Connection Theory: The Current Evidence v2.1 draft written – 2/13/11 minor revisions – 9/21/11 Author: Geoff Anders Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Methodology 2.1. The Elegance Principle 2.2. Applying the Principle 2.3. Truth and Usefulness 2.4. Types of Data 2.5. Distinguishing Options 3. Current Evidence 3.1. Evidence For CT 3.1.1. Recommendation Plan Tests 3.1.2. Mind Mapping Tests 3.1.3. Other Sources 3.2. Evidence Against CT 3.2.1. Counterexamples 3.2.2. Conflicts with Established Science 3.2.3. Other Sources 4. Assessment of the Evidence 4.1. The Evidential Situation 4.2. Candidate Theories 4.3. Proposed Conclusions 5. Conclusion 0. Preliminary Remarks Even though this is version 2.0 of this document, it is still an early version. It is better than version 1.0 in a number of regards. Nevertheless, it is still unpolished, incomplete and simplified
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Connection Theory: The Current Evidence
v2.1
draft written – 2/13/11
minor revisions – 9/21/11
Author: Geoff Anders
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Methodology
2.1. The Elegance Principle
2.2. Applying the Principle
2.3. Truth and Usefulness
2.4. Types of Data
2.5. Distinguishing Options
3. Current Evidence
3.1. Evidence For CT
3.1.1. Recommendation Plan Tests
3.1.2. Mind Mapping Tests
3.1.3. Other Sources
3.2. Evidence Against CT
3.2.1. Counterexamples
3.2.2. Conflicts with Established Science
3.2.3. Other Sources
4. Assessment of the Evidence
4.1. The Evidential Situation
4.2. Candidate Theories
4.3. Proposed Conclusions
5. Conclusion
0. Preliminary Remarks
Even though this is version 2.0 of this document, it is still an early version. It is better than
version 1.0 in a number of regards. Nevertheless, it is still unpolished, incomplete and simplified
in a number of regards. Please continue to forgive this. I will release another version of this
document soon.
1. Introduction
Connection Theory (CT) is a scientific theory. As such, it should be accepted or rejected on the
basis of the evidence. This document presents my current evidence both for and against CT, as
well as the conclusion I propose to draw on the basis of this evidence.1
To anticipate, I will draw the tentative conclusion that the evidence favors either (a) the
acceptance of CT as approximately true in at least a narrow range of cases, or (b) the acceptance
of CT as true and universally applicable. Which a person should believe depends, I will argue, on
the person’s philosophical views about the physicality or non-physicality of the mind.
2. Methodology
To assess a scientific theory, one must employ some method. Over the next few sections, I will
discuss the method I use to assess scientific claims and theories. As the purpose of this document
is to assess the evidence for and against CT, and not to give a full exposition of my views on
scientific methodology, I will keep this discussion relatively brief. I will discuss scientific
methodology fully in another document.2
In the following sections, I will state the principle I use to determine which claims to
accept and reject (2.1), describe how to apply this principle in practice (2.2), discuss how the
principle relates to my goals of truth and usefulness (2.3), and discuss the types of data I use
(2.4). I will then distinguish several philosophical theories about the mind and explain why it is
important to distinguish such theories prior to assessing evidence (2.4).
2.1. The Elegance Principle
I use a single principle to determine which scientific claims to accept or reject. I call this
principle the “Elegance Principle”. The Elegance Principle is as follows:
The Elegance Principle:
All propositions included in the most elegant
theory that explains all of the data are true.
1 Keeping in mind the caveat in section 0.
2 Forthcoming.
Let’s clarify some of the terms here. A “theory” is just a collection of one or more
propositions. I will discuss what we count as “data” in section 2.3. For now, an intuitive
understanding will suffice. “Elegance” is a measure of explanatory completeness, i.e., how much
of what is posited by a theory is explained3 within that theory. Go through the things a theory
says are the case. Ask why each of those things is the case. Why does this exist? Why did this
happen? The more a theory can answer, the more elegant it is. The more times a theory fails to
answer, the less elegant it is. Elegance can be thought of as opposite of arbitrariness. The more
that a theory posits arbitrarily, the more there will be unexplained things within the theory, the
less elegant the theory will be. The fewer arbitrary things a theory posits, the more the theory
will provide explanations for what it posits and hence the more elegant the theory will be.
The Elegance Principle is not meant to be special or controversial. It is similar to
principles that many people use, including the many variations of Occam’s Razor. Why do I use
the Elegance Principle instead of another principle? I leave this question to my full discussion of
my views on scientific methodology.
2.2. Applying the Principle
It is straightforward to see how to apply the Elegance Principle in general. If a proposition is
included in the most elegant theory that explains all of the data, then it should be accepted as true
and its negation rejected as false.
It is also fairly simple to see what sorts of theories the Elegance Principle will favor. It is
easier to ask more questions about complex theories, so in general, the Elegance Principle will
favor simpler theories. These simpler theories will still need to explain all of the data, of course,
and this will only be possible if the theories are sufficiently universal. As a result, in general, the
Elegance Principle will favor theories that are more universal. Sometimes when simple, universal
theories are used to explain data, the theories cleanly explain the data. Other times, the theories
can only be made to explain the data by adding various additional posits (dust in the lens, unseen
forces, etc.). Since these additional posits typically decrease the elegance of a theory, all else
equal, the Elegance Principle will typically favor theories that require one to make fewer
additional posits of this sort.
Unfortunately, while it is possible to see how to apply the Elegance Principle in general
and while it is possible to see broadly what sorts of theories the Elegance Principle will favor, I
do not have a procedure for applying the Elegance Principle precisely in practice. I have no way
to precisely rate theories in terms of elegance. I cannot provide them with a precise elegance
“score”. I also do not know how to measure the amount of elegance a theory gains or loses as a
result of particular modifications. A new posit is added and not explained – how much elegance
is lost? Two semi-universal laws are replaced with a single universal law – how much elegance
is gained? I do not currently know how to answer these questions.
In practice, what I do is this. If I am assessing a theory, I consider the theory and get a
general sense of how elegant its major components are. I then look at how well the theory
explains the data. First, I look for data that directly contradict the theory. If there are any such
data, the theory is refuted. Second, I look for data that the theory explains by means of arbitrary
3 Here and elsewhere in this document, I use the word “explain” so that “X explains Y” does not imply “X correctly
explains Y”. According to my use, it is consistent to have an explanation of something that is not a correct
explanation of it.
posits. Such data is evidence against the theory; the more arbitrariness required to explain some
bit of data, the stronger that data is as evidence against the theory. Third, I look for data that the
theory explains without the addition of arbitrary posits. All such data is evidence for the theory;
the cleaner the explanations a theory gives of a piece of data, the stronger that data is as evidence
for the theory. Then I compare the theory to other theories. I look in particular for things that
distinguish theories from one another. If the theory I am assessing only has a poor explanation of
some data (i.e., the theory can only explain the data via a bunch of arbitrary posits), and there are
theories that are have good explanations and that are not too inelegant, this is good reason to
reject the theory in question. If the theory we are assessing has a good explanation of some data
(i.e., the theory can explain the data without adding arbitrary posits), and all other theories either
have poor explanations of that data or are otherwise too inelegant, this is good reason to accept
the theory in question. If there are simultaneously both good reasons to accept a theory and good
reasons to reject it, then the evidential situation is difficult. In such cases, there are various
possible courses of action.
The procedure I have just described involves comparing relative degrees of elegance
without any well-specified procedure for ascertaining or comparing degrees of elegance. This
may seem to be a problem, but as far as I can tell, comparing relative degrees of elegance is
something that scientists in their work and people in everyday life manage to successfully
accomplish every day. If people do manage to compare relative degrees of elegance fairly well,
then the fact that I do not have a well-specified procedure is not a significant practical problem.
(This is not to say that I would not prefer to have a well-specified procedure. I very much
would.)
What happens in the case of disagreement? The fact that I do not have a well-specified
procedure means that in practice we may encounter cases where different people judge theories
differently. If this happens, in many cases it is possible to design tests that will produce data that
will help decide between the different theories. If one person thinks the most elegant theory that
explains the data is theory A and another person thinks it is theory B, we can try to design a test
that will, depending on how the test comes out, produce data that favors theory A over theory B
or produce data that favors theory B over theory A.
One point of clarification. The generally-specified procedure I have just described is a
procedure for assessing total theories, i.e., theories that purport to explain all of the data. It is not
a procedure for assessing partial theories, i.e., theories that purport to explain only some of the
data. To assess partial theories, I first assess total theories. I then adopt whatever partial theories
are included in the total theory I judge to be best. Regarding the task at hand, this means that I
will not assess CT by itself. CT is a partial theory: it offers no explanation at all, for instance, for
the existence of a person’s current sensations. Instead of assessing CT by itself, I will assess the
best total theory that includes CT and compare that to the best total theories that do not include
CT. If I decide that the best total theory that includes CT is the best overall, I will conclude that
CT should be accepted as true. If I decide that some other total theory is the best overall, I will
conclude that CT should be rejected as false.
2.3. Truth and Usefulness
As I said earlier, my goal in this document is to assess CT for truth and usefulness. One might
wonder then whether the deliverances of the Elegance Principle are meant to be true or useful or
both. The answer is somewhat complex.
In section 2.1, I said that my method for assessing scientific claims involves “using” the
Elegance Principle. The Elegance Principle itself says that all of the propositions included in the
most elegant theory that explains the data are “true”. This permits one to interpret my procedure
here in accordance with one’s own philosophical predilections.
If one would like, one can accept the Elegance Principle as true. If one does, then one
should take the deliverances of the Elegance Principle to also be true. In this case, one should
take CT to be true if the claim “CT is true” is part of the most elegant theory that explains the
data, one should take CT to be false if the claim “CT is false” is part of the most elegant theory
that explains the data, one should take CT to be useful if the claim “CT is useful” is part of the
most elegant theory that explains the data and one should take CT to not be useful if “CT is not
useful” is part of the most elegant theory that explains the data.
If one does not want to accept the Elegance Principle as true but is willing to accept the
deliverances of the Elegance Principle as useful, one can form two sets of beliefs. The first set of
beliefs pertains to what is true conditional on the acceptance of Elegance Principle (EP). So, one
should believe “if EP is true, then CT is true” if the claim “CT is true” is part of the most elegant
theory that explains the data, one should believe “if EP is true, then CT is false” if the claim “CT
is false” is part of the most elegant theory that explains the data, one should believe “if EP is
true, then CT is useful” if the claim “CT is useful” is part of the most elegant theory that explains
the data and one should believe “if EP is true, then CT is not useful” if the claim “CT is not
useful” is part of the most elegant theory that explains the data. The second set of beliefs pertains
simply to what is useful. Here, one should believe “CT is useful” if the claim “CT is true” is part
of the most elegant theory that explains the data, one should believe “CT is useful” if the claim
“CT is useful” is part of the most elegant theory that explains the data and one should believe
“CT is not useful” if the claim “CT is not useful” is part of the most elegant theory that explains
the data.
2.4. Types of Data
I have spoken quite a bit about the “data”. What things count as data? I recognize two general
types of data. I will call the first general type “observational” data and the second general type
“theoretical” data.
Let’s start with observational data. Observational data includes all and only those things,
states, events, etc., that one observes. Speaking strictly, this includes only those things that one is
observing oneself right now – the things one sees, smells, hears, tastes, feels and is aware of in
one’s mind. For most purposes, though, it is acceptable to expand what falls under
“observational data” to include things that one has observed in the past and things that others are
observing now or have observed in the past. In this document, unless otherwise noted, I will
include past observations and the past and present observations of others as observational data.
Theoretical data is data of a different sort. It includes, speaking roughly, everything that
one knows through the use of pure reason. Thus theoretical data can include mathematical
results, such as “2 + 2 = 4”, and the rules of logic, such as modus ponens. Some people maintain
that some philosophical claims can be known with certainty. If this is true, whatever
philosophical claims a person knows with certainty can be considered theoretical data as well.
Unfortunately, there is a special difficulty associated with presenting theoretical data
from philosophy (or, more simply, “philosophical data”). The difficulty is that most people today
have not spent time considering philosophical issues and are, as a result, are not currently
prepared to assess sophisticated philosophical arguments. This means that while it may be
possible to collect philosophical data and use it in the assessment of a scientific theory, it is often
difficult to present this data to others. As a result, this version of this document will discuss the
philosophical data only briefly and incompletely. I will include a more complete discussion in a
future version of this document.
2.5. Distinguishing Options
Some will propose that it is impossible to prove anything philosophically and that as a result
there is no need to consider philosophical data at all. Whether this is true or not, there is another
way in which philosophy ideas are relevant to the assessment of CT. This is a way in which
philosophical considerations cannot be avoided.
As described in section 2.1, I use the Elegance Principle to assess scientific theories. CT
is a scientific theory, and so I will assess it using the Elegance Principle. The Elegance Principle
calls for us to accept as true the most elegant theory that explains the data. In order for us to be
able to do this, we must know what the different options are. If we are unfamiliar with the
different candidates for the title of “most elegant theory that fits the data”, we may end up
selecting some sub-optimal theory.
In many cases, being familiar with the different candidate theories does not require us to
make any philosophical distinctions. For the purposes of assessing CT, however, it will be
necessarily to distinguish the philosophical theories of physicalism, dualism and idealism. Why
this is necessary will become clear in section 4.2.
What are physicalism, dualism and idealism? To understand these views, one must first
understand the concept of a non-spatial object. A spatial object is an object that has length, width
and/or depth, has a spatial location and/or stands in one or more spatial relations to other objects.
Examples of spatial objects include rocks, trees, animals, human bodies, stars, electrons, regions
of space and points of space. A non-spatial object is an object that is not a spatial object. Thus a
non-spatial object is one that lacks length, width and depth, lacks a spatial location and does not
stand in any spatial relations to any objects.
In terms of examples of non-spatial objects, many people believe in a God that has no
size, no location and no spatial relation to anything. This means that many people believe in a
non-spatial God. Some people believe that there exist such things as physical laws. If there
physical laws exist, where are they? Could we find the law of gravity and pick it up? Might we
trip over it while out on a walk? Clearly not, the people think. On the contrary, they say, physical
laws exist but have no size, no location and no spatial relation to anything else. Thus these
people believe that physical laws are existing non-spatial objects. Other people believe that there
exist such things as numbers. They take very seriously statements like “there are three odd
numbers between 3 and 11”. They also believe that the numbers lack size, location and spatial
relation to things. Thus they believe that numbers are existing non-spatial objects. And, most
importantly for our purposes, many people believe that the mind is a non-spatial object. They
believe that the mind has no length, breadth or depth (“How big is the mind?”), no spatial
location (“Where is the mind?”) and that the mind is not spatially related to anything else (“What
is the mind to the left of?”).
Whether one agrees that any non-spatial objects exist, it is possible to understand the
proposal that they do. Some may propose that the notion of non-spatial objects is unintelligible,
as it is impossible to picture something in one’s mind that lacks all size and location. It is true
that it is impossible to accurately picture non-spatial objects; however, it is not true that this is a
barrier to understanding them. One can understand the concepts of a four-dimensional space, the
sound of a voice, an invisible person and justice, even though none of these things can be
accurately pictured in the mind. Likewise, one can understand the concept of a non-spatial
object.
Once one has wrapped one’s mind around the concept of non-spatial objects, it is
possible to explain physicalism, dualism and idealism. Physicalism, as I will define it for the
purposes of this document, is the view that states that every existing thing is a spatial object.
Adherents of physicalism often grant that the mind is an existing object; when they do, they also
maintain that the mind is identical to some spatial object, such as the brain or part of the brain.
Dualism, as I will define it, is the view that states that spatial things exist, minds exist and minds
are non-spatial. Idealism, as I will define it, is the view that every existing thing is a non-spatial
object. Adherents of idealism typically believe that the mind is an existing object and is also non-
spatial. (In this connection, “idealism” here should not be confused with other views that
sometimes go by the same name, including the view that things will go well or the view that one
should never compromise one’s moral principles.)
This concludes my remarks on scientific methodology. Again, this has not been meant as
a full discussion. I did not, for instance, discuss whether there are any grounds to utilize the
Principle of Elegance. I will fully describe my views on scientific methodology in another
document.
3. Current Evidence
The evidence pertaining to CT can be divided into two categories: evidence in favor of CT and
evidence against. In sections 3.1 and 3.2 below, I will discuss both of these categories of
evidence. For both, I will select some data, explain how I believe that sort of data should be
assessed, present the data itself and then assess it. As we will see, different pieces of data support
different conclusions to different degrees. In section 4, I will discuss what conclusions I believe
should be drawn on the basis of all the evidence taken together.
3.1. Evidence For CT
Currently, there are six different source of evidence for CT. I will discuss two of them, the
Recommendation Plan tests and the Mind Mapping tests, in detail. I will briefly summarize the
remaining four.
3.1.1. Recommendation Plan Tests
Description. The first type of data I will examine is data from our Recommendation Plan (RP)
tests.
Using CT, a comprehensive CT chart and information about a person’s environment, it is
possible to deduce conditions under which CT says that a person’s beliefs and actions will
change. Each of these conditions can be phrased as a specific prediction, formulated as follows:
“If person X performs actions A1, A2, A3, etc., in that order, then at time T person X will change
in way W”. For instance, CT, a person’s CT chart and the facts of the person’s environment may
imply that if a particular person learns to dance, creates a theory of what her mother approves of
and negotiates how to divide chores with her husband, in that order, then immediately upon the
successful completion of the negotiations she will stop assuming that her husband always
understands what she really wants.
The fact that CT makes specific predictions makes it possible to test those predictions.
This is what RP tests are designed to do. To run an RP test, select a test participant. Make a
comprehensive and accurate CT chart of the participant’s mind. Ask the participant which
elements of her mind she would like to change. Then use CT, the participant’s chart and facts
about the participant’s environment to derive a set of predictions. Each prediction should be of
the form “if the participant performs actions A1, A2, A3, etc., in that order, then at time T the
participant’s mind will change in way W”, where way W is one of the ways the participant
would like her mind to change. Next, have the participant perform the actions in the order
prescribed. Keep track of the results, either by questioning the participant or by having the
participant keep a diary. Once the participant stops performing the actions stated in the
antecedents of the predictions, either because all of the prescribed actions have been taken or for
some other reason, the RP test is complete. Collect all of the results. Be sure to determine which
actions were taken at which times and which results occurred or failed to occur at which times.
For results that occurred, determine how long results lasted. Determine how unusual it was that
the results occurred. If a result, for instance, was the production of a particular action, it is
important to note how frequently the participant performed that action prior to the RP test. Was
this the first time in five years the participant got herself to perform the action in question? Or
did the participant perform the action sporadically in the past? Also, it may be useful to
determine what methods the participant had used previously, if any, to try to cause the same
results, and the degree of success the participant had with those methods.
The data produced by RP tests consists of sets of observed phenomena. For example, a
set of observed phenomena corresponding to a successful prediction could include the following
observations: (a) the participant has been smoking for three years, (b) the participant has been
trying to stop smoking for one year, each time using a method based on willpower, (c) while
trying to stop smoking for a year, the participant succeeded in stretches of a week or a week and
a half on a few occasions, but otherwise continued smoking, (d) the CT advisor created a
practically comprehensive mind chart for the participant, following the procedures stated in the
most recent CT documentation, (e) the CT advisor used the mind chart to generate the following
prediction: “if the participant performs actions A1, A2 and A3, in that order, then immediately
upon the completion of action A3, the participant will stop smoking”, (f) the CT advisor recorded
the prediction made, (g) the participant performed actions A1, A2 and A3, in that order, (h)
immediately upon the completion of action A3, the participant stopped smoking, and (i) the
participant did not smoke for N months following the completion of action A3. A set of observed
phenomena corresponding to a failed prediction could include (a)-(g) but then instead of (h) and
(i), could include: (h*) upon the completion of action A3, the participant did not stop smoking,
and (i*) the participant has continued smoking for N months following the completion of action
A3.
How to assess. Assessing data from an RP test is relatively straightforward. If the participant
performed the actions prescribed in one of the predictions and the effect occurred at the time
predicted, then the prediction came true. If the participant performed the actions prescribed and
the effect did not occur at the time predicted, then the prediction failed. In some cases predicted
effects are amorphous. This can make it difficult to tell whether the effects have occurred. In
such cases, one should note the difficulty and do one’s best.
If a prediction is recorded as coming true, there are several possible explanations. The
prediction may have come true. Or there may have been error in calculating the prediction. Or
there may have been error or bias in recording the results. If the prediction did come true, it
could be because CT is true. Or it could be because CT is false but functionally true in the
relevant circumstances. Or it could be a matter of random chance.
For each prediction recorded as coming true, one should look to see which of these
explanations are more elegant and which are less so. The more unusual the effect, the less
plausible it will be that it was merely a result of random chance. The more concrete the predicted
effect, the less plausible it will be that there was an error in recording the results. Any prediction
that actually came true provides some evidence for CT. The more clearly the prediction came
true, the better. The less plausible it is that some other factor caused the result, the better.
Results that clearly occur, just as predicted, and are not plausibly explained by other factors
provide very strong evidence for CT or for a very similar theory.
If a prediction is recorded as having failed, there are also several possible explanations.
The prediction may simply have failed. The prediction may have been miscalculated, either as a
result of an inaccurate mind chart or as a result of incorrect reasoning from an accurate mind
chart. There may also have been error or bias in recording the results.
For each prediction recorded as having failed, one should look to see which of these
explanations are more and less elegant. Luckily, in the case of failed predictions it is possible to
double-check the accuracy of the mind chart and the accuracy of the derivation of the prediction.
If there appear to be no errors, there is some chance that the predicted effects did occur but were
not noticed. If the effects would have been easily discernible, then either there was some
indiscernible error in the mind chart or the prediction failed. It may be permissible to explain a
very small number of failed predictions as due to unascertainable inaccuracies in the
participant’s mind chart. However, this should only occur rarely. Each case where we must posit
unascertainable inaccuracies in a participant’s mind chart to save CT decreases the elegance of
the best total theory that contains CT. Enough such posits and it will become more plausible to
suppose that predictions have simply failed. If we judge that one of more predictions have
actually failed, we should reject CT. Whether CT or a CT-like theory can be salvaged in the face
of failed predictions will depend on the specific details of the failure.
All of the preceding applies to RP tests conducted with the highest standard of care and
rigor. For RP tests conducted less carefully, the resultant evidence for or against CT will be
proportionally less strong.
The data. I have conducted two full RP tests. The first was performed by me on myself. The
second was performed by me on a friend and colleague of mine. The statistics from the tests are
as follows:
Recommendation Plan Test # 1 2
# of Predictions Originally Made 29 31
# of Original Predictions Tested 15 7
# of Original Predictions Untested 14 28
% of Original Predictions Tested 51.7% 22.6%
# of Original Predictions Tested 15 7
# of Variants of Predictions Tested 0 1
# of Predictions Tested Total 15 8
# of Independent Original Predictions Tested 15 6
# of Independent Variant Predictions Tested 0 1
# of Independent Predictions Tested Total 15 7
# of Successful Independent Predictions 9 7
# of Failed Independent Predictions 1 0
# of Independent Predictions Too Difficult to Confirm 5 0