Exploration & Production onshore and offshore: technical challenges and their solutions

TUROGE 2014 - Ankara, 10 April 2014

Exploration & Production onshore and

offshore: technical challenges and their

solutions

Safety of Onshore and Offshore Oil & Gas Operations

Giovanni Uguccioni – D’Appolonia SpA - Italy

Introduction

Giovanni Uguccioni, O&G Sector Development Manager in

D’Appolonia SpA, former Head of the HSE Division in

D’Appolonia.

D’Appolonia SpA is an Italian Company with 700+ technical staff

and offices in Italy and worldwide (including Turkey) belonging

to the RINA Group, providing services to Clients in the O&G,

Transportation and Infrastructures markets from concept to

decommissioning, through consultancy, design, management and

operation & maintenance engineering.

For the O&G sector, in addition to PMC, Basic and Detail design,

Gesoscience, Asset Integrity Management, O&M services,

D’Appolonia has a long term experience in Safety and

Environmental consultancy to major O&G Operators and EPC

Contractors Worldwide.

Risk: Nature

The Oil and Gas (O&G) industry supplies the world

market with substantial amounts of raw products,

fuel and refined products produced and transported

for a number of industrial activities.

Therefore the O&G industry is by its very nature a

high risk industry, handling large quantities of

flammable, hazardous and sometimes toxic (H2S)

substances frequently with high pressure and

temperature scenarios.

Risk: Nature

Despite sophisticated Health, Safety and Environment

(HSE) Management Systems and highly developed

safety cultures, major accidents in the Oil & Gas

industry are reoccurring events, putting at stake the

lives of personnel working at the site, the life and

health of populations in neighboring communities, the

viability of the ecosystem, the reputation and the

same economic survival of the Company involved.

During the ’70s some major accidents

occurred in Europe :

1974 Flixborough (United Kingdom)

[28 fatalities, damages to the environment]

1975 Beek (Netherland)

[14 fatalities, 106 injured ]

1976 Seveso (Italy)

[chronic damage to population and environment]

After this last event, in 1982 Council Directive 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities, so-called Seveso Directive,was adopted.The Directive was then revised in 1996 (96/82/EC) and in 2003(2003/105/EC), after the industrial accidents of Toulouse (F), Baia Mare(RO) and Enschede (NL)

Legislation on Industrial safety in Europe

• prevention of major accidents involving dangerous

substances

• limitation of the consequences of accidents on

man and the environment

high level of protection

for man and the environment (throughout

the European Union), through…..

Aim of the “Seveso” Legislation

Demonstrate Safety within the Safety Report

SafeManagement

SafeTechnology

Emergency

Planning

Land-Use

Planning

Info

rma

tio

n to

th

e P

ub

lic

I N S P E C T I O N S

Accident Reporting and Lessons Learnt

“Seveso” Legislation General Philosophy

• SEVESO approach is based on the concept of controlling the risk

• SEVESO relates to 'presence of dangerous substances‘

– actual

– anticipated

– generated during loss of control of an industrial chemical process

• Dangerous substances are listed in the Annex I

– a list of Named Substances (i.e. LPG, Chlorine, methanol, MIC,

gasoline, gasoil, dioxins, etc.)

– a list of Generic Categories of Substances and Preparations

(i.e. toxics, flammables, explosives, dangerous for the aquatic

environment, etc.)

“Seveso” Legislation Hazardous Plants

The level of the hazard is based on the presence of specific quantities of

dangerous substances. The higher the Hazard, the more stringent the

safety measures shall be.

The SEVESO Directive sets two levels of controls depending on quantities

(so called lower tier and upper tier)

– Example:

• gasoline and light liquid hydrocarbons: Lower tier is set to 2,500 tons, Upper

tier is set to 25,000 tons

• Substances “Toxic for Aquatic environment”: Lower tier is set to 200 tons,

Upper tier is set to 500 tons

• Upper tier industries (Type B) are more hazardous than lower tier

industries (Type A)

• Upper tier requirements are more severe than lower tier requirements

“Seveso” Legislation Tiered approach

10

Maximum amounts on siteSeveso Directive

Upper tier Lower tier

Classificatio

nO

bligatio

ns

Notification to the authorities

Major Accident Prevention Policy

Safety Management System

Safety report

Information to the public on safety

measures

Emergency planning

Shows Level of risk of the plant and demonstrate reliability of safety measures

Environmental risk reduction policy

Threat assessment(risk analysis)

“Seveso” Legislation Tiered approach

Enforced for the

first time

August 2010

Regulation on Control of Major Industrial Accidents

Revised regulation

December 2013

Regulation on Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents and Reduction

of Their Impacts

Prepared in line with SEVESO Directive

Involves the same principles with SEVESO

What about Turkey?

12

Maximum amounts on siteTurkish Regulation

Upper tier Lower tier

Classificatio

nO

bligatio

ns

Notification to the authorities

Major Accident Prevention Policy

Safety report

Public Notification

Emergency Planning(Internal and External Plans)

Turkish Regulation

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Enforcement dates

31.12.2013

01.01.2016

“Seveso” Directive Competency Building

“Seveso” Directive is not yet fully operative in Turkey, however its

full application is under way.

An “Europaid” Project is on-going, co-financed by the European Union

and the Republic of Turkey, to provide Technical Assistance to the

competent Ministries in Turkey on Increasing the Implementation

Capacity of the Seveso II Directive.

The Project, carried out by a Consortium of six companies including

D’Appolonia, is aimed to provide training to Central and Local

Authorities personnel, as well as developing a Pilot Safety Report

study on a Turkish O&G installation to test the application of the

Seveso Directive principles and criteria in a real Turkish situation.

A Safety Report demonstrate the Safety of an operation, by:

1. demonstrating that a particular scenario no longer presents a

major-accident hazard due to the measures in place;

2. demonstrating that the extent of the effects of a particular

scenario have been limited or the probability of the scenario is

sufficiently low;

3. demonstrating the efficiency and the effectiveness of mitigation

measures put in place;

4. establishing whether further mitigating measures are necessary;

5. providing information for competent authority obligations (e.g.,

emergency plans, land-use planning).

In summary, by establishing whether the activity is “tolerable”.

Risk Analysis and Safety Report

• The main elements in any risk analysis process are :

• Hazard identification (checklists, hazard indices and historical

data, HAZOP, FMEA, event trees accident scenario selection)

• Scenarios’ ‘likelihood’ (historical data, fault/event trees,

expert judgment), considering the reliability and availability of safety systems (measures to prevent/limit consequences)

• Scenarios’ consequence assessment (population and opertors, environment, property)

• Risk ranking (on the basis of frequency and severity, e.g. by individual risk and social risk measures)

Risk Analysis Process

Minor injuries

Serious Injuries

Lethality threshold

Fatality

Risk Analysis Results

R s = < f .C >S = Scenario

f = Expected frequency of an adverse event

C = Consequent reference damage

Risk Assessment

“Risk” is defined as “the probability of suffering a given damage”,

and is a function of Frequency and Damage level. In general terms:

Starting from the general definition, Risk Indicators can be quantitative,

semi-quantitative or qualitative. The choice of either a qualitative or

quantitative approach is strongly influenced by the specific safety culture

philosophy within each individual State.

How are the Risk Analysis results used for?

To assess the Risk…..

Individual riskannual frequency of occurrence of the reference

damage (e.g., the death), in any point of the

geographical area, for a person present in the area,

taking into account the probability of the presence

of the person.

Residential area

10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7

Risk source

Sea

Risk Assessment –Quantitative Indicators

Societal Risk

An F-N curve describes the cumulative

frequency (F) of accidents from all risk sources

leading to the reference damage (e.g. death)

for a number of people equal to or greater

than N. This figure characterises the societal

dimension of possible accidents.

10-4

10-5

10-6

10-7

10-8

1 5 10 50 100 Number of

deaths N

Annual

frequency F

Land-Use Tolerability Each combination of the likelihood and the severity

classes is associated to a specific land use that is

tolerable. Examples are tolerable land uses (Italian

Law 9/5/2001)

Risk Assessment –Semiquantitative Indicators

Accidentfrequency

Damage Effect Categories

Fatalities LethalityThreshold

Seriousinjuries

Minor Injuries

< 10-6 DEF CDEF BCDEF ABCDEF

10-4 – 10-6 EF DEF CDEF BCDEF

10-3 – 10-4 F EF DEF CDEF

> 10-3 F F EF DEF

Use of the Safety Report in Authorisation Process

New or

modified ?

Preliminary

Safety Report

Approved ?

new

noStop

Authorisation

to build the

plant

yes

Upper tier?

Detailed

Safety

Report

Document

non increase

of risk

Approved ?

Authorisation

to Operate

no yes

Approved ?

Authorisation

to build and

operate

Revise

Project

no

Increase of Risk

(DM 9.8.00) ?

modification

yes

no

yes

yes

Notifyno

Updat

edev

ery

5 y

ears

Offshore ?

On June 2013 the European Parliament has approved Directive

2013/30/EU on “safety of offshore oil and gas operations”, that

will fully enter into force in 2016 for new and in 2018 for existing

installations.

The Directive adopts the same philosophy and principles described

for the “Seveso” Directive (onshore), in particular:

• The operator shall issue a Safety Report identifying Major

Hazards to safety and environment;

• The Operator shall submit an Emergency Response Plan (ERP);

• An Independent Verification Scheme on Safety and Environmental

critical elements shall be enforced by Operators;

• A competent Authority will be appointed to manage regulatory

functions.

Conclusions

• Risk of Major Accidents affects any O&G installation

• Public concern causes “NIMBY” reactions… project schedule

jeopardized

• Risk Analysis techniques triggered by “Seveso” improve safety

of installations

• Scope can be extended: from onshore to offshore

• Coverage also expanding: several non-EU Countries are applying

“Seveso-like” concepts

• Next step: TURKEY!

Thank you for your attention