.60 In contrast to the American position on Iraq, German Defense Minister Rudolf

Scharping noted that it would be naïve to think that European societies would support

military action. Europe, and specifically Germany, would support military intervention

only if several conditions were met: a clear mandate under international law, a clear role

for the United Nations, and a multinational political and military approach.61 Sharping’s

comments reflected Germany’s reluctance to expand the war on terrorism to Iraq. The

SPD/Green coalition government and German public were unconvinced of the

connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq and skeptical of U.S. claims of Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Throughout the spring of 2002, Germany supported U.S.

policy diplomatically, but stressed the need for a UN mandate to support military

operations against Iraq. At the March European Union (EU) summit in Barcelona,

Schröder confirmed the German stance when he stated that Germany would only join an

anti-Iraq coalition if the United Nations supported an intervention.62

A serious rift in German and U.S. policy developed after Bush visited Berlin in

May 2002. Bush made his case against Iraq to Schröder, but gave reassurances that he

would not act without consultation with the allies. It was reportedly agreed that Bush

60 John McCain, From Crisis to Opportunity: American Internationalism and the New Atlantic Order (Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2002 [cited December 19 2007]); available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2002=&menu_konferenzen_archiv=&menu_2008=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=76&. 61 Rudolph Scharping, Global Security - New Challenges, New Strategies (Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2002 [cited February 20 2008]); available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2002=&menu_konferenzen_archiv=&menu_2008=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=88&. Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 8, Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 87. 62 Britain 'Isolated' over Iraq (BBC News, 2002 [cited December 10 2007]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1876015.stm.

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would not start preparations for war before the German elections, and Schröder would not

campaign on the antiwar issue during his election campaign.63 Both promises were soon

broken. As news of an impending Iraq War began to surface in the early summer, the

German government remained cautious towards U.S. policy as long as the U.S. made no

concrete requests for German support. As long as there were no specific requests from

Washington, a Berlin spokesperson stated, there was no need for the government to make

a decision.64 After President Bush’s West Point address that made the case for preventive

military action against emerging WMD threats, however, German public opinion polls

showed that an overwhelming majority of Germans opposed a military intervention in

Iraq.65 An October 2002 Pew Research Center poll reported that while 75 percent of

German respondents supported the removal of Saddam Hussein, only 26 percent

supported the use of force.66 Weakened by a poor economic record and facing a strong

challenge in the upcoming federal elections, Schröder felt he could no longer take a

cautious approach towards Iraq and embraced negative public attitudes towards the

impending conflict as a defining election issue.

63 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq, 109, Klaus Larres, "Mutual Incomprehension: U.S.-German Value Gaps Beyond Iraq," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003), Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," 143-44, Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 19. 64 Quoted in Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 9. 65 Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections.", Tuomas Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (2005), 218. 66 Madeline Albright and Andrew Kohut, "What the World Thinks in 2002," Pew Global Attitudes Project (Washington DC: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2002), 3.

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Immediately after the start of the German election campaign in August 2002,

Schröder hardened his rhetoric against a military intervention in Iraq and explicitly stated

that Germany was not going to support the U.S. policy. In an election rally in Hanover

on August 5, Schröder stated, “We must get the international inspectors into Iraq. But

playing games [Spielerei] with war and military intervention—against that I can only

warn. This will happen without us…We are not available for adventures [Abenteuer],

and the time of checkbook diplomacy is finally at an end.”67 In an interview in the news

weekly Die Zeit, Schröder openly criticized the Bush administration for not consulting

with Germany and declared the need for a “German Way” in foreign policy. He began to

use charged phrases like “reckless adventure” and emphasized that there would be no

German military contribution to a war in Iraq, even though the Bush administration had

not specifically asked for one. Foreign Minister Fischer was also critical of any war in

Iraq, but was careful to formulate his positions diplomatically. Fischer’s more nuanced

position concerning Iraq, based on a UN mandate, is significant given his pacifist

background as an activist in The Greens party and 1960s peace movements. Fischer

believed that German support should be conditional on an international mandate. The

German opposition was also critical of Schröder’s stance, arguing instead for the

coalition government to work out a common European position in the Iraq debate.68

67 This quote is in response to the notion that Germany provided only checkbook support in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Quoted in Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 23. Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 218. "Gerhard Schröder Auf Anti-Amerika Kurs [Gerhard Schröder on an Anti-American Course]," Die Tageszeitung, August 6, 2002. 68 "German Opposition Critical of Government Stance on Iraq," Die Welt, August 7, 2002.

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According to the opposition, Germany and Europe would be better served by a unified

European position on Iraq. They were concerned that a foreign policy classified as “The

German Way” would cause considerable upset in European foreign policy circles.

Instead, Schröder publicly continued to criticize U.S. policy for domestic gains.

His staunch opposition to the war marked him from his challenger, CSU candidate

Edmund Stoiber. Der Spiegel magazine later observed that the campaign marked the end

of “unlimited solidarity” when Schröder became the Chancellor of Peace.69 Schröder’s

position hardened in late August in reaction to Vice President Cheney’s speech to the

Veterans of Foreign Wars claiming the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein by military

means, if necessary. Cheney stated, “old doctrines of security do not apply;” quoting

Henry Kissinger he continued, “The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and

the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for

preemptive action.” 70 Cheney’s speech presented Schröder an ideal opportunity to

escalate his opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq, and the Iraq issue became the dominant

theme in the elections.71 In an interview in the New York Times, Schröder stated that the

arguments against a war with Iraq are so strong that he would oppose one even if the

69 Quoted in Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 23. 70 Richard Cheney, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention (White House Press Office, 2002 [cited December 20 2007]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html. 71 Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections.", Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 218. White House, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention (White House Press Office, 2002 [cited December 3 2007]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html.

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Security Council approved [emphasis added].72 During the course of the national

election campaign, the German position on a possible Iraq war changed from support

with a UN mandate to unequivocal opposition to any military intervention even under a

UN mandate. Schröder’s anti-war stance isolated Germany within Europe and

established a policy position from which Schröder could not retreat after the elections.73

The anti-war rhetoric resonated well in the east where suspicion of NATO was strong,

and along with a the government’s competent response to a massive flood just a few days

before the election, turned a 10 percentage point deficit into a SPD-Greens victory by the

slimmest margin in the Federal Republic’s history.74 The governing coalition gained a

narrow four-seat majority in the Bundestag, yet the unintended consequences of

Schröder’s rhetoric quickly became apparent: a weak coalition government, European

isolation from U.S. foreign policy prerogatives, and a soured German-American

relationship.

The resolute policy position taken by Schröder in the campaign left little room for

any adaptation or modification. The day after the election, Schröder met with the left

wing of his parliamentary party and told its foreign policy spokesperson, Gernot Erler,

that his decision on Iraq was fundamental and unshakable. To change his approach

72 Steven Erlanger, "German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake; Perspectives -- Sept. 11 and Beyond: Gerhard Schroder," The New York Times, September 5, 2002. See also Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 26. 73 Erlanger, "German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake; Perspectives -- Sept. 11 and Beyond: Gerhard Schroder.", William Horsley, Foreign Policy Works for Schroeder (BBC News, 2002 [cited December 4 2007]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2261878.stm. 74 Chandler, "Foreign and European Policy Issues in the 2002 Bundestag Elections.", Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 351, Hogwood, "The Chancellor-Candidates and the Campaign."

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would cost him credibility with his party and the voters, and he had no mandate to do

so.75 Schröder welcomed the late September decision by the United States to seek a UN

Security Council resolution but continued to counter any U.S. policy advocating the use

of force. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed that any UN resolution should not

contain mechanisms to justify immediate military action in the case of Iraqi non-

compliance. Fischer also re-stated Germany’s earlier position that it would not

participate in military intervention, even if the United Nations provided a clear mandate

for that participation.76 This position lost Germany any real leverage to influence the

Bush administration into taking a more restrained approach towards Iraq. Furthermore,

the stance continued to isolate Berlin among its European partners who continued to

suggest a military intervention would require at least an additional UN resolution.

Schröder’s unilateral stance was critiqued within policy circles, “It does not say much for

the prospects of a shared security and defense policy when Schröder comes out with a

stance like this without any liaison,” said Frank Umbach, a senior research analyst at the

independent German Council on Foreign Relations.77 Schröder was alone among NATO

leaders in ruling out military action regardless if it was supported by a United Nations

resolution.

At the same time that Germany refused to support military intervention, it

attempted to repair diplomatic relations with the United States in a strategy of damage

75 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 34. 76 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 12. 77 Schröder's Iraq Rhetoric Alarms Western Allies (Telegraph Media Group, 2002 [cited March 4 2008]); available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/09/15/wschr15.xml.

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limitation. Schröder supported efforts in the larger war on terrorism, while also

providing Iraq support that did not require a vote in the Bundestag. Schröder offered

support to the United Nations for arms inspections in Iraq.78 At the end of September,

Foreign Minister Fischer declared that Germany could participate in a post-war UN-

mandated force although it still opposed military intervention in the first instance.79 The

Bundestag consequently extended the mandate for the German contingent for Operation

Enduring Freedom.80 At the advice of U.S. Secretary of State Powell, Germany

expanded its military role in Afghanistan to include almost 2,000 troops and volunteered

to command NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) once the force

came under NATO’s authority.81 Most significantly, the federal government—in spite of

concerns of several members of the governing coalition who deemed this commitment

would violate international and German constitutional law—promised transit rights for

German territory and air space as well as rights to the use of U.S. installations in the case

of military intervention.82 Chancellor Schröder also agreed to provide security for U.S.

bases in Germany in case of war thereby making U.S. troops from the 4th Infantry

78 "German Chancellor Offers Support for UN Arms Inspections in Iraq," DDP News Agency, September 17, 2002. 79 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 12. 80 "German Parliament Approves Extension of Enduring Freedom Mandate," DDP News Agency, November 15, 2002. 81 Steven Erlanger, "Rumsfeld Urges NATO to Set up Strike Force," The New York Times, September 25, 2002, "German Cabinet Extends Bundeswehr Mandate for Afghanistan, Macedonia," DDP News Agency, December 3, 2002. "German Minister Stresses Need for Ongoing Isaf Mission in Afghanistan," DDP News Agency, December 20, 2002. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 35. 82 "German Chancellor Expected to Grant USA Use of Air Space " Der Spiegel, November 20, 2002. "Germany to Grant Overflight Rights to US, Allies in Case of Iraq War," DDP News Agency, November 22, 2002.

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Division available for deployment to Iraq.83 Lastly, Berlin offered two Patriot missile

batteries to Israel.84 By the end of 2002, Germany was robustly supporting the war on

terrorism with approximately 8,500 German troops deployed in various parts of the

world, second only to United States in the effort. Politically, however, its opposition to

military intervention in Iraq offset this support.

Germany was thus caught between its interest in improving relations with the

United States and Schröder’s uncompromising position on a war in Iraq. Foreign

Minister Fischer continued to keep open the possibility that Germany might eventually

lend political support to the war, and he stated: “That’s something no one can predict as

no one knows…which accompanying conditions the Security Council will attach. It

remains certain that we will not participate militarily in an intervention.”85 Fischer’s

comments prompted a strong reaction in Germany. Some in the SPD and the Green

parliamentary groups were worried that the government was backing away from its

strong opposition to the war.86 Using the analogy of a two-level game, Schröder had

given too much for a win-set at the domestic level to have a win-set available with the

United States at the international level.87 Germany had to continue its staunch opposition

83 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 35. 84 "Germany, Israel to Hold Talks on Patriot Missiles," DDP News Agency, December 3, 2002. "Germany to Grant Overflight Rights to US, Allies in Case of Iraq War." 85 Die Hoffnung Wird Immer Kleiner [Hope Is Becoming Smaller All the Time] (December 30 2002 [cited December 3 2007]); available from http://service.spiegel.de/digas/find?DID=26024486. Quoted in Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 219. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 37. 86 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 37. 87 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games."

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to the war to maintain Schröder’s credibility domestically and had to search for support in

the international community to mitigate its isolation from the United States.

The natural partner to combat their perceived isolation from the United States was

Germany’s neighbor to the west: France, their European Union ally and traditional

antagonist to the United States. By January 2003, Germany was politically isolated by

the Bush administration and unsure whether France would side with the Americans,

British, Spanish, and Italians on Iraq. This position left Germany dangerously

marginalized within the Western alliance. The true impact of the German anti-war

position was felt by French President Jacques Chirac, pushing him towards adopting a

policy of confrontation with the United States.88 Schröder reached out to French

President Chirac in a telephone conversation and agreed that they would closely

coordinate their policies in the Security Council when Germany gained its rotating seat.89

German foreign policy expert Gregor Schöllgen described Germany’s role as having “had

unintentionally taken on a leadership role as a counterbalance to the United States.”90 As

a result, Schröder continued to court President Chirac of France to counter any U.S.

military intervention. The U.S. counter-alliance solidified in a January 20 ministerial

meeting in the United Nations when Foreign Minister Fischer joined French Foreign

Minister Dominique de Villepin in accusing the United States of “impatience” in the

88 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 38. 89 Ibid., 37. 90 Quoted in Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 65.

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confrontation with Baghdad.91 Fischer supported the French in hinting that it would

support a French veto if the United States tried to raise the issue of Iraq, particularly in

anticipation of the January 27 ministerial meeting in which Hans Blix was slated to

announce progress on weapons inspections. The Franco-German bloc was firmly

cemented two days later when Schröder and Chirac issued a joint statement in Versailles

declaring that military intervention in Iraq would be a last resort and would require a UN

Security Council decision. According to a German official, “Chirac gave Schröder a

great gift that day. Schröder went from being isolated to being part of a French-German-

Russian bloc whose position was supported by a potential majority on the Security

Council. He was no longer alone.”92

Germany, together with France and Russia, sought an open-ended extension of

the UN weapons inspections authorized under Resolution 1441. To regain momentum

for the U.S.-U.K. position in the Security Council, Secretary of State Powell provided

gripping testimony offering detailed evidence that argued Iraq was hiding WMD and

maintaining links to al Qaeda.93 The German-Franco- Russian axis was unmoved: the

speech had little impact on their position that the inspectors should be given more time to

do their work.94 After the second report by UN inspectors Hans Blix and Director

General of the IAEA Mohamed El Baradei on February 14, which showed improvement

91 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations. 92 Quoted in James Kitfield, "Damage Control," National Journal, July 19, 2003. 93 United States. White House., U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council (February 5 2003 [cited February 21 2008]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html#17. 94 Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 42.

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in the inspection process but a considerable lack of full co-operation on the part of Iraq,

Foreign Minister Fischer declared that the inspection regime had to be improved. He

advocated a strengthened verification and control mechanism so that a re-start of Iraqi

weapons programs could be precluded.95 This strategy was also pursued in the European

Union, where Germany advocated a declaration that agreed that “war is not inevitable”

and that “force should be used only as a last resort.”96 Berlin, however, resisted fixing a

specific date for the Hussein regime to comply with Security Council demands. Instead,

the German government—in a joint memorandum with France and Russia—proposed a

strengthening of the inspections regime in the Security Council.97 These measures would

have taken months, if not years, to implement.98 The anti-war bloc, now under the

leadership of the French, continued to resist U.S. efforts in the Security Council. In late

February, French ambassador to Washington, Jean David Levitte, urged Deputy National

Security Advisor Steven Hadley not to pursue an additional Security Council resolution

on Iraq. He delivered a message from Chirac, “Let's agree to disagree on Iraq, but a

second resolution by the Security Council was unnecessary and would risk damaging

relations further.” Hadley replied that the United States did not think it needed a second 95 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 17-18. 96 "Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 17 February 2003," (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003). 97 The Declaration on Iraq by Russia, Germany, and France stated, “U.N. Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the U.N. Security Council, provides a framework of which the potential has not yet been fully exploited.” It continued, “There is still an alternative to war. The use of force can only be considered as a last resort. Russia, Germany and France are determined to ensure that everything possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully.” Declaration by Russia, Germany and France Pronounced by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, During a Joint Press Briefing with Vladimir Poutine, President of the Russian Federation (Embassy of France in the United States, February 10 2003 [cited March 4 2008]); available from http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2003/chirac021003.asp. 98 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 18.

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UN resolution authorizing force, but that British Prime Minister Tony Blair required one

for domestic political reasons. The Bush administration reasoned it had nothing to lose in

attempting a second resolution. If the United States did not seek a second resolution and

lost Blair, it still would not be able to win over France.99 The United States, Great

Britain, and Spain thus submitted a proposed resolution to the UN Security Council on

February 24 calling for the authorization to use military force; consequently, on March 5,

France, Germany, and Russia issued a joint statement that unambiguously declared that

the three states would block any attempt in the UN Security Council to use force against

Iraq.100 The draft resolution was withdrawn on March 10 when Chirac stated “whatever

the circumstances, France will vote no.”101

To counter the German-French-Russian impasse in the Security Council, British

Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed changes to the proposed 18th UN resolution on

March 12, which would call for Iraq to meet certain benchmarks to prove that it was

disarming.102 France, which promised to veto any new resolution and could not back

down from that unequivocal guarantee, immediately rejected the Blair amendment. With

the outbreak of war imminent, Schröder and Fischer underlined their commitment to

solving the Iraq crisis through diplomacy. In his State of the Nation speech to the

99 Kitfield, "Damage Control." Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 39. 100 Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 67. 101 Elaine Sciolino, "Threats and Responses: Discord; France to Veto Resolution on Iraq War, Chirac Says," The New York Times, March 11, 2003. 102 Anthony Depalma, "Threats and Responses: An Overview: March 12, 2003; Trolling for U.N. Votes (8 Enough?), Terms for Delay, Drones on Display," The New York Times, March 13, 2003. For text of the draft resolution see . United Nations Security Council, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution. S/2003/215 (United Nations, March 7 2003 [cited March 4 2008]); available from http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-07mar03-en-rev.pdf.

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Bundestag of March 14, Schröder argued, “We must have the courage to fight for peace

as long as there is a scrap of hope that war can be avoided.”103 On March 16 in a prewar

council held between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain, a decision was

made to withdraw the additional UN resolution and present Hussein with an ultimatum to

leave Iraq.104 At the UN Security Council meeting on March 19, Fischer condemned the

use of military action by stating “the Security Council had not failed” and that “Germany

emphatically rejects the impending war…the policy of military intervention has no

credibility.”105

Germany was also a crucial U.S. counterweight in NATO. Belgium, supported by

Germany and France, led the opposition in NATO for providing Turkey with Airborne

Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and Patriot anti-missile batteries. The

three opposing NATO members argued that voting to deploy military aid to Turkey

would amount to implicit support for military operations that were underway, and they

again argued against a “rush to war.”106 The debate in NATO lasted several weeks, and a

solution to deploy NATO forces was found by moving the deliberations to the Defense

Planning Committee (where France was not represented).107 At the same time, German

103 Quoted in Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 67. 104 US, Britain and Spain Abandon Resolution (Associated Press, 2003 [cited December 27 2007]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/armtwist/2003/0317usbritspain.htm. 105 United Nations, Security Council Meeting Minutes, 4721st Meeting, 19 March 2003, S/Pv.4721 (2003 [cited December 27 2007]); available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N03/286/04/PDF/N0328604.pdf?OpenElement. 106 Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 220, Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 65-66. 107 Richard Bernstein and Steven R. Weisman, "Threats and Responses: Alliance; NATO Settles Rift over Aid to Turks in Case of War," The New York Times, February 17, 2003. Harnisch, "German Non-

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Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer further defended the German stance against the war at

the annual Munich Security Council. U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued that,

“Diplomacy has been exhausted,” while Fischer continued to urge for caution with

respect to Iraq by stating, “Why now? I am not convinced.”108 Fischer criticized the

United States for its militaristic strategy to combat international terrorism since

September 11, arguing instead that the more important task was to promote a Middle East

peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Germany’s diplomatic strategy in the buildup to the Iraq War was to minimize the

international consequences of an anti-war policy. According to Karsten Voigt, the

coordinator for German-American cooperation and a former Member of Parliament, “The

Americans were telling us that the French would leave us by ourselves, so we moved

closer to France to avoid that isolation.”109 By aligning Germany with France and

promoting views that enjoyed broad support within the public, Schröder broke with the

basic tenets of his country’s foreign policy: promoting strong rapport with the United

States. As a result of Schröder’s anti-war stance, the relationship with the United States

was severely damaged and, on the continent, smaller EU members felt rejected by the

Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 15. France pulled out of the Defense Planning Committee in 1966 over DeGaulle’s belief that French nuclear weapons should not be subject to NATO oversight. As a result, France participates diplomatically in NATO discussions but not in defense planning operations. 108 Petra Spoerle-Strohmenger, Struggling Hard to Find Solutions to the Conflict in Iraq (2003 [cited December 3 2007]); available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2003/. 109 Richard Bernstein, "Germany Hoping for Return of Strong American Bond," The New York Times, March 12, 2003, A16.

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exclusivity of the French–German relationship.110 Central and East European political

leaders argued that there was a dual standard in the EU when Chirac commented that the

East and Central Europeans had missed a “great opportunity to shut up,” when they wrote

an open letter in support of the United States on Iraq. Their frustration was best

illustrated by Hungarian writer Péter Esterházy, who stated that whereas he had once

been an East European, he then became Central European, and then for a few months a

new European but, even before he could get accustomed to it or reject it, he was now

relegated to being a non-core European.111 Schröder repeatedly emphasized in practically

every speech he held on major foreign policy issues that alignment with France served

Germany’s national interests better than any other strategy.

Overall, German diplomatic opposition to U.S. planning for a military

intervention in Iraq began immediately after the attacks of September 11 and remained

fairly consistent. Germany’s unqualified refusal for military action created a dilemma for

the Schröder government when the Bush administration decided to pursue Security

Council approval in September 2002. By pursuing military action under the auspices of

the United Nations, the Bush administration exposed the central weakness in Schröder’s

premature position that German armed forces would not participate in military action in

Iraq. If the UN Security Council were to decide that force would be necessary to

implement its former resolutions, the Schröder government would have to change its

110 Kaare Dahl Martinsen, "The End of the Affair? Germany’s Relationship with France," German Politics 14, no. 4 (2005), 413. 111 Quoted in Ibid., 409.

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stance domestically towards German military participation. Therefore, Germany exerted

significant diplomatic effort to create a counter coalition in the Security Council and

NATO, strengthening Schröder’s position domestically. Germany encouraged a shift in

French policy to form a common position with Russia to prevent a UN resolution

authorizing force. Schröder’s stance vis-à-vis a UN resolution authorizing force

significantly contributed to the European Union’s inability to present a unified strategy

on Iraq, stripped the U.S.-led intervention of the legitimacy of a UN Security Council

mandate, and unintentionally sent false signals to Saddam Hussein that an armed

intervention was unlikely.112

After the conclusion of conventional combat operations in May 2003, Chancellor

Schröder softened on a German role in Iraq by suggesting to the United States that

Germany would be willing to participate economically in the reconstruction of Iraq only

if there were a clear UN mandate and a strong role for the United Nations in stabilization

and reconstruction operations. After the conclusion of U.S. and allied combat operations

in Iraq, the Schröder government toned down its anti-war rhetoric and shifted its

diplomatic goals towards stabilizing the war and sanctions-torn country as well as

mending fences within the European Union and NATO. Schröder signaled that his

112 Throughout the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003, Saddam’s public and private comments reflected his belief that the United States and United Kingdom lacked the stomach for war. Additionally, sometime in the first week of March 2003, the Russian ambassador to Iraq assured the Iraqi government that Russia, China, France and Germany would counter U.S. efforts in the Security Council giving Saddam the hope that the international community would dissuade the coalition from attacking. Woods and Joint Center for Operational Analysis (U.S.), Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership. See also Benjamin, "Germany: A Questionable Ally," 63-64, Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 89-90.

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government favored lifting sanctions against Iraq during Secretary of State Powell’s visit

to Berlin in mid-May 2003.113 Germany, while willing to offer limited assistance to the

U.S. reconstruction effort, urged a symbolic end to Iraq's status as an occupied country.

In contrast to the sharp public criticism leveled by President Chirac, Chancellor

Schroeder stressed the need to move forward.114 Additionally, Schröder indicated a

willingness to expand the German patrolled security zone in Afghanistan beyond Kabul,

as long as it did not change the approved mandate in the Bundestag.115

Despite strong U.S. pressure for more substantial military contributions to the

Iraqi stabilization and rehabilitation effort, through 2003 Berlin continued to resist further

calls for German deployment, and instead offered to help train Iraqi police and security

forces in Germany.116 Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer made it clear

that Germany would not contribute troops to the stabilization and reconstruction process

in Iraq. This resistance, however, did not block a small role for NATO in the

stabilization process. In May 2003—with German approval—NATO backed logistical

support for the Polish sector in Iraq, extending the decision again in December 2003.

Berlin also assured Washington that it would not block a consensus on NATO’s

involvement in Iraq.117 The German government argued that the UN Security Council

would have to provide an appropriate mandate and that the United Nations would have to 113 "Germany's Schroeder for Lifting Iraq Sanctions," DDP News Agency, May 15, 2003. 114 Greg Hitt and Jess Bravin, "U.S., Germany Repair Iraq Rift; Bush Bid to U.N. Yet to Bear Fruit," The Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2003. 115 "Germany Rejects Change of Mandate for Soldiers in Afghanistan," DDP News Agency, May 16, 2003. 116 Maggie Farley and Farley Reynolds, "Bush, Schroeder End Feud; Germany Offers Aid in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, September 25, 2003. 117 Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," 30.

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take over much of the civilian administration in the transition period towards Iraqi self-

rule before it could consider supplying forces to a stabilization force such a move. The

German government suggested that the Bush administration should consider a

multilateral framework for outlining goals for an interim government, similar to the

“Petersburg Process” implemented for Afghanistan.118

Germany continued to exert pressure on the United States for a wider

multinational role in the reconstruction of Iraq. In early September, both Chancellor

Schröder and President Chirac announced that their countries would not support the

initial American proposal that the Security Council authorize an expanded international

force under American control and financial help for Iraq. France and Germany provided

a prod to the United States to give the United Nations greater authority in post-war

Iraq.119 In mid-October, Germany—after urging from Russian President Putin—agreed

to UN Security Council Resolution 1511, which provided a framework for UN and

international participation in the political and economic rebuilding of Iraq and the

maintenance of security. The resolution authorized a multinational security force and

urged states to contribute to Iraq security and reconstruction.120 Despite U.S. pressure in

the wake of Resolution 1511, Berlin remained silent on the issue of troop deployments to

Iraq, while supporting the substance of the resolution.

118 Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 20. 119 Richard Bernstein, "France and Germany Differ with U.S. On Plan for Iraq," The New York Times, September 5, 2003. 120 United Nations Security Council., Resolution 1511 (United Nations, 2003 [cited October 24 2007]); available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356391.pdf?OpenElement.

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Although Germany attempted to come together with the United States in the

aftermath of conventional combat operations, U.S. policy clearly showed a preference for

coalition partners. In December 2003, the Department of Defense implemented a policy

barring the states that did not support the Iraq coalition. France, Germany, Russia and

other coalition non-participants were blocked from $18.6 billion in U.S.-financed Iraqi

reconstruction projects. Chancellor Schröder intervened personally with President Bush,

who subsequently sent former Secretary of State James Baker as a special envoy to

encourage German creditors to forgive Iraq debt and to promise future reconstruction

contracts, even though German had been deliberately excluded from the initial $18.6

billion disbursement.121 The Bush administration policy sought to reward those states

that contributed militarily to the American effort in Iraq with lucrative contracts and

funds approved for reconstruction.

Finally, in January 2004, after NATO Secretary General Jaap de Scheffer again

proposed a NATO force for the reconstruction of Iraq, Chancellor Schröder floated the

idea of German military support for Iraq medical evacuation missions. Schröder

continued his stance that Germany would not block NATO operations in a military

mission for Iraq. To placate his domestic audience, Schröder argued that such an

engagement would not constitute a “military deployment” of German forces that would

121 Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Defends Barring Nations from Iraq Deals," The New York Times, December 12, 2003, Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 21.

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require Bundestag approval, but rather a “humanitarian action.”122 However, since

Bundestag approval had been the crucial obstruction for the SPD-Green government ever

since the September 11 attacks, the Schröder initiative met strong domestic resistance

within the coalition’s own party caucus.123 Germany rescinded any offer to place troops

in Iraq proper.

In February 2004, Germany began to mend fences when German Foreign Minister

Fischer called for a new transatlantic Middle East initiative structured around NATO at

the annual Munich Security Conference, thereby embracing the U.S. position that the

status quo in the region entailed a security risk for both Europe and America.124

Furthermore, in the wake of the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, Germany

privately asked Spain’s new leadership to tone down its anti-U.S. rhetoric. According to

a senior German official, “If we give the impression that you can plant a big bomb in

Europe, cause a government to fall, and force a withdrawal of troops, then this would

send the wrong signal to terrorists.” Stressing a unified role in combating terrorism, the

official stated, “That's not in Germany's interests, or in Europe's or in Spain's.”125

122 "Germany Reportedly No Longer Rules out Humanitarian Commitment in Iraq," DDP News Agency, January 14,, 2004, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Kas Germany Update - January 2004 (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2004 [cited December 28 2007]); available from http://www.kas.org.ar/Doc/Docum/Realidad%20Alemana/GermUpd_Jan04.pdf. 123 "German Participation in NATO Iraq Mission "Premature" - Social Democrats," Frankfurter Rundschau, January 16,, 2004. 124 Joschka Fischer, Speech on the 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy (Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2004 [cited December 28 2007]); available from http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?id=123&sprache=en&. 125 Marc Champion and Greg Jaffe, "Poland's Leader Questions U.S. Steps in Iraq; Weapons Issue Is Criticized; German Officials Try to Get Spain to Temper Rhetoric," The Wall Street Journal, March 19,, 2004.

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In June 2004, NATO decided to support the training of Iraqi security forces and to

build up a modest military presence in Baghdad to support the training mission. The

German government continued to refuse to send troops into Iraq, focusing instead on a

training mission in the United Arab Emirates.126 Another sign of rapprochement in the

German-United States relationship came in November 2004, when Germany—along with

the Paris Club, 19 of the world's richest countries—wrote off 80 per cent of Iraqi debt, a

move long sought by the Bush administration.127

Germany’s foreign policy during the reconstruction phase involved approachment

with the United States combined with maintaining a firm stance against military

involvement in Iraq’s reconstruction. Germany advocated a greater role for the UN in

post war Iraq, and pressured the United States in the Security Council to accept UN

sponsorship of the pursuant occupation. The Schröder government actively courted U.S.

policy makers and supported U.S. efforts in the greater war on terror. By the late spring

of 2003, reconciliation was under way and Germany generally supported U.S. positions

concerning Iraq.

Military Contributions

Despite the diplomatic maneuvering and the denial of UN sanction to the war, the

Schröder government provided robust support to military efforts that did not require

126 "German Leader Expects Continuing Problems in Iraq, Skeptical on NATO Role," DDP News Agency, June 10, 2004, Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," 31, Gerhard Schröder, "We Have a Good Relationship," The Washington Post, February 29,, 2004. 127 Benjamin, "Germany: A Questionable Ally," 69, Helmut Reuter, "Germany's Red Line in Its Aid to Iraq: No Troops," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 21, 2005, Martin A. Weiss, "Iraq: Paris Club Debt Relief," CRS Report for Congress - RS21765 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005).

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parliamentary approval.128 Military planners in the Pentagon noted, “Germany is an odd

category. It was quietly contributing to the U.S. effort, but opposed to the war.”129 In

fact, Germany provided two types of support to enhance U.S. operations in Iraq. First,

Germany shouldered a larger military burden than other NATO partners in other areas of

operation. Germany provided military forces in Germany, the Horn of Africa, and

Afghanistan, freeing U.S. forces for participation in Iraq. Second, it provided direct

covert intelligence support for U.S. coalition operations within Iraq. Schröder did

everything he could –that did not require the Bundestag-and kept it quiet to not arouse the

alarm of the German domestic audience.

The German government significantly cooperated with U.S. military preparations

inside Germany. More than 2,500 Bundeswehr soldiers were tasked to protect U.S.

installations in Germany, which freed up additional U.S. Army V Corps personnel to

deploy for the war.130 Additionally, Germany provided 800 Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical (NBC) defense troops and 20-25 Fuchs chemical detection vehicles as a

detachment in Kuwait that was designed to detect and clean up a potential chemical or

biological weapons attack.131 Moreover, after initially resisting the NATO approved

deployment, Germany supplied the Turkish military with Patriot missiles to defend

against a possible Iraqi missile attack. In the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, German 128 Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," 134. 129 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 123. 130 "Germany's Struck to Discuss Bundeswehr Changes, Iraq at Munich Security Talks," Welt am Sonntag, February 1,, 2004. 131 "German Defence Ministry: Deployment of NBC Units in Kuwait Possible," DDP News Agency, January 9, 2002.

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ships guarded the sea-lanes as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The operation was

intended to deter movement of al Qaeda, but the Germans, in effect, were safeguarding

the waterways that the United States used to build up its military forces in the Persian

Gulf. According to German Rear Admiral Rolf Schmitz, “We are stabilizing the area,

and that probably is an advantage for your [American] forces as well.”132 Germany

expanded its military role in Afghanistan including the command of the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) once the force came under NATO’s authority. It also

contributed to a new NATO Reaction Force, which was established after the Prague

NATO summit in the fall 2002 to undertake counterterrorism operations.133 With their

presence in the Balkans, and within the framework of the Operation Enduring Freedom,

a total of 10,000 German soldiers were deployed worldwide at the beginning of the Iraq

war.134 Germany’s political and diplomatic opposition to the war thus did not impede its

military cooperation in efforts outside Iraq.

Germany also provided direct—and controversial—support to the Iraq military

effort in two significant ways. First, agents of the German intelligence service, the BND,

reportedly provided American war planners with Iraqi plans for the defense of Baghdad.

In February 2003—one month before military operations commenced—a German liaison

132 Quoted in Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, 123. 133 Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation," 224, Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations, 44. Although Germany has a significant ground presence in Afghanistan, its soldiers are still restricted from participating in combat operations, see "NATO Requests German Troops for Combat Role in Afghanistan," review of Reviewed Item, Deutsche Welle, no. February 21 (2008), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3095130,00.html. 134 "Germany's Schroeder on Postwar Iraq, EU Split, Relations with USA," DDP News Agency, March 28,, 2003.

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officer to U.S. Central Command in Qatar slipped to U.S. officials an illustration of

Hussein’s concentric defensive lines around the capital.135 The illustration was identified

as the Baghdad defense plan presented at a December 18, 2002 meeting of Saddam and

his top commanders. The plan gave the American military an extraordinary window into

Iraq's top-level deliberations, including where and how Mr. Hussein planned to deploy

his most loyal troops. The New York Times article discussing this crucial acquisition was

based largely on a classified study of Iraqi military strategy prepared in 2005 by the

Pentagon’s Joint Forces Command and a classified German Parliamentary report on BND

support the Iraq effort.136 In addition, the Los Angeles Times, as well as a German TV

show and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, reported that German intelligence operatives provided

targets for the advancing U.S. troops. In particular, two German military intelligence

operatives, who stayed in a Baghdad safe house after Berlin had closed its embassy,

passed the intelligence tip that Saddam Hussein and his two sons had been spotted near a

chicken restaurant in Baghdad’s wealthy Mansour district. Less than 45 minutes later, a

B-1 bomber obliterated the site with four satellite-guided bombs, leaving a deep crater

and at least a dozen dead.137 German government spokesperson, Ulrich Wilhelm,

admitted the existence of the two agents and the intelligence sharing with the U.S.

135 "Germany Admits Providing Washington with Iraq Intelligence," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 24,, 2006, Michael R. Gordon, "German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says," The New York Times, February 27,, 2006. See also Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, 123-24. 136 Richard Bernstein and Michael R. Gordon, German Help on Iraq Lasted Months (2006 [cited December 31 2007]); available from http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/02/news/germany.php. 137 Bob Drogin, "German Spies Aided U.S. Attempt to Kill Hussein in Aerial Attack," Los Angeles Times, January 12,, 2006.

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officials, but claimed that the relevant data did not contain military targets, but rather

dealt exclusively with the identification of institutions such as mosques, hospitals, and

embassies that were to be protected.138 The reports of intelligence sharing and the

significant military cooperation inside Germany is evidence that, despite their sharp

political differences over the Iraq war, Germany and the United States continued practical

cooperation at a high and continuous level.

Financial Contributions

Germany’s financial contributions to the Iraq War and post-war reconstruction

stand in stark contrast to its support to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the 1991 effort,

Germany, even under the financial strain of reunification with the German Democratic

Republic, provided approximately $11.5 billion to the Gulf coalition. Germany provided

direct funding to the coalition partners to support military, technical, and logistical

support. Additionally, Germany contributed to international aid through the United

Nations, Red Cross, and European Community. Due to constitutional limitations on the

deployment of its military forces, Germany’s robust financial support for the Persian Gulf

War was dubbed “checkbook diplomacy,” but it reflected the strong conviction that

Germany share the burden with allies that had supported Germany since World War II.139

138 Richard Bernstein and Judy Dempsey, "Germany Denies Giving U.S. Iraq's Plan to Defend Baghdad," The New York Times, February 28,, 2006, "German Agent Did Not Pass on Iraq Information, Says Bnd," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 3,, 2006. Peter Schwarz, New York Times Raises New Charges against German Intelligence (2006 [cited December 31 2007]); available from http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/mar2006/nbnd-m02.shtml. 139 Gunther Hellmann, "Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks: Germany and Alliance Burden Sharing in the Gulf War," in Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, ed. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). According interpretations of

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As Ronald Asmus, an expert on German foreign policy observed, “What was perhaps

most striking in the German debate was the almost total lack of any discussion about

German strategic interests in the Gulf and how they should guide policy. Instead, the

terms were set by such issues as whether Germans ‘owed’ the United States political

support in the Gulf in return for American support during the unification process.”140

Germany’s financial support for the 1991 Persian Gulf War reflected its dependence on

the United States for influence in Europe and NATO.

Conversely, Germany’s financial support for the Iraq War reflected the anti-war

stance in Germany and a renewed focus on Euro-centric interests. German contributions

to Iraqi reconstruction were modest considering its support of the earlier Gulf War.

Germany agreed to $2 billion in debt relief and eventually pledged $155 million to

training and reconstruction accounts. This amount pales in comparison to the $11.5

billion in direct compensation for the Persian Gulf War.141 Although Chancellor

Schröder pledged financial support to the Iraq reconstruction during President Bush’s late

September 2003 visit, Russia, France and Germany refused to commit money at the

October 25 Madrid Donors Conference.142 Germany’s tepid support reflected two major

German Basic Law in 1991, the government was barred from supplying troops for military operations other than self defense or NATO defense of Europe. See Historical Learning, this chapter, for a discussion on Germany’s broadening interpretation of the Basic Law. 140 Quoted in Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 47-48. 141 O’Hanlon and Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, April 18, 2005. 142 Maggie Farley and Maura Reynolds, "Bush, Schroeder End Feud; Germany Offers Aid in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, September 25,, 2003. "German Cabinet "Boycotting" Donors' Conference for Iraq," Der Spiegel, October 20,, 2003.

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concerns with Security Council Resolution 1511, passed shortly before the donor’s

conference: it did not stipulate a central role for the United Nations in Iraq and it did not

present a precise and binding timetable for the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis.143 To

avoid further damage to the Security Council, Germany presented its concerns through

the donor’s conference rather than in a Security Council vote against the resolution.144

Germany’s lack of investment in Iraq reconstruction was exacerbated by a

directive issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz that announced a list of 63

countries eligible to bid for the 26 primary Iraq reconstruction contracts worth $18.6

billion. Countries eligible to bid were identified as either coalition partners or force-

contributing nations.145 Chancellor Schröder reacted immediately with a phone call to

President Bush, and Bush dispatched his personal representative, former Secretary of

State, James Baker to visit Berlin to discuss Iraq reconstruction and debt restructuring.146

At Baker’s urging, Germany granted Iraq a debt relief of 80 percent of the $2.5 billion

Iraq owed Germany, and engaged in various reconstruction activities.147 Germany’s total

143 German Daily Questions Use of Iraq Donor Conference without UN Resolution (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2003 [cited December 31, 2007]); available from http://0-docs.newsbank.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:WGER&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=102A8F5EC226D836&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated4&req_dat=0D0CB4F83B341AB5. 144 Chancellor Schröder noted that the resolution was a “step in the right direction,” but fell short of German requirements for full support. See "Legitimization for the US Occupation Power," Die Welt, October 17,, 2003. 145 Bumiller, "Bush Defends Barring Nations from Iraq Deals.", Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," 21. 146 "Bush's Personal Representative to Berlin 'before Christmas' to Discuss Iraq," DDP News Agency, December 11,, 2003. 147 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes," 352. See also Nikolaus Blome and Torsten Krauel, "Gerhard and George," Die Welt, February 26,, 2004. Craig S. Smith, "Major Creditors Agree to Cancel 80% of Iraq Debt," The New York Times, November 22, 2004.

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contribution towards reconstruction and training totaled $155 million.148 This

contribution to reconstruction, however, pales in comparison to Japan, for example,

which pledged $3.3 billion in debt relief, $1.5 billion in grants, and $3.5 billion in loans

for reconstruction.149

Germany’s financial support to the Iraq War explicitly reflects its desire to

distance itself from the conflict and U.S.-led coalition. Germany did not support

reconstruction efforts with the largesse that Japan or Saudi Arabia did; rather, Germany

chose to contribute through institutions such as the European Union and World Bank.

Explaining German Contributions

Why was Germany the only European country to exclude a priori any military

involvement in a war to disarm Iraq, even in the case of a UN mandate? Germany’s

behavior is somewhat puzzling since it provided much of the military support the United

States required to move efficiently its forces from Europe but, at the same time, its

diplomatic approach ensured that Germany would be excluded from any rewards from

the United States for its permissive use of airspace and facilities located in Germany.

Chancellor Schröder’s early public opposition against military “adventures” in Iraq, can

be best understood by understanding the domestic concerns of preserving his ruling SPD-

Green coalition government in the face of the considerable opposition that had developed

148 Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard, "Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction," CRS Report for Congress - RL32105 (Congressional Research Service, 2007). 149 Economic and Military Support for the U.S. Efforts in Iraq: The Coalition of the Willing, Then and Now, O’Hanlon and Campbell, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, April 18, 2005.

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throughout the 1990s concerning the use of military force, particularly for non-

humanitarian interventions. Chancellor Schröder felt compelled to rule out any military

adventures long before the Bush administration committed itself to military action or had

made a request for support, because a vote on the use of force in the Bundestag could

well have signaled the end of his government. The domestic political structure, historical

learning, and alliance dependence blocks of the Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger model best

explain Germany’s Janus-like stance.

Historical Learning: From “Checkbook Diplomacy” to “Tactical Abstention”

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 became the first significant security

challenge for Germany in the post-Cold War era. All German leaders believed the

invasion itself was a blatant violation of international law, but the crisis posed a complex

challenge for the newly unified Federal Republic. In response to the Iraqi aggression,

President George H.W. Bush personally requested that the German government consider

the deployment of troops to the Gulf; deployment, however, was stymied by political

disagreements about the proper response to the Gulf crisis.150 The notion that the

Bundeswehr could be used for purposes other than the defense of Germany was

inconceivable across the political spectrum. Most German political leaders agreed that

Articles 24 and 87 of the German Basic Law essentially barred the government from

sending troops to the Persian Gulf.151 In the end, Germany’s participation in the 1991

150 Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 21-22. 151 Article 24, paragraph 2 stated, “For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will

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Persian Gulf War amounted to “checkbook diplomacy,” which provoked embarrassing

international criticism that Germany was shirking in its role as a European leader by not

supplying military forces. This incident convinced leading conservative politicians that

Germany’s international influence and standing as a partner was indeed at stake.152

Criticism of Germany for not supplying military forces for the Persian Gulf War led

German leaders to pursue a strategy of progressively stretching the boundaries of the use

of armed force through the use of increasingly taxing deployments.

In Germany, discussion of the proper role for German foreign policy focused on

the tension between notions of “normalization” and “civilian power.” “Normalization”

meant that Germany would free itself from its post-Cold War restriction on the use of

force while pursuing international interests like the other large Western powers. It would

act more often out of self-interest, but it would not return to its historical Sonderweg

(special path) and once again become an international “trouble-maker.”153 Hans Maull,

noted expert in German foreign policy, in contrast, explained German foreign policy with

the concept of “civilian power;” civilian power referred to Germany’s nature as a strong

international power that was willing to respect international law and understood the

bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.” Article 87 stated, “The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for Defense purposes… Apart from Defense, the Armed Forces may only be used insofar as explicitly permitted by this Basic Law.” See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 and Federal Statute of 23 September 1990 (The Constitution Society, 1993 [cited January 2 2008]); available from http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt. 152 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 103, Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 155. 153 Forsberg, "The Debate over German Normality: A Normal German Debate?.", James A. McAdams, "Germany after Unification: Normal at Last?," World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997).

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necessity of cooperation. The consequence of this “civilian” attitude was a consistent

preference to employ political, rather than military, solutions through multilateral

organizations to address international conflict.154 Civilian power did not stand in a direct

opposition to military power, but military power was to be used only with strong

international consensus; a “civilian power” did not resort to unilateral military options.

German preferences for the use of military force thus swung between concepts of

“normalization” and a supra-state “civilian power” notion. German foreign policy

therefore emphasized the politics of dialogue and preventive diplomacy rather than

military intervention.155 Domestically, the German public rejected the notion that it

would be either advisable or even promising to tackle foreign policy problems

unilaterally.156

Chancellor Kohl and the conservative Christian Democrat-Liberal government

used the 1991 Persian Gulf War crisis as an opportunity to address the constitutionality of

out of area troop deployments. The government supported a broader interpretation of the

Basic Law that would allow collective security participation under NATO, the United

Nations, and even European Community (EC)/Western Economic Union (WEU)

154 Hanns Maull, "Germany's Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," in Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave, 2001), Henning Tewes, "How Civilian? How Much Power? Germany and the Eastern Enlargement of NATO," in Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; Palgrave, 2001), Timmins, "Germany: Solidarity without Adventures," 61. Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," 29, Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations." 155 Siwert-Probst, "Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy," 31. 156 Bartsch, "Foreign Policy Influence and Transnational Relations of Political Parties," 303.

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sponsorship.157 Opposition Social Democrats and Greens, in contrast, strongly resisted

efforts to liberalize deployment policies and argued against military action for legal and

moral reasons. Legally, the opposition parties stressed that Articles 24 and 87 barred

Germany from military involvement outside of the NATO area.158 Morally, the

government opposition argued that given Germany’s history, it was obliged to exercise

maximum restraint in all military matters.159 A broad consensus existed in parliament

that financial and logistical support represented the limits of German military

participation.

The Kohl government attempted to alter the strict interpretation of the Basic Law

through repeated Bundeswehr deployments that set new precedents for the role of the

armed forces. By early 1991, Germany was providing non-combat support to the

Kurdish refugee crisis in Turkey and Iran and minesweeper support to clear the Persian

Gulf, thus making the Gulf safe for commerce.160 Other crises in the 1990s helped define

Germany’s use of force boundaries. In 1992 and 1993, German ships and aircraft helped

monitor a sea-embargo of Serbia/Montenegro, a no-fly zone over Bosnia Herzegovina,

while German troops provided medical and logistical support to the UN missions in

Somalia and Cambodia. The Somalia crisis notably marked the first deployment of

157 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 102, Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 23-24, Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 56. 158 Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 24. 159 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 102. 160 Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 46-47.

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German ground forces beyond the NATO area of operations since World War II.161 The

liberal opposition opposed these “out-of-area” deployments of troops and lodged a

complaint with the Constitutional Court that the deployments violated Article 87 of the

Basic Law. In July 1994, the Court ruled that out-of-area engagements of the

Bundeswehr were constitutional if they formed part of a multinational coalition, obtained

the explicit approval of a simple majority in the Bundestag, and served to uphold

“international peace and security.”162 The court decision is of central significance in that

it ratified the government deployment strategy without the need for constitutional

amendment; the debate about Bundeswehr deployments consequently lost its legalistic

argument.163 Even with this legal mandate, however, majorities on the German left

maintained moral arguments against out-of-area engagements and warned against the

“militarization” of German foreign policy.164

After the legal argument lost vigor with the court decision, the moral argument

against the use of force lost steam during the ongoing bloody war in Yugoslavia, where

all non-military measures to stop ethnic cleansing proved ineffectual. In July 1995,

Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN “safe area” of Srebrenica and systematically killed

8,000 Muslim men and boys. Diplomatic and economic measures failed to prevent the

161 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 103, Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, 54-105, Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 59-60. 162 Hanns Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?" (paper presented at the Workshop on Force, Order and Global Governance, Washington DC, July 1-2, 1999). See also Press release issued by the Federal Constitutional Court, No. 29/94 (Karlsruhe, Germany). 163 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 64-65. 164 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 103.

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largest European mass-murder in post-Cold War history. The massacre split the German

left, bringing elements that are more moderate closer to the conservative Christian

Democrat government.165 Fischer, then influential in the pacifist opposition Greens Party,

pointed to the massacre at Srebrenica as the point at which it became clear that

sometimes the use of military force was not only moral, but refusal to use force might be

immoral.166 Thus, the previous opponents to “out-of-area” deployments began to argue

that Germany had a historical responsibility to resist aggression and massive human-

rights violations, if necessary by threatening or using force. Respected philosopher

Jürgen Habermas joined Fischer by stating that preventing Serbian ethnic cleansing

clearly represented a case where using force was necessary.167 The other major

opposition party also changed its official position on the use of force outside the NATO

boundaries. In June 1997 and later in December 1997, the opposition Social Democrat

party changed its foreign policy stance from “humanitarian support only” to a wider

interpretation allowing Bundeswehr support for “all kinds of military operations that have

the blessing of the United Nations.”168 While it superficially appeared that German

security policy had undergone a profound change, pacifism still shaped the foreign policy

discourse; the German government supported a wider range of military intervention, but a

robust consensus between elites on the proper use of armed forces reflected the tension

between the “normalization” and “civilian power” advocates. The use of force was

165 Ibid. 166 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 164. 167 Jürgen Habermas, "Ein Abgrund Von Trauer [an Abyss of Grief]," Der Spiegel, August 7,, 1995. 168 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 67-68.

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marked by a propensity to consider using the Bundeswehr in a greater range of missions,

but consensus would require a strict mandate based on UN support, a multilateral

framework, a clear mission statement, and a clear humanitarian dimension.169

In 1998, the conservative coalition was replaced by the liberal Social Democrat-

Greens government, yet the use of force policy continued on a “normal” path. The 1999

Kosovo conflict further solidified Germany’s transformation in the use of military force.

The deployment of 14 fighter aircraft for Operation Allied Force—a NATO sponsored

bombing campaign aimed at halting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—marked the first

combat deployment in the history of the Bundeswehr.170 Germany had thus officially

crossed the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The Kosovo mission was

also markedly different in that it was an offensive military operation against a sovereign

state without a clear UN mandate.171 The expanded role of the Bundeswehr in

interventions, however, came at a cost to the governing SPD coalition. The Greens party

was critical of the dominant role of the United States and the way American-style

coercive diplomacy had foreclosed options other than military escalation. The Bundestag

vote of 444-318 in favor of supporting the government position reflected the view that

Germany was committing the “sin” of having consented to military action without a UN

mandate.172 In contrast, German consensus solidified when the Bundestag, by a vote of

169 Ibid., 69. 170 Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," 104. 171 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 70-71. 172 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, 167-74, Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," 141.

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505-24, endorsed the deployment of 8,000 soldiers to the UN sanctioned post-conflict

Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission.173

German foreign policy through the 1990s reflected a coalition between the

“normalization” and “civilian power” elements in the German government. The center-

right Christian Democrats were driven by concerns about Germany’s international

standing and influence, while the center-left Social Democrats were influenced by the

perception that Germany had an obligation to combat ethnic violence and massive human

rights abuses. Thus, Germany’s willingness to deploy armed forces was far from

unconditional, but reflected an alignment of interests between the left and the right.

The German participation in Operation Essential Harvest illustrated the fragile