Experiment 1-Hazard & Accidents

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ABSTRACT

This experimental report is based on the knowledge I have imparted on the hazard analysis using

a direct approach. The report contains an introduction, hazard theory, experimental procedures,

presentation of results and discussion and finally conclusion and recommendation.

Hazards which are conditions, events, or circumstances that could lead to or contribute to an

accident event such as fire hazards, trip and falls, slippery ground and electricity were

recognized. Experimental procedures involved the fill of analysis sheet by direct approach of

hazards recognition. It was discussed that the hazards and risks recognized were not prioritized

and therefore no strictly immediate measures were taken to suppress hazards. Therefore it was

concluded that there was poor management of hazards control and it was recommended that risk

assessment must be conducted over each system and the findings should be prioritized.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... i

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ ii

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... ii

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1

2. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES.................................................................................................. 1

2.1 HAZARD THEORY ............................................................................................................. 1

2.2 HAZARD CAUSAL FACTORS .......................................................................................... 2

2.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS TYPES AND TECHNIQUES ........................................................ 3

2.4 HAZARD RECOGNITION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS ................................................. 4

3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES ........................................................................................... 5

4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ............................................................ 5

4.1 RESULTS.............................................................................................................................. 5

4.2 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 10

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................... 10

5.1 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................. 10

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 10

NOMENCLATURE ..................................................................................................................... 11

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 12

APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................. 13

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Relationship between a hazard and an accident .............................................................. 2

Figure 2: Narrowed corridor by used gas cylinders ...................................................................... 13

Figure 3: Worn out insulations from the hot-water pipes ............................................................. 13

Figure 4: Exposed bared electric wires ......................................................................................... 14

Figure 5: Parked vehicle in the lab and sharp edged object fixed on concrete column ................ 14

Figure 6: Poor housekeeping in the welding section in the lab building ...................................... 15

Figure 7: Oil spillage from modified plant oil (MPO) .................................................................. 15

Figure 8: Expired and damaged fire fighting equipments ............................................................ 16

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Hazard Analysis Type vs. Technique ............................................................................... 3

Table 2: Analysis Sheet .................................................................................................................. 6

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1. INTRODUCTION

We live in a world comprised of systems and risks. When viewed from an engineering

perspective, most aspects of life involve systems. For example, houses are a type of system,

automobiles are a type of system, mine sites are a type of system and electrical power grids are

another type of system. With systems and technology also comes exposure to accidents because

systems can fail or work improperly resulting in damage, injury, and deaths.

Hazard is any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel,

damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment, (MIL-

STD-882D). Hazard analysis experiment was part of exercise work for the course MM 430

offered by the department of Chemical and Mining engineering (CME) whose purpose was to

develop us (students) with skills of recognizing hazards, determining countermeasures to

hazards, eliminating hazards, etc by performing a hazard analysis at a working area specifically

at the laboratory areas.

The experiment was quantitative and analytical where by accidents identified first before they

will occur. This report contains theoretical principles which contain hazard theory, experimental

procedures, presentation of results and discussion, conclusion and recommendation.

2. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

A hazard is defined as a condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an

unplanned or undesirable event, (U.S’s FAA order 8040.4., 1958). It is a potential condition that

can potentially result in death, injury, and/or loss, (Erickson, C. A. 2005).

2.1 HAZARD THEORY

Per the system safety definitions, an accident is an actual event that has occurred and resulted in

death, injury, and/or loss; and a hazard is a potential condition that can potentially result in death,

injury, and/or loss. Therefore a hazard is the precursor to an accident; a hazard defines a potential

event (i.e., mishap/accident), while a mishap is the occurred event. It is therefore means that

there is a direct relationship between a hazard and an accident.

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Figure 1: Relationship between a hazard and an accident

The working and production process in any industrial system is a constant cooperation between

man, machine and environment in which both man and machine are into. Hazards, which are

grouped in the following categories namely physical, chemical, ergonomic and biological (the

US National Safety Council's Principles of Occupational Safety and Health course), their effects

on man and measures to protect man against theses hazards in the system are concerned by the

industrial safety.

A hazard and an accident/mishap are the same entity, only the state has changed from a

hypothesis to a reality.

Accidents are the immediate result of actualized hazards. The state transition from a hazard to an

accident is based on two factors: (1) the unique set of hazard components involved and (2) the

mishap risk presented by the hazard components. The hazard components are the items

comprising a hazard, and the accident risk is the probability of the accident occurring and the

severity of the resulting accident loss.

Accident/mishap risk is a fairly straightforward concept, where risk is defined as:

Risk = probability × severity

The mishap probability factor is the probability of the hazard components occurring and

transforming into the mishap.

2.2 HAZARD CAUSAL FACTORS

There is a difference between why hazards exist and how they exist. The basic reasons why

hazards exist are: (1) they are unavoidable because hazardous elements must be used in the

system, and/or (2) they are the result of inadequate design safety consideration. Inadequate

design consideration results from poor or insufficient design or the in correct implementation of

a good design. This includes inadequate consideration given to the potential effect of hardware

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failures, sneak paths, software glitches, human error, and the like. HCFs are the specific items

responsible for how a unique hazard exists in a system.

2.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS TYPES AND TECHNIQUES

Hazard analyses are performed to identify hazards, hazard effects, and hazard causal factors.

Hazard analyses are used to determine system risk and thereby ascertain the significance of

hazards so that safety design measures can be established to eliminate or mitigate the hazard.

Analyses are performed to systematically examine the system, subsystem, facility, components,

software, personnel, and their interrelationships.

There are two categories of hazard analyses: types and techniques. Hazard analysis type defines

an analysis category (e.g., detailed design analysis), and technique defines a unique analysis

methodology (e.g., fault tree analysis). The type establishes analysis timing, depth of detail, and

system coverage. The technique refers to a specific and unique analysis methodology that

provides specific results. System safety is built upon seven basic types, while there are well over

100 different techniques available.1 In general; there are several different techniques available

for achieving each of various types. The overarching distinctions between type and technique are

summarized in table below.

Table 1: Hazard Analysis Type vs. Technique

TYPE TECHNIQUE

Establishes where, when, and what to

analyze

Establishes a specific analysis task at

specific time in program life cycle.

Establishes what is desired from the

analysis.

Provides a specific design focus.

Establishes how to perform the

analysis.

Establishes a specific and unique

analysis methodology.

Provides the information to satisfy the

intent of the analysis type.

Each of these analysis types define a point in time when the analysis should begin, the level of

detail of the analysis, the type of information available and the analysis output. The goals of each

analysis type can be achieved by various analysis techniques.

The following general steps should be taken for the elimination of hazards (Erickson, C. A.

2005):

1) Recognition of hazards

2) Determination of countermeasures against hazards

3) Implementation of measures

4) Checks in regard to correct implementation and effectiveness of measures.

1Refer to the System Safety Analysis Handbook published by the System Safety Society.

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These four principal steps should always be observed when making an analysis of

hazardous situations.

Accident prevention progress is generally measured in terms of disabling injuries, which

are compiled into accidents statistics. Therefore accident statistics are regarded as a useful tool

for the prevention of accidents. This should not mean that measures for prevention of accidents

should be taken only when accidents already has occurred, i.e., indirect approach, which

regrettably is the case in many companies.

The modern approach to accident prevention is the “direct” method to prevent accident

before they occur and before they cause injury, illness, or death to personnel, damage to or

loss of a system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment, (Dr. Kimweri, H.T.H, et

al).

Direct method should be done through safety analysis of the job, machine, equipment, and

installation or production process in question.

2.4 HAZARD RECOGNITION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

The objective of hazard recognition is to identify perceived, existing, and potential hazards

and/or the consequences of exposure to hazards.

One of the most important elements of any hazard recognition system is to help management and

employees to have some knowledge of operational hazards and associated risks. This knowledge

is essential to ensure that hazards are controlled, reduced, or eliminated as they are identified.

The first and very important step in conducting a safety analysis is to recognize every

hazard within a system or within elements of a system. Secondly, to determine the kind and

amount of energy which possibly, under adverse conditions, could become free, and thirdly, to

investigate in which way and how severe a person(s) could get injured, and/or equipment,

material, property or environment could get damaged, (Dr. Kimweri, H.T.H, et al. 2003).

The systematic assessing and analyzing of workplace hazards uses a process strategy that

includes the following analysis (Roughton, J.E and Crutchfield N., 2008):

o Conducting a risk assessment of the workplace.

o Prioritizing the risk assessment findings.

o Developing controls to resolve risk-related issues.

o Recommending and implementing controls.

o Monitoring the results of the controls implemented.

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An assessment of the workplace is accomplished by conducting structured and routine physical

reviews. The physical hazards survey process identifies the presence or absence of any specific-

related hazards and begins by asking simple questions like;

o What is currently happening? What are we currently doing?

o Have there been any changes in tools, equipment, materials, or the environment?

o Are there violations of policies, procedures, protocols, rules, and guide lines?

o Are we doing what we should or think we should be doing?

3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

The experiment was conducted at the CME laboratory and the procedures were as follows:

2 hours of lab time were used to study the site and conduct the experiment where by an analysis

of (endangerments) hazardous situations using a direct method was conducted as guided by

the form provided all the potential hazard forming systems or elements were identified and

recognized. 10 systems/elements recognized.

The experiment/practical was a weekly exercise to ensure checks on the execution and

effectives of the measures taken were evaluated. This means that to each potential danger

identified, checks on the implementation of measures proposed to achieve targeted protection

were evaluated so as to determine their effectiveness and presented in “Analysis Sheet”.

4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 RESULTS

All the tasks performed were filled in the analysis sheet. The sheet contains procedures on how

the analysis performed.

The table below is the filled analysis sheet based on the direct approach of the hazard analysis.

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Table 2: Analysis Sheet

ANALYSIS OF HAZARDS FOR WORKPLACE AND

PROCEDURES

(Using the Direct Single Case Method)

Analysis Sheet Group No. 3

Safety Problem: Hazards in the CME Laboratory

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Procedure

Danger

Arising from

system/eleme

nt

Possible

Hazards

(Energy)

Possible

Accident

favoring

Conditions

(TOP)

Possible

Results

(Injury

and/or

damage)

Necessary

Targeted

Protection

(Desired

situation)

Necessary Measures to Achieve

Targeted Protection

Checks on Execution

and Effectiveness

Type of

measure

(what)

Responsible

for

Execution

(Who)

Deadline

(When)

Measures

Executed

Measures

Effective

1 Fire from

welding

Electricity/

Sparks

Poor

house

keeping

Improper

PPE

Burn of

the

equipme

nts.

Burn of

the

building.

Burn to

personne

l/death.

Good

house-

keeping

Proper

PPE

Ensurin

g Good

Houseke

eping

Proper

PPE

Putting

effective

fire

extingui

shers

Operator at

the place

Operator’s

supervisor

All time

29-11-13

No

No

-

-

7

2 Injury from

sharp edges

of tables and

equipments

Sharp-edged

corners

Poor

house

keeping

Being

hurt,

pierced

Good

housekeep

ing

Carefulnes

s

Ensurin

g Good

Houseke

eping

Remova

l of

sharp

edged

corners

Worker at

the place

Technician

in-charge

All the

time

29-11-13

No

No

-

-

3 Trip and fall

from stairs,

ladder,

corridor

Stairs,

Ladder

position,

Narrowed

corridor.

Stairs

configurati

on,

Poor

housekeep

ing at the

corridor.

Being

hurt,

injured

from

trips and

fall

Carefulnes

s with the

stairs,

Removal

of

obstacle

objects at

the

corridor,

Good

housekeep

ing.

Remova

l of

obstacle

objects

at the

corridor

and

good

arrange

ment.

Workers of

the building

29-11-13 No -

4 Impact

Machine

damage

Uninstalled/

not fixed

base

Falling of

the

machine

Damage

to m/c

parts,

Injury to

m/c user

Proper

m/c

installed

base.

M/c

base

installati

on

Technician

concerned

3-12-13 No -

8

5 Slip and Fall

of personnel

at modified

plant oil

(MPO)

location

Oil spillage

from the

machine

Uncontroll

ed leakage

Underper

formance

of the

machine.

Hurt

from slip

and fall

Clean

non-

slippery

floor

Remova

l of the

oil,

Seal the

leakage

points.

Machine

technician

29-11-13 No -

6 High voltage

output-lines

electric shock

High voltage

Electricity

Lines-

leakage

Electric

shock,

Fire

formatio

n

Safe

handled

power

lines

Barricad

ing and

putting

hazard

signs

Lab

supervisor

and

technicians.

29-11-13 No -

7 Noises

pollution,

hearing

problems

Noises Un-

checked

worn out

machine

parts

Poor

lubrication

Defective

m/c

deafness Low

Noise

producing

m/c must

be used

Wearing

ear plugs

Ensurin

g

machine

produce

s low

amount

of

Noises,

Supply

of ear

plugs

Lab

manager

Immediat

ely

No -

8 Heat burning

from hot

exposed pipes

Exposed hot

surface

pipelines

Non

insulated

pipelines

Heat

related

injuries

Insulated

hot-pipes

Insulator

repair

CME Lab

manager

3-12-13 No -

9 Parking of

vehicles

inside the

laboratory

area

Vehicle in

the lab.

Narrowing

/Blockage

of main

entrance

ways

Injury,

damage

due to

explosio

n

No

vehicles in

the lab

Not to

park

vehicles

in the

lab

Head CME Immediat

ely

No -

9

10 Fall of lights

from the roof

they attached

Lights,

electricity

Loosed

locks/attac

hments

Injury,

Damage

of the

lights,

Electric

shocks

Lights

fixed

properly

Fixed

lights

Lab

technician

Immediat

ely

No -

10

4.2 DISCUSSION

Observations from the table of results have shown that the hazards and risks recognized were not

prioritized. No strictly immediate measures were taken for example all fire extinguishers were

expired since 2005 and needed to be serviced or changed but they did not! Figures 2-8 in the

appendices show the pictures of some of hazards tabulated in the analysis sheet.

Areas needed to be barricaded and put warning signs did not given that need. Therefore there

were violations of policies, procedures, protocols, rules, and guide lines concerning hazards and

their potential risks.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

As hazards were available in every part of the system, most of the areas of the laboratory

building were unsafe. Poor management of hazards control is problem for example not keeping

the fire extinguishers able to work in case of fire which have not been done for eight years now

and people are working everyday in that hazardous building. It can therefore be concluded that,

violations of standard policies, procedures and rules towards hazard control exists. The results

were shown that;

o Hazards result in accidents.

o Hazards are (inadvertently) built into a system.

o Hazards are recognizable by their components.

o A hazard will occur according to the hazard components involved.

o A hazard is a deterministic entity and not a random event.

o Hazards (and accidents) are predictable and, therefore, are preventable or controllable.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Since hazards are unavoidable because hazardous elements were used in the given system or

element, the following are the recommendations:

Risk assessment must be conducted over each system and the findings should be prioritized.

Control measures should be developed, implemented and results monitored.

o Conducting a risk assessment of the workplace.

o Prioritizing the risk assessment findings.

o Developing controls to resolve risk-related issues.

o Recommending and implementing controls.

o Monitoring the results of the controls implemented.

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NOMENCLATURE

CME Chemical and Mining Engineering

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

HCF Hazard Causal Factor

Lab Laboratory

m/c Machine

MIL-STD Military Standard

MPO Modified Plant Oil

TOP

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REFERENCES

Ericson, C.A. (2005), Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety, Virginia, John Wiley &

Sons, Inc.Pg. 1-32.

Roughton, J. E and Crutchfield, N (2008)., Job Hazard Analysis, Butterworth Heinemann.

Simpson, G. et al. (2009)., Human Error in Mine Safety, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England.

Pg 1-40

Dr. Kimweri, H.T.H., et al, (2003)., Laboratory Instructions for Mining Engineering and Mineral

Processing Engineering Programs, CME Department. Pg 84-85.

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APPENDICES

Hazards recognized at the CME laboratory:

Figure 2: Narrowed corridor by used gas cylinders

The gas cylinders and oil were not supposed to be there as they block the corridor entrance and

also are close to the office door. Their existence to such a position they are hazards and may

cause trip and fall accidents.

Figure 3: Worn out insulations from the hot-water pipes

Exposed hot surfaces of pipelines may result into serious burn and other heat related injuries

when touched by human flesh. Insulation must be repaired and the warning signs must be kept

on the hot area place.

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Figure 4: Exposed bared electric wires

The bare wires may result into electrical shock or fire explosion when mishandled.

Figure 5: Parked vehicle in the lab and sharp edged object fixed on concrete column

he vehicle narrowed the space for personnel passage and the sharp edged object may therefore

result into injury.

15

Figure 6: Poor housekeeping in the welding section in the lab building

Poor housekeeping might result into fire from welding as a result of sparks generated when

ignites any combustible material available such as wood and spillage oil.

Figure 7: Oil spillage from modified plant oil (MPO)

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Figure 8: Expired and damaged fire fighting equipments

Fire extinguishers were expired and damaged since 2005 and yet not replaced. This was may be

due to poor management of hazards. Hazards are recognized but are not prioritized.