Europe, A Smart Power?

Europe as a Smart Power: The Impact of the European External

Action Service

Dr. Mai’a K. Davis CrossSenior Researcher

ARENA Centre for European StudiesUniversity of Oslo

[email protected]

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Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association, September 1-4, 2011.

Copyright by the American Political Science Association

THE SMALL WORLD OF SMART POWER

There is growing interest in the idea of smart power –

defined as the effective combination of hard and soft power – in

policy circles on both sides of the Atlantic.1 For example, US

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made smart power a key part of

her message during her Senate Confirmation hearing (Naughton

2009), and has since mentioned it repeatedly in her diplomacy

with other countries. The Center for Strategic and International

Studies in Washington DC has launched a Smart Power Initiative,

which has resulted in a number of meetings and publications,

including the Commission on Smart Power, chaired by Richard

Armitage and Joseph Nye (Armitage and Nye 2007). On the other

side of the Atlantic, the Security & Defence Agenda, a leading

Brussels-based think tank, held a day-long conference at the

European Parliament in 2009 to discuss EU smart power. Shortly

1 S. Nossel first coined the term (2004).

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before that, European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn

spoke at Oxford University, outlining the way forward for the

European Union (EU) to exercise smart power as it fulfills its

goals. Smart power seems to be an emerging buzz word, but how

much substance does it really have? And does the concept have

any place in long-standing scholarly debates about power that

have been so central to the study of international relations?

Academic interest in smart power has been somewhat lacking.

This may be surprising given that a significant proportion of

scholarly work in international relations (IR) deals

fundamentally with different forms of power. Ernest Wilson

(2008) and Joseph Nye (2008; 2009a; 2009b) are two of only a

small handful of scholars to write about the concept directly.

It is increasingly common for IR scholars to mention it in

passing, but only a few have researched its implications, and

even then, almost exclusively as it pertains to US power. Recent

research in the field of EU studies actually contributes much to

our understanding of the EU’s potential to become a smart power,

even if only implicitly (Reid 2005; Ilgen 2006; McCormick 2006

and 2010; Leonard 2006; Laïdi 2008; Hill 2010; Moravcsik 2010).

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Yet it still appears that the concept of smart power itself is

too ambiguous and misunderstood to be useful, even though there

is general agreement that this is where Europe’s real strength

lies. Policy experts continue to throw the term around and

academics continue to give it short shrift.

I seek to clarify the meaning of smart power first by

unpacking its two main components – hard and soft power – to

analyze each separately. Through a review of the literature that

defines the tools of power and their relationship to hard and

soft power, I argue that soft power is fundamentally different

from hard power in significant ways, and this has implications

for smart power. Second, I bring the two concepts of hard and

soft power back together again to re-conceptualize how we

conceive of smart power, and to make the concept analytically

useful. Third, I consider the case of Europe, and specifically,

the recent launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

I suggest that the EU is mostly a soft-power actor that

occasionally engages in very targeted smart power, and that the

EEAS is a key example of smart power in a number of ways. I

conclude that the study of smart power has much potential, and

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that more focused and explicit research can reveal the various

ways in which the combination of hard and soft power can be

maximized.

THE TOOLS OF POWER

The greatest misinterpretation of smart power stems from how

one defines soft and hard power separately. In Joseph Nye’s 2004

book, he defines soft power as when A gets B to want what A wants

(co-option), and hard power as when A gets B to do something that

B would not otherwise do (coercion). He argues that the use of

force or sanctions are the main resources used to coerce, while

values, culture, institutions, and policies are resources that

can be wielded to attract or co-opt. In so doing, he somewhat

conflates the tools of power (i.e. persuasion, military force,

trade agreements, etc.) with the type of power (soft or hard).

In other words, if a state engages in persuasion and diplomacy,

this is assumed to be an exercise of soft power. By contrast, if

a state uses military force to accomplish a task, this is assumed

to be an exercise of hard power. Zaki Laïdi and others correctly

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point out that the ends are not necessarily correlated with the

means (2008).

To illustrate this point, Janice Mattern argues that

language, often thought of as a tool for soft power, can be used

in a coercive way (2007). Through verbal fighting, an attacker

can undermine a victim’s subjectivity by closing off its options.

Mattern uses the example of the phrase “war on terrorism” to

argue that the US was not just retaliating against 9/11, but

defending the world against terrorists (2007, 113). When

supplemented with President George W. Bush’s statement to the

world that, “you are either with us or with the terrorists,” the

phrase “war on terrorism” effectively set a verbal trap that

constituted a “non-choice.” The message was that if you, as a

state, wanted to be considered on the side of the “good,” you had

to be in the US camp. Obviously, the implication was that any

other option was equivalent to siding with the terrorists.

Mattern argues that this form of verbal coercion actually made

certain states like Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey favor the US

in their international dealings because they needed to establish

their status as “good” states (2007, 115).

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From the other direction, the EU’s Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP) illustrates how military power can be

attractive. In cases of humanitarian intervention or

peacekeeping, military power is often used as a form of soft

power because people tend to want this kind of aid, even if it

entails the use of force. The EU is explicit about obtaining a

UN mandate before launching a CSDP military operations, and thus

gaining international legitimacy for its actions. In a later

work, Nye agrees with the point that the tools of power must be

conceptually disaggregated from the type of power that is being

exercised. He argues that myths of invincibility, well-run

military campaigns, military-to-military cooperation and training

can all augment soft power (2007, 167).

At the same time, Nye warns that attractive military power

can quickly lose its allure if principles of legitimacy or

efficiency are lost in the process, such as with the example of

prisoner mistreatment at Abu Ghraib (2007, 168). Indeed, there

is a sense in which the very existence or buildup of military

power may be unattractive to some publics. Scholars like Ian

Manners, who explore the idea of Europe as a normative power,

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argue that the more the EU militarizes, the more it will lose its

normative power, regardless of the fact that such militarization

strengthens the EU’s ability to engage in humanitarian action

(2006). This view supports the notion that on some level,

military power is going to be seen as coercive and decisive.

Alexander Wendt refers to this as “rump materialism” (Wendt 1999,

112-3). Nonetheless, the fact remains that there are still

numerous and significant ways in which military power is

attractive. The case of the EU makes this ever more apparent.

The same type of argument can be made about some of the most

innocuous forms of soft power, like public diplomacy, educational

exchange, and cultural diplomacy. Their purpose is to encourage

engagement, two-way dialogue, and listening, but they may easily

cross the line into propaganda and indoctrination (Cull 2009).

With these nuances in mind, the overarching argument remains

that we cannot automatically associate the tools of power with

the type of power. What is most important is whether the tool is

used to coerce or to attract. This is a basic point that sets

the stage for a better understanding of smart power. It also

raises several broader questions. Are hard and soft power just

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two sides of the same coin? Or, are they in some ways

intrinsically different? Who perceives hard and soft power? How

are various audiences impacted by the exercise of power?

HARD AND SOFT POWER COMPARED

Soft power is in several ways a completely different animal

than hard power, especially in the context of the post-Cold War

world. Globalization has made it easier to communicate across

national boundaries, develop thick transnational ties, and obtain

accurate, real-time information about what is happening within

other states and on the other side of the globe (Keohane and Nye

2000). Because of the quickness and transparency of

transnational interactions, we no longer live in a world in which

states can be boiled down to black boxes (if indeed we ever did).

Most security threats are from non-state actors, either sub-

national or transnational. This has changed the nature of the

international system, de-prioritizing traditional militaries

poised for territorial defense, and prioritizing other factors

like economic interdependence, security against terrorism and

related public knowledge, the internet and cyber-security,

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Hollywood films, and the influence of transnational networks of

experts.

In this context, I advance three arguments about the nature

of hard and soft power. First, soft power is now a far more

expansive concept than hard power. Second, soft power can be

both purposeful and non-purposeful, while hard power is only

purposeful. Third, soft power is more likely to be perceived

differently by various audiences compared to hard power, making

it much more difficult to control or anticipate. All of these

qualities are inter-related and have important ramifications for

the exercise of smart power.

First, soft power is a more expansive concept (Nye 2008,

143). This comes in the distinction between having power as a

resource and exercising power as an instrument of influence

(Baldwin 2005). I contend that hard power is only recognized as

such when tools of power are exercised or threatened as an

instrument of coercion. Otherwise, those very resources could

just as easily be used to attract or co-opt. Neo-realists, for

whom hard power resources determine outcomes in international

relations, define these resources as “size of population and

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territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military

strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz 1979, 192).

But are these resources necessarily coercive without the state that

possesses them actually wielding them for some end? No. The

fact that India’s population is expected to surpass that of China

in 2026 is not regarded by most people as a threat. The efforts

of the EU to build up a common military capability is not

generally seen as a bid for hegemony even though member states

spend more on military than the next six biggest spenders after

the US combined. The size of the Japanese economy is not

regarded as a threat even though it is around the same size as

China’s and it holds nearly the same level of US debt. For much

of the world, France’s nuclear weapons mean something far more

benign than Pakistan’s or China’s. Wendt points out that power

resources must be placed in their social context to have meaning

(1999). Today’s social context is not the same as during World

War I or the Cold War, when the power resources that neo-realists

identify may have had more predictive value.

This leads to the second point: hard power is purposeful

power. The real measure of hard power is how a state uses or

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threatens to use its resources to coerce. And even then, a state

may not be able to successfully convert its resources into hard

power (Schmidt 2005, 47). As Baldwin writes,

Planes loaded with nuclear bombs may be worse than useless in a situation calling for planes with conventional weapons with insufficient time to unload the nuclear weapons and reload the planes with conventional ones (2005, 179).

In today’s context, the neo-realist argument that the simple act

of increasing one’s military strength is enough to make other

states fear for their own security and trigger an arms race (the

so-called security dilemma) has not played out. The US has

nearly doubled its defense spending since 9/11 without any other

states rising to challenge its military superiority, and it has

simultaneously lost its unipolar status, defying realist

expectations. Part of this has stemmed from its inability to

convert its military resources into fungible hard power in light

of the particular threats it faces. Another part can be

attributed to the weaknesses in the perceptions of US power. In

fact, it can be argued that American use of military power in

Iraq and Afghanistan has actually degraded its status as a hard

power actor because it has shown the world that the largest

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military power can easily become overstretched and incapable of

achieving the goals it sets for itself. It took ten years to

catch Osama bin Laden, and in the end even this was the result of

a small contingent of special forces personally directed by

President Obama. Making hard power resources fungible is not a

straightforward task even when its use is purposeful.

By contrast, soft power can be either purposeful or non-

purposeful; a state can be attractive even without trying to

exercise power over others. A country like Norway, for example,

can be attractive for its high quality of life, environmental

standards, strong economy, democratic values, and culture (Nye

2004, 112). Domestic attributes like these can serve as soft

power resources without necessarily being exploited for gain vis-

à-vis other states. At the same time, just like hard power, soft

power can be purposefully exercised in a particular instance to

co-opt others into changing their behavior or adopting favorable

policies to the state wielding it. For example, it can be argued

that the US co-opted the UK to join it in the 2003 Iraq War,

drawing upon its longstanding relationship, shared norms, and

personal ties between George Bush and Tony Blair. The

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implication is that a state’s resources that can potentially

contribute to soft power are generally much more prevalent than

those that can be used for hard power.

The third property of soft power that distinguishes it from

hard power relates to how audiences perceive it. Soft power is

open to interpretation depending on who you are and where you sit

in the world. For example, China engages with African nations to

attract them to support Chinese interests at the UN. But soft

power has different audiences beyond the one it targets, so while

many Africans find Chinese gestures attractive, many Europeans

find them unattractive. Even if state A is trying to target

state B specifically, states C, D, and E also form their own

perceptions about state A. This is true whether state A seeks to

co-opt or to coerce state B. States that are not targets of

coercion may actually find the action to be attractive. For

example, when the EU sanctions Iran or freezes the bank accounts

of Syrian leaders, many other countries applaud it, and the EU

gains legitimacy in the eyes of others. In effect, the exercise

of either hard or soft power has direct soft power implications,

whether positive or negative, all over the world. The

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information revolution certainly enables this. Political leaders

are constantly aware that even narrow, targeted attempts to

influence are being observed by third parties.

The same is not true for hard power. The efforts of state A

to attract state B do not have hard power implications in other

areas of the world. For example, the Eastern Partnership, which

involves closer engagement between the EU and Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, may seem

threatening to Russia, but the impact is not to force Russia to

change its behavior in support of EU policies. If anything,

Russia has responded by competing for influence with these six

countries, through both soft and hard power strategies. Russia

has retaliated, behaving in a less favorable way towards the EU.

However, the efforts of state A to coerce state B may have hard

power implications for third parties under specific

circumstances. For example, European military action in Libya

could serve as a warning to other dictators in the Middle East

and North Africa, thereby coercing them to change their behavior.

Overall, the implications for hard power are thus more limited

than for soft power when it comes to third publics.

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In addition to the factors that distinguish hard and soft

power from each other, there are at least two key similarities.

First, states compete for hard and soft power. As the example

above illustrates, China and the EU compete for influence over

Africa. China offers mutually beneficial trade deals with Africa

that bear no conditionality. The EU has numerous aid and trade

programs that help improve African countries’ democratic

institutions, stability, human rights, health, and quality of

life. And in the case of the Eastern Partnership countries,

Russia and the EU compete for influence. Russia is a major

supplier of energy and other goods to the Eastern Partnership

countries, and draws upon long-standing historical ties and

geographic proximity. The EU offers access to its markets,

lessons in best practices, help with good governance, and so on.

In both cases, Russia, China, and the EU compete in both soft and

hard power terms.

Second, both hard and soft power have negative and positive

aspects. Soft power can lead to attraction or repulsion,

depending on the audience. Hard power can be viewed as a carrot

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or a stick. An actor can be coerced because it wants access to a

new market (carrot) or because it fears a trade embargo (stick).

HARD AND SOFT POWER COMBINED

Despite the fact that the coexistence of hard and soft power

has long been observable before Nye coined the term “soft power”,

smart power still waits on the sidelines of academic debates.

This is likely because the definition of smart power – an

effective combination of both soft and hard power – is

analytically useless. Since effectiveness is wrapped into the

definition, we cannot immediately use the concept to assess the

degree to which smart power works. “Smart” is only an adjective

describing an outcome, and provides no hint as to the process or

the alternatives. But there is much to be gained from rethinking

smart power.

A simple step in enhancing the utility of smart power is to

take effectiveness out of the definition. Smart power can be

redefined as the strategic and simultaneous use of coercion and

co-option. This enables scholars to differentiate between an

actor’s attempts to use smart power and the end result, which can

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be effective, ineffective, or somewhere in between. This allows

us to consider such questions as: What goes into the composition

of smart power? Are particular tools for power better combined

than others? Is smart power more likely to be effective when

hard and soft power are developed separately or in tandem? Under

what conditions are actors more likely to use smart power and

when is it more likely to be effective? By separating

effectiveness from the idea of smart power, a potentially

important and distinctive research agenda emerges that addresses

these questions.

Another step in enhancing the utility of smart power is to

recognize the diverse ways in which hard and soft power can be

combined, which builds upon the above analysis of the tools of

power (see Table 1). This is the added value of the concept of

smart power. It opens up potential research agendas to

consideration of both forms of power in tandem, rather than

separately. For example, smart power might entail long-term

attraction alongside short-term use of coercion when necessary.

Long-term soft power could involve cultivating legitimate and

efficient domestic institutions, maintaining a rapid reaction

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military force on standby, or projecting elements of domestic

culture that have universal appeal. It may also come about

through consistent outreach to foreign publics through public

diplomacy efforts, such as support for cultural programs,

educational exchanges, and tourism campaigns.

Table 1: Examples of Long- & Short-Term Power

Long Term Short TermHard Power Ex. sanctions, trade

conditionality, militaryposturing, coercive diplomacy, refusal of cooperation, rhetoric ofdistrust, indirect coercion

Ex. sanctions, boycott, military invasion, cut-offof energy supply, embassy closings, severing diplomatic ties, leaking information, issuing threats through media or high-level speech, freezing bank accounts

Soft Power Ex. fostering legitimatedomestic institutions, transparency, strong humanitarian intervention capabilities, public diplomacy, aid, sharing of best practices, promoting domestic culture & minority rights

Ex. media rhetoric, high-level political speech, aid program, diplomatic summit, high-level visit to foreign country, new cooperative treaties, promoting foreign interests domestically

Another way to achieve smart power might be to employ both soft

and hard power approaches in every episode of influence. Or, a

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state could remind foreign publics of its ability to coerce over

the long term, but rely mostly on soft power when it needs

particular results. Since there are multiple audiences observing

every exercise of power, it is important to remember that a

single action, like EU sanctions on Syria, has both hard and soft

power ramifications. There is likely an interaction effect in

the use of both, which has so far not been explored in the IR

literature.

Finally, how do we determine whether these various

combinations are more or less effective? Given that the tools of

power are numerous and context specific, it is perhaps helpful to

examine how the idea of smart power might apply in the context of

Europe, and the case study of the EEAS, which is still a work in

progress.

THE CASE OF THE EEAS & EUROPEAN POWER

On 1 December 2010, the EU inconspicuously launched the new

European External Action Service (EEAS). Much of the world was

unaware that anything had changed. But despite its quiet

beginnings, the EEAS actually represents a major innovation in

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the field of diplomacy as the first supranational diplomatic

service of its kind. To be sure, it was not created from

scratch. It builds upon the infrastructure of the 136 Commission

delegations around the world that were already in place. But the

powers of the new EU delegations are significantly broader and

more ambitious than the old Commission delegations. Rather than

being responsible for enacting the policies of just one

institution, the EEAS is charged with coordinating, shaping, and

enacting the entire body of EU foreign policy, under the command

of the EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. In this

sense, rather than being an offshoot of just one EU institution,

the EEAS is set to become the embodiment of common EU foreign

policy, and is in the process of cultivating a distinctive

institutional identity.2

Of all the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations, the EEAS most

demonstrates the EU’s commitment to smart power. The EEAS is

still in its first year and it is too soon to know what role it

will ultimately have, but its very existence is an important

indication of the EU’s evolving approach to foreign policy. From

2 Richard Whitman, 2010. “Strengthening the EU’s External Representation: The Role of the European External Action Service,” European Parliament.

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the 2003 Iraq war to the 2011 Libya crisis, it is easy to point

out the recent, high-profile episodes in which member states were

not readily able to coordinate their foreign policies, but it

would be a mistake to draw any conclusions from these events

alone. As discussed below, from a longer-term perspective, the

fact that Europeans were willing to launch an ambitious, new

multinational diplomatic institution shows that they are taking

smart power seriously. This bodes well for the EU’s ability to

be better prepared in the face of crises, and to become a more

consistent foreign policy actor.

The launch of the EEAS reflects a European commitment to

smart power in a number of ways. First, the EEAS is designed to

bind the foreign policies of member states and EU institutions

more closely together, facilitating better coordination of hard

and soft power. This is of course key to achieving effective

smart power. Member states have been the main purveyors of hard

power, while the EU has been more of a source of soft power.

This is true both in response to unanticipated crises as well as

in terms of policy emphases. The EU has been reluctant to coerce

(or to appear to coerce) because it is a multinational actor that

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is committed to institutional and legal processes that are

transparent and voluntary. Hard power tactics would go against

its normative character. Indeed, the EU resorts to hard power

only to support its most important norms and values, such as to

stop human rights violations or discourage authoritarian

practices. Typically, the EU draws upon its wealth of soft

power. Depending on the audience, the EU is attractive because

of its democratic norms, model of regional integration,

commitment to enlarging its membership, history of overcoming a

violent past, and so on.

By contrast, member states have tended to control the hard

power side of foreign policy, to the extent that this is

necessary, because it is much easier for them to act decisively

and legitimately in ways that involve coercion. When it comes

down to it, statesmen still have the distinct authority to make

difficult foreign policy decisions unilaterally and to implement

them as quickly as they deem necessary. Of course, member states

also have a wealth of soft power resources at the same time, such

as programs of educational exchange, cultural promotion, and

public diplomacy. The creation of the EEAS shows the political

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will to bring these various tools of power together, and to set

the stage for better coordination of both hard and soft foreign

policy strategies.

Second, the creation of the EEAS is “smart” because the EU

is fundamentally a diplomatic actor. This is where its real

strength lies. The primary way in which member states and EU

institutions articulate their interests in the international

arena is through diplomacy. The common market, Schengen zone,

justice and home affairs issues, enlargement, and so on, were all

built on a strong process of internal diplomacy among member

states. High-level, professional diplomats based in Brussels

push integration forward and translate new treaties into tangible

policy. By strengthening this hallmark of Europe – diplomacy –

the EU capitalizes on what it does best. Without exception,

member states have put forward their best and most qualified

ambassadors to lead the new EU delegations, and at lower levels

in the diplomatic hierarchy competition for EEAS postings has

been fierce. Given that the success of the EU delegations will

rest in part on the people who populate them, there is reason to

believe that all parties involved want to equip the EEAS to be a

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smart power actor. Diplomats are well-positioned and

professionally trained to use soft power consistently, and hard

power when necessary. By focusing on diplomacy as the tool for

future EU foreign policy, and then endowing the new institution

with the best and the brightest, Europeans have clearly shown a

commitment to smart power.

Third, the EEAS enables the member states to articulate

their common voice more strongly. In doing so, it amplifies both

hard and soft power. Indeed, the oft-repeated goal of member

states to speak with one voice comes from an understanding that

by acting together, Europe is stronger. Collectively, the 27

member states have much at their disposal – over half a billion

people, the largest economy in the world, the second-highest

level of military spending globally, the largest contribution of

foreign aid, transnational collaboration in research and

development, and so on. For several decades now, member states

have renewed and strengthened their goal to speak with one voice

in foreign policy matters: from the 1970 European Political

Cooperation to the 1992 Common Foreign and Security Policy to the

1998 European Security and Defense Policy. Now in 2011, with the

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EEAS, Europeans have one of the largest diplomatic services in

the world. This new diplomatic body is distinctive in that it

actually puts thousands of high-level foreign policy experts on

the ground who will be able to judge first-hand how events impact

EU interests and goals. They will also be able to shape

responses to these events, and to build strong relationships that

they can draw upon when unexpected crises strike in the future.

This will serve to make both Europe’s hard and soft power more

visible.

In sum, the EEAS facilitates better coordination of hard and

soft power, capitalizes on a successful tradition of professional

diplomacy, and amplifies hard and soft power. The potential for

effective smart power clearly exists. Of course, it is still up

to the member states to decide what they will allow the EEAS to

do, and how far it will go in its development. Ashton has

already faced the challenge of coordinating diverse member-state

positions in the wake of several crises. The EEAS is ideally

suited to exercise smart power, but it must still have a mandate

to act. Stronger leadership going forward is necessary so that

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member states are encouraged to see their diplomatic creation

reach its potential.

Naturally, the EEAS does not mean that member states will be

able to speak with one voice all the time, but there are reasons

to be optimistic. The EU’s development of its own internal

diplomacy has shown that professional diplomats often find ways

of proving their abilities on the job (Cross 2007, 2011). The

Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), comprised of

member states’ ambassadors to the EU, is an excellent example of

this. Coreper started out with a limited mandate to prepare

Council meetings. By many accounts, it has now grown into the

central engine of EU integration. This occurred in large part

because of the initiative of these highly experienced

ambassadors. Could the EEAS also achieve this kind of authority

and influence on the global stage? This may be a more

challenging proposition, but as already noted, it is off to a

good start. Moreover, the fact that European leaders launched

this new entity in the first place shows a commitment to smart

power. These leaders now have a stake in the outcome, and the

right ingredients are in place for success.

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Looking beyond the EEAS, there are clearly numerous sources

of European soft power. Its domestic, multi-level institutions

and policies are generally attractive to the outside world. It

has a strong tradition of providing welfare for its citizens,

protecting civil liberties, and being willing to reform rules and

laws. Europeans citizens trust EU institutions (48%) more than

they trust their own national governments (34%) (Risse 2010,

232). The EU is the biggest donor of aid, and it has engaged in

24 CSDP operations around the world to promote stability, reform

institutions, and prevent human rights abuses, among other

things.

Moreover, the EU serves as a model for others because of its

historical path from the bloody violence of the first half of the

20th century to the achievement of a permanent peace on the

continent. Its achievements in terms of integration and

enlargement have inspired other experiments in regional

cooperation from Africa to Latin America to Southeast Asia. Just

by its very existence, the EU has attracted others to its cause.

Its success in this respect is underlined by the recent UN vote

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approving its status as an actor equal to states in the Assembly,

among other things.

In terms of more purposeful elements of soft power, the EU

has a proven record in normative power terms. Laïdi defines the

EU’s normative power as, “its capacity to produce and set up at

the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible

to organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors,

[and] introduce predictability in their behavior” (2008, 35).

Some of the EU’s strongest areas of influence derive from its

attempts to persuade others and shape the nature of the

international system. Laïdi identifies the central norms that

the EU espouses: an emphasis on institutions in spreading norms

and providing good governance, a global approach to tackling

global problems, and long-term cooperation and interdependence to

transcend anarchy. In this respect, Laïdi argues that the EU has

actually surpassed the United States as a norm-setter (2008, 65).

Of course, the EU has its own share of flaws when it comes

to soft power. In recent years, the financial crisis has caused

many observers to question the viability of the euro, and to

debate whether Europeans made a mistake in adopting it in the

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first place. Before that, the controversy over the

Constitutional Treaty tarnished the EU’s image. Critics argued

that a failure to pass the treaty signified the failure of the

European project. And before that, European disagreement over

the Iraq war and accusations of “old” vs. “new” Europe made

headlines. Similar examples abound throughout its history, but

the EU has not only endured, it has responded to each crisis with

more resolve for further integration. The biggest challenge the

EU faces in this respect is that negative external perceptions of

these crises are often overblown, while the EU’s numerous

achievements often go unnoticed. This indicates that even though

the EU is a significant soft power actor, it still punches below

its weight.

In terms of hard power, Laïdi argues that Europe has two

instruments it can wield: “conditional access to its market and

conditional access to its institutional system through the

process of accession” (2008, 24). Indeed, one of the strongest

sources of EU hard power is offering the carrot of EU membership

in exchange for adopting the entire body of EU laws and norms.

Other instances of hard power are relatively targeted and light,

30

such as when the EU includes conditionality in trade or aid

agreements and when it issues sanctions to countries that violate

human rights. These are clear, purposeful decisions to coerce

using carrots or sticks. But in all of these instances, the EU

avoids exercising hard power without soft power. In general, the

EU appears to be following a model of long-term soft power with

the occasional use of short-term hard power. Further research

can establish the extent to which this hypothesis bears out by

comparing episodes of coercion against the backdrop of the EU’s

ongoing soft power reserves, and paying careful attention to how

third audiences respond.

While a cursory glance at the European case would seem to

suggest that the EU is weak on the hard power side, it is

important to take into account the differences between how

democracies and non-democracies exercise smart power. As Nye

argues, it is typically better to rely on soft power in

democratic societies because hard power is more difficult to

exercise effectively and morally (Nye 2008, 30). In Europe,

engaging in external coercion sits uncomfortably with many

leaders, and thus is a last resort. However, the recent case of

31

Libya does show that in dealing with actors that continue to defy

international norms, a good dose of hard power alongside soft

power would enable the EU to maximize its influence. The EU’s

use of smart power is typically reserved for specific and rare

instances, and it could benefit from becoming more able to agree

on the use of smart power. The European case is particularly

revealing in that it is clearly a strong soft-power actor that

aims to develop the capacity for coercion, but only in the name

of the norms it espouses.

CONCLUSION

The direct study of smart power as a key international

relations concept is certainly in its nascent stage. Yet, there

are many reasons why it should be an obvious next step in the

study of power. One of the main shortcomings of the research

program at this stage is the ambiguity surrounding the

definitions of soft, hard, and smart power. Future research in

this area should recognize that the tools of power are not

associated with any one type, and that soft and hard power are

not two sides of the same coin. Soft power is far more

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encompassing, and rests on a greater diversity of tools that

states have at their disposal. Yet, all actors at one point or

another will want to have the capacity for coercion, and there is

a gap in the literature when it comes to understanding the

circumstances under which adding hard power to the soft power mix

is most effective. Research into this question can begin to

offer such explanations as to whether there is an interaction

effect in the use of hard and soft power, whether hard power

legitimizes soft power, or whether the two have a zero-sum

relationship. The world of smart power at this point may be

small, but the question of how states combine hard and soft

power, and the properties that define effectiveness, are

certainly fruitful avenues for research.

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