This report considers the presence of transnational volunteers, otherwise known as foreign fighters, in the Syrian conflict and the security implications of returning radicalised fighters to home countries. Additionally the report briefly reviews the unique challenges European countries face regarding domestic terrorism attacks. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text. Introduction Rebel fighters battling the Syrian regime of President Bashar al Assad now number between 100,000 and 120,000, according to defence consultancy IHS Jane’s and Aram Nerguizian, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Nearly fifty to sixty thousand are considered to be jihadist and hard-line Islamists intent on establishing an Islamic state upon the ousting of the Assad government, reports The Telegraph. Of that fifty per cent, approximately 10,000 fighters, including foreign fighting elements, are considered to be jihadist 1 . While the US and its allies continue to fund the rebel Free Syrian Army, many observers warn that the growing presence of jihadist and militants from beyond Syria is creating a dangerous new conflict within the Syrian civil war, according to Christian Science Monitor (CSM). The increasing number of radicalised young Muslims travelling to Syria to fight against the regime has raised Western concerns over what might occur once those fighters return home, according to Bloomberg. Matthew Olsen, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center says that the Syrian war is providing both “a rallying point and a training ground for radical Islamists from other nations”. Richard Barrett, former coordinator of the UN al Qaeda Taliban Monitoring Team, says the risks of returning jihadists are real, while acknowledging that not all those retuning home will be inclined to engage in terrorist activity. Europol reports that terrorist attacks and related arrests in the European Union (EU) “significantly increased in 2012” compared to previous years. Its findings lend credibility to concerns that terrorism threats remain strong and varied throughout Europe. In 2011, there were 174 reported terrorist attacks in EU member states. In 2012, 219 terrorist attacks were documented (Figure 1.). Terrorist bomb attacks at Burgas airport in Bulgaria and shootings by a lone gunman in France claimed the lives of fourteen people in 2012 2 . Separate attacks in Belgium, France and Northern Ireland killed three others. Director of Europol Rob Wainwright says, “[t]here is growing concern about the threat posed by [foreign fighters] given the possibility of their returning to the European Union intent on committing acts of terrorism”. 1 Charles Lister from IHS Jane’s offers variations in these numbers. In August 2013, Lister indicated that al Qaeda-linked jihadist fighters such as those associated with Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) numbered 12,000. Lister also indicates that the larger and more powerful rebel group Ahrar al Sham has approximately 15,000 to 25,000 fighters and is also strongly Islamist. 2 According to the Europol report, there were no terrorism related deaths in 2011. November 2013 Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues Linda Lavender Complex Coverage Desk Officer [email protected]Europe’s Challenge: The Return of the Foreign Fighters C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E M E D I T E R R A N E A N B A S I N T E A M P R E S E N T S Source: Europol 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Terrorist attacks Individuals arrested Deaths Figure 1: 2013 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2012 2011
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Europe's Challenge: The Return of the Foreign Fighters
This report considers the presence of transnational volunteers, otherwise known as foreign fighters, in the Syrian conflict and the security implications of returning radicalised fighters to home countries. Additionally the report briefly reviews the unique challenges European countries face regarding domestic terrorism attacks.
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This report considers the presence of transnational volunteers, otherwise known as foreign fighters, in the Syrian conflict and
the security implications of returning radicalised fighters to home countries. Additionally the report briefly reviews the unique
challenges European countries face regarding domestic terrorism attacks. Related information is available at
www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.
Introduction
Rebel fighters battling the Syrian regime of President Bashar al Assad now number between 100,000 and
120,000, according to defence consultancy IHS Jane’s and Aram Nerguizian, a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Nearly fifty to sixty thousand are considered to be jihadist and hard-line
Islamists intent on establishing an Islamic state upon the ousting of the Assad government, reports The Telegraph.
Of that fifty per cent, approximately 10,000 fighters, including foreign fighting elements, are considered to be
jihadist1.
While the US and its allies continue to fund the rebel Free Syrian Army, many observers warn that the growing
presence of jihadist and militants from beyond Syria is creating a dangerous new conflict within the Syrian civil
war, according to Christian Science Monitor (CSM). The increasing number of radicalised young Muslims travelling
to Syria to fight against the regime has raised Western concerns over what might occur once those fighters return
home, according to Bloomberg. Matthew Olsen, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center says that the
Syrian war is providing both “a rallying point and a training ground for radical Islamists from other nations”.
Richard Barrett, former coordinator of the UN al Qaeda Taliban Monitoring Team, says the risks of returning
jihadists are real, while acknowledging that not all those retuning home will be inclined to engage in terrorist
activity.
Europol reports that terrorist attacks
and related arrests in the European
Union (EU) “significantly increased in
2012” compared to previous years. Its
findings lend credibility to concerns
that terrorism threats remain strong
and varied throughout Europe. In
2011, there were 174 reported
terrorist attacks in EU member states.
In 2012, 219 terrorist attacks were
documented (Figure 1.). Terrorist bomb
attacks at Burgas airport in Bulgaria
and shootings by a lone gunman in
France claimed the lives of fourteen
people in 20122. Separate attacks in Belgium, France and Northern Ireland killed three others. Director of Europol
Rob Wainwright says, “[t]here is growing concern about the threat posed by [foreign fighters] given the possibility
of their returning to the European Union intent on committing acts of terrorism”.
1 Charles Lister from IHS Jane’s offers variations in these numbers. In August 2013, Lister indicated that al Qaeda-linked jihadist fighters such
as those associated with Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) numbered 12,000. Lister also indicates that
the larger and more powerful rebel group Ahrar al Sham has approximately 15,000 to 25,000 fighters and is also strongly Islamist. 2 According to the Europol report, there were no terrorism related deaths in 2011.
This report considers the current level of terrorist threats in the EU, provides an overview of a select number of
countries of origin for foreign jihadists now fighting in Syria, and discusses the on-going debate on how best to
address jihadists returning to their countries of origin.
Foreign Fighters in Syria
According to Newsweek, the Syrian civil war is the third-largest foreign Mujahideen3 mobilisation in history,
following Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq in the past decade. “Syria is the new epicentre for the global jihad
with would be ‘martyrs’ arriving from across the Islamic world to fight Assad (Figure 2.). They are getting
experience in the terror arts they will bring home”, according to Bruce Riedel, former CIA official and member of
the White House National Security Council, cited by The Washington Times. The newly-appointed head of the UK
Security Services, Sir Andrew Parker, issued a stern warning in October 2012 when he said that jihadi fighters
migrating to Syria are a major security threat to the UK, Europe and beyond, reports Newsweek. Parker reports
that “a growing proportion of our casework now has some link to Syria, mostly concerning individuals from the UK
who have travelled to fight there or who aspire to do so. Al Nusrah [Jabhat al Nusra] and other extremist Sunni
groups there aligned with al Qaeda aspire to attack Western countries”.
Precise information is difficult to gather and verify. Foreign Policy reports that foreign fighter groups operating in
Syria have integrated themselves into the social fabric of host communities, particularly in the northern
governorates of Aleppo, northern Idlib, Raq’a and in eastern Deir al Zour. Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute
states that in the early stages of the Syrian conflict, most foreign fighters joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but this
was prior to any jihadi group announcing its presence in Syria. In the autumn of 2011, there were only a small
number of foreign fighters in Syria. This changed after January 2012 when Jabhat al Nusra (JAN4) announced its
formation, resulting in a greater number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria to engage in the fight. Since 2012,
there has been a steady stream of foreign fighters entering Syria. This is significant as the majority of jihadists
come from the Arab world5, states Zelin,
3 Mujahideen is an Islamic-Arabic term for Muslims guerilla warriors engaged in jihad. 4 Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) is an al Qaeda linked militia fighting against the Assad regime. 5 “The Arab world”, Zelin’s description, includes Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.
Qaeda. Of the large number of European Muslims who have received training overseas and fought in places such
as Somalia, Libya and Syria, few have actually conducted attacks after returning to Europe, according to Stratfor.
Still, in an era when jihadist ideologues are urging individual jihad in the West, these trained individuals pose a
very real threat to Europe’s security.
Foreign Fighters from European Countries
Foreign Policy indicates that the UK, France, Germany, and Ireland are among the countries from which up to
1,000 European transnational volunteers8 have left to join Syrian rebels against the Assad regime. Zelin reports
that European countries have growing concerns over the number of European Muslims joining the Syrian rebels
(Figure 4.). In February 2013, the UK-based Independent claims that more than 100 Britons had gone to Syria. Le
Figaro estimated 50 to 80 people came from France. Der Spiegel reported “dozens” of Germans, and Jyllands-
Posten reported 45 Danes. Without question, the picture on the ground in Syria is far from complete and will likely
change as the conflict continues to morph. As a result, accurate figures vary considerably, but do reveal the
European countries from which citizens have travelled to Syria to engage in the fight.
Figure 4. European Nationalities Represented in Syrian Opposition Forces (as of Feb 2013)
Albania Austria Belgium
Britain Bulgaria Denmark
Finland France Germany
Ireland Iceland Kosovo
Netherlands Spain Sweden
Source: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
The threat of battle savvy, foreign fighters returning to Europe from combat in Syria and North Africa is fuelling
debate over immigration and integration policies throughout Europe, says an August 2013 Stratfor report. EU
Counterterrorism Coordinator de Kerchove estimated in April 2013 that 500 Europeans were fighting in Syria
mostly from the UK, France and Ireland; the ICSR reported up to 600 Europeans.
The challenge of monitoring returning fighters is complex. EU cross-border travel restrictions are minimal and
some European officials report they do not want to provoke reaction from Muslim communities. Compounding the
problem, according to Stratfor, is that returning fighters are in fact European citizens and are not flagged by
current immigration mechanisms. Hence, returning European fighters can receive support from people and groups
in the Middle East and North Africa largely undetected. Further, the networks made on the battlefield can be
leveraged to plan and execute attacks on Western targets. This potential threat posed by radicals has emerged as
an important policy issue, likely one reason both the UK and France have been reluctant thus far to arm Syrian
opposition fighters, suggests Stratfor.
Additionally, Thomas Hegghammer, an expert on terrorism and political violence, discovered that approximately
one in nine returning foreign fighters attempt to launch a Western attack. While the percentage is low,
Hegghammer asserts that the plots are more likely to succeed. Attacks planned by returning foreign fighters are
twice as likely to be lethal than those planned by terrorists who have never fought abroad. While Hegghammer’s
research reveals that most foreign jihadists prefer to attack abroad, the one in nine radicalisation rate
demonstrates that the foreign fighting experience is one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in
domestic operations. Hegghammer also emphasised that the vast majority of returning foreign fighters will resume
their “former, peaceful lives-albeit perhaps with enhanced prestige” among home country Islamists. Research also
suggests that some foreign fighters will never return home. Of course, some foreign fighters will die in battle but
some could move to other locations to fight9, and some may settle in Syria.
For those monitoring radicalism in Europe, Caucasian converts to radical Islam is of great concern. Patrick Poole, a
private counterterrorism analyst indicates that terrorist groups welcome Americans that join their ranks. These
new recruits facilitate fundraising and recruitment in the West, demonstrated in recent years with al Shabaab
8 Foreign fighters have also been referred to as transnational volunteers and transnational insurgents. 9 Thomas Hegghammer asserts that some of the battle seasoned jihadists currently fighting in Syria “cut their teeth” battling against Muammar
sect in Germany with 4,000 adherents. AFPC reports that the attacks of 9/11 were organised in part in Germany
by the “Hamburg cell” headed at the time by Mohammed Atta13, one of the 9/11 hijackers. Abu Hajer, one of
Osama Bin Laden’s deputies in Sudan and head of his computer operations and weapons procurement, was
arrested in Germany shortly after the 9/11 attacks, according to the 9/11 Commission Report.
Germany’s counter-terrorism provisions are located within the German Criminal Code (section 129a, b and 89a ff)
as well as a growing number of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedures14. The COE country profile asserts that
Germany recognises the importance of working on an international level to address terrorism.
German security services closely monitor extremism, reports The Guardian. The Bundesamt fϋr Verfassungsschutz
(BfV15) estimates that there are 20 Islamist groups active in Germany with approximately 35,000 members or
supporters who desire to establish a “Koran-state” in Germany. As of May 2013, German intelligence suggested
that up to forty people had left Germany to fight in Syria and up to sixty militants had left Germany for Egypt where
they were traced to training camps in Somalia, reports The Guardian. In the 08 June 2013 interview with Die Welt,
Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said, “Radical Salafism is like a hard drug. All of those who succumb to her
become violent”. On 22 October, Germany's BfV secret service suspects there are some two hundred jihadists
from Germany in Syria, reports Deutsche Welle. The majority of fighters come from the western state of North
Rhine-Westphalia, followed by Hesse, Berlin, Bavaria and Hamburg. More than fifty per cent are German citizens.
In Syria the majority of German jihadists congregate in a so-called “German camp”.
A spate of Salafist-led attacks on German police in 2012 has many concerned of rising extremism in Germany. In
the aftermath, German authorities launched a major crackdown on radical Islamists suspected of working against
the interests of Germans. In March, 2013, the Ministry of the Interior banned three Salafist organisations as anti-
democratic, reports Reuters. DawaFFM, Islamische Audios and An-Nussrah16 were deemed incompatible with
Germany’s “free democratic order”. Evidence collected in country-wide raids involving over 1,000 German police
in June 2013 could enable the German government to outlaw some of the dozens of Islamist groups still operating
in the country, reports Gatestone Institute. Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich, in May 2013, raised the
issue of “home-grown terrorism” and pledged to address it at meetings of EU governments. Friedrich proposes a
controversial two year re-entry ban to the EU for suspected terrorists.
Netherlands
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) reported in 2012 that 951,000 Muslims reside in the Netherlands, accounting for
5.7 per cent of the total population. However, this accounts for legal residents while the illegal Muslim population
is reported to be “quite substantial” and more difficult to quantify. Turks account for 37 per cent of the Muslim
population and Moroccans an additional 36 per cent. Other large Muslim communities come from Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. Additionally, there are several thousand native Dutch converts and children of
second-generation Muslim immigrants. For example, “Dutch Islamophobe” Arnoud Van Door a onetime anti-
Islamic filmmaker and member of the anti-Islamic Geert Wilder’s party, converted to Islam in April 2013, reports
The Guardian.
The Dutch judicial system, like many other Western countries, lacks the authority to prevent Dutch foreign fighters
from travelling to foreign battlegrounds. In many instances, the cases are highly controversial. For example, three
Dutch Kurds were arrested in November 2012 under charges they were “taking preparatory actions for the
purpose of committing terrorist offenses”. The case is pending and two of the three Kurds have been released
from jail. In another case, on 23 October 2013, a Dutch court convicted two men of “preparing to commit murder”.
It set a legal precedent in the Netherlands for people planning to fight in Syria, reports Al Jazeera. The Court’s
ruling suggested that the two men planned to join rebel fighters in Syria; both men were Dutch citizens and
arrested in November 2012. Suspicions were raised after one of the men purchased an airplane ticket to Turkey,
terminated his apartment lease and told social service he was going abroad. Prosecution spokesman Paul van der
Zonden said the decision, “is the first time that the Netherlands hands down such a judgement and this helps
clarify the fact that it’s illegal to go to Syria to fight. This means that we now have a legal precedent and can
prosecute other people wanting to go to Syria or coming back”.
13 Spiegel reports that the al Qaeda Hamburg-Cell, was headed by Mohammad Atta. Atta and cell-member Marwan al Shehhi piloted the planes
that rammed into the World Trade Center. Ziad Jarrah, also a cell-member had skyjacked the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania. 14 An extensive listing of Germany’s codes that address aspects of counter-terrorism efforts can be accessed at:
http://legislationline.org/topics/country/28/topic/5 15 The Bundesamt fϋr Verfassungsschutz is the domestic intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Germany. 16 An-Nussrah is reported to be part of the Millatu Ibrahim group that was outlawed in Germany in June 2012.
security and facilitates free movement within the Schengen area. The SISII provides “easy exchange of information
between national border control authorities, customs and police authorities on persons who may have been
involved in a serious crime. It also provides alerts for missing persons, as well as information on certain property
such as banknotes, cars, vans, firearms and identity document that may ben been stolen misappropriated or lost”
according to the EU.
Further, protection can be enhanced through Frontex24
effective risk analysis of the EU external border and through
implementing common standards on civil aviation, port and
maritime security. Finally EU member states affirm that action
must be taken to protect critical infrastructure.
Pursue
While much of the terrorist threat to Europe currently
originates outside the EU, member countries must recognise
that pursue must include a global dimension and will work
with the UN Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism to
achieve dialogue and agreements. Instruments such as the
European Arrest Warrant25 are proving to be important but
controversial tools in pursing and investigating terrorists
across borders. Critics lament that it violates rights such as
due process and rules of evidence.
In June 2013, the Joint Communication to the European
Parliament, the COE, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions published a
report that addressed ways to prevent radicalisation. In the
report, the EU affirmed its need to remain vigilant over potential threats of returning EU citizens from Syria. The
Commission indicated that it has initiated the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network,26 seeking to prevent and
counter violent extremism. The Commission encouraged member states to make better use of the Second
Generation Schengen Information System that could assist in better movement monitoring of foreign fighters. Also
the Commission will continue to work with the European Parliament and the Council towards implementing a
proposed EU Passenger Name Record (PNR27) Directive as the data will provide an additional tool to track foreign
fighters who leave or return to the EU via air travel. While most EU countries already collect such data, it is often
not shared due to the European Parliament concern of privacy rights.
Additionally, the body could increase use of EU-instruments and tools available under international agreements
such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP28) to track payments related to terrorist movements. With
border controls inside the European Union largely abolished, radicalised Islamists can easily threaten multiple
countries, making collaboration among EU members more important. Working in conjunction with EU intelligence
Analysis Centre (IntCen29), Europol30 and Frontex, The EU will continue to identify the major security risks for the
EU and the identification of possible mitigation measures.
24 Frontex’s mission is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter
applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. 25 The European Arrest Warrant has come under criticism that it violates human rights. 26 The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is part of the “Prevent” portion of the EU Counter-terrorism strategy and is guided by the EU
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. 27 On 01 August the European Parliament was urged by nine member countries to review plans for an EU-wide passenger data list that could
help prevent suspected extremists traveling to fight in Syria. Earlier attempts to introduce legislation requiring airlines to share personal data
on passengers failed in April 2013, reports RT. Lawmakers concerned about privacy issues, failed to approve the proposed the introduction of
Passenger Name Record (PNR). PNR would provide detailed flight information to member states of passengers entering or leaving the EU. The
petition advanced by France, Belgium. Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Britain and Sweden underscored “the importance
for the security of the European Union and those who live within it, of being able to quickly have at our disposal a PRN system offering a high
level of privacy protection”. 28 According to the European Commission, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) has been successful in generating intelligence that
has helped detect terrorist plots and trace their planners. A new EU-US TFTP agreement signed in August 2010 improves appropriate
safeguards to address concerns over security, privacy and respect of fundamental rights. 29 IntCen monitors events both inside and outside the EU in order to provide “intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness” to
EU institutions and member states in the realm of security, defence and counter-terrorism. 30 Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency whose mission is to “achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens”.
However, the management of public assets within the EU is challenging and complex. The density and
transnational character of many European critical infrastructures as well as the interdependency of border
security, transport and other cross-border infrastructures have only increased the opportunities for multifaceted
crisis, posits Javier Argomaniz, expert in European terrorism and political violence. Unfortunately, Argomaniz
concludes that while the EU recognises the need to better secure infrastructure against attack, EU actions to date
have not yet matched the ambitions outlined in its programmes and declarations. This is partly due to the fact that
there are long-running tensions related to security and the notion of national sovereignty versus the trans-border
character of European critical infrastructure (ECI). EU member states are aware of the necessity of enhancing
cross-border cooperation but remain reluctant about “delegating powers to the EU”. While Argomaniz
acknowledges a few notable instances of “swift and firm EU action”, he suggests the EU still has not moved far
from the discussion stage of enhanced protection.
Efforts to Counter Radicalisation
Without question, the UK has taken the lead in prevention strategies, according to the Centre for Security Studies
(CSS), launching its first incarnation of a prevent strategy in 2003 with several countries following suit. In 2005,
the EU launched its own counter-radicalisation strategy and has since encouraged member states to adopt their
own measures. Today, only Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and the UK have issued a comprehensive national
counter-radicalisation strategy detailing a budget, goals, methods, and responsibilities. Broadly speaking, counter
radicalisation efforts can be divided into two categories; general prevention initiatives and targeted
interventions31.
Preventative initiatives seek to help the target group32 become less vulnerable or, more “resilient”, to radical
ideologies, according to Washington Institute’s Matthew Levitt. Preventive initiatives vary significantly in
characteristics and underlying philosophy. Some have a strong religious component such as the Radical Middle
Way, a British government-sponsored project that brings traditionalist Muslim scholars to speak to young British
Muslim audiences and denounce terrorism from a theological perspective. Other projects focus on integration,
seeking to provide employment and education for young Muslims. Many initiatives seek to foster critical thinking
and the ability to deal constructively with opposing views. Stephen Jones at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity
and Citizenship at the University of Bristol argues that government funded initiatives such as the Radical Middle
Way risk being discredited because “everyone assumes that point of view is being pushed for political reasons by
the same politicians that support Israel and smashed up Iraq”.
In order for EU members to better address the threat of jihadist attacks at home, security along the bloc’s borders
will likely need to be tightened, reports Stratfor. This tightening will affect not only potential terrorists but also
other Muslim and European travellers. This could add pressure on countries such as the Balkan states to increase
their overall security efforts, many of which are not EU members, though they border EU territory and reportedly
have seen extensive outflows of fighters to Syria. Western European countries will probably provide aid in the form
of money, personnel and hardware to those that need it, according to Stratfor.
Conclusion
According to the EU, the international dimension associated with terrorism and other types of organised crimes
must be addressed through international cooperation. However, the intensification of cooperation among states,
which have differing standards on the subject of fundamental rights, puts these rights at risk. Member states tend
to infiltrate terrorist organisations by employing special methods of investigation that may constitute potential
threats to privacy, particularly when they are used proactively before an actual offense has been committed. Legal
tools to prevent potential jihadists from engaging in Syria are lacking throughout Europe. EU initiatives to protect
member states from terrorism have been strong on rhetoric but weak on implementation. While there is political
commitment of EU leaders to promote cooperation in the JHA field and to improve the EU’s ability to better combat
terrorism, forging common internal security polices remains a challenge. As such, EU member states face an
adaptable and resilient opponent. Some analysts assert that al Qaeda franchises, and foreign fighters, now control
more territory and can call on more fighters than at any time since 1988 when Osama bin Laden created the
organisation. The EU, while making calculated advances, remains vulnerable to terrorist activity.
31 According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), European countries have developed
schemes “that seek to identify individuals that have displayed clear signs of radicalisation but have not yet committed a crime. Authorities
assess each case” and specifically tailor targeted interventions aimed to sway the individual away from militancy. 32 In this particular the “target group” consists, de facto, of Muslim youth.