Exploring a 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security Relationship: Linking Two Spokes Together?

Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 691–715, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.4.691.

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Renato Cruz De Castro is on the faculty of the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, and is the Leopoldo Aguinaldo Professorial Chair Lecturer on Philippine-Japan Relations. He is the 2009 U.S. State Department’s ASEAN Research Fellow based at the Political Science Department of Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, U.S.A. Email: <[email protected]> or <[email protected]>.

EXPLORING A 21ST-CENTURY JAPAN-PHILIPPINE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Linking Two Spokes Together?

Renato Cruz De Castro

AbstractThe article examines Tokyo’s efforts to link the Philippine and the Japanese security spokes in the face of Beijing’s moves to widen the cleavage between both countries’ alliances with the U.S. and render them irrelevant. The article concludes that Manila and Tokyo must first reconfigure a defense relationship that is not merely a military aggregation but a political apparatus enabling them to constructively engage an emergent China.

Keywords: alliances, Philippine-Japan relations, U.S. bilateral alliances, China’s emergence, Japanese foreign policy

On May 2, 2005, Japanese Defense Agency Director Ono Yoshinori paid a one-day official visit to Manila, during which he discussed with then-Philippine Defense Secretary Avellino Cruz a mecha-nism for an annual political/military dialogue between the two U.S. allies. The two defense officials also explored possible cooperation in maritime security, disaster management, counter-terrorism training, plus measures to address non-traditional security challenges such as piracy and drug trafficking. The event was historical and significant because it was the first official visit made by a Japanese defense director to the Philippines. It

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marked as well the possible beginning of increased, sustained, and formal security cooperation between Washington’s two allies in East Asia.

Cruz made this point, saying, “Japan is a close ally of the United States. The Philippines is a close ally of the U.S. It would be good if the three parties could discuss areas of cooperation.”1 If realized, this security co-operation between Manila and Tokyo will help establish a de facto bond between two separate spokes of the San Francisco system of bilateral alliances—the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 and the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951.

This article traces Tokyo’s exploratory moves to link these two spokes of the San Francisco system. It probes this main problem: How is Japan establishing this tentative bond between two of Washington’s bilateral alliances in East Asia? It also tackles the following questions: What is the relationship between the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Philippine defense alliances? How did the end of the Cold War affect these two alliances? What is the nature of the 21st-century China challenge in East Asia? What are China’s key policies in effecting its peaceful emergence in East Asia? What are Tokyo’s motives in linking these two alliances together? How is Japan en-gaging the Philippines in a tentative and exploratory security relationship? And finally, what is the future of these two security pacts in the face of China’s emergence in East Asia?

Alliances in a Changing EnvironmentAs a form of interstate cooperation, an alliance demands the states’ explicit declaration of intent to assist each other by cooperating militarily against other states.2 States form alliances—a kind of interstate cooperation— primarily to aggregate power, enhancing the capacities of each member through a deterrent guarantee provided by a more powerful state, or in-creasing the allies’ capabilities by pooling their resources and efforts to ensure their defense and security. Allies usually combine their resources against a specific and common enemy, generally another, more powerful state. Alliances exist and operate on a “threat-fluid” (i.e., ever-changing security) environment that should correspond with “alliance mutuality.” Alliance mutuality involves those collective or shared interests that cut across different alliances, particularly bilateral ones, to reinforce coopera-tion. New threats can come in various forms, such as unrestrained behav-ior of allies, instability, weapons proliferation, the narcotics trade, or the

1. Carina I. Roncesvalles and Darwin T. Wee, “RP, Japan Agree to Step up Security Co-operation,” Business World, May 3, 2005, p. S.1.

2. glen H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization 45:1 (Winter 1991), p. 123.

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transformation of a mere military challenge into something more compre-hensive and systemic. Threats can also include a shift of threat perception from a single powerful and revisionist state. Or alliances can form a more general and encompassing notion of balancing against perceived general threats to the system and/or maintaining the international order.

To confront a new security challenge (a bigger state with a different po-litical system and ideology), it is necessary for allies to reformulate their security relations or even transform a military alliance into a comprehen-sive political coalition. A specific threat can be rendered insignificant by the changing nature of the threat itself, as when a simple military chal-lenge evolves into something more systemic, broader, and complicated. Security relations may also be affected by how the contracting parties forge their links to economize on resources—maximizing political benefits from the exchange and minimizing transaction costs. In short, states opt for the most efficient and appropriate type of security relationship. And in choosing the appropriate type of security bond, states consider a long continuum of defense association types defined by a degree of hierarchy that ranges from alliance, protectorate, informal empire, to empire.3

Both alliances originated in the 1950s. At the start of the Cold War, the U.S. developed a system of separate but related bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines and a trilat-eral security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand. Triggered spe-cifically by the Korean War in 1950, the system resulted in a series of U.S.-sponsored defense commitments to these countries that ensured American participation in Asian security affairs.

Often referred to as the hub-and-spokes model, these bilateral alliances depict the United States as the hub of the wheel and each of the five bilat-eral alliances (Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thai-land) as the spokes. Each of the five alliances is separate from one another, significant in its own right, and with distinctive characteristics. Together they form a dense web of security and military partnership between the U.S. and selected East Asian states stretching from Northeast to South-east Asia.4 The five alliances commonly rely on American military power to deter communist external aggression and prevent domestic disorder caused by internal insurgency.5 Thus, during the Cold War, these alliances

3. See David Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the variety of International Relations,” ibid., 50:1 (Winter 1996), pp. 1–33.

4. David Shambaugh, “Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order,” Current History 105:690 (April 2006), p. 154.

5. Roger Buckley, The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 74.

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apparently became a clear psychological deterrent against the allies’ po-tential adversaries—the Soviet Union and later, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite the end of the Cold War in 1991, these alliances have had an enduring effect on Washington’s and its allies’ foreign policies. They have created an inertia or stasis born out of the combination of self-interests and bonds of anti-communism, one that has outlived the Cold War. Currently, in the face of China’s economic emergence and diplomatic initiatives, the U.S. alliances with Japan and the Philippines face the pros-pect of being isolated from each other and rendered anachronistic.

Since the mid-1990s, China has embarked on a diplomatic gambit di-rected at eroding America’s strategic dominance predicated upon the lat-ter’s well-established system of alliances and forward-deployed forces. Chinese strategy involves debunking the basis of these alliances (the so-called China threat) and their obsolete Cold War mentality. Beijing’s offer of a new regional order and direction became apparent when it began implementing its New Security Concept (NSC) in 1998. Premised on cooperative and coordinated security, the NSC proposed a pattern of diplomatic-defense relationships with all East Asian countries whether they are U.S. allies or even China’s potential adversaries. According to Beijing, the new concept is well-suited to what it claimed to be a new post-Cold War environment characterized by peace and development but threatened by non-traditional (non-state) security challenges, e.g., trans-national crimes, international terrorism, etc. The NSC subtly conveys the idea that American security alliances originated from the Cold War era and smack of realpolitik.

China now advocates a comprehensive national security strategy in which military security is only one component. In fact, Beijing relies on diplomatic and economic means to address its international security con-cerns, rather than on military means. By emphasizing non-traditional se-curity concerns, Beijing seeks to infuse a sense of shared growth and security into China’s relations with neighboring states. China’s approach is aimed at promoting a model of interstate cooperation that enhances collective security for participating states but does not threaten any out-side party. The inclusion of and focus on these non-traditional security challenges make the highly militarized/realist American approach to secu-rity appear outdated while fostering cooperation among Southeast Asian countries in confronting non-military threats—at the expense of U.S. in-fluence in the region. Assessing the overall thrust of China’s 21st-century diplomacy in East Asia, William Tow argues that China is “implementing a regional diplomacy of anti-hegemony designed to shape a regional secu-rity environment where [the] U.S. alliance system will no longer be relevant

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or necessary.”6 This effectively puts U.S-Japan security relations and the U.S.-Philippine alliance in the same boat. As far as Beijing is concerned, these two alliances must be wedged apart; they should become outdated in the near future.

Originally signed in 1951, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty as re-vised and extended in the 1960s was primarily directed against the Soviet Union. Its scope was limited to the territorial security of the Japanese homeland. However, since 2000 the Japanese government has expressed serious concern about China’s growing military capabilities. The 2005 Japanese White Paper explicitly stated the threat posed by the increasing presence and activities of Chinese warships within and outside China’s territorial waters, as well as the possibility that Beijing might use force against Taiwan.7 Consequently, since 9/11 the Japanese government has provided military-medical, transport, and logistic services, plus informa-tion, funding, and other non-military support to the U.S. campaign against international terrorism. Furthermore, despite Japanese public op-position to the American military occupation of Iraq since 2003, the government of former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro deployed Self-Defense Force (SDF) units to the war-ravaged country. Furthermore, Tokyo is also currently active in the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with Washington and Canberra. The Bush administration initiated the formation of the TSD in 2005. It was part of the administration’s overall push to bolster the efforts of America’s regional allies (specifically Japan and Australia) in facilitating the evolving U.S. global strategy to counter international terrorism, check nuclear proliferation by rogue states, and sustain an acceptable balance of power against aspiring hegemonic com-petitors.8 In July 2008, Tokyo hosted the Third TSD meeting that focused on the three allies’ cooperation in humanitarian operations and address-ing non-traditional security challenges.9

To further bolster their relations, the U.S. and Japan have expanded the geographic span of their security arrangement by including within its scope other possible East Asian regional conflicts, notably in the Taiwan

6. William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Singa-pore: green giant Press, 2001), p. 35.

7. Harushao Fukui, “Japan: Recasting the Post-War Security Concerns,” in Global Secu-rity Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 225.

8. William Tow, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: Facilitating Community-Building or Revisiting Containment,” in Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue NBS Special Report No. 16 (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2008), p. 4.

9. Akihito Tanaka, “Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: A Japanese Perspective,” ibid., p. 38.

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Strait and the Korean Peninsula. More significantly, Tokyo has uncondi-tionally supported the deployment of U.S. forces in East Asia and has committed to play a central role in the U.S. core of bilateral alliances in the region. By assuming this role, Tokyo intends to engage China in a geo-strategic competition. Thus, in response to China’s efforts to render these U.S. bilateral alliances irrelevant, Tokyo is trying to cement the security bonds between Washington and other East Asian countries.10

Japan’s Security Policy: Hedging against Rivalry?

In the early 1990s, the Bush, and later the Clinton, administrations en-gaged Japan in a tedious and protracted market-opening negotiation that nearly ruined their security ties. However, the North Korean nuclear pro-gram, China’s emergence as a possible hegemon, and the economic recov-ery of the U.S. in the mid-1990s created an opportunity to review and redefine the alliance. Formulating a rationale for a reaffirmed alliance en-tailed a long negotiating process between the American and Japanese de-fense and foreign affairs departments. In 1994, the Japanese government suggested a more autonomous defense posture vis-à-vis the U.S. Alarmed by this possibility, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye initi-ated a bureaucratic effort to assure Tokyo of the value of a U.S.-Japan al-liance. Since the release of the East Asia Strategy Report (EASR) in February 1995, Washington has steadily strengthened and maintained the U.S.-Japan security alliance while keeping economic disputes from under-mining it.

The EASR reaffirmed the centrality of U.S. security alliances in Asia and called for increased cooperation between Japan and the U.S., includ-ing greater Japanese logistic support for U.S. forces operating in the region and joint research on theater missile defense (TMD). In 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro signed a joint decla-ration calling for a new basis for U.S.-Japan security relations. The follow-ing year, the two countries issued the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. One of the provisions states that Japan could play a more active role in the event of hostilities in East Asia. However, the most significant and contro-versial segment pertains to the joint military operations in “areas sur-rounding Japan.” Presumably, the phrase refers to the Korean Peninsula but it may also apply to other areas—including the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In 2001, the Bush administration came into office with

10. See Szu-shen Ho, “Analysis of Japan 2005 White Paper on Defense,” Views and Poli-cies: Taiwan Forum 2:1 (September 2005), pp. 21–36.

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hopes of further strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Washington’s ex-pectation included Tokyo’s participation in the joint development of a missile defense shield designed to protect both countries, and allowing the SDF to support or assist U.S. forces in regional military conflicts, includ-ing those geographically remote from Japan.11

China’s emergence in the 21st century has gradually changed Japan-China relations as the two countries became powerful and assertive almost at the same time. As strategic competitors, they have created an unprece-dented era in the East Asian security equation. China views Japan as a major rival for control over the maritime territory it claims, and as an in-creasingly powerful offshore balancer challenging its emergence as the re-gion’s foremost power. Specifically, Beijing is concerned that Japan will soon become a military force that can confront or balance China’s rising power.12 The two countries are currently at odds over a number of conten-tious issues. Among these are their need for energy, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan. Japan imports 99% of its petroleum and natural gas; China, since the early 1990s, has become dependent on imported oil. Thus, both countries have laid claim to a vast expanse of the East China Sea and at-tempted to explore the area for possible petroleum deposits.

In May 2004, China began serious oil exploration in the Chunxiao gas fields only four kilometers from a median line declared by Tokyo as part of its maritime territory. A year later, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) authorized Japanese companies to explore the contested waters of the East China Sea for natural gas. Beijing responded by deploy-ing Chinese warships near the now-active Chunxiao fields. The prospect of these two nations becoming involved in a strategic competition appeared first in November, when a Han-class submarine was tracked by the SDF for more than two days with P-3C Orion patrol planes, destroyers, and helicop-ters.13 Then in January 2005, Japan warned Beijing that Tokyo would defend its resources, after two Chinese destroyers entered a disputed area in the East China Sea.14 This maritime/energy dispute could escalate and put the U.S. in a very delicate situation, given its alliance with Japan.15

11. John H. Miller, “The glacier Moves: Japan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 30:2 (Summer 2003), p. 132.

12. Sebastian and Martin Fackler, “Marching on to a New Role,” Far Eastern Economic Review 167:2 (January 15, 2004), p. 19.

13. Peter A. Dutton, “International Law and November 2004 ‘Han Incident’,” Asian Se-curity 2:2 (June 2006), p. 88.

14. Mark J. valencia, “Pouring Oil on the East China Sea,” International Herald Tribune, February 24, 2005, p. 7.

15. David Shambaugh, “Asia in Transition: The Evolving Regional Order,” Current His-tory 105:690 (April 2006), p. 156.

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Aside from that brewing territorial dispute, China and Japan are watch-ing each other’s moves in the South China Sea. Since the late 1980s, China has pursued a policy of creeping assertiveness as the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) encroached on and built permanent structures on a number of islets and shoals in the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by several countries in the region.16 Japan worries about China’s growing in-fluence in Asia and monitors developments in the South China Sea to as-certain Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions. In Tokyo’s view, a more aggressive PRC stance in the South China Sea hints at Chinese expansion-istic tendencies that could further threaten Japanese interests.17

Another hot spot is the Korean Peninsula, where both countries have extensive economic interests. It is certainly within the realm of possibil-ity that the long-term rivalry between Tokyo and Beijing for influence on the peninsula could be rekindled—a rivalry that sparked the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.18 A crisis in the Taiwan Strait could also draw the two sides into confrontation, because the 1997 Japanese defense guide-lines consider any military conflict in the Strait as a scenario that may push Tokyo to conduct a joint military operation with Washington.

Beijing’s current military buildup alarms Tokyo primarily because the missiles that China has deployed and aimed at Taiwan could also be used against Japan’s main island as well as Okinawa, the site of most U.S. de-fense facilities in the country. Tokyo also keeps a close watch on China’s growing military capabilities that suggest wider ambitions—especially Bei-jing’s blue-water ambition—that no government in Tokyo could afford to ignore.19 On the other hand, China fears U.S.-Japan cooperation in devel-oping a missile defense system, which could be shared with Taipei. In the aftermath of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Taiwan in February 2005, Beijing immediately berated Japan for its “wild behavior” in sup-porting the U.S.’s strategic objective of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait.20 China-Japan relations hit rock bottom as Beijing reacted furi-ously, calling the joint declaration a threat to China’s sovereignty because it says the U.S.-Japan security alliance will not simply work to keep the

16. Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines, and the South China Sea Dispute, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21:1 (April 1999), pp. 95–118.

17. Joshua P. Rowan, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” Asian Survey 45:3 (June 2005), p. 432.

18. Kent Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 85:2 (March/April 2006), p. 131.

19. Robyn Lim, “Japan’s Spirals into Insecurity,”Far Eastern Economic Review 169:7 (September 2006), p. 21.

20. James Brooke, “On Chinese-Japanese Seesaw: Hot Trade and Chilly Politics,” Interna-tional Herald Tribune, February 23, 2005, p. 3.

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peace in the Taiwan Strait but will also cover the development and secu-rity of the entire Asia-Pacific region.21 Furthermore, the declaration touches on the two allies’ possible contingency measures and joint reac-tion if a crisis erupts in that area. It even raises the prospect of Washington-Tokyo-Taipei military cooperation and integration.

Contemporary Japan-China bilateral relations are one of the most complex and volatile major power dyadic interactions in contemporary world politics. This is because the dynamics of this relationship is driven by two contradictory forces. On the one hand, the two countries enjoy vibrant bilateral trade linkages and their economies complement each other. Japan is China’s most important trading partner, and likewise, China has been Japan’s since 2006. Tokyo provides Beijing with valuable technologies and huge amounts of foreign direct investment. In return, Beijing provides Tokyo with cheap labor and a viable export platform. Both countries also place great importance on bilateral people-to-people exchanges that include student, intellectual, tourist, and sometimes even military programs.

On the other hand, however, Japan and China view each other with in-tense suspicion. From Tokyo’s point of view, Beijing is a looming military threat: its medium-range ballistic missiles, surface ships, and submarines are a blunt coercive instrument pointed directly at the heart of the Japa-nese homeland. Senior Japanese intelligence and defense analysts assume that China is targeting U.S. bases in the country and that Tokyo would be within range of Beijing’s approximately 1,500 missiles currently directed against Taiwan.22

From Beijing’s perspective, Tokyo is undertaking a rapid and major re-armament program as it talks explicitly about the dangers of North Ko-rea’s support of terrorist networks and possession of weapons of mass destruction—but the implicit and actual target of this massive build-up is China.23 Beijing also casts a wary eye on Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its defense links with Washington through their Common Strategic Objec-tives and Transformation and Realignment for the Future agreements. given its own growing economic and political clout in East Asia, Beijing sees Tokyo’s current diplomatic and defense efforts as a classical balancing gambit conducted with Washington’s connivance aimed to strategically constrain and encircle China. Ironically, despite their vibrant economic

21. Michael vatikiotis, “Heading off a Japan-China Conflict,” ibid., March 3, 2005, p. 6.22. Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East

Asia (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 140.23. David Scott, China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System (New York:

Routledge, 2007), p. 152.

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and cultural ties, a Japan-China rapprochement remains an elusive quest. Instead, both powers are currently locked in a brewing geopolitical rivalry in East Asia.24

The deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in the early 21st century coincides with a general improvement in U.S.-Japan security ties. North Korean nuclear ambitions, China’s emergence as a power in the region, and the current war on international terrorism have made the alliance a feasible and vibrant security option for both Washington and Tokyo. On the one hand, the 9/11 terrorist attack on the U.S. prompted Washington to adjust its bilateral alliances in East Asia. On the other hand, it created an environment in Japan where security issues could be openly discussed. The ascendance of Koizumi as a popular, pro-American prime minister resulted in a radical restructuring of the U.S-Japan alliance. Immediately after 9/11, Tokyo promised that the SDF would play a prominent role in America’s war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in particular and global terrorism in general.25

In 2002, Washington and Tokyo held a series of dialogues to reassess their alliance in the light of the changing security environment. Officially called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the effort recognized that the security threats have been transformed.26 Consequently, the struc-ture and pace of U.S.-Japan security cooperation must be altered and ac-celerated, respectively. Tokyo agreed to be part of the ballistic missile defense system by 2007. It procured the Joint Strike Fighter program and Joint Direct Attack Munitions program, which will make the two coun-tries’ militaries more interoperable and interdependent.27 Tokyo is also de-veloping capabilities to enable the SDF to interface with U.S. armed forces in any major overseas operations away from the Japanese homeland. These are indicators that Japan will eventually assume the geostrategic role of

24. See Yeo Lay Hwee, “Japan, ASEAN, and the Construction of an East Asian Community,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28:2 (August 2006), p. 123, <http://wf2dnvr10.webfeat.org/>, accessed May 23, 2008.

25. Eric Heginbotham and Richard F. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” Foreign Affairs 81:5 (September/October 2002), pp. 113–18.

26. Yuki Tatsumi, “The Defense Policy Review Initiative: A Reflection,” PacNet Newslet-ter (April 27, 2006), p. 1.

27. The Joint Strike Fighter or Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning is an aircraft that can perform various roles such as close-air support, tactical bombing, and even air-defense mis-sions. This aircraft is intended to replace the F-16 Falcon, A-10 Warthog, F/A-18 Hornet, and Av-8 Harrier. The aircraft’s development has been principally funded by the U.S., with the U.K. and other allied countries providing additional funding. The Joint Direct Attack Muni-tions is a low-cost guidance kit manufactured by Boeing that can convert existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurately guided “smart” bombs. See William E. Rapp, “Past Its Prime? The Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Parameters (Summer 2004), p. 110.

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the “new South Korea”—a U.S. leverage point against China.28 Summing up Tokyo’s alliance behavior since the start of the 21st century, Christo-pher Hughes observes:

Japan’s national military doctrines and capabilities indicate an overall drive to expand the possibilities of cooperation with the U.S. This is matched by the Japanese and U.S. bilateral moves to strengthen the alliance itself. . . . The two countries have finally filled in the alliance gap left over during the Cold War period . . . and upgraded its functions to respond to regional contingencies such as North Korea and Taiwan.29

Philippine Security Policy: Walking on Two Legs?

In the early 1990s, the Philippines and the U.S. conducted a two-phase ne-gotiation to establish the framework for American military facilities in the Philippines. In June 1991, Washington and Manila forged a new accord to replace the 1947 military base agreement, called the Philippine American Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security (known as PACT) of 1991. However, the Philippine Senate by a vote of 12 (against) to 11 (in favor) rejected the PACT. A year later, Washington withdrew its forces from Subic Naval Base, having earlier closed Clark Air Base. On the heels of the withdrawal, Manila and Washington significantly downgraded their political and military relations. But the PRC’s promulgation of its territo-rial law claiming a large portion of the South China Sea in 1992, and Ma-nila’s discovery in 1995 of Chinese construction on Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, changed the Philippine perception. In early 1995, the Philippines was shocked to find that the Chinese navy had constructed permanent structures on this reef, located 130 miles off the Philippines’s westernmost island of Palawan. The Philippines claims the reef as part of its continen-tal shelf; it lies within the country’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Manila immediately filed a diplomatic protest against Beijing’s building of concrete facilities and accused China of adopting a “talk and grab” strategy that avoids confrontation while pursuing a creeping inva-sion of these islets and islands in the South China Sea.30 By the mid-1990s, Manila found a militarily strong and irredentist China knocking on its

28. James E. Auer and Robyn Lim, “Japan: America’s New South Korea?” Current His-tory 103:674 (September 2004), p. 282.

29. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a Normal Power (New York: Rout-ledge, 2005), p. 142.

30. For an interesting discussion of this incident and how Tokyo viewed and responded to this event, see Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balanc-ing to Bandwagoning (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 62.

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door. The Philippine government realized the importance of the Ameri-can military presence in maintaining the balance of power in Southeast Asia. given the failure of Manila to upgrade its armed forces, the Philip-pine government also saw improved security ties with Washington as vital in getting American support for the modernization of the ill-equipped Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

In 1999, the Philippine Senate ratified the U.S.-Philippine visiting Forces Agreement (vFA). The agreement provided a legal framework on the treatment of American troops taking part in defense-related activities covered by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, effectively reviving bilateral military cooperation. In February 2000, the large-scale military exercise Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder), an annual undertaking suspended in 1996, was revived. The agreement also developed an effective program to meet the requirements of the AFP in the face of Chinese military expan-sion in the South China Sea. Washington assisted in improving the AFP’s operational and maintenance capabilities through the transfer of excess defense articles, continued funding of Manila’s Foreign Military Financ-ing (for equipment purchases), and conduct of the International Military Educational Training Program (IMET) for AFP personnel.31

However, Beijing did not allow its political ties with the Philippines to deteriorate because of the disputes over the Spratlys and Manila’s efforts to strengthen its security relations with the U.S. From 1996 to 2000, Beijing consistently disavowed any intention to expand militarily into the South China Sea. It agreed to formal multilateral discussions to resolve the dispute and showed an increasing receptivity to abide by international norms in regulating its behavior vis-à-vis other ASEAN claimant states.32 Beijing was tactful in pressing its sovereign claim to the Spratlys. Chinese leaders quickly and quietly attempted to defuse the Mischief Reef inci-dent. In March 1996, China and the Philippines held their first annual vice-ministerial talks to resolve problems caused by conflicting claims to the Spratlys. Earlier in 1995, Beijing discussed issues of the South China Sea on a multilateral basis with ASEAN. Beijing also indicated that China would abide by international law in settling the territorial dispute with other claimant states. China then agreed, as a confidence-building mea-sure, to shelve the dispute temporarily in favor of joint development.

31. In late 1999, the U.S. Congress passed a law granting $10 million in security assistance to the Philippines. The law also encourages the White House to transfer, on a grant basis, UH-1 helicopters, A-4 Sky Hawks attack aircrafts, amphibious landing craft, and other naval vessels that are available under the excess defense article program. See “U.S. Congress Passes RP Security Aid,” Filipino Reporter, December 16, 1999, pp. 28, 51, 2.

32. See Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and Cooperation in the Making of a Regional Order (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 200–01.

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These concessions to the Philippines and ASEAN were extended mainly because of Beijing’s calculation that Southeast Asian states might align themselves with the U.S. against China in a possible Taiwan Strait crisis.33 Beijing did not expect its territorial dispute over the Spratlys to be resolved in the near future. From its point of view, however, any major armed clashes affecting the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea could invite an American military response. Chinese officials may have noted that since the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, there has been a gradual for-malization of increased U.S. military access in Philippine territory, while senior Philippine defense officials consistently played up the link between U.S. military presence and the Spratlys dispute. Beijing assumed that maintaining a peaceful and stable regional environment would prevent Washington from increasing its forward military presence and strengthen-ing its bilateral security alliances that could lead to the containment of China. This goal could be achieved only through constant dialogue and by cultivating mutual trust between Beijing and Manila. Such a strategy could lay the foundation for the parties concerned to avoid subsequent disputes over the Spratly Islands that could damage diplomatic relations.

Thus, in July 1996, as a result of former Philippine Defense Secretary Renato De villa’s visit to Beijing, both countries exchanged defense and armed forces attachés in their respective capitals. This formalized Philippine-China defense and military relations, ironically a year after the Mischief Reef incident. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine and Chinese de-fense establishments began a series of high-level official visits, intelligence exchanges, and ship visits.34 In September, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Chief of the general Staff general Fu Quanyu visited the Philip-pines, and former AFP Chief of Staff general Arturo Enrile went to Bei-jing the following month. Then in March 1997, the first PLAN ships—the

33. Prior to June 1975, the Philippines and the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) main-tained vibrant military, political, and economic ties. However, after President Ferdinand Mar-cos decided to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing in the mid-1970s, the Philippines-ROC ties were downgraded to an unofficial and non-governmental level. These relations have also been limited primarily to economic, commercial, and cultural exchanges. However, since the mid-1980s, Taiwan has become one of the leading trade partners of the Philippines and a vital labor market for thousands of Filipino overseas contract workers working as domestic workers, textile workers, and musicians. Consequently, Philippine gov-ernment officials have made several “private visits” to Taiwan to boast their country’s unofficial economic ties with it. For a historical and an analytical account, see Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, “Philippine-Taiwan Relations,” in China-ASEAN Relations: Political, Eco-nomic, and Ethnic Dimensions, Theresa C. Carino, ed. (Manila: De La Salle University Press, 1991), pp. 112–26.

34. Office of Plans (J-5), AFP Strategic Papers, 2004–05 (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, January 2006), pp. 1–8.

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Qingdao 113 destroyer and Tongling 542 frigate—made a port call at Ma-nila. In October 1998, the first AFP-PLA Intelligence Exchange was held in the Philippines; the second was hosted by Beijing in October 1999.

From 1998 to 2000, China and the Philippines conducted frequent high-level contacts and official/state visits that enabled them to exchange views and coordinate positions on bilateral concerns and on major international or regional issues. During former President Joseph Estrada’s state visit to Beijing in May 2000, both countries issued a Joint Statement on a Frame-work of Bilateral Cooperation in the 21st Century. The agreement laid down a strategic direction for the Republic of the Philippines (RP)-China cooperation in defense, trade and investment, science and technology, ag-riculture, education and culture, the judiciary and other areas.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the consequent American-led global coalition against terrorism further boosted the revitalization of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. President gloria Macapagal Arroyo quickly of-fered Washington access to the former U.S. facilities—Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base—for exigent military operations. Her declaration of support for the American anti-terror campaign injected a new dynamism into the 50-year-old alliance. Earlier, during their November 2000 summit meeting in Washington, D.C., President george W. Bush and Arroyo dis-cussed how U.S. forces could help train Philippines forces and provide them with logistics, intelligence, and communication support in their coun-ter-terrorist campaign against a local Islamic terrorist group operating in the island of Basilan, the Abu Sayyaf.

The two countries formulated an integrated plan that included a robust training package for the AFP, provision of equipment needed to increase the Philippine military’s mobility, and the creation of a new bilateral de-fense consultative mechanism. Washington increased its foreign military financing program to Manila from $1.9 million to $19 million for fiscal year 2002. The Bush administration also decided to send 200 U.S. troops for a two-and-a half-week joint exercise with Filipino forces, plus 190 Special Forces officers to train the AFP on counter-terrorism tactics. These moves were part of upgrading American military links in South-east Asia to prevent the region from becoming a haven for international terrorists after the 9/11 incident. This development, in turn, resuscitated the Philippine-U.S. alliance, which had been moribund since November 1992.

Far from being intimidated by the revitalization of Philippine-U.S. secu-rity relations, China eventually decided to join the counter-terrorism band-wagon. A year after 9/11, Beijing offered to cooperate with Manila in all areas of defense to ensure the stability of the region and the whole world.

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Beijing proposed a wide range of joint defense ventures with Manila in-cluding military training, exchange of students, sharing of information on counter-terrorism, and provision of military equipment. Through these en-gagements, Beijing should be able to prevent the U.S. from strategically “boxing-in” China with the increased American military presence in South and Southeast Asia. Counter-terrorism cooperation with the Philippines is also part of China’s confidence-building measures, which include exchanges of visits between the two countries’ high-ranking defense and military offi-cials. In 2003, Beijing invited Manila to join a counter-terrorism coalition—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (although Manila declined). The two countries also signed a number of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) addressing non-traditional security challenges such as illegal drug trade and transnational crimes. Through the ASEAN Regional Forum, both Manila and Beijing have agreed to increase the participation of their respective defense ministries in military exchanges. Thus, the PLA regularly invites AFP officers to attend courses in the PLA School and the National Defense Universities. As a goodwill and neighborly gesture, Beijing extends not only personnel training but also logistic support to the AFP.35

The two countries’ defense cooperation took a dramatic turn when Phil-ippine troops were withdrawn from Iraq in July 2004. President Arroyo’s decision to save the life of kidnapped Filipino truck driver Angelo De La Cruz elicited angry responses from Washington and cooled relations be-tween the U.S. and the Philippines. A few weeks later, Arroyo made a state visit to China, which fueled speculation that she was playing “the China card” to gain some leverage against Washington.36 During her visit, Ar-royo conducted high-level talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. The two leaders identified key areas of defense cooperation such as sea rescue, disaster mitigation, and exchange of training. They decided to put aside their countries’ respective territorial claims to the Spratlys and to jointly develop the disputed area. A separate closed-door meeting was held be-tween Filipino and Chinese officials to discuss security cooperation, in-cluding visits of defense top brass, regular dialogue, and possible provision of Chinese military equipment to the AFP.37

35. Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2004), pp. 101–02.

36. Raisa Robles, “Warming Ties Mark Arroyo’s Beijing visit: China Emerges as the Phil-ippines’ New Foreign Ally after Manila’s Pullout from Iraq,” South China Morning Post, September 1, 2004, p. 7.

37. Marichu villanueva, “RP and China Approve Defense Cooperation,” Philippine Star, September 3, 2004, p. 4, at <http://us.f504.mail.yahoo.com/ym/ShowLetter?Msgld=9626_717861_11288_1834_4250258_0_67185>, accessed February 25, 2008.

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In November 2004, former Philippine Defense Secretary Avellino Cruz and his Chinese counterpart signed in Beijing an MOU on defense coop-eration on behalf of their respective defense ministries. Reportedly, the PLA proposed to the AFP more military exchanges, setting up a consulta-tion mechanism, enhanced cooperation against terrorism and other inter-nal security threats, and holding a joint military exercise. These proposals were confidence-building measures to qualitatively transform the state of Philippine-China security relations. The MOU has resulted in more ex-changes between the AFP and the PLA. China has donated a total of $2.5 million in non-lethal military equipment and supplies to the Philippine military.38 On the motive behind Beijing’s efforts to improve its security relations with Manila, an American defense analyst explains: “China’s pragmatic non-ideological approach to bilateral relations provides foreign governments with an alternative to dependence on the United States, thereby reducing U.S. influence in many countries. . . . [B]y providing countries with a partial alternative, Beijing gives them increased leverage in dealing with Washington on a range of issues.”39

Discovering a Common Bond?The two alliances—U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Philippines—have common roots and were originally directed against communist expansion in the 1950s and 1960s. However, since the late 1990s, the two spokes of the San Fran-cisco system have taken different paths. On the one hand, U.S.-Japan secu-rity relations now aim to maintain a stable regional balance of power and address potential short-term regional conflicts. U.S.-Philippines security ties, on the other hand, have been fine tuned to address domestic insur-gencies and international terrorism. Nevertheless, both are influenced by China’s emergence in East Asia. In the face of China’s growing economic and political clout, Tokyo needs to strengthen its security relations with Washington as a strategic hedge. The Philippines, however, is simultane-ously revitalizing its alliance with the U.S. and developing an entente with China.

Security ties between China and the Philippines thrive amid a general intensification of their economic and political relations. Sino-Philippine trade volume increased by 41% in 2004; China has invested heavily in the Philippine agricultural and mining sectors and has infused $450 million

38. Office of Asia-Pacific Affairs, Overview of Philippine-China Relations (Pasay City: Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), p. 1.

39. Phillip Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Occasional Paper 4 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, June 2006), p. 31.

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for the rehabilitation of the North Luzon Railway System.40 Eventually, Manila must consider Beijing’s political and strategic interests in making any major decision that could affect its ties with China. This will definitely constrain the Philippines’s ability to conduct any security initiative with the U.S. that may be construed as thwarting Chinese strategic moves in East Asia or smack of being an anti-China alliance. Furthermore, the Philippines’s and China’s single-minded focus on terrorism and other non-traditional threats will infringe on any efforts by Washington and Manila to reorient their alliance from internal security concerns to stabilizing the regional security environment.41 Inevitably, this will widen the cleavage be-tween the two spokes of the U.S. bilateral alliance system in East Asia, making them separate, exposed, and vulnerable to China’s current security gambit.

Slowly but surely, Japan is trying to link the two spokes of the alliance together despite China’s moves to deepen the cleavage. Since the late 1990s, Japanese defense analysts have viewed China as hegemonic, pushing for more influence in the region. However, Japan’s primary interest in the ASEAN region is not to contain China. Rather, it intends to maintain the balance of power—or at least a balance of influence—vis-à-vis China.42 The 1997 Hashimoto Initiative, for instance, quietly pressed for a strategic dimension in Japan’s relations with the Southeast Asian states including the Philippines.

Prior to the 21st century, Philippine-Japan relations leaned heavily on the economic side. Manila signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Tokyo in 1951. However, normal diplomatic relations did not begin until 1956; the two countries became entangled in an emotionally driven, com-plex four-year negotiation over the reparation agreement and post-1945 economic development loans. From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, any dramatic improvement in the Philippine-Japan relationship was retarded by a diplomatic impasse over three lingering post-war economic issues:43 (1) the annual consultations on how the reparations were to be imple-mented; (2) the amount and type of development loans that could be

40. xinhua News Agency, “Sino-Philippine Ties Undergoing Quick Development,” xin-hua News Agency, April 25, 2005, p. 2.

41. Rita gerona-Adkins, “U.S. Wary of New Philippine Ties with China,” Philippine News.Com, June 1, 2005, p. 8, at <http://us.f504.mail.yahoo.com/ym/ShowLetter?Msgld=9626_ 717861_11288_450258_0_67185>, accessed February 25, 2008.

42. Michael green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Un-certain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 189.

43. Yoshikawa Yoko, “War Reparations Implementation, Reparations-Secured Loans, and a Treaty of Commerce,” in Philippines-Japan Relations, Ikehata Setsuho and Lydia N. Yu-Jose, eds. (Quezon City: Ateneo University Press, 2003), p. 377.

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sourced by Manila from Tokyo through the reparations; and (3) the acri-monious and protracted negotiations leading to the eventual signing and ratification of the Philippine-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Nav-igation in 1973 and its revision in 1979.44 By the late 1970s, partly because of the signing and ratification of the 1973 treaty, the two countries’ eco-nomic linkages dramatically intensified, making Philippine-Japan rela-tions Manila’s second-most important bilateral ties, next only to those with Washington. Currently, trade with Japan accounts for nearly half of Philippine overseas trade, while Japanese companies have been investing in the country to secure low-cost production bases for their merchandise exports to the United States and other Western markets. On the official side, Tokyo has become Manila’s number one provider of official develop-ment assistance (ODA) since the mid-1980s.

The emergence of China in the late 1990s and Beijing’s concerted efforts to wean Manila away from Washington have caused a slow but dramatic change in Philippine-Japan bilateral relations. Tokyo’s game plan is to check Beijing and ensure that Washington will remain the Philippines’s only major strategic ally. Consequently, beginning in the late 1990s, Fili-pino and Japanese political leaders and high-ranking defense officials have conducted good-will visits and high-level dialogues to ensure that vigorous political interactions between the two U.S. allies are sustained. In these exchanges, issues such as trade, investment, ODA, labor, immigration, and consular matters are discussed. The most notable among these high-level exchanges was the September 15, 2001, summit between President Arroyo and Prime Minister Koizumi. The two leaders agreed to elevate Philippine-Japan relations to a higher level and to hold an annual politico-security dialogue.

Conducted by Tokyo, the dialogue promotes confidence-building mea-sures between Japan and its Southeast Asian neighbors and enhances joint efforts to combat international terrorism. An interesting feature is the participation of the military in these exchanges. The two U.S. allies also discuss bilateral security concerns in other international forums such as the Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia, the Philip-pine-Japan Sub-Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN-Japan Forum, the ASEAN-Japan Summit, and ASEAN Plus Three. Interestingly, both sides acknowledge that their alliance with the U.S. provides common ground for them to take the same position in key security issues affecting their mutual

44. For a historical and comprehensive discussion of Philippine-Japan bilateral relations, see Lydia Yu-Jose, “Philippine-Japan Relations: The Revolutionary Years and a Century Hence,” in Philippine External Relations: A Centennial Vista, Aileen San Pablo-Baviera and Lydia N. Yu-Jose, eds. (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1998), pp. 279–362.

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interests. The two countries also cooperate to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. Their armed forces conduct low-key military activities such as table-top exercises and semi-nars on defense-related matters that are generally multilateral, e.g., con-ducting U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Japan has consistently provided emergency relief assistance to the Phil-ippines after the latter was ravaged several times by earthquakes and ty-phoons. Currently, the two countries are formulating a bilateral agreement to make it easier to send emergency assistance during natural calamities. In 2006, Tokyo sent a Japanese Disaster Relief Expert Team to the Philip-pines to assist the Philippine Coast guard (PCg) in containing the envi-ronmental damage caused by a major oil spill off the island of guimaras.45 The Japanese experts provided technical guidance and advice to PCg on oil removal operations to contain the damage. Tokyo has also extended substantial financial and technical assistance to Philippine law-enforcement agencies such as the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the PCg through its human resource development grants.46

Tokyo has said it will fully commit itself to the economic development of Mindanao once the peace process between the Philippine government and the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is concluded. The Japanese government indicated that its assistance will take the form of grant aid and yen loan programs designed to raise the standard of liv-ing on the island. To maximize the impact of its ODA projects, Tokyo has already identified areas in Mindanao as recipients of concentrated assis-tance through a program labeled “grants Assistance for grassroots and Human Security Project.”47

Earlier in 2005, Tokyo indicated its political commitment to the ongo-ing peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF when it assigned a senior political adviser to the International Monitoring Team (IMT) to monitor the ceasefire agreement. This lone Japanese member also observes the rehabilitation and economic situation in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao.

45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Oil Spill Disaster off Guimaras Island, Philip-pines, Tokyo, August 21, 2006, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/8/0821-2.html>, accessed May 23, 2008.

46. Ibid., Japan-Philippine Joint Statement on Partnership between Close Neighbors for Comprehensive Cooperation, December 9, 2006, at <http://www/mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/joint0612.html>, accessed May 23, 2008.

47. See Foreign Minister Masahide Koumura, “Japan: A Builder of Peace” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, January 24, 2008), at <http://www/mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/speech0801. html>, accessed March 5, 2008.

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In September 2007, Manila and Tokyo signed the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), which includes provisions for mutual tariff reduction to boost bilateral trade ties and allows health care workers to move freely back and forth. The JPEPA also contains coopera-tion initiatives on human resource development, financial services, infor-mation technology, energy and environment (management of hazardous and solid waste), science and technology, trade and investment promotion, small and medium enterprises, tourism, transportation, and road develop-ment.48 More significantly, in contrast to China, the Philippines welcomes Tokyo’s plan to revise its 1947 pacifist Constitution and enable the SDF to assume international peacekeeping and other military roles.49 Manila has also expressed its support for Tokyo’s bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.50 In its budding security ties with the Philip-pines, Japan apparently maintains a proper equilibrium within its two-track policy vis-à-vis Southeast Asian countries, enabling Tokyo to play an independent politico-security role in East Asia and to strengthen the foundation of its security cooperation with the U.S.51 Compared with Manila, Tokyo finds it extremely urgent to sustain the Philippines’s and Japan’s ties with their common security ally in the face of China’s eco-nomic emergence in the region.

Linking the Two Spokes TogetherIn February 2005, the Philippines and Japan conducted the first Japan-Philippine Politico-Military Dialogue as part of Japan’s overall security relation with the ASEAN countries to foster confidence-building measures and explore possible areas of security cooperation.52 Philippines and Japa-nese defense officials exchanged views on a variety of issues such as re-gional security, North Korea, the Spratlys, and non-nuclear proliferation in East Asia. They also looked into other probable joint security ventures,

48. “Free Trade Pact with Japan to Slightly Boost Philippine Economy,” Business World, January 15, 2007, p. 1, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=37&did=1194656581&SrchMode=1&si=1&Fmt>, accessed February 25, 2008.

49. “gMA Welcomes greater global Role for Japan,” Manila Times, May 24, 2007, p. 1, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=24&did=1276135921&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt>, accessed February 25, 2008.

50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan-Philippine Joint Statement on Partnership.51. See Keiko Hirata, “Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Ja-

pan’s Foreign Policy toward Indo-China,” in Akitoshi Miyashita and Yochiro Sato, eds., Japa-nese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 55–99.

52. Author interview with an anonymous Japanese diplomat, Makati City, November 2, 2006.

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particularly in the areas of counter-terrorism and maritime security. The two sides agreed to prioritize the problems of terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and transnational crimes. Tokyo then noted that it would play a more active role in maintaining peace and stability in the international community.

The Philippine delegation followed up its request for maritime security cooperation on capacity-building and training, particularly in the acquisi-tion of new equipment to improve the communication infrastructure of the civilian PCg. Manila’s proposal involved Japan’s provision of equip-ment and training to the PCg in counter-terrorism and search-and-rescue operations, as well as civil aviation training for the security personnel of the Philippine Air Transportation Office (ATO).53

In May 2005, Japanese Defense Agency Director Ono Yoshinori visited Manila to bolster Philippine-Japan security and defense cooperation, par-ticularly in peacekeeping and cadet and officer exchange. He called for collaborative efforts in maritime security, disaster management, and counter-terrorism training. Significantly, Ono discussed with then-Defense Secretary Cruz a mechanism for an annual political security dialogue and the implications of redeploying American troops from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland. Also explored were the redeployment of American troops from Japan to the Philippines and the conduct of joint military ex-ercises between the AFP and the SDF. Likewise, the AFP proposed a com-bined training with the SDF in peacekeeping operations.

In February 2006, the second Political-Military Dialogue was held in Tokyo. The two countries reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate on disaster preparedness and management in view of Japan’s expertise in these areas.54 They also exchanged views on their visions of an East Asian Community founded on their common and robust alliance with the U.S., and on the defense-oriented nature of their security policies. Tokyo sug-gested addressing maritime security and piracy issues related to capacity-building, information-sharing, and the protection of the environment by the littoral states in Southeast Asia. The Philippine delegation, for its part, advanced the idea of a Philippine-Japan strategic partnership in regional ocean governance.

The Japanese delegation was particularly interested in the Philippine initiative called “Coast Watch South.” This concept is designed to help secure the long coastline from Palawan to Davao by installing radar- capable watch stations in strategic areas. Each coast watch station will be

53. Office of the Asia-Pacific Affairs, RP-Japan Political-Security Dialogue (Pasay City: Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), p. 1.

54. Japanese diplomat interview.

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provided with interdiction capabilities through the use of small fast craft, gunboats, offshore patrol vessels, and aircraft. Primarily a civilian/coast guard project, the proposed coast watch system will enable the Philippine navy to monitor and report all transit of surface and subsurface craft in Philippine waters. The government intends to establish strategically lo-cated coast watch stations (equipped with surface, sub-surface, and air de-tection capabilities) along the critical areas and choke points throughout Philippine territory, with the primary mission of monitoring maritime traffic along international sea lanes crisscrossing the country’s archipelagic waters. The discussion reflected the two countries’ growing interest in mar-itime security and the need to build mutual capacity and strengthen coop-eration in the management of the maritime environment in Southeast Asia. It also signified the growing interest of Tokyo in forging a crucial security link with Manila.

Manila hosted the third Philippine-Japan Political Military Dialogue in December 2007.55 The Japanese delegates raised concerns about the PLA’s growing military capability in East Asia and asked their Filipino counter-parts how they saw Beijing’s emerging economic and political influence in the region. Particularly mentioned were Beijing’s military buildup, China’s naval activities that have expanded beyond the Taiwan Straits, and its mari-time security line encroaching into the Sea of Japan. Tokyo feared that China’s military superiority over Taiwan could affect political decision-making there. The Japanese panelists were also worried about China beef-ing up its naval and air forces and its inability to explain the country’s ballooning defense budget. They also revealed that the Chinese plan to establish an administrative city in Hainan Island that would administer the disputed Spratly Islands or archipelago.

In hindsight, the Japanese were warning their Filipino counterparts of the danger of getting too close to China. This obviously put the Filipinos on the defensive, as they countered that Philippine-China defense relations are actually “young,” having formally started only in November 2004. To placate their Japanese counterparts, the Philippine officials affirmed Ma-nila’s close defense and security relations with Washington and went on to explain the mechanisms of Philippine-U.S. military cooperation (the Mu-tual Defense Board and the newly created Security Engagement Board) and their detailed components—humanitarian assistance/civic action, ca-pacity and capability upgrade, and support for AFP operations. The Phil-ippine delegates then reiterated their country’s position that the U.S. is a stabilizing force in the region and the alliance is “most important” in

55. Details of the third Philippine-Japan Political Military Dialogue were culled from an interview by the author with an anonymous Filipino diplomat, Manila, December 28, 2007.

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assuring their mutual security. They added that Philippine-U.S. bilateral ties are deeply rooted in shared history and values and commitment to global peace, security, and prosperity. given the close security ties with the U.S., officials assured Japan, despite Manila’s budding security relations with Beijing, the Philippines is still an active American ally and will not be weaned away by China.

The third political military dialogue ended with the Philippines and Japan reiterating their common positions on the North Korean issue, mar-itime security, and international terrorism. The Philippine delegates then challenged their counterparts to include other substantive security issues in the dialogue and to develop other consultative mechanisms for further cooperation. To date, however, nothing concrete has emerged from the ini-tial tentative discussions to link the two hubs, primarily because of Japan’s constitutional restrictions on providing military hardware and deploying the SDF overseas. Both countries are wary that any security cooperation might be viewed by Beijing as an anti-Chinese alliance. If linking these two spokes is to be considered seriously, it is imperative for Japan and the Philippines to analyze in depth the nature of their tentative security rela-tions in the light of China’s emergence.

A Philippine-Japanese Security Relationship?

Formed in the early 1950s, the bilateral alliances with the U.S. were origi-nally designed to contain China militarily during the Cold War. going a step further, the Eisenhower administration pondered the creation of a multilateral arrangement bringing together various parties into a collec-tive defense pact against communist military expansion in East Asia. At present, however, China’s emergence is simply not a military challenge that could be contained by bilateral military alliances. The challenge of 21st-century China far exceeds Beijing’s calibrated and focused military mod-ernization against Taiwan and possibly, against the U.S. More significantly, it concerns China’s efforts to set a regional agenda by shaping the prefer-ences of East Asian states about what ought to be the regional order. It is more about Beijing’s skill of applying soft power to undermine Washing-ton’s bilateral alliances and erode American power and influence in East Asia.

Confronted by this new and complicated security development, Tokyo and Manila should not consider the China challenge a military matter and cast Beijing as a threat to regional security and peace. The main concern is how Japan and the Philippines, as smaller states, liberal democracies, and American allies, should respond to the emergence of Beijing as a regional

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power. Both countries should consider that an increasingly powerful Bei-jing could play off Tokyo and Manila against each other, possibly even against Washington. To prevent this from happening, any attempt to link these two spokes should be based on the assumption that Manila and Tokyo would work together in politically engaging, not containing, Bei-jing. Both countries should welcome China’s emergence in the region. However, they should work together to counter any development that could adversely affect their mutual interests. Manila and Tokyo should co-ordinate their foreign policy pronouncements and diplomatic actions to restrain China from pursuing its long-term foreign policy goal—eroding American strategic preponderance in East Asia. This is a goal that China could achieve if the Philippines and Japan do not encourage and support each other as U.S. allies. The major objective of a Manila-Tokyo security/political relationship is to circumscribe the ability of Beijing to pursue any goal that could undermine the current strategic equilibrium. This means both countries must align their foreign policies with this goal in mind.

Redefining their politico-security relations in the 21st century requires that Manila and Tokyo engage Beijing constructively so that China’s emer-gence will not cause any radical and disruptive changes in the regional order. It is also important that China does not challenge the status quo and remains a responsible regional stakeholder that will not attempt to ease the U.S. and other Western powers out of East Asia. A 21st-century Manila-Tokyo security relationship should have the following politico-diplomatic (not military) goals: (1) to increase their ability to resist pres-sure from an emergent and potentially assertive China; (2) to improve their bargaining position in negotiating with Beijing; (3) to act as a diplomatic “shot across the bow,” impressing upon Beijing that it cannot take for granted the compliance of East Asian states; and finally (4) to serve as a hedge in the face of the uncertainties generated by China’s economic and political emergence.

Making Philippine-Japan Politico-Security Relations Relevant

A key feature of the region’s security structure since the 1950s is the U.S.-sponsored bilateral system of alliances. During and immediately after the Cold War, this system of separate alliances was able to contain the mili-tary expansion of communist states in East Asia and maintain a balance of power favorable to the U.S. and its Asian allies. Now this system of alliances is challenged by an emergent China. Notwithstanding its mili-tary dimension, China’s rise is made possible by its growing economic prowess, increasing politico-diplomatic clout, and its efforts to restructure

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the regional system through cooperative ventures and multilateral ar-rangements. Consequently, this development has infringed on the two key spokes of the San Francisco system of alliances—the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Philippine security relationships.

On the one hand, given its historic rivalry and lingering bilateral dis-putes with China, Japan is compelled to reconfigure its alliance to address any major change in the regional balance of power. It has also decided to build-up its SDF and strengthen its security ties with the U.S. The Philip-pines, on the other hand, initially tried to balance an emergent China by reviving its security relations with the U.S. However, through Beijing’s mil-itary diplomacy and prudent application of soft power, Sino-Philippine politico-diplomatic relations have not been adversely affected. Instead, the two countries are now engaged in a vibrant entente. Recent developments in Japan’s and the Philippines’s alliances with the U.S. indicate that the gap between these two spokes is becoming wider. In the long run, these two alli-ances might be rendered anachronistic by China’s foreign policy gambit.

With this possibility, Tokyo is currently trying to establish security links with Manila to create bonds between these two spokes. However, efforts at linkage might be counterproductive because their main objective is still containment of a “military threat.” Yet, China’s emergence is more than a military challenge. It concerns the change of attitudes toward the U.S. and the American system of regional alliances by wielding soft power. There-fore, to forge an effective security partnership, Japan and the Philippines should first develop a politico-diplomatic apparatus that will enable them to engage China as the latter asserts itself as an economic, political, and military power. Both need to expand and intensify their relations so that Beijing will not be able to pit one against the other. Any model of Japan-Philippine security relations should never be construed in purely military terms. Rather, the structure should allow both states to cooperate in assur-ing China that it will never be contained if it continues to act as a respon-sible power. Finally, the security relationship should restrain China from challenging or undermining the interest, power, and influence in East Asia of the U.S., Tokyo’s and Manila’s common ally.

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Exploring a 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security Relationship: Linking Two Spokes Together?

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