EXTERNALITIES OF FDI: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S EASTERN COASTAL AND CENTRAL PROVINCES BY CHAN YUEN TUNG STUDENT NO. 12006866 ECONOMICS CONCENTRATION A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS) DEGREE IN CHINA STUDIES HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY APRIL 2015
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EXTERNALITIES OF FDI: EVIDENCEFROM CHINA’S EASTERN COASTAL
AND CENTRAL PROVINCES
BY
CHAN YUEN TUNGSTUDENT NO. 12006866
ECONOMICS CONCENTRATION
A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS) DEGREEIN CHINA STUDIES
HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY
APRIL 2015
Page of Acceptance
April 2015
We hereby recommend that the Project by Mr. CHAN Yuen Tung entitled
“Externalities of FDI: Evidence from China’s Eastern Coastal and Central Provinces.” be
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Bachelor of Social Sciences
(Honours) Degree in China Studies in Economics.
____________________ ____________________
Dr. Erin SO Pik Ki ____________________
Project Supervisor Second Examiner
1
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Erin SO Pik Ki for guiding and
enlightening me through out the entire study. Without her generous care and support, this
paper is hardly finished. Thanks are also due to Dr. CHAN Hing Lin for his teaching of the
econometric theories and applications and to Dr. LUK Sheung Kan for his pragmatic
comments on the regression models.
____________________
China Studies Degree Course
Economics Concentration
Hong Kong Baptist University
15.04.2015
2
Table of Content
PAGE OF ACCEPTANCE 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 2
ABSTRACT 4
1. INTRODUCTION 5
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 9
3. METHODOLOGY AND REGRESSION MODEL 14
4. DATA 21
5. REGRESSION RESULT AND INTERPRETATION 23
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 37
REFERENCES 40
3
Abstract
Using the panel data across 14 provinces in China’s Eastern coastal and Central
regions from 2002 to 2011, this paper finds that there are different levels of positive and
significant externalities spilled out from the labors hired by FDI and HKMT firms in
various sectors as well as the capital stocks invested by FDI firms. Moreover, export-led
growth does exist in China’s industry sector, but is limited to the domestic firms only. In
addition, the export shares of FDI and HKMT firms do not affect the domestic economic
growth. Lastly, an interesting finding is that increasing the capital inputs in construction
sector does not necessarily generate efficient GDP output growth.
4
1. Introduction
To take the advantages of the foreign direct investment (FDI), it is not uncommon
to see that the less developed countries’ governments are competing with each other to
offer different preferential policies, such as rental discounts, tax holidays and some special
subsides, to attract the overseas investors. Doubtlessly, China is a case in point. For
instance, in some sectors, the FDI firms can enjoy a 2-year tax holiday starting from the
first year that they can make profit and after these 2 years, they can still have a 50%
discount of the tax for the following 3 years. The major reason for doing so is that Chinese
government realizes that there will be externalities brought from the FDI inflows, which
will finally benefit the domestic economy. Thus, in the 1990s, with the government’s
efforts, China has become the largest recipient of the FDI among all other developing
countries.
Back to the late 1970s, China government has already set attracting the overseas
capital as one of the economic reform strategies. Since the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity
Joint Ventures1 published in 1979, the annual inflow of FDI has stepped up steadily. In
early 1992, China’s top leader Deng promised to further open up the country and to
accelerate the economic reform in his tour to the Southern provinces. Right after his speech,
the annual FDI inflows of 1992 and 1993 have increased for more than the double and
reached a peak of U.S. 44.2 billion in 1997. After China entered the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001, according to Figure I below, the inflows of FDI kept
expending explosively until 2008, which was the year of global financial tsunami, to a level
1 It is a legal framework for FDI, which allows foreign investors to have equity joint ventures together with partners from China.
5
of U.S. 186.8 billion. Starting from 2009, the figure recovered and rebounded rapidly from
U.S. 167.1 billion to another peak of U.S. 331.6 billion in 2011.
Figure I – China’s FDI inflows (1990 - 2011). Source: The World Bank.
Although there are many FDI inflows in China, not every province can get the same
amount of benefits. As Figure II below illustrates, the regional distribution of FDI is not
even. The majority part, up to 85%, went to the Eastern coastal region; this is because in the
beginning of the open door policies, the Eastern area acted as a ‘white mouse’, especially
Guangdong province, as it is near Hong Kong and close to the coastal line, it has a better
linkage with the overseas investors. As a result, Guangdong alone shared 25.3% of the total
FDI inflows from 1990 to 2011. While the central region accounted for 10% during this
period. Although the West regions shared only 5% of the total FDI from 1990 to 2011, this
percentage indeed has already been increasing slowly from 3% in 1979 to 1998.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Bill
ion
(U.S
.)
FDI inflows in China (1990 to 2011)
6
Figure II – Regional Distribution of FDI Inflows in China (2002 - 2009). Source: China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook. Eastern coastal region: Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong,
Guangdong and Hainan. Central Region: Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. West Region: Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.
Besides the uneven geographic distribution, the sectorial distribution of FDI inflows
is also uneven. As the production costs in China are relatively cheap; therefore, according
to the Figure III below, the secondary sector, especially the industry, benefited the most and
accumulated for more than half of the FDI inflows; only industry alone got 56% of the total
FDI inflows from 2002 to 2009.
As above data shows, the FDI inflows after China entered WTO in 2001 have been
increasing rapidly and majorly concentrates on the 2nd sector, especially the industry sector,
and in the Eastern coastal and the central regions. Therefore, this paper collects a panel data
Subscript Definition p Pinvince t Time Period (Year) t-1 The Last Time Period (Lagged 1 Year) F Foreign Direct Investment Firms HKMT Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan Investment Firms D Domestic Firms 1st Sector The First Economic Sector 2nd Sector The Second Economic Sector 3rd Sector NON 2nd Sector Industry Construction TEV TPV
The Third Economic Sector The First and the Third Economic Sectors Industry Sector Construction Sector Total Export Value Total Production Value
Table I – Definitions of the Subscripts.
15
where In(LF,p,t / Lp,t) and In(LHKMT,p,t / Lp,t) are the growth rates of the ratios of labors
employed by FDI firms as well as HKMT investment firms among the total employed
labors respectively; while the coefficient β3 and β4 measure the magnitudes of the impacts
from the growths of the FDI and HKMT investment firms’ labors to the total employment
ratio severally. This model is set to study whether changes of the portions of labors hired by
the FDI and HKMT investment firms will affect the GDP growth.
Model (2) is somehow similar with model (1), except it is set to study whether
changes of the portions of capital stocks, instead of the employed labors, invested by the
FDI and HKMT investment firms will affect the GDP growth.
The econometric analyses in this paper are based on data of 14 provinces across the
Eastern coastal and central region of China from 2002 to 2011. The annual provincial data
is collected from various statistical reports: CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, CHINA
POPULATION & EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS YEARBOOK, CHINA LABOUR
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE CHINESE
INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, CHINA INDUSTRY ECONOMY STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, CHINA REAL ESTATE STATISTICS YEARBOOK, CHINA EXTERNAL
ECONOMIC STATISTICAL YEARBOOK and different provincial statistical yearbooks,
such as JIANGSU STATISTICAL YEARBOOK.
Since NGDP cannot reflect the actual economic performance, GDP used in this
paper is the NGDP deflated by the GDP deflator, which takes 1978 as the base year. Labor
is measured as the employed labor number at the end of the year. The export and
production value are counted in the provinces which product the final goods. For example,
if Guangxi produces a car and Guangdong acts as the exporter, the production value as well
as the export value will both count into the former’s account.
As Liu (2002) mentions, the capital stock measurement is a well-recognized
problem in the empirical studies; it does not only exist in the studies of China, but also
other countries. There are several approaches to estimate the total capital stock in a country;
unlike some fellows who will use the fixed capital investment figures directly as the capital
stock, this paper uses a scientific method used by Kim and Lau (1994) and Lei and Yao
(2009), which the initial capital stocks of China, Hong Kong and Macau, are assumed to be
21
5 times of the real gross fixed capital formation in the same year and the real gross fixed
capital formation after the initial year can be used as a proxy for the change in the capital
stock each year. And China’s annual depreciation rate of the capital, as used by Perkins
(1988), Woo (1998), Meng and Wang (2000) and Wang and Yao (2003), is assumed to be
5%. Therefore, in the current study, the nominal fixed capital formation of the initial year
(2002) is firstly deflated by the investment in fixed assets price index, which takes 1978 as
the base year; then by multiplying the value 5 times, the initial capital stocks can be found.
And the capital stock of the year after 2002, i.e. 2003, is the sum of 95% of the capital
stock of 2002 plus the newly real fixed capital formation of 2003 (deflating the nominal
fixed capital formation by the investment in fixed assets price index of 2003).
Furthermore, as Holz (2004) claims that China’s official statistics are of
questionable quality and inaccuracy, the inconsistency among the data used by this study is
relatively apparent. To cope with this problem, if there is inconsistency of a data point, the
data from a later time period will be given the first priority and the data from a higher
authority will be given the second priority in this study.5
5 This practice is in a belief that the data announced later may be amended and therefore they should be generally more consistent and competent; while the data published by a higher authority might be more accurate because the data may be processed more seriously.
22
5. Regression Result and Interpretation
As there are various institutions and characteristics of each province after the de-
centralization, fixed-effects model should be used to process the panel data to separate the
differences and let each province has a different constant term. However, probably due to
the insufficient sample size as the time limitation, the results from 18 models are almost
statistically insignificant. Hence, pooled ordinary least squares (pooled OLS) is used to
carry out the regressions in the current paper. And the results are shown below.
From the results of 9 models as well as 9 (t-1) models, generally speaking, the
coefficients of lnL and lnK, which are β1 and β2, are positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level. And the means of the all coefficients of them are 0.5981 and 0.3871
respectively. Therefore, it implies that, on average, every 1% of labor increase will lead to a
0.60% growth of GDP, while every 1% increase of capital stock will lead to 0.39% growth
of GDP. And the results above are indeed within the expectation as L and K are two basic
elements that have positive relations with the output in the production function. Moreover,
it suggests that, from a macro view, putting 1% extra labor in economic activities will give
a higher output growth then putting 1% more of the capital stock. And it denotes that in
these regions, economic activities and growths are still relying more heavily on labor
instead of using capital such as machines and computers and it can also be interpreted as
the economy of China’s Eastern coastal and central areas is relatively labor-intensive.
However, one thing to be highlighted is that the coefficients of the InKConstruction in
model (6) and its (t-1) model, unlike all other coefficients of lnL and lnK in remaining
models, are not statistically significant. This suggests that the increase in fixed capital stock
23
in the construction sector of those provinces does not push up the GDP growth of the
related field and this can also be interpreted as the capital investments in China’s
constriction sector are inefficient to generate positive outputs.
Table II – Estimation of GDP growth effect by the changes of (LF/L), (LHKMT/L), (KF/K) and (KHKMT/K).
a) Models with (t-1) mean that the independent variables are lagged for 1 year for robustness checking. b) The italic numbers in the table above are the p-values. c) *** stands for p-value < 0.01; ** stands for p-value between 0.01 & 0.05; * stands for p-value between 0.05 & 0.1.
According to Table II, the results of model (1) show that if the ratio of labors hired
by the FDI firms to the total employment of a province increase 1%, the GDP of that place
will have a 0.12% increase; while the labor hired by HKMT investment firms to the total
employment ratio of a province increase 1%, it will lead to a 0.06% rise in GDP of that
24
province. And both findings above are significant at the 1% level and the results still hold
their significances and robustness in the (t-1) model. The empirical results reveal that the
increases of ratios of labors from FDI firms and HKMT firms can both have positive effects
on the GDP growth; but with the same 1% increase in the ratio, the labor hired by the FDI
firms will give a nearly 100% higher return then the labors hired by HKMT firms to the
GDP growth. It denotes that the spillover effects are stronger through the labors hired by
the FDI firms to the domestic GDP growth. It may due to different reasons and for example,
the worker training sections are better and/or the standards of production, such as the know-
hows, technical requirements in the working environment, are higher in the FDI firms,
comparing with HKMT ones; as there is a hypothesis that when the multinational firms
decided to enter a country, i.e. China, they will have ensured that the revenues brought by
their competitive advantages, such as high technologies, are big enough to cover the huge
costs. And when the labors in the FDI firms go to domestic firms, the local firms can enjoy
the relatively high-skilled labors. Hence, the general productivities and contributions to the
local GDP growth of the labors in FDI firms are higher than those in HKMT firms.
Model (2)’s results in Table II above show that when the percentage of the capital
stock owned by FDI firms among the total amount of the capital stock increases 1%, the
GDP will have a rise of 0.22% and this finding is robust and significant at the 1% level
both in Model (2) and its (t-1) model. Whereas the coefficients of the ratio of capital stock
owned by HKMT firms to the total amount of the capital stock are statistically insignificant
in Model (2) and also its (t-1) model, suggesting that there are no association between this
ratio and the GDP growth. By assuming that the more advanced capital stocks can generate
a higher output value and contribute more to the GDP, the above findings reveal that, 25
comparing to the fixed asset capital stocks owned by HKMT firms, the ones owned by FDI
firms are more advanced and with higher productivities and this finding is also in line with
the hypothesis mentioned above. Therefore, if the ratio of the capital owned by the FDI
firms to the total capital stock amount in a province increases, there will be a positive
spillover effect to domestic sector as well as a positive growth of the GDP.
Table III – Estimation of GDP growth of 2nd sector and NON 2nd sector effects by the changes of (L2nd Sector,F /
L2nd Sector), (L2nd Sector,HKMT / L2nd Sector) as well as (LNON 2nd Sector,F / LNON 2nd Sector) and (LNON 2nd Sector,HKMT / LNON
2nd Sector).
a) Models with (t-1) mean that the independent variables are lagged for 1 year for robustness checking. b) The italic numbers in the table above are the p-values. c) *** stands for p-value < 0.01; ** stands for p-value between 0.01 & 0.05; * stands for p-value between 0.05 & 0.1.
26
Model (3) and (4) in Table III are further developed from model (1) to see how
spillover effects occur through the labors employed by the FDI and HKMT firms in the
secondary and the non-secondary sector. Basing on the regression results of model (3) as
well as the related (t-1) model, the coefficients of the ratio of labors hired by the FDI firms
within the secondary sector to the total employment number of the secondary sector are
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, showing that when there is a 1%
increase in this ratio, the GDP of the secondary sector will increase by 0.04%. On the other
hand, model (3) also shows that there are no statistical relation between the growth of GDP
in secondary sector and the change of the ratio of labors hired by HKMT firms within the
secondary sector to the total employment number of the secondary sector, since the
coefficients of this ratio are insignificant in both model (3) and its (t-1) model. The
empirical results above reveal that, within the secondary sector, the spillover effects to the
domestic economic growth will transmit through the labors hired by the FDI firms but not
through those who are hired by HKMT firms. And thus, it implies that the productivities of
the labors employed by the FDI firms in the 2nd sector are averagely higher; thence, when
more and more labors work in the FDI firms, with the total labor number of the 2nd sector
unchanged, more and more labors may have a better knowledge and productivity and
contribute more to the 2nd sector’s GDP growth. A reason behind may be the high standard
and technology productions of the FDI firms, but not HKMT ones, in the industry sector
that can spill the technical skills and the knowledge to the domestic labors and this reason is
further confirmed in model (5), which will be discussed later.
According to model (4) and its (t-1) model in Table III, there is a 99% confidence
level to claim that when the ratio of labors employed by HKMT firms within the non-2nd 27
sector to the total employment number of the non-secondary sector goes up 1%, it will lead
to a 0.08% increase of the non-secondary GDP. However, in the non-2nd sector, as the
coefficients of the ratio of labors hired by the FDI firms to the total employment number
are insignificant in model (4) as well as the (t-1) model, there are no statistical relations
between this ratio and the GDP growth of the non-2nd sector. It discloses that, in the non-
secondary sector, which is mainly composed by 3rd sector6, the workers hired by HKMT
firms have a higher contribution to the GDP growth of the related sectors, comparing with
the ones hired by the FDI firms; and there are some possible reasons to explain. Closer
Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) involving Hong Kong and Macau may be one
of the reasons as it liberates various high value-added 3rd sectors, such as banking sector,
insurance service sector and security markets, to the companies from Hong Kong and
Macau. The labors of HKMT firms can work in the higher economic output fields, which
also require higher human capitals, than the ones work in FDI firms by assuming that
higher value added sectors need higher human capitals, and consequently, the workers in
HKMT firms of non-2nd sector will conduct a stronger spillover effect to the domestic
economic growth. Culture may also be another reason to explain. Since the 3rd sector is
majorly composed by the service sector, unlike the industry and construction sector in 2nd
sector, it is much more ‘human’ and hence, with the same service quality, the culture of a
company is relatively important. By assuming that HKMT firms will have a more similar
cultural background with Chinese consumers; one can claim that HKMT firms will be more
6 The size and the economic output value from the 3rd sector are much bigger than the 1st sector. For instance, China 3rd sector’s GDP was around 4.6 times higher than the 1st sector one in 2013.
28
popular than the FDI firms in the service sector7; in another words, the labors in these
HKMT firms can adapt to the Chinese service market environment better and thus, there
can be greater spillover effects regarding the knowledge and the skills, such as selling skills,
which can generate higher outputs. And when these workers go to domestic firms, the skills
they learnt could then spill to the domestic firms.8
Table IV – Estimation of GDP growth of industry sector and construction sector effects by changes of
(LIndustry,F / LIndustry), (LIndustry,HKMT / LIndustry) as well as (LConstruction,F / LConstruction) and (LConstruction,HKMT / LConstruction).
a) Models with (t-1) mean that the independent variables are lagged for 1 year for robustness checking. b) The italic numbers in the table above are the p-values. c) *** stands for p-value < 0.01; ** stands for p-value between 0.01 & 0.05; * stands for p-value between 0.05 & 0.1.
7 This assumes that the service qualities of the FDI firms and HKMT firms are the same.
8 This is because the service qualities of the FDI and HKMT firms are generally better than the local ones.
29
Model (5) and (6) are built up from model (3) to see and compare the spillover
effects through the labors hired by the FDI firms and HKMT firms in 2 sectors of the 2nd
sector, namely the industry sector and the construction sector.
From the regression results of model (5) in Table IV above, the estimated
coefficient of the ratio of labors employed by FDI firms in the industry sector to the total
labor employment number in the industry sector is positive and significant at the 10% level,
which means that, in China’s Eastern coastal and central areas, every 1% increase of this
ratio, it will lead to a 0.08% growth of the industry’s GDP. Yet, this finding, indeed, is
relatively feeble comparing with other findings in this paper as the coefficient of above
ratio in its (t-1) function is insignificant statistically; more works have to be done to solidify
this finding. On the other hand, significant and robust relation does not exist in the labors
employed by HKMT firms according to the results above. In both model (5) and its (t-1)
model, the results shows that there are no relations found between the GDP growth of the
industry sector and the change of the ratio of the industrial labors hired by HKMT firms to
the total industrial employment number as both coefficients in these 2 models are
insignificant.
The aim of setting model (6) is to find out the relations between the GDP growth of
the construction sector and the ratios of the workers in construction sector employed by
FDI firms as well as HKMT firms to the total employment number of the construction
sector. However, as the coefficients of both ratios are statistical insignificant in model (6)
as well as in its (t-1) model. It denotes that no matter how the portion of workers in
construction sector employed by the FDI firms or by HKMT firms among the total
30
construction sector employment changes, the GDP growth rate of the construction sector
will not be affected. This may be explained by construction sector’s situation. As in the
construction sector, it is common to see that the large infrastructure projects are indeed
launched by the state; therefore, the contracts are usually got by the domestic firms. As a
result, the numbers of labors hired by the FDI firms as well as HKMT firms are small, i.e.
the ratios of them to the total employment in construction sector are generally below 5%
from 2002 to 2011. Thus, even if there are spillover effects through these labors, the effects
might not be statistically significant.
As illustrated previously in model (3) of Table II, if there is a 1% increase of the
ratio of labors hired by the FDI firms in the 2nd sector to the total employment of the 2nd
sector, it will lead to a 0.04% increase of the GDP of 2nd sector. One possible reason behind
is that the FDI firms in industry sector are using relatively higher technologies and/or
having higher productivities and the labors working there should have absorbed the skills
and technical know-hows. As a result, when this kind of labors’ portion becomes relatively
bigger in the society, it will lead to a higher economic growth and their knowledge will also
spill to the domestic firms someday later. And this reason is now solidified by the results of
model (5) and (6). Increasing the number of labors employed by the FDI firms in the
industry sector with total employment number of the industry sector unchanged does have a
positive relation with the GDP growth of industry sector. As a major part of GDP growth of
the 2nd sector is in fact coming from the GDP growth of the industry sector9; therefore, one
9 From 2012 to 2013, 2011 to 2012 and 2010 to 2011, the increases of the GDP of the industry sector accounted for 76%, 76% and 84% of the GDP growth of the 2nd sector, while the rest of 24%, 24% and 16% of the GDP growths of the 2nd sector are contributed by the construction sector respectively.
31
of the sources for the spillover effects to carry out through the labors hired by FDI firms in
2nd sector to the domestic economic growth is probably from the spillover effects through
labors hired by the FDI firms in the industry sector but not in the construction sector; yet, to
further ensure this statement, new models as follow should be set and tested:
InGDP2nd Sector,p,t = C + β1InL2nd Sector,p,t + β2InK2nd Sector,p,t
Table V – Estimation of GDP growth of industry sector effect by changes of (TEVIndustry / TPVIndustry),
(TEVIndustry,F / TPVIndustry,F), (TEVIndustry,HKMT / TPVIndustry,HKMT) and (TEVIndustry,D / TPVIndustry,D).
a) Models with (t-1) mean that the independent variables are lagged for 1 year for robustness checking. b) The italic numbers in the table above are the p-values. c) *** stands for p-value < 0.01; ** stands for p-value between 0.01 & 0.05; * stands for p-value between 0.05 & 0.1.
32
Unlike previous models, model (7) aims at figuring out the relation between the
GDP growth of the industry sector and the ratio of the total industrial export value to the
total production value in order to see whether there will be export-led growth10 in China’s
Eastern coastal and central areas’ industry sectors. From the results of model (7) in Table V,
the estimated coefficient of the total industrial export value to the total industrial production
value is positive and significant at the 1% level. It reveals that when this ratio goes up by
1%, the GDP growth of the industry sector will increase 0.09% and this finding is also
robust in the (t-1) model. Besides L and K, the growth of export to production ratio of the
industry sector can also drive the GDP growth of the industry sector positively; it denotes
that with the total industrial production value unchanged, one can increase the economic
growth of the industry sector by increasing the export value of the industrial goods.
According to Grossman and Helpman (1991), trade can promote technology diffusion and
knowledge spillover and hence lead to a faster productivity growth. Therefore, as China
exports more with the total production level unchanged, there should be a bigger spillover
effect from the trade to the domestic economic sector.
10 Indeed, to see the export-led growth of the whole country should use the model below:
but not only limited to the industry sector. Yet, the export sector is only composed of primary goods and
manufactured goods in China and the export from the industry sector accounts the majority part of the export
sector; i.e. in 2013, 2012 and 2011, manufactured goods’ export values account for 95%, 95% and 94% of
China’s total export values. The relations between the export-led growth of the whole society and the change
of the ratio of the total export value (which is mainly from the industry sector) to the total production value
may not be obvious as the spillover effects have to be strong enough to spill to the non-industry sector in a
short period of time. Since the models set in this paper are only the present year and the lagged one year (t-1),
this paper focuses only on the industry sector’s export-led growth effect.
33
Model (8) tries to find out whether the spillover effect found in model (7) is from
the FDI firms, HKMT investment firms or from the domestic firms. According to the
results in Table V, the coefficient of the ratio of industrial total export value of the domestic
firms to the industrial total production value of these local firms, unlike the ratios of the
FDI firms and HKMT firms, is the only robust finding and it is significant at the 1% level
in both model (8) and its (t-1) model. In fact, the findings above are not difficult to
understand. Comparing to the FDI and HKMT investment firms, domestic firms, without
doubt, are relatively less productive. As trade can increase the chances of technology
diffusions by letting the less advanced party to exposes to the more productive ones and to
learn from the latter, therefore, the spillover effect from the exports of industrial goods only
appears in the relatively backward Chinese domestic industrial firms according to the
regression results above.
34
Table VI – Estimation of GDP growth of industry sector effect by changes of (TEVIndustry,F / TEVIndustry) and (TEVIndustry,HKMT / TEVIndustry).
a) Models with (t-1) mean that the independent variables are lagged for 1 year for robustness checking. b) The italic numbers in the table above are the p-values. c) *** stands for p-value < 0.01; ** stands for p-value between 0.01 & 0.05; * stands for p-value between 0.05 & 0.1.
Unlike Model (7) and (8), model (9) is used to see whether the shares of the
industrial total export value of the FDI firms as well as HKMT firms among the total
industrial export value will affect the growth rate of GDP of the industry sector. As the
estimated results indicate that the coefficients of both ratios of the FDI firms as well as
HKMT investment firms are statistical insignificant in both model (9) and the (t-1) model,
the changes of the export shares amount the FDI firms and HKMT investment firms do not
affect the industrial GDP growth rate. One of the reasons to explain the above findings is
35
that there are basically no export quotas for many manufacturing goods in China after the
entering of WTO and thus, the export amount of the FDI firms and the export amount of
HKMT investment firms do not necessarily have relation and hence, the export amounts
solely depend on the firms’ decisions. As a result, only the changes of ratio of the export
value to the production value will matter and may affect the GDP growth, as model (7) and
(8) show, but not the relative export shares.
36
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication
Using the panel data across China’s 14 provinces in the Eastern coastal and the
central regions from 2002 to 2011, this study tries to find out the evidences of the relations
between labors, capital stocks and the exports of the FDI firms as well as HKMT
investment firms and the domestic GDP growths in different sectors.
Basing on the pooled OLS regression results from above 9 models, it is obvious to
observe that the growth of the labor force and the growth of the fixed asset capital stock are
two important and essential factors to drive the positive growth of the GDP as they are two
basic components of the production function; therefore, it is not hard to understand that
basically all the coefficients of the lnL and lnK in above regression results are positive and
significant at the 1% level, except one of the InK in the construction sector. It indicates that
the growth of the fixed asset capital stock in that sector does not have statistical relation
with the growth of the GDP and in another words; the input increase of the capital will not
lead to output growth in the construction sector.
As for the spillover effects through the labors, the results indicate that, with the total
labor employment number unchanged, both increases of the labors hired by the FDI and
HKMT firms will lead to a positive growth of the GDP. Within the 2nd sector, only the
growth of the labors hired by the FDI firms to the total employment level will lead to a
positive rise of the 2nd sector’s GDP, but not the ones employed by HKMT firms. Whereas
the situation is totally different in the non-2nd sector, the results reveal that, instead of the
FDI firms, the portion of the labors hired by HKMT investment firms to the total
employment number in non-2nd sector has a positive relation with the GDP of that sector.
37
To dig deeper in the 2nd sector, within the industry sector, only the ratio of the labors hired
by FDI firms to the total industrial employment number will positively drive the industry
sector’s GDP, but not the workers employed by HKMT firms. In the construction sector, no
spillover effects are observed from the labors hired by the FDI as well as HKMT firms.
As for the externalities from the capital stocks, when more capital stocks are
invested by the FDI firms, but not HKMT firms, with the total amount of the stocks the
same, it will lead to a positive GDP growth.
Last but not least, this paper also finds that export-led growth does exist in China’s
industry sector as the total export to total production value goes up, the related GDP will
also be driven up positively. Moreover, this situation will only appear in the domestic firms
but not the FDI firms nor HKMT firms. In addition, no statistical relations has found
between the ratios of the industrial export values of FDI firms as well as HKMT firms to
the total export value and the GDP growth of the industry sector; and this indicates that
there will be no crowding out effects between which parties export more.
Basing on the empirical results of the current study, there are some policy directions
towards the government policies of the Eastern coastal and the central regions of China.
Generally speaking, the government should welcome the investments from overseas
and HKMT as they can generate positive externalities to the domestic economic growth.
Comparing both kinds of the investments, FDI ones will have stronger spillover effects
than HKMT ones. And thus, once there are crowding out effects, government should limit
HKMT investments before limiting the FDI.
38
To capture the spillover effects through the labors as much as possible, the
government ought to encourage the FDI firms from the 2nd sector, especially the industry
sector, to hire more domestic workers; on the other hand, to encourage HKMT firms from
non-2nd sector to employ more local workers as well. For instance, giving tax rebates to the
companies hiring certain amounts of the domestic labors.
Encouraging the industry sector to export more is another way to enjoy the spillover
effects. Be that as it may, this can only apply on the domestic firms. Besides liberating the
export duties as the government does now, it, for example, can assist the domestic firms to
build up connections with overseas buyers by holding more expos and internationalize
RMB to facilitate the trading and so on. Although the government should stimulate the
industrial export of the domestic firms, there is not necessary to put a cap or heavy tariffs
on the exports of the FDI firms as well as HKMT firms’ goods.
39
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