UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA EVANSVILLE DIVISION WILLIAM HURT, DEADRA HURT, ANDREA HURT, DEBBIE HURT, Plaintiffs, v. JEFF VANTLIN, JACK SPENCER, WILLIAM ARBAUGH, JASON PAGETT, LARRY NELSON, RICHARD BLANTON, DAN DEYOUNG, CITY OF EVANSVILLE, MATTHEW WISE, ZACHARY JONES, AMY BURROWS-BECKHAM, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 3:14-cv-00092-JMS-WGH ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Presently pending before the Court is Defendants City of Evansville (the “City”) and Evansville Police Department Detective Jeff Vantlin, Detective Jack Spencer, Detective William Arbaugh, Detective Jason Pagett, Sergeant Larry Nelson, Sergeant Richard Blanton, and Lieutenant Dan DeYoung’s (collectively, the “EPD Defendants”) Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. [Filing No. 69.] Defendants Kentucky State Police Detectives Zachary Jones and Matthew Wise (“KSP Defendants”) ask to join the pending motion without objection, [Filing No. 72], and the Court grants that request. For simplicity, the Court will refer to the moving parties HURT et al v. VANTLIN et al Doc. 112 Dockets.Justia.com
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION WILLIAM HURT, DEADRA HURT, ANDREA HURT, DEBBIE HURT, Plaintiffs, v. JEFF VANTLIN, JACK SPENCER, WILLIAM ARBAUGH, JASON PAGETT, LARRY NELSON, RICHARD BLANTON, DAN DEYOUNG, CITY OF EVANSVILLE, MATTHEW WISE, ZACHARY JONES, AMY BURROWS-BECKHAM, Defendants.
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No. 3:14-cv-00092-JMS-WGH
ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants City of Evansville (the “City”) and
Evansville Police Department Detective Jeff Vantlin, Detective Jack Spencer, Detective William
Arbaugh, Detective Jason Pagett, Sergeant Larry Nelson, Sergeant Richard Blanton, and
Lieutenant Dan DeYoung’s (collectively, the “EPD Defendants”) Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings. [Filing No. 69.] Defendants Kentucky State Police Detectives Zachary Jones and
Matthew Wise (“KSP Defendants”) ask to join the pending motion without objection, [Filing No.
72], and the Court grants that request. For simplicity, the Court will refer to the moving parties
collectively as “Defendants” for purposes of this motion.1 For the following reasons, the Court
grants in part and denies in part the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. [Filing No. 69.]
I. APPLICABLE STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party can move for judgment on the
pleadings after the filing of the complaint and answer. Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th
Cir. 2007). In ruling on the motion, the Court may only consider the complaint, answer, and any
documents attached thereto as exhibits. See N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South
Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1998).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) “ is governed by the same
standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Adams v. City
of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014). To survive the motion, “a complaint must
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “‘ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Factual
allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, but allegations that are legal conclusions are
insufficient to survive the motion. Adams, 742 F.3d at 728. A complaint that pleads facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability “‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In other words, to
1 Defendant Amy Burrows-Beckham is alleged to be a medical examiner for the State of Kentucky. [Filing No. 1 at 5.] She has not asked to join the pending motion and, given the varied assortment of claims and parties, the Court will not address the impact of the pending motion on Plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Burrows-Beckham.
(“Because we conclude that [the defendant officer] is entitled to the broad statutory immunity
afforded by ITCA, we also must conclude that the statute does not provide an adequate state law
remedy to the plaintiffs.”).2
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ federal claim for malicious
prosecution and William and Deadra’s federal claim for due process may proceed against the
individual Defendants at this stage of the litigation.3
4) Federal Conspiracy Claim (Count 5)
The EPD Defendants and the KSP Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy
claim against them must be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations lack the specificity or
particularity required to pursue such a claim. [Filing No. 70 at 15-17 (EPD Defendants’ brief);
Filing No. 83 at 3-4 (KSP Defendants’ brief).] They contend that Plaintiffs’ general allegation
that these Defendants “reached an agreement amongst themselves to frame Plaintiffs” for Mr.
Golike’s death is insufficient, without more, to plead a federal conspiracy claim. [Filing No. 70 at
16; Filing No. 83 at 4.]
In response, Plaintiffs emphasize that there is not a heightened pleading standard for federal
conspiracy claims and that they can be proven with circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.
2 The Court disagrees with the EPD Defendants and the KSP Defendants that Plaintiffs’ Complaint limits their due process claim to the denial of a fair trial and that Deadra cannot pursue a federal due process claim because she did not proceed to trial. [Filing No. 70 at 17-18; Filing No. 83 at 4-5; Filing No. 86 at 11-12.] As a basis for the due process claim, the Complaint references more than just William’s trial—specifically, that Defendants “deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence, as well as fabricated false reports” that led to William and Deadra being “pursued” in the criminal matters at all. [Filing No. 1 at 22-23 (due process claim).]
3 The KSP Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ federal malicious prosecution and do not challenge Deadra’s federal due process claims on any basis other than her not proceeding to trial. [Filing No. 83.] Because the Court has addressed the only arguments raised, it will not address the possible effect of its conclusion later in this order that the ITCA does not apply to the KSP Defendants. See Part III.C.
(7th Cir. 2012). Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law civil conspiracy claim (Count
XII) against all Defendants as a matter of law.
1) False arrest/false imprisonment (Count VIII)
The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ state law claim for false arrest/false imprisonment against
the City survives the pending motion. [Filing No. 70 at 19-20; Filing No. 80 at 26; Filing No. 86
at 14-15.] They disagree, however, regarding whether the ITCA bars Plaintiffs’ claim for false
arrest/false imprisonment against the individual EPD Defendants. [Filing No. 70 at 18-19; Filing
NO. 80 at 26-28; Filing No. 86 at 14-15.]
The ITCA provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the employee’s employment bars an action by the claimant against the employee personally. However, if the governmental entity answers that the employee acted outside the scope of the employee’s employment, the plaintiff may amend the complaint and sue the employee personally.
Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5. Another section of the ITCA provides a law enforcement immunity
provision “that shields state actors, acting within the scope of their employment, who are engaged
in the ‘adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and
regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.’” Belcher
at 13.] They contend that William bears the burden to prove compliance with the ITCA and that
he has not done so. [Filing No. 86 at 14.] The EPD Defendants do not attempt to distinguish Antey
in their reply, instead ignoring Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the similarity of the cases. [Filing
No. 86 at 13-14.]
The ITCA provides that a claim against a political subdivision is barred unless notice is
filed with the governing body of that political subdivision within 180 days from when the loss
occurs. Ind. Code § 34–13–3–8. The plaintiff in Antey filed various claims against an individual
officer and the City of Evansville, stemming from the officer’s investigation into a domestic
disturbance. 2013 WL 466222, at *1. Like the EPD Defendants in the matter at hand, the Antey
defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and attached the plaintiff’s tort claim
notice, arguing that the notice was untimely and that the district court should enter judgment in
favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s state-law claims. Id. at *3-4. The district court denied
the request to consider the tort claim notice, concluding that it would convert the pending motion
into a summary judgment motion. Id. at *3. With regard to arguing untimeliness at the pleadings
stage, Antey concluded as follows:
The purpose of a 12(c) motion is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint and identify defects in a plaintiff’s claim, not the presence of a defendant’s affirmative defense. Plaintiffs need not anticipate and attempt to plead around all potential defenses. Complaints need not contain any information about defenses and may not be dismissed for that omission. Only where a plaintiff admits all of the elements of an impenetrable defense, thus pleading herself out of court, may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be dismissed; however, omission of facts from her complaint which would ultimately defeat an affirmative defense does not justify dismissal. The assertion that a plaintiff failed to comply with the ITCA notice requirement is an affirmative defense.
2013 WL 466222, at *4 (citations omitted).
This Court agrees with the conclusion in Antey. Even if the Court considered the tort claim
notice the EPD Defendants submit with their motion, [Filing No. 70-1], the Court cannot grant
judgment as a matter of law on the basis of its timeliness because that is an affirmative defense
that Plaintiffs need not have anticipated in filing their Complaint. As Plaintiffs point out, it is
possible for the notice period to be tolled and that analysis is outside the scope of the Court’s
consideration at this stage of the litigation. Antey, 2013 WL 466222, at *4 (citing White v. Stuben
Cnty., Ind., 2011 WL 4496504, at *14 (N.D. Ind. 2011)). Because the Court will not determine
the timeliness of William’s tort claim notice at this stage of the litigation, the Court denies the EPD
Defendants request to consider it. The Defendants may, however, raise the timeliness issue on
summary judgment should they determine it proper to do so.
C. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims against the KSP Defendants4
Plaintiffs allege that the KSP Defendants are “current or former Kentucky State Police
Detectives.” [Filing No. 1 at 5.] They further allege that each has been sued in his individual
capacity and that each acted under color of law and within the scope of his employment for all
actions within the scope of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. [Filing No. 1 at 5.] The KSP Defendants admit
that they “are and were Kentucky State Police officers and were acting within the course and scope
of their employment at all times relevant herein.” [Filing No. 27 at 2 (KSP Defendants’ Answer).]
The KSP Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against them are barred
by the ITCA. [Filing No. 83 at 5-8.] They contend that nothing in the ITCA limits its application
to Indiana law enforcement personnel and, thus, its protections should also apply to them. [Filing
No. 83 at 6.]
4 In their consolidated response brief, Plaintiffs argue that the KSP Defendants waived any arguments concerning tort claim immunity by adopting the EPD Defendants’ arguments on that issue without explaining why the ITCA would apply to Kentucky state actors. [Filing No. 80 at 29.] The KSP Defendants filed a reply brief on that issue, [Filing No. 83 at 5-8], and Plaintiffs filed a surreply on that point, [Filing No. 95]. Because the KSP Defendants and Plaintiffs had an opportunity to brief the issue, the Court rejects the waiver argument and will address the issue. [Filing No. 80 at 29.]
proceedings.5 [Filing No. 83 at 5-8.] While it is possible that, as the Plaintiffs acknowledge, the
KSP Defendants may be able to seek statutory indemnification under Kentucky law, [Filing No.
95 at 3 (Plaintiffs’ surreply citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 16.185)], the KSP Defendants have not raised
that issue and it is beyond the scope of the pending motion.
IV . CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants Zachary Jones and Matthew
Wise’s Motion for Joinder, [Filing No. 72], and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, [Filing No. 69]. No final judgment
shall issue at this time. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to file an Initial Statement of Claims by
November 9, 2015, setting forth which claims they intend to pursue in light of the Court’s Order,
specifically identifying which defendants they are pursuing each claim against.
The Court makes the following rulings on arguments presented by the parties’ motions.
• Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the City may proceed;
• Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Supervisor Defendant Sergeant Nelson may proceed;
• Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Supervisor Defendants Sergeant Blanton and Lieutenant DeYoung are dismissed;
• Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution may proceed against the EPD and KSP Defendants;
• William and Deadra’s § 1983 due process claim may proceed against the EPD and KSP Defendants;
5 This conclusion also forecloses the KSP Defendants’ argument regarding the timeliness of William’s tort claim notice. [Filing No. 83 at 8-9.] Moreover, even if the ITCA did apply to the KSP Defendants, for reasons set forth in addressing the EPD Defendants’ argument, the Court will not determine the timeliness of William’s tort claim notice at this stage of the proceedings. See Part III.B.2.
• Plaintiffs’ federal conspiracy claim may proceed against the EPD and KSPDefendants;
• Plaintiffs’ state-law claims for malicious prosecution (Count IX), intentionalinfliction of emotional distress (Count X), and defamation (Count XI) against theEPD Defendants and the City are dismissed, pursuant to Plaintiffs’ concession thatit is appropriate to do so, [Filing No. 80 at 23];
• Plaintiffs’ state-law claim for civil conspiracy (Count XII) is dismissed against theDefendants as a matter of law, see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 606(7th Cir. 2012) (“In Indiana, there is no independent cause of action for civilconspiracy.”);
• Plaintiffs’ state-law claim for false arrest/false imprisonment (Count VIII) mayproceed against the City and the EPD Defendants;
• The Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the KSP Defendants may proceed, exceptfor the state law claim for civil conspiracy; and
• Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Amy Burrows-Beckham, who is alleged to bea medical examiner for the State of Kentucky, may proceed since she did not jointhe pending motions.