Evid

Sec. 34

MBTC vs Custodio GR # 173780 March 21, 2011

This civil case is essentially a demand by a bank for the recovery of a sum of money from one of its tellers who allegedly failed to account for funds entrusted to her, amounting to six hundred thousand pesos (PhP600,000).Petitioner Metrobank argues that respondent Custodios prior involvement in a cash shortage in its Cubao branch is admissible as evidence to prove a scheme or habit on her part.The general evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time. However, evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like. In Citibank N.A., (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, the Court explained the rationale for this rule:The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial convenience. The fact that a person has committed the same or similar acts at some prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical guaranty that he committed the act in question. This is so because, subjectively, a man's mind and even his modes of life may change; and, objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at a given time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way. Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity of collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well as confuse the court and prolong the trial. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially to actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it reveals a mistake. In this case however, respondent Custodios prior involvement in a cash shortage in the banks Cubao branch does not conclusively prove that she is responsible for the loss of PhP600,000 in the Laoag City branch, subject of the instant case. Regrettably, the evidence offered by petitioner Metrobank is insufficient to convince to the Court that the probability of respondent Custodios having taken the money is greater than its having been taken by another employee. Verily, weighing the evidence on record, the Court finds that petitioner Metrobank failed in its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that respondent Custodio took PhP600,000 from petitioner Metrobank and is liable to return the amount to the latter.PP vs Dadles 278 SCRA 393Intent

Accused were charged with 2 counts of kidnapping. Since the 2 incidents happened almost simultaneously, the cases were consolidated and joint trial ensued. In the first case, accused tied the hands of the 2 victims and pointed their guns at them. In the second, however, it appears that the 2 victims were not physically threatened or tied.

Can the evidence in the first case be used in the second to prove that accused had the intent to deprive the victims of liberty?

Yes. That the victims hands were not tied nor guns poked at their sides when they were taken by accused do not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty. The circumstances surrounding the taking of the victims in the first case, particularly the previous conduct of accused in kidnapping them, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive the victims in the other case of their liberty.True it is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time. However, it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. Thus, it was held that:The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be shown to influence a jury in passing upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the particular offense for which he is on trial. A man may have committed many crimes and still be innocent of the crime charged in the case on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one tends to prove the other.

Sec. 35

Sec. 36

PP vs Cabintoy 247 SCRA 442As applied to testimonyThe investigating policemen discovered from the co-workers of the accused that the knife recovered from the scene of the crime was owned and used by the accused at said slaughterhouse. A policeman was presented in court to prove this fact and the trial court took the testimony into consideration when it convicted the accused.Should the testimony be given credit?No. The testimony of the policemen that in the course of his investigation, there (3) butchers had identified the subject knife as frequently used by accused is not sufficient to prove such ownership, such evidence being merely hearsay in nature. The witness had no personal knowledge of the ownership or use by accused of the subject knife. Not one of his three (3) fellow butchers who had allegedly identified the said knife was belonging to the accused, testified in court. Hence, accused was deprived of his right to confront his fellow butchers and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. The hearsay character of evidence commonly affects the intrinsic weight and credibility of such evidence.

PP vs Roxas 410 SCRA 451As applied to documentsAmong the allegations of accused for his defense in a murder case was that the victim used tear gas against him. To prove this, he presented in court the hospital record of Quezon City General Hospital showing that he was treated for eye irritation and for abrasions on his right hand. The medical certificate was identified by the records officer of the hospital but was not attested by the attending physicians who were no longer connected with the hospital at the date of trial.Is the medical certificate admissible?No. A medical certificate would be hearsay and inadmissible in evidence without the affirmation or confirmation on the witness stand of the physician who prepared it and corroborated by the testimony of the physician who had examined the patient. The record officer has no personal knowledge about the contents of the record; neither could she attest to the veracity of its contents.

Reyes vs Heirs of Felipe Alejaga 393 SCRA 361Independently relevant statementsIn an action for reversion od property acquired fraudulently under the Public Land Act, the State presented as witness Special Investigator Cartagena who testified that the Land Inspector who submitted the Investigation and Verification Report upon which the award of the land was based admitted to him that he actually conducted no investigation and ocular inspection on the parcel of land.Is Cartagenas testimony admissible?Yes. Cartagenas statement on the alleged admission may be considered as independently relevant. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another personthe latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation Report he submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the admission made to him may be considered as independently relevant.The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it:(a) Constitutes a fact in issue or(b) Is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.

PP vs Competente 207 SCRA 591Waiver of the hearsay rule

Accused, who are father and son, are charged with murder. During trial, the witness for the state testified that when the victim was approaching, she heard the elder accused say here he is, here he is and heard the mother say why do you have to join your father? These testimonies were nor objected by the accused.What is the effect of the failure of the accused to object to the hearsay testimony?The failure of the accused to object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the right to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence, thereby rendering the evidence admissible. For another, the testimonies were offered to prove the fact of utterances regardless of their truth and, therefore, were not hearsay. In any case, the utterances can be considered as part of res gestae, having been made during the incident.

Feria vs CA 325 SCRA 525Newspaper reportsTo prove that the petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings was previously convicted, the jail authorities presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that the inmate was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to life imprisonment.Is the evidence admissible?No. Newspaper articles amount to hearsay evidence, twice removed and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving a truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.

Eagle Ridge Golf vs CA GR # 178989 March 18, 2010

The instant case is an off-shot of the desire of around 112 rank-and-file employees to organize themselves as a legitimate labor union and their employers opposition to their aspiration.In the more meaty issue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, we hold that the probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same treatment to the supporting affidavits.The six affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in a hearing before the Hearing Officer (DOLE Regional Director), as required under the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relations. Said Rules is embodied in Department Order No. (DO) 40-03 which was issued on February 17, 2003 and took effect on March 15, 2003 to replace DO 9 of 1997. Sec. 11, Rule XI of DO 40-03 specifically requires:Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial evidence. Any affidavit submitted by a party to prove his/her claims or defenses shall be re-affirmed by the presentation of the affiant before the Med-Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be. Any affidavit submitted without the re-affirmation of the affiant during a scheduled hearing shall not be admitted in evidence, except when the party against whom the affidavit is being offered admits all allegations therein and waives the examination of the affiant.It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. The above rule affirms the general requirement in adversarial proceedings for the examination of the affiant by the party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party, i.e., the Union.For their non-presentation and consonant to the above-quoted rule, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the Union in the instant case. Moreover, the affidavit and joint-affidavits presented by the Union before the DOLE Regional Director were duly re-affirmed in the hearing of March 20, 2006 by the affiants. Thus, a reversible error was committed by the DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director in giving credence to the inadmissible affidavits of retraction presented by Eagle Ridge while not giving credence to the duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union. Evidently, the allegations in the six affidavits of retraction have no probative value and at the very least cannot outweigh the rebutting attestations of the duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union.

Sec. 37

PP vs Salafranca GR # 173476 Feb. 22, 2012

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony.The Court notes Rodolfo B. Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.Q What time was that?A 12:50 a.m.Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."Q What did you do?A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca.Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?A Yes, Sir.Q How long have you known him?A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?A Yes, Sir.Q Will you look around and point him to us?A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)COURTWhen he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just suffer more.Q What happened when you told him that?A He kept silent.Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?A He was brought to Emergency Room.Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?A He was pronounced deadIt appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

PP vs Montanez 425 SCRA 675Admissibility as evidence

During the direct examination of the witness, the following transpired:Q: Did your brother know that he was going to die because of that gunshot wound?A: Maybe he knew that he was about to die because he told me that he would die.Q: That was the time you asked him who was responsible in the shooting?A: Yes.Q: And he answered you 3 times the name of Cesar Montanez?A: Yes.Q: After answering you the name of Cesar Montanez, what happened to your brother Perlito?A: We carried him and brought him downward in order to bring him to the hospital.Q: He was still alive?A: Yes.Q: Until what point did you bring him downward?A: He died on the way.Is the statement of Perlito admissible against the accused?Yes. His statement, that it was the accused who shot him, was a dying declaration. The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is gone, every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was in the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.

US vs Mallari 20 Phil 14

The facts set forth appear to have been duly proven in the case and constitute the crime of homicide, provided for and penalized in article 404 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the defendant appeared at the house of deceased with the demand that the latter treat his wife, whom he believed to be bewitched by the artifices of the deceased. As the latter refused to do so, saying that he was not a wizard, the defendant Mallari insulted the Sunga spouses, threatened them with death and straightway went up into the house of the deceased with a bolo in his hand. When the deceased saw this he immediately leaped out of the window in flight but the defendant pursued him and upon coming up with him in front of the house of the teniente of the barrio, to whom he was going to complain, struck him a blow in the abdomen with the bolo, so that his intestines protruded therefrom, inflicting a serious and fatal wound that caused death on the third day thereafter. The justice of the peace of Macabebe arrived on the scene a few moments later and in his presence the wounded man declared that his assailant was Mallari, who had been in his house, and who had inflicted the serious wound he had in the abdomen. As a consequence of this wound he died three days later.Defendant attempts to show by this testimony that he was through necessity defending himself from the unlawful assault made upon him by the deceased.With respect to the third error assigned to the court for having held that the declarations made by the deceased before the justice of the peace had the character of ante mortem declarations, when the death of the deceased did not occur for three days and the wound was not in itself of a fatal nature, it must be remembered that as a result of the wound inflicted upon the deceased his intestines protruded and for this reason the wound was of a serious if not fatal nature. Therefore the opinion of the court with reference to the nature and force of the statements made by the victim before the justice of the peace at the time of the investigation is quite proper, because the credibility of statements made by a person severely wounded rests not only on the serious situation resulting from his wound but also on his physical and mental condition, which, given the depressed state of his mind, has induced the profound conviction that his life is actually slipping away, and that he is in positive and imminent danger of dying sooner or later from the wound; nor can the force of such declaration be affected by the circumstance that he died later, hours or days after it was inflicted, for when the patient did finally die his death was due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the time he made his declaration until the hour of his death. In the case of Moore vs. State (96 Tenn., 209) the principle was maintained that "a dying declaration, otherwise competent, will not be excluded because it was made five days before death." In the syllabus of the decision in the case of Daughdrill vs. State (113 Ala., 7, 9) it is held: "Where it is shown that deceased had received a dangerous wound and stated several times that he was dying, and wanted witness to take a message to his wife, and was gasping for breath at the time he was talking, and trembling from fear or excitement, a sufficient predicate is laid for the admission of a statement made at that time, as a dying declaration; and it is no objection to its admission that such declaration took the form of a message to another." In the syllabus of the decision rendered in the case of the United Stated vs. Castellon (12 Phil. Rep., 160) it is held: "Notwithstanding the fact that hearsay evidence is not admissible at a trial, the statement made by an individual who is seriously wounded, at a moment when he was dying, being conviced that there was no hope of recovery, constitute per se at least a grave, conclusive and decisive indication of the culpability of the persons designated by the dying man, inasmuch as it must be assumed that he, being in so precarious a condition, spoke truthfully, and that he was not induced by a desire to tell a lie and to injure an innocent person."

PP vs Boller 380 SCRA 217Form of dying declaration

The dying declaration of the victim was reduced to writing by a barangay tanod. However, in writing it down, he used his own words, did not read to the victim what he wrote down, or asked him to sign it.Is the dying declaration admissible?Yes. The Rules of Court do not require that the witness repeat the exact words of the victim, it being sufficient that he testifies on the substance of what was said by the declarant. The rule is that a dying declaration may be oral or written. If oral, the witness who heard it may testify thereto without necessity of reproducing the word of the decedent, if he is able to give the substance thereof. An unsigned dying declaration may be used as memorandum by the witness who took it down.

PP vs Salison 253 SCRA 430

At the trial of the case, Alcoseba presented the written and signed declaration of Valmoria and she affirmed what was written in the declaration, testifying as follows:PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:Q Mrs. Alcose(b)a, on November 30, 1990, where were you?A I was in our house.Q Where?A At Gory Village.xxx xxx xxxQ After you heard that there was trouble in Cory Village, what happened next, if any?A I noticed that the mother and father of Rolando Valmoria helped Rolando Valmoria in walking towards my house.Q When they arrived (at) your house, what happened next?A When they arrived (at) the house, the father requested that his son be allowed to sit on our chair.Q And what happened next after that?A At that time Rolando Valmoria was sitting on the chair and he was so weak and his neck and head slumped on the chair and the Valmorias requested me that he has something to say and requested it to be written and he stuttered in talking.Q What did you do after the victim requested you?A I obeyed. I obeyed the request and I got a ballpen and paper.Q Then what happened next?A He related to me as to who started the trouble as to who struck him first, the second and the third.Q Now Mrs. Alcose(b)a, while the victim was narrating to you, what did you observe about his condition?A I observed that he was so weak and he was in pain and I believed at that time he was dying.Q Did the victim utter the words to that effect that he was dying?A Yes, sir. He told me by saying "I believe that I will die".Q What else?A Because he said that he felt a terrible pain on his head.Q Did he tell you the reason why he requested you to make a declaration in writing?A He told me that if anybody will testify regarding my death this declaration of mine could be utilized as evidence.xxx xxx xxxQ Showing to you this statement, what a relation is this one (sic) to the one you said which is the statement of the victim?A Yes, this is the one.xxx xxx xxxQ There is a printed name . . . a signature over the printed name Rolando Valmoria, "ang guibunalan/pasyente'', whose signature is this?A That is the signature of Rolando Valmoria.COURT:Q When the victim signed that document, was he sitting?A Yes, sir.Q After the victim signed that document what happened next?A They left and they went to the detachment.xxx xxx xxxQ What happened to this piece of paper after the victim signed this?A I gave it to the mother.Q So you did not keep that piece of paper?A No, sir. I gave it to them so they will be able to use it.Q Before they left your house you gave that piece of paper to the mother?A At that time I did not give that declaration first to the mother because they were attending to their son.Q When did you give that document to the mother?A When Rolando Valmoria died.xxx xxx xxxQ At the time you were taking this statement, from the victim did he tell you the persons who were responsible for his injuries?A Yes, sir.Q Who?A Rufino Dignaran, Jr. alias Jongjong and the second is Loloy Salison and the third one is name(d) Tirso and the fourth, I cannot remember the name of the fourth person who hit the victim . . . yes, now I remember, it's Leonilo Fideles.Q You wrote that statement (o)n a piece of paper?A Yes, sir. (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the hospital where he was X-rayed and treated for his head injuries. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However, at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died.Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader cannot be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.

Sec. 38

Pp vs Bernal 274 SCRA 197Scope of interestBernal was charges with kidnapping wherein the victim, Bienvenido Openda, remained missing until accused was convicted. To prove that accused had a motive to commit the crime, a prosecution witness, one Enriquez, testified that Openda once admitted to him that he and the wife of Bernal were having an affair.Is the evidence admissible?Yes. Opendas revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Sec. 38, Rule 130 Of the Rules on Evidence. With the deletion if the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is pecuniary, proprietary, moral, or even penal.A statement may be admissible when:(1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify;(2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;(3) at the time he made said declaration, the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and(4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.Openda, having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

Fuentes vs CA 253 SCRA 431Declarant not unable to testify

The defense put up by the accused in the murder charge is mistaken identity, particularly that the assailant was his cousin Zoilo. In fact, accused testified that Zoilo admitted to him spontaneously that he stabbed the victim. An uncle also testified to corroborate him.Should the admission of Zoilo be admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule being a declaration against penal interest?No. Under Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, there are three (3) requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest:(a) the declarant must not be available to testify;(b) the declaration must concerna fact cognizable by the declarant; and(c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.In this case, the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The declaration is untrustworthy. Zoilo who is related to accused had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused and his uncle. Further, legal rhetoric need not be resorted to find that the admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, shocking to the sense of justice. Assume that the trial court did not admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused. Assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement.But more importantly, the weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted is that the declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. It is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure an acquittal.

Viacrusis vs CA 44 SCRA 176Private respondents, Anastacio Orais and his wife Celestina Malazarte brought this action, in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, to establish their title to a land of about four (4) hectares, located in the sitio of Candilomot, barrio of Santo Rosario, formerly Palompon, now Matag-ob Leyte, and more particularly described in the complaint alleging that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them, on June 8, 1936, by its registered owner, Pedro Sanchez, by virtue of a deed of sale, copy of which was attached to said pleading, as Annex A and later marked as Exhibit B as well as to recover, from petitioners herein defendants in the aforesaid court Guillermo Viacrucis and Luisa de Viacrucis the possession of said land and damages. In their answer to said complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis averred that they are the owners of said 4-hectare land; that the deed of sale, Exhibit B, in favor of Anastacio Orais, on which private respondents plaintiffs in the court of first instance rely, attests merely to a simulated transaction; and that this action is barred by the statute of limitations. Alleging that the rights of Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis had been assigned to them, Claros Marquez and his wife Rustica Arevalo subsequently intervened in the case, reiterating, in a way, the stand taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis although with a variation to be pointed out later on.After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein respondent herein and against the defendants and the intervenors petitioners herein rejecting their defenses of prescription of action and simulation of contract (Exhibit B), and declaring that the whole land conveyed thereby belongs to Mr. and Mrs. Orais, as well as ordering Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis to vacate said land and awarding damages to Mr. and Mrs. Orais. The dispositive part of said decision reads: With respect to the third assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals had erred in considering that the failure of Orais to bring the present action earlier was mere "laziness," instead of an omission that "may be given in evidence against him," as provided in section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and as "strongly persuasive of lack of merit" of the claim of said respondent, and that when he tried to obtain a loan from the Philippine National Bank in 1936 and offered OCT No. 243 as collateral security, the bank did not accept said offer upon the ground that the land in question is not his property, in reply to which Orais said nothing, which is an admission by silence, pursuant to section 23 of the same Rule 130. Moreover, petitioners bewail that the Court of Appeals, like the trial court, considered in favor of Orais allegedly in violation of section 25 of said Rule 130 the admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to the effect that, although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her now deceased husband, Pelagio Costelo, he and she recognized Orais as the owner of said land. It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Costelo and this recognition by the now deceased Pelagio Castelo which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G constitute a declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest, Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his successors in interest," but, also, "against third persons."

Sec. 39

Benhur Nepomuceno vs Arhbencel Ann Lopez GR # 181258 March 18, 2010This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:Manila, Aug. 7, 1999I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth,11 has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.

Sec. 40

Jison vs CA 286 SCRA 495Family possessions

In an action for recognition as illegitimate child, the plaintiff presented in evidence letters written by relatives of her supposed father attesting to her filiation.Are the letters admissible as part of family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree?No. Rule 130, Section 40, may be divided into 2 parts:(1) the portion containing the first clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and(2) the section containing the second phrase.What must be ascertained is whether letters, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings and family portraits.The scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree if a person. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

Sec. 41

City of Manila vs del Rosario 5 Phil 228

This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant. The court below entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for possession and damages in the sum of $2,500, United States currency, and costs.

At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. This motion was overruled by the court, to which ruling the defendant duly excepted. The question thus raised puts in issue the trial courts finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question. We accordingly hold that this point is impliedly involved in the third and fourth assignments of error.

Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony of John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city (p. 11 of the bill of exceptions). The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and 13 of the bill of exceptions)). It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the complaint, they are building lots.The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of the precediing witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villegas testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.

Sec. 42

Pp vs Mendoza 284 SCRA 705Statement of the accused

Prosecution witness Jose testified that he came upon accused and the taxi driver the former was robbing. He stated that he was able to tie both hands of the accused and asked him, Why did you say it is a hold-up? to which the latter responded in Tagalog, I am getting despondent because I do not have money to buy milk for my child.Is the testimony admissible?Yes. The test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated with cogency by Justice J. Francisco thus:whether the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event which it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.Tested by this standard, the extra-judicial admission of accused was clearly part of the res gestae and therefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against him.

Pp vs Villarama 397 SCRA 306Statement by the victim

Among the witnesses who testified against the accused in the rape case was the mother of the 4-year old victim. According to her, when she arrived home about one (1) hour after the incident, she saw her child crying. When she asked why she was crying, the child answered that she was molested by the accused.Considering that the statement is hearsay, is it admissible in court?Yes. It is an exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae.To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto and must relate to the circumstances of such occurrence. In this case, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to accused as her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time gap between the sexual assault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there was neither capability nor opportunity for a 4-year old victim to fabricate her statement.

Pp vs Nartea 74 Phil 10At about eight o'clock in the morning of September 26, 1940, Benito Graban, an old man of about seventy years, received four bolo wounds: one on the back in the lumbar region, eight inches long; one on the left hand, amputating or wounding all the fingers except the thumb; one on the right wrist; and one at the left inguinal region. The aggression took place in the house of his nephew Benedicto Naagas in the sitio of Tangnan, barrio of Bislig, Carigara, Leyte. At that time Gaudiosa Balais, wife of Benedicto Naagas, and Fernanda ( alias Alejandra) Caete, common-law wife of Benito Graban, were present in the house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWithin about an hour Sergeant of Police Benito Arintok arrived at the scene in response to the report made by Gaudiosa Balais, who had run to the municipal building immediately after the wounding. Sergeant Arintok found Benito Graban lying flat on the ground behind the kitchen, and interrogated him as follows:Q. What is your name? - A. Benito Graban.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryQ. Who wounded you? - A. Didoy Nartea, Igoy Nartea, Potin Nartea, Jesus Nartea.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryQ. How do you feel due to your wounds, will you die? - A. I do not know this.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryQ. Why were you wounded? - A. I am not guilty for any, I just keep looking for my means of living as I am too old.On the way to the municipal building, the Justice of the Peace Rufino A. Astorga met the sergeant of police and the wounded man, and the latter was also by him interrogated as follows:P. Cual es la gracia de usted? - R. Benito Graban.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryP. Quien le hirieron a usted? - Potin, Igoy, Idoy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryP. Cuantos hirieron a usted? - Cuatro.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryP. Por que le hirieron a usted? - R. No se, yo no tengo culpa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryP. Con que motivo? - R. No me di cuenta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryP. Donde le hirieron a usted? R. En la casa de Benedicto Naagas.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryP. Usted podra sobrevivir o morira usted? - R. No se, no puedo Precisar.It is not disputed that Didoy or Idoy is the pet name for Aguedo; Igoy, for Domingo; and Potin, for Potenciano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn the evening of the same day Benito Graban died of hemorrhage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt is also an undisputed fact that two days before, that is to say, on September 24, 1940, Ildefonso (also referred to as Alfonso) Nartea, appellants' father, was killed by Fidel Naagas, brother of Benedicto Naagas and nephew of Benito Graban. Porfirio Graban, another nephew of Benito, was accused together with Fidel Naagas of the killing of appellants' father.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe trial court found from the testimony of Gaudiosa Balais and one Potenciana Dandan, another eyewitness, and from the declarations of the deceased hereinbefore transcribed that the four accused, including Jesus Nartea, were the ones who inflicted the wounds above mentioned upon Benito Graban First. The trial court found that the manifestations made by the deceased to Sergeant of Police Arintok regarding the identity of the persons who wounded him were spontaneous and were neither inspired by a desire for revenge nor suggested by any person, it appearing that the said policemen was the first to succor the wounded man. Counsel de oficio argues, however, that more than one hour had elapsed after the fight when Arintok took the statements of the deceased and that, therefore, the declarations in question cannot be considered spontaneous. As an indication that the said declarations were the result of reflection, counsel points to the statement of the deceased that he was not guilty of anything, thus showing a desire on his part to exculpate himself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe term "res gest" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrance sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content. Whether a declaration is a part of the res gest depends upon whether the declaration was the facts talking through the party or the party talking about the facts. (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, sec. 662, pp. 553, 556.) While as a general rule the declaration sought to be proved as part of the res gest must be contemporaneous with the event established as the principal act, no fixed time from the main occurrence can be arbitrarily set in order to determine what shall be part of the res gest. The factual situation in each instance will set its own pattern of time in this respect. ( Id., sec. 669, see also Moran, Law of Evidence, revised and enlarged edition, pp. 295-296.) "The marked trend of decisions is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations as part of the res gest. Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gest is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (20 Am. Jur., sec. 663, p. 557.)chanrobles virtual law libraryWe are not persuaded that the trial court erred in admitting the declarations in question as part of the res gest. It is not disputed that the sergeant of police was the first talk to Benito Graban after the latter had been severely wounded and while he was still lying helpless at the place where he was left by his aggressors. The fact that, when asked why he was wounded, he replied he was not guilty of anything, meaning that he had not done anything wrong to his assaillants, does not necessarily show that his declaration was not spontaneous but was the result of reflection and deliberation. In his situation, when the life-sustaining blood was painfully and irretrievably gushing out of his body, he had no reason nor occasion to excogitate excuses of his own conduct. He had no reason to fear of being prosecuted for what they had done to him; he had more reason to fear of losing his life than of anything else, although hope, springing eternal in the human breast, made him say he did not know whether he would survive or perish. But as a matter of fact he expired a few hours later. His declaration, therefore, to the sergeant of police to the effect that he had not done anything wrong to his aggressors, was consistent with the truth and did not militate against its spontaneity. He repeated the same statement to the justice of the peace when the latter asked him the same question, saying, "I do not know; I am not to blame," after he had pronounced the pet names of those who wounded him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe, therefore, sustain the admission by the trial court of the declarations in the question as part of the res gest, and consequently overrule appellants' first assignment of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual

Pp vs Diva 23 SCRA 332In the tenth error, appellants claim that the trial court erred in giving weight and credit to the alleged res gestae of the deceased. The trial court did not commit this error. 1wph1.tIt was established that before he expired or just after the incident, the deceased told his wife "Help me because I am going to die from these wounds I sustained" and "If I will expire before the arrival of the chief of police and the doctor, please notify my mother and brothers and sisters, and tell them that it was the husband and wife who hacked me." (TSN, p. 33, July 10, 1963.) The deceased made the statement immediately after appellant Maximo Diva left him and as soon as his wife and two other persons arrived at the scene of the crime and while he was still under the stress of nervous excitement, if not almost at the point of death. In fact, the same statement was uttered by the deceased a few minutes before he expired. His statement, therefore, may be considered as a part of the res gestae and as such, is admissible in evidence. The victim's statement immediately after receiving the wounds naming the accused as the author of the aggression is legal evidence as part of the res gestae (People vs. Quimson, 62 Phil. 162).

Pp vs Tampus 96 SCRA 624

The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the killing, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom thuy encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.

Pp vs Balbas 122 SCRA 859

Appellant admitted having talked to the deceased and his son Ferdinand in the afternoon of December 21, 1970. About seven 6 clock in the evening of the same day, E Ernesto Arellano, a driver and a resident of barangay Espiritu, Ilocos Norte testified that they were passing barangay Lang-ayan, Currimao, Ilocos Norte when he saw a person bleeding and lying at his back on the side of the road. Hereunder is his testimony on this point. Q You said a while ago that you saw a person bleeding and so you asked the driver to stop the bus. Where did you find that person who was bleeding? A I went down and directed my flashlight on the person and I asked him what happened and he said, " I was shot." xxx xxx xxxFISCAL: Q Now, when he answered he was shot, did you ask other questions to that person? A I asked him if he was bumped by a truck and he said he was shot COURT: Continue. A I asked him who shot him if he knew, and he said I know him It was Ben Balbas. Q Did you ask the name of the injured person? A No, sir. Q In what particular place did you find this person bleeding? A South of the big 'silag' or burl tree. Q What municipality is that Silag tree found? A Within the town of Currimao, sir. Q On what part of the road did you find this person bleeding? A He was on the right when you are going south sir. Q How far from the asphalted portion of that road did you find this person? A More than one (1) meter from the edge. Q What was the position of the person whom you found bleeding when you first saw him? A Lying on his back, sir. Q Did you examine the body of the person whom you saw bleeding? A I saw blood oozing from his breast, sir. Q Were you alone when you focused your flashlight to the person whom you saw bleeding by that side of the road? A I, my companions followed me, sir. Q After this person whom you don' t know his name has told you that he was shot by one Ben Balbas, what did you do? A The person told us that you carry me because I am feeling 'numb' And I told him to wait and may (sic) inform the persons in the neighboring house that they would inform the barrio captain to take him. And the owner of the house was Manong Maning. Q Were you able to find this Maning in this house. ATTY. ASUNCION: May I pray that the witness just answer the question A Yes, sir. FISCAL: Q What did you tell your Manong Maning if any? A I told him to go to the person wounded and that he would inform the barrio captain. (tsn., pp. 26-28, March 20, 1973) Mayor Cirilo Quilala of Currimao, Ilocos Norte, upon being of the incident, proceeded to the place where he saw the victim Florencio Yamongan lying on the shoulder of the road. Mayor Quilala testified as follows Q What was his condition when you saw him? A He was serious, sir. Q What was he doing when you saw him? A He was shouting not exactly very loud but when we asked him with Pat Oscar Reynon what happened, he told us 'Benjamin Balbas shot me sir. Q Now, who were your companions Mayor when you proceeded to the place? A Pat, Oscar Reynon and Sgt. Pablo Bumanglag of the PC and one policeman whose name I could not remember now, sir. Q Were there persons at the place where you found the body of Florencio Yamongan when you arrived? A None, sir. COURT: Q When you arrived there and you saw Florencio Yamongan, said Florencio Yamongan told you that he was shot by Benjamin Balbas?A Yes, your Honor. Q How was he positioned then? A He was lying like this, your Honor. (Witness demonstrating the same inclining his body on the right side with his two hands on his stomach below the belt.) Q In other words, he was alive when you arrived? A Yes, your Honor. Q Around what time? A More or less 7:00 [d clock], your Honor. Q Of what date? A December 21, 1970, your Honor. xxx xxx xxxFISCAL: Q After asking Florencio Yamongan what happened to him and he answered you that he was shot by Benjamin Balbas, what did you do next? A I told Oscar Reynon to get his statement and I will caused for the Bo. Captain because the house of the Bo. Captain was about 600 meters away from the place, then I drove my jeep and went to get the Bo. Captain, sir.Q Who is this Oscar Reynon whom you have instructed? A Pat, Oscar Reynon of Currimao, Ilocos Norte, sir. Q Did you see if Oscar Reynon took the statement of Florencio Yamongan? A Well when he began getting the statement I still saw it, but immediately when he began getting his statement I drove the jeep and proceeded to the house of the Bo. Captain and after ten minutes, we came back, sir. Q When you came back, what transpired next? A Oscar Reynon was about to finish the statement and when he finished the statement, he told me, 'sir, this is the statement which is already finished' so, I told him to get the blood thumbmark, sir. Q When Oscar Reynon testified he presented Exh. 'C' which is the question and answer and at the bottom of Exh. 'C' is a name of Florencio Yamongan with a red thumbmark ... What is the relation of this Exh. 'C' with that statement which you said you instructed Oscar Reynon to take? A This is the statement that Oscar Reynon got during that night, sir. xxx xxx xxxQ Now, after Florencio Yamongan has affixed his thumbmark, what transpired next? A I told them to bring Florencio Yamongan to the jeep and we proceeded to the hospital but on our way to the hospital it so happened that he expired and we were not able to bring him to the hospital alive, sir. Q And what did you do when Florencio Yamongan died in your jeep as you were going to the hospital? A Well, we brought back the patient already, sir. Well, I could not remember where we brought him already but I notified the Rural Health Officer to check and autopsy him, sir. (tsn, pp. 221-227, Oct. 23, 1974 hearing) The rule on dying declaration is that (1) it is made under consciousness of an impending death, (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death (3) the declarant is a competent witness; and, (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the subject of inquiry is the declarant's death (Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court And, there are three (3) requisites for the admission of evidence of res gestae, namely-. (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a starts occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and, (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. (People vs. Ricaplaza, 23 SCRA 374). In the case at bar, the deceased Florencio Yamongan made the statements while he was still under the stress of nervous excitement, if not almost at the point of death In face the statement was uttered few hours before he expired. His statement therefore, may be considered as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae and, as such is admissible in evidence. The victim s statement immediately after receiving the wounds naming his assailant is legal evidence, a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae.

Pp vs Onarosa 127 SCRA 155

Pp vs Palmones 336 SCRA 80Time gap between the statement and occurrence: 30 minutes

The RTC convicted the brothers Palmones of the crime of murder. The conviction was based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to Sonny Boy (nephew of the victim) and Police Inspector Tagum as witnesses of the prosecution and the apparent weakness of the defense of alibi of the Palmones brothers. As testified by Sonny Boy, the supposed dying declaration of the victim was made as follows:Q: What did you do in the emergency room?A: I saw my uncle there lying.Q: Are you referring to SP02 Asim Manansal?A: Yes, sir.Q: What did you do after that?A: Upon seeing his condition, I went near him and whispered, Ano ba ang nangyari sayo? meaning, What happened to you?Q: What was the answer, if any?A: His answer (sic) that he was waylaid.Q: What else did he tell you?A: I was worried after saying those words, I asked him who are the perpetrators.Q: What was the answer?A: And he said, Its Juany and Tony Palmones.Is the statement admissible as part of res gestae?No. In order to admit a statement as evidence part of res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. A most important requisite to be considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously is the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement.Tested against these factors, these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae for the following reasons:(1) When the victim allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time (30 minutes to 1 hour) had already elapsed from the time he was shot;(2) He allegedly made the statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment; and(3) The trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.

PP vs Lariosa 106 SCRA 369

Meanwhile, at about 6:00 oclock that same evening, the Mayor of Dipolog City received a report that Primitivo James was shot. In immediate response, he summoned Lt. Ciriaco Gonzales, the Deputy Chief of Police of the Dipolog City Police Force, and instructed him to proceed to the clinic of Dr. Ames to investigate cranad(pp. 41-42, tsn, ibid). He took the ante-mortem statement of Primitivo James wherein the following questions and answers were included:Question No. 2 Why are you in this hospital?Answer: I was shot in Sinaman.Question No. 3. Who shot you?Answer: Cristituto Lariosa.Question No. 7 Do you know why he shot you?Answer: Because he has an axe to grind against me.Question No. 8 Do you think you will die as a result of your injuries?Answer: I think I will die. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Exhibits D, D-1, D-3, D-5 & D-6; pp. 43-44, tsn, ibid).The ante-mortem statement which was identified on the witness stand by Lt. Gonzales was witnessed by Engr. Miranda cranad(Exhibit D-9; p. 45, tsn, ibid and pp. 4-6, tsn, March 12, 1973). It bears the bloodstains of the victim on the right hand corner thereof cranad(Exhibits D-10 and D-11), as testified to by Lt. Gonzales cranad(p. 46, tsn, ibid).Equally strong evidence against the appellant, if not even stronger, is the ante-mortem declaration of the deceased, in which he named appellant as his assailant cranad(Exhibit D), 5 which is the document to which was reduced his statement first, to Adaro, to whom he said with his wounds, he was going to die, next to Barangay Captain Solarte, then to Dr. Ames, and finally, to the Deputy Chief of Police, as he progressively neared death, that appellant was the person who shot him. Thus, even as mere res gestae, the declaration would be of similar probative value. Hence, it is evidently futile for appellant to assail the dying declaration of the deceased with his assertion that it was motivated by the victims hatred against him for having taken his daughter as a common-law wife and his desire to put an end to the disgraceful relationship.

Sec. 43Lao vs Standard Insurance 409 SCRA 43Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was insured with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. under Policy No. CV-210743 for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be caused to his goods.While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No. FBS-917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and was bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less.Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper drivers license at the time of the accident. The restriction4 in Leonardo Anits drivers license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the "authorized driver" clause5 of the insurance policy. In addition, respondent cited the following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit:C-UN-85 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES R/ IMPRUDENCE11:30 PM Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by Pat. Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took place between a truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y COYEL, 38 yrs, a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142 and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG-538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver (sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, 33 yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya, Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482. (Emphasis supplied.)6Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report7 wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April 27, 1985. However, respondent insurance company was firm in its denial of the claim.The admissibility and probative value of the police blotter as evidenceWe agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records.20 Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.21 Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia,22 where we said that "entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value," since the Court there found that "the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars".Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.

Sec. 44Malayan Insurance Comp vs Rodelio Alberto GR # 194320 Feb. 1, 2012At around 5 oclock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker with plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate number PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732.4Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.5Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability, own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured amounting to PhP 700,000.6Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against respondents.7In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver. They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the service road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes right of way. When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could not cope with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the other hand, sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the latter in the amount of PhP 20,000. Respondents also controverted the results of the Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus driver.8After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued. Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of its lone witness, a motor car claim adjuster, who attested that he processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the documents submitted to him. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence.

WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REFUSING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLICE REPORT SINCE THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHO PREPARED THE SAME DID NOT ACTUALLY TESTIFY IN COURT THEREON.Admissibility of the Police ReportMalayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in evidence.16 Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.17Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own perception.18 Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters.19 Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.20As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA,21 "Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements."There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are entries in official records.22 Section 44, Rule 130 provides:Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,23 this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information.Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved.24Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police reports presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so.25 As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.