Explaining Electoral System Change: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Belgium and Its Rejection in Great Britain

Explaining Electoral System Change: The Adoption ofProportional Representation in Belgium and Its

Rejection in Great Britain

Nina Barzachka

Third Annual Graduate ConferenceWoodrow Wilson Department of Politics

University of VirginiaSpring 2007

“No party, even in America, voluntarily resigns a sure hold on power for the uncertainties of a new system simply on grounds of abstract justice.”

Thomas Harrison Reed, A.B., LL.B.Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan,

in Government and Politics of Belgium, 1924

In 1899, Belgium became the first country in the world

to introduce proportional representation (PR) for national

legislative elections of its lower chamber. It was Prime

Minister Beernaert who first pushed for PR in 1894 and

ultimately sacrificed his political career for it, knowing

fully well that the new electoral system would significantly

diminish the overwhelming majority (104 out of 152 seats) of

his Catholic Party. “And when, five years later, the reform

was implemented, it was again with the initiative of a

Catholic government, despite the fact that the majority [of

the governing party] had increased further [with 112 out of

152 seats]” (Barthélemy 1912 p.536). By contrast, the

adoption of proportional representation was considered and

rejected by portions of both the Liberal and the

Conservative parties in the British Parliament in 1885 and

1918.

1

The fact that proportional representation for national

legislative elections was first introduced by a political

party that commanded formidable parliamentary majority and

expected continued future electoral returns under the

existing majoritarian system and plural vote has been has

not been emphasized by the recently emerged literature on

electoral system change. The Belgian case seems to

contradict not only common-sense expectations, but also the

literature of electoral system change and the literature on

institutional change, in general. The observation that

electoral rules result from strategic calculations of the

major political actors (parties and party leaders) has been

made in the works of notable political scientists (Reed

1924; Rokkan 1970; Mainwaring 1999; Boix 1999; Benoit 2004;

Colomer 2004; Colomer 2005; Andrews and Jackman 2005). It is

now clear that large parties that expect to continue winning

election under majoritarian or plurality rules have no

incentive to switch to proportional representation, while

smaller parties prefer PR (Boix 1999; Benoit 2004; Colomer

2005). Similarly, Knight (1995) refines the conventional

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rational choice understanding of institutional change by

acknowledging power asymmetries between actors. Knight

points out that the most powerful actors tend to impose

their institutional preferences. The conditions that led to

the consecutive rejections of proportional representation in

Great Britain, where both Gladstone and Lloyd George opposed

PR in 1884-1885 and 1916-1918 respectively confirm these

conclusions. In that light, the Belgian anomaly appears even

more puzzling. What motivated the leaders of the Catholic

party in Belgium to support proportional representation

despite expected electoral losses under the new system? Was

this a foolish sacrifice or a matter of political necessity?

What are the implications of the Belgian case for the

electoral system change literature and the institutional

change literature in general? It is the goal of the present

paper to answer these questions, as well as to identify a

causal mechanism of change from majoritarian electoral

system to a system of proportional representation.

The case studies reveal several major variables that

contributed to the adoption of PR in Belgium and to its

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rejection in Britain. These include: 1) the nature of

existing electoral institutions and especially the existence

of the plural vote and the size of electoral district; 2)

the level of disproportionality created by existing

electoral institutions; 3) the degree of institutional

stability; 4) the perception of internal crisis; 5) very

strong and consistent pressure form the Left (mass strikes

and demonstrations); 6) dangerous overlap of economic,

political, religious, linguistic and ethnic cleavages.

Electoral institutions such as the plural vote and large

districts in combination with the sharply divided society

(the cleavage structure) created highly disproportional

election results in Belgium. This disproportionality

discredited these very same electoral institutions and

underrepresented actors began to demand change. Strong

extra-parliamentary pressure from the Left interacted with

cleavage structure to create a sense of national crisis i.e.

the disintegration of the young country appeared as a very

real threat. Perception of internal crisis and institutional

instability interacted and aggravated each other, thereby

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increasing the uncertainty in which actors operated and

creating an opening for institutional change. At this

crucial point politicians were compelled to compromise in

adopting proportional representation. The presence of many

large multi-member districts1 and the rejection of

redistricting made PR a viable option. And while actors

preferred the type of electoral system, which they believed

would benefit their own party in so far as that the

consequences of the new electoral system were foreseeable

(i.e. actors had relatively short-term horizons and

electoral system change was risky), their partisan goals

cannot simply be described as seat-maximization.

Furthermore, in the face of crisis, certain key politicians

were willing to compromise in order to preserve the unity of

the country. By contrast, the case of Great Britain

illustrates that when the predominance of the single-member

district is accompanied by a high degree of institutional

stability, lack of crisis and a simpler structure of

cleavages, the adoption of proportional system of

1 The presence of many large multi-member districts made PR was necessary, though not sufficient for the introduction of PR.

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representation becomes unlikely. PR was not introduced in

Britain in 1883-1885 and 1916-1918 because circumstances and

actors failed to create opening for this type of

institutional change. In both countries, actors attempted to

change the institutions, as they were simultaneously

constrained by them.

I identify this causal mechanism based on some

assumptions derived from the literature on institutional

change but, primarily, through a detailed historical

analysis and process tracing of the circumstances that led

to the adoption of proportional representation in Belgium

and its rejection in great Britain. Unlike the most recent

works of scholars of electoral system change Boix (1999),

Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2003), Colomer (2005), who

employ primarily quantitative methods and formal modeling, I

rely on both secondary and primary sources and focus on the

preferences (and reasons for these preferences) of the main

political parties and party leaders, as well as on the

effects of existing electoral institutions and social

conditions. My approach is largely inductive. In that

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respect, my paper provides detailed examples and explanation

of the causal mechanism that are missing in existing

quantitative work.

I have selected as my case studies four episodes when

PR was considered in Belgium and Great Britain. Both are

Western European countries with high levels of

industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th century.

Both were unitary parliamentary systems2, undergoing the

process of democratization (and more specifically suffrage

extension) during this period. The two Belgian episodes are:

the period 1831-1893, with a special focus on the conditions

that led to the Constitutional Reform of 1893; and the

period between the reform and the introduction of PR (1893-

1899). The British episodes are: the reforms of 1885 and

1918. In three of the four episodes, PR was rejected; it was

adopted in Belgium in 1899. This approach allows me to add a

longitudinal dimension to the comparison across countries

and present a dynamic causal mechanism.

2 This controls for other institutional arrangements, including federalism.

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I begin with a brief overview of some of the main

theoretical explanations of institutional change. I then

examine consecutively the two Belgian cases and the two

British episodes. I conclude with an answer to the question

why proportional representation was introduced in Belgium

but not in Great Britain.

Theoretical Approaches to Institutional Change:

The circumstances surrounding the introduction of

proportional representation in Belgium and its rejection in

Great Britain can provide useful insights into the

mechanisms of electoral change in particular and

institutional change in general. Institutions are understood

by both rational choice scholars and historical

institutionalists as established formal and informal rules

and procedures that guide conduct (Bates 1998; Orren and

Skowronek 1994; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Electoral laws and

proportional representation in particular are one of the

clearest examples of institutions.

The main difference between the manner in which

rational choice and historical institutionalism explain

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institutional change remains in identifying the sources of

this change. While most rational choice theorists view

actors (individuals; groups; parties) as the agents of

change, historical institutionalism emphasize the causal

importance of existing institutions. Finally, Paul Pierson’s

notion of path dependence attempts to create a bridge

between the two perspectives by incorporating both structure

and agency as part of the causal mechanism (Pierson 2004).

Rational choice theorists employ a macro-analytical

approach and game theory (Bates 1998; Scharpf 2000; Greif

1998; Knight 1995) in order to study institutional change.

They focus on individual actors as agents of change and

consider institutions to be part of the structure, which

provides constraints and incentives to the actors. Rational

choice theory assumes that: 1) actors are rational (and

always act in ways that allow them to maximize utility and

minimize cost); 2) actors operate in an environment of

perfect information (they know what their interest is and

they are aware of the costs and benefits of the alternative

options); 3) all actors posses the same motivations and act

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in a similar fashion (actor homogeneity). Consequently,

institutions are created as a result of negotiations between

actors who are pursuing their self/interest (Scharpf 2000

170). In that respect institutions constitute equilibria.

Actor co-operate and uphold the status quo as long as it is

beneficial to them. Exogenous shocks can alter the

perceptions of actors. Once co-operation is no longer

perceived as beneficial by some actors, they have the

incentive to defect. The old institutional arrangement is

destroyed and a new institution can be formed if a new

equilibrium is found. This mechanism accounts for the

creation and demise of institutions as well as for periods

of institutional change (Scharpf 2000). The majority of the

rational choice literature (among them Bates 1998; Greif

1998; Knight 1995) focuses on exogenous shocks as factors

that alter actors’ perceptions.

Historical institutionalism differs from the rational

choice approach in that it emphasizes the causal

significance of earlier institutions. For instance,

historical institutionalists question the rational choice

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assumption that actors are all-knowing and rational. In

cases when actors do not posses all relevant information and

might be unable to rationally evaluate all options, they are

much more likely to rely on existing rules (institution) in

deciding their course of action (Thelen and Steinmo 1992 8).

“By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational

choice), but their goals as well, and by meditating their

relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions

structure political situations and leave their own imprint

on political outcomes” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992 8). Orren

and Skowronek, by contrast, emphasize the agency of

political institutions much more forcefully. Because

different institutions are established at different points

in time, there is an overlap of institutional structures,

which may co-operate or be in conflict with each other. In

as much as institutions are “purposeful and intentional”

they will strive to affect the creation of other

institutions (Orren and Skowronek 1994 326-8). This

constitutes a major point of difference between rational

choice theory and historical institutionalism. As for the

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particular mechanism of institutional change, the historical

institutionalist approach relies on several different

explanations. In Krasner’s model of punctuated equilibrium,

periods of stability are interrupted by points in which

exogenous shocks cause dramatic change or even overhaul of

existing institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). In that

respect, punctuated equilibrium accounts for both periods of

stability and times of drastic exogenous change. It becomes

evident that historical institutionalism does not have a

single, coherent theory that explains institutional change.

Furthermore, the representatives of this school of thought

seem to employ a definition of institutions that is broader

than the understanding of institutions as mere procedures3.

The main problems with the pure rational choice and

historical institutionalism explanations of institutional

change constitute a mirror image of each other. Pure

rational choice approaches tend to underestimate the

importance of previous institutional arrangements, while

traditional historical institutionalism perspectives

3 After all, how can electoral laws in themselves be purposeful and intentional?

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undervalue agency. It is in examining the origins of

specific institutions that the inadequacies of these two

approaches become the most clear. Actors attempt to alter or

destroy some institutions but they remain constrained by

existing institutional arrangements. This is a tension that

cannot be escaped or ignored. Recently, efforts have been

made to reconcile this dichotomy. The rational choice

institutional approach is one such example (examined by

Norris, 2004). The recent literature on electoral system

change (Boix 1999; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2004; Colomer 2005;

Andrews and Jackman 2005) appears to fit in this category.

Another important effort in the direction of bridging

the gap between rational choice and historical

institutionalism is Paul Pierson’s (2004) concept of path

dependence4. According to the model of path dependence,

existing institutions continuously provide restrictions to

the options available to actors in the future. In the long

run, certain institutional arrangements become entrenched.4 While considered part of the school of historical institutionalism, path dependence is accepted by some rational choice scholars. Furthermore, it is Pierson’s goal to move in direction of reconciliation of rational choice and historical institutionalist approaches to institutional change.

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Change can result only when an opening is created through an

exogenous shock.

While this model is dynamic and particularly suitable

to the study of electoral institutions (Pierson 2004), it

suffers from several shortcomings. It becomes deterministic

the longer one remains on the same path. In that respect,

the model allows great degree of agency in the early stages

of the path, but agency disappears at the latter stages.

Path dependence also operates under the assumption that

change is always exogenous. However in practice, it is

possible for an opening to be created endogenously through

the actions of agents who want to change existing

institutions. The causal mechanism, derived from the case

studies in this paper, demonstrates that even when path

dependent logic is at work, actors can endogenously create

such institutional openings.

The Introduction of Proportional Representation inBelgium:

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The history of electoral system of independent Belgium

can be dividend into three main periods, namely the period

of limited suffrage or régime censitaire (1831-1892); the period

of the universal male suffrage accompanied by the plural

vote (1893-98); and the era of equal universal male

suffrage5 (1919 to present). Proportional representation was

introduced in 1899, as a corrective measure to the system of

the plural vote (Caramani 2000; Gilissen 1958; Barthélemy

1912; Mahaim 1900). For the purposes of this paper

developments that led to the adoption of PR can be divided

into two episodes: the period, which clearly demonstrated

the gross disproportionality of régime censitaire (between 1831

and the Constitutional Reform of 1893); and the period

between the Constitutional Reform and the introduction of

proportional representation (1893-1899).

5 While authors like Cusak, Iversen and Soskice (2003) consider 1894 theyear of introduction of universal male suffrage, their interpretation ignores the plural vote. Here I employ the conventional definition of universal suffrage as equal universal male suffrage (Collier 1999; Caramani 2000) and consider 1919 as the year of introduction of universal male suffrage in Belgium.

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Initially, Belgium had a two-ballot majoritarian

system and 41 electoral districts6. “Elections were partial:

half of the representatives of the Chambre de Représentants (or

Kamer der Volksvertegenwoordiger) were elected every two years to

a four-year term. General elections were carried out only if

the parliament was dissolved” (Caramani 2000 151). Under

the system of limited suffrage men were required to pay a

fee (cens), originally between 20 to 100 florins in order to

vote. This was a common feature of the voting systems in

most of Western European countries at the time. In Belgium,

however, instead of being included in ordinary electoral

law, the system of régime censitaire was inscribed in Article 47

of the Belgian Constitution (Barthélemy 1912; Gilissen 1958

91; Mahaim 1900). While electoral laws could be revised by a

simple majority in an ordinary parliament, a constitutional

revision could only be made by 2/3 majority in a lower

chamber, especially elected and authorized to conduct such

revision (Gilissen 1958 123; Mahaim 1900). This made

constitutional reform particularly difficult.

6 At first, they were both single (9) and multi-member districts (32). Gradually districts became larger. (Barthélemy 1912 513).

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The question of proportional representation was first

brought up in Belgium in the early 1860s by the progressive

Liberal Count Goblet d’Alviella and was supported during the

next thirty years by both Liberal and Catholic members of

the bourgeoisie (Barthélemy 1912 532). In his account of the

early years of the PR question in Belgium, Barthélemy

highlights two interesting points, namely that PR was an

elitist idea, which enlisted the support of members of both

of the country’s main parties (Barthélemy 1912 524). The

issue of proportional representation encountered strong

opposition by the older and more reactionary, yet very

influential figures from both parties, including Frère-Orban

(leader of the Liberals) and Woeste (Catholic Party). In the

1870s, Hare’s system of PR made its appearance in Belgium

(Barthélemy 1912 533). The fact is significant because it

illustrates that PR proponents in Belgium followed closely

the developments abroad and that the events in Belgium did

not take place in isolation. Barthélemy concludes, however,

that the influence of Hare’s system was not substantial

because in 1878, a Belgian professor, Victor d’Hondt

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proposed a new PR system (Barthélemy 1912 534). The question

of proportional representation was discussed on several

occasions (in 1866, 1871 and 1878) in the lower chamber of

the Belgian Parliament only to encounter hostility and

ridicule.

Nevertheless, in the 1870s the system of régime censitaire

began to create disproportionalities between votes and

seats, disproportionalities that overwhelmingly favored the

Catholic Party. The electoral districts (diverse in size)

were the same as the administrative districts inherited from

the Dutch. In addition, the requirement that there should be

one representative per every 40,000 inhabitants was

inscribed in the Constitution. As the major industrial

centers grew in population, the size of their districts also

increased.7 This majoritarian electoral system accompanied

by multi-member districts led to gross overrepresentation of

the countryside (the stronghold of the Catholic Party) at

the expense of urban areas. “[S]pread throughout the entire7 According to Barthélemy: “in 1831, the district of Brussels elected only 7 deputies, Gand [elected] 6, the Anvers and Liège [elected] 4 each” (Barthélemy 1912 513). By 1899, only 40 years later these number had changed drastically, “Brussels elected 18 deputies, Liège and Anverseach [elected] 11, Gand 9, Chaleroi 8” (Barthélemy 1912 513).

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surface of the country” and representing “only a cultivated

and intelligent minority” (Barthélemy 1912 518-519) the

Liberal Party was clearly at a disadvantage. It must be

mentioned that the majoritarian system8 favored the rural

areas, that were not only conservative and thus, affiliated

with the Catholic party, but also predominantly Dutch-

speaking (Gilissen 1958; Tyson 1904).

After the “scandalous” election of 1880, the

shortcomings of the existing system, the need for electoral

reform and PR as a viable alternative became blatantly

obvious. In 1880, “the Catholics, with 1240 votes less than

[the Liberals], won 14 more seats9” (Barthélemy 1912 534).

As a result, PR supporters from both parties formed The

Reformist Belgian Association for Proportional

Representation in 1881, which sponsored numerous conferences

and brochures explaining PR. In 1882, d’Hondt published a

redefined version of his system and in 1888 the Association

proposed a bill based on it (Barthélemy 1912 535; Gilissen8 Barthélemy considered this system dangerous as it focused on regional rather than national matters and favored extreme parties at the expense of the moderate ones (Barthélemy 1912).9 “The liberals received 22,000 votes and only 26 seats, while the Catholics received 20,979 votes and 40 seats.” (Barthélemy 1912 522).

19

1958). Catholic Prime Minister Beernaert “declared his

sympathy for the principle but added that because of its

complexity, the project needs to be carefully studied”

(Barthélemy 1912 535). It is important to note that the idea

of proportional representation did not become salient until

particular events demonstrated the problems with the

previous electoral system and put certain political actors

(in this case the Liberal Party) in a particularly

disadvantageous position. In this light, the fact that it

encountered the sympathy of many Catholic politicians

appears somewhat surprising. The results of the 1880

election, however, were not sufficient to lead to the

adoption of PR.

In 1893 the Belgian constitution underwent a major

reform that had a serious impact on the electoral system of

the country. The Constitutional Reform of 1893 implemented

several innovations including: 1) reform of the Senate; 2)

the obligatory vote for which Belgium is famous; 3) the

province as a new electoral unit, and, most importantly, 4)

the substitution of limited suffrage with universal male

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suffrage tempered by the plural vote (Barthélemy 1912;

Gilissen 1958). The last institutional change is of

particular importance to the question of PR introduction, as

it aggravated the disproportionality between votes and seats

and further strengthened the dominant position of the

Catholic Party in the lower chamber. It is, thus, necessary

to examine the conditions and events that led to the 1893

Constitutional Reform.

The question of universal suffrage is the main factor

that necessitated the constitutional reform. The matter of

universal suffrage was in turn fueled by the democratic

movement in Europe and strong pressure form the Left

(Gilissen 1958). At the time, Belgium was the fastest

industrializing nation in Europe, a country with a rapidly

growing working class (Mahaim 1900 382; Barthélemy 1912).

Influenced by the first International in 1864, “in 1866 a

Manifesto of the Workers [was] launched, calling for ‘the

abolition of the voting fee [cens]’ and for ‘equality in the

right of suffrage’” and in 1885 POB (Belgian Worker’s Party)

[was] constituted” (Gilissen 1958 120). In 1886 Belgium was

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shaken by mass workers protest that threatened to turn into

a civil war (Barthélemy 1912 268-269; Mahaim 1900) and which

“showed the gravity of the social situation and the strength

of the working class” (Gilissen 158 121). This strength and

the importance of universal suffrage were further emphasized

four years later, when in 1890 in Brussels “several tens of

thousands protestors” demanded universal suffrage (Gilissen

1958 21). Furthermore,

“In 1891, under considerable pressure from the POB, the Catholicprime minister and the king both let it be known that they mightaccept some type of electoral reform. The POB followed up the nextyear with a general strike, which ended only when the governmentannounced the forthcoming elections of a Constituent Assembly torevise the electoral articles of the constitution” (Collier 199990).

Two important observations need to be noted here.

First, disenfranchised Belgians

were pushing for universal suffrage that was to lead to a

profound change in the electorate. Second, the party system

was transformed by the creation of the Belgian Worker’s

Party. This confirms the observations of Colomer (2004) that

changes in the party system took place prior to the

introduction of proportional representation .

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As for the position of the parties that enjoyed

parliamentary representation, the Liberals were divided on

the issue of universal male suffrage, a division which,

according to Gilissen, cost them the elections of 1884. Paul

Janson, a progressive Liberal and a supporter of universal

suffrage and PR, had introduced in vain several propositions

for constitutional reform. Under the strong pressure from

POB in the early 1890s, however, it became apparent to all

sides that the issue could no longer be avoided. The

Catholic Party consented to reform in an effort to pacify

the Left (Gilissen 1958 121-122; Collier 1999). In what

Barthélemy describes as an astute political move Prime

Minster Beernaert quietly lobbied the Catholic Party for

support of a constitutional revision, while allowing the

radical elements to bring forth the matter to the

parliamentary tribune (Barthélemy 1912 269). In February in

1892, Paul Janson’s proposition for reform of Article 47 was

accepted by Parliament (Gilissen 158 122). According to the

provisions governing constitutional reform, elections for

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constitutive assembly were held in 1892. Gilissen describes

the results of the election in the following manner:

The constituent chamber, elected on the 14th of July 1892consisted of 92 Catholics and 60 Liberals; the former lacked 9seats to capture two thirds of the votes and realize the reform ontheir own; they had to take into consideration the opposition; Thelatter was nevertheless divided approximately in half between thedoctrinaires and the radicals or the progressives (Gilissen,p.123).

All members of the constituent chamber agreed that

constitutional reform was necessary but could not reach a

settlement on the type of reform. Most Liberals and

Conservatives, however, were suspicious of universal male

suffrage (Gilissen, 1958; Barthélemy 1912). A week after

Paul Janson’s bill for the introduction of universal male

suffrage (suffrage universel pur et simple) was voted down, POB

organized a mass national strike. It was under this strong

extra-parliamentary pressure from the Left that the two

parties represented in Parliament, the Liberals and the

Conservatives, were forced to consider a compromise with

POB: the introduction of universal male suffrage tempered by

the plural vote (Barthélemy 1912; Gilissen 1958 124; Collier

1999 90). Under this system all men could vote but those

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amongst them who were over a certain age; possessed a

certain income and property; and/or had university education

could obtain one or two additional votes, for a maximum of 3

votes (Gilissen 1958 124; Mahaim 1900 387; Barthélemy 1912).

The constitutional reform of 1893 is important for the

study of the introduction of PR in Belgium for several

reasons. It demonstrates the difficulty with which universal

suffrage with the plural vote was in Belgium and emphasizes

the role of the Left in electoral reform. The events of 1893

paved the way for PR by introducing conditions that

enfranchised many workers and thereby allowed a third party,

POB in the electoral competition (Mahaim, 1900; Barthélemy

1912; Gilissen, 1958). This situation contributed

significantly to the disproportionate results of the 1894

election and the anomalies that could be produced when three

parties compete under a majoritarian system. Moreover, as a

result of 1893 revision, “the province became the electoral

unit, a reform which would permit the introduction of

proportional representation without a new revision”

(Gilissen, p.125).

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The matter or PR, which Prime Minister Beernaert

supported, was also briefly considered and rejected as part

of the constitutional reform. Beernaert, however was

instrumental in ensuring that the type of electoral system

was not included in the Constitution, but rather left to be

decided by an electoral law (Barthélemy 1912 538). This was

an important precondition because adopting a new electoral

law was easier than embarking on another Constitutional

Reform. Mr. Beernaert was one of the prominent advocates for

PR during the parliamentary discussions in 1894. According

to both Mahaim and Barthélemy, the Prime Minster had become

genuinely convinced that minority representation is

necessary and that PR would prove to be the most just

system. At the same time both authors underscore the fact

that Beernaert’s actions were not taken without regard to

what was best for the Catholic Party. Mr. Beernaert knew

that the inflated parliamentary majority only masked the

weaknesses and internal divisions of the Catholic Party and

believed that, while diminishing its majority, PR would

bring strength and cohesion to the party. Mr. Beernaert

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resigned amidst strong criticism from his own party and

after PR for the legislative level was rejected by

Parliament in 1894 (Mahaim 1990 78-79; Barthélemy 1912 538).

However, in 1895 a law regulating local elections,

introduced the use of PR (with d’Hondt’s system) as a

tiebreaker. This contributed to the adoption of PR for

parliamentary elections because it demonstrated that the

system worked well and allowed people to familiarize

themselves with it (Mahaim 1900 78; Barthélemy 1912 558;

Gilissen 1958). It served to decrease the uncertainty which

surrounded PR.

After 1894 the need for reform of the existing

electoral system became apparent. The results of the 1894

election showed that the majoritarian system, combined with

the plural vote increased the disproportionality between

votes and seats even further. For comparison, with a total

of 962,000 votes the Catholics had 104 seats, the Socialists

(POB) received 310,000 votes and 28 seats, while the

Liberals remained the most underrepresented with 537,000

votes and 20 seats (Gilissen 1958 127; Mahaim 1900 77).

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The members of Parliament, however, could not agree on

what the reform should entitle. While the progressive

representatives of the Liberal and the Catholic parties

preferred PR, their more reactionary counterparts (again

both Liberals such as Bara and Catholics like Woeste and

Schollaert) opted for redistricting. They claimed (in error)

that the substitution of all multi-member districts (scrutin

de liste majoritaire) with single-member ones (scrutin uninominal)

would solve the problem. In January 1899, “the King asked

the cabinet to prepare a project that would cut Belgium into

152 circumscriptions” (Barthélemy 1912 528). Catholic Prime

Minister de Smert de Naeyer, a moderate and supporter of

PR, resigned in protest. The Liberals and Catholics who

opposed the bill did so because they realized that the

introduction of scrutin uninominal for all districts would not

preclude disproportional representation. Moreover, they were

particularly worried that the division of districts could

lead to gerrymandering as in the United Stated at the time.

The bill was rejected. (Barthélemy 1912 528). This

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demonstrates that actors were trying to learn from the

electoral experiences of other countries.

Mr. Smet de Naeyer was replaced by Mr. Vandenpeereboom,

“protector of a reactionary, ultra clerical regime”

(Gilissen 1958 129), who proposed the partial introduction

of proportional representation only in large multi-member

districts. This meant that PR was to be introduced in large

cities, where the Socialists and Liberals typically won. By

contract, the smaller, rural and Dutch-speaking districts,

in which the Catholic Party dominated and its rivals

received no representation were to remain under the

majoritarian system. It was not difficult to predict that

the reform was going to increase further the Catholic

majority and the level of disproportionality (Mahaim 1900

83; Barthélemy 1912 540; Gilissen 1958 129). This is a

fragrant example of the Prime Minster attempting to

manipulate electoral laws in order to increase the strength

of not only his own party. It is an example of seat

maximizing motivation par excellence.

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The reform was unacceptable to the Liberals and the

Socialist, who did not have enough representatives in order

to stop it. Instead, they decided to block parliamentary

debates and a possible vote by disruptive behavior. The

Socialists went as far as utilizing trumpets and other wind

instruments (Mahaim, 1900 84) and throwing paper balls at

the ministers (Barthélemy 1912 541). Mass protests sponsored

by POB erupted in Brussels and other large cities and as the

government sent mounted police (Mahaim, p. 84), “civil war

was about to burst” (Barthélemy 1912 541). Under this

pressure, Vandenpeereboom withdrew his proposal and

resigned.

Restored as Premier, Smet de Naeyer sponsored the bill

for the adoption of proportional representation in all of

Belgium. The law passed the lower chamber on November 24th,

1899 (Barthélemy 1912 542) “by 65 Catholics and 5

Proportionalist Liberals, against 35 Catholics and 28

Socialists and Liberals” (Mahaim 1900 85). According to

Mahaim, PR became a reality, “because they [its opponents]

were unable to devise a system of voting to replace the

30

existing system with which all were discontented” (Mahaim

1900 85). The socialists surprisingly rejected the reform,

claiming it is acceptable only if accompanied by universal

suffrage. Barthélemy explains that they used this pretext to

cover their concern that with PR, the Liberals would no

longer depend on the POB. Catholics who voted against PR

were unconcerned with electoral justice, while those

Catholic who supported it, though interested in justice,

acted primarily out of fear that a strategic alliance

between Liberals and Socialists would hurt the Catholic

Party (Barthélemy 1912 547).

So, what does the behavior of Catholic proponents of

proportional representation suggest? First of all, it

underscores the fact that parties (especially very large

ones) are not unitary actors. Different politicians within

the same party are often guided by different motivations.

Some, like Vandenpeereboom, Woeste and Schollaert, were

clearly seat maximizers and yet, seat maximization was a

goal that led them to pursue different strategies. While

Vandenpeereboom wanted a selective introduction of PR only

31

in areas where the Catholic party was weak, Woeste and

Schollaert completely opposed the new electoral system and

advocated redistricting. The motivations of staunch PR

supporters in the Catholic Party such as Beernaert and Smet

de Naeyer appear to be more complex. They were clearly

motivated by partisan concerns but the very fact that they

were willing to adopt a system that was to diminish their

parliamentary majority precludes one from classifying them

as seat-maximizers. However, it is difficult to consider

Beernaert and Smet de Naeyer as politicians who deliberately

wanted their party to loose power. Rather, it appears that

for them preserving the plural vote (as a check on universal

suffrage) was more important than preserving the

majoritarian electoral system. It is possible (though I

possess no direct evidence of it10) that the Catholic

leaders who supported PR calculated that they would still be

able to gather the most votes between the three parties even

10 In his book Barthélemy includes a table, designed by one M. Hector Denis, which calculates the results of the elections between 1870 and 1898 under the plural vote majoritarian system and under plural vote PR.It is unclear when exactly this table was created (though certainly between 1898 and 1912), and whether Catholic Party leaders had access toit or similar calculations.

32

under a system of proportional representation. In fact, in

the first election after the introduction of PR, the

Catholic Party was still able to preserve a majority of 86

out of 152 seats or 56.6%, even if its seats decreased by 26

in comparison to the previous election (See Appendix A). The

preservation of the plural vote was only possible with

support of those Liberals who were in favor of PR and were

concerned of the rising power of the Left and the Liberal

Party’s dependence on POB. In that respect, the

introduction of the question of PR could be considered as a

brilliant heresthetic move on behalf of Beernaert and his

colleagues.

On the other hand, it is clear that Beernaert’s concern

about the future of the Catholic Party was much more than

preserving majority in the lower chamber of the Parliament.

Beernaert realized the need for improvement of the party’s

discipline and unity even at the expense of loosing seats.

Furthermore, Beernaert and other Catholic leaders who

supported PR wanted to break the alliance between Liberals

and Socialist by introducing a system that ensured the

33

independent survival of the Liberal Party. They also

believed that the Catholic party should improve its image

after Vandenpeereboom’s fiasco, that it should“ rehabilitate

itself in the eyes of the public and take credit for an

equitable reform” (Barthélemy 1912 546). These are all

partisan concerns that do not fit within a simple model of

seat-maximization.

It is also necessary to consider the possibility that

Catholic leaders who supported PR clearly realized the

internal crisis that Belgium faced and acted to preserve the

unity of the country. This motivation fits with what Benoit

calls governablitity motives for electoral change (Benoit,

2004). Last but not least, it is important to note “the idea

of justice” or the desire on behalf of Catholic PR

proponents to introduce a system that allows for the

representation of minorities. The two motivations seem

closely interrelated but should be distinguished for

analytical reasons. Barthélemy praises Beernaert and his

supporters as acting in the interest of the country, “they

have had the wisdom to take up the task to implement reforms

34

which maybe could have been done without them, against them,

or maybe also […], against the general interest of the

country” (Barthélemy 1912 549). Other authors including Reed

(1924); Mahaim (1900); Gilissen (1958) share Barthélemy’s

belief that the behavior of the Catholic Party was also

driven by noble motives and was, thus, exceptional. I

remain a bit puzzled as to why the idea of justice should

stop only at PR with the plural vote.

Nevertheless, the events surrounding passage of

proportional representation do not diminish its positive

effects. It preserved the Liberal Party and contributed to

the stability of the nation. (Mahaim 1900; Barthélemy 1912;

Gilissen 1958; Humphreys 1908). PR decreased “the perilous

coincidence which tended to establish itself between

political divisions and racial and linguistic divisions,”

“diminish[ed] the virulence of the electoral campaign” and

strengthened the Belgian parties and their party discipline

(Tyson 1904 159-160).

Proportional representation in Belgium was introduced

as a result of slow, incremental changes of the electoral

35

institutions over the period of thirty years. These changes

escalated the disproportionality of election results and

level of conflict between the main parties. During the first

episode (1831-1893) the combination of industrialization and

the constitutional provision of minimum representation led

to increase of district magnitude; larger districts in turn

interacted with the cleavage structure to create very

disproportional election results. As the problem of

disproportional representation became obvious in 1880,

politicians from both parties responded by turning to the

idea of PR. It was not until the Left organized several

major strikes to demand universal male suffrage, that the

Constitutional Reform of 1893 was implemented. The new

institutional arrangements created conditions conducive to

the adoption of PR. On one hand, some institutions played a

permissive role. The fact that the majoritarian electoral

system was not inscribed in the Constitution in 1893

facilitated the consideration of PR in the future. In

January 1899, the distinction between PR and redistricting

and the refusal of Belgian MPs to introduce single-member

36

districts, left the door open for PR. On the other hand,

other electoral institutions continued to create problems.

Universal male suffrage with the plural vote in combination

with old institutions (large districts) and existing

cleavage structures further increased electoral

dispororptionalities and the power of the Catholic Party.

When extremely conservative actors of the Catholic party

attempted to further manipulate electoral institutions to

their advantage, the Left responded by mass protests. This

caused an internal crisis that ultimately led to a

compromise: the adoption of PR. This mechanism is very

similar to the idea of path dependence. However, the main

difference here is that the crisis is endogenous: generated

by a combination between the actions of politicians under

conditions created by institutional effects and social

structures. Pressure from the Left and the increasing degree

of disproportionality remain the key factors that

contributed to the necessity of institutional reform.

The Question of Proportional Representation in Great

Britain:

37

In Great Britain, like in Belgium, the question of

proportional representation for national elections of the

lower chamber was closely connected to the extension of the

suffrage. The issue of PR in Great Britain was seriously

debated twice during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The first time PR was considered was in the period between

1883-1885 in the context of the Reform Bill of 1884. The

second time was between 1916-1918 during the Speaker’s

Conference and in the discussions of the Representation of

the People Bill.

In Britain, as in Belgium, proportional representation

was supported by both Liberals and Conservatives. Similarly,

some of its more pragmatic proponents considered it a

possible defense against the rise of Labor, while others

deemed PR a suitable method for just representation of

minorities. In his book Democracy and Redistribution, Boix (2003)

underscores the conservative case for proportional

representation. He explains that in the 19th century Europe,

“Given their position on the income scale, middle-class

individuals prefer[ed] a restrictive democracy (in which

38

only the wealthy and the middle class vote) to either a

regime controlled only by the wealthy or a universal

suffrage system” (Boix 2003 47). The early years of the

development of proportional representation in Great Britain

could be perceived in such light. Paul Kent argues that

Hare, one of the people who invented the single transferable

vote (STV) system of proportional representation in 1857,

was guided primarily by his distaste of full democracy and

his fear that as the franchise was made more inclusive,

upper and middle class voters would become minorities.

Hare’s primary motivation in developing a system of

proportional electoral was the belief that representation of

upper and middle classes must be insured, if Britain was to

be protected from the rise of the proletariat. The same

could be said about John Stuart Mill who supported extension

of the suffrage but was worried about the quality of

leadership and the influence of the lower classes. Mill

accepted Hare’s system for it provided means for

reconciliation between his belief in the extension of the

suffrage and his concerns that Left forces could come to

39

power as a result of such extension (Kent 1972). Both Hare

and Mill believed in the necessity to educate and co-opt the

lower classes (Kent 1972; Bromund 2001 78). Gradually, the

idea of proportional representation gathered more

supporters, especially when another suffrage extension

became more likely.

The Proportional Representation Society (PRS) in Great

Britain was formed in 1884 to counter what was perceived in

1883 as the Liberal government’s intention to sponsor a

suffrage reform and Joseph Chamberlain’s open hostility to

PR. Britain had already implemented two franchise reforms

(in 1867 and 1832), yet electoral reform was part of the

1880 election campaign of the Liberal Party and, once in

power, they had to demonstrate that they were willing to

fulfill their promise (Hart 1992 100; Bromund 2001 78). “The

Proportional Representation Society was founded in January

1884 by Sir John Lubbock, a noted financier, naturalist and

political economist, and was led by Lubbock, Henry Fawcett,

Leonard Courtney and Albert Grey” (Bromund 2001 78). They

were all MPs from the Liberal Party. It is interesting to

40

note that both in Britain and Belgium, the individuals who

first took interest in the issue of proportional

representation were members of the Liberal Party (the second

largest party, most vulnerable to the rise of the Left).

While Jennifer Hart emphasizes the idealistic and forward

thinking of these men, Bromund points out that they were

primarily moved by the fear that “if this democracy was not

accompanied by PR, it would endanger the unity, stability

and good government of Britain” (Bromund 2001 78). Bromund

explains that the leaders of the PRS believed that

proportional representation would gradually: co-opt

minorities and make them part of the system; “help unify the

nation and the empire” (Bromund 2001 81); decrease party

influence; and ensure the quality of parliamentary members

(Bromund 2001 81; Hart 1992). Nevertheless, the supporters

of proportional representation among the British elites were

not only motivated by narrow electoral and partisan

concerns. Bromund points out that the leaders of PRS were

guided by “the coherent ideology of communitarian

liberalism.” (Bromund 2001 82) and can be considered “true

41

believers and moral reformers” (Bromund 2001 82). As in

Belgium, the members of the PRS attracted supporters among

both the Liberals and the Conservatives (Hart 1992).

In 1884, the Proportional Representation Society made

its first attempted to introduce PR. As the government

prepared the Reform Bill in the winter of 1884,

representatives of the PRS met with Prime Minister Gladstone

in order to convince him to consider proportional

representation as part of the reform. Gladstone rejected the

inclusion of PR on grounds that it is a matter not of

suffrage, but of seat redistribution, which was supposed to

be discussed in a separate bill. Trusting that a

redistribution bill would be introduced during the next

session, and concluding that the government would not allow

PR to be brought up at this moment “the PRS decided not to

propose an amendment to the franchise bill” (Hart 1992 105).

The Reform Bill was passed in the Commons. However, the

proponents of proportional representation found support in

the House of Lords, which decided that the bill should not

become law “unless ‘accompanied by provisions for so

42

apportioning the right to return members of Parliament as to

insure a true and fair representation” (Hart 1992 107).

While some of the Lords who returned the Bill to the Commons

did so because they believed in the necessity of minority

representation (Conservative Lord Salisbury being the most

prominent example11), many used the issue in order to block

the suffrage reform. “During this period there was a

vehement campaign in the country against the Lord’s refusal

to pass the franchise bill before a redistribution bill had

been enacted” (Hart 1992 111).

In Great Britain (unlike Belgium) government remained

hostile to the issue of proportional representation. As

Gladstone openly rejected Lubbock’s attempts to bring

attention to the matter of PR in the Commons, the government

prepared the Redistribution of Seats Bill (proposed on Dec.

1st, 1884) without informing the Proportional Representation

Society. The Bill included the removal of the limited vote

of 1867, as well as the creation of single-member districts

in most of the country. “In announcing that one-member11 Both Hart and Bromund agree that Lord Salisbury’s position was motivated primarily by his concern that the Conservative party might become a minority in the future. He supported PR out of pragmatism rather than idealism (Hart, 1992; Bromund, 2001).

43

districts would be the general and prevailing rule,

Gladstone justified the arrangement as the best on the

ground that it was very economical, very simple, and went a

long way towards ‘what is roughly termed the representation

of minorities” (Hart 1992 114). The bill was approved by the

Lower House. In the Upper House, the only PR supporter at

the time, Lord Salisbury, was compelled by the author of the

redistricting bill, Charles Dilke, to not bring up the

concept of minority representation during the debates. Both

Hart and Bromund explain that Salisbury agreed with the Bill

because he believed that single-member districts would be

enough to ensure future representation of the Conservative

Party12. (Hart 1992 113; Bromund 2001 92). The Proportional

Representation Society attempted lobbying the Lower and

Upper House but its efforts were in vain. Lubbock made one

last attempt to address the matter of proportional

representation with the single transferable vote:

On the first day of the committee stage of the Redistribution ofSeats Bill (2 March 1885) in order to get the subject discussed,

12 In addition, Bromund contends that “Salisbury shied away from proportional representation, as Leslie Stephen remarked, because it did nothing to ensure that the working classes would not dominate the system. Indeed it guaranteed that the class with the most votes would have a majority in the Commons” (Bromund, p.92)

44

Lubbock moved ‘that the committee be instructed that they have thepower in all cases where an elector is entitled to one vote only,to enable the elector to nominate more than one candidate to whomunder certain circumstances that vote might be transferred in amanner indicated by the elector (Hart 1992 117).

Though it acquired the support of some of the Liberal and

some of the Conservative MPs the motion was rejected by 134

to 31. On June 25th 1885, the Lower House voted the

Redistribution of Seats Bill (Hart 1992 118-9). As a result,

the single-member district became the predominant electoral

unit. “Only 27 constituencies (23 boroughs, the City of

London and 3 Universities) were allocated two members by the

bill” (Hart 1992 113). By creating the false impression of

solving the matter of minority representation, the

Redistribution of Seats Bill of 1885 significantly decreased

the possibility of PR introduction in Britain. “Nothing

could have sapped support for PR more effectively than

electoral districts” (Bromund 2001 93).

In contrast, the multi-member province was the

electoral unit in the 1893 revision of the Belgian

Constitution. Furthermore, Belgian supporters of PR argued

successfully and correctly that redistricting would not have

45

solved the problem of disproportional representation. One

should also note that the majority of electoral districts in

Belgium were considerably larger than their British

equivalents. The problem of disproportionality was much more

acute in Belgium than in Great Britain. In Britain the idea

of seat redistribution appeared as a much more reasonable

solution than the introduction of a completely new electoral

system.

In addition to the predominance of single-member

district, four other factors contributed to the rejection of

PR in 1883-1885. First, the organization of the Proportional

Representation Society was not efficient. The members of PRS

made several mistakes. They lacked funding and delayed

selecting a particular type of PR (Hare’s single

transferable vote) until after the introduction of the

Redistribution of Seats Bill. The PRS settled on the issue

of the exact method of PR only after the single-member

district was brought up. Redistricting seemed to be a much

easier task than the STV, which includes a complicated

procedure for the transfer of votes into seats. In addition,

46

some of the members of the organization, Courtney in

particular, exhibited a condescending attitude and excessive

loquaciousness on the floor. They ultimately utilized the

wrong type of arguments. In short, the Proportional

Representation Society failed to demonstrate that PR was a

better solution than seat redistribution (Hart 1992; Bromund

2001).

Second, Bromund emphasizes the difficult position of

the organization in regard to settling on what arguments in

favor of proportional representation it should employ. The

Proportional Representation Society was a heterogeneous

group that failed to rally the supporters of PR. It included

both idealistic believers in PR and pragmatists who were

suspicious of the ability of fancy franchises to hold back

the advent of the masses. As a coalition the PRS sought “to

appeal to all its supporters and so keep the pressure on the

government” (Bromund 2001 93). It was betrayed by both sides

of its followers when it came down to the crucial votes.

On the other hand, the Liberal government did

everything possible to stop the advent of PR, mainly because

47

Prime Minister Gladstone did not believe in the principle of

minority representation (Hart 1992). It is interesting to

note Gladstone’s ability to maneuver in such a way as to

prevent the PRS from even putting up the issue of

proportional representation on the agenda in 1884. Finally,

Bromund points to British conservatism as another reason for

the cold reception of proportional representation, “PR was

profoundly untraditional, and the supposedly immemorial

English constitution was never worshipped more reverently

than in the mid-Victorian era, when it seemed to symbolize

the political stability and grandeur of Great Britain”

(Bromund 2001 91).

The next key moment for PR in British history came when

the Speaker’s Conference of Oct. 1916-Jan. 1917 “suggested

that STV should be adopted for all boroughs constituencies

which elected three or more members, and the [alternative

vote] AV for single-member constituencies” (Chadwick 1999

195). The Conference also recommended that the remaining

multi-member districts should not have more than 5 seats

(Hart 1992 191). The Conference had been convened in order

48

to address the demands for extension of the suffrage created

by World War I. As the war raged on, it no longer seemed

just to deny the right to vote13 to people who fought for

their country (Close 1977 890; Chadwick 1999 195; Hart 1992

178). As Hart explains some members of the Speaker’s

Conference were true believers in the fairness of PR, while

others acted out of concern that without a mechanism of

minority representation, the impending franchise bill would

prove to be extra advantageous to the recently founded

Labour Party (Hart 1992 183).

The Liberal government, led by Lloyd George, disagreed

with the Conference’s recommendation for PR. The bill, with

the proposal for partial introduction of proportional

representation, nevertheless, went to the House of Commons,

where it encountered persistent opposition. “[T]he Lords

reinstated proportional representation in it three times,

but their proposals were always turned down by the Commons”

(Hart 1992 185). The Representation of the People Act of

1918:

13 About half of the working class was disenfranchised at the time (Close, p.890; Chadwick, p.195; Hart, p.178).

49

“did not prescribe that elections in any constituenciesexcept some University seats should be held under theprinciple of PR, but provided that a Royal Commission was toprepare a limited scheme to apply it to one hundred seats.Any proposals emanating from the commission would only beimplemented if approved by both Houses of Parliament withintwenty-one days” (Hart, p.185).

The Lower House voted against the Commission’s Scheme (Hart

1992 185) in 1918.

Especially noteworthy in the events of surrounding the

reform of 1916-1918, is the fact that the Liberals and the

Conservatives were split on the issue of PR in both the

Lower and the Upper House. In the Commons most Conservatives

voted against proportional representation because of what

Close deems, their “grater pragmatism and devotion to

continuity” (Close 1977 906). The Liberals and Labour

originally favored proportional representation, “until

alienated by the Lord’s decisions” (Hart 1992 186). Hart

identifies two reasons for the apparently contradictory

behavior of these two parties. First, some MPs were

irritated by the possibility that the mode of their election

could be imposed by the Peers. Second, and more importantly,

they suspected the Upper House in using PR to stall the

50

franchise bill (Hart 1992 186), as it had done during the

1884-85 reform.

The majority of Conservatives in the House of Lords

supported the introduction of proportional representation

because they believed in the so called “conservative case

for PR” i.e. that in the long turn this electoral system

would ensure the survival of their party and prevent the

domination of the proletariat (Hart 1992; Close 1977). As

for the liberal representation in the Lords, Hart explains

that they were split evenly but does not elaborate on their

motivations (Hart 1992).

The factors that contributed to the failure of PR in

1916-18 were similar to the ones that were detrimental to

the issue during the first campaign. As in 1884-5, there

were several problems with the organization and strategy of

the PRS, including the presentation of PR as a panacea for

all problems from the allegedly deteriorating quality of MPs

to Britain’s involvement in World War I. Such allegations

pushed away many politicians (Hart 1992). In addition, just

like during 1884-85, the Proportional Representation Society

51

was slow in identifying the STV the method of PR that they

supported. Furthermore, during the second campaign the

organization was not able to prevent the simultaneous

consideration of the AV and the STV. The conflation of the

two issues confused further many legislators who where not

familiar with the technical aspects of the two systems and

considered them very complicated. This seriously hurt the

chances of PR implementation (Hain 1986 5). Second, Hart

makes a point that is similar to Bromund’s contention that

the coalition nature of the PRS proved to be harmful to its

cause. “The trouble with what can be called ‘the

conservative case for PR,’ was that it failed to win over

enough Unionists to secure majority in the Commons, while it

also alienated some Liberals and many Labour MPs” (Hart 1992

191).

In third place, as during the previous PR campaign, the

Proportional Representation Society was not able to secure

the support of the Prime Minister. Though in 1916-18

conditions were a bit more favorable because the government

was divided on the issue of PR, the Premiere Lloyd George

52

deeply disliked the concept of minority representation and

acted to hinder the initiatives of the PRS. While both

Gladstone and Lloyd George were primarily motivated by their

ideological stances against minority representation, Lloyd

George had a much more pragmatic, seat-maximizing

motivation. He was afraid that PR might damage the Liberal

Party’s majority in Wales (Hart 1992). Finally, British

conservatism expressed by the refusal of many politicians to

believe in the shortcomings of the first-past the post

system; their lack of desire to understand the STV (which

was in itself a complicated procedure); their ideological

resistance to and often irrational fear of minority

representation were also factors that affected both reform

campaigns (Hart 1992). In Britain PR was an “innovative

idea” (Bromund 2001), advocated by individuals who shared

“unconventional” religious and philosophical beliefs (Kent

1977) and who were less prominent than most of the PR

opponents (Hart 1992).

In short, in Great Britain proportional representation

remained just an idea. It was an idea that never acquired

53

enough salience to be seriously considered by the majority

of British politicians. By the late 19th century, Great

Britain was already a country with strong constitutional

tradition and stable electoral system. It did not have as

strong and hostile Left, nor ethno-linguistic divisions14

that were as deep and as polarized as the ones in Belgium.

Consequently, Great Britain did not experience the internal

crisis that necessitated the change of the electoral system

in Belgium. Furthermore, while extension of the suffrage

continued, the seat-redistribution reform of 1885, which

made single-member districts predominant became a major

institutional hurdle to PR. This too seems to be consistent

with the concept of path dependence, except for the

endogenous nature of the shock. Circumstances and actors in

Great Britain failed to create an opening for electoral

system change.

Explaining Electoral System Change: In Lieu of Conclusion

14 The Irish question is one possible exception. In the case of Irish Home Rule, proportional representation was, in fact, introduced for Ireland. However, the majority of British politicians were convinced that Ireland is an exception and that PR is not necessary in Great Britain, a county with strong constitutional tradition and electoral institutions that work well. (Hart, 1992).

54

A comparison of Belgium and Great Britain reveals

several factors that contributed to the introduction of

proportional representation in Belgium, and to the rejection

of this type of electoral system in Great Britain. These are

the following: 1) existing electoral institutions

(especially the interaction between district size and the

plural vote); 2) different levels of institutional

stability; 3) the perception of internal national crisis; 4)

very strong and consistent pressure form the Left in the

form of mass protests; 5) dangerous overlap of all major

societal cleavages, which created two distinct ethno-

linguistic and economic groups. It is necessary to consider

how these factors interact with each other in order to lead

to the introduction of proportional representation.

The historical episodes explored in this paper

demonstrate that new institutional arrangements (in this

case, the change from majoritarian/plurality systems to

proportional representation) result from the process of

negotiation between key political actors. While it is actors

(politicians and parties) that manipulate electoral rules,

55

actors themselves are constrained by existing electoral

institutions.

It must be noted that in both Belgium and Great

Britain, the concept of proportional representation was

developed and popularized in the context of suffrage

reforms. In that sense, both countries experienced the rise

of worker’s political parties and changes in both the

electorates and party systems. The starkest difference

between developments in the two countries is the fact that,

while proportional representation came to be viewed as an

important alternative in the Belgian Chamber of

Representatives, it did not merit serious consideration in

the British Parliament 1884-5 and 1919. Despite the efforts

of the members of the Proportional Representation Society

and the backdrop of suffrage reform, the credibility of the

first-past-the-post electoral system for national

legislative elections in Britain was not questioned. No

opening was created for the adoption of PR in Great Britain.

By contrast, such institutional opening did exist in

56

Belgium. The crucial question is what explains this

difference?

There are two aspects to the answer, namely, the

perception that there are serious problems with the existing

electoral system and the solutions proposed. Problems with

the existing electoral system stem from the manner, in which

electoral and constitutional institutions interact with pre-

existing social conditions. In Great Britain, due to smaller

electoral districts and a simpler cleavage structure there

was less electoral disproportionality. In that respect, when

existing institutions and social conditions conspire to

create gross electoral disporportionalities, the likelihood

of change to PR increases. Second, a simpler cleavage

structure and comparatively less hostile Left did not lead

to major internal crisis in Great Britain15. Arguably, World

War I also created a sense of crisis in the British society,

a crisis that prompted the consideration of another suffrage

extension in 1916. Nevertheless, this was an external threat

that served to bring political groups and the nation, in

15 It must be noted again that the Irish question is the one major exception (Hart, 1992).

57

general, closer together (Hart, 1992). It must be noted that

the since the high degree of disproportionality and strong

Left pressure are present when PR is adopted and absent when

it is not, the present study does not allow one to

distinguish which of these factors is more important.

Further inquiry into this issue is necessary.

On the other hand, institutional alternatives also

affect institutional choices. Several factors contributed to

the consideration of PR as a credible solution in Belgium.

First, because Belgium was a relatively young country,

politicians were more open to consider electoral systems,

other than the existing majoritarian one. This becomes

particularly clear when compared to the situation in Great

Britain, where most influential politicians, PMs included,

refused to attempt to even understand PR. When the

institutional stability is low, the constraints are weaker

and the possibility of very different institutional

arrangement increases (Belgium); when the institutional

stability is high, the structure exercises greater

constraints on the actors (Britain). Second, the specific PR

58

formula proposed is important. Actors in both countries

preferred PR formulas that were developed by their

compatriots and were thus, more familiar to them. However,

the single transferable vote developed by Hare in Britain

was considerably more complicated than d’Hondt’s formula. In

Belgium, PR appeared to be a much more feasible option.

Third, actors in both countries operated in conditions of

heightened uncertainty - the effects of PR systems were

known in theory but not in practice. The positions which

Gladstone and Lloyd George adopted in regard to PR

demonstrate Thelen and Steinmo’s (1992) point that when

actors posses imperfect information they are more likely to

rely on existing institutions. The feasibility of this

electoral system in Belgium became clearer after PR was

introduced for local elections in 1895. The practical

application of PR (albeit in somewhat different context)

increased politician’s confidence in the system and lowered

some of the uncertainty associate with it.

Forth, existing institutions can serve as veto points

that increase the likelihood of adoption of other

59

institutions, or can prevent it entirely. This is because

once a particular institutional arrangement takes root, it

becomes part of the overall institutional structure and,

short of a complete overhaul of the system, could prove

conducive to certain institutional arrangements and

unfavorable to others. The size of the electoral district is

such an institution. Once single-member districts become

introduced and are considered as the norm, they prove to be

a major hurdle to the introduction of proportional

representation. In that respect, multi-member districts are

a necessary condition for PR. The existence of an upper

chamber can also serve as a veto point.

Nevertheless, when an opening is created actors can

maneuver by suggesting existing/possible options. For

example, the major reason why PR was considered a credible

solution in Belgium but never in Great Britain is that the

issue of electoral system type was never distinguished from

the issue of seat redistribution16. Gladstone made a cunning

herestehtic move when he managed to convince the members of

16 While the two issues are obviously connected (i.e. one cannot have PRand single-member districts), theoretically these are distinct concepts.

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the PRS to not introduce the question of proportional

representation in the Reform Act of 1885. Gladstone linked

PR to seat redistribution, but when single-member districts

were introduced in most of England, the question of PR

became irrelevant. By contrast, Beernaert managed to

convince the Parliament to not inscribe the type of

electoral system in the constitution, thus leaving a wider

institutional opening that allowed the possibility of PR

adoption via a regular law. The fact that the Belgian

Premiers supported PR, while the British ones, rejected it

hints to the importance of certain political actors and

serves to further strengthen Knight’s argument about power

asymmetries.

The outcome, change from majoriatrian/plurality system

to proportional representation, is the result of

negotiations and compromise between actors. Actors matter

both in the process of negotiations once an institutional

opening is created, and also in creating such institutional

opening. However, actors’ actions alone were not sufficient

to create opening without the existence of certain

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institutions. In that respect, the mechanism presented above

is consistent to a large extent with the concept of path

dependence. A major difference between the two is that in

path dependence institutional change results as a

consequence of exogenous shocks, whereas here the shocks are

endogenously created. This suggest the possibility that the

notion of path dependence should be altered as to

incorporate endogenous change.

Finally, the case of Belgium demonstrates that party

leaders are not necessarily motivated by the narrow concern

of seat maximization. Nevertheless, PR was introduced in

Belgium as a defense mechanism against the left as Rokkan

and Boix claim. The adoption of proportional representation

is a compromise struck between actors on their way to

introducing equal universal male suffrage. In that respect,

Belgium is as much less of an anomaly than it appears to be,

based purely on an analysis of the power distribution

between parties in parliament. This demonstrates that the

notion of threat, understood by Boix (1999), Benoit (2004),

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Colomer (2005), and Andrews and Jackman (2005) in very

narrow electoral terms, should be broadened.

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Appendix A: Composition of the Belgian Chamber ofRepresentatives

First Election Under Universal Male Suffrage and Plural Vote(Majoritarian System) - 1894

Votes Seats in ParliamentPolitical Party

Number of Votes

Percentage ofVote:

Number of Seats

Percentageof Seats

Catholic Party

962,000 53.2%

104 68.4%

Liberal Party

537,000 29.7%

20 13.2%

Belgian Worker’s Party

310,000

17.1%

28 18.4%

TOTAL: 1,809,000 100% 152 100%Sources: Gilissen, 1958; Mahaim, 1900.

Last Election under Universal Male Suffrage and Plural Vote(Majoritarian System) – May 22nd, 1898 Partial Election (Group 1)

Votes Seats in ParliamentPolitical Party

Number of Votes

Percentage ofVote:

Number of Seats

Percentageof Seats*

Catholic Party

N/A N/A 112 73.7%

Liberal Party

N/A N/A 12 7.9%

Belgian Worker’s Party

N/A N/A 28 18.4%

TOTAL: N/A N/A 152 100%Sources: Tyson, 1904; Barthélemy, 1912; Caramani, 2000.

Belgium 1900: First Election (General Election) Under PRVotes Seats in Parliament

Political Number Percentage of Number of Percentage

64

Party of Votes

Vote: Seats of Seats*

Catholic Party:

N/A N/A 86 56.6%

Liberal Party:

N/A N/A 33 21.7%

Belgian Worker’s Party:

N/A N/A 32 21.1%

“DemocraticChristian – a dissident from the Catholic party.” (Tyson 1904 158)

N/A N/A 1 0.66%

TOTAL: N/A N/A 152 100%Sources: Tyson, 1904; Barthélemy, 1912.

*Results rounded to nearest tenth of a percent.

** I am in the process of compiling additional data.Appendix B: Result of British Parliamentary Elections

General Parliamentary Election: 24th of November – 9th of December1885

Votes Seats in ParliamentPolitical Party

Number of Votes

Percentage of Vote:

Number of Seats

Percentageof Seats*

ConservativeParty:

2,020,927 44.6

N/A N/A

Liberal Party:

2,199,998 47.44

N/A N/A

Nationalists(Irish): 310,608 6.7

N/A N/A

Other Parties: 106,702 2.3

N/A N/A

Labour Party - - - -

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Independent Labour Party

- - - -

TOTAL: 4,638,235 100

N/A N/A

Source: Caramani, 2000.

General Parliamentary Elections during 1910Votes in June 1910 Votes in October 1910

Political Party

Number of Votes

Percent of Votes:

Number of Votes

Percent of Votes

ConservativeParty 3,104,407 46.6 2,420,169 46.2Liberal Party 2,866,157 43 2,293,869 43.8Labour Party 505,657 7.58 371,802 7.1Nationalists(Irish) 126,647 1.9 131,720 2.5Other Parties 64,532 1 17,678 0.3Independent Labour Party - - - -TOTAL: 6,667,400 100.08 5,235,238 100Source: Caramani, 2000.

*Results rounded to nearest tenth of a percent.

** I am in the process of compiling additional data.

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