EXPERT OPINION - GFSIS · process. The establishment of the Ir14 media center on March 10, 2010, as well as the Aynar15 media club in Abkhazia, also in 2010, is associated with Chebotarev’s

EXPERT OPINION

MAMUKA KOMAKHIA

BEHIND THE SCENES: KREMLIN’S POLICIES TOWARDS GEORGIAN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

ÓÀØÀÒÈÅÄËÏÓ ÓÔÒÀÔÄÂÉÉÓÀ ÃÀ ÓÀÄÒÈÀÛÏÒÉÓÏ ÖÒÈÉÄÒÈÏÁÀÈÀ ÊÅËÄÅÉÓ ×ÏÍÃÉGEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

2015

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The publication is made possible with the support of the US Embassy in Georgia.

Editor: Jeffrey Morski

Technical Editor: Artem Melik-Nubarov

All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic

and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Copyright © 2015 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

ISSN 1512-4835 ISBN 978-9941-0-7962-7

Introduction

Following the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 and Russia’s recognition of the Abkhazian and “South Ossetian” regimes as sovereign states, the Kremlin intensified its policies towards the two breakaway regions. The Kremlin’s growing interest in these regions has been manifested in the activities of the various departments in the executive branch of the Russian govern-ment focused on the development of relations with Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” and the integration of these regions into the Russian Federation.

After the Russia-Georgia conflict, Russian state agencies have had limited coverage in Georgia. Besides security services and ministries, two govern-mental agencies representing the executive branch of the Russian govern-ment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Administration, are especially active in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and “South Os-setia”.

This article, on the basis of open source monitoring and analysis, will at-tempt to identify the state agencies and public officials behind the de-velopment and implementation of the Kremlin’s policies towards Georgia and especially in terms of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”.

Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation

One of the objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed-eration is the conducting of information warfare against Georgia on the international arena and the employment of “soft power” to impact Geor-gian political life. In this regard, the Russian Center for International Sci-entific and Cultural Cooperation (RCISCC), operating under the Ministry, has been its primary foreign policy instrument since the 1990s. The Center provided funding for various cultural and humanitarian events in Georgia in 1994-2008.

On September 6, 2008, as per the Russian presidential decree, a brief pe-riod after the conclusion of the Russia-Georgia war, the RCISCC was re-placed by the Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)1 under the auspices of the Ministry. The principal objectives for the establishment of

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the Agency are the improvement of Russia’s foreign image following the war with Georgia and the enhancement of Russia’s influence in the near and far abroad.

The Agency operates in three key areas: humanitarian cooperation, public diplomacy and support for international development. Due to the relations between Georgia and Russia, the Agency’s activities in Georgia are limited; although, by means of its structural units, it funds various initiatives in Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” which are territories beyond the control of the central government of Georgia. The Department of the Russian Cen-ter of Science and Culture (RCSC) and Multilateral Cooperation within the CIS, headed by Sergey Medvedev, is tasked with maintaining relations with Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” while the development of relations with the breakaway regions has been the direct responsibility of the Division on the CIS, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, headed by Lydia Diachenko.

On its initiative, on December 18, 2009, a representative office of the Agency was opened in Sokhumi2 and on September 6, 2010 – in Tskhinvali.3 The offices are headed by Russian Embassy staff and their key priorities are as follows: development of bilateral cultural, educational, scientific and technical as well as information links; cultural and educational activities involving Russian compatriots and the development of ties between international, regional and local organizations.

The first Head of the Agency, Farit Mukhametshin, was replaced, as of March 5, 2012, by a prominent representative of the Russian political elite, Konstantin Kosachev, who frequently makes anti-Georgian statements and is an avid supporter of the Abkhazian and “South Ossetian” regimes.

A member of the Federation Council, Lyubov Glebova, has been appointed as the Head of the Agency as of March 23, 2015. She replaced Kosachev who, in December 2014, became a member of the Federation Council and the Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Prior to her ap-pointment, Glebova’s contact with the Abkhazian and “South Ossetian” regimes was minimal. Previously, Glebova, while serving as Head of the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor), had insignificant contact with Abkhazia when the de facto Minister of Edu-cation, writer Daur Natchkebia, was awarded an Honorary Silver Order of the Russian Fund for “Public Recognition.” One of the signatures on the document certifying the award belonged to Glebova.4

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Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with For-eign Countries

Several structural units under the Presidential Administration of Russia are tasked with working on Georgia-related issues. Among them is the Direc-torate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Coun-tries, founded in March 2005. The key functions of the Directorate are the following: project design and implementation in the field of interregional and cultural ties with foreign countries and provision of information and analytical support to the President and the Head of the Presidential Ex-ecutive Office on issues of interregional and cultural relations with foreign countries.5

Against the background of the Rose and Orange Revolutions and owing to its targeted activities against the Georgian and Ukrainian governments, the Directorate has also been referred to as a “Counterrevolutionary Di-rectorate.” Following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, the Directorate’s role with respect to Georgia has weakened. The breakaway regions of Abkha-zia and “South Ossetia”, where until 2013 the entity has played a key role, have become a priority area in the Directorate’s activities.

Modest Kolerov

The first Head of the Directorate, Modest Kolerov, led the development and implementation of the Kremlin’s policies against the “colored revolutions” in the post-Soviet space. During Kolerov’s tenure at the Kremlin, a number of organizations and information resources were established which were to help achieve the objectives of the Directorate. Among them, notewor-thy is the Regnum news agency (regnum.ru) with Kolerov still serving as its Chief Editor. The agency is well-known for its pro-government position and propagation of misinformation against Georgia. In order to achieve his objectives, Kolerov also employed the Caucasus Institute for Democracy and the Eurasian Studies Center, which presently continue to carry out Kremlin-funded projects. A special role is attributed to the Europe Pub-lishing House6 which was founded in 2005 under Kolerov’s guidance and publishes books of an anti-Western and anti-Georgian content.

Sergey Vinokurov

Despite the efforts of Modest Kolerov, his work was considered unsatis-factory and he was obliged to leave the Kremlin in 2007. As of that year, Kolerov was replaced by Sergey Vinokurov who, according to widely ac-

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cepted belief, yielded to the Kremlin’s unsuccessful policy towards the unrecognized regions of “South Ossetia” and Transnistria in 2012. The Kremlin-favored candidates failed to win the illegitimate presidential elec-tions conducted in these regions. The Kremlin’s candidate of choice was “South Ossetia’s” de facto Minister of Emergency Situations, Anatoliy Bibi-lov, although the former de facto Minister of Education, Alla Dzhioyeva, won the election instead. In the spring of 2012, a repeat election was held in “South Ossetia” where a new Kremlin-backed candidate, Leonid Tibilov, gained the majority of the votes. In Transnistria, as per Vinokurov’s rec-ommendation, Moscow supported the Parliamentary Speaker, Anatoliy Kaminski, who lost the 2011 de facto presidential elections to the oppo-sitionist, Yevgeny Shevchuk. Shevchuk received no support from Moscow and, furthermore, was criticized. The accountability for failure in both illegitimate elections was imposed on Vinokurov since his Directorate was in charge of the election campaigns. The disgraced official was then ap-pointed as Deputy Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service.7

Vladimir Chernov

Vladimir Chernov was appointed Head of the Directorate on April 28, 2012. Until January 17, 2012, Chernov headed the Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov’s Secretariat. Following his appointment as the Head of the Directorate, Chernov conducts periodic meetings with the de facto lead-ers of Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” to discuss bilateral relations.8 He also frequently congratulates them on holidays, including on anniversaries of the “victory against Georgia.”9 With Chernov’s appointment, his Deputy, Vladislav Gasumyanov, resigned from his position. In July 2012, Gasumya-nov’s post was occupied by Sergei Chebotarev who previously worked in one of the departments of the Directorate overseen by Gasumyanov.10

Sergey Chebotarev

Chebotarev has a longstanding experience of relations with Abkhazia and “South Ossetia.” According to media analysis, Chebotarev can be consid-ered the public official who performs most of the “basic hard work” in this area. The following facts confirm that Sergey Chebotarev frequently visits Abkhazia and “South Ossetia,” both individually and accompanied by his supervisors. While serving as Department Head at the Directorate, on May 20, 2006, he, along with Modest Kolerov, attended the presentation of the newspaper, Gudok-Abkhazia, in Sokhumi.11

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On April 26, 2007, Chebotarev took part in the handover of communica-tion equipment by the Caucasus Institute for Democracy to Maj. Gen. Ser-gey Chaban, Commander of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces stationed in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.12 In 2008, Chebotarev visited Sokhumi where he met with the de facto President, Sergey Bagapsh.13

Chebotarev’s influence especially increased after the Russia-Georgia war when the Kremlin initiated the Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” annexation process. The establishment of the Ir14 media center on March 10, 2010, as well as the Aynar15 media club in Abkhazia, also in 2010, is associated with Chebotarev’s name.

According to the media, in autumn 2011-spring 2012, Chebotarev was di-rectly in charge of the illegitimate presidential elections held in “South Ossetia.” In order to support Anatoliy Bibilov’s candidacy, he arrived in Tskhinvali via a chartered flight on November 8, 2011.16

On March 3, 2012, Chebotarev participated in the opening ceremony of the first division of the “South Ossetian Republic’s” Postal Service in Tskhinvali.17 On May 6, 2013, Vladimir Chernov and Chebotarev secretly visited Tskhinvali, without much fanfare, so that the “South Ossetian” media did not even cover the visit. As reported, the two officials met with the de facto President, Leonid Tibilov. The visit was followed by a postponement of a meeting with Vladimir Putin scheduled for May 14. According to reports, the guests criticized Tibilov for his personnel policies and inefficient spending of money transferred from Russia.18

Chebotarev’s name is also linked with the development of the Agreement on Cooperation and Integration signed by the Russian President and the de facto President of “South Ossetia” on March 18, 2015.19

Assistant to the President on Social and Economic Cooperation with Ab-khazia and South Ossetia

The Presidential Executive Office includes the position of Assistant to the President on Social and Economic Cooperation with Abkhazia and “South Ossetia.” As of May 23, 2012, the post was occupied by Tatyana Golikova who was subsequently appointed as Head of the Chamber of Control. Ac-cording to opinions circulating in Abkhazia, Golikova failed to regulate re-lations with the de facto President, Alexander Ankvab. As of September

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20, 2013, Golikova was replaced by the Gray Cardinal of Russian politics, Vladislav Surkov.

Who is Vladislav Surkov?

In the first period of Vladimir Putin’s tenure as President (2000-2008), Vladislav Surkov was the informal leader of one of the established influ-ential political clans in the Kremlin, the Siviliki. Surkov, né Aslambek Du-dayev, is of Chechen origin. In the 1990s, Surkov, an economist by train-ing, held key positions in companies owned by businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky who, due to a confrontation with Putin, spent the 2003-2013 period in prison.

In 1999-2011, Surkov served as First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration and was the Kremlin’s principal ideologist, developing and advocating the Russian political doctrine, frequently referred to as a “sovereign”/”managed” democracy. As per Surkov’s efforts to support the Kremlin’s policies, a youth political movement, Nashi, was estab-lished aiming to lay the grounds for a pro-government class in post-Sovi-et Russia. Surkov also contributed to the creation of pseudo-opposition parties and organizations. In the same period, he was charged with the ambitious Skolkovo project which was to exert technological break-throughs in Russia.

Surkov’s power reached its peak in 2008-2012 when a member of the Siviliki, Dmitry Medvedev, became President of the country. However, Surkov’s influence began its decline in 2011 when the Surkov-esque model of political management failed to obstruct anti-Kremlin protests which developed into anti-Putin rhetoric.

In 2011-2013, Surkov served as Deputy Prime Minister, before his res-ignation on May 8, 2013. According to a statement issued by Putin’s representative, Surkov failed to properly carry out the President’s or-dinances. In parallel, an investigative committee under the influence of Siviliki’s rival group, the Siloviki, commenced the inspection of the Skolkovo project which translated into a direct blow to Surkov.

Surkov’s appointment to the aforementioned posts is linked with the de-sire to control Russian investment in Abkhazia and “South Ossetia.” The decision to appoint Surkov was assessed as crucial, given his ethnic Cau-

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casian background and proficient knowledge of Caucasus-related affairs, especially in Abkhazia where he has paid frequent visits since 2000 and is well-aware of Abkhazian internal politics.20 Following his appointment as Assistant to the President, the Abkhazian and “South Ossetian” regimes developed a perception that Surkov was once again recruited as their curator who, as they believed, had been previously removed from this po-sition. During Surkov’s absence, the regions were under the supervision of Vladimir Chernov and Sergey Chebotarev. With Surkov’s appointment, the latter officials’ positions weakened and their roles became secondary.21

The title of Surkov’s position – Assistant to the President on Social and Eco-nomic Cooperation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia – denotes his direct official linkages to Abkhazia and “South Ossetia.” His frequent visits to the regions beyond the control of the central Georgian government and his direct involvement in the processes taking place in these regions confirms the view that Surkov is indeed in charge of Abkhazian and “South Osse-tian” issues in the Kremlin.22

Surkov and Abkhazia

On September 30, 2013, shortly after his appointment as Assistant to the President, Surkov paid a visit to Sokhumi to attend events commemo-rating the 20th anniversary of the “independence” of the Abkhazian re-gime where Cossack units and Russian “peacekeepers” also participated. Surkov only spent three hours in Sokhumi and did not attend the celebra-tory d in ner. He held his first meetings behind closed doors with the de facto President of Abkhazia, Alexander Ankvab, and the de facto President of “South Ossetia,” Leonid Tibilov.23

Surkov’s special role in the Abkhazian processes was revealed in May 2014 when he was one of the main actors in the internal political crisis developing in Abkhazia. On May 28-29, Surkov, together with a Russian delegation, arrived in Abkhazia on an emergency mission where he met with opposition leaders in Sokhumi and with de facto President, Alexander Ankvab, at the Russian military base in Gudauta. Surkov’s meeting with the oppositionists lasted for three hours during which he heard their de-mands, including for the resignation of the incumbent de facto President. As a result of Surkov’s direct intervention, Ankvab resigned from his posi-tion on June 1. The subsequent early de facto presidential elections were won by the former Soviet Security officer, known for his loyalty to Rus-sia, Raul Khajimba. On September 25, 2014, Surkov attended Khajimba’s

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inauguration ceremony and, subsequently, on November 24, 2014, also took part in the signing ceremony of the Russia-Abkhazia Treaty on Alli-ance and Strategic Partnership.24

On February 16, 2015, during his visit to Abkhazia, Surkov promised the Abkhazian side to continue the provision of financial aid and open borders. He spoke about the allocation of up to RUB 10 billion in aid to Abkhazia. He said in a statement that an investment agency had been established in Russia whose goal is the development of Abkhazia. During the visit, Surkov was accompanied by members of his personal team, including Oleg Govo-run, Head of the Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States Member Countries, the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, and Alexander Pavlov, Chief of Staff of the Assistant to the President.25

Surkov and “South Ossetia”

Like in Abkhazia, Vladislav Surkov is in direct control of Russian-backed reconstruction efforts in “South Ossetia” and periodically visits Tskhinvali. In December 2013, during one of his first visits to Tskhinvali, Surkov criti-cized the “South Ossetian” de facto government, expressing disapproval of the way funds allocated by Russia were being expended. His criticism was followed by the resignation of Rostik Khugaev’s de facto government in early 2014.26

On June 23-24, 2014, Surkov examined social and industrial projects un-derway in “South Ossetia.”27 On December 4, 2014, during his visit to Tskhinvali, Surkov praised the de facto President and the de facto Prime Minister on their exceedingly effective performance since the 2008 war. According to local media estimates, Surkov’s appointment is credited with establishing order in “South Ossetia,” resulting in the completion of res-toration work in the region as well as the implementation of investment programs planned for 2014.28

Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the Common-wealth of Independent States Member Countries, the Republic of Ab-khazia and the Republic of South Ossetia

The Directorate, overseen by Vladislav Surkov, administers the Russian President’s activities in terms of relations with the Abkhazian and “South Ossetian” regimes. The subdivision is charged with the implementation of

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joint social and economic projects with Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” and periodically prepares analytical publications for the President and Chief of Staff.29 Beginning on October 11, 2013, the Head of the Directorate is Oleg Govorun, former Minister of Regional Development, who was released from this post following President Putin’s criticism.

Govorun is Surkov’s distinguished and experienced staff member. His ap-pointment as Head of the Directorate took place after the former’s return to the Kremlin. Their relationship presumably began at Alpha-Bank where both worked in earlier years. Subsequently, Govorun also worked at the Presidential Executive Office alongside Surkov.30 The position of Head of the Directorate became vacant following the transfer of then-Head of the subdivision, Yuri Voronin, to the Chamber of Control on October 1, to-gether with Tatyana Golikova.

Upon his appointment, Govorun became a frequent guest in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. On November 5, 2013, he visited Sokhumi to conduct a meet-ing with de facto President, Alexander Ankvab.31 On January 28, 2014, he arrived in Tskhinvali to inspect construction and restoration work.32 On Oc-tober 20, 2014, Govorun examined the construction of facilities in Tskhin-vali and met with de facto President, Leonid Tibilov.33 Govorun conducted a repeat visit to Tskhinvali on December 8, 2014.34

In December 2014, another member of Surkov’s staff was appointed to the Directorate. Mikhail Mamonov, charged with overseeing issues relat-ed to Abkhazia and “South Ossetia,” was replaced by Mikhail Semenov. Mamonov was actively involved in the last illegitimate presidential elec-tions in Abkhazia. He also developed the new agreement between Rus-sia and Abkhazia, signed in Sochi on November 24, 2014. Semenov and Mamonov worked together in managing the implementation of Russian investment programs in Abkhazia and “South Ossetia.”35

Mamonov’s resignation took place under rather scandalous circum-stances. After the abdication of the government in January 2014, specu-lations surfaced about Mamonov’s possible appointment as the de facto Prime Minister,36 replacing Rostik Khugaev. Ultimately, the de facto Prime Minister’s post was occupied by Tskhinvali’s candidate, Domenti Kulum-berov.37

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Conclusion

In the absence of diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia, the scope of operation of Russian state agencies in Georgia has been limited. The situation is different in the breakaway regions beyond the control of the central Georgian government where, in parallel with Special Services, structural units of the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of For-eign Affairs of Russia are actively engaged in internal proceedings. In this regard, noteworthy are the Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries, Assistant to the President on Social and Economic Cooperation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Director-ate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the CIS Member Countries, the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, under the aus-pices of the Presidential Administration.

An analysis of the operation of Russian state institutions leads to the con-clusion that the Kremlin’s interest towards territories beyond Georgian central government control is high which is determined by the former’s political objectives to execute a deeper integration of the regions as well as by the ambition of groups within the Kremlin to control resources al-located by Moscow as assistance to Abkhazia and “South Ossetia.” The fight for control over the strengthening of political positions among the Kremlin’s various groups or over funds transferred to Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” from the Russian budget has been ongoing for years, with varying levels of success.

Based on the analysis of information obtained through open source moni-toring, it can be assumed that following the 2008 war, the Kremlin’s poli-cies towards the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” were developed and carried out by the Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries under the Presidential Ad-ministration. Beginning in 2012, the development and implementation of the Kremlin’s policies were under the direct supervision of Vladimir Chernov and his deputy, Sergei Chebotarev. In this regard, Chebotarev is an outstanding staff member who, for many years, has been working on Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”-related issues and is directly familiar with the local ruling elite.

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The situation shifted in 2013 when Vladislav Surkov returned to the Krem-lin in the capacity of Assistant to the President. Recent events indicate that the Assistant to the President on Social and Economic Cooperation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Vladislav Surkov, and the members of his team from the Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with CIS Member Countries, the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia play a leading role in the development and implementation of the Kremlin’s policies towards the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”. The Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Con-tacts with Foreign Countries and its leaders, Vladimir Chernov and Sergey Chebotarev, as well as the Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, have a secondary role in the implementation of the Kremlin-sanctioned policies.

In the recent years, against the background of Vladislav Surkov and his team’s frequent visits to Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” and their active in-volvement in the current polit ical situation in these regions, it can be con-cluded that custody over Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” has been entrust-ed to Vladislav Surkov whom the Kremlin has tasked with managing funds allocated for the regions by Moscow as well as ongoing reconstruction work and political processes. Through the appointment of such a political heavyweight, the Kremlin will also seek to exploit Abkhazia and “South Os-setia” as effective foreign policy instruments to exert pressure on Georgia.

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References:

1. For detailed information on the activities of the Agency, please see: www.rs.gov.ru/en.

2. For detailed information on the activities of the Agency’s representative office in Ab-khazia, please see: www.abh.rs.gov.ru (In Russian)

3. For detailed information on the Agency’s representative office in “South Ossetia,” please see: www.rso.rs.gov.ru (In Russian)

4. “Writer, Minister of Education, Daur Natchkebia, Awarded Honorary Silver Order ‘Public Recognition,’” ApsnyPress, 03.10.2013, www.bit.ly/1RihZyF (Accessed: June 30, 2015)

5. For detailed information on the activities of the Directorate, please see: www.en.kremlin.ru/structure/administration/departments.

6. For detailed information on the Europe Publishing House, please see: www.europub-lish.ru/eng/.

7. Vinokurov worked together with the Acting Head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency, Mikhail Fradkov, when the latter served as Prime Minister (2004-2007). Vladimir So-lovyov, Ivan Safronov, Elena Chernenko. «The FIS Has Found Assistance,» Kommer-sant, 05.09.2012, www.bit.ly/1HauSjq (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

8. «Alexander Ankvab and Vladimir Chernov Discuss Russian-Abkhazian Cooperation,» Ekho Kavkaza, 10.04.2014, www.bit.ly/1MaTQnk (Accessed on: June 18, 2015) (In Russian)

9. “Head of the Presidential Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries, Vladimir Chernov, Congratulates the President of Abkhazia on the 20th Anniversary of Victory,” ApsnyPress, 02.10.2013, www.bit.ly/1S5BrtB (Ac-cessed on: June 15, 2015) (In Russian)

10. “Vladimir Chernov Reassigned as Head of a Key Department of the Presidential Execu-tive Office,” Kginform, 12.06.2012, www.bit.ly/1UvVVjc (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

11. “’Gudok-Abkhazia’ Newspaper Presentation Held in Sokhumi,” Regnum, 20.05.2006, www.bit.ly/1CmISLo (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

12. “’Caucasus Institute for Democracy’ Hands over Communication Equipment to the Command of Peacekeepers in Abkhazia,” Regnum, 27.04.2007, www.bit.ly/1TiNAhq (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

13. Angela Kuchuberia, “President of Abkhazia Expresses Hope for Fur-ther Cooperation with Russia,” Caucasian Knot, 12.06.2008, www.bit.ly/1eCbqp1 (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

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14. «Where is Our Locomotive Headed? Vladimir Chernov Uses Eurasian Rhetoric for the Disintegration of the CIS, the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community?,» PMRnews.com, 06.05.2015, www.bit.ly/1S5Bgoz (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

15. Yakov Volynski, “Under-the-Carpet Romp of the ‘Eurasian Integration,’” 05.09.2013, www.bit.ly/1LUj0tp (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

16. «South Ossetian Prime Minister Organizes Pre-Election Charter for 1 Mln,» RIA New Day, 08.11.11, www.bit.ly/1H76jEQ (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

17. V. Kalaev, “Uniting Nations and Countries,” South Ossetia, 06.03.2012, www.bit.ly/1HK2ISX (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

18. Zhanna Tarkhanova, «Tibilov Angers Putin,» Ekho Kavkaza, 13.05.2013, www.bit.ly/1JRuASM (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

19. “Russia and South Ossetia Sign New Agreement,” Polit.ru, 20.03.2015, www.bit.ly/1J2geMo (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

20. Oleg Krasnov, “Controlling Russian Investment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Will Serve as Surkov’s Principal Objective,” KavkazWeb.su, 21.09.2013, www.bit.ly/1UvWE3U (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

21. Murat Gukemukhov, “Return of the Chief Curator,” Ekho Kavkaza, 21.07.2014, www.bit.ly/1IGM7yb (Accessed on: June 21, 2015) (In Russian)

22. As reported, Surkov also bears the informal function of Vladimir Putin’s representa-tive in Ukraine. A version exists according to which he was actively involved in talks with Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, and following the latter’s departure from Ukraine, he is unofficially considered as the supervisor of the Donetsk and Lu-hansk separatists; Natalya Galimova, “Secret Envoy,” Gazeta.Ru, www.bit.ly/1kFcVoR (Accessed on: June 22, 2015) (In Russian)

23. Anastasia Kashevarova, Sergey Podosenov, Yulia Tsoy, “Surkov Carries out First Visit to Abkhazia in New Capacity,” Izvestia, 02.10.2013, www.bit.ly/1eCbWTQ (Accessed on: June 22, 2015) (In Russian)

24. “Vladislav Surkov Encourages Abkhaz Opposition Leaders,” LifeNews, 28.05.2014, www.bit.ly/1JLKWir (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

25. “President Raul Khajimba and Assistant to the President of Russia Vladislav Surkov Discuss a Series of Issues,” AIAAIRA, 16.02.2015, www.bit.ly/1HdhqOZ (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

26. Zaur Farniev, «Vladislav Surkov Inspects South Ossetia,» 19.02.2014, www.bit.ly/1LUjCPs (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

27. «Vladislav Surkov Arrives in South Ossetia,» IA Res, 23.06.2014, www.bit.ly/1LUjDDb (Accessed on: June 22, 2015) (In Russian)

28. Lana Parastaeva, Olga Allenova, “The Tskhinvali Fracture,” Kommersant, 02.02.2015, www.bit.ly/1G4MqwB (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

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29. For detailed information on the activities of the Directorate, please see: www.en.kremlin.ru/structure/administration/departments.

30. Oleg Aleksandrov, «’Surkovian’ Candidate: Oleg Govorun,» The Moscow Post, 17.05.2012, moscow-post.ru (Accessed on: June 15, 2015) (In Russian)

31. “Head of Russian Presidential Directorate Oleg Govorun Pays Official Visit to Abkha-zia,” ApsnyPress, 05.11.2013, www.bit.ly/1gligAx (Accessed on: June 15, 2015) (In Russian)

32. “Leonid Tibilov and Oleg Govorun Inspect the Construction and Restoration of a Num-ber of Facilities,” OSinform, 28.01.2014, www.bit.ly/1G4MAUO (Accessed on: June 15, 2015) (In Russian)

33. “Oleg Govorun Examines Progress of Implementation of Program to Promote the So-cial and Economic Development of South Ossetia,” Regnum, 20.10.2014, www.bit.ly/1UvXwpj (Accessed on: June 15, 2015) (In Russian)

34. “Oleg Govorun Inspects Construction of Several Facilities in Tskhinvali,” OSinform, 09.12.2014, www.bit.ly/1CmJMHP (Accessed on: June 15, 2015) (In Russian)

35. Mikhail Rubin, Polina Khimshiashvili, «Official Accountable for Abkhazia and South Os-setia at the Kremlin to be Replaced,» RosBusinessConsulting, 26.12.2014, www.bit.ly/1IGMokE (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

36. Murat Gukemukhov, “Who is Mr. Mamonov?,” Ekho Kavkaza, 21.02.2014, www.bit.ly/1LQ95UA (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

37. Murat Gukemukhov, “Change Not Expected?,” Ekho Kavkaza, 29.12.2014, www.bit.ly/1JRvgrg (Accessed on: June 23, 2015) (In Russian)

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