Evidence Day 02PERALTA V. OMELIO, A.M. NOS. RTJ-22-2259,
RTJ-22-2264, & RTJ-22-2273, OCTOBER 22, 2013.Ma. Regina Peralta
v. Judge Omelio (RTC Davao City) / Romualdo Mendoza v. Judge Omelio
/ Atty. Cruzabra v. Judge Omelio (2013) Per Curiam.FACTS:These are
three consolidated administrative complaints brought against Judge
Omelio of RTC Davao City.ONLY the third case, Cruzabra v. Omelio is
relevant:(1) Cruzabra is the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Davao
City.(2) A special proceeding for reconstitution of title was fled
by Helen Denila with the RTC wherein Judge Omelio was the presiding
Judge.(3) The special proceeding was fled despite the fact that the
SC had already ruled against the reconstitution in a prior case
Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel
Carpio.(4) Despite this ruling, Judge Omelio granted the petition
of Helen Denila.(5) OSG and Cruzabra attempted various legal
procedures to reverse the decision. Cruzabra also refused to
reconstitute the titles as ordered and was eventually charged for
indirect contempt by Judge Omelio.(6) An administrative
investigation was conducted with the following fndings:a. The frst
two cases to be dismissed for lack of merit.b. Cruzabra v. Omelio
Investigating judge found that Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance
of the law; recommendation that he be dismissed fromservice and
forfeiture of his benefts.ISSUE: WON Judge Omelio was guiltly of
gross ignorance of the law. (YES)SC: Guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. Should have taken judicial notice of prior decision.(1)
Rule 129, Section 1 prior SC decisions fall under ofcial acts of
judicial departments of the Phillippines(2) Decisions of courts
form part of the legal system and failure of any court to apply
them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a
dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for
administrative action against an inferior court magistrate (citing
Petran Development Inc v. CA).(3) The Supreme Court had already
ruled against reconstitution of titles in Heirs of Don Constancio
Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio.(4) Judge Omelio was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failing to take judicial
notice of this prior decision of a superior court (as well as
reversing a prior inhibition and taking cognizance of the motion
for indirect contempt).(5) Where the law is straightforward and the
facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.REPUBLIC V.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011.REPUBLIC V.
SANDIGANBAYAN [2011]FACTS Republic of the Philippines, through the
PCGG, fled a complaint (CC No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel
H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan.The petitioner alleged that the
respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of themajor
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings
respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves
and, through their holdings benefcially for Sps. Marcos. [Filthy
dummies!] CC No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among
them, CC No. 0130.I. CC NO. 0130 PCGG-conducted ETPI SHs meeting, a
PCGG-controlled BOD was elected. The ETPI SHs convened a special
SHs meeting wherein another set of BOD was elected. Africa fled a
petition seeking to nullify the Orders of the PCGG. Sandiganbayan
favored Africas motion and ordered an annual SHs meeting where only
the registered owners [or their proxies] may vote their
corresponding shares. In an April 12, 1993 resolution, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of CC No. 0130, among
others, with CC No. 0009, with the latter as the main case andthe
former merely an incident. PCGG fled with this Court a Very Urgent
Petition for Authority to Hold Special SHs Meeting for [the] Sole
Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock (Urgent
Petition). SC referred this Petition to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence and immediateresolution. The Sandiganbayan
included the Urgent Petition in CC 0130. In the proceedings to
resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane
(former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the
petitioners instance and after serving notice of the
deposition-taking on the respondents by way of deposition upon oral
examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro
of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. PCGG deposed Bane
without leave of court (invoking that it is a matter of right after
the defendants have fled their answer, the notice stated that the
purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on
the facts so as to prove the ownership issuein favor of [the
petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for
sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock. The notice also states that
the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition in evidence in the
main case of CC No. 0009. On the scheduled deposition date, only
Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane. Sandiganbayan
resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the
PCGGPahina 1 ng 33Evidence Day 02o (i) to cause the holding of a
special SHs meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing
ETPIs authorized capital stock ando (ii) to vote therein the
sequestered Class A shares of stock. Africa petitioned. Court
referred the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence todetermine whether there is a prima facie evidence
showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and
there is an imminent danger of dissipationto entitle the PCGG to
vote them in a SHs meeting.II. CC NO. 0009 Sandiganbayan
promulgated a resolution (1998 resolution) denying the petitioners
1st motion insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the
testimonies on oral deposition of Bane as part of its evidence in
CC No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the
[petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this Court
by the [respondents]. The petitioner did not in any way question
the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Ofer of Evidence
on Dec 14, 1999. Signifcantly, the Bane deposition was not included
as part of its ofered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the
petitioner fled an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
(2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer
that the case be re-opened for the introduction of additional
evidence. Sandiganbayan promulgated (2000 resolution) denying the
petitioners 2nd motion: On the matter of the [Bane deposition],
[its] admission is done through the ordinary formal ofer of
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise
objection on grounds provided by law. Defnitely, it is not under
Art (sic) 129 on judicial notice. Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioners 3rdmotion:o 1998 Resolution which already denied the
introduction in evidence of Banes deposition and which has become
fnal in view of plaintifs failure to fle any MR or appeal within
the 15-day reglementary period.o Plaintif has slept on its rights
for almost two years that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by
fling a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and
ofer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative
for thecourt to take judicial notice of the allegations of the
deposition.o it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the
deposition is inadmissible.THE PETITION Petitioner asserts that CC
No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken,
introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a child of the parent
case, CC No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence ofered and
admitted in any of the children cases should be considered as
evidence in the parent case. Sandiganbayan should not have denied
its admission on fimsy grounds, considering that:1. It was also
already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition)
that it would be used as evidence in CC No. 0009. Notices having
been duly served on all the parties concerned, they must
accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine
the witness when they failed to show up.2. The Bane deposition was
a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relativeto its
allegation that the respondents interest in ETPI and related frms
properly belongs to the government.3. The non-inclusion of the Bane
deposition in the petitioners formal ofer of evidence was obviously
excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the
case was fled and the voluminous records that the present case has
generated. THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS AND THE PETITIONERS REPLY
Respondents:o 3rd motion - mere rehash of similar motions earlier
fled by the petitioner,likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayans
1998 resolution.o 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed
third MR of the 1998 resolution.o respondents assert that they have
not waived their right to cross-examine the deponent;o the
allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of
judicial notice under Rule 129.o Bane deposition is inadmissible in
evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the
requisites for admission under Sec 47, Rule 130. Petitioner:o it
fled the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans 2000
resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition
should be done through the ordinary formal ofer of evidence.o it
has not yet rested its case although it has fled a formal ofer of
evidence.o mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent is sufcient for the admission of the Bane deposition
considering that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be
easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence,
his citizenship, and his advanced age. Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and
not Sec 47, Rule 130, should apply to the present case, as
explicitly stated in the notice of the
deposition-taking.ISSUES/RULINGWON THE CONSOLIDATION OF CC NO. 0009
AND CC NO. 0130 DISPENSED WITH THE USUAL REQUISITES OF
ADMISSIBILITY. NO.Pahina 2 ng 33Evidence Day 02 Petitioner argues
that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without
observing the provisions of Sec 47, Rule 130. The petitioner claims
that in light of the prior consolidation of CC No. 0009 and CC No.
0130, among others, the former case or proceeding that Sec 47, Rule
130 speaks of no longer exists. Consolidation is used generically
and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several
causes. There is nothing that would even suggest that the
Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action,
parties and evidence. At most , there was a consolidation of trial
but not actual consolidation. Considering the fact that in the
present case the party respondents to CC No. 0009 are not parties
to CC 0130, the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended
an actual consolidation. To impose upon the respondents the efects
of an actual consolidation results in an outright deprivation of
the petitioners right to due process especially where the evidence
sought to be admitted is not simply a testimonytaken in one of the
several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in
another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specifc
provisions on our rules on evidence.WON THE BANE DEPOSITION IS
ADMISSIBLE BY VIRTUE OF RULE 130, SEC 47. NO. Depositions are not
meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a
party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for
oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. Any
deposition ofered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of
the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule
i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is
ofered. That opportunity for cross-examination was aforded during
the taking of thedeposition alone is no argument, as the
opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party
at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing of a case. However, under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in
Sec 4, Rule 23, the deposition may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand. Sec 47, Rule 130 lays
down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or
deposition given at a former case or proceeding.1. The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;2.
The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative;3. Involving the same parties;4. Relating to the
same matter;5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to
cross-examine him. The reasons for the admissibility of testimony
or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However,
before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must frst lay the proper predicate
therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the
admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible
evidence. The deposition may not be allowed in this case because
petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of
interest or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the
present opponents, the respondents.WON THE RESPONDENTS NOTICE OF
TAKING OF BANE DEPOSITION IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF WAIVER. NO. The
petitioner asserts that the respondents have waived their right to
cross-examine the deponent for their failure to appear at the
deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to
them. Petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the respondents,
as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the
non-party status of the respondents in CC No. 0130 the efect of
consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot
be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifcally, they cannot be
bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent
impairment of theirright of cross-examination. After failing to
take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar
circumstancesof this case, the least that the petitioner could have
done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed
with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling
thereon Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It
must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to
CC No. 0130, they likewise have no interest inAfricas certiorari
petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder. Considering
that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a vital cog in the
petitioners case against the respondents, the Court is left to
wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident
case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became the
technical right of the petitioner to do so.[SYLLABUS TOPIC] WON THE
SANDIGANBAYAN SHOULD HAVE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF BANES
DEPOSITION. NO. The petitioner also claims that since the Bane
deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted in
CC No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial
notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. Judicial
notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
take and act on without proof because these facts are already known
to them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of
further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on
convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on
matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not
bona fde disputed. The foundation for judicial notice may be traced
to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non
indigent probatione.The taking of judicial notice means that the
court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of
Pahina 3 ng 33Evidence Day 02evidence. In so doing, the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be
disputed. The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129.
Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice of the
ofcial acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines,
or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of
matters oughtto be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge. This rule though admits of
exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case
fled in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose,
by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufciently designated; or when the original record of the former
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at
the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of
another case or cases, where sufcient basis exists in the records
of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule
on mandatory taking ofjudicial notice; neither is the applicability
of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously
pursued. Petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from
a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence ofered in
any of the children cases CC 0130 as evidence in the parent case CC
0009 - or of the whole family of cases. To the petitioner, the
supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of
judicial notice. We strongly disagree.o The supporting cases the
petitioner cited are inapplicable either becausethese cases involve
only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which
proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases.o The petitioners proposition is
obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The
petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot
of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of
varyingcomplexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners
argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by
indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case,
which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case,
simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty
of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the
court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it
seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. The Judge
in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know
nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been
adduced judicially in evidence.Thus, when the case is up for trial,
the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and itis incumbent
upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts
upon which they rely.NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNER'S ASS'N., INC. V.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, BRGY. SUNVALLEY, PARAAQUE CITY, G.R. NO.
156686, JULY 27, 2011.NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. vs
SANGGUNIANG BRGY., BRGY. SUN VALLEYFactsRespondent Sangguniang
Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued a Resolution to petitioner
New Sun Valley Homeowners Association (NSVHAI) directing it to open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to private vehicles and pedestrian
trafc at all hours daily except from 11 p.m to 5 a.m.NSVHAI,
represented by its President Marita Cortez, fled a petition for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with a prayer
for issuance of TRO with the RTC, arguing that the resolution would
disrupt the residents' safety, health and well-being, that it would
destroy the roads and drainage system on said streets (as these
were not designed to withstand heavy trafc), and that there are
other ways to ease trafc fow anyway, such as strict enforcement of
trafc rules and regulations, and the presence of trafc enforcers on
all trafc choke points. In its Amended Petition, NSVHAI also
claimed that respondent had no jurisdiction over the opening of
Rosemallow and Aster Streets as such can only be ordered through an
ordinance.BSV Sangguniang Barangay fled its Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of court jurisdiction
over the subject matter, alleging that the subject streets are of
the public domain and are thus owned by the local government. It
was granted, prompting petitioner to appeal the casebefore the
Supreme Court.Issuew/n the CA erred in dismissing the case by
making fndings of fact not supported by evidence of recordHeldNO,
the CA did not err in dismissing the case of the
petitionersRatioBurden of ProofPahina 4 ng 33Evidence Day 02Being
the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on
the petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads. It is a
basic rule in civil cases that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence, relying on
the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.In this case, NSVHAI did not submit an iota of proof to
support its acts of ownership over Rosemallow and Aster streets
(closing the roads, collecting fees from delivery vans passing
through, etc). On the other hand, the local government units power
to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under
Section 211 of the Local Government Code. However, since Rosemallow
and Aster Streets have already been donated by the Sun Valley
Subdivision to the City Government of Paranaque, they have since
then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the
commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or
claims of herein Appellant. Section 21 of the LGC thus does not
apply in this case.Judicial NoticeMoreover, NSVHAI wants the court
to take judicial knowledge that criminal activities like robbery
and kidnapping are becoming daily fares in Philippine society.
However, Rule 129 provides that:Rule 129WHAT NEED NOT BE
PROVEDSECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
the ofcial acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of
time, and the geographical divisions.(1a)The activities claimed by
petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the
rule quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive
relief in any way.As petitioner has failed to establish that it has
any right entitled to the protection of the law,and it also failed
to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive
relief insteadof going to the Mayor as provided by the Local
Government Code, the petition must be denied.1 Section 21. Closure
and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may pursuant to
an ordinance permanently or temporarily close or open any local
road alley par! or s"uare falling #ithin its $urisdiction% Provided
ho#ever &hat in case of permanent closure such ordinance must
'e approved 'y at least t#o(thirds (2)*) of all the mem'ers of the
sanggunian and #hen necessary an ade"uate su'stitute for the pu'lic
facility that is su'$ect to closure is provided.Doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remediesThe thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respectivecompetence. In this case, It
is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions
to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and
functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within
the local government.Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found
that the trial court committed no reversible errorin dismissing the
case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as
the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure
and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a
resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject
roads belong to the City Government of Paranaque.ASIAN TERMINALS,
INC. V. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. NO. 171406, APRIL 4,
2011.ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC.,
(2011)DEL CASTILLO, J.:FACTS:1. On November 14, 1995, Shandong
Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I
60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50
kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice
value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430,
and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation
Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and
Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.2. On
November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South
Harbor, Manila, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc.,
a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing
arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda
ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area
of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending
clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee.
When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995,
2,702 bags were foundto be in bad order condition.3. On November
29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in
the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to
the consignee. On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were
unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags
were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking,and hardening
of the contents.4. On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid
the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the
amount of P643,600.25.5. On November 20, 1996, respondent, as
subrogee of the consignee, fled before RTC of Manila for damages
against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the
cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.Pahina 5 ng 33Evidence Day 026.
RTC rendered a Decision fnding petitioner liable for the
damage/loss sustained bythe shipment but absolving the other
defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the
damage/loss was the negligence of petitioners stevedores who
handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC
emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors
Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in
retrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioners stevedores
continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the
spillage.The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is
liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles
2176 and 2180 paragraph (4) of the Civil Code. The CA denied the
appeal.ISSUE (TOPICAL): WON the court can take judicial notice of
the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability.HOLDING:
Judicial notice does not apply.1. Petitioner claims that the amount
of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its
Management Contract for cargo handling services with the PPA.
Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice
of the said contract since it is an ofcial act of an executive
department subject to judicial cognizance.2. Respondent contends
that this is outside the operation of judicial notice. And even if
it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it
is a contract of adhesion.3. The Management Contract entered into
by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which
the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an
ofcial act of the executive department. The PPA, which was
createdby virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a
government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of
administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only
performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management
Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be
applied.AS TO THE LIABILITY: The petition was DENIED. Asian
Terminals is liable.From the nature of the damage caused to the
shipment, i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or
caked portions of the contents, it is not difcult to see that the
damage caused was due to the negligence of ATIs stevedores who used
steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the
piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and
who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI with insufcient
coverthereby exposing them to the elements and causing the contents
to cake or harden.B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. V. CA, G.R. NO. 159230,
OCTOBER 18, 2010.B.E. San Diego Inc. v. Court of AppealsDoctrine:
Geographical divisions are subject to mandatory judicial notice. A
new barrio being previously part of another barrio is a
geographical division which is a matter subject of mandatory
judicial notice.FACTS:B.E. San Diego fled an accion publiciana
(recovery of possession, who has a better right to possession)
against Jovita Matias over a parcel of land located in Malabon. In
her Answer, Matias said that the property she is occupying is
diferent from the property that B.E. San Diego seeks to recover.She
claimed that the property she is now occupying is located in Barrio
Catmon while the property B.E. San Diego is seeking to recover is
located in Barrio Tinajeros as shown in the transfer certifcate of
title (TCT) it presented.RTC took judicial notice of the fact that
Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros, and declared
B.E. San Diego as the rightful owner of the subject property. CA
however reversed the RTC and said that the discrepancy in the
location is signifcant, and RTC should have required an expert
witness from concerned government agency to resolve the said
discrepancy.ISSUE:Whether or not the testimony of an expert witness
is necessary to explain the discrepancy inthe location of the
subject propertyHELD:No. Expert witness testimony is not
necessary.RATIO:The RTC has authority to declare that the
discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously
part of Barrio Tinajeros. This is a matter subject of mandatory
judicial notice. Geographical division is among matters that courts
should take judicial notice of as provided for in Section 1 of Rule
129 of the Rules of Court.Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent
to Barrio Catmon, it is likely that, indeed, the two barrios
previously formed one geographical unit.Sufcient evidence also
exists to support this conclusion. The TCT of B.E. San Diego
identifes the property as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 in Barrio
Tinajeros. B.E. San Diegos tax declaration identifes it too as Lot
No. 3, Block No. 13 but located in Barrio Catmon. It is clear
though that both title and the tax declaration share the same
boundaries to identify the property. The trial court judge can very
well ascertain the facts to resolve the discrepancy and dispense
with the need for the testimony of an expert witness.BARUT V.
PEOPLE, G. R. NO. 167454, SEPTEMBER 24, 2014.EMERITU C. BARUT v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014, J. Bersamin)FACTSPahina 6 ng
33Evidence Day 021. Barut (a guard of Philippine National
Construction Corporation) was tried for and found guilty of
homicide by the RTC of Muntinlupa City2. Background: SPO4 Vicente
Ucag was on board a passenger jeepney (driven by his brother) on
the SLEX, coming from Laguna and going back to Metro Manila. His
wife and 16-yr old son Vincent were riding an owner-type jeep
driven by Rico Villas on the same route. When the jeep driven by
Villas exited at the Sucat interchange ahead of Ucags jeepney, PNCC
guards Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas. They informed him that his
vehicle had no headlights, asked for his license, and issued him a
trafc violation report (TVR) ticket. The jeepney carrying Ucag then
stopped where Villas jeep had parked. Ucag and co-passenger Fabiano
alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire what the
matter was. Ucag then requested the return of Villas license upon
being apprised, but Ancheta refused. Argument ensued. Later, Ucag
turned around to avoid further argument, which irked Ancheta.
Ancheta then suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fred
it several times. Ucag was hit on both thighs. Ucag fred back and
hit Ancheta. Vicente Ucag (son), upon seeing the exchange of
gunshots, rushed towards Ucag (his father). Before he could reach
his father, Barut fred at Vincent in the chest. Vicente was rushed
to the Paranaque Medical Center. He died during the emergency
surgery.3. Baruts contentions: the extrajudicial statement that
Villas gave at about 1:00pm of September 25 1995 (a day after the
fatal shooting of Vincent), in which he declared not having seen
Barut fre a gun, is inconsistent with Villas court testimony on
June 10 1996; this manifested that he was not clear and convincing
because he never pointed out who [had] really shot Vincent Ucag.o
Question during direct examination: What was the reason if you know
why he (Vicente Ucag) was weak?o Villas answer: Maybe he was hit
Such inconsistency gave rise to the doubt as to who really shot and
killed the victim4. CA: Villas and Fabiano clearly and consistently
testifed that Barut was the person who shot Vincent, and Baruts
bare denial of fring at Vincent did not prevail over their positive
and categorical identifcation of him as the perpetrator the RTC
could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because
Villas extrajudicial sworn statement containing the declaration had
not been ofered and admitted as evidence by either side. Only
evidence that was formally ofered and made part of the records
could be considered. In any event, the supposed contradiction
between the extrajudicial sworn statement and the court testimony
should be resolved in favor of the latter.5. Barut seeks review of
his conviction by petition for review on certiorariRULING: CA
ruling afrmed.1. Findings of fact by the RTC are accorded great
respect especially when afrmed by the CA RTC judge has personal and
direct observation of the witnesses manner and decorum during
intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused2. CAs negative
treatment of the declaration contained in Villas extra-judicial
sworn statement was in accord with rules and jurisprudence Sec. 34,
Rule 132 (Rules of Court): the RTC, as the trial court, could
consider only the evidence that had been formally ofered; the
ofering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was
being oferedo Purpose: to ensure the right of the adverse party to
due process of law (to timely object to the evidence as well as to
properly counter the impact of evidence not formally ofered)o
Candido v. CA: xxx a formal ofer is necessary since judges are
required to base their fndings of fact and judgment only upon the
evidence ofered by the parties at the trial xxx The rule that only
evidence formally ofered before the trial court can be considered
is relaxed upon the concurrence of two requisites:(a) The evidence
was duly identifed by testimony duly recorded(b) The evidence was
incorporated in the records of the case Furthermore, the rule has
no application where:(a) The court takes judicial notice of
adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, or(b) where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws
inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of
Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or(c) where the trial
court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their
credibility even without the ofer of the demeanor as evidence.DELA
LLANA V. BIONG, G.R. NO. 182356, DECEMBER 4, 2013.Dela Llana v
BiongAction: Petition for review under Rule 45 of ROC(Note:
Relevant to Section is the question on Judicial Notice)FACTS:
Petitioner Dra. dela Llana was on front passenger seat while Juan
dela Llana was driving along North Ave. Dump truck carrying sand
and gravel rammed into their rear. They were bumped by driver Joel
Primero, employed by Rebecca Biong.Pahina 7 ng 33Evidence Day 02
Dra. dela Llana started feeling pain on the left side of her neck
and shoulder deteriorating her health after a month. It was soon
found out she had an injury caused by compression of nerve running
to her left arm and hand.o Underwent surgery but it incapacitated
her from practice of her profession. Petitioner demanded
compensation from Respondent Biong. But respondent refused payment.
Petitioner fled for damages in RTC. Petitioner presented her
Medical Certifcate for sufering whiplash injury as evidence.
Respondent presented Testimonial evidence of herself, Joel and
licensed driver-mechanic Alberto Marcelo. RTC ruled in favor of
Petitioner holding the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's
whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving. CA reversed RTC
ruling saying Petitioner failed to establish reasonable connection
bet. vehicular accident and whiplash injury by preponderance of
evidence citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp v CA.o CA declared courts
cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. Arguments:o Petitioner Stressed that Nutrimix ruling
involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code
on hidden defects and no evidence was shown to connect the
poisonous animal feeds sold to respondents. Preponderance of
evidence is shown in 1) pictures of damaged car 2)medical
certifcate 3) petitioners testimony since she is a medical surgeon.
Judicial Notice should be rendered to the causation of whiplash
injury from accident since such is a matter of common knowledge.o
Respondent Argues that Petitioner does not ofer substantial merit
to Courts consideration ISSUE: Whether or not Joel's reckless
driving is the proximate cause of Petitioner Dra. dela Llana's
whiplash injury? HELD: No. Petitioner failed to establish
preponderance of evidence. RATIO:o Petitioner should establish
preponderance of evidence on the quasi-delict case(Art 2176 of
Civil Code)o It is required that Petitioner show chain of causation
between the reckless driving and the whiplash injury in order for
presumption to arise. He who alleges has burden of proving
allegation by preponderance of evidence. Burden falls on the
Petitioner.o Petitioner failed to adduce the evidentiary facts by
which the ultimate fact can be adduced. 1) Picture of the damaged
car only demonstrated the impact of the collision. But it did not
establish result of whiplash. 2) Medical certifcate cannot be
considered because it was not admitted in evidence. CA should have
not considered it as documentary evidence since RTC did not admit
it. Said medical certifcate is has no Probative Value for being
hearsay since it is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on knowledge of another person not in the witness
stand. 3) Petitioner's opinion that Joel's negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value. She serves as an ordinary
witness and not an expert witness. Opinion of ordinary witness may
be received: (a) identity of persons he has adequate knowledge (b)
handwriting he has familiarity (c) sanity of person sufciently
acquainted Expert witness may be received on special knowledge,
skill, experience or training. Yet, courts do not immediately
accord probative value to an expert testimony. Testimony of
Petitioner on whiplash efect cannot be givenprobative value since
she serves as not as an expert witness.o IN REGARD to the Judicial
Notice on whiplash injuries caused by vehicularaccidents. Courts
cannot take judicial notice on such because 1) not public knowledge
2) not capable of unquestionable demonstration 3) not known to
judges on their judicial functions (Sec 3 of Rule 129 ROC) Court
has no expertise in the feld of medicine contrary to Petitioners
claim. She failed to render testimonial/ documentary evidence in
the Trial Court.MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO.
190793, JULY 19, 2012.MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (from UST Law Review)Public knowledge of facts pertaining
to employment of violence and unlawful means to achieve ones goals
is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is
sufcient to deny a party registration and accreditation.Magdalo sa
Pagbabago (MAGDALO) fed its Petition for Registration with the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its
registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party
based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the
2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its
Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its
Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).Pahina 8
ng 33Evidence Day 02Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the
COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to
employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their
goals.ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration fled by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals
through violent or unlawful meansHELD:MAGDALO contends that it was
grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the
Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on
record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument
cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial
notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code,
specifcally empowers administrative agencies to admit and give
probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably
prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.That
the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by
the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated
these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof
without requiring the introduction and recent jurisprudence. The
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in fnding that
MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under
Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties,
organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means shall be Denied registration.
This disqualifcation is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which
provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through Violence shall be entitled to accreditation.In the present
case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with Violence.
As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege,
their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the
administration of Former President Arroyo and to divulge the
alleged corruption in the military and The supposed sale of arms to
enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her
cabinet members, and the top ofcials of the AFP and the PNP To
resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel
occupied by civilians, March in the premises in full battle gear
with ammunitions, and plantExplosives in the building. These brash
methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its
members and withdraw its support from the government constituted
clear acts of violence. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit
grave abuse of discretion when ittreated the Oakwood standof as a
Manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to
violence or Threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.The
fnding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or
unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case
No. 03-2784. The power vested by ArticleIX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register
political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in Character.
In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess
whether the party or organization seeking registration or
accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as
violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in Nature.In
fnding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfl
its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an
assessment as to whether the members of MAGDALO committed crimes,
as COMELEC was not required to make that determination in the frst
place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO
possessed all the necessary qualifcations and none of
disqualifcations for registration as a political party.
Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a
privilege given to groups who have Qualifed and met the
requirements provided by law.Note worthily, however, in view of the
subsequent amnesty granted in favour of the membersof MAGDALO, the
events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the
disqualifcations from party registration.SPS. LATIP V. CHUA, G.R.
NO. 177809, OCTOBER 16, 2009.FACTS:( Respondent Rosalie Chua is the
owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building in Baclaran.( In
2001, she fled a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages
against the Sps. Latip. She attached to the complaint a contract of
lease over two cubicles of the building.( A year after the
commencement of the lease and with the Sps. Latip already occupying
the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a
letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail( In
their Answer, the Sps. Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred
that the lease of the two cubicles had already been paid in full as
evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total
amount of 2.5M.( Sps. Latip asseverated that sometime in October
1999, Rosalie ofered for sale lease rights over 2 cubicles in the
building. According to them, the immediate payment of 2.5M would be
used to fnish the construction of the building giving them frst
priority in the occupation of the fnished cubicles.( In December
1999, as soon as the 2 cubicles were fnished, Sps. Latip occupied
them without waiting for completion of the other 5 stalls.MTC: in
favor of Rosalie and asked them to vacate the premisesRTC: ruled in
favor of Sps. Latip, did not give credence to the contract of
lease( lacked the signature of Ferdinand Chua, etc.Pahina 9 ng
33+O& ,-1 o#ned 'y .egayo 'eing leased to /arencio(.ingle
0loilo/ a l a u d R i v e r m a y a+O& 1*2,O#ned 'y
.inglasan(Pototan 0loilo)Evidence Day 02( signature of Sps. Latip(
the specifc dates on the term of the contract( exact date of
execution of the document( provision for payment of deposit or
advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease
contracts( As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of 2.5M was simply
goodwill payment by the prospective leases, and not payment for the
purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out
that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce
evidence in this regard.CA: reversed the decision of the RTC and
reinstated the decision of the MTC ( found that the alleged defects
of the contract of lease did not render the contract inefective( On
the issue of WON the 2.5M was goodwill payment, the CA took
judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran
(also bolstered by the statement ofthe other occupants)ISSUES/HELD:
WON taking judicial notice of goodwill payments is proper NORATIO:(
Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 129 declare when the taking of judicial notice
is mandatory or discretionary.( State Prosecutors v. Muro is also
instructive:o The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and everyreasonable doubt on the subject should
be prompty resolved in the negative.o Requisites:1. Matter must be
one of common and general knowledge2. It must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain3. It must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courto
Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court.-
reiterates the requisite of notoriety( Things of common knowledge
of which courts could take judicial notice may be matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration.( Here, RTC specifcally ruled that apart
from the bare allegation, Rosalie produced no evidence to prove her
claim that the amount of 2.5M simply constituted the payment of
goodwill money.( Here, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the
necessity of attaching documentaryevidence. Apparently, only that
division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill
money in the Baclaran area.( DISPOSITIVE: Liable to pay unpaid
rentals minus 2.5M payment.DEGAYO V. MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, G.R. NO.
173148, APRIL 6, 2015.Degayo v. DinglasanPetitioner: ELSA
DEGAYORespondent: CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, et. alTopic: Judicial
NoticeKeywords: Accretion, General Rule on Judicial Notice,
Exception, Close ConnectionBrion, J. (2015)Facts:1. This petition
for review involves two cases:a. Case 1: Magbanua-Dinglasan v.
Jarencio (Branch 27)b. Case 2: Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan (Branch
22)2. The river bounding the two lots and separating Dingle from
Pototan, Iloilo, as illustrated, steadily moved its course sometime
in 1970 towards the banks of Pototan, leaving its old riverbed dry.
As a result the lot owned by Dinglasan progressively decreased
while the lot of Degayo increased in land area. Because Degayo and
her tenant, Jarencio, believed that the increase was an accretion
to Lot 861, Jarencio cultivated said land. DInglasan, however,
believed that the land was an abandoned riverbed and therefore,
belonged to them.Pahina 10 ng 33Evidence Day 023. To assert their
right over the disputed land, Dinglasan, et al., fled Case 1
against Jarencio, the tenant, a complaint seeking to declare her
the owner of the land and for damages.4. Degayo sought to intervene
in Case 1, being the owner of the land, but her motion was denied.
Degayo never questioned this order. Hindi nya siguro alam ang
petition for certiorari (Rule 65) na favorite ni Ta Vicks. However,
she was able to participate in the case as witness for the
defense.5. Instead, she fled a separate petition, (Cae 2) also for
declaration of ownership with damages. The matters she raised
herein are the same as those she raised as witness in Case 1.6. RTC
Iloilo Branch 27 ruled in favor of Dinglasan (no accretion
happened). Jarenciofailed to perfect the appeal, hence, the case
became fnal and executory.7. On the other hand, in Case 2, Branch
22 ruled in favor of Degayo (there was an accretion).8. Dinglasan
appealed to the CA; the CA reversed. Ruling of CA:a. The disputed
land was an abandoned riverbed, hence belonged to Dinglasan.b. The
decision in Case 1 was conclusive to the title of the thing, being
an aspect of the rule on conclusiveness on judgment.RELEVANT
ISSUE:1. WON CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision
in Case 1 which was not presented during the hearing of the present
case.HELD:1. NO.General rule: Courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge.Exceptions: (Enunciated in Tiburcio v.
PHHC)1. When a case has close connection with the matter in the
controversy (asin this case)2. When a previous case determines WON
the case pending is a moot oneThe Court did not elaborate on this
but obviously, this case belongs to the frst exception. The matter
in controversy in this case is the nature of the disputed land (WON
its an accretion) and such controversy is closely linked, in fact
similar, with the 1st case.Also, Degayos objection was deemed a
mere technicality because Degayo herself repeatedly referred to the
Case 1 in her pleadings in Case 2, as well as in her appellees
brief before the CA and her petition for review in the SC. The
existenceof Case 1 was also jointly stipulated by the parties in
Case 2.OTHER ISSUES (In case she asks)1. WON the disputed property
is an abandoned riverbed and not an accretion. YESArt. 461 CC -
River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands
are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.2.
WON Case 1 constitutes Res Judicata to Case 2. YESTwo concepts of
Res Judicata:a. Bar by former judgment - a judgment constitutes a
bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action.b. Conclusiveness of judgment - precludes
the relitigation of a particular fact of issue in another action
between the same parties on a diferent claim or cause of action.
For this concept to apply, the identities of parties and issues
must be the same.Issue both cases involve the question on the
nature of the disputed landParties need not be identical; only
community of interest is required. Degayo is privy to the interest
of Jarencio in the frst case since she is the owner of Lot 861.ANDO
V. DFA, G.R. NO. 195432, AUGUST 27, 2014.Edelina Ando v. DFAAug.
27, 2014 | Sereno | 1stFACTS:Edelina Ando married Japanese National
Yuichiro Kobayashi. In Japan, Yuichiro Kobayashiwas validly granted
a divorce. Believing in good faith that the divorce capacitated her
to remarry, Edelina married Masatomi Ando. Edelina applied for the
renewal of her Philippinepassport to indicate her surname as Ando
but was told at the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her until
she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with
her said husband Masatomi is valid until otherwise declared.Edelina
fled with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief, impleading the
DFA as respondent and praying the court to declare her marriage
with Masatomi as valid and to direct the DFA to issue a passport
under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol. RTC issued an order
dismissing the petition for want of cause and action as well as
jurisdiction. The RTC said there is no showing that Edelina
complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family
Code, that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of absolute divorce. After Edelina fled an ex parte motion
for reconsideration of the order was endorsed to a family court,
which dismissed the petition anew on the ground that petitioner had
no cause of action. An ex parte motion for reconsideration was also
denied.Edelina fled this petition for review under Rule 45.ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.Pahina
11 ng 33Evidence Day 02PETITIONER: Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it
is solely the wife or the husband who can flea petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, the
state cannot collaterally attack the validity of a marriage in a
petition for declaratory relief. Further, Edelina alleged that a
marriage shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
ajudicial proceeding. She also argued that assuming a court
judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is required under
Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere
irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license.RESPONDENT:
Prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce
decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino
spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal efects of
remarriage.SC: Petition is without merit.1. Edelina incorrectly
fled a petition for declaratory relief with respect to her prayer
to compel the DFA to issue her passport. She should have frst
appealed before the Secretary ofForeign Afairs, according to the
Philippine Passport Act.2. Edelina should have fled a petition for
the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her frst
husband with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her
second marriage as valid.In Garcia v. Recio, the SC ruled that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufcient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment. The law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven and like any other fact.There appears to be
insufcient proof or evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her frst husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of
the divorce decree under that national law. Any declaration as to
the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national
law of her alienspouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.NOVERAS V. NOVERAS, G.R. NO. 188289, AUGUST 20, 2014.David A.
Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras20 August 2014J. Perez | 2nd
DivisionFacts:1. Petition for review assailing the Decision of the
CA, which afrmed in part the RTC decision.2. Case: Petition for
Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property fled by LeticiaDavid and
Leticia were married on 12/3/1988 in QC, Philippines. They have 2
children, namely: Jerome and Jena. They migrated to the USA where
they eventually acquired American citizenship. They continues to
own properties in theUS and Philippines.Due to business reverses,
David returned to the Philippines in 2001. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived
with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province.Leticia fled a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, whichwas
granted. The California court also granted to Leticia the custody
of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the
USA and awarded the Philippine properties to David.On 8 August
2005, Leticia fled a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Grounds: David has
abandoned Leticia and their 2 minor children or failed to comply
with his or her obligations to the family; and At the time of the
petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for atleast one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.3. RTC Recognized that
since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal
and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their
marriage, the parties marriage had already been dissolved by virtue
of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the
Superior Court of California. Thus, the petition fled by Leticia is
converted as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property (ACP) regime with the determination of the legitimes,
support and custody of the children, instead of an action for
judicial separation of conjugal property. Re property relations, TC
frst classifed their property regime as ACP because they did not
execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their
marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, TC ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial
notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof
oftheir national law. TC held that as the instant petition does not
fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial
separation of properties, the ACP cannot be forfeited in favor of
Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that
Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infdelity with preponderant
evidence.Pahina 12 ng 33Evidence Day 02 Decalred the ACP dissolved
and awarded the Philippine properties to David only with of the
awarded properties given to Jerome and Jena as their presumptive
legitimes.4. CA: modifed the trial courts Decision by directing the
equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.5.
David fled petition for review.Issue 1: W/N the Court should
recognize the Caifornia Judgment which awarded the Philippine
properties to David. (Said judgment was made part of the pleadings
presented and ofered in evidence)Held: TC erred in recognizing the
divorce decree.The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the efect of the judgmenton
the alien himself or herself. Specifcally, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage,
a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132.24 and132. 25, in relation to Rule
39. 48(b). The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifcally for the purpose orin another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.Under 132.24, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an ofcial publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the ofcer having the legal
custody thereof. Such ofcial publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certifcate that the attesting ofcer has the legal custody thereof.
The certifcate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular ofcials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
ofce. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specifc part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the ofcial seal of the attesting
ofcer.132.25 states that whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specifc part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the ofcial seal of the attesting ofcer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.Only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certifcates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.The Court
relaxed the requirement on certifcation in Bayot v. CA where it
held therein that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American
citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized
and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of
a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufcient." In this case
however, it appears that there is no seal from the ofce where the
divorce decree was obtained.The application of the doctrine of
processual presumption is entirely a diferent matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in
the Philippines.Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree,
it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.Issue 2: W/N the Philippine properties should be
awarded to David.Held: NOTC should have proceeded with the case as
an action for judicial separation of conjugal property based on
Art. 135 of the Family Code instead of converting it as a
liquidation of theACP. It should have evaluated the grounds
asserted by Leticia.The trial court had categorically ruled that
there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the
Family Code.Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a
judicial separation of property was nottackled in the trial courts
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition
as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.The records
of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is
highly improbable. It is undisputedthat the spouses had been living
separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to
thePhilippines. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David
has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the
hospital where David was once confned, testifed that she saw the
name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form. Third, their divorce was granted by the California
court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had
actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be
granted.Disposition: CA decision afrmedLBP V. YATCO AGRICULTURAL
ENTERPRISES, G.R. NO. 172551, JANUARY 15, 2014.Rule 129: What Need
Not Be Proved>Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing
necessaryLBP v YatcoJanuary 15, 2014Brion,2 J.FACTS: Respondent
Yatco Agricultural enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of
a parcel of agricultural land in Laguna. In 1999, the government
placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).Pahina 13 ng 33Evidence Day 02
Pursuant to EO 405, LBP valued the property at PHP1+ M, which Yatco
did not fnd acceptable. Yatco elevated the matter to DAR Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). PARAD computed the propertys
value at PHP16+ M; it used the propertys current market value (as
shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the
formula MV x 2. PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any
verifed or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it
brushed aside LBPs evaluation. LBP fled with the RTC of San Pablo
City Branch 30, acting as Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation. RTC-SAC
fxed just compensation at PHP200/sqm. It used the valuation set by
RTC Calamba Branches 35 and 36 in 2 civil cases. RTC-SAC did not
give weight tothe LBPs evidence in justifying its valuation,
pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the
prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation
factors provided in Sec 17 of the CARL. RTC-SAC denied LBPs MR. LBP
appealed to the CA, CA dismissed appeal. Hence, this
petition.ISSUE/HOLDING: W/N RTC-SACs determination of just
compensation for the property was proper. NO. Petition granted,
case was remanded to RTC-SAC.RATIO: [topic] The rules allow the
courts to take judicial notice of certain facts. The taking of
judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it
fulflls the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and
in this sense, it isequivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not
authorized to "take judicial notice ofthe contents of the records
of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court or before the same judge." They may take judicial
notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case
sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in
evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the
court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the
courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court.SC noted that Yatco ofered in evidence
copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which ofer the LBP
opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming,
however, that the order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatcos ofer in
evidence and the LBPs opposition to it) constitutes sufcient
compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the ROC,
the Court still found the RTC-SACs valuation based on Branch 36s
previous ruling to be legally erroneous because:1. The RTC-SAC
fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 66572 and DAR AO 5-983 and
thus acted outside the contemplation of the law. The RTC-SAC did
not point to any specifc evidence or cite the values and amounts it
used in arriving at the PHP200/sqm valuation. It did not even
consider the propertys 2 Section 11. .etermination of /ust
Compensation. 3 0n determining $ust compensation the cost of
ac"uisition of the land the current value of li!e properties its
nature actual use and income the s#orn valuation 'y the o#ner the
ta4 declarations and the assessment made 'y government assessors
shall 'e considered. &he social and economic 'ene5ts
contri'uted 'y the farmers and the farm#or!ers and 'y the
6overnment to the property as #ell as the non(payment of ta4es or
loans secured from any government 5nancing institution on the said
land shall 'e considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.3A. &here shall 'e one 'asic formula for the
valuation of lands covered 'y 7OS orCA%+7 8 (C90 4 :.-) ; (CS 4
:.*) ; (ed 9et 0ncomeCS 8 Compara'le Sales