Evidence Doctrines Roco 2015

8/17/2019 Evidence Doctrines Roco 2015

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Remedial Law Review Doctrines (Evidence) Atty. Tranquil Salvador IIIRoco, B2015

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I. ADMISSIBILITY (Rule 128, Section 3)

1. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, 575 SCRA 170 (2008)QUICKIE F ACTS:In the 2004 Presidential Elections, GMA made a phone call to a Garcillano, a COMELEC official, and allegedly instructed the

latter to manipulate the results in her favor. Unbeknownst to them, their conversation was being recorded and would beeventually known as the “Hello Garci” tapes.

As a result, House inquiries involving various Committees were conducted. During said inquiry, NBI Director Wycocosubmitted 7 allegedly “original” tape recordings thereof. As such, Garcillano filed in the SC a Petition for Prohibition andInjunction seeking to restrain the Committees from using said tape recordings since they were obtained by means of an illega

wiretap. It likewise asked that said recordings be stricken off from the records.

Later, the Senate likewise recommended a legislative investigation on the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP)PNP, and other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. As such, Petitions were filed byseeking to prevent the playing of the recordings in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee. Moreover, thePetition also seek to prohibit or stop the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

Since the Petition as regards the House became moot and academic due to the playing of the tapes in the said Committeehearings.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE SENATE CAN CONDUCT INQUIRIES REGARDING THE “HELLO G ARCI” TAPES.

HELD: NO. SENATE WAS NOT ABLE TO PUBLISH THE R ULES ON LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS IN VIOLATION OF THECONSTITUTION. ALSO, THE INTERNET IS NOT A MEDIUM FOR PUBLISHING LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS.

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representat ives, or anyof its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of

procedure .” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publicationis indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a lawor rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

It was admitted in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the presenSenate of the 14th Congress , however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007 , noeffort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session .

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officerand Investigations , we said:

Fourth , we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the ‘duly published rules of procedure.’ We quote the OSG’s explanation:

The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rulesof procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the onebefore it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’smembership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thusenact a different set of rules as it may deem fit . Not having published its Rules of Procedure , thesubject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate , are therefore, procedurally infirm .


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The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s def iance of the clear and unambiguouslanguage of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or itscommittees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure , anddoes not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision . Theconstitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom , practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Actof 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.

R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a writtendocument only for evidentiary purposes . In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (fotheir being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet amedium for publishing laws, rules and regulations .

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use itsunpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid oflegislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so on ly “inaccordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recentpublication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions .

Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not beundertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it , in clear contravention othe Constitution.

2. People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010QUICKIE F ACTS:Lauga came home one night drunk from a drinking spree. Finding his 13-year-old daughter sleeping and all alone in the house

Lauga raped her. Soon after, Lauga’s son returned and saw his sister crying. Thus, he decided to take her to theirgrandmother’s house. On the way, she talked about what Lauga did to her.

As a result, they sought assistance of a certain Moises Boy Banting, a “Bantay Bayan.” Banting found Lauga in his house andinvited him to the police station. While there, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter because he could not controhimself. After confirming said rape through a medical exam, Lauga was charged for raping his daughter in the RTC.

During trial, the victim, her brother, and Banting gave their testimonies. Thereafter, RTC convicted Lauga of rape qualified byrelationship and minority. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Lauga argues that his extrajudicial confession before the BantayBayan was without assistance of counsel which violated his constitutional right.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT L AUGA’S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION TO A “B ANTAY B AYAN” IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

HELD: INADMISSIBLE BUT THE CONVICTION WAS NOT BASED SOLELY ON SAID EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION . The case of People v. Malagan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malagan , appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions givento the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:

Arguably , the barangay tanods , including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may bedeemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of theConstitution. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by [the]Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. For this reason, the confession of


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accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman, as well as the lighter found in her bag are inadmissiblein evidence against her.

[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. [T]he constitutional safeguards duringcustodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or theiragents but GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY MANNER whereby the accused verbally admits as in the case at bar

when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors [of the private complainant].

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malagan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “bantay bayan ” may bedeemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia , this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a “bantay bayan ,” that is, “a groupof male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] anaccredited auxiliary of the PNP .”

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, aamended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized “to serve as implementing arm of theCity/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.” The composition of the Committee includes, among others(1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan ; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa ; (4

a Barangay Tanod ; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay- Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups ora Non-Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay- based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as inthe case of the “bantay bayan ,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the

preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by MoisesBoy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan ,” particularly on the authority toconduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar asthe entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitutionotherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of Lauga, which was taken without a counsel , inadmissible in

evidence.

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of Lauga was not deduced solely from theassailed extrajudicial confession but “from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt .”

II.

JUDICIAL NOTICE (Rule 129)

1. Corinthian Gardens v. Spouses Tanjangco, G.R. No. No. 160795, June 27, 2008QUICKIE F ACTS:

Tanjangco owned lots adjacent to those owned by Cuaso in the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision which is managed byCorinthian Gardens Association Inc. Before Cuaso constructed their house, Corinthian referred them to Geodetic Engineer

De Dios. Also, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in compliance with their Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Unfortunately, after Cuaso constructed their house, their perimeter fence encroached Tanjangco’s land by 87 sqm. SinceCuaso refused to demolish said perimeter fence upon Tanjangco’s demand, the latter filed an Action for Recovery ofPossession with Damages against Cuaso in the RTC. Cuaso immediately impleaded as parties Corinthian, the engineer, and thebuilder. In particular, Cuaso ascribed negligence on the part of Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and buildingplans without verifying their accuracy which was a proximate cause of said boundary dispute.

RTC ruled in favor of Tanjangco. It ruled that Cuaso was a builder in good faith. Likewise, RTC ordered Cuaso to paymonthly rentals amounting to P2,000. However, the case was dismissed as to Corinthian. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC


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and ruled that Corinthian was negligent. As such, CA ordered them to contribute 5% each to all sums awarded to TanjangcoLikewise, CA ordered them to pay monthly rentals amounting to P10,000. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

For purposes of this topic, Corinthian assails the CA’s unilateral increase without proof of the P2,000 rentals to P10,000.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE COURTS CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RENTALS OF LAND WITHOUT OTHER

EVIDENCE.

HELD: NO. HOWEVER , THERE WAS SUPPORTING EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE RTC AND THE CA.On the second issue, our ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag is instructive:

Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property.However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, couldsimply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence . As we havesaid earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on theevidence adduced by the parties.

In Herrera v. Bollos , the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC,this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial

notice , but by supporting evidence:

A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice ofmatters of public knowledge , or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration , or ought to beknown to judges because of their judicial functions . Before taking such judicial notice, the courtmust ‘allow the parties to be heard thereon.’ Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental valueof the premises in question without supporting evidence .

Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rentalvalue . But contrary to Corinthian’s arguments , both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the

Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property . This uniform factual finding of theRTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below.

Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two decadesthrough no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.

2.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008QUICKIE F ACTS:In 2001, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Manila and with the approval of Mayor Atienza, enacted Ordinance 8027. Under saidordinance, the Pandacan area was reclassified from industrial to commercial. Also, it directed the oil companies operating

within said area to cease and desist from operating within 6 months from the effectivity of the ordinance.

As a result, SJS filed an original Petition for Mandamus in the SC seeking to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance8027. In 2007, SC ruled that Mayor Atienza has a ministerial duty to enforce said ordinance.

As a result, the oil companies intervened. Said companies informed the SC that the oil companies filed complaints before theRTC of Manila assailing the validity of the ordinance and asking for TROs, writs of preliminary injunction, and status quoorders. These were granted. Moreover, the oil companies claim that, in 2006, Ordinance 8119 (Manila Comprehensive LandUse Plan and Zoning Ordinance) was enacted. Based on this, the oil companies again filed complaints assailing the validity ofnew ordinance and seeking to enjoin its enforcement.

The oil companies aver that the implementation of the 2007 decision was impeded by the subsequent passing of Ordinance8119.


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ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE 8119 WAS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE EXECUTION OF THE 2007 DECISION.

HELD: NO. ORDINANCE 8027 WAS NOT SUPERSEDED BY ORDINANCE 8119 The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the AdministrationEnforcement and Amendment thereto” which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that

the Court was never informed about this ordinance.

While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress , the rule with respect to locaordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicianotice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that:

SEC. 50. Judicial notice of ordinances. — All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of theordinances passed by the [ Sangguniang Panglungsod ].

this cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.

Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances , a court is norequired to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access . The partyasking the court to take judicial notice is OBLIGATED TO SUPPLY THE COURT WITH THE FULL TEXT OF THE RULES

THE PARTY DESIRES IT TO HAVE NOTICE OF. Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances .

The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a courmight have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance . Such a statute does not direct the court toact on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance available to the court for ito take notice.

In its defense, Mayor Atienza claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance No. 8119because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not inconsistent with eachother.

In the same way that we deem the oil companies’ late interventi on in this case unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.

3. “G” Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers (NAMAWU), G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 2009QUICKIE F ACTS:Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust, GHI bought 90% of MaricalumMining Corporation’s (MMC) shares and financial claims. After full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHIimmediately took possession and full control of the management and operation of MMC. However, 4 years later, a labor

dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU, exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file employees.

DOLE Secretary Quisumbing assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor of NAMAWU and ordered that MMCcommitted ULP and ordered reinstatement of the laid-off workers. When it reached the SC, the order was sustained andthereafter attained finality.

Thereafter, upon NAMAWU’s motion, Acting Secretary Brion, directed the issuance of a writ of execution and orderedDOLE sheriffs to execute the order. When this reached the SC, the order was also upheld. Since said order was not fullysatisfied on account of MMC’s resistance, Secretary Sto. Tomas issued an Alias Writ of Execution and Break -Open Orderupon NAMAWU’s motion. As a result, MMC’s properties were levied upon.


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Aggrieved, GHI filed in the RTC an Action for Contempt with TRO against the sheriff and contended that the leviedproperties were subject to a Deeds of Real Estate Mortage and Chattel Mortgage executed by MMC in favor of GHI and thathese were already extrajudicially foreclosed. As a result of said foreclosure, the properties were sold to GHI as the highestbidder in the auction sale. As a result, a TRO was issued to enjoin execution.

Thereafter, NAMAWU filed an MR which was denied. On certiorari, CA set aside the RTC’s order and directed immediateexecution. CA stated that the foreclosure was only to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment against MMC. Moreover, theCA pierced the corporate veil and considered GHI and MMC as one entity. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PREVIOUS CASES INTIMATELY RELATED TO THE PRESENT CASE IN DECIDING THE ISSUE PERTAINING TO NAMAWU’S CLAIMS AND GHI’S MORTGAGE CLAIMS OVERPROPERTIES OF MMC.

HELD: Y ES. CA SHOULD HAVE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PREVIOUS DECISIONS . Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, weacknowledge our Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. “G” Holdings, Inc ., in whichGHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC , and thus, entitled to the delivery of the

company notes accompanying the said purchase. These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, werepart of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Eachof these notes uniformly contains stipulations “establishing and constituting in favor of GHI ” mortgages over MMC’sreal and personal properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a separate document denominated Deed oReal Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was registered on February 4, 2000.

We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts below inthe disposition of the controversy at their respective levels . To repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right ofNAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and

personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below.

The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we

find it timely to reiterate that: “courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not thecase pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration .”

However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the challenged writ of injunction depends onthe validity of the third party’s (GHI’s) claim of ownership over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by thelabor department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated as athird party or a stranger to the labor dispute , whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution datedDecember 18, 2001.

In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid , as they providethe necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid ownership claim over the propertiessubject of the writ of execution.

In Juaban v. Espina , we held that “in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other casesthat are closely connected to the matter in controversy . These cases may be so closely interwoven , or so clearlyinterdependent , as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.” The two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of suchcharacter, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

Having recognized these crucial Court rulings, situating the facts in proper perspective, we now proceed to resolve thequestions identified above.


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4. Spouses Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009QUICKIE F ACTS:Rosalie Chua owned a commercial building in Baclaran. Pursuant to a Contract of Lease, spouses Latip leased 2 cubicles insaid building. A year after the commencement of the lease, Chua sent Latip a letter demanding payment of back rentals andshould they fail to pay, to vacate said leased cubicles. When this remained unheeded, Chua filed a Complaint for UnlawfulDetainer against Latip in the MTC.

In their answer, spouses Latip claimed that the lease had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment toChua of 2,570,000. Nonetheless, MTC ruled in favor of Chua. On appeal, RTC reversed on the ground that the Contract ofLease not notarized and lacked the signature of Chua’s husband. Likewise, the RTC denied Chua’s claim that the 2,570,000

was merely goodwill payment since she failed to present evidence to substantiate this claim.

Later, CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the MTC decision ordering that the spouses Latip should vacate. In its decision,CA took judicial notice of the common practice in the Baclaran area (near the Redemptorist Church) of the payment ofgoodwill money. This finding was supported by a Joint Sworn Declaration other lessees in the commercial building that theyall had to pay goodwill money to Chua prior to occupying their cubicles.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT, IN RULING THAT THE L ATIP SPOUSES SHOULD BE EJECTED, THE CA CORRECTLY TOOK JUDICIALNOTICE OF THE ALLEGED COMMON PRACTICE OF THE PAYMENT OF GOODWILL MONEY .

HELD: NO.Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionaryon the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory . — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction ofevidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government andsymbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, thepolitical constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicialdepartments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary . — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public

knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of theirjudicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to takejudicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisitenotoriety exists ; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in thenegative .

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have THREE MATERIAL REQUISITES:

(1)

the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2)

it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain ; and(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts ofgeneral notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form ofevidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired .


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This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge . The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not thejudicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, notgenerally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters

which are “commonly” known.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to theknowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life , or they may be matterswhich are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioneddemonstration . Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias ,dictionaries or other publications , are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of everyperson.

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , which cited State Prosecutors :

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of

general notoriety . Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute inthat it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court ; or (2) capable ofaccurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably bequestionable .

As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judiciallynoticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any factwhich , in part, is dependent on the existence or nonexistence of a fact of which the court has noconstructive knowledge .

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the CA took judicialnotice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety . To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed

practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area . Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former evenruling in favor of Chua, found that the practice was of “common knowledge” or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Chua, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claimthat the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached anannex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in RoferxaneBldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor.

On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be provedunder Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certainmatter so notoriously known , it will not be disputed by the parties . However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety isbelied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Chua;s appeal before

the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Chua ; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rulesof Court — What need not be proved .

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in theBaclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors , justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason forthe claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative .


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III. JUDICIAL ADMISSION (Rule 129, Section 4)

1. Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, supra QUICKIE F ACTS:In 2001, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Manila and with the approval of Mayor Atienza, enacted Ordinance 8027. Under saidordinance, the Pandacan area was reclassified from industrial to commercial. Also, it directed the oil companies operating

within said area to cease and desist from operating within 6 months from the effectivity of the ordinance.

As a result, SJS filed an original Petition for Mandamus in the SC seeking to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance8027. In 2007, SC ruled that Mayor Atienza has a ministerial duty to enforce said ordinance.

As a result, the oil companies intervened. Said companies informed the SC that the oil companies filed complaints before theRTC of Manila assailing the validity of the ordinance and asking for TROs, writs of preliminary injunction, and status quoorders. These were granted. Moreover, the oil companies claim that, in 2006, Ordinance 8119 (Manila Comprehensive LandUse Plan and Zoning Ordinance) was enacted. Based on this, the oil companies again filed complaints assailing the validity onew ordinance and seeking to enjoin its enforcement.

The oil companies aver that the implementation of the 2007 decision was impeded by the subsequent passing of Ordinance8119. Moreover, they assert that Mayor Atienza judicially admitted that Ordinance 8027 was repealed by Ordinance 8119 in a

civil case wherein Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance 8027. It is claimed that there was a judicial admission when, in Petron’s Motion to Withdraw Complaint, it was stated that the issue has been rendered moot and academic by virtueof the passage of Ordinance 8119.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THERE A JUDICIAL ADMISSION SUCH THAT M AYOR A TIENZA IS ALREADY CONSIDERED ASESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT ORDINANCE 8027 WAS NOT REPEALED BY THE SUBSEQUENT ORDINANCE .

HELD: NO JUDICIAL ADMISSION. THEY WERE NOT MADE IN THE SAME PROCEEDING Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing

that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here.

Mayor Atienza made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03106379 and 06115334 which are no“the same” as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the SAME CASE IN

WHICH IT IS OFFERED.

Hence, Mayor Atienza is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No.8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped . They rely on the argument thatOrdinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119’s) validity. We frown on the

adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of whatappears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute oordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

2.

Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, G.R. No. 174154QUICKIE F ACTS:Cuenco leased from Talisay Tourist Sports Complex Inc the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex to be operated as a cockpit. Inaccordance to their agreement, Cuenco made a deposit of 500,000 equivalent to 6 months rent to answer for whatever damagethat may be incurred on the property during the period of the lease. Cuenco was likewise obliged to keep the property in goodcondition and that said property would be open for regular spot inspection during the period of the lease.


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Upon expiration of the contract, Talisay conducted a public bidding for the lease of said property. Unfortunately for Cuencothe lease was awarded to a certain Salud. Thereafter, Cuenco wrote 4 demand letters for the purpose of the return of thedeposit he paid considering that he already made the necessary repairs on the property. Likewise, in said letters, he asked that

Talisay to send a representative to conduct an ocular inspection for the release of the deposit.

In all 4 occasions, Talisay never replied. Thus, Cuenco was constrained to seek judicial recourse. Consequently, he filed aComplaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Talisay for acting in bad faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without justifiable reason. In its Answer, Talisay contended that the physical damage caused by Cuenco was more than500,000.

During pre-trial, Talisay admitted that there was no inventory of damages on the property as of that time. This was confirmedin the Pre-Trial Order. Then, trial ensued and the parties were allowed to present evidence. In particular, Talisay presented aninventory of the property. Afterwards, RTC ruled in favor of Cuenco and ordered Talisay to return the amount of the depositplus litigation expenses. It also ruled that the inventory submitted during trial was a mere afterthought. On appeal, CAreversed. Hence, this petition.

Cuenco asserts that the admission by Talisay during pre-trial was binding as a judicial admission.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE ADMISSION DURING PRE- TRIAL BY T ALISAY ’S COUNSEL THAT NO INVENTORY WASCONDUCTED CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A JUDICIAL ADMISSION THEREBY NEGATING ANY EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING

TRIAL WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED ADMISSION.

HELD: Y ES. ADMISSIONS CONFIRMED IN A PRE- TRIAL ORDER ARE CONCLUSIVE AND BINDING ON THE PARTY MAKING THEM.Indeed, at the pre-trial conference, Talisay’s counsel made an admission that no inventory was made on the leased premises , at least up to that time. This admission was confirmed in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court onMarch 8, 1999 after the lease expired on May 8, 1998.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof . The admission may be contradicted only by ashowing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in

(1)

the pleadings ; (2) during the trial , by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding .

The STIPULATION OF FACTS AT THE PRE- TRIAL of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judiciaadmissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were

made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, asembodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.

Talisay did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake . As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts .

The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decisionmaking. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worth less.


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Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a “general or implied authority” is regarded as an actof the client which renders Talisay in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive uponthe person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

Thus, Talisay are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed anerror when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents ’ evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.

3.

Toshiba Information v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.No.157594, March 9, 2010QUICKIE F ACTS:

Toshiba filed applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of 1997 in the amounof 3.6M. Toshiba likewise filed a Petition for Review with the CTA to toll the 2-year prescriptive period. Naturally, CIRopposed the claim for tax credit/refund. Thereafter, CTA advised the parties to file a Joint Stipulation of Facts and IssuesPertinently, the parties agreed that Toshiba is subject to 0% VAT on its export sales.

During the trial, Toshiba presented documentary evidence in support of its claim. On the other hand, CIR did not present anyevidence. Subsequently, CTA ruled in favor of Toshiba stating that CIR admitted that the export sales of Toshiba were subjectto 0% VAT. Thus, Toshiba could then claim tax credit/refund of its input VAT. However, CTA reduced the refund to 1.3M.

On MR, CIR contended that since Toshiba is merely VAT-exempt, it is not entitled to a tax credit/refund. CTA denied the

MR. Aggrieved, CIR filed a Petition for Review in the CA which granted the appeal and reversed the CTA finding. CA heldthat Toshiba was not entitled because it was a tax-exempt entity. Toshiba’s MR was denied. Hence, this Petition.

Toshiba asserts that CIR should already be bound by his admission in their Stipulation of Facts.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT CIR ADMITTED THAT TOSHIBA WAS VAT-REGISTERED AND THAT ITS EXPORT SALES WEREZERO-RATED AND THUS ENTITLED TO REFUND.

HELD: Y ES. The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latter’s export sales were VAT-exempt transactions areinconsistent with the explicit admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues (Joint Stipulation) thatToshiba was a registered VAT entity and that it was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales .

The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised to do so by the CTAat the end of the pre-trial conference held on June 23, 1999. The approval of the Joint Stipulation by the CTA , in itsResolution dated July 12, 1999, marked the culmination of the pre-trial process in CTA Case No. 5762.

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rulesof Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. It has been hailed as “themost important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century.”

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judiciaadmission . Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof . The admission maybe contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made

The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when the opposing party relied upon the same andaccordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of theproceedings does not require proof.

In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved JoinStipulation are that Toshiba “is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, asamended[,]”that “is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.” The CIR was bound by these admissions, which he could not eventuallycontradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decision dated October 16, 2000, by arguing that Toshibawas actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions . Obviously, Toshiba could no


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have been subject to VAT and exempt from VAT at the same time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba could not have beensubject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as well.

The CIR does not deny that his counsel, Atty. Joselito F. Biazon, Revenue Attorney II of the BIR, signed the JoinStipulation, together with the counsel of Toshiba , Atty. Patricia B. Bisda. Considering the presumption of regularity in theperformance of official duty, Atty. Biazon is presumed to have read, studied, and understood the contents of the Join

Stipulation before he signed the same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the contrary.

Yet, the Court observes that the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decisiondated October 16, 2000, nor in his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals , that Atty. Biazon committed amistake in signing the Joint Stipulation. Since the CIR did not make such an allegation, neither did he present any proof insupport thereof. The CIR began to aver the existence of a palpable mistake only after the Court of Appeals made such adeclaration in its Decision dated August 29, 2002.

IV.

P ARAFFIN TEST

1.

Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006QUICKIE F ACTS:

One day, after Artemio Pantinople had dinner, he was shot on the chest. Immediately after, in the local dialect, he called out tohis neighbor, Lito, and said, “Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.” Lito did not immediately approach Artemio as hefeared that he might also be shot. Thereafter, Lito saw Artemio’s wife running towards the direction of her husband whileshouting, “Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa?” Hours later, the police came. Thereafter, the went to Brgy CaptainMarturillas house and asked him to go with them to the police station in connection with the killing of Artemio.

Thereafter, Marturillas was charged with Homicide. During trial, his defense was that of an alibi and claimed that he was in hishouse when the alleged shooting occurred. This was all corroborated by his relatives. Despite this, RTC convicted him ofHomicide. CA affirmed the conviction. Hence, this petition.

Marturillas argues that the RTC and the CA erred in considering Artemio’s utterances as the latter’s dying declaration or aspart of the res gestae. Moreover, he contends that he should not have been found guilty because the paraffin test conducted

yielded a negative result.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE NEGATIVE RESULT OF THE PARAFFIN TEST CONCLUSIVELY PROVED THAT M ARTURILLAS WAS NOT GUILTY .

HELD: NO. While the paraffin tests were negative , that fact alone did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and timeagain, this Court has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun .

In other words, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates , as when culprits wear gloves , wash theirhands afterwards , or are bathed in perspiration . Besides, the prosecution was able to establish the events during theshooting, including the presence of petitioner at the scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative paraffin

test result, are of lesser probative value.

V.

PHOTOGRAPH AS E VIDENCE

1. Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118441, January 18, 2000QUICKIE F ACTS:

While Macarubo and Abraham were driving home from a party, their Ford Escort encountered mechanical trouble which hadto be repaired. After the defective cross-joint was fixed, it was only after 5am that they were able to drive the car. At around6:15am, the car figured in an accident with a bus driven by Armando Jose and owned by Manila Central Bus Lines


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Corporation (MCL). Macarubo and Abraham were seriously injured. Immediately thereafter, Jose rushed them to a nearbyhospital. Macarubo died 5 days later while Abraham survived but was blinded in one eye. As a result, Abraham sued MCL and

Jose for damages in the RTC. Similarly, Macarubo’s parents sued MCL alone for damages in the same RTC. MCL filed a thirdparty complaint against the registered owner of the car — Juanita Macarubo — on the theory that Macarubo was negligent

The cases were consolidated.

In dismissing the case against MCL and Jose, RTC found that Macarubo was negligent. Aside from the fact that he had nosleep and was not in the proper condition to drive, photos of the accident showed that the MCL bus was in its proper lane while the car crossed the line of MCL indicating that the car was in the act of overtaking.

On appeal, Macarubo and Abraham contend that the photos cannot be relied upon considering that they were taken an hourafter the collision and thus the position of the vehicles could have been changed. Moreover, the photos do not show that thecar was overtaking another vehicle when the collision occurred. Hence, this petition.

MCL and Jose heavily relied on the photo showing the position of the vehicles to attribute negligence on the part ofMacarubo. On the other hand, Macarubo and Abraham relied on Abraham’s testimony which claimed that the collision tookplace because the bus invaded their lane.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN RELY ON THE PHOTOS TO HOLD THAT M ACARUBO WAS NEGLIGENT WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED.

HELD: Y ES. The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham’s testimony which wasobviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence .

Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthyevidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court hasin many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth . In People v. Vasquez , where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail.

In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line inspecto Jesus Custodio about an hour and 15 minutes after the collision , disputes Abraham’s self -serving testimony that the2 vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly theopposite of what he claimed happened.

Contrary to Abraham’s testimony, the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it wasthe Ford Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The 3 photographs show the Ford Escort positioneddiagonally on the highway, with its 2 front wheels occupying Bus 203’s lane . As shown by the photograph markedExhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the centerline separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet fromthe center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtakinganother vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.

Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was filled with passengers , and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort . If it was overtaking another vehicle, itnecessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum sothat the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a considerable distance from thepoint of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escort’s smashed hood was only about one or two meters fromBus 203’s damaged left front. If there had been a great impact , such as would be the case if Bus 203 had been running aa high speed, the 2 vehicles should have ended up far from each other .

In discrediting the physical evidence, the CA made the following observations:


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We cannot believe that it was the car which overtook another vehicle and proceeded to the lane occupied bythe bus. There was a traffic jam on the “bus lane” while traffic was light on the “car lane.” Indeed, we find itinconceivable that the car, occupying the lane without any traffic, would overtake and traverse a heavy traffic lane .

This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on the opposite lane

occupied by Bus 203.

The likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not have been overtaking another vehicle , it actually strayed intothe bus’ lane because of the defective cross-joint, causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.

VI. BEST E VIDENCE R ULE/SECONDARY E VIDENCE (Rule 130)

1. Edsa Shangrila v. BF Corporation, G.R. 145842, June 27, 2008QUICKIE F ACTS:

A construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builder’s Work for the EDSA Shangri -la HoteProject was executed between Shang and BF Corporation. In said contract, it stipulated for the payment of the contract priceon the basis of work accomplished. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to Shang wherein thelatter would re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress billing.

BF complied with the procedures and submitted Builders Work Summary (BWS), monthly progress billings, evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Manager’s Instructions (PMI), and valuations in the Work Variation Orders (WVO) forfinal re-measurement.

From May 1991 to June 1992, BF submitted 19 progress billings. Based on progress billings 1-13, Shang paid 85M. Accordingto BF, however, Shang did not re-measure the work done with respect to progress billings 14-19. Likewise, Shang did notremit any payment even though BF worked continuously.

After demands to collect failed, BF filed an Action for Sum of Money and Damages in the RTC. In its defense, Shang claimedthat it overpaid BF with respect to progress billings 1-13 and that BF incurred delays and produced inferior work

Nonetheless, RTC ruled in favor of BF. In the fallo, it held Shang liable as well as the members of its Board of Directors (e.gDean Del). RTC found that Shang’s refusal to pay amounted to bad faith.

Shang’s MR was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Shang contends that pursuant to the best evidence rule,the photocopies of Progress Billings 14-19, PMIs, and WVOs should not have been admitted in evidence. On the other handBF asserts that there was basis for presenting secondary evidence considering that the originals were in Shang’s possession andrefused to hand them over despite the BF’s requests.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE LOWER COURT ADMITTED THEPHOTOCOPIES OF SAID DOCUMENTS.

HELD: NO. I T FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE.

The only actual rule that the term “best evidence” denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition , be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the originacannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule :

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of adocument, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, EXCEPT in thefollowing cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith onthe part of the offeror ;


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(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence isoffered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice [.]

Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or

under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it . If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence maybe presented as in the case of loss .

SECONDARY EVIDENCE of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than the originainstrument or document itself . A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when theoriginal is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party .

In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.

In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question as secondaryevidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.

Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documentswhich Shang had possession of ; (2) a request was made on Shang to produce the documents ; (3) Shang was affordedsufficient time to produce them ; and (4) Shang was not inclined to produce them .

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other wordsthe conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document assecondary evidence have been met. These are:

(1) there is proof of the original document’s execution or existence;(2) there is proof of the cause of the original document’s unavailability; and(3) the offeror is in good faith.

While perhaps not on all fours because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People , is very much apt, thus:

To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or controlof the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonablenotice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proofof its existence.

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom itis offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he hasdone all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce thedocument . The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in

open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum , provided that the partyin custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may beadmitted.

2. Chua Gaw v. Chua G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008QUICKIE F ACTS:

The Spouses Chi were founders of 3 corporations namely Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill, and Columbia Wood. Thespouses had 7 children. When one of the spouses died, the surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition andRenunciation of Hereditary Rights wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber.


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Meanwhile, Concepcion Chua Gaw, one of the children, asked one of her siblings, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200K for theconstruction of their house in Bulacan. It was agreed that the loan would be payable within 6 months without interest.However, Gaw was not able to pay. Failing to heed the demand letters, Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of Moneyagainst Gaw in the RTC.

In their Answer, Gaw argues that the P200K was not a loan but his share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber after Gawrequested for an accounting and payment of her share in the profits.

During trial, Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify as an adverse witness. On direct examination, the latter testified that he ownsthe lots on which Hagonoy Lumber stands. On cross-examination, Suy Ben Chua explained that his sister acquired HagonoyLumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition and that he was able to acquire the same from his sister through a Deed of Sale.

RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua. Furthermore, RTC held that the validity of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Saleevidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Suy Ben Chua’s sister was never impugned. Although Suy BenChua failed to produce the originals of said documents, Gaw judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partitionand even acknowledged her signature thereon. As for the Deed of Sale, since its contents were not put in issue, non-presentation of the original is not fatal to its authenticity and as to the truth of its contents. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence,this petition.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE DEED OF P ARTITION AND THEDEED OF S ALE.

HELD: Y ES. The “best evidence rule” as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only whenthe content of such document is the subject of the inquiry . Where the issue is only as to whether such document wasactually executed , or exists , or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence ruledoes not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible . Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible withouneed to account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’sdiscretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other usefu

purpose will be served by requiring production.

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to theterms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. Gaw never even deniedtheir due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition . As for the Deed of Sale, Gaw had, in effectadmitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by therules.

Gaw merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, Gaw does not contest thecontents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber toChua Sioc Huan was only temporary.

An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties andobligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties . The parties’ intention is to be deciphered from thelanguage used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who arestrangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to containall the terms agreed upon and there can be , between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of suchterms other than the contents of the written agreement.


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3. Sasan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008QUICKIE F ACTS:Equitable PCI entered into a Contract of Services with Helpmate Inc (HI). HI would hire and assign workers to Equitable toperform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. Sasan et al were among those employed and assigned to EquitableLater, Sasan et al filed complaints for illegal dismissal against Equitable and HI. They contended that HI’s dismissal was nuland void because they considered themselves as regular employees of Equitable.

LA found that HI was a labor-only contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital orinvestment. As a result, Equitable and HI appealed to the NLRC. During said appeal, HI presented for the first time severalphotocopies of documents indicating that HI had substantial capital and investments.

As a result, NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented and declared that HI is a r highly capitalized venture and is thus not engaged in labor only contracting. Sasan filed an MR but this was denied. In the CA, CA affirmed thefinding of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

Sasan et al contend that the NLRC should not have accepted said documents considering they were only raised for the firsttime during appeal.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO PROVE THAT HI HAD SUBSTANTIAL CAPITALIZATION IS ADMISSIBLE.

HELD: Y ES. TECHNICAL R ULES OF E VIDENCE ARE NOT BINDING IN LABOR CASES E VIDENCE MAY BE PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admievidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules oevidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts ineach case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure , all in the interest of due

process.

The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules oevidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases . The NLRC and labor arbiters are

directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively , withouregard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice .

In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavitssubmitted by the parties for the first time on appeal . The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudicethe other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.

In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , we again emphasized that:

[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technicalrules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.

The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technicalrules of evidence are not binding in labor cases . In fact, labor officials are mandated by the LaborCode to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily andobjectively , without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC , and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v. NLRC , we heldthat even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appealto the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling backon the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first courseof action would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.


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BEST E VIDENCE R ULE DOES NOT APPLY IN L ABOR C ASES For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in Sasan et al’s protestations against the documentary evidence submittedby HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, Sasan et al are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:

Section 3. Original document must be produced ; exceptions . — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of adocument, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself[.]

The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document , no evidenceshall be admissible other than the original document itself . Notably, CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES of these documentsacceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to Sasan et al.

Even assuming that Sasan et al were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC arenot covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts . Technical rules ofevidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a carefullook into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.

Sasan et al had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, their

Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentaryevidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, Sasan et al cannot now be heard to complain about these documentaryevidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate jobcontractor.

4. DECS v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 146596, January 26, 2005QUICKIE F ACTS:Del Rosario filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against DECS. They alleged that they were owners of a property inBulacan, a portion of which is occupied by a school run by DECS. Despite demands to vacate, DECS refused to heed saiddemand.

In its Answer, DECS claimed that said portion of the land was donated to them by the predecessor of Del Rosario. The Deed

of Donation was prepared by Judge Natividad and it was accepted by the Municipal Council through a resolution. In factDECS later renamed the school after its donor, Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.

However, since the Deed of Donation when the Municipality transferred to a new building, DECS sought to prove itsexistence through the testimonies of 3 witnesses (Nicolas, De Jesus, Judge Natividad). Thereafter, the RTC ruled in favor ofDECS. It held that they were able to prove the Deed’s due execution and acceptance.

On appeal, CA reversed. It held that DECS was unable to prove the existence and due execution of the Deed. Moreover, itCA opined that the DECS did not conduct a diligent search of said Deed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE DECS WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE OF THE DEED OFDONATION AND THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL R ESOLUTION ACCEPTING THE DONATION AS WELL AS THE LOSS OF THEREOF.

HELD: NO. The donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the formalities stated in Article 749 of the CiviCode. Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in a public instrumentOtherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary public is a public document. The notarypublic shall certify that he knows the person acknowledging the instrument and that such person is the same person whoexecuted the instrument, acknowledging that the instrument is his free act and deed.


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The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. An acceptance made in aseparate instrument must also be in a public document. If the acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the donor shall benotified in writing of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact of such notification.

BEST AND SECONDARY E VIDENCE The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of donation with all the

formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code . The duty to produce the original document arises when thesubject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself . Simply put, when a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the bestevidence is the original writing itself.

A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the exceptions in Section 3, Rule130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions . — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of adocument, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the followingcases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on

the part of the offeror [.]

In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable . — When the original document has been lost or destroyed, orcannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of itsunavailability without bad faith on his part , may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of itscontents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document itself . A party mayintroduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, bualso when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror .

However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort tosecondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non production of the original instrument . The correct order of proof is as follows: EXISTENCE , EXECUTION , LOSSCONTENTS , although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary.

The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the deed of donation since he testifiedthat he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and that he witnessed the signing of the document.However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personaknowledge of the contents of the document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.

In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus’ testimony does not help to establish the deed of donation’s existence, execution and contents . He

testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information thatIsaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself. If at all, DECS offered Vidal De Jesus’ testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get acopy of the deed but the Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was lost when the municipal office wastransferred to a new building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved futile too.

This leaves us with Judge Nati vidad’s testimony. Judge Natividad testified that he prepared and notarized the deed ofdonation. He further testified that there was a municipal council Resolution, signed in the Office of the Secretary and of theMayor, accepting the donation and expressing gratitude to the donor. He furnished the municipal government, the DECSDivision Office of Bulacan and the clerk of court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation. DECS did not introduce in


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evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the doneecommunicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the circumstance that DECS constructed theschool during Isaias’ lifetime without objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted inboth instruments.

SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF OF LOSS

What mainly militates against DECS’ claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate proof that DECS or the Municipalitymade a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessfulPrior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the existence and due execution of theinstrument . After a party establishes the existence and due execution of the document, he must prove that thedocument was lost or destroyed . The destruction of the instrument —

may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the factof its loss, or by anyone who had made, on the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place[or] places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custodythe document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which issufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in Bulacan. The copies of the

deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly “lost” when these offices transferred to new locations. However, asthe Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failedto account for other copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designatedgovernment offices.

VII.

P AROLE E VIDENCE R ULE

1. ACI Phil. Inc. v. Coquia, G.R. No. 174466, July 14, 2008QUICKIE F ACTS:

ACI Philippines was in the business of manufacturing fiberglass. Instead of using silica sand, it opted to use recycled brokenglass or flint cullets to save on manufacturing costs. For this purpose, ACI contracted with Coquia for the purchase of 2,500-

3,000 metric tons at a price of 4.20 per kilo through a Purchase Order. Several deliveries made were accepted and paid for by ACI.

However, ACI demanded the reduction of the purchase price to 3.65, to which Coquia acceded. Nonetheless, when deliveries were again made, ACI accepted but refused to pay them at the reduced price but further demanded that it be reduced to 3.10per kilo.

Aggrieved, Coquia filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against ACI seeking payment for the deliveriesmade at the renegotiated price of 3.65 per kilo. A few days after the filing of the Complaint, ACI paid for the flint cullets. In

ACI’s Answer however, it contended that the agreement stipulated in the Purchase Order did not express the true intent of theparties because, while it provided that time was of the essence, it was not specified when ACI needed the flint culletsHowever, RTC ignored this.

Subsequently, RTC ruled for Coquia and ordered ACI to pay for the deliveries at 4.20 per kilo and also awarded damages. Onappeal, CA affirmed and stated that the Purchase Order was a contract of adhesion which must be construed against ACI. OnMR, ACI contends that it did not intimidate Coquia in accepting the reduced price and that it contracted with Coquia uponthe latter’s assurance that she could promptly deliver the flint cullets required. However, ACI believes that the RTC and CAerroneously refused to receive evidence aliunde to prove that time was an important element of the agreement.

Essentially, ACI believes that the RTC should not have granted the objection of Coquia on the ground of parole evidence ruleto preclude ACI from presenting evidence aliunde to prove that time was an element of their agreement.


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ISSUE: W HETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED EVIDENCE ALIUNDE TO PROVE THAT TIME WAS THE ELEMENT.

HELD: Y ES. THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE P AROLE E VIDENCE R ULE. There is every indication in this case that Coquia, a presumably astute businesswoman who has dealings with big corporationssuch as La Tondeña as the latter’s sole buyer of cullets and has the financial savvy to obtain a loan from a bank, gave her

assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with full knowledge. She was, in fact, the one who sought a contract with petitionerupon learning of the latter’s need for a supply of flint cullets.

We cannot, therefore, apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in construing the provisions of the purchase orders in this caseEven the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse side of the purchase orders, which uniformly provide —

4. Delivery of the goods must be made at the Purchaser’s address shown on the face of this order or asotherwise directed, on a working day between the hours of 8:00 and 3:30 p.m. Until delivery the goods shallbe at the Vendor’s risk. Any delivery date shown on this order shall be of the essence of any contractarising. Delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or delivery schedule and anyquantities delivered in excess of that specified on the order may be returned by the Purchaser at the Vendor’srisk and expense.

— do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in favor of ACI.

If anything, in fact, Condition 4 above seems to have worked to ACI’s disadvantage as it underpins the refusal of theRTC to accept evidence aliunde to show that time was of the essence in the transaction. The said condition specificallymentions that the “delivery date shown on (the purchase order) shall be of the essence of any contract arising ” andthat “delivery must be made in strict accordance with the order or delivery schedule .” Purchase Order No. 106211however, is unusually silent as to the date the flint cullets are needed .

ACI remedied this seeming inadvertence by squarely raising the failure of the purchase order to express the trueintent of the parties , i.e., that ACI entered into a contract with Coquia conditioned upon the latter’s prompt delivery of flincullets, as an issue in its Answer with Counterclaims. Unfortunately, the RTC sustained Coquia’s objection based on the parol evidence rule .

It is a CARDINAL RULE OF EVIDENCE, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the bestevidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is establishedas the repository of the parties’ stipulations , any other evidence is excluded and the same cannot be used as asubstitute for such contract , nor even to alter or contradict them .

This rule, however, is not without exception. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may presenevidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of thewritten agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties . Since an exception to the parol evidencerule was squarely raised as an issue in the Answer , the RTC should not have been so inflexible as to completelydisregard ACI’s evidence .

Sifting through the testimony of Coquia, we find that although she was not given definite days during which she shoulddeliver the flint cullets , she was indeed apprised of ACI’s urgent need for large quantities thereof .

Furthermore, ACI presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its materials control manager , to provethat it agreed to the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because Coquia assured it of prompt deliveries sufficient fo petitioner’s production requirements. These testimonies give us a more complete picture of the transaction between theparties and allow for a more reasoned resolution of the issues, without overreliance on the tenuous application of the rule oncontracts of adhesion.

Evidence Doctrines Roco 2015

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