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SALIENT POINTS AND EN BANC DECISIONS ON POWERS AND STRUCTURE OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT (Articles VI, VII, VIII of 1987
Constitution)
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Departmenfsectt
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigation, GR No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008 (En Banc)- Congress
has legislative and oversight powers.
Puno, Separate Opinion, Macalintal vs. Comelec- the power of
oversight is intrinsic to the grant of legislative power. It
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted.
Santiago vs. Comelec, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (En Banc)-
the provision on the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is not self-executory. R.A. No. 6735
is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of [the] Act.
Lambino vs Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 (En Banc)-
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines
only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of
the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in
the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Prepared for the exclusive use of Barrister Law Review Center by
Joan S. Largo, Professor, USC College of Law,
Cebu City
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Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan
also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific
and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the
entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be
altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of
its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.
On the proposed amendment by initiative, that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
petition signed by the people.
In view of the flaws in the Lambino petition, the Court did not
revisit the Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. It declaredthat it must avoid revisiting a ruling
involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a
logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will
not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators
who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Art. IV, Section 2
In Re Aplication for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente
Ching petitioner, BM No. 914, October 1, 1999 (En Banc)- Under
Section 1 of CA No. 625, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
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Bengson vs. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001 (En Banc)- Under
the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of
Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those
who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos
at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born
because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine
citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now considers those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered
not natural-born citizens.
Altarejos vs. Comelec, GR No. 163256, November 10, 2004 (En
Banc)- The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the
Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen. [But] The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of
filing of one's application for repatriation subsists.
Valles vs. Comelec, GR No. 137000, August 9, 2000 (En Banc)- In
order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioner's contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the
more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of
Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena
was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did
not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application
for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs.
Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on
April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his
American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that one was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration
are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship
and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the
same must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case
of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration
does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one's
citizenship. The application for an alien certificate of
registration, and the holding of an Australian passport, as in the
case of Mercado vs. Manzano,
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were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before
she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a
Filipino, as well.
Mercado vs. Manzano, GR No. 135083, May 26, 1999 (En Banc)- Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art.
IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1)
Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Mariano, Jr. vs Comelec, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (En Banc)-
In the case of Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994,
this Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may
be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment
law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No.
7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local
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government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be
denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must
be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Read RA 7941
Veterans Federation vs. Comelec, GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000
(En Banc)- To determine the winners in a Philippine-style
party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No.
7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes."
CIBAC vs. Comelec, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 (EN Banc)- The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4)
inviolable parameters to determine the winners in a
Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the Constitution
and R.A. 7941.
In determining the number of additional seats for each
party-list that has met the 2% threshold, "proportional
representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra
seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to
additional seats
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of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was
clearly explicated in Veterans.
Bantay Republic Act or BA- RA 7941 vs. Comelec, GR No. 177271,
May 4, 2007 ( En Banc)- Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
Tobias vs. Abalos, GR No. 114783, December 8, 1994 (En Banc)-
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution
(Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law.
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.
SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take
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effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that
may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they
are authors.
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.
Bitonio vs. COA, GR No. 147392, March 12, 2004 (En Banc)-
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant
Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution
expressly provides. The presence in the PEZA Board meetings is
solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary
of Labor. There was no separate or special appointment for such
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such
prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board
only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor.
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different
date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
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Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1007 (En Banc)-
Cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 128055, April 18, 2001 (En
Banc)- The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, supra. - The Journal is regarded as
conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall,
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be
sitting.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be
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designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Guerrero vs. Comelec, GR No. 137004, July 26, 2000 (En Banc)-
The contention that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to the
qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution was rejected. Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word
"qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term
"constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire
debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
Moreover, the argument that HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there
is a valid proclamation of the winning candidate is likewise
without merit. In an electoral contest where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is
best addressed to the HRET.
Barbers vs. Comelec, GR No. 165691, June 22, 2005 (En Banc)- The
alleged invalidity of Biazon's proclamation involves a dispute or
contest relating to the election returns of members of the Senate.
Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole
jurisdiction of the SET.
Javier vs. Comelec, GR No. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986 (En
Banc)- The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns;
and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
delivery or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002 (En Banc)- An
ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into
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office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The ad interim appointment remains effective until such
disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The Constitution imposes
no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and
thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The
appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure
officer, all the powers pertaining to the office.
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized
with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission
on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session,
at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon
it.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to
and expenses incurred for each Member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus of Camilo Sabio, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006 (En Banc)-
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not
just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is
significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the
mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the
committees.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En Banc)-
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which
is to elicit
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information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight
function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of
legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate
by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt
from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power
is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt
on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the
fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary.
Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 (En Banc) - May
the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has
constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks
the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent
of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify
before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which
the President has the duty to faithfully execute. The refusal of
the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject
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to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of
the legislature's functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President's power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress's right to conduct legislative inquiries.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, supra.- Section 21 relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while Section 22
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of
its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to
the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress
cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
22.
SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
Gudani vs. Senga, supra.- Pursuant to the maintenance of
civilian supremacy over the military, the Constitution has
allocated specific roles to the legislative and executive branches
of government in relation to military affairs. Military
appropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by
Congress, as is the power to declare the existence of a state of
war. Congress is also empowered to revoke a proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The approval of
the Commission on Appointments is also required before the
President can promote military officers from the rank of colonel or
naval captain. Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance
and administration over the military, the Constitution is silent,
except for the commander-in-chief clause which is fertile in
meaning and implication as to whatever inherent martial authority
the President may possess.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
David vs. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (En Banc)-
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly,
a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and
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exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus: (1)There must be a war or
other emergency; (2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only; (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe; and (4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Agan vs. PIATCO, GR No. 155001, May 5, 2003 (En Banc)- In the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the term "national emergency" was
defined to include threat from external aggression, calamities or
national disasters, but not strikes "unless it is of such
proportion that would paralyze government service."
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, September 1, 2005 (En
Banc) - it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At
this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make
the House superior to the Senate.
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.
PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994 (En
Banc)- As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which
Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,"
it follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item
of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which
can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the
category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws,
because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an
appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more
appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
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(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations
for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials
shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and
effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the
Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, GR No. 115455, August 25,
1994 (En Banc)- The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
(ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, December 10,
2003 (En Banc)- Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of
a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Court finds no
reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the
internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd
Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This
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Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor.
Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, supra.- the "no-amendment rule" refers
only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with
regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before
said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or
amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to
proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted
on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other
house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to
amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2)
of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction
by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been
acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered
in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he
had signed it.
Compare with pocket veto possessed by US Congress
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, supra.- Taxation is progressive when
its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected.
The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very
nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has
no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the
consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is
the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats
the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity
lies in the income earned by a person or
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profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the
income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or
profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or
profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the
end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses
with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit. Nevertheless,
the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of
indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that
Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.
Lung Center vs. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004 (En
Banc)- Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160
in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is
burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. "Exclusive"
is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is
defined, "in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege
exclusively." If real property is used for one or more commercial
purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but
is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or "principal use"
cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without
doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is
synonymous with exclusively. What is meant by actual, direct and
exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct
and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is
not the use of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt
purposes.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
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(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred
to the general funds of the Government.
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998 (En
Banc)- Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize
an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall
be enacted.
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws
or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof.
ARTICLE VII
Executive Department
SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines.
Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989 (En
Banc)- Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
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"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated. The President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people [is] founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able
to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the
same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in
the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in
the same manner as the President.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, November
10, 2003 (En Banc)- If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before
the Senate as impeachment court. The "impeachment proceeding" is
not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something
prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation.
SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected
by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day
of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection.
No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of
May.
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The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session,
and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by
the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.
SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office,
the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall
take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President
or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God."
(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence. The
salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source.
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152259, July 29, 2004 (En
Banc)- Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a
President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President
from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in
office.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, supra- In In re:
Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that
there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the
presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to
communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential. The latter includes
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. Accordingly, they are characterized by marked
distinctions.
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Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making
of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to
decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents
unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege.
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety,
and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial
negation of the presidential communications privilege is always
subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process
privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential
communications privilege, In Re Sealed Case confines the privilege
only to White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct
presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to
encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential
authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential
and non-delegable Presidential power, such as commander-in-chief
power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons
and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other
public officers, the power to negotiate treaties etc.
For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive
privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving
their confidentiality.
Senate of the President vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20,
2006 (En Banc)- The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this
jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of
the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best
understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the
legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and
the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public."
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary
concept. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in
fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of
executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish
information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds
of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of
success, in the context of either judicial or legislative
investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state
secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with
Washington, on the ground that
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the information is of such nature that its disclosure would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety
is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of the Government not
to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that
law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has
been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure
requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization
where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining
governmental operations, and extends not only to military and
diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive' domestic decisional and policy making
functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression
necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative
communications.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the
courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
types of information of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid
or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition
that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed,
the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure.
SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect
shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the
Vice-President-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the
Vice-President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
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The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.
SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both
the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President
in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the
Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as
the Acting President.
SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI
of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
months before the date of the next presidential election.
SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
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reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should
a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours,
in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote
of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as the President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the
public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of
the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations
and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
shall not be denied access to the President during such
illness.
SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896,
February 22, 1991 (En Banc)- Does the prohibi
tion in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar
as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned
admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy
reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality blic officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. In order
that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the
prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required
by the primary
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functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any
additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation
for his services in the said position. The reason is that these
services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if,
say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary
Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal
office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which
come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance,
therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation,
whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution.
SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 139554, July 21, 2006 (En Banc)-
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers
to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The
second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. Under the
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same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case
involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group
of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints
the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes
Congress to vest "in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked officers.
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary.
The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such
Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the
agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency
itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the
commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the
board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize
officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board
to appoint lower-ranked officers.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress
has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of
agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions
for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the
recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the
other members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is
a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus
not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to
appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court
en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also
self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or
conditions.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the
specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers
to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their
members.
The 1987 Constitution has established three branches of
government the Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In addition,
there are the independent constitutional bodies like the Commission
on Elections, Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, and
the Ombudsman. Then there are the hybrid or quasi-judicial
agencies, exercising jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are
under the Executive branch for administrative supervision purposes,
but whose decisions are reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are
the local government units, which under
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the Constitution enjoy local autonomy subject only to
limitations Congress may impose by law. Local government units are
subject to general supervision by the President.
The Cultural Center of the Philippines does not fall under the
Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not
one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must
fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them
under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the
President." Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the
trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs
afoul with the President's power of control. By stating that the
"President shall have control of all the executive . . . offices,"
the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence
but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including
the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 96409, February 14, 1992
(En Banc)- It is a fundamentally accepted principle in
Constitutional Law that the President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. Equally well accepted, as a
corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot
be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members, who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.
Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, GR No.
164171, February 20, 2006 (En Banc)- Police power is inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote
the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society.
It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the
President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such
delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which
may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to
the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to
carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative
policy. On the propriety of challenging EO 156 in a declaratory
relief proceeding, in Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu
v. Province of Cebu, the Court entertained a suit for declaratory
relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation
of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of
the right of the party affected.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion,
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when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, supra.- The President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains
a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision
"represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All
his other functions are clearly civil in nature." His position as a
civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to,
the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military."
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284,
August 15, 2000 (En Banc)- When the President calls the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. There is a clear textual commitment under the
Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. The full discretionary power of the
President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the
calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the
rest of Section 18, Article VII. Congress may revoke such
proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the
difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered
as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this
Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must
concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2)
public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in
the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only
criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is
given full
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discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to
call as compared to the two other powers.
Sanlakas vs. Reyes, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (En Banc)-
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
"sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the
Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an
actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the
exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required
in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is
that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.'" Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests
the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first
and foremost, with Executive powers. The President's authority to
declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.
In Re: Ferdinand Arguelles, Jr. vs. Baladia, Jr., GR No. 167211,
March 14, 2006 (En Banc)