Explaining the Easterlin paradox • Easterlin’s proposed explanations: Income comparison and relative utility Adaptation • Both imply thresholds in the individual utility function Benchmarks: self-regarding/ other regarding • This section presents the empirical evidence of relative income concerns 1
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Explaining the Easterlin paradox Easterlin’s proposed explanations: Income comparison and relative utility Adaptation Both imply thresholds in the individual.
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Explaining the Easterlin paradox
• Easterlin’s proposed explanations:
Income comparison and relative utility
Adaptation
• Both imply thresholds in the individual utility function
Benchmarks: self-regarding/ other regarding
• This section presents the empirical evidence of relative income concerns
“Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich. On which step of the ten is your household today?”
“Now imagine the same ten-step ladder around 1989, on which step was your household at that time?”
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Identification strategy
• There is no reason a priori why some people should estimate that they have done better than their colleagues but worse than their former high school mates, or better then their parents but worse than in 1989.
• Looking at the effect of such opposite evolutions in different dimensions thus helps avoiding the risk of collinearity of comparison benchmarks due to omitted variables.
map the different modalities of each pair of variables, creating a series of interaction terms that constitute a total partition of the sample.
estimate Life Satisfaction on these interaction categories, controlling for the usual socio-demographic variables and for country dummies.
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Results
• Comparisons are relevant and exert a significant impact on subjective well-being.
• Comparisons are asymmetric: under-performing one’s benchmark is always more important than out-performing it.
• “intra-personal” comparisons are more important than inter-personal ones.
• Local comparisons (to parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more powerful than general ranking in the social ladder and its evolution.
• Comparisons that affect subjective well-being trigger a “compensating” demand for redistribution,
• but self-ranking on a general affluence scale is the most important determinant of the demand for redistribution.
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Clark and Senik (2010)
• Wave 3 of the European Social Survey (ESS)
• 22 European countries
• direct information on the intensity and the direction of income comparisons.
Comparisons are important for the poorer
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Clark and Senik (2010)
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Clark and Senik (2010)
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Clark and Senik (2010)
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• Income comparisons are acknowledged as important by a vast majority of Europeans.
• They are associated with lower levels of self-declared happiness and a greater demand for income redistribution.
• Colleagues are the most frequently cited reference group,
• but is also the most innocuous one.
• Cultural differences:
the negative welfare effect of comparisons is more important in Continental countries and less so in the British Isles, which is also the region in which comparisons most frequently concern colleagues.
Southern Europeans seem to be more family-oriented: they compare more to family members and suffer more from this type of comparisons than inhabitants of other parts of Europe.
• Income comparisons are also associated with a greater demand for income redistribution.
It is comparisons to family members and “others”, much more than comparisons to colleagues, that prompt the demand for income redistribution.
Clark and Senik (2010)
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Two Different Effects of Reference Income on
Satisfaction
• Direct effect: Comparisons
• Indirect effect: Information
• Hirschman (1973): “tunnel effect”
UA = V(YA, EA(YB), YB).
dV / dYB = (dV / dEA . dEA / dYB) + V3
V3 is the direct effect of YB on V; negative.
• Test: sign of dV / dYB :
negative sign:
o comparison effect V3 is negative and dominates the information effect (dV / dEA . dEA / dYB)
positive sign:
o information effect dominant
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Indirect informational effect:
• My own welfare can increase if I observe the
progression of my peers;
• stronger effect in a context of uncertainty and
volatility.
importance of the economic environment
Stabilized economies versus transition
economies (Senik, 2004, 2008).
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Senik (2008) « Ambition and Jealousy. Income
Interactions in the Old Europe versus the New Europe and the United States”
Identification• 2 types of variability:
- Time variability (panel data) fixed effects,
- Distinction Western Europe versus Eastern
Europe: higher volatility in the East
- Distinction Europe/USA: higher perceived
mobility in the USA.
• Relate these differences to the perception of
reference income.
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DATA
• Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, panel,
1994-2000 (5 waves, 11130 individuals),
• TARKI Hungarian Household Panel, 1992-1997
(6 waves, 8237 individuals),
• NORBALT II: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 1999,
10539 individuals,
• Polish Household Survey: 3 separate panels :
1987-1990, 1994-1996 et 1997-2000 (about 2000
individuals per wave).
• European Community Household Panel, 1994-
2001 (919000 observations for 14 countries and 8
waves) + French household survey (90000
observations).
• General Social Survey (United-States): cross-
section, 1972-2002 (44000 observations)
• European Social Survey, 2002, 21 countries
(42319 observations).
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Estimation in two stages
• First stage estimation: country by country, year by year :
• log real individual income = . [education, experience,
profession, branch, region, sexe] + it
Predicted income --> Reference income
• In a second stage, I use the post-estimation predicted income as a proxy for
the individual’s reference group’s income. I include Reference Income in an
equation of individual well-being :
S it = 1 . Reference Income + 2 . it + 3 [household
size, marital status, age, year dummies, (health, etc.)] +
Experiment in 2 stages• 0) Define a stratified sample in 3
Californian universities (6411 employés)Faculty, staff, medical
• 1) Send an information message to a randomized sub-sample inside each university (treatment group).Control group = those who did not receive
the information• 2) 10 days later, survey the entire
sample:Did they look at the site?Job satisfaction, willingness to quit job?
• Matched sample with administrative data on wages
First stage message
Second stage questionnaire
Results
• Those who received the information
were twice more likely to consult the
website (50% versus 20%).
• 4/5 looked at the wages of their
collleagues in the same department.
• Asymmetric effect on satisfaction.
• Correlation between treatment and
actual job quits within 3 years.
Impact of treatment on job satisfaction
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3) Experimental evidence on income comparisons
Michael McBride « Money, Happiness, and Aspirations: An
Experimental Study » (2008)
• experimental study of how multiple factors—
past payments, social
• comparisons, and expectations—influence
reported satisfaction.
• expectations and social comparisons
significantly affect reported satisfaction,
• subjects care relatively more about social
comparisons once they have achieved a
satisfactory outcome.
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California Social Science Experimental Laboratory
(CASSEL), UCLA
• The core of the experiment is a version of the matching pennies game.
• In each round, each subject is randomly matched with one of the five following computer partner-types:
• 20% heads – 80% tails
• 35% heads – 65% tails
• 50% heads – 50% tails
• 65% heads – 35% tails
• 80% heads – 20% tails.
• The computer then tells the subject the partner-type
• Each partner type is equally likely
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• Next, the subject chooses heads or tails for each of five coins.
• Then, the computer randomly and independently selects heads or tails according to partner-type distribution.
• If the subject’s first coin and the computer’s first coin match (either both are heads or both are tails), then the subject wins the coin, and so on for the other coins. Thus, a subject can win anywhere from 0 to 5 coins in any given round.
• After the computer partner’s choices are made, the computer reports to the subject the coin choices made by the computer and the number of coins won by the subject.
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In Treatment A, the subject is told only
her own outcomes for each round.
In Treatment B, the subject is told her
own outcomes and also the average coins
won by the other subjects in the
experiment.
In Treatment C, the subject is told her
own outcomes, and the average coins
won by others by partner type.
• Immediately after being told the outcome of
a round, the subject is asked “How satisfied
are you with the result of this round?” She
then reports her satisfaction on a scale of 1 to
7.
• Estimation of satisfaction over own payment,
expected payment and average own type
payment.
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Are Relative Income Concerns a Luxury?
• Evidence of relative-income concerns in low-income countries (increasing availability of surveys):
Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, and 20 other Latin American countries
China, India, Nepal, Tajikistan
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania
• Comparisons are mostly upward. Relative deprivation.
• Development of information and communication technologies