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Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin
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Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Apr 01, 2015

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Page 1: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Extracting Randomness

David ZuckermanUniversity of Texas at Austin

Page 2: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Randomness extremely useful

• Algorithms– Approximation, optimization, factoring polys.

• Monte Carlo simulations

• Cryptography

• Distributed computing– Consensus, Byzantine agreement, load

balancing.

Page 3: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Randomness wonderful, but …

• Computers typically don’t have access to true randomness.

Page 4: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Is Randomness Necessary?

• Essential for distributed computing and cryptography:– Must choose secret key randomly.

• Unclear for algorithms.

Page 5: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Is Randomness Necessary?

• Major open question in field: does every efficient randomized algorithm have an efficient deterministic counterpart?– Does RP = P?

Page 6: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Is Randomness Necessary?

• Major open question in field: does every efficient randomized algorithm have an efficient deterministic counterpart?– Does RP = P? Appears very difficult.– Does RSPACE(S) = SPACE(S)? Difficult but

some hope.

Page 7: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

What is minimal randomness requirement?

• Can we eliminate randomness completely?

• If not:

– Can we minimize quantity of randomness?

– Can we minimize quality of randomness?• What does this mean?

Page 8: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

What is minimal randomness requirement?

• Can we eliminate randomness completely?

• If not:

– Can we minimize quantity of randomness?

• Pseudorandom generator

– Can we minimize quality of randomness?

• Extractor

Page 9: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Pseudorandom Generators

• Computers rely on pseudorandom generators:

PRG71294 141592653589793238

short random string

long “random-enough”string

Classical approach: ad hoc. Many failures.Modern approach: provably good PRGs.

Page 10: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Quality: von Neumann’s model

Extvery long

weakly random

long

random

• Bits independent.• Each bit has same bias:

–Pr[Xi=1] = p, p unknown.

• Can’t use directly.

Goal:

Page 11: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Quality: von Neumann’s model

• Extractor:– Group bits in pairs.– Pr[01]=Pr[10] = p(1-p).– Map 01 to 0, 10 to 1, ignore 00 and 11.

• Example: 01 01 11 10 11 01 00 maps to

0 0 1 0

Page 12: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Use in Practice

• Intel has random number generator (not PRG) which uses white noise.

• Temperature may influence bias.

• Intel applies von Neumann’s extractor to output.

Page 13: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

General Weakly Random Sources

• What if bits are correlated?

• Many models studied [Blum, Santha-Vazirani, Chor-Goldreich].

• Most general model - upper bound probability of each string [Zuckerman].

• Similar to lower bounding entropy.

Page 14: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

General Weakly Random Sources

• Weakly random distribution on n bits: each string has probability ≤ 2-k.

• Example: weakly random integer in [1,1000].

• Distribution unknown.0

0.0010.0020.0030.0040.0050.0060.0070.0080.009

0.01

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

weaklyrandomalmostrandomtrulyrandom

Page 15: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Goal

Extvery long

weakly random

long

almost random

Should work for all (n,k) weakly random sources.

Page 16: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Goal

Extvery long

weakly random

long

almost random

Should work for all (n,k) weakly random sources.

Problem: impossible.

Page 17: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Solution: Extractor[Nisan-Zuckerman]

Extvery long

weakly random

long

almost random

short truly random

Page 18: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Extractor Parameters[NZ,…, Lu-Reingold-Vadhan-Wigderson]

Ext n bits

weakly randomPr[each string] ≤ 2-k

.99k bits

almost random

O(log n) truly random

Page 19: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Power of Extractors

• Sometimes can eliminate true randomness by cycling over all possibilities.

Page 20: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Power of Extractors

• Sometimes can eliminate true randomness by cycling over all possibilities.

• Useful even when no weakly random source apparently present.

Page 21: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Power of Extractors

• Sometimes can eliminate true randomness by cycling over all possibilities.

• Useful even when no weakly random source apparently present.

• Mathematical reason for power: extractor constructions beat “eigenvalue bound.”

Page 22: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Applications of Extractors• PRGs for Space-Bounded Computation [Nisan-Z]• PRGs for Random Sampling [Z]• Cryptography [Lu, Vadhan, Dodis-Smith]• Expander graphs and highly connected networks[Wigderson-Z]• Coding theory [Ta-Shma- Z]• Hardness of approximation [Z, Mossel-Umans]• Efficient deterministic sorting [Pippenger]• Time-space tradeoffs [Sipser]• Implicit data structures [Fiat-Naor, Z]

Page 23: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

New Extractor and Application[Z]

• Extractor requires log n + O(1) random bits.

• NP-complete to approximate MAX CLIQUE and CHROMATIC NUMBER to within n1-, any >0.– Previously same inapproximability ratio

required NP ZPP [Hastad, Feige-Kilian].– We use new extractor to derandomize previous

reductions.

Page 24: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

The Future for Extractors

• Current extractors near optimal.

• Where to go from here?

• Two interesting directions:– Deterministic extractors for specialized sources.– Extractors for independent sources and a new

technique.

Page 25: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Bit-Fixing Sources

• Adversary fixes all but k of the n bits.• Remaining k bits chosen randomly.• Parity can extract 1 bit if k≥1.

Page 26: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Bit-Fixing Sources

• Adversary fixes all but k of the n bits.• Remaining k bits chosen randomly.• Parity can extract 1 bit if k≥1.• This model seems unrealistic:

– What good is it?

Page 27: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Bit-Fixing Sources

• Adversary fixes all but k of the n bits.• Remaining k bits chosen randomly.• Parity can extract 1 bit if k≥1.• This model seems unrealistic:

– What good is it?

• Applications in cryptography and more realistic models.

Page 28: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Bit-Fixing Sources

• Adversary fixes all but k of the n bits.• Remaining k bits chosen randomly.• Parity can extract 1 bit if k≥1.• To extract 2 truly random bits, need k>n/3.• Can extract k2/n almost-random bits

deterministically [Kamp-Zuckerman].• Improved to (1-o(1))k [Gabizon-

Raz-Shaltiel].

Page 29: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Exposure-Resilient Cryptography

• Standard cryptography: secret keys totally secret.• What if adversary learns some bits of secret key?• Deterministic extractors for bit-fixing sources can

help foil such adversaries [Dodis-Sahai-Smith]. Need exponentially small error.

• Kamp-Z extractor has small enough error to apply ([GRS] error too large).

Page 30: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

More realistic sources: Generalizing von Neumann’s Model• Bits independent, allow different biases.• Deterministic extractors for bit-fixing

sources also work for these new sources [Kamp-Vadhan-Zuckerman].

• Goal: deterministic extractors for more general sources.

• Some preliminary results allowing correlations.

Page 31: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Technique:Additive Number Theory

• For set A, A+A={a1+a2: a1, a2 in A}• Thm: either |A+A|>|A|1.01 or |AA| > |A|1.01

[Bourgain-Katz-Tao, Konyagin].• Can extract from 3 independent sources

[Barak-Kindler-Shaltiel-Sudakov-Wigerson].

• Promising technique -- other applications?• Anup Rao: improvements without additive

number theory.

Page 32: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Conclusions

• Extractors fundamental: diverse applications.• Future in extractors:

– Deterministic extractors

– 2-source extractors

– More applications

– Practical variants

• Can we make progress towards RP=P or RSPACE(S) = SPACE(S)?

Page 33: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Students

• Jesse Kamp - extractors

• Anindya Patthak - coding theory

• Anup Rao - extractors

Page 34: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Extractors in Cryptography

• Alice and Bob know s = “secret” random 1000 bit string.• Eavesdropper Eve knows 600 bits of s.• Alice and Bob don’t know which 600 bits.• Eve can see all communication.

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressorare needed to see this picture.

Page 35: Extracting Randomness David Zuckerman University of Texas at Austin.

Extractors in Cryptography

• Alice and Bob compute a shared secret string of 300 bits, about which Eve has negligible information:

• To Eve, s appears like output of known bit-fixing source. So Ext(s) will appear almost random.

• Hence shared secret = Ext(s).