European Union – Poland – Dialogue

Wojciech Misztal

Institute of Sociology

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University

wmisztal@[email protected]

European Union – Poland – Dialogue

AbstractThe article discusses the question of social and civil dialogue as a form ofcivic involvement in a democratic, free market system, and analyses it in thecontext of Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Focusing on themechanisms and consequences of institutional solutions adopted in the Polishsocio-political and economic reality, and examining the possibilities of theirdescription and explanation, the study demonstrates that both theinstitutional structure and analytical tools applied in the Polish context areessentially imitative and do not meet practical or cognitive expectations.

Key words: social dialogue, civil dialogue, public sphere, participatorydemocracy, theory of communicative action

Civil freedom is an inherent element of a democratic order.

Under communism, the atrophy of political freedom of citizens and

civil society stemmed from the instrumental treatment of the

public sphere. In liberal democracy, the vitality of the public

sphere is a natural function of free, independent and efficiently

organised civil society, and provides an opportunity to overcome

weaknesses of modern democratic systems by means of active civic

participation in the decision making process at all levels of

public administration.

Having successfully developed a democratic system of

government and joined the European Union, Poland had to adopt a

new pattern of civic involvement which had been shaped in the

process of evolution of EU democratic practices. Social and,

later on, civil dialogue as a project aiming to promote social

empowerment became yet another challenge for a young Polish

democracy. Marked with tension and conflict, Polish social

dialogue brought into light a number of unsolved and seemingly

insoluble problems. In this situation, civil dialogue appeared to

provide the prospect of addressing most of them and consolidating

democracy in the process.

As an answer to the shortcomings of representative

democracy, participatory democracy offers an opportunity for

social and civil dialogue. Social and, even more so, civil

dialogue in the European Union have a growing impact on the

socio-economic and political reality in Poland. Both the Polish

Constitution1 and the legal regulations of Polish EU membership2

1 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 2 April 1997, Preamble [officialtranslation]: ‘We … hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic ofPoland as the basic law for the State, based on respect for freedom andjustice, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue as well as onthe principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers of citizens andtheir communities.’http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm.

2 Article I-47 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe declares‘The principle of participatory democracy: 1. The institutions shall, byappropriate means, give citizens and representative associations theopportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas ofUnion action. 2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent andregular dialogue with representative associations and civil society. 3. The

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require that the government and local administration should

implement the model of social dialogue established at the

Community level. Apart from this, the EU also promotes the

development of civil dialogue.3

In his theory of communicative action, Jürgen Habermas

defines democracy and the democratic process according to the

specific nature of the political, economic and civil sphere

(Habermas, 1981, after Cohen, Arato, 1997: 148). Following this

view, my assumption is that the public sphere constitutes an

actual structure of communication (exchange of information, views

and opinions) expressed in the form of public opinion which has

to be considered by public authority. However, it does not

encompass the entire public sphere developed by citizens acting

against ‘real socialism’. Formed by open, public associations

aiming to reintroduce public debate at all levels of society, the

public sphere emerges in a developed democracy as a platform of

democratic participation of citizens in shaping the common norms

of social consensus, moulding public opinion and exercising

influence on the system, both public institutions and economy.

Rooted in civil society organisations, the public sphere expands

beyond them to become instrumental in forging a general consensus

on public questions and forms of social solidarity as a component

of universally shared morality.

Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned inorder to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent.’Official Journal of the European Union, C 310, vol. 47.

3 Ibid.

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The present discussion aims to analyse the state of Polish

social and civil dialogue in terms of Habermas’s concept of

communicative action and establish what type of such action is

involved in the process. In this way, it is an attempt to test

the explanatory value of Habermas’s theory for the description of

social phenomena in Poland. In such a theoretical framework,

dialogue between public administration and institutionalised

civil organisations (trade unions and non-governmental

organisations) is approached as a conduit between the ‘system’

and ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt), and citizens rely on civil dialogue

to liberate themselves from the inner logic of the administrative

and economic system (which is in charge of the medium of money

and power). I attempt to establish whether social and civil

dialogue should be interpreted in terms of consensus-oriented or

strategic action. Thus, the article discusses the essence, form,

condition and evaluation of Polish dialogue today, and considers

approaches to the definition of the process and its function in

public life. Important factors in this area include the level of

democracy, the development of the public sphere, the competence

and level of engagement of the partners involved, as well as

ethical and legal norms and values (both Polish and European)

making up a set of cultural tools of dialogue. In my analysis, I

follow the postulate of refraining from making personal value

judgments or adopting an axiological approach to the problems

under consideration.4

4 Analyses of problems connected with civil dialogue are sometimescharacterised by highly emotional attitudes stemming from an assumed, but not

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Background of dialogue

The second half of the 20th century saw the beginning of a

radical socio-political and economic transformation in many

countries, especially in Western Europe (Staniszkis, 2003).

Characterised mainly by decentralisation and deconcentration of

public authority, it entailed a reorientation of the entire

machinery of public administration. As inefficiency of extensive

bureaucratic structures became apparent, public authorities were

growing increasingly aware that they were unable to adequately

satisfy the needs and expectations of citizens. A remedy for this

situation was seen in closer relations with society.

Consequently, the state initiated the process of sharing power

with local councils and social organisations, leading to social

dialogue, which formed a bond and enhanced cooperation between

the state, society and economy, the three hitherto separate

spheres. Thus, the process of dialogue emerged and consolidated

as an important element of the concept of participatory

democracy.

explicitly expressed, axiological approach. Strictly academic studies ofPolish civil dialogue are still few and far between, and preliminary incharacter. In addition, some authors display distinctly judgmental attitudes,since their aim is to promote an idea of dialogue as valid and desirable forthe future of Polish democracy, rather than to provide a neutral descriptionof a social phenomenon for its intrinsic interest. Hence my methodologicaldeclaration, aiming to refrain from a judgmental or axiologically engagedapproach to the problems under consideration. In my analyses, I try to adopta distanced and neutral perspective, and to avoid making personal judgmentsor voicing expectations.

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Civil dialogue in the European Union

While civil dialogue is firmly based in the treaty

regulations, it is relatively weak at the European institutional

level, which stems mainly from its optional status. A closer look

at the EU legislation reveals that although civil dialogue has

its place and plays a role both in the European law and in

administrative practice, its potential impact on the official

regulations drafted within the EU institutional framework is in

fact quite limited.5

The main difference between social dialogue and civil

dialogue lies in the fact that while the former involves some

institutionalised consultation procedures at the European level,

it would be quite difficult to point at such forms in the case of

the latter (Grosse, 2006: 109). Although civil dialogue

constitutes a notably weaker of the two platforms of social

consultation in the European Union, there are certain areas where

they clearly overlap and complement each other. Thus, it seems

reasonable to enquire to what extent they contribute to solving

the actual problems of social and economic policy (Grosse, 2006:

115).

5 As observed by Marek Rymsza, ‘… in the European Union, civil dialogue iscurrently being promoted as a mechanism of good governance. This, however, isin fact not so much about spreading the mechanism of participatory democracyas an ‘added value’ factor, but about limiting the extent of the ‘democraticdeficit’ in the decision-making structures of the Union, whose officials arenot elected. As well as this, the European administration (an emergent supra-national government), and thus the decision-making process itself, aresubject to very limited political control.’ (Rymsza, 2008: 8)

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Civil dialogue has a growing role in the decision-making

process in the European Union. As a vital component of

participatory democracy, it is becoming an essential complement

of parliamentary democracy and social dialogue. This trend is

particularly important in the context of a crisis of traditional

forms of political involvement (such as voting in the elections,

political party and trade union membership) affecting countries

with a consolidated democratic system. It is more and more often

that the principles of participatory democracy seem to be

perceived as ‘an indispensable lifeline for democracy’ (Leś,

2003).

Social dialogue in the European Union is focused mainly on

the issues of labour market and industrial relations. However, at

the Community level the spectrum of social consultations is

expanding to engage a number of social and non-governmental

organisations apart from organisations of employers and trade

unions. This type of dialogue, referred to as civil dialogue, is

concerned with a broader scope of issues handled by European

institutions. One of its important dimensions involves

consultations with local councils and their organisations

(Grosse, 2006: 114).

Since the areas of social and civil dialogue overlap only to

some extent, the interpretation adopted by the European

Commission seems justified: particular issues are consulted

according to the level of their social impact. Although labour

relations have long remained within the scope of social dialogue,

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civil organisations are expressing a growing interest in socio-

economic questions, an area of debate traditionally dominated by

employers, employees and the public administration. This process

can be attributed to an increasing popularity of ‘social

economy’, a view which does not restrict the aim of economic

activity to making a maximum profit but puts forward also some

other objectives related to social development in a broad sense

of the concept (Leś, 2003).

Considerable reservations about this form of consultation

stem from the fact that the EU practice does not include a

generally applied definition of civil dialogue or civil

organisations as participants of such a process. The problem lies

in the question how representative the non-governmental

institutions really are at the Community level, and how the

European Commission, which has considerable freedom in this

respect, handles the dialogue itself (Grosse, 2006: 115).

In view of a growing role of civil dialogue in a debate on

governance in general, and in the EU in particular, it is

puzzling that the European Union should have no commonly approved

definition of the process. Developed alongside social dialogue,

it refers to a broad range of interrelations between civil

society organisations and public institutions rather than to

clearly specified practices. As discussed by Jeremy Kendall

(2005), civil dialogue in the European Union relies on mutual

understanding and relations between the participants involved,

and thus goes beyond a simple exchange of information; its degree

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of formality ranges from informal to legally recognised

structures; it is characterised by multi-level involvement on the

part of civil society organisations (from information transfer to

consultation and active participation); it is functional in the

following stages of the policy making process: agenda setting,

policy development, decision making, implementation, evaluation

and feedback (Kendall, 2005).

The role of civil dialogue in the European Union

It goes without saying that civil dialogue is not in

opposition to social dialogue, and neither is it intended to

replace this form of consultation. Indeed, such an approach is a

shared view among various interest groups and the Brussels

administration. On the one hand, civil dialogue plays a

considerable role in spreading the popularity of the intentions

of the European Commission and can make an important contribution

to strengthening European identity among various social groups

(cf. Grosse, 2006: 115-16). On the other, its main weakness lies

in the limited potential to make a substantial contribution to

solving the actual problems of social and economic policy. When

it comes to dealing with the dilemmas of public policies where

conflicting social interests are involved, decision makers can

count on very little support from this process (Grosse, 2006:

117).

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Although the role of civil dialogue in the European Union

came to be recognised relatively late, it does not change the

fact that both formal and informal consultations of this kind had

been running parallel to social dialogue and the activity of such

consultative bodies as the European Economic and Social Committee

(EESC), acting in an advisory capacity to the European Commission

and the European Parliament. The EESC is an intermediary between

organised civil society and the EU decision makers. The body

functions on the basis of the Treaty of Nice, which specifies

that ‘the Committee shall consist of representatives of the

various economic and social components of organised civil

society, and in particular representatives of producers, farmers,

carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations,

consumers and the general interest.’6

Civil organisations have been given a right to express their

views and be consulted on documents relating to socio-economic

questions and the labour market as applicable in general

regulations, thus assuming a complementary function to the EESC

activity in its major advisory role.7 However, they are not

represented in bilateral or trilateral European institutions

dealing with industrial relations (Grosse, 2006: 116). As

interpreted by the EESC itself, this increases its responsibility

for ‘organising discussions between representatives of civil

society with different motivations and defending divergent

6 The Treaty of Nice, Article 257; the document was signed on 26 February 2001and came into force on 1 February 2003.

7 It should be stressed that in a number of cases the Committee opinion is amandatory requirement.

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interests; and facilitating a structured and continuous dialogue

between the European organisations and networks of organised

civil society and the EU institutions.’8 Consequently, the

Committee facilitates dialogue within civil society itself and

dialogue between civil society and European institutions in four

different ways:

(1) Membership in Group III (Various Interests Group); along

with employers (Group I) and employees (Group II), the EESC

includes also 99 representatives of ‘other sections of civil

society’.9

(2) Participation in the EESC consultations, hearings and

conferences (working together with other institutions, especially

the European Commission, the EESC plays an increasingly important

role in organising consultations, conferences and hearings).10

8 See the European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on therepresentativeness of European civil society organisations in civil dialogue,14 February 2006. The Protocol of Cooperation Between the European Commissionand the European Economic and Social Committee (November 2005) states that‘the Committee, as an institutional intermediary between civil society andthe institutions of the European Union, has a key role to play …’ As well asthis, the document declares that the European Commission ‘shall also supportthe Committee's commitment to the establishment over the long term of closer,structured dialogue with organised civil society, particularly by way of theLiaison Group that it has created.’ www.EKES.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.civil-society.

9 Such as ‘farmers’ organisations, small businesses, the crafts sector, theprofessions, social economy actors (mutualities, cooperatives, foundationsand non-profit associations), consumer organisations, environmentalorganisations, and associations representing the family, women’s and genderequality issues, youth, minority and underprivileged groups, persons withdisabilities, the voluntary sector and the medical, legal, scientific andacademic communities’. The list of EESC Group III members is available at www.esc.eu.int/sco/group/documents/list.doc.

10 Such as a Joint Hearing on the European Constitutional Treaty organised bythe EESC and the European Parliament (November 2004),http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.press-releases.1671; the EESC

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(3) Participation in the EESC study groups and sub-

committees set up to consider specific policy proposals and

projects.

(4) Participation in the Liaison Group (set up in 2004 to

interact between the EESC and ‘the representatives of the main

sectors of European organised civil society’).11

European institutions have cooperated with a considerable

number of consultation committees involving civil organisations

and other members. As declared in its 1990s official

communications, the European Commission recognised that apart

from expertise, participatory democracy was characterised by a

particular ‘added value’ factor. Most of these documents aimed to

Stakeholders’ Forum on ‘Bridging the gap’: How to bring Europe and itscitizens closer together?, organised in cooperation with the EuropeanCommission (November 2005),http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/info_09_2005_en.pdf.

11 Mandate of the Liaison Group:1. Exchange of information and views on the respective work programmes andimportant events;2. Identifying themes on which cooperation would be appropriate and possible;3. Examining the feasibility of and practical arrangements for an increasedinvolvement of the networks in the EESC’s consultative work;4. Consultation or cooperation on preparations for certain hearings,seminars, conferences, etc.;5. Studying any other matters of common interest, e.g. in the context ofdialogue with the EU institutions, such as:· the role of organised civil society in the democratic life of the Union;· interpretation and implementation of Article I-47 of the draftconstitutional treaty on the principle of participatory democracy: how toput participatory democracy into practice and how to organise civildialogue;

· the representativeness of civil society organisations other than thesocial partners;· funding of NGOs.http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/reunion_constitutive_en.pdf

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determine the criteria of representativeness of organisations

involved in consultations with the Commission.12

Such recognition of the role and function of non-

governmental organisations (NGOs) in building the European social

order has led to a shift from the concept of ‘government’ to

‘governance’, an approach involving various social subjects in

the political process.13 A growing interest in the role of

organised civil society stems from appreciating the important

part it plays in the process of intensified European integration

and in overcoming the ‘democratic deficit’ (resulting from the

fact that the EU organs, apart from the European Parliament, do

not have a direct democratic mandate). Non-governmental

organisations are also supposed to bring the EU institutions and

citizens closer together and convince people that they can

influence the shape of public policies.

More and more EU institutions, mainly the European

Commission, are beginning to see non-governmental organisations

as valuable partners and participants of various consultations,

conferences or internet panels, and their opinions are treated as

an important element of public debate. Such organisations make it

possible for the EU organs to gain a better insight into12 See European Commission ‘An open and structured dialogue between theCommission and Special Interest Groups’, SEC 92 2272 final, EuropeanCommission ‘Communication on promoting the role of voluntary organisationsand foundations in Europe’, COM 97 241, European Commission Discussion Paper‘The Commission and Non Governmental Organisations: building a strongerpartnership’, COM 2000 11 final.

13 The term ‘governance’ became more widely used in the EU after the EuropeanCommission published its White Paper on European Governance (2001) setting anew formula of government aimed to bring Europe and its citizens closertogether.

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attitudes and opinions of citizens on important social issues and

problems, especially those which have not been successfully

solved within the framework of member state policies (Groux,

2003: 70-4). In this way, the European Union is opening the space

of public debate, thus considerably enhancing the prospects for

greater democratisation and legitimisation of its community

policy. As well as this, such a process means implementing the

principles of public governance, a concept going back to the

1990s, when it was conceived as an instrument to tackle the

symptoms of a crisis stemming from the transformation of the

global economic order, and affecting both the individual member

states and the European Community as such (Fazi, Smith, 2006).

Social and civil dialogue in Poland

Social dialogue is a historically established, essential

form of contact between organised citizens and public

administration, with the principal objective being to secure

peaceful settlement of conflicts in the world of work. In the

course of time, the scope of dialogue evolved and expanded:

Social dialogue is a concept referring to the entire sphereof relations between trade unions and organisations ofemployers, a principle of democratic system, and a particularform of debating social interests. It involves socialpartners acting on the principle of equality of their statusand interests. Differences of opinion are overcome in theprocess of consultations, negotiations and mutual concessionswith a view to arriving at a social contract. In broaderterms, social dialogue refers to any form of communication

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between different levels of public administration and socialpartners representing interests of various social groups in agiven administrative area, such as civil organisations,associations or protest groups. In this perspective, socialdialogue is an instrument of democratic governance and ameans to reach an agreement on objectives, instruments andstrategies of implementing public policies in a particularcommunity. Partners involved in social dialogue include:organs of local self-government, organs of professional self-government, trade unions, organisations of employers, as wellas other social organisations and representatives of tradesand professions. Their rights and obligations, role andposition in social dialogue are defined in applicable laws.14

Social and civil dialogue with its practice of social pacts

or agreements goes back to 1980. Later on, the Round Table

Agreement established a special body composed of representatives

of the government, trade unions and the remaining signatories to

monitor its implementation. However, the rapid pace of

transformation made the institution irrelevant, as the change of

the entire system could not be subject to negotiations with the

old groups of interest it sought to undermine. This, however,

brought accusations of top-down engineering of a new social order

(Gardawski, 2008: 25; Gąciarz and Pańków, 2001: 107). For this

reason, from their early days, civil and social dialogue have

been a part of a ‘bargaining democracy’, where the fate of the

majority is decided by a well-organised minority, and where the

key element is success-oriented activity in the political sphere

(Kaczocha, 2004: 32). Trade unions were recognised as partners

when, as a result of progressing privatisation, they agreed to

the so-called State Enterprise Pact, the only social pact in the

14 Website of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (May, 2010).

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post-communist Poland. As decided, employees of privatised state-

owned enterprises were guaranteed a considerable proportion of

shares in the companies in return for their agreement to

privatisation. A subsequent ordinance of the Council of Ministers

established the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic

Affairs (1994) to monitor the implementation of the pact.

This meant institutionalisation of social dialogue at the

national level. The commission brought together the signatories

of the Enterprise Pact: trade unions: Solidarity and the National

Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), and the Confederation of Polish

Employers (KPP), an organisation of employers and managers of

state-owned and privatised enterprises. In the early period of

the Tripartite Commission, the trade unions, mainly Solidarity

and the OPZZ, were politically engaged on opposite sides,

supporting either the government or the opposition. As a result,

they were able to pursue their goals by relying on their alliance

with the government, without their actual involvement in the

Commission. Furthermore, the trade union currently in opposition

boycotted the activities of the institution, which meant that it

could not reach any agreement at all (Gardawski, 2008: 25-8;

2009: 137-44). Such tripartite dialogue neither legitimised the

government, nor increased the level of social consent to the

reforms, thus exposing the crucial weakness of social dialogue in

this institutional form.

A breakthrough came with the Act on the Tripartite

Commission for Social and Economic Affairs and the Regional

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(voivodship) Commissions for Social Dialogue, which extended

social dialogue from the national to local level and set out

clear criteria of representativeness. The commission now included

also organisations of private employers: Business Centre Club

(BCC), Polish Confederation of Private Employers (PKPP)

‘Lewiatan’ and Polish Craft Association (ZRP), while on the

employee side it was joined by the Trade Union Forum (FZZ). As

expanded and redefined, the main objectives were to reach and

maintain social peace, pursue dialogue regarding the questions of

salaries and social welfare, and provide opinions on the state

budget.

Poland relies mainly on the model of tripartite social

dialogue, focused on representatives of trade unions and

employers, which has become an increasingly insufficient formula

to address a number of fundamental social problems. Since 2013,

following a decision of the Solidarity and OPZZ leaders to

suspend their participation in the Tripartite Commission, social

dialogue has been practically at a standstill. Consequently, some

authors perceive the growth of civil dialogue not only as a

positive factor, but as a necessity. Mounting challenges in

various areas of social life beyond the world of work require a

much broader framework of dialogue (Freiske, 2005: 42-8). There

are also arguments calling for expansion of dialogue to include

more areas of public life. It has also been noticed that the so-

far underestimated civil dialogue provides an opportunity to

foster various forms of social participation, from reaching

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consensus and participation in public debate, to direct

involvement in administrative or political decisions.

In view of the fact that in Poland civil dialogue has not

been clearly defined, there are a number of perspectives in which

it is approached. In broad terms, it is seen as one of the main

forms of public discourse that relies on democratic principles in

the public sphere. The inclusive nature of such dialogue enables

citizens to become involved in public debate and makes it

possible for them to express their opinions on what they perceive

as important public issues. Thus, it provides an opportunity for

civil influence on the shape of the public sphere and on the

decision-making process.

Definitions of social dialogue make reference to the

principle of governance, focusing on its institutional character

(civil organisations and their networks, procedural framework),

participation in decision-making and citizens’ interests. They

place less emphasis on the role such dialogue plays in shaping

public opinion, in the consultation and negotiation process, and

in reaching agreement. Neither do they point out the ways in

which a compromise should be achieved. This lack of reflection on

ways of reaching a consensus, coupled with the fact that, as a

form of participatory democracy, civil dialogue does not

necessarily have to result in a compromise, may be among the

crucial, if little consciously realised, factors hindering the

successful development of civil dialogue in Poland.

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The potential of Polish non-governmental organisations to

engage in civil dialogue depends on a number of factors, such as

the level of democracy, the development of the public sphere and,

most importantly, the overall condition of the third sector.

Poland is among the countries that have modern regulations in

this area, which are frequently modified to achieve better

results.

Potential of Polish non-governmental organisations to engage in

civil dialogue

It is worth remembering that the development of civil

dialogue over the last decade or so has contributed to a

consolidation of civic involvement in the European model of

public policy. Polish membership in the European Union has

determined a new pattern of such participation (in this case, of

civil dialogue), formed in the process of implementation of the

EU procedures. The question is how the third sector in Poland

adapts the European model of civil dialogue. Considering that the

institutional environment seems to provide a basis for the

development of the European model of governance, do the EU

principles consolidate the institutionalisation of civil dialogue

in the country?

Each country has its own, slightly different definition of a

‘non-governmental organisation’ and different models of

cooperation between the third sector and the public

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administration. For example, in Britain the system is based on a

free-market competition for public benefit contracts among the

independent sector organisations (both non-profit and for-

profit). On the other hand, Germany has a corporative model based

on the principle of subsidiarity, in which the non-governmental

sector is favoured as a social services provider if public

expenditure is involved. As observed by Marek Rymsza, ‘a strong

point of the Polish model of cooperation between the public

administration and non-governmental organisations, as set by the

Public Benefit Activity and Volunteer Work Act, is that it

includes elements of these two different systems’ (Rymsza, 2007).

Although the non-governmental sector is a relatively favoured

social services provider, there is competition between the

organisations, and contracts can be awarded by tender if such a

procedure improves their effectiveness.

However, in spite of modern legal regulations, the non-

governmental sector in Poland is still relatively underdeveloped

when compared to western countries. Owing to difficulties in

applying standardised methodology, there are no current

comparative data on this question. However, as revealed by

reliable data published by the Johns Hopkins University, in 2002

Poland was almost at the bottom of European statistics of the

share of labour force employed by non-governmental organisations

(0.6%; the corresponding figure for the Czech Republic was 1.3%,

for Holland, Belgium and Ireland: 8-9%), (Salamon, Sokolowski,

List, 2003)

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With about 60,000 active non-governmental organisations, the

Polish third sector is far less significant than in France, where

it has over a million associations with 20 million members and 15

million volunteers. Also, a number of umbrella organisations

existing at various levels make it a cohesive system. On the

other hand, in the context of Central and Eastern European

countries of the former Soviet bloc, until recently the Polish

NGO sector appeared as exceptionally strong, well-developed and

efficient, which seemed to indicate that is was going in the

right direction. However, in comparison with 2008, the situation

has deteriorated. Consequently, the Polish third sector does not

compare so favourably with other post-communist countries any

more, while the distance from the Western European levels remains

as far as before (NGO Sustainability Index, 2008).

The situation is similar when it comes to practical dialogue

with public administration. In most Western European countries,

NGOs are treated as partners and receive institutional support.

For example, French ministries have special departments

responsible for contacts with such organisations, and the

administration is engaged in regular consultations with them over

specific issues. In the Czech Republic, the government provides

institutional support and financial assistance both to national

organisations and to Czech think tanks operating as part of

foreign networks (Świeboda, Zerka, 2009: 15).

In general, since Polish NGOs are hardly visible on the

European scene (either as members of international alliances, or

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representatives of interests), it is difficult to assess their

efficiency. Compared to their Western counterparts, they are

certainly far less active in this sphere and neither do they show

much interest in changing this situation. Underdevelopment of the

Polish third sector in comparison with the Western European

countries and its limited experience on the international level

make the position of Polish NGOs considerably weaker when it

comes to influencing the EU decision-making process.

Polish organisations are opening up to dialogue on the

European level quite slowly. Their predominant focus is home

issues, with the European perspective still remaining a new

approach, even though since 2004 decisions made in Brussels have

had a direct and ever increasing influence on the situation in

Poland. Thus, a visible intensification of their activity in this

area over the last few years, coupled with a general growth of

the third sector in Poland, should be interpreted as positive

symptoms. It is not only that more and more NGOs are becoming

interested in some involvement on the European level. Also, the

non-governmental sector is slowly consolidating, which enables it

to form nationwide platforms of cooperation that have European

involvement among their major aims and objectives (e.g. Grupa

Zagranica (Group for action abroad)), (Świeboda, Zerka, 2009:

52).

Another problem is posed by structural impediments affecting

Polish NGOs. Without access to stable funding from diversified

sources, they are usually unable to face the challenge of

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involvement in the European debate. Also, a network of their

contacts in Brussels and their ability to grasp the complexity of

the EU decision-making process are rather limited. Thus, even if

they decide to act on the European level, they still have a lot

to learn before they become effective (Świeboda, Zerka, 2009:

52).

European activity of Polish NGOs is characterised by their

involvement in particular policy areas: the EU Eastern

neighbourhood, cooperation for development, and transformation.

Their presence is most easily noticed in the sphere relating to

the protection of some particular social groups, such as women

(Polish Federation for Women and Family Planning), or the LGBT

community (Campaign Against Homophobia). Think tanks (e.g. the

Institute for Public Affairs, Centre for International Relations,

demosEuropa-Centre for European Strategy, Batory Foundation) are

considered the most active Polish non-governmental organisations.

However, their involvement on the European level is not

particularly noticeable and is related to the prestige of their

leaders rather than to their strong position as organisations

(Świeboda, Zerka, 2009: 53).

Hurdles to dialogue on the European level

The development of dialogue on the European level is

hindered mainly by the shortage of funding and by financial

regulations preventing Polish organisations from long-term

23

planning and professional improvement (accounts have to be

settled within a period of one year). Since effective involvement

at the European level requires expenditures, this situation

perpetuates their weak position on the EU scene. Unlike Poland,

many EU member states provide support to their non-governmental

organisations, especially think tanks, as they are considered as

an element of public diplomacy (Świeboda, Zerka, 2009: 59).

Since Polish NGOs are not in a position to take part in the

main stream of European dialogue, they do not receive a stimulus

encouraging them to become involved. Underdevelopment of civil

society in Poland and the relatively recent accession to the EU

(2004) mean that they still have not acquired a significant

position and neither have they developed a network of contacts in

Brussels. Without any concessions made by the EU for Central

Eastern European countries, Polish NGOs have to compete on equal

terms with much better developed and connected organisations from

Western Europe, which have long been involved in the EU

structures (Świeboda, Zerka, 2009: 52).

Impact of European civil dialogue

The ideological impact of the EU in the sphere of civil

dialogue in Poland is, like other European institutions, subject

to a phenomenon referred to as ‘Europeanisation’. Civil dialogue

is ‘a particular case of promoting the idea of participatory, or

deliberative, democracy. What is at work here is the EU support

24

for the idea of civil dialogue and its development as an

institution in new member states’ (Gliński, 2009: 43). As an EU

member, Poland is obliged to implement civil dialogue as set out

by the EU directives. However, it is difficult to observe any

major social change that would involve adopting cultural patterns

of European democracy. While Polish society has accepted

structural funds and, particularly eagerly, agricultural

subsidies, it has not, as yet, considerably increased its

awareness of civic and democratic culture (Gliński, 2009: 46).

While the EU model of civil dialogue enables non-

governmental organisations to become involved in the decision-

making process, at the same time it produces a risk of excessive

corporatisation of the third sector. A sustained, long-term

involvement of umbrella organisations in bureaucratised

negotiation and consultation procedures can transform them into

excessively sector-focused, technocratic bodies ready to make

compromises that would not be accepted or understood by public

opinion, and thus alienate them from their social base (Rymsza,

2008: 10).

As a tool of participatory democracy, civil dialogue runs

also other risks stemming from ‘Europeanisation’. One of them may

be a development of a particular type of formalised institutions

of civil dialogue allowing only umbrella or sector-focused

organisations to take part in the political process. This can

lead to unnecessary bureaucratisation of civil activity and a

gradual evolution of the non-governmental sector into an

25

oligarchy (Gliński 2002: 249; 2009: 44). Such tendencies are

exacerbated by phenomena which have become routine elements in

the process of European dialogue and hinder its efficient

progress.

Studies of civil dialogue in the European Union have

indicated a number of factors limiting the democratic nature of

the process. Apart from its institutional structure, some of them

are as follows: a lack of a stable and formalised structure of

dialogue; insufficient legitimacy (e.g. no selection procedures)

and transparency of membership; a lack of transparent criteria of

selecting non-governmental networks as stakeholders taking part

in hearings and consultations; a limited degree of formality and

transparency of dialogue (it is organised ad hoc and initiated by

civil organisations); an informal nature of contacts between the

EU officials and non-governmental organisations, often based on

personal acquaintance; an important role of informal groups as

the main information channel between the European Parliament and

civil society organisations; a limited level and variety of forms

of dialogue with the European Council; frequent informal contacts

through bilateral meetings of non-governmental organisations with

the European Commission officials. Such contacts are perceived as

a more direct, thus more efficient, channel of communication, but

it is open only to the most established networks (Fazi, Smith,

2006).

Apart from the factors mentioned above, the negative impact

of ‘Europeanisation’ can involve

26

… a multidimensional import of non-democratic institutions andlegislative regulations from the European Union to Poland. Ingeneral, the problem concerns institutions in which officials,‘unelected’ politicians (e.g. judges) or experts replacerepresentatives of society who have been democraticallyelected or appointed in democratic procedures. In the civilsector environment, the main result is excessivebureaucratisation of the procedures of allocating the EUfunds, with the administration playing the principal role as adecision-making authority; as well this, the institution ofcivil dialogue itself becomes bureaucratised.

(Gliński, 2009: 45)

It is also observed that:The mechanisms of ‘Europeanisation’ of post-communist

countries outlined above partly confirmed the apprehensionsconcerning export of the EU deficit of democracy to EasternEurope. One of the most prominent signs of this wasreinforcement of elite dominance and the dissemination ofsocial apathy in the public sphere. During the pre-accessionperiod the ‘EU effect’ reinforced the top-down nature of thetransformation, a process which had two different politicalconsequences. First, ‘Europeanisation’ mainly supported theautonomy of the executive and the administration (thegovernment, the experts, the officials) who played a key rolein the negotiations with the EU and gave them a moretechnocratic twist … . This specific shape of the politicalprocess weakened the other political actors, includingparliament and the nongovernmental organisations, whoparticipated in the process of adjustment to EU demands onlyto a limited extent. They also delegitimised it due tocorruption in the top echelons of the government, theinstitutions which decided how to use foreign assistanceprogrammes and also decided about the forms of transactions inwhich foreign investors participated (privatisation,networking in expert and decision-making communities withingovernment agencies, consulting firms, foreign financialinstitutions etc.). …

Second, development of new political solutions in Central-Eastern Europe coincided with institutionalisation of theinfluence of actors who were not elected in direct elections.… In Poland this can be seen in the exceptional role of the

27

media which are largely controlled by foreign capital and alsoin the significance of economic experts or NGOs who usuallyrefer to criteria and standards borrowed from internationalcapital markets, EU directives etc. in public debate.

(Jasiecki, 2008: 374-375)

It is highly doubtful that civil dialogue at the European

level has any impact on the general condition of civil dialogue

in Poland and it would be rather difficult to defend an argument

for… a considerable influence of European political culture withits new participatory style of governance on socio-politicalchanges in Poland, and particularly on changes of theenvironment in which the non-governmental sector functions.Firstly, it is difficult to make a firm conclusion that such anew style has actually been successfully implemented in theold EU member states. Secondly, institutional changes(inherently imperfect themselves) always demand a substantialperiod of time to acquire a new cultural content. … The systemof Polish political and administrative institutions, includingthe new ones directly involved with the process of‘Europeanisation’, has been very successful in its oppositionto the introduction of real changes. Instead of evolvingtowards European patterns, it generally adapts the logic of‘Europeanisation’ to its old ways and operating principles,which hinders the development of civil society in Poland.

(Gliński, 2009: 46-7)

Do Poles know how to debate?

Although the Polish mechanisms of civil dialogue are fully

operational, the parties involved in traditionally established

institutions of social dialogue often reduce it to a mere slogan

and perceive it as an empty façade of no practical impact. In

fact, political and non-governmental elites do not have suitable

28

expertise in, and experience of, the machinery of civil dialogue.

It seems that the government as the host party is to take most of

the blame for this situation. The elites are unable, or perhaps

also unwilling, to work out a coherent vision of the role that

dialogue is to play, which makes it chaotic and insignificant

(Schimanek, 2007: 44-52; 2008, 28-35). This superficial and

instrumental approach is coupled with highly insufficient and

inadequate legal regulations, often conditioned by political and

economic factors; as well as this, ethical guidelines for the

parties involved are not thoroughly observed. Indeed, the

regulatory framework both for the institutions of civil dialogue,

and for civil dialogue in the institutions of social dialogue, is

vague, imprecise and often unclear. Not only does this situation

considerably hinder the process itself, but also its status as

perceived by the government, social partners and public opinion.

Vague regulations are open to loose interpretations, sometimes

clearly contradicting the spirit, even if they adhere to the

letter, of the law, itself already blurred by the government.

Such shortcomings stem mainly from the lack of a clear vision of

how the institution of civil dialogue is to function in Poland

(Schimanek, 2007:50).

In practice, the role of civil dialogue in the

implementation of public policies is quite limited. It is an

inefficient instrument of public management from the point of

view of such factors as improving the efficiency of public

policy, the pace of legislative process, or expanding the scope

29

of public debate to include elements that social partners

perceive as important (Fałkowski, Grosse, Napiontek, 2006: 99).

As a result of the dominating role of inclusive social capital,

the superficial character of dialogue stimulates the development

of a network of informal contacts between the parties involved

(Putnam, 2009: 36). In its current state, dialogue still

considerably depends on personal motivation and commitment on the

part of administration officials and members of civil

organisations. As perceived by the participants involved, these

elements are both vital and morally right, even if they are not

in line with the officially approved procedures.15 A reaction

against excessive institutionalisation of the third sector and

the burden of bureaucracy, this phenomenon could be interpreted

also in terms of a mechanism of defence against dehumanisation of

their mutual relations (Schimanek, 2007: 44-52; 2008: 28-35). In

small communities, unofficial cooperation stems from personal

contacts between members of non-governmental organisations and

public administration officials. Although regarded as beneficial

for the cooperation itself, such relations are conducive to

unfair competition and malpractice (e.g. the results of open

15 Tomasz Schimanek comments on an alternative, as it were, non-institutionalplatform of civil dialogue: the meetings of the Parliamentary Committee forCooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations, initiated by the Speaker ofthe Polish Senate, and the head of the committee, Bogdan Borusewicz. In hisconclusion, the author observes that: ‘This dialogue under the auspices ofthe Speaker of the Senate, Bogdan Borusewicz, was very much needed and iscertainly worth continuing, even though it breaks generally establishedconventions and exceeds generally accepted definitions of civil dialogue,which is usually run by executive bodies.’ (Schimanek, 2007: 482). As can benoticed, such an assessment is contradictory: the author questions thevalidity of the criteria that he uses for his evaluation of civil dialogue.

30

public contests are often quite obvious long before they are

announced) (Niewiadomska-Guentzel, 2008: 65; Makowski, 2008: 36).

As Juliusz Gardawski observes, a similar mechanism operates in

the case of social dialogue, where such a ‘bypass’ of official

procedures and standards of cooperation also involves direct

contacts between the representatives of the parties concerned

(Gardawski, 2005: 246ff; Schimanek, 2007: 20; 2008: 32).

Polish dialogue has been considerably affected by negative

stereotypes and prejudice. During the process itself, the main

focus generally shifts away from the actual obstacles and

limitations preventing the solution of the initial problem.

Instead, what comes to the foreground is the question of who is

to blame for the existing situation, thus transposing the issue

of responsibility to the moral level. Such a debating culture

displays a tendency towards negative dialogue, conducted with an

aim to express social protest rather than to reach a compromise.

Institutions and procedures are frequently used not to foster

understanding but to block negotiations in order to pursue narrow

interests (Fałkowski, Grosse, Napionetk, 2006: 110).

Consequently, what becomes consolidated is a peculiar negotiating

strategy borrowed from the world of political struggle and aimed

to discredit other partners involved. In this way, a conflict of

interests turns into a conflict of values. The main objective is

to exclude other parties from the public sphere and significantly

reduce their social role (Hausner, Marody, 2001: 114-44).

31

One of the factors hindering the course of dialogue is a

lack of rudimentary awareness of the forms and techniques of the

process, elements that often determine both the attitude of the

parties involved and the outcome of negotiations. The experience

of dialogue with public authorities is also quite limited

(Schimanek, 2007: 51-6; 2008: 36). Another problem is the fact

that civil dialogue, like social dialogue, is embedded in the

political sphere (Fałkowski, Grosse, Napiontek, 2006: 106).

Consequently, the institution of civil dialogue is used by the

administration to manipulate partners into legitimising

government decisions (Schimanek, 2007: 44-5). ‘Polish NGOs … feel

that their government “has no habit or tradition of working with

NGOs”’ (Fazi, Smith, 2006: 80). The same holds true for the local

administration. Also, very few organisations employ professional

specialists with expertise in the field of public policy making,

not to mention the fact that in Poland such specialists are few

and far between. Most NGOs are new structures with very limited

resources (or no resources at all), and thus they often find it

difficult to fully participate in consultations with the

government. A dominant feeling among them is that ‘since we have

existed there have been changes all the time in the government,

in policy … we have so much to do, so I guess we concentrate on

national issues, [but we do] try to use EU standards in lobbying

our own government’ (Fazi, Smith, 2006: 80).

Civil organisations do not receive adequate support from the

public administration, nor can they efficiently protect

32

themselves against manipulation. Owing to the fact that NGOs do

not have a balanced strategy which would enable them to formulate

their own standpoint independently, they either readily support

the government proposals, or treat them with suspicion and

distrust (Schimanek, 2007: 46). Insufficient experience in

communicating with the government administration makes them

liable to manipulation involving limited access to, or refusal

of, reliable information, which results in NGO activity being

blocked altogether. This situation is further aggravated by the

financial dependence of the third sector on government funding.

It seems that sometimes the government uses its relations with

NGOs to its own advantage, while the NGOs, having long experience

of being treated as weaker partners in their dealings with the

administration, tend to accept the fact. Under the circumstances,

they find it difficult to criticise or oppose the government

decisions (Schimanek, 2007: 46).

Both social and civil dialogue rely on a corporatist, or

neo-corporatist,16 model, conducive to articulating and defending

16 The Polish model of civil dialogue is sometimes characterised as neo-corporatist (Gardawski, 2009). It functions within the framework ofbargaining democracy, in which conflicts of interests between differentsocial groups are resolved by public authority. As viewed by Max Weber,representation by the agents of interest groups constitutes a specific typeof authority. Such representative bodies of interest groups aim to settledifferences through compromise. Today, this kind of pattern can be observedin the form of corporatism and neo-corporatism, which rely on intermediariesrepresenting interests of particular groups that have different roles ratherthan compete against one another. In democratic countries, interest groupsinfluence political decisions of the state and are involved in public policymaking. (Weber, 2002: 226). The questions of neo-corporatism and socialdialogue are often closely related. Solutions applied in neo-corporatism arean important element of social dialogue, which is a much broader institution.

33

narrow interests rather than to searching for a consensus

involving resignation from certain demands in the name of a

compromise for the sake of common good. In the case of civil

partners, the battle of interests takes on monstrous proportions

as a result of the already mentioned diversity of the non-

governmental sector and the weakness of representation

procedures. This situation is not peculiar to Poland, and similar

problems occur in many member states of the European Union and in

other countries where the corporatist model prevails. To a

greater or lesser extent, all those countries experience similar

difficulties concerning the legitimacy of representation,

protracted consultation processes, and the instrumental treatment

of the institutions of dialogue (Schimanek, 2007: 44-56; 2008:

28-34).

Both in the EU and in Poland the top level of civil dialogue

is marked by similar negative factors limiting the democratic

nature of the process, which, apart from its institutional

nature, include: a lack of a stable and (until recently)

formalised structure of dialogue; insufficient legitimacy of

civil organisations; a lack of transparent criteria of selecting

stakeholders taking part in hearings and consultations (which

generates problems with defining the criteria of

representativeness for non-governmental organisations involved in

consultations); a limited degree of formality and transparency of

dialogue; a practice of informal contacts between the EU

officials and non-governmental organisations (often based on

34

personal connections), which are perceived as a more efficient

channel of communication. These phenomena, which have become

routine elements in the process of European dialogue and hinder

its efficient progress, are present also in Polish civil

dialogue. As such, they are not inherently Polish

characteristics. Thus, the process of ‘Europeanisation’

understood as an import of the EU ideology involves also a

transfer of such undesirable features.

As it turns out from the above account of Polish dialogue,

Habermas’s theory of communicative action (Habermas, 2006) offers

a rather limited explanatory potential in this context. In his

framework, dialogue between public administration and

institutionalised civil organisations (trade unions and non-

governmental organisations) is approached as a conduit between

the ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt), and citizens rely on

civil dialogue to liberate themselves from the inner logic of the

administrative and economic system (which is in charge of the

medium of money and power). A confrontation of empirical findings

on civil dialogue in Poland with such theoretical assumptions

leads to a number of conclusions:

Polish civil dialogue does not aim to achieve a ‘rationally

mediated consensus’ and consequently it does not constitute

consensus-oriented action. While the objective of social

dialogue is to make social pacts, the key function of civil

dialogue is to take part in the decision-making process of

public authorities.

35

Polish civil dialogue is dominated by objective-oriented,

rational action aiming to achieve certain goals perceived in

terms of tasks to be accomplished – the type that Habermas

(1999) refers to as ‘strategic action’. In the course of

such action (involving both objects and people), individuals

and collectives are treated as objects of manipulation. The

process is predominantly success-oriented and the sphere

where it takes place is one of conflict. These findings are

confirmed by the practice of Polish civil dialogue, which

involves numerous conflicts, and displays an instrumental

approach to the principles of the process, frequent

manipulation, simulated action or bypassing official

procedures, often are not entirely clear. The parties

involved in the process resort to such measures with a view

to their own benefit. Thus, Polish civil dialogue is not

communicative action as understood by Habermas: it does not

democratically mould public opinion, which would shape the

limits of, or exchange between, communicatively structured

lifeworld and administrative system.

Polish civil dialogue is not the domain of public opinion

generated by a considerable number of various associations

‘essentially public’ in their structure and character (Cohen

Arato, 1997). Rather, the country is characterised by an

elitist model of the public sphere, excluding a number of

social categories from the dialogue. Thus, the goal

36

postulated by Habermas, i.e. the reintroduction of public

debate at all levels of society, has not been achieved.

Contrary to Habermas’s theory, civil dialogue does not

create a new model of social ethics which would enable a new

social order based on communication free from distortion or

political domination. Poland has not seen the emergence of a

dialogic space, open to all those capable of conducting

dialogue and acting within its framework (Cohen, 1995: 84).

The basis and principles of civil dialogue which enable the

participants to reach a consensus on shaping social norms

are not established in the course of dialogue. As a result

of breaking ethical standards by the parties involved in the

dialogue, normative content of social life cannot emerge.

Habermas views deliberation as a process involving open and

public debates conducted in good faith, free from coercion

and aiming to secure equal opportunities to be heard

(Habermas, 2005: 324-5). Polish civil dialogue cannot be

classified as an example of a deliberative model: it lacks

in transparency and is open to informal contacts between

administration officials and non-governmental organisations,

often based on personal connections.

As it turns out, Habermans’s model is not a normative theory

of the culture of dialogue between society and

administration and it does not enable a diagnosis of the

actual social reality. Polish civil dialogue is not the type

37

of action classified as communicative and neither is there

any evidence of the direction of its evolution.

It would seem that Habermas’s approach to the analysis of

social dialogue in general, and civil dialogue in particular, is

a case of emancipation potential of critical awareness leading to

sociological idealism (Gellner 1997: 85). As such, it assumes

that an idea and its constitutive framework of meaning is the

source of its own limitations. In this way, the concept of

emancipation of awareness involves a utopian motif typical of

false awareness. For the time being, however, there are no signs

of a new approach to replace the postmodern framework rooted in

Hegel’s philosophy.

Institutional solutions implemented in Poland, as well as

theories and methodological tools used in their description and

interpretation, are for the most part imitative. This leads to

the emergence of a hybrid conglomerate of institutional solutions

modelled on the pattern of the European Union member states. The

structure and the mode of operation of these institutions is then

analysed by borrowing theoretical approaches developed in the

European or American social context. As can be seen from the

above account, both social and civil dialogue are examples of

such solutions which do not produce expected results and their

inadequacy brings a prolonged institutional and intellectual

crisis. In this situation, the question is how to conceptualise

intellectual mechanisms of generating reality in a way which

would not undermine its socially accepted version, and at the

38

same time adjust it to fit better with people’s aspirations and

abilities. Is it the case that Polish socio-economic, political

and intellectual life is characterised by an incommensurability

of values, which produces a huge gap, manifested in the absence

of a common yardstick, a simple incomparability, an inability to

introduce order, a tragic conflict and a lack of a uniform

decision-making pattern? (Wojtczak 2010: 455).

Translated from Polish by Piotr Styk

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