Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)

Affordability Through InnovationAffordability Through Innovation

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)

Briefing to 1998 National Space SymposiumBriefing to 1998 National Space SymposiumCatching a Ride to Orbit SessionCatching a Ride to Orbit Session

Col Richard McKinneyCol Richard McKinneySystem Program DirectorSystem Program Director

2

Overview

í Program Background

• Acquisition Strategy Change

• Summary

3

EELV Mission Statement

• Mission:

– Partner with Industry to develop a national launch capabilitythat satisfies the Government’s national mission modelrequirements and reduces the cost of space launch by at least25%

• Objectives:

– Increase the U.S. space launch industry’s competitiveness inthe international space launch market

– Implement acquisition reform initiatives resulting in reducedgovernment resources necessary to manage systemdevelopment and acquire launch services

4

FY94 DefenseAppropriations Act

Tasking

Background

Space LaunchModernization Plan(SLMP) [May 94];Gen Moorman,

Chairman

Options:

(1) Sustain currentsystems

(2) Evolve currentexpendablesystems

(3) Develop new“clean sheet”expendable system

(4) Develop a newreusable system

EELV

Department of Defense (DoD)IntelligenceCivilIndustryALS

NLS

SPACE-LIFTER

$650M INVESTMENT

Nat'l Space TransPolicy(PDD/NSTC-4)[5 Aug 94]

DoDImplementationPlan [25 Oct 94]supported Opt. 2

ALS - Advanced Launch SystemNLS - National Launch SystemPDD - Presidential DecisionDirectiveNSTC - National SpaceTransportation Council

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EELV Contractors’ System Concepts

6

Drivers to EELV Program

• Key Performance Parameters:

– Launch National Mission Model

– Design Reliability

– Standardized Launch Pads

– Standard Vehicle Interface

• Cost

– Probably first time a space program has cost as THE driver

– Direct Impact to Warfighter

7

Overview

• Program Background

í Acquisition Strategy Change

• Summary

8

Acquisition Strategy

• Original acquisition strategy formulated in early 1995– Strategy called for downselecting to one contractor

­ Contractor provides a family of launch vehicles to supportGovernment requirements

­ Contractor in a position to capture a larger share of theinternational commercial launch market

• Other features of original strategy:

– Cost-type contract for Engineering & ManufacturingDevelopment (EMD) contract

– Two system test flights during EMD

• Approach in strategy revised on 6 Nov 97

9

Why Change Strategy?

Larger commercial marketthan envisioned two years

ago

Sufficient market tosupport two contractors

Gov’t leverage commercial market competition

Industry InvolvementIndustry Involvement

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Why Change Strategy?Changes Since the “Moorman Study”

1994, SPACE LAUNCH MOD. PLAN TODAY

Future med/heavy launch marketdominated by government

Launch market dominated bycommercial market

Little potential in commercial marketfor growth or economy

Tremendous growth potential incommercial market

Conclusion: too many launchproviders/production capacity

Conclusion: sufficient market tosupport two EELV concepts

Recommendation: reduce industrialoverhead; downsize; reduce nichemarkets; DoD pursue innovativeincentives

Recommendation: Partner withindustry to develop EELV family;leverage competition in commercialmarkets

Led to single EELV contractordeveloping a modular family ofvehicles

Leads to two competing EELVcontractors over life of program forcommercial launch services

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0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

'88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10

1994

1997

Low

High

Most

Likely

Actual

COMSTAC AddressableCommercial Geosynchronous Transfer

Orbit (GTO) Market

Lau

nch

es p

er Y

ear

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

'88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

Actual

Lau

nch

es p

er Y

ear

Predictions Averaged Over Period

Why Change Strategy?COMSTAC Addressable Commercial GTO Market

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Commercial Space Market Growth

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1986 1991 1996 2000

Services

User Equip

Satellite

Launch

Does not includeGovernment spendingwhich was $38B in1996 and projected tobe $40B in 2000

The

n Y

ear

$Bill

ion

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Summary of Strategy Change

Old

• Cost-type contract for EMD

• Two system test flights

• Downselect to one

• Production

New

• Fixed Gov’t investment fordevelopment in addition tocontractor investment

• No system test flights

• Compete two over life of program

• Launch services

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EELV Acquisition Schedule

MS 0

TAILORED

PDR

FY95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08

MS I MS II

PDR - Preliminary Design Review RFP - Request for Proposal CFI - Call For Improvements SRR - Systems Requirements ReviewDDR - Down-select Design Review LCCV - Low Cost Concept Validation TCDR - Tailored Critical Design Review

Pre-EMD

CFI RFPRFP

DDR

LCCV15 Months4 Contracts

TAILORED

SRRTCDR

MS III

Development - 2 Contractors17 Months

2 Ktrs

Follow-on Launch Services

First Flights(Commercial/Military)

Initial Launch Services - 2 Contractors

16

Overview

• Program Background

• Acquisition Strategy Change

í Summary

17

SummaryWhat Does This Mean to You?

• Ensures two viable U.S. providers of launch services, eachwith a Government business base

• U.S. becomes more competitive in international market andcaptures a greater market share

• EELV will reduce the cost of space launch

Affordability Through InnovationAffordability Through Innovation