EtLex, Volume 1 - African Law Library Volume 1 Selected Federal ... Civil Procedure Mistir Solomon v. Fikadu Kasahun et al, 74890 (14: 2013) ... List of Proclamations (Amharic) ...

ETHIOPIAN LEGAL INFORMATION CONSORTIUM

EtLex, Volume 1 Selected Federal Cassation Decisions, and

Ethiopian Law Index (19952012)

Elias N. Stebek, Editor

JLSRI Publications

Published by Justice and Legal Systems Research Institute (JLSRI)

Addis Ababa Ethiopia

December 2013

ii EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium

Founding Members of the Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium

Menberetshehai Tadesse, PhD (Director General, JLSRI) Chairperson of the Consortium

Elias N. Stebek, PhD (Mizan Law Review, St. Mary’s University) Coordinator for Legislation and Case Translations

Mesenbet Assefa, LL.M, PhD Candidate, AAU School of Law Coordinator for Secondary Sources

Maereg G. Gidey, LL.M (JLSRI) Consortium Secretary and Project Coordinator

____________

Members of the Working Group Bantayehu Demile, Deborah Haddis, Hanna Arayaselassie, Hermella Getachew,

Luladay Berhanu, Mesfin Eshetu, Sintayehu Mitiku

EtLex Volume 1 Selected Federal Cassation Decisions, and Ethiopian Law Index (1995-2012) First Published in 2013 Copyright: Justice and Legal Systems Research Institute © 2013

All intellectual property rights reserved except as specified herein. JLSRI grants permission for copies of the content in the volume to be made, in whole or in part, by not‐for-profit organizations and individuals, provided the use is for educational, informational and non-commercial purposes only, and provided that any such copy includes this statement in its entirety and also acknowledges its source. ISBN 978-99944-997-3-1

Acknowledgments

We thank the House of Peoples Representatives for providing us with the soft copies of the proclamations and regulations indexed in this volume. Moreover, we are grateful for the case translators whose names are mentioned at the end of each abridged translation.

It is with gratitude that we express our appreciation for the African Online Law Library Project initiated by African Innovation Foundation and its implementing partner, Globethics, because it was under this project that the case translations were done which ultimately led to the publication of this volume by JLSRI.

December 2013 iii

Contents

Contents …....................................................................................................................................................... iii Foreword …...................................................................................................................................................... ix Introduction …................................................................................................................................................. x

Part One Selected Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions

1. Agency Atsebeha Wolday et.al v. Zuriyash Asegid, 73291 (13: 2012) 559-562 …............ 2 Nigisty Emnet v.Tewodros Tekle, 72337 (13: 2012) 549-552 ...............................…. 5 Beshah Kifle v. Atsede Dube, 50985 (13: 2012) 544-540 ...…..............................…. 10 Yonas Hiluf v. Estifanos et al, 38721 (12: 2012) 555-560 ……………...…….....…. 14 Habtu W. v. Meselu D.& Amakelech G/H., 50440 (10: 2010) 329- 331 ........... 19

2. Banking and Insurance Nasir Abajabir’s spouse and heirs v. CBE, 68708 (13: 2011) 464-466 ..........…. 24 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. CBE, 38572 (10: 2009) 289-291.............…. 28 Ethiopian Insurance Corp. v. Beyan Oumar, 42139 (9: 2009) 118 -119….....…. 31 Eth. Ins. Corp. v. Benshangul-G. Ed. Bureau, 24703 (7: 2007) 225-228 ............ 33 Eth. Insurance Corp. v. v. Ferhan Ahmed et al, 23363 (6: 2008) 33-36 .......…. 36

3. Business-related Ethiopian Ins. Corp. -v.- Bale Rural Dev. Ent., 47004 (13: 2012) 392-398 …. 40 Africa Insurance (SC) v. Dashen Bank (SC), 40186 (13: 2012) 402-416......…. 43 Aster A. v. Amsale & Tibebe, 39608 (10: 2010) 335-337…..................................…. 47 Meseret Hailu v. Zewdu Bireda, 33954 (9: 2008) 133-135 ........................................ 50 Tekle Wakjira v. Shonata Gubu, 19258 (7: 2007) 308-313..................................…. 53

4. Civil Procedure Mistir Solomon v. Fikadu Kasahun et al, 74890 (14: 2013) 131-133…........... 58 Gota Ejeta v. Ato Mudesir Redi, 72017 (14: 2012) 121-124 ..................................... 61 Apeno Engineering Constr. v. Tiruneh Y., 63699 (12: 2010) 375-376 …........... 63 African Insurance S.C. v. CBE, 57360 (12: 2011) 369-370........................................ 66 Tirhas Fishaye v. Zenebech Berihun, 43821 (9: 2010) 295-300..........................…. 68

iv EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium

5. Contracts Negussie H. & Mamitu v. Huressa D. & Lelise, 72463 (13: 2012) 209-210 .... 74 Abrha B. v. Birkinesh H., 71927 (13: 2012) 215-217 .................................................... 77 Dashen Printers & Trading v. Fisseha Yihun, 71375 (13: 2012) 203-205......... 80 Andarge I. v. Zehra M., 64397 (13: 2012) 200-202 ....................................................... 83 Ethio-Telecom v. G. Ginaho, 61331 (13: 2012) 175-178 .......................................…. 85 Birkinesh Birru v. Kifle Habdeta, 25912 (5: 2008) 343-345 ................................…. 88

6. Contracts related to Immovable Property Shiferaw Dejene et al v. Sisay Abebu, 78398 (14: 2012) 51-54 ........................91 Alganesh A. v. Gebru E. & Workitu E., 36887 (13: 2008) 233-235................. 95 Yohannes T. v. Amarech M., 58157 (12: 2011) 107-110 ....................................... 98 Meseret Bekele v.. Elza Somonella, 57356 (12: 2011) 98-100 .......................... 102 Alehegn G/hiwot v. Etenesh Bekele et al, 39803 (8: 2009) 369-371 ........... 105 Berhane Abebe v. Markos Terfa et al, 33295 (7: 2008) 51-57.....................…. 108

7. Criminal Law Tesfaye T. v. Prosecutor of Federal EAC, 73514 (14: 2012) 240-244 ....... 112 Wudima A. v. SNNPR Public Prosecutor, 66856 (13: 2012) 296-298 ......... 117 Tesfaye A. v. Public Prosecutor, 48617 (10: 2010) 208-209.............................. 120 Fasil B. v. Oromia Reg. St., Pub. Pros., 42703 (9: 2009) 22-25........................ 123 Jemila M. v. Public Prosecutor, 381613 (9: 2009) 11-13....................................... 127 Seid Y. v. Amhara Region Ethics & AC., 34077 (7: 2008) 287-291 ......…. 130 Asnake B. v. Public Prosecutor, 31734 (7: 2007) 283-286 .................................. 134

8. Customs and Taxes TeshoAB PLC v. ERCA, 71070 (14: 2012) 175-177................................................. 137 Habesha Cultural Centre v. ERCA, 74753 (13: 2011) 514-516............................. 140 Abebe G. v. Arada Sub-city Revenue Office, 69921 (13: 2012) 521-524........ 144 A. Adventist M School v. ... Revenues Office, 66474 (13: 2011) 506-510 ...... 147 ERCA v. Adale S. & Phromisis PLC, 57100 (11: 2011) 348-350......................... 153

9. Family Law Dereje M. v. Frehiwot P., 74451 (14: 2013) 160-162 ................................................ 157 Yeromwork et al v. Asegid, 54827 (11: 2011) 129-131......................................... 160 Gebreselassie Amare -v.- Abrehet Techane, 46608 (11: 2010) 6-7................. 162 Seniya v. Belaynesh & Sherif, 43988 (11: 2007) 107-109.................................... 164

December 2013 v

Poster v. Veno & Letitiya, 44101 (10: 2010) 44-47.................................................. 167 Fantanesh et al v. Molla, 42682 (10: 2009) 8-9............................................................ 170 Zenebetch v. Birkinesh, 42648 (10: 2009) 19-20 ....................................................... 172

10. Intellectual Property ARTMFF v. Elias Asegahegn, 78856 (14: 2013) 269-274................................... 175 Samuel H. et al v. Simret A. et al, 68369 (13: 2011) 576-581 .......................... 180 Ethio Cement v. IP office, 57179 (12: 2011) 544 -548............................................ 185 Artistic Printing Press v. Getahun Shiberu, 44520 (10: 2010) 339-341 ...... 190 Mulu H. v. Zemenai Printing Press PLC, 42253 (9: 2009) 149-151............. 193

11. Judgment Execution Wegagen Bank v. Selamawit T. et al, 81616 (14: 2013) 265-267................. 198 Rakeb M. v. Federal Prosecutor, 79860 (14: 2012) 261-264 ............................ 200 Seida Debele v. Sherif Shikur, 73041 (13: 2012) 596 -597................................... 204 Lulseged A et al. v. Flora Eco & FELU, 70378 (13: 2012) 585-587.............. 207 Atatu K. v. Steps at Educational PLC., 59301 (11: 2011) 451-453 ...................... 209 Mohammed Ismael v. Mohammed Ahmed, 32143 (8: 2008) 382-383........... 213

12. Jurisdiction Wasihun M.’s spouse & heirs v. AGH, 43511 (14: 2013) 211-215................... 216 Weldai Zeru et al v. ERCA, 51790 (12: 2011) 482-485............................................ 221 Eth. Electric Power Corp. v. Dragados Const., 42928 (10: 2010) 262-263...... 224 Nigist H. v. Legessie A, 37339 (9: 2009) 101- 103........................................................ 226 Office of the Patriarchate v. Mezgebu B., 34440 (9: 2008) 85-86........................ 229 Assefa B. v. Military Prosecutor, 33368 (9: 2008) 89-91............................................ 232

13. Labour Law Wesene Medical Service v. K. A., 77134 (14: 2012) 5-7........................................... 235 World Vision Ethiopia v. Mezemir M., 79105 (13: 2012) 94-96.......................... 239 Mitiku H. v. Mesfin T., 67201 (13: 2012) 64-65.............................................................. 241 SOS Children’s Village v. Kebede Kumsa et al, 38435 (8: 2009) 169-170...... 244 Addis Ababa Restaurant v. Yewibdar T., 37256 (8: 2008) 116-118.................... 246 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia v. Alemayehu W, 33314 (6: 2008) 355-360...... 249

14. Property Law Frehiwot M. G. v. Mebrahtu G. & & Desta W., 81081 (14: 2013) 191-194.... 252 Kirkos Sub-City W. 6 Ad. v. Alemtsehay W., 67691 (13: 2011) 460-462........ 255

vi EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium

Taitu Kebede’s Heirs v. Tirunesh et al, 67011 (13: 2012) 450-452..................... 258 Genet S. v. Kirkos Sub-City K. 17/18 Ad. et al, 64014 (13: 2012) 437-440.... 261 Heria M. v. Shemsu Y., 60720 (11: 2011) 289-292 ...................................................... 265 Rahel Sinetsehay v. Mesfin Tamrat, 55081 (11: 2010) 256-257.............................. 269 Abadit L. v. Zalambesa T. Ad. & Berhane Z., 48217 (11: 2010) 249-251........ 271 Samuel T. v. Ayisha A. et al, 43081 (10: 2010) 232-234........................................... 274

15. Successions Leul K. v. Seble K., 73247 (14: 2013) 175- 177.............................................................. 278 Daniel T. & Tsion T. v. Asalefe T. ..., 58338 (11: 2011) 135-138........................ 281 Hanna T. v. Ta’emu D., 57114 (11: 2011) 66-67............................................................ 284 Robel Negusise’s Tutor, Tarikua Abebe, 49851 (10: 2010) 68-69........................ 286 Amare R. v. Solomon K., 43069 (10: 2010) 70-73 ....................................................... 289 Tewodros M. v. G/Hiwot T., 40510 (8: 2009) 269-271.............................................. 292

16. Torts (Non-contractual Liability) Ethiotelecom v. Nigussie Tefera, 77238 (14: 2012) 203-206................................... 296 Alemnesh Ermo v. Alem Mesfin, 74111 (13: 2012) 495-497................................. 300 Gov’t Housing Ag. v. Tsehaye Z. & Sultan K., 54518 (11: 2011) 419-421..... 303 Ayele Admasu v. Ajebu Shume, 42962 (10: 2010) 244-245................................... 306 Ethiopian Roads Authority v. Temegnehu E., 38457 (9: 2009) 79-81................. 309 Ministry of Agri. and Rural Devpt v. Alsha, 32144 (5: 2008) 156-157................ 311

17. Miscellaneous Wegagen Bank v. ERCA, 81215 (14: 2013) 290-294............................................... 314

Getachew D. & Fantu T. v. Rukiya K., 68573 (13: 2012) 623-625................. 319 Getnet Yenew v. Iyob Binyam, 60392 (11: 2011) 557 -559................................ 322 Bahir Dar CAS v. BD Textile (3 resp.), 54567 (11: 2011) 522-524................ 325 Berhane Tessema v. Tamrat Kidane et al, 42824 (11: 2009) 539 -541........ 328 Mukmil Mohammed v. Miftah Kekir, 38794 (9: 2009) 173-175........................ 331

December 2013 vii

Part Two Index of Proclamations and Regulations (1995-2012)

Index 1: Index of Proclamations: Constitution, Codes of Law and State Organs

1. Constitution ........................................................................................................................336 2. Codes of Law .....................................................................................................................336 Codes of law Amendment to codes of law 3. FDRE, Flag, Emblem and Holidays .........................................................................336 4. Executive Organs .............................................................................................................336 5. Legislative Organs ...........................................................................................................337 6. Judicial Organs .................................................................................................................337 7. Various Organs .................................................................................................................337 8. City Charters ......................................................................................................................338 9. Defense and Police............................................................................................................339 10. Fund Establishment ......................................................................................................339 11. Budget, Fiscal Year: Ethiopian Calendar (1995-2005 Eth. Calendar)..............339

Index 2 Index of Proclamations: Themes and organs

1. Agriculture and Rural Development .........................................................................340 2. Banking and Insurance ...................................................................................................340 3. Business related ................................................................................................................341 4. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure .....................................................................342 5. Customs and Taxes .........................................................................................................343 6. Education .............................................................................................................................343 7. Electoral Law ....................................................................................................................344 8. Environmental Law .........................................................................................................344 9. Health ...................................................................................................................................345 10. Human Rights .................................................................................................................345 11. Intellectual Property .....................................................................................................345 12. Investment ........................................................................................................................345 13. Labour Law, Civil Service and Pensions .............................................................346 14. Land Law and Urban Planning ................................................................................346 15. Media Law .......................................................................................................................346 16. Nationality, Registration of Vital Events and Immigration ...........................347 17. Societies and Foundations ..........................................................................................347 18. Professional Services: Advocates, Auditors, Medical Practitioners, Consultants .........................347

19. Utilities: Electricity, Telecommunication ............................................................347 20. Miscellaneous .................................................................................................................347

viii EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium

Index 3 Index of Proclamations: Agreements

1. African and Sub-regional ..............................................................................................348 2. Air Transport Agreements ............................................................................................348 3. Avoidance of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion Agreements ................349 4. Co-operation, Trade, Investment Promotion & Protection Agreements.....350 5. Peace and Security ...........................................................................................................353 6. Other agreements and conventions ...........................................................................354 7. Loan and Financing, 2012 ............................................................................................354

Index 4 Index of Regulations: Themes, Sectors and Institutions

1. Agriculture and Rural Development ..........................................................................356 2. Banking and Insurance ...................................................................................................356 3. Business related ................................................................................................................356

Mining Registration and Licensing Trade and Industry Transport Others

4. Criminal Law .....................................................................................................................357 5. Education ............................................................................................................................357 6. Environmental Law .........................................................................................................358 7. Health ...................................................................................................................................358 8. Intellectual Property ........................................................................................................358 9. Investment ..........................................................................................................................358 10. Labour Law, Civil Service, Pensions .....................................................................359 11. Media Law .......................................................................................................................359 12. Nationality, Registration of Vital Events, Immigration .................................359 13. Professional Services:

Advocates, Auditors, Medical Practitioners, Consultants........................359 14. Societies and Foundations ..........................................................................................359 15. Utilities ..............................................................................................................................359 Electricity Telecommunications 16. Water resources and water works ...........................................................................360 17. Miscellaneous .................................................................................................................360 18. Various organs and institutions ................................................................................361

Index 5 List of Proclamations (Amharic) ............................................................................................363 Index 6 List of Regulations (Amharic) ..................................................................................................383

December 2013 ix

Foreword

Access to justice is a right enshrined in major international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human rights, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. This right is enshrined in the FDRE Constitution and various legal and policy documents including the Growth and Transformation Plan and the National Justice System Reform Program. One of the pillars of access to justice is making legal information accessible.

To this end, the Justice and Legal Systems Research Institute, the School of Law of Addis Ababa University and Mizan Law Review of St. Mary's University have formed a Consortium and have been working in partnership with the African Law Library (ALL). The objective of the initiative is to provide online access to legal texts and secondary literature on African law and governance. The Consortium is wholeheartedly engaged in various efforts toward making legal information accessible. We are thus working towards making available legislation, court decisions and secondary literature, audios, videos and a range of texts on legal and justice related issues of Ethiopia. After the initial tasks were accomplished, this initiative was launched at a workshop on August 22, 2013 during which stakeholders provided very useful feedback and pledged to participate in the pursuits of enhancing the accessibility of legal information in Ethiopia.

The publication of this book is an outgrowth of two of the tasks that have been accomplished under this initiative, i.e. thematic indexing of legislation (1995-2012) and the translation of one hundred Federal Supreme Court Cassation Decisions. This is indeed a significant contribution in the enhancement of easy and effective accessibility of legal information. Thus, EtLex Volume 1 adds value and capacity to the ongoing national efforts to enhance access to legal information.

Even if the publication of this book was not part of the African Law Library project, it has benefited from the tasks that have been accomplished by the Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium. The indexing of laws done as part of the project and the case translations indeed constitute the foundation for the publication of this volume. Thus, I would like to express my appreciation to the African Innovation Foundation and its implementing partner Globethics.net, for initiating the African Law Library project, and I thank all those who participated in the preparation of this book.

Menberetsehai Tadesse (PhD), Assistant Professor of Law

Director General, JLSRI

x EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium

Introduction

As legislation is the primary source of Ethiopian law, its indexing significantly reduces duplicity of efforts to identify relevant proclamations and regulations on a given theme or legal issue. Moreover, it makes it easier to identify the proclamations and regulations that have been repealed or amended. EtLex Volume 1 covers the proclamations and regulations enacted since Proclamation No. 1/1995, i.e. the FDRE Constitution. A descending order is used in listing indexes 1 to 4 so that more recent legislation can gain priority in sequence. However, Indexes 5 and 6 use an ascending sequence as they are meant to facilitate reference to Amharic titles and numbers of the proclamations and regulations.

Indexing legislation is a continuous process. The take-off phase is thus modest, and we are optimistic that more can be done in EtLex’s future volumes. A case in point is the need to widen the scope of the indexes included herein by incorporating laws enacted prior to 1995 which are still operative. The content of the indexing can also include directives. Another domain of focus in future publications of EtLex can include the applicability status of proclamations, regulations and the provisions therein.

The indexing in this volume is largely thematic. Index 1 embodies the FDRE Constitution, Codes of Law, laws dealing with state organs and various public institutions, etc. while Index 2 presents various themes and a list of proclamations relevant to the themes and organs. Agreements and conventions ratified by Ethiopia are mostly included in Index 3, while some are classified under the thematic Index 2, as in the case of international instruments on environmental law. Future volumes of EtLex can enhance the integration of international instruments ratified by Ethiopia under the thematic index because they form an integral part of Ethiopia’s legal regime. Relatively similar thematic indexing is used for regulations under Index 4.

The last two indexes include list of proclamations (Index 5), and regulations (Index 6) in Amharic. They are meant to enable readers of EtLex Volume 1 to easily identify the exact Amharic wording of the title of proclamations and regulations. They also enable readers to identify the year of enactment in Ethiopian Calendar. In principle, Ge’ez numerals should have been used. However, utility has taken precedence as most readers might find it convenient to read the numerals they frequently use.

In addition to facilitating access to legislation, EtLex aims at availing access to abridged translations of the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. Even if Ethiopia does not pursue the common law tradition, the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division are

December 2013 xi

binding on all courts with regard to interpretation. The decisions of this Court do not of course create case precedent (in its common law conception) because the decisions cannot be cited as case law or legal principles. Yet, the interpretation of legal provisions in this court as applied to specific legal issues in a given fact situation should to be pursued in all courts.

The decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division fall between case law and non-binding judgments that may only have a persuasive function. This volume thus includes federal cassation decisions which can be considered as part of the Ethiopian legal regime with regard to the interpretation of legal provisions. Such binding interpretations apply to legal issues specifically (and not incidentally) analyzed in the decisions of the Court provided that the fact situation is similar to the one which was the basis of the federal cassation decision.

One hundred translated cases are published in this volume. Some parts of the decisions (other than the parts that deal with analysis and reasoning are) abridged wherever necessary. The cases are mostly selected by the translators, except a few cases that were identified and assigned to translators. The terms of reference that were provided to the translators were the potential for the frequency of the issues at courts, and the level of analysis in the case. Wherever possible, translators were encouraged to give attention to more recent cassation decisions.

The chapter titles under which the case translations are classified are largely based on the categories used in the fourteen volumes of the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. However, minor changes are made in the classification of the chapters as in the case of the chapter on successions. Alphabetical sequence is used for the chapters. The volumes and page numbers in which the original decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division are published (online) are indicated at the end of every translation.

We would like to appreciate the online accessibility of the fourteen volumes of the cassation decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. Moreover, the positive contribution of various websites, databases and portals in enhancing the accessibility of these volumes is indeed commendable.

Elias N. Stebek (PhD), Associate Professor Chief Editor, Mizan Law Review

St. Mary’s University

Part One

Selected Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division

Decisions

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 1: Agency 1

1. Agency

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Atsebeha Wolday et.al v. Zuriyash Asegid

73291 2012 13 559 - 562

2 Nigisty Emnet v.Tewodros Tekle 72337 2012 13 549-552

3 Seshah Kifle v. Atsede Dube 50985 2012 13 544-540

4 Yonas Hiluf v. Estifanos et al 38721 2010 12 555-560

5 Habtu Woldu v. Meselu Desta & Amakelech G/Hiwot

50440 2010 10 329- 331

2 EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium December 2013

Atsbeha Welday -v.- Zuriash Asegid

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 73291 (July 11, 2012)

Holding of the court: - A contract made by a person who has no valid power of attorney

(agency) at the time of making of the contract has no legal effect. - In contracts that require registration, it is the date of registration and

not the date written on the document that is regarded as the date of the contract.

- A contract of agency terminates upon the death of the principal, and Article 2232(2) does not allow concluding a contract on behalf of the deceased principal.

Articles 2232(1), 1204(2), 2005(2), 2232(1) and 2015(a) of the Civil Code and 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution.

______________ Cassation File No. 73291

Hamle 4, 2004 EC (July 11, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division

Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioners: (1) Atsbeha Welday (2) Kibatu Gidey Respondent: Zuriash Asegid

The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case started at the Assosa Zone High Court of the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. The current respondent was the plaintiff.

The plaintiff stated that her daughter Dinke Mekonnen appointed Atsbeha Welday as her agent on Hamle 13, 1996 E.C. (July 19, 2004) to administer her house located in Asosa Zone, Kurmuk Wereda. Since Dinke Mekonnen died on Hamle 29, 1998 E.C. (August 5, 2005), the agency contract also terminated on the same day [owing to the death of the principal]. After Dinke’s death, the petitioners lived in the house for two years and they were not willing to leave the house. The current respondent (i.e. plaintiff at the lower court) requested that the petitioners should leave the house and claimed payment of Birr 2,000


(two thousand) per month as house rent. The petitioners (former respondents) argued that the first petitioner sold the house to the second petitioner on Sene 20, 1997 E.C. (June 27, 2005) while he was W/ro Dinke Mekonnen’s agent empowered to sell and exchange the house. After hearing the litigation of both sides, the High Court rejected the respondent’s (i.e. current petitioner’s) claim and decided that the first petitioner sold the house on June 27, 2005 (Sene 20, 1997 E.C.) and the sale contract was authenticated by the Region’s Justice Bureau.

The respondent appealed against the High Court’s decision. The Regional Supreme Court rejected the appeal by invoking Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The respondent lodged her petition to the Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division. The Cassation Division found that the first petitioner sold the house, authenticated the contract and delivered the house to the second respondent in 2001 E.C and 2003 E.C. which was after the death of W/ro Dinke. So it decided by majority that since the agency contract had terminated upon the death of W/ro Dinke, the house should be returned to the respondent.

On October 4, 2011 (Meskerem 23, 2004 E.C.), the petitioners lodged a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division stating that the second petitioner bought the house for Birr 4,000 (four thousand) and has spent more than Birr 400,000 (four hundred thousand) on the house. They argued that the decision to invalidate the contract of sale is inappropriate since it will be difficult to reinstate the parties to their former position. They claimed that the decision is based on fundamental error of law and sought its reversal.

The respondent in her written response submitted on December 23, 2011 (Tahisas 13, 2004) stated that the first petitioner sold the house to the second petitioner in bad faith and with full knowledge of the death of the principal (W/ro Dinke) and termination of the agency contract. She argued that the decision of the Regional Cassation Division to invalidate the sale contract did not contain error of law.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the decision of the Regional Cassation Bench. We have examined whether the first petitioner sold the house to the second petitioner after the death of the principal (and the termination of the agency contract). Pursuant to Article 2232(1) of the Civil Code, a contact of agency shall terminate upon the death of the principal or where he/she is declared absent or becomes incapable or is adjudicated bankrupt. The facts of the case show that the first petitioner (the agent) sold the house to the second petitioner after the death of the principal or after the termination of the agency contract as envisaged under Article 2232(1) of the Civil Code.


The cumulative reading of 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution and 1204(2), 2005(2) and 2232(1) of the Civil Code show that ownership can be transferred to another person only by the owner or by the person who has a valid special agency. The petitioners had the sales contract registered at the Region’s Justice Bureau in [2002] E.C. This shows that the transfer of ownership was made by the person who did not have valid power of agency. Therefore, the transfer has no legal effect. The decision of the Regional Cassation Division to invalidate the contract of sale is thus based on these legal provisions and has no error of law.

The minority opinion in the Regional Cassation Division explained that the registration of the sale contract at the Regional Justice Bureau is covered by Article 2232(2) of the Civil Code. The petitioners also argued that the sale was made on June 27, 2005 (Sene 20, 1997 E.C.) but it was authenticated at the Region’s Justice Bureau in 2002 E.C. However, this argument is not tenable because the date that should be considered as the date of the contract between the petitioners (regarding the sale of the house) is not what the parties have stated on the document. By virtue of Article 2015(a) of the Civil Code, the date of the contract’s registration at the Region’s Justice Bureau is considered as the date of the contract. Moreover, the content of Article 2232(2) and the legislative intent behind it do not allow the agent to sell a house or continue performing as agent after the death of the principal. We have not thus accepted the arguments of the petitioners which invoked Article 2232(2).

The contract for the sale of the house is void ab initio (void from the very beginning) and of no effect. The argument of the second petitioner based on the interpretation rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division in File No. 47800 is not relevant to this case. We have thus found that the decision of the Regional Cassation Decision rendered by majority opinion has no error in law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Benishangul Gumuz Regional State Supreme Court

Cassation Division is affirmed. 2. If the second petitioner has a claim against the respondent of any unlawful

enrichment, he has a right to sue and submit his claims under relevant legal provisions.

... Signature of five justices

_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 559-562 Abridged translation: Solomon W/Tensae & Fasil Abebe


Nigisti Emnet -v.- Tewodros Tekle

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 72337 (March 5, 2012)

Holding of the Court: - There is no legal ground for concluding that evidence submitted by

administrative organ to correct previously submitted evidence can be regarded as inadmissible on the ground that different documents are submitted on the same issue.

- Where a contract of agency shows that the power of attorney given to the agent is a special agency, the fact that the document does not mention Article 2205 of the Civil Code (which deals with special agency) does not lead to the conclusion that a special authority is not given.

- An issue raised regarding the admissibility of evidence is an issue of law, and can thus be entertained by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court.

Articles 2205, 2005(1), 2179, 2199, 2203 and 2204 of the Civil Code _____________

Cassation File No. 72337 Yekatit 26, 2004 E.C (March 5, 2012)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Nigisti Emnet

Respondent: Tewodros Tekle


Judgment The case concerns a claim for the return of a house. It started in the Afar National Regional State, Dubti Woreda (District) Court, where the current respondent was the plaintiff. The respondent in the pleading he submitted to the Logia Woreda Court stated that the petitioner refused to return the house located in the city of Logia, given to her by the father of the respondent, the


deceased Ato Tekle Kidane. The petitioner on the other hand contended that she has sold the property to a third party using her power of attorney that was given to her by the father of the respondents. The Woreda Court examined the case and rendered a decision that the petitioner is not required to return the house, as it was proven that she sold the house according to the power of attorney given to her by the owner of the house before he left the county.

The respondent brought an appeal against this decision to the Zonal High Court, which, after further examining the case and hearing additional evidence, held that the case should have been adjudicated only upon payment of court fee. The court decided that the case should be remanded to the lower court so that it shall be seen after payment of court fee.

The respondent brought an appeal to the Regional Supreme Court. The Court found that the remanding of the case by the Zonal High Court is procedurally incorrect and that there is a law of procedure that allows it to change the issue of the case and examine it itself. The Regional Supreme Court found different issues have been raised on the contract of agency and on the documents attesting the sale of property. It also found that the contents of the contract allow the petitioner only to perform acts of management on the house but not to sell or exchange it. The Regional Supreme Court thus reversed the decision of the Zonal High Court and rejected the petitioner’s appeal.

The Supreme Court rendered this decision stating that the documents produced as evidence are not reliable. While the document attesting the power of agency dated Nehassie 19, 1990 (August 25, 1998) was verified by the Regional Justice Bureau, the organ which is alleged to have registered the contract of agency, it again wrote another letter stating that it was registered in the relevant dossier thereby replacing a prior letter given by the office. When oredered by the court to verify the same issue, the Bureau had previously replied that the document could not be found. The Court stated that examining the contents of the power of attorney submitted by the petitioner only allows acts of management, and does not enable her to sell or exchange the house under litigation. This cassation petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is thus brought against this decision.

This court examined whether the power of attorney given to the respondent goes beyond acts of management and whether it allows her to sell the house. It ordered the joinder of the respondent. The latter then submitted a statement of defense stating that the case could not be seen by the Cassation Division as the petition is based on a substantive issue [rather than fundamental error in law].


This court has examined the argument of the respondent that this cassation petition is inadmissible because it involves a substantive issue and the act of weighing of evidence which is outside the power given to the court by law. Although the Cassation Division is entrusted with the responsibility of remedying an error of law as per Article 80(39)(a) and Article 10 of Proclamation No. 25/1996, and not that of examining the substance of the case or weighing of evidence, it has the authority to entertain this case because the admissibility of evidence is a question of law that falls under the scope of its mandate. The Cassation Division thus rejected the contention of the respondent.

Moreover, this court holds that there is no legal ground for rejecting letters submitted by an administrative office retracting a previous letter written on the same subject-matter. It further holds that the main issue would be verifying which of the letters are correct and admitting the correct one as evidence.

In the case at hand, the contract of agency document and the contract of sale have been proven by the letters written the second time by the relevant administrative office. The respondent did not contest the authenticity of these documents; nor did the courts which examined the substantive issues of this case contest them. Thus, on top of the unsound reasoning based on which the Supreme Court rejected the documents as evidence, the conclusion that it reached on the contract of agency is not tenable under the law. The document brought as evidence for the contract of agency allegedly concluded on Nehassie 19, 1990 (August 25, 1998) shows that the father of the respondent assigned the petitioner to do acts of management and send the proceeds of the sale of the house to him.

The statement of the Supreme Court that, the power of agency given to the petitioner as per Article 2203 and 2204 of the Civil Code is to do acts of management on the property and not the sale or exchange of the house is not acceptable because it omitted part of the contract of agency which gives authority for the sale and exchange of the house, in addition to performing acts of management. In fact the contract of agency while listing the kinds of activities the petitioner can carry out cites Article 2199 of the Civil Code. It is stipulated under Article 2205 of the Civil Code that the power to sell and exchange an immovable property requires special agency. While Sub-article 1 of this provision states that if the agent is called upon to perform acts other than acts of management, special authority shall be required, Sub-article 2 stipulates that the agent can sell or mortgage a property if he/she has a special authority.

The decision of the Supreme Court was given without having due regard to the powers of the agent listed under the contract of agency, in addition to its assumption that the power of agency given to the petitioner is general agency as the provision cited was Article 2199 of the Civil Code. Thus, there is no


legal provision which warrants the conclusion that special agency does not exist unless Article 2205 of the Civil Code dealing with special agency is mentioned. The contract of agency shows that the agent is given the power to sell an immovable property, and this fact proves the existence of special agency.

The key issue is that the tasks given to the agent are listed in a clear manner in the contract of agency, and not that the relevant provisions are mentioned. In a situation where the contents of the document are clear, invalidating the document on the ground that the relevant provisions of the law are not mentioned by the principal and/or the agent would be against the intention of the contracting parties, and would be against the rules of interpretation of contracts. Hence, this court holds that the decision of the Appellate Division of the Afar Regional State Supreme Court did not take into account Articles 2179, 2205 and 2005(1) of the Civil Code, and has thus committed a fundamental error of law.

Because the agent sold the house with the power lawfully given to her, this court examined the kind of remedy that would be available for the respondent. It is proven that the respondent is the lawful heir of the principal. Moreover, the petitioner has not, during the litigation at the Cassation Division nor in the lower courts, raised the issue of having given the money acquired from the sale of the house to the respondent or other heirs of the deceased. Rather, in the statement of defense submitted to the Cassation Division, the petitioner has clearly stated that, apart from giving the proceeds from the sale of the house, she should not be required to return the house to the respondent. This court holds that there is no legal ground based on which the respondent can claim the possession of house. However, he can request his share of the money acquired from the sale of the house as an heir of the principal. The court has rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision of the Afar Regional State Supreme Court File No 2310

rendered on Nehassie 12, 2003 (August 18, 2011) stating that the petitioner does not have the power to sell the house apart from performing acts of management is reversed according to Article 384(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. There is no legal ground to deny the admissibility of the contract of agency which attests the power of agency given to the petitioner on Nehassie 19, 1990 (August 25, 1998) by the father of the respondent, and the contents of the document show that it authorizes the petitioner to sell the house which was sold accordingly. The petitioner is not thus obliged to return the house.


3. The petitioner shall give the respondent the proceeds from the sale of the house, as per the latter’s right of succession.

…

Signature of five justices

_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 549-552 Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey


Seshah Kifle & Setugn Bekele v. Atsede Dube & Azalech Dube

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 50985 (November 15, 2011)

Holding of the court - Contract of agency should be interpreted narrowly. - The power of agency envisaged under Article 58 of the Civil Procedure

Code and Article 2204 confers administrative power, and it does not include the mandate to transfer a house to a third person.

- Sale or pledge of immovable property requires special power of agency.

Articles 2181(3), 2204 and 2205 of the Civil Code

Cassation File No.50985

Hedar 05, 2004 E.C (November 15, 2011)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu , Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie

Petitioners: (1) Seshah Kifle; (2) Setugn Bekele

Respondents: (1) Atsede Dube; (2) Azalech Dube


Judgment The petitioners brought this case to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench stating there is fundamental error of law in the Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench decision. The subject-matter of the dispute was that the first petitioner who is the first respondent’s child and second respondent’s brother did not have special agency to sell, exchange or transfer immovable property. The respondents stated that the first petitioner only had the power to administer the house in Metehara; nevertheless, he sold the house to the second petitioner.

The respondents requested the court to invalidate of the contract. The second petitioner, on the other hand, argued that he bought the house from a person who had the authority to sell it. He also stated that he incurred Birr


150,000 (one hundred and fifty thousand) to improve the property after purchasing it. He thus requested that his ownership be confirmed by the court, and in the alternative demanded that the respondents be held jointly and severally liable for the refund of the money. The East Showa Zone High Court after hearing the arguments from both parties and examining the evidence decided that the house was sold in accordance with the power of agency given to the first petitioner and there is no ground to invalidate the contract.

The respondents dissatisfied with this decision appealed to the Regional Supreme Court but the court rejected the appeal. The respondents then brought their case before the Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench. The court decided that the respondents did not give a special power of agency that allows selling the house and that the contract of sale between the first and second petitioners is of no effect. The court also decided that unless the first petitioner wants to sue the second petitioner he could not bring cross claim against the respondents.

In a cassation petition submitted on December 15, 2009 to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench, the petitioners stated that the Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Bench has not addressed the argument submitted to it. They argued that the power of agency the respondents gave to the first petitioner included the power to represent them, and transfer property in their name when needed. The petitioners contended that the first petitioner concluded the contract of sale in accordance with this power of agency and the Court’s decision to invalidate the contract has a fundamental error of law. Even if the contract is invalidated, the omission of a holding with regard to the money invested (by the second petitioner) on the property constitutes error in law.

The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the power of agency given to the first petitioner is not a special agency that empowers him to sell immovable property, but only allows him to follow up formalities in the transfer of property on their behalf. They argued that the decision of Region’s Cassation Bench in this regard has no legal error and that the second petitioner’s claim to be paid Birr 150,000 has no legal ground.

The issues considered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division were: whether the decision of the lower court that invalidated the contract between the first and second petitioners is appropriate; whether the lower courts have failed to render a decision on the second petitioner’s counterclaim; and whether the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Division decision that the second petitioner can only sue the first petitioner and not the respondents is appropriate.


With regard to the first issue, the court examined the content of the contract of agency concluded between the two parties on March 22, 1993. The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division found that the power of agency envisaged in the contract falls under Article 58 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 2204 of the Civil Code that confers administrative power on the Agent, and does not include he power of transferring the house to a third person. The Court noted that sale or pledge of immovable property requires special agency. This court decided that the power of agency given to the petitioner did not specifically confer special agency which allows the agent to transfer ownership of immovable property or pledge it to a third party.

Special agency conferred based on Article 2205 should specify each task to be performed by the agent. The phrase ‘to conclude a contract on our behalf’ should be interpreted as a mandate to perform the acts of management stated under Article 2204, and cannot include the act of selling or exchanging immovable property. It is to be noted that Article 2181(3) of the Civil Code requires a contract of agency to be interpreted narrowly, and the power given by the respondents to the first respondent should be interpreted as solely referring to acts connected with management in the transfer of ownership on behalf of the respondents, but not sale or exchange of immovable property on their behalf. We have thus found that the decision of the Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division which invalidated the contract has no error in law.

The second issue under consideration is the second petitioner’s counterclaim for an award of Birr 150,000 (one hundred fifty thousand) in the event that the contract for the sale of the house is declared invalid. We have noted that the Zone High Court did not render its decision hearing the parties and examining the evidence as per Articles 246, 247 and 248 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench has not also given a decision on the failure of the Zone’s High Court and the Regional Supreme Court Appellate Division to render a decision on the counterclaim..

With regard to the third issue, the Oromia Region Supreme Court Cassation Division is empowered, under Article 80(3)(b) of the FDRE Constitution, to render a decision on cases decided in the Region that involve fundamental error of law. In the case under consideration, the second petitioner’s counterclaim has not been addressed in the Zonal High Court and the Region’s Supreme Court Appellate Bench. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division had incidentally handled the issue of the second petitioner’s counterclaim and decided that the second petitioner can only file suit against the first petitioner and not against the respondents. This is not in conformity with Article 80(3)(b) of the FDRE Constitution and involves a fundamental error of law.


Decree 1. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Bench decision is varied. 2. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Bench’s decision which

invalidates the contract of sale of the house concluded by the first petitioner (acting as the agent of the respondents) with the second petitioners on June 18, 2002 is affirmed.

3. The Oromia Regional Supreme Court Cassation Bench’s decision which rejected the second petitioner’s counterclaim against the respondents is reversed.

4. The case is remanded to the East Showa Zone High Court so that it can hear testimony and entertain evidence to examine other factual and legal arguments and to give decision on the matter as per Article 341(1) of the Civil Procedure Code with regard to the second petitioner’s counterclaim against the respondents, and on the first instance opposition of the respondents regarding the counterclaim.

5. The injunction order given by this Court on January 27, 2010 on the property is lifted.

... Signature of five judges

__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 544-548 Abridged translation: Tsedey Girma & Fasil Abebe


Yonas Hilluf -v.- Estifanos Kidane et al

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38721 (December 6, 2010)

Holding of the Court: - In a power of attorney, it is the principal who can raise an argument for

the invalidation of the activity undertaken with the power of agency. - There is no legal ground based on which the heirs of the principal can

challenge the activities carried out by the agent within the limits of his power of attorney.

Article 2189(1)& (2) of the Civil Code ______________

Cassation File No. 38721

Hidar 27, 2003 E.C (December 6, 2010)


Justices: Teshager Gebreselassie, Berhanu Amenew, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Ali Mohammed, Sultam Abatemam

Petitioner: Yonas Hiluf

Respondents: 1. Estifanos Kidane 2. Helen Kidane 3. Azeb Kidane 4. Aster Kidane


Judgment The litigation started when the first respondent in a suit dated Tir 21, 1995 (January 29, 2003) filed a case at the Federal First Instance Court stating that the current petitioner (defendant in the lower court) was a tenant, and refused to vacate House No 383 located at Woreda 21, Kebele 10. He stated that the house was the property of the parents of the first, second, third and fourth respondents (heirs), and that the petitioner is unwilling to vacate that house claiming that he has bought it. The plaintiff requested the court to give an order for the return of the house, and for payment of rent starting from the date the case was filed.


The defendant (now petitioner) on the other hand requested for the intervention of other children of the deceased, Ato Kidane Tesfahawariat. He had also submitted preliminary and other objections, and stated that he bought the house from the plaintiff’s (first respondent’s) sister. He argued that requesting him to vacate the house should not be brought against him while the contract is still valid. He further argued that such contracts require registration only for the purpose of third parties and not for the contracting parties. He contended that the plaintiff (first respondent) cannot request the invalidation of the contract.

The court after examining the case, decided that the defendant (current petitioner) should return the house to the first respondent, stating that the agreement for the sale of the house entered into with the agent of the deceased on Megabit 27, 1991 EC (April 5, 1999) does not fulfil the requirements of Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code, and hence it is considered as a mere draft contract. The petitioner (defendant in the lower court) appealed to the High Court challenging this decision.

Dissatisfied with decision, the second, third and fourth respondents filed an appeal to the High Court. They objected the decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court on Tir 4, 1997 (January 12, 2005). The appeal dated Yekatit 15, 1997 (February 22, 2005), stated that the decision of the Federal First Instance Court transfers the property (on which they have a right) without them being a party to the case, and thus it should be revoked. They argued that the fourth respondent sold the house registered in the name of their father, with a power of attorney he got from the latter before he died on Hamle 1, 1991 (July 8, 1999). The second, third and fourth respondents also invoked period of limitation and form of the contract in the application they submitted, which the court rejected arguing that the period of limitation argument could not be raised as it was not brought by the defendant (petitioner). It also rejected the other points of objection and confirmed its own decision delivered on Tir 4, 1997 (January 12, 2005), by stating that the agreement entered into with the fourth respondent, who is the agent of the deceased is not done according to the form authorized by the law.

The High Court, which examined the case joining the appeals brought by the petitioner and the second, third and fourth respondents in File No 37810, reversed the decision of the Federal First Instance Court stating that the first respondent cannot raise the form of contract as an issue, as the fourth respondent sold the house on Megabit 27, 1991 (April 5, 1999) while his father was alive, with the power of attorney given to him by his deceased father who died on Hamle 1, 1991 (July 8, 1999).


The first respondent brought an appeal against this decision to the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The court adjourned the case for Hamle 10, 2000 (July 17, 2008) to hear the appellant (first respondent) and the second, third and fourth respondents. On this date, the attorney of the petitioner submitted a statement of defense. As the second, third and fourth respondents were not present, the Court could not hear their litigation. Thus, it adjourned the case for Tahsas 3, 2000 (December 13, 2007), on which date the second, third and fourth respondents requested the Court to dismiss the case as the appellant was not present. After examining the case, the court reversed the decision of the High Court and sustained the decision of the First Instance Court stating that the contract of sale does not conform to the requirements of the law.

In a petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, dated Sene 23, 2000 (June 30, 2008), the petitioner stated that the decision of the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court which ordered him to transfer the house to the first respondent has a fundamental error of law. On the one hand, the Court dismissed the appeal of the first respondent as he was not present during the hearing of the appeal, and discharged the second, third and third respondents. As the High Court rendered its decision after having joined the cases, the petitioner further argued that, the decision of the Supreme Court that the contract of sale does not fulfil the requirements of the law contradicts with its declaration that the appeal of the first respondent is dismissed.

The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined the issue whether the decision of the Federal Supreme Court was correct in reversing the decision of the High Court, and noted the following:

1. The father of the respondents, Ato Kidane Tesfahawariat, gave a special power of attorney to the fourth respondent as per Article 2205 (1) of the Civil Code so that the latter can sell an immovable property registered under the principal’s name. Accordingly, the fourth respondent sold the house to the petitioner based on this power of attorney while Ato Kidane Tesfahawariat was alive. As per article 2189(1), the contract of sale concluded by the fourth respondent within the limits of the power given to him is considered as an agreement concluded by the deceased. According to Article 2189(2) of the Civil Code, any claim for the repudiation of an activity conducted by a person acting with the power of attorney given to him/her can only be brought by the principal (the person who gave the power of attorney). Thus, if the agreement concluded by the fourth respondent on Megabit 21, 1991 (March 30, 1999) has a defect in relation to authority or form, these issues could have been raised by the principal Ato Kidane


Tesfahawariat. As the latter did not use such power while he was alive, there is no legal ground for the heirs to challenge the activities undertaken by the agent acting within the power of agency given to her. Thus, the decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court ordering the invalidation of the sale and transfer of the house to the first respondent has a fundamental error of law because it failed to take into account the fact that the deceased did not challenge the agreement while he was alive.

2. The petitioner submitted a statement of defense on Hamle 10, 1999 (July 17, 2007) when the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court was hearing the appeal brought by the first respondent to challenge the decision of the High Court. The Appellate Division adjourned the case to hear the parties for Tahsas 3, 2000 E.C. (December 13, 2007) as the first respondent (the then appellant) was not present. During the time, the Appellate Division gave an order for the dismissal of the case, based on the request of the second, third and fourth respondents. The petitioner, (who was respondent), gave a written statement of defense contesting the appeal brought by the appellant (first respondent).

According to Article 32(2) and Article 73 of the Civil Procedure Code, if the appellant is not present during the hearing of the appeal and if the written or oral statements of defense given by the respondents do not support the appeal, the court shall cancel the appeal and dismiss the case. However, in the case at hand, even though the written statement of defense brought by the petitioner (the then respondent) refutes the first respondent’s appeal, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal brought by the first respondent against the second, third and fourth respondents. Reversing the decision of the High Court based on the statement of defense submitted by the petitioner is not in line with the spirit of Articles 32(2) and 73 of the Civil Procedure Code. For the petitioner, this decision has the effect of cancelling the decision of the High Court rendered on the same issue, and for the second, third and fourth respondents, the rejection of the appeal of the first respondent has the effect of sustaining the decision of the High Court. There is thus a fundamental error of law.

Accordingly, the court rendered the following decree.


Decree 1. The decision of the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court is

reversed. 2. The decision of the Federal High Court is sustained with a change in its

reasoning. 3. The petitioner does not have an obligation to return the house to the 1st

respondent ...


________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 12, pp. 555-560 Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey


Habtu Woldu -v.- Meselu Desta

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 50440 (May 24, 2010)

Holding of the court: The principal can request invalidation of the sale contract made by the agent on the ground of conflict of interest, and the agent has the duty to avoid conflict of interest.

Articles 2187(1), 2208 and 2209 of the Civil Code

______________



May 24, 2010 (Ginbot 16, 2002 E.C)

Justices: Hirut Melese, Teshager Gebreselassie, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Habtu Weldu

Respondents: (1) Meselu Desta; (2) Amakelech Gebrehiwot

The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment

Judgment

The case started at Mekelle Woreda Court of Tigray Regional State. The petitioner was a plaintiff. He claimed that he appointed the first respondent to manage, sell, and exchange the house which is registered in his name and located in Mekele town Kedamay Weyan Kebele Cooperative Association, House Number C/116. He stated that the first respondent acted beyond the scope of agency granted to her and donated the house and transferred its ownership title to her mother, the second respondent. The petitioner requested the court to invalidate the donation contract and to transfer the ownership title on the house from the second respondent to himself.


In response, the first respondent replied that she made the contract of sale with the second respondent within the scope of agency and it was not contract of donation, but a contract of sale. She added that the contract had to be made according to the provisions of the Memorandum of Association of the cooperative and the Commercial Code and not pursuant to the Civil Code. She stated that she acted within the scope of her authority and the contract was made in line with the law, thereby requesting the suit to be rejected.

The second respondent stated that the petitioner had no right to sue because does not possess an authenticated ownership title on the house. The house is transferred by contract of sale and not by donation. She argued that the house could be sold in accordance with the cooperative association's Memorandum of Association and the Commercial Code, but not according to Article 1723 of the Civil Code. She added that the house is registered in her name and that the contract should not be invalidated. In case the contract is invalidated, she requested that she should be entitled to receive penalty fee of Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand) from the petitioner.

The third respondent at the lower court, which was Kedamay Weyan House Construction Cooperative Association, responded that there was no contract of sale or donation. It stated that the first respondent in line with the decision of the cooperative association’s general assembly and sale procedures transferred the house to the second respondent after having filled the form for the transfer of title and by showing evidence that she was unmarried.

After hearing the litigation, the lower court rendered a judgment. It decided that there is conflict of interest between the role of the first respondent as agent, and her act of selling the house to her mother (the second respondent) which indirectly makes the first respondent a beneficiary of the transaction. The Court found that the contract did not fulfil the legal requirements for the sale of immovable property. It decided that the contract should be invalidated and the ownership title should be transferred from the second respondent to the petitioner.

The respondents appealed to the Tigray Regional State High Court but the Court rejected their appeal. The respondents lodged their petition to the Tigray Regional State Supreme Court Cassation Division. The cassation bench after hearing the litigation of both parties rendered a judgment. It noted that the petitioner’s argument is that the first respondent acted beyond the scope of her mandate in transferring the house to the second respondent by donation, and found that the decision of the lower courts to invalidate the contract of sale was not in line with Article 182(2) of the Civil Procedure Code because it went outside the statement of claim. It reversed the decision of the lower courts and confirmed the contract of sale.


The petition to this Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is lodged against this judgment. The petitioner stated that the act of the first respondent to sell the house to her mother involves conflict of interest which warrants the invalidation of the contract. He contended that the decision of the Region’s Cassation Division based only on the type of the contract without considering the existence of conflict of interest has fundamental error of law.

This court has considered the facts in the litigation as follows. The petitioner states that the transfer is made through a donation contract. During the oral litigation at the lower courts, the petitioner had also contended that even if the transfer is considered to have been made by sale contract, there is conflict of interest. According to the petitioner, the conclusion of the Tigray Regional State Supreme Court Cassation Division that the lower courts have rendered a decision on issues not raised in the litigation is erroneous.

This court has examined whether there is a conflict of interest. Pursuant to Article 2187(1) of the Civil Code, a contract may be cancelled at the request of the principal where there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent and where the third party entered into the contract knew or should have known the conflict. In the case at hand, the first respondent in her capacity as an agent sold the petitioner’s house to her mother. According to Articles 2208 and 2209 of the Civil Code, the agent should act in strict good faith towards his principal and shall act in the exclusive interest of the principal. The agent should make sure that the interest of the principal is not jeopardized.

Furthermore the provisions prohibit the agent to act in matters involving his own interest, interests of his friends or close relatives without giving prior notice and getting confirmation from the principal. In this case, the petitioner appointed the first respondent as his agent to manage, sell and exchange the house. The respondent bears the duty to respect the interest of the petitioner. The first respondent sold the house to her mother. We understand from the litigation in the lower court that the first respondent did not show whether she gave prior notice to the petitioner before she sold the house. The first respondent has also failed to show that she sold the house at the market price and that the petitioner’s interest is not jeopardized. Moreover, the second respondent knew or should have known the existence of interest conflict. The petitioner can thus request invalidation of the sale contract made by the first respondent on the ground of conflict of interest.

It was not shown in the litigation at the lower court whether the first respondent has paid (to the petitioner) the money obtained from the house sold. If payment was made, the first respondent has the right to sue and request the amount from the petitioner. Likewise, the second respondent has the right


to require from the first respondent the return of the money paid to buy the house and additional costs, if any. There is no legal ground to reverse the decision of the lower court which invalidated the contract of sale and decided that the house should be registered in the name of the petitioner.

Decree 1. The judgment rendered by the Tigray Regional State Supreme court

Cassation Bench, File No.32155 on Tikimt 17, 2002 E.C. (October 27, 2009) is reversed.

2. The decision of Mekele Wereda Court, File No. 0065 on Sene 5, 2001 E.C. (June 12, 2009) and the order rendered by Tigray Regional State High Court, File No. 07667 on Sene 8, 2001 E.C. (June 15, 2009) are affirmed.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 10, pp. 329-331 Abridged translation: Solomon W/Tensae

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 2: Banking & Insurance 23

2. Banking and Insurance

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Nasir Abajabir’s spouse and heirs v. Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

68708 2011 13 464-466

2 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

38572 2009 10 289-291

3 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. Beyan Oumar

42139 2009 9 118 - 119

4 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. Benshangul-Gumuz Education Bureau

24703 2007 7 225-228

5 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation v. Ferhan Ahmed et al

23363 2008 6 33-36


Nasir Abajabir Abajefar’s spouse & heirs -v.- Commercial Bank of Ethiopia


Holding of the court: Auction undertaken by bank according to the foreclosure law may not be cancelled by court order; however, violation of legal procedures while undertaking the auction may entail tort liability against the bank.

Article 2143 of the Civil Code, Property Mortgaged or Pledged under Banks Proclamation No. 97/1998

_______________


Tahsas 05, 2004 E. C (December 15, 2011)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioners: Spouse and Heirs of Ato Nasir Abajabir Abajefar 1. W/ro Liya Tamirat 2. Firawul Nasir Abajabir 3. Farome Nasir Abajabir

Respondent: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

The court has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case relates to a claim for compensation of damages initiated at the Federal High Court by the testator of the current petitioners, against the current respondent. The statement of claim states that when the collateral for the loan contracts entered into on Sene 1, 1992 (June 8, 2000) and Hidar 22, 1993 (December 1, 2000), was auctioned the respondent had deliberately left out parts of the collateral that should have been included. It also states that the procedures undertaken were not appropriate, and the plaintiff claimed compensation of Birr 1,280,556.70 (one million two hundred eighty thousand


five hundred fifty six birr and 70 cents) plus interest against the defendant (current respondent).

In its preliminary objections, the respondent contested the admissibility of the suit based on Article 447(1) of the Civil Procedure Code and invoked period of limitation because the suit was filed three and a half years after the foreclosure. The lower court, found that the plaintiff did not contest the auction as such, but rather contested that parts of the collateral have unduly been left out from the auction, and it rejected this claim stating that it should have been instituted within two months from the date of the auction as required under Art 447(1) of the Civil Code.. The plaintiff’s appeal to the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench was also rejected based on Art 337 of the Civil Procedure Code. This cassation petition is instituted in objecting to the decision of the lower courts.

The petitioners state that they did not seek cancellation of the auction; they contested the exclusion of parts of the collateral and the transfer of property at reduced price. They had sought compensation from the respondent for the loss incurred. In this regard, the lower courts have cited an irrelevant provision, i.e. Article Art. 447(1) of the Civil Procedure Code and decided that the two months period of limitation has elapsed.

The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined the arguments of both parties and the decisions of the lower courts.

There was a contract of loan between the testator of the petitioners and the respondent, and the loan was taken at different times. However, because the testator could not discharge his loan, the respondent (based on Proclamation No.97/1998) has sold the property under foreclosure in an auction. The borrower filed a suit on Ginbot 05, 2002 (May 13, 2010), contesting the exclusion of part of the collateral during the foreclosure in addition to which the foreclosure was alleged to have been undervalued. This court has also learnt that the plaintiff at the lower court did not seek the cancellation or invalidation of the auction undertaken.

Banks are allowed to sell property under foreclosure according to the legal procedures embodied in Proclamation No.97/1998, Proclamation No.98/1998 and Proclamation No.216/2000. According to Article 6 of Proclamation No. 97/1998, the auction shall be conducted as specified in Articles 394- 449 of the Civil Procedure Code. Article 7 of the same proclamation holds the bank liable if it fails to undertake the auction in accordance with the law. However, the petitioner has not based its claim on such reasoning, but has rather contested the undue exclusion of part of the collateral.

This issue falls under Articles 2027 and 2028 of the Civil Code. The property to be sold at auction should, inter alia, be proclaimed as required


under Article 423(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and Art 6 of Proclamation No.97/1998. Where a person illegally causes damage, he incurs tort liability according to Articles 2027, 2028 and 2035 of the Civil Code. Therefore failure to follow the legal procedures required under Proclamation No. 97/1998 renders the bank at fault and this entails liability to compensate for the damage incurred according to Article 7 of Proclamation No.97/1998.

When this provision is considered in light of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, the claim for damage shall be instituted within two years according to Art 2143(1) of the Civil Code. The period of limitation of two months provided under Article 447(1) of the Civil Procedure Code is only relevant for petitions which seek the cancellation and invalidation of foreclosure, but not for claims that involve compensation for the damage sustained. This is because bank foreclosures are not conducted based on the procedures embodied in Articles 194-449 of the Civil Procedure Code, but rather pursue the provisions of Proclamation No.97/1998, Proclamation No.98/1998 and Proclamation No. 216/2000.

Even if bank foreclosure is not subject to court cancellation, an auction conducted by disregarding the legal procedures may bring tort liability against a bank as stipulated in Proclamation No. 97/1998. Therefore, the decisions of the lower courts against the compensation claimed by the testator of petitioners based on Article 447(1), involve a fundamental error of law. The issue whether the period of limitation has elapsed according to the relevant provision of Art 2143(1) of the Civil Code needs to be considered.

The testator of the petitioners instituted his statement of claim on Ginbot 05, 2002 (May 13, 2010) and the auction, alleged to have excluded part of the collateral, was conducted on Tahsas 20, 1999 (Dec 29, 2006). Accordingly, the period of limitation of two years has elapsed and thus this court concurs with the results in the decrees of the lower courts. Therefore, the following decree is rendered.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High court, File No 92618 on Tikimit 26,

2003 (Nov 5,2010), and affirmed by the appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court under File 64130 Yekatit 28,2003 (March 7,2011) , are affirmed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code after having altered the reasoning of the lower courts according Art. 342 of the Civil Procedure Code.


2. The period of limitation for statement of claim for damages against the respondent has expired according to Art. 2143(1) of the Civil Code. …


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 464-466 Abridged translation: Sisay Luche & G. Habteyes


Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38572 (October 27, 2009)

Holding of the Court: If the pledge that is given for a loan is insured and becomes subject to an accident, the creditor can request the insurer to pay compensation even if the money loaned is lesser in amount than the value of the pledged property.

Article 2858 of the Civil Code, Article 678 of the Commercial Code _____________


Tikimt 17, 2002 E.C (October 27, 2009)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation Respondent: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia


Judgment The case is brought because the petitioner submitted its petition dated Sene 9, 2000 (June 16, 2008) to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court claiming that the judgment rendered by the Federal First Instance Court and confirmed by the Civil Bench of the Federal Supreme court has a fundamental error of law.

The current respondent was the plaintiff in the Federal First Instance Court. It held as a pledge the truck owned by Ato Hassan Abdela Plate No. 3-16015 and trailer number 3-03383 for the Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand) Ato Hagos Tedla borrowed from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia Nifas Silk Branch. The Respondent and the debtor Hagos Tedla agreed that the pledge be insured, and the truck was insured with the defendant, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation West Main Branch, with an estimated value of Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand), and they have accordingly been paying premium.


The truck, insured by the petitioner, encountered an accident on Hidar 28, 1988 E.C (December 8, 1995) and was alleged to be completely destroyed. A suit was filed for the payment of the value of the damaged truck because the plaintiff (current petitioner) refused to pay the estimated value of the vehicle i.e. 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). The petitioner (the defendant in the lower court) argued that the respondent is not entitled to bring the suit as they did not have a contractual agreement. Moreover, it contested liability because technical evidence is not brought to prove that the car was damaged due to failure of the steering wheel. It further argued that if it has to pay, the amount should only involve the loan given by the respondent to Hagos Tedla, i.e. Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand). The lower court rejected petitioner’s arguments and decided that the damage amounting to Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand) caused due to the total destruction of the pledge should be paid to the respondent with an interest rate of nine percent starting from Hidar 8,1998 E.C (November 17, 2005).

The Ethiopian Insurance Corporation was dissatisfied with the decision of the Federal First Instance Court, and brought an appeal to the Federal High Court. The latter reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case to the First Instance Court, stating that the amount of damage sustained is not verified in addition to raising other related issues. The respondent brought an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court against this decision and the Court reversed the decision of the High Court confirming the decision of the Federal First Instance Court.

The petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court, by Ethiopian Insurance Corporation contests the decision of the Federal Supreme Court arguing that the respondent was allowed to bring the suit and litigate without verifying whether it has recovered the amount it lent, and that this is against the fundamental principles and objectives of Insurance. It further argued that, the respondent’s claim of interest and profit is inappropriate because the amount lent is Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand). Accordingly, it requested for the reversal of the decisions arguing that, the decisions of the lower court and the Civil bench of the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court are not in conformity with the relevant civil and commercial laws, and hence have a fundamental error of law.

The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the amount due for the damage it sustained as a result of delayed settlement of debt, interest accrued and other cost is Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). The respondent further argued that it entered into an insurance contract with the petitioner and paid premiums not only for the Birr 75,000 (seventy five thousand) it lent to the borrower but also to the vehicle held as a pledge, whose price equals Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). Thus it argued that the decisions of the


Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal First Instance Court do not have an error of law. It thus contended that the amount requested does not exceed the insurance coverage stated in the insurance contract.

The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has found the argument of the petitioner unacceptable after having observed that the petitioner has not submitted evidence which proves its argument that the vehicle is not completely destroyed. The respondent has taken as a pledge a car worth Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand) when it provided the loan to the debtor who is the owner of the truck. By virtue of Article 2858 (1) of the Civil Code, the right of the respondent on the collateral includes the amount of the loan that remains to be paid, the interest that accrues due to the non-performance of the loan agreement and other expenses not paid.

The respondent has made it clear to the lower court that it is entitled to receive from the debtor Birr 350,000 which covers the amount of the money lent, interest and other payments. It is also established that there is property held as a pledge to secure the payment of debt. The respondent knowing that the property it held as a pledge is movable and exposed to danger bought an insurance coverage worth Birr 350,000 (three hundred fifty thousand). It did so to increase its chance of recovering the money that it lent, the interest thereof and other payments.

Hence, this court has confirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and has found that that the petitioner is liable to pay to the respondent Birr 350,000 with an interest to be calculated starting from Hidar 8, 1988 E.C (November 18, 1995) as per Article 678 of the Commercial Code and the insurance contract. The court has thus rendered the following decree according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

Decree The decisions of the appellate division of the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal First Instance Court are affirmed. …


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 10, pp. 289-291 Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey


Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Beyan Oumar Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 42139 (July 7, 2009)

Holding of the Court: The insurer does not have an obligation to pay compensation to a passenger injured while boarding an insured vehicle destined for carriage of goods.

______________


Sene 30, 2001 E.C (July 7, 2009)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellesse, Belachew Anshiso, Sultam Abatemam

Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation

Respondent: Beyan Oumar


Judgment The case concerns litigation regarding the payment of compensation. It started in the Oromia Regional State, West Harerge Zone High Court, where the current respondent was the plaintiff. Ethiopian Insurance Corporation filed a suit against the owner and the driver of the vehicle alleged to have caused the damage. The petitioner became part of the litigation because it was ordered to join the case because of its insurance contract with the defendant. In its statement of defense, the petitioner presented a preliminary objection and substantive arguments.

The Zone High Court found the defendant and the petitioner liable for the damage caused, and decided that they pay damages. The Regional Supreme Court which adjudicated the appeal confirmed the decision of the High Court. This petition is lodged to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court contesting the decision of the Regional Supreme Court.

In a petition dated 14 Tahsas 2001 (December 23, 2008), the petitioner stated the fundamental error of law allegedly committed by the lower courts.


The court examined the case in light of the petitioner’s claim that the damage was caused by the respondent’s fault and that the vehicle was involved in an activity which was not covered by the insurance contract, and thus it should not be liable to pay the damage.

From the litigation in the lower court, this Court noted that the truck, Plate No. 3-29779 A.A has insurance coverage. The respondent alleges that he sustained damage while he was travelling in the vehicle. The petitioner argued that it gave insurance coverage to a vehicle destined for transportation of goods and not transportation of people, and hence contended that it should not be liable for a claim that falls outside its contractual obligation. The respondent did not contest the substantive argument brought by the petitioner.

The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court noted that the insurance policy does not cover the harm caused to individuals who were travelling in the vehicle destined for carrying of goods, and that the respondent did not sustain the injury as a pedestrian. It thus found that the lower court has committed a fundamental error of law in holding the petitioner liable. Accordingly, it has rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Oromia Regional State, West Hararge Zone

High Court, File No.- 08797 on Meskerem 26,2001 E.C (October 6, 2008) and the order given by the Regional Supreme Court in File No.-71528 on Hidar 25, 2001 E.C (December 4, 2008) regarding the petitioner are reversed in accordance with Article 384(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The decision of the lower court on the first and second plaintiffs in the initial suit is confirmed.

3. There is no legal or contractual basis according to which the petitioner will be liable for the damage caused to the respondent.

...




Ethiopian Insurance Corporation – v. – Benshangul Gumuz Regional State Education Bureau

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 24703 (April 16, 2007)

Holding of the court: - Special provisions of the Commercial Code that deal with the formation

of insurance contracts prevail over the general provisions of the Civil Code.

- Insurance contract exists between the parties according to the Commercial Code if the insured signs on the proposal form which constitutes an offer followed by the corresponding signature of the insurer on the insurance policy.

Articles 651, 654 and 657 Commercial Code; Articles 1725 and 1727 of the Civil Code.

_____________


Miazia 9, 2000 E.C (April 16, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Medhin Kiros, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation

Respondent: Benshangul Gumuz Regional State Education Bureau

The court has rendered the following judgment

Judgment This case started at the Asosa Zone High Court. The current petitioner (plaintiff at the High Court) instituted a claim against the respondent due to unpaid insurance premium of Birr 55,068.56 (fifty five thousand sixty eight birr and fifty six cents). Summons was served to the respondent, but it failed to appear and the case was adjudicated ex parte. On the basis of the claim and the evidence submitted by the petitioner, the High Court decided that there is no contract of insurance between the parties thereby rejecting the claim submitted by the plaintiff (current petitioner).


The petitioner appealed to the Federal Higher Court. However, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court invoking Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

This cassation petition is submitted against the decision of the lower courts. The issue that needs to be resolved is whether there is contract of insurance. As the case relates to unpaid insurance premium based on the insurance contract concluded between the parties, the special law that governs insurance embodied in the Commercial Code of Ethiopia is applicable.

Like any other contract, an insurance contract, involves offer and acceptance between the contracting parties. When a person submits a proposal form to the insurer, the act constitutes an offer, and acceptance is deemed to have been made when the insurer signs on the insurance policy. Thereupon, a legally binding contract of insurance exists between the parties as stipulated under Articles 651, 654 and 657 of the Commercial Code

The respondent expressed its interest to insure its vehicles by sending a letter, sealed and signed by its authorized officer, to the petitioner. This shows that the respondent made an offer. The petitioner thereafter signed an insurance policy, according to the provisions stated above, and it is clear that an insurance contract is formed between the parties.

Even if Articles 1725 and 1727 of the Civil Code state that a contract of insurance is one of the contracts that need to be made in a written form, signed by the parties and witnessed by two persons, the insurance relations between the current parties is governed by the special law in the Commercial Code. In accordance with the principle of legal interpretation, the special law prevails over the general law whenever there is contradiction between the two.

The insurer who prepares the insurance policy is required to sign on it according to Article 657 of the Commercial Code, while this provision does not require the insured to sign on the insurance policy. Therefore, if the insured signs on the proposal form which constitutes an offer, followed by the corresponding signature of the insurer on the insurance policy, an insurance contract exists between the parties according to the Commercial Code. The decision of the lower courts that an insurance contract does not exist between the parties thus involves fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Asosa Higher Court, File No 528 dated Tahsas 30,

1996. E.C (January 9, 2004.) and Federal High Court File No. 31510 dated Yekatit 6, 1998 E.C (February 13, 2006) constitute a fundamental error of law, and are thus reversed.


2. There is contract of insurance in accordance with the Commercial Code, and the respondent has not contested the amount claimed by the petitioner. Therefore, the respondent shall pay to the petitioner the amount stated in the suit, i.e. Birr 55,068.56 (fifty five thousand sixty eight birr and fifty six cents) plus 9% interest rate to be computed from the date of the suit.

. . .

Signatures of five justices

_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 7, pp 225-228 Abridged translation: Sisay Luche & G. Habteyes


Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Ferhan Ahmed el al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 23363 (June 3, 2008)

Holding of the Court: An insurer's liability shall not exceed the amount specified in the policy.

Article 665(2) of the Commercial Code _____________


Ginbot 26, 2000 E.C. (June 3, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Mesfin Equbeyonas, Taffesse Yirga, Medhin Kiros

Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation Respondents: 1. Ferhan Ahmed 2. Ayeded Yusuf 3. Abdulwehad Atiye

The court has examined the case and it has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment This case began at the Jijiga Zone High Court of the Somali Region. The current respondents were plaintiffs at the lower court. They filed a suit against the Ministry of Defense 103rd Ground Force and Ato G/Egziabeher G/Hiwot. When the second defendant was driving in an area known as Hodele, he encountered an off-road collision with a vehicle owned by the first plaintiff and destroyed it. The plaintiff demanded for a compensation of Birr 219,000 (two hundred nineteen thousand). The son of the second plaintiff who was in the car of the first plaintiff at the time of the accident died. He had two under-age children. The second plaintiff demanded Birr 65,520 (sixty five thousand five hundred and twenty) for raising the children until they reach majority and Birr 74,000 (seventy four thousand) as compensation, i.e. a total of Birr


139,520. The third plaintiff suffered bodily injury during the accident and demanded for a compensation of Birr 140,000 (one hundred forty thousand).

When the plaintiffs brought the case, the defendants explained that the vehicle that caused the accident was insured by the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation. Consequently, they requested that the Corporation be made party to the suit under Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Ethiopian Insurance Corporation appeared before the court, presented its objections and defended itself.

The first preliminary objection raised by the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation is that the court does not have jurisdiction. This is so because in instances where one of the parties is an organ of the federal government and when the amount claimed exceeds Birr 500,000 (five hundred thousand), the case falls under the jurisdiction of a federal court.

With regard to the merits of the case, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation argued that its obligation is to cover damages caused by the vehicle on properties of third parties up to Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) and up to Birr 30,000 (thirty thousand) for harm caused on human beings. It argued that in the case under consideration it shall only pay Birr 160,000 (one hundred sixty thousand) and not the total amount claimed by the plaintiffs. This amount covers Birr 100,000 for the damage caused on the car of the first plaintiff, and Birr 30,000 for each for the two individuals, making a total of Birr 60,000 for the harm caused to the victims.

The Jijiga Zone High Court examined the case, overlooked the preliminary objection raised by the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation and rendered the following decision. First, the Corporation shall pay Birr 217,000 to the first plaintiff for the vehicle that was completely destroyed which was the price of the vehicle. Secondly, for the second plaintiff whose son was killed during the accident, it should pay Birr 91,520 and Birr 60,000 for the third plaintiff for the bodily injury he suffered during the accident.

The Corporation, then appealed to the Federal High Court which examined the case, heard the argument of both parties and confirmed the decision of the lower court. The case is brought to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court as a petition against this decision. .

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has heard both sides The case involves two issues. The first is whether the Jijiga High Court had jurisdiction over the matter. The second is, if it indeed fell under its jurisdiction, whether its decision regarding the compensations is appropriate. The court has examined both issues.

The preliminary objection is that the court does not have jurisdiction because in instances where one of the parties is an organ of the federal


government and when the amount claimed exceeds 500,000 Birr, the case falls under the jurisdiction of federal courts.

However, Article 78(2) of the FDRE Constitution provides that the jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and of the First-Instance Courts are delegated to the State courts if such courts are not established in the states. Moreover, the claim in the case has not exceeded Birr 500,000. Therefore the petition that the Jijiga High Court had no jurisdiction is rejected.

Regarding the compensation that should be paid by the current petitioner, it is stated in Article 665(2) of the Commercial Code that the insurer's liability shall not exceed the amount specified in the policy. The court has observed that the Corporation has insured the first defendant in the lower court for damages on properties of third parties up to Birr 100,000 and that the maximum amount payable for harm caused to human beings is up to Birr 30,000. Accordingly, this court has found that there is a fundamental error of the law in the decisions of the lower courts that they did not take into account the amount of coverage stated in the insurance policy.

Decree The decisions of the lower courts are varied in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. As per the policy, the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation shall pay Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) to the first respondent. The second and third respondents are entitled to receive Birr 30,000 (thirty thousand) each. The total amount to be paid by the petitioner shall be Birr 160,000. . . .


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 6, pp 33-36 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 3: Business related 39

3. Business-related

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Bale Rural Development Enterprise

47004 2012 13 392-398

2 Africa Insurance (S.C) v. Dashen Bank (S.C)

40186 2012 13 402-416

3 Aster A. v. Amsale & Tibebe 39608 2010 10 335-337

4 Meseret Hailu v. Zewdu Bireda 33954 2008 9 133-135

5 Tekle Wakjira v. Shonata Gubu 19258 2007 7 308-313


Ethiopian Insurance Corporation -v.- Bale Rural Development Enterprise

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, File No. 47004 (March 20, 2012)

Holding of the Court Performance bonds are regulated under the Civil Code of Ethiopia’s suretyship contract provisions (Arts. 1920-1951) and not under the provisions relating to insurance contracts in the Commercial Code of Ethiopia. Accordingly, a right to bring an action based on claims relating to performance bonds can only be barred after the expiry of ten years as provided for in the Civil Code of Ethiopia.

Articles 657(1), 674 of the Commercial Code; Art. 2(2) of the Stamp Duty Proclamation No.110/1998;

Art 2(18) of Proclamation No.57/1996; Art 2(20) of Proclamation No.648/2009; Articles 1719(2), 1720, 1725(b), 1727, 1848, 1922(1)&(2), of the Civil

Code; Art. 1(1) of NBE Directive No. 23/2002 EC; and Art. 1(3) of NBE Directive No. 24/2004 EC.

______________


Megabit 11, 2004 EC (March 20, 2012)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation (EIC)

Respondent: Bale Rural Development Enterprise

The Court has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The issue relates to the category of law which regulates performance bond. Insurance contracts are regulated under Articles 654-712 of the Commercial Code. These provisions stipulate that insurance contracts should not only be in


written form but shall also be executed through a document called ‘policy’. Furthermore, it is stated that insurance contracts will be effective when signed and that insurance business mainly involves collecting ‘premiums’ in order to compensate the insured whenever a risk or loss materializes. Generally, as per Article 654(1) of the Commercial Code, insurance contract refers to a contract whereby the insurer, by charging premiums, would pay a certain amount of money to the beneficiary upon the materialization of a certain risk.

On the other hand, surety contracts are regulated under Arts.1920-1951 of the Civil Code. By contrast, thus, surety contract may be gratuitous, and that the surety can intervene as such even without the knowledge of the debtor. This shows that suretyship does not necessarily involve a relationship based on financial benefit. Hence, a surety contract is a contract whereby a third party extends security to the creditor by undertaking to discharge any obligation by the debtor where the latter is proven to have totally or partially failed to perform his obligations. A contract of guarantee includes several instruments of which financial guarantee bond is one. As defined under the National Bank of Ethiopia’s Directives No. 23/2002 EC and No. 24/2004 EC (Arts.1(1) and 1(3) respectively), “Financial Guarantee Bond shall mean an obligation undertaken by an insurance company to pay for the lending bank or another creditor or supplier all outstanding claims arising from the non-payment by debtor or debtors”.

Thus, this instrument is far from possessing any of the basic characters of insurance policy. It is, therefore, proper to conclude that the period of limitation applicable to claims arising out of such an instrument should be Civil Code provisions relevant to surety and not the Commercial Code provisions on insurance contracts.

It should be noted that insurance policies require an insurable interest of the insured party on what is insured. In the case at hand, the main reason for the respondent’s need for the Performance Bond is to compensate for any loss eventuated by the Contractor (Axum Construction Company) in the event of any failure in the performance of its obligations under the road construction contract, which, under Article 6 thereof, requires the Contractor to procure a Performance Bond up to an amount ETB 1,101,890. From this, it is understandable that the Contractor is simply obligated to the respondent by not performing its contractual obligations and, thus, the respondent does not have any insurable interest on the payment or non-payment of the obligation assumed under the performance bond by the petitioner.

Therefore, the contract that had been entered into between Axum Construction Company and the petitioner cannot be an insurance contract. Nor can it be argued that the respondent is a beneficiary of an insurance policy. Thus, the performance bond is what the respondent has issued to jointly and


severally commit itself to pay the amount of money stated in the instrument if the Contractor fails to discharge its obligations under the contract.

Thus, the attributes of the performance bond that was issued by the petitioner are not that of an insurance contract but a joint guarantee to pay the amount stated in the instrument. It is, therefore, regulated under Articles 1920 ff of the Civil Code, and in effect, Art.1845 of the Civil Code shall apply with regard to the period of limitation.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal File No. 410054

rendered on Megabit 30, 2001 EC (April 8, 2009) is confirmed. 2. Performance Bond is not an insurance contract, but a contract of

suretyship regulated under the Civil Code provisions of 1920 ff. 3. The ruling that the case brought by the respondent against the petitioner

was within the ten-year period of limitation is affirmed.

. . . Signatures of five justices

_________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Volume: 13, pp. 392 - 398 Abridged Translation: Tecle Hagos Bahta


Africa Insurance (S.C) -v.- Dashen Bank (S.C)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Civil File No. 40186 (6 March 2012)

Holding of the Court - Financial guarantee bond issued by an insurance company cannot be held

inconsistent with the objectives of the company if it was issued before it was expressly prohibited by the National Bank of Ethiopia.

- Restrictions in the ordinary powers of a manager cannot be effective unless they are expressly entered and registered in the registry.

- The nature of financial guarantee bond is peculiar in that it need not comply with the formality requirements under Arts.1922 ff as it is fully prepared by the insurance companies under the license granted to them for the purpose of carrying on the issuance of bonds.

- The period of limitation applicable to the transaction on the issuance of financial guarantee bond is the ten-year period embodied in Art.1845 of the Civil Code.

Constitution (F.D.R.E): Art. 80(3)(a) Civil Code: Articles 1719(2), 1720, 1725 (a)&(b), 1727(b), 1808(2), 1845,

1922(1) & (2), 1924,1930 Commercial Code: Articles 34, 35, 109(1)(f), 121(h), 363(1), 348(3), 657(1),

674(1) Art. 10 of the Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation No. 25/1996;

Licensing and Supervision of Insurance Business Proclamation No. 86/1994; Art.2(2) of the Stamp Duty Proclamation No.110/1998;

Art. 1(1) of NBE Directive No.23/2002 (EC); Art. 1(3) of NBE Directive No. 24/2004 EC; Cassation File No. 40187

______________



Yekatit 27, 2004 EC (6 March 2012)


Justices: Mesfin Equbeyonas, Amare Amogne, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Africa Insurance (S.C)

Respondent: Dashen Bank (S.C)


Judgment There are five issues which need the court’s attention: 1. Whether the issuance of a financial guarantee bond by an insurance

company is inconsistent with the activities that an insurance company in Ethiopia is permitted to carry on, with the purpose of its establishment, and with the objectives of its existence and registration;

2. Whether a manager of an insurance company possesses the power to issue financial guarantee bonds;

3. Should the issuance of a financial guarantee bond comply with the formality requirements provided under the Civil Code provisions [Arts.1920ff]?

4. Whether legal action for non-performance under a financial guarantee bond is barred within 2 years as per Art. 1808(2) or whether Article 1845 of the Civil Code is applicable;

5. Is the petitioner liable for the obligations it undertook under the financial guarantee bond? If so, to what extent?

With regard to the first issue, the Licensing and Supervision of Insurance Business Proclamation No. 86/1994 provides that insurance activities are not limited to what are described thereon, and it stipulates that other insurance activities, as they could be defined from time to time, will be part of the insurance company’s business. As defined under NBE Directives No. 24/2004 (EC) and 23/2002 (EC), “Financial guarantee bond shall mean an obligation undertaken by an insurance company to pay for the lending bank or another creditor or supplier all outstanding claims arising from the non-payment by debtor or debtors”.


While the afore-said Directives prohibit insurance companies from issuing henceforth any financial guarantee bond under any name whatsoever, it does, however, confirm that what have been issued prior to the date of coming into effect of the Directives remain valid instruments. Thus, it is unacceptable to claim that the issuance of the instrument was contrary to the petitioner company’s objectives and it cannot be proved that such act was contradictory to the activities that insurance companies carry on.

Secondly, reductions or restrictions to the ordinary powers of a manager cannot be effective unless they are expressly entered and registered in the registry. This can easily be observed from the content and structure of Articles 36 and 121(f) of the Commercial Code. It has been proven that there is no such record in the case at hand. Therefore, there is no reason why the manager cannot be held responsible for the issuance of the financial guarantee bonds under whose name and signature they were issued.

Thirdly, the petitioner contended that the financial guarantee bond is like any surety contract and, thus, should comply with the formality requirements stipulated under Articles 1922(2)&(3), 1727, and 1725(a) of the Civil Code; i.e., it should have been attested by two witnesses and signed by the respondent. Nevertheless, unlike any ordinary surety contract, it is not prepared by the contracting parties. It is rather prepared by the insurance company which is permitted to do the same thereby committing itself to pay any debt owed by a third party as stated under National Bank of Ethiopia Directives No.23/2002 EC cum No. 24/2004 EC.

Fourthly, it is established that what has been issued by the petitioner is not a contract of insurance. The period of limitation that would be relevant for this case is that period provided for under Art.1845 of the Civil Code and it is also submitted that the legal action for the financial guarantee bond is barred simultaneously at the time when the action for the principal debt by the lender (respondent) against the original debtor is barred by period of limitation. Thus, the ruling by the lower courts that the action for the financial guarantee bond is not barred by period of limitation is proper. Hence Article 674(1) of the Commercial Code is not relevant to this case.

Finally, the petitioner is liable under the financial guarantee bond up to the amount of outstanding debt that has not been paid by the principal debtor to the respondent. The petitioner’s argument submitted to this Cassation Bench that the borrower [Grace PLC] has committed fraudulent practices was not raised in the lower courts and is not in conformity with Article 329(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Nor is it consistent with the powers granted to the Cassation Bench under Article 80(3) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation No.25/1996.


Decree 1. The decisions rendered by the Federal High Court on Yekatit 29, 1998

E.C. (March 8, 2006), under Civil File No. 41632 and by the Federal Supreme Court on Hamle 30, 2000 (August 6, 2008) under Civil Appeal File No. 24055 respectively are affirmed with variation on the reasoning thereof.

2. The injunction order granted by this Bench is lifted.

. . . Signatures of five justices

_________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Volume: 13, pp. 402- 416 Abridged Translation: Tecle Hagos Bahta


Aster A. -v.- Amsale B. & Tibebe T.

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 39608 (February 18, 2010) Holding of the Court:

Managers have the responsibility to administer in good faith the finances of the business organization they are in charge of. If they fail to do so, they will be individually and severally liable

Article 530 of the Commercial Code _____________


Yekatit 11, 2002 E.C. (February 18, 2010)


Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Aster A. Respondents: 1. Amsale B.; 2. Tibebe T.

Judgment This case is related with the responsibility of managers of business organizations for fault toward shareholders of a private limited company. The case was first brought to the Federal High Court. The current respondents were the plaintiffs in the lower court and the defendants were the current petitioner and another individual called Dr. Alehegn M. The respondents, in their pleadings, stated that they agreed to buy shares worth Birr 150,000 (one hundred fifty thousand) and gave American Dollars directly and through other people to the defendants at the lower court. They had also given them money for buying a computer and for putting an advertisement on a newspaper. At that time Dr. Alehegn M. was the manager and the current petitioner was appointed by him to manage the business starting from Tahsas 24, 1999 Eth. Cal (January 2, 2007). They also stated that the defendants at the lower court claimed to have established the business.


Although they claimed that the initial capital of the business was Birr 1,100,000 (one million one hundred thousand), they refused to issue receipts in the name of the organization. Then, the business went bankrupt and it was decided to dissolve it. The respondents further added that the defendants at the lower court (i.e. the current petitioner and Dr. Alehegn) did not start the business in good faith. They only used its name to collect money from people. The respondents thus requested for their money to be returned with interest.

The total amount they requested for was 912,733 Birr. The first defendant at the lower court in his rebuttal argued that the plaintiffs (current respondents) contributed the money ten years ago. So, the period of limitation has lapsed. Moreover, he argued that he did not receive any money directly or indirectly from the plaintiffs. He explained that they gave their money during the time the current petitioner was in charge. The petitioner on her side argued that the suit should not have joined her with the other defendant (at the lower court) and if that was not done the court would not have had jurisdiction. Moreover, since ten years have passed since the money was given, the period of limitation has lapsed.

She also argued that the money should have been demanded when the organization was up for dissolution and that it should not be raised again. The current respondents only produced two cheques as evidence to prove that they have given money. She also argued that she put the money she received into the account of the organization. She did not keep it for herself. So, she requested for the charges to be dropped as she is a victim like all the other members who are not held liable for more than what they have contributed, as it is a private limited company. Nothing more should be demanded from her just because she was a manager.

The lower court examined the case, rejected the preliminary objections and rendered a decision. It decided that the defendants (at the lower court) did not fulfil their responsibilities. So, according to Article 530 of the Commercial Code, they were held individually and severally liable. It decided that they should pay Birr 300,000 (three hundred thousand) plus 9% interest from the date it was given. The current petitioner and the other defendant at the lower court appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. However, the court confirmed the decision of the lower court.

Dissatisfied by these decisions, the current petitioner has appealed to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. This court has examined the files of both cases together.

This Court has checked all the above facts and proved that they are true. Moreover, the court has discovered that the company’s accountant who took care of the finances of the business could not find documents that show the


incomes and expenses of the business. The business has never been audited and it never had a bank account. It does not have any document to show all the expenses it incurred. Moreover, although the business was never functional, 88.83% of the capital was spent in the name of salary, rent and per diem. These facts show that the managers did not fulfil their responsibilities in good faith as managers in accordance with the Memorandum of Association of the Private Limited Company. Therefore, they should be held individually and severally liable according to Article 530 of the Commercial Code. On the other hand, the respondents (plaintiffs at the lower court) are claiming an amount more than the Birr 300,000 (three hundred thousand) they have paid as share contributions. However, the claim, other than the Birr 300,000, is not backed by evidence. This court has thus affirmed the decision made by the lower courts.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Federal High Court, File Number 44250 dated Ginbot

27, 1999 E.C. (June 4, 2007) and the Supreme Court, File No. 31907 on Hamle 9 2000 E.C. (July 16, 2008) are affirmed.

2. The injunction order granted in this file on Tir 7, 2001 E.C. (January 15, 2009) is lifted.

. . .


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 10, pp 335-337 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Meseret Hailu -v.- Zewdu Bireda

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 33954 (October 30, 2008) Holding of the Court:

Claiming half of a business organization during dissolution of marriage by divorce does not refer only to corporeal movables, but also applies to the incorporeal elements such as the right to rent out business premises. Such request does not amount to a claim of ownership of the business premises which is under state ownership.

Article 124,127 and 145 of the Commercial Code

_____________


Tikimt 20, 2001 E.C. (October 30, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Meseret Hailu

Respondent: Zewdu Bireda

The case was adjourned for investigation. The court has examined the case and it has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case came before this court as a cassation petition stating that there is a fundamental error of law in the decisions rendered by the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court. The issue of the case is the partition of the common property of the spouses after the termination of their marriage by divorce. The petitioner is claiming half of two boutique shops worth about Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) located in Merkato. She has also claimed half of other property in addition to these two shops.

After hearing the parties, the Federal First Instance Court decided that the clothes and shoes in the shops should be divided between the parties. However, it rejected the petitioner’s request for the division of the business


organizations stating that they cannot be part of common property as the shops or the places belong to the Agency for Government Houses. The petitioner, then, appealed to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court rejected the appeal stating there was no error of law or fact in the decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court. The petitioner finally submitted a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, contending that there is an error of law in the decisions of the lower courts. She also stated that her requests of partition of other properties that were supported by evidence have been ignored.

The court has received arguments of the respondent to examine the validity of the decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court, and examine whether the businesses conducted in the shops rented from the Agency for Government Houses are common property. The respondent argued that the decision of the First Instance Court has no error of law because the business organization was his private property before and after marriage. He also argued that the right he has as lessee to the place was his private right. It was noted by this court that the business organization was rebuilt by common property after the shops were destroyed by fire.

After examining the case, this Court has identified that the petitioner is not requesting for the partition of the places that are owned by the government. It is clearly stated in the judgment rendered by the First Instance Court that the petitioner is requesting for division of the business organization along with the clothes and shoes worth about Birr 100,000. Accordingly, this Court has observed that the petitioner did not ask for the lower court to allow her half of the merchandise in the shops and half of the shops as separate components of the common property.

The petitioner requested for the partition of the business organization in the two shops located in Merakto. Article 124 of the Commercial Code states that a business is an incorporeal movable consisting of all movable property brought together. This Court has found that the decision rendered by the First Instance Court is inappropriate because it has overlooked this provision and decided that the merchandise in the shops be divided leaving out the right to rent the premises of the shops that are publicly owned.

The lower court regarded the business organization and the merchandise in the shops separately. By virtue of Article 127 of the Commercial Code, a business organization, among other things, consists mainly of a good will. Sub-article 2(c) of the same provision states that a business may consist of the right to lease the premises in which the trade is carried on. Therefore, we have found a fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower court that denied the petitioner her right to the business organization along with her right to rent


the premises of the business organization by stating that they belong to the Agency for Government Houses. The lower court rejected the petitioner’s request not because the business organization is the private property of the respondent, but by stating that the places belong to Agency for Government Houses. The argument of the respondent before this court that the business organization is his private property is not acceptable as well.

Although the petitioner requested for the partition of the business as a whole according to Articles 124 and 127 of the Commercial Code, the lower court has overlooked these provisions and Article 145 of the Commercial Code in rejecting her request stating that she has claimed properties owned by the Agency for Government Houses. Thus, this Court has found that the judgment rendered by the lower court has a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the lower court which states that the petitioner cannot

claim the business organization in the two shops is reversed. 2. The petitioner shall have half of the business run in the two shops located

in Merkato including the right to rent the premises. . . .


_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 9, pp 133-135 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Tekle Wakjira et al -v.- Shonata Gubu Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 19258 (July 19, 2007)

Holding of the Court: Members of a private limited company should pay up their contributions upon the establishment of the company.

Articles 516, 517 and 521(1) (b) of the Commercial Code; Article 348 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code

_____________

Cassation File No. 19258 Hamle 12 1999 E.C. (July 19, 2007)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Aseged Gashaw, Teshager G/Selassie,

Taffesse Yirga, Birhanu Amenew

Petitioners: 1. Tekle Wakjira 2. Tilahun Bobas 3. Habib Mohamed

Respondent: Shonata Gubu The court has examined the case and it has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment

This case relates to the time and the manner in which a member of a private limited company should pay up the amount he has agreed to contribute during establishment.

The petitioners and the respondent have established a private limited company with a capital of Birr 800,000 (eight hundred thousand). Each had agreed to contribute Birr 200,000 (two hundred thousand), out of which the current respondent has not paid up Birr 74,838.80 (seventy four thousand eight hundred thirty eight birr and eighty cents). Nonetheless, the company has been functioning. When the other members asked the respondent to pay the remaining contribution, he said he would give it to them from his share of the profit and that he never agreed to pay up the money upon their request. This caused the conflict between the members.


The respondent reiterated this argument during the litigation at Gedio Zone High Court. After examining the case, the court decided in his favour stating that the respondent never agreed to pay up his contribution in a specific time and there is no proof showing he has received any notice to this effect. Thus, the court decided there is no reason for him to promptly pay the outstanding contribution.

The petitioners, then, appealed to the SNNPR Supreme Court. The appellate court examined the case and observed that the respondent has not paid the remaining Birr 74,838.80, and that he had consented to make the contribution through an agreement that has neither been terminated nor invalidated. Therefore, the court decided that the respondent should promptly pay up the money.

Displeased with this decision, the current petitioner brought the case to the Cassation Division of the Region’s Supreme Court claiming fundamental error of law in the decision of the court. The Region’s Cassation Division examined the case and rendered the following decision.

Article 338(1) of the Commercial Code states that “[s]hares subscribed in cash shall be paid up upon subscription as to one fourth of their par value or a greater amount if so provided in the memorandum of association and, where appropriate, as to the whole of the premium; [t]hey may only be registered shares until they are fully paid”. Moreover, sub-Article 2 of the same provision provides that “[p]ayment of the balance may be spread over a period of five years from the date of registration of the company”. Article 342 states the effect of a shareholder’s failure to pay his contribution at the due date. Therefore, according to Articles 338(1) and 342 of the Commercial Code, the options that result from the failure of a shareholder to fully pay up contribution are:

- retention of the shares not paid up in the name of the company; - sale of unpaid up shares by auction; - liability for compensation if failure to pay-up shares entails bankruptcy

and suspension of shareholder votes.

The Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division stated that this list is exhaustive and found that there is no legal ground to force the member to pay up his share of the contribution. It thus reversed the decision of the SNNPR Supreme court which required the respondent to pay up the remaining share contribution of Birr 74, 838.80.

Petition has been brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court stating that the decision of the Regional Supreme Court’s Cassation Division has fundamental error of law. The respondent, on the other hand, has


argued that there is no error of law in the decision given by the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court.

This Court has examined the case and it has observed the establishment of the company, the amount of the capital, the amount of the contribution and the amount of money that has not been paid up. Articles 516 and 517 of the Commercial Code clearly state that each member shall fully pay his contribution in money or in kind. The company is said to be established when the Memorandum of Association that sets up the company is signed by all the members or by persons acting on their behalf and is authenticated. Article 517(g) states that one of the terms that should be shown on a Memorandum of Association is a statement that the capital is fully paid up. Moreover, Article 521(1) of the Commercial Code lists the terms that should be shown on a share register.

The Amharic version of Article 521(1)(b) embodies some indication that the contribution may be made before or after the establishment of the company. However, the English translation reads ‘the value of all contributions made by the members’. From the joint reading of the two versions, it can be observed that the contribution shall be made before the establishment of the company. These provisions show that the member shall make the contribution before the establishment and that Article 338(1) which deals with the time of paying up for shares does not apply to this. The members should have made sure that all the contributions were made before the establishment.

However, the fact that they failed to do so does not negate the establishment of the company, and this issue has not been raised. Moreover, although there is no indication as to when and how the member would pay his contribution in the Memorandum of Association, it is observed that the respondent admits that he still owes the money and that he will make the payment. The issue at hand is that the respondent seeks to make the payment from his share of the profit through time and that he cannot be forced to make prompt payment. However, as mentioned earlier, a member should pay his share of the contribution before the establishment of the company. Therefore, the respondent’s argument to pay this money from his share of the profit does not have any legal ground.

The Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional Supreme court based on Articles 338 and 342 of the Commercial Code. These provisions, however, deal with share companies. Although share companies and private limited companies are both business organizations, they are very different in their establishment, scope of liability and their scope of business undertaking. The time of paying up of shares bought from a share company and the time for making contributions for a private limited company are provided in different parts of the Commercial


Code. There is no legal provision that renders the provisions dealing with the time of paying up for share in share companies applicable to private limited companies as well. Therefore, there is a fundamental error of law in the decree rendered by the Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court.

Decree 1. The respondent should pay up the outstanding capital contribution of Birr

74, 838.80 as agreed upon the establishment of the company. 2. The decision of the Gedio Zone High Court, File Number 22/92 rendered

on of Hidar 24, 1995 E.C. (December 3, 2002) and the decision of the Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court, File Number 5648 dated Tahsas 26, 1997 E.C. (January 4, 2005) are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

3. The decree rendered by the SNNPR Supreme Court File Number 3694 on Tahsas 29, 1996 E.C. (January 8, 2004) is affirmed.

…. Signatures of five justices


Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 4: Civil Procedure 57

4. Civil Procedure

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Mistir Solomon v. Fekadu Kasahun and others

74890 2013 14 131-133

2 Gota Ejeta v. Ato Mudesir Redi 72017 2012 14 121-124

3 Apeno Engineering Construction v. Tiruneh Yemer

63699 2010 12 375-376

4 African Insurance S.C. v. CBE 57360 2011 12 369-370

5 Tirhas Fishaye v. Zenebech Berihun 43821 2010 9 295-300


Mistir Solomon -v.- Fekadu Kasahun et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 74890 (February 7, 2013)

Holding of the Court: The validity of evidence adduced to prove a contested issue has to be litigated and decided by the court which entertains the main suit.

_____________


Tir 30, 2005 E.C. (February 7, 2013)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa,

Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Mistir Solomon Respondents: 1. Fekadu Kasahun, 2. Ali Kasahun,

3. Mulualem Kasahun, 4. Belay Kasahun and 5. Abate Kasahun


Judgment This case started at the Federal First Instance Court. The petitioner brought a civil action against the respondents claiming that property (a house and a car) registered in the name of her late father and which she is entitled to inherit is found in the possession of the respondents. When the respondents were asked to surrender the property, they claimed to have a right over it because the petitioner’s father has donated it to their mother and they are their mother’s heirs. However, the petitioner argued that the donation contract was not signed by her father and was not legally valid. She contended that it does not therefore bestow any right on the respondents and pleaded for the property to be handed over to her together with the rental benefits it has yielded.

The Federal First Instance Court decided that the jurisdiction to examine the validity of the contested contract lies with another court. The court stated that the petitioner who challenges the contract has not actually presented a


court decision which invalidated the contract, nor has he requested the court to do the same. Therefore, the Federal First Instance Court declined to consider the suit brought by the petitioner stating that it is not appropriate and does not have legal ground.

Upon appeal, the Federal High Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

This petition against the Federal High Court’s decision is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The parties have presented their arguments on the issue whether the lower court’s decision is appropriate in dismissing the petitioner’s claim against the donation merely because she did not have the donation invalidated by another court.

As can be understood from the case, the petitioner instituted the suit at the Federal First Instance Court taking into consideration the estimate value of the contested house and car. This is in conformity with Article 14(1) of Proclamation No. 25/1996 which confers such jurisdiction on the court, and as a result, is in line with the requirements stated under Articles 16, 9 and 231(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code. The lower court has not found fault on the part of the petitioner with regard to jurisdiction. Nor have the respondents contested the jurisdiction of the lower court.

If a suit is brought before a court which has material jurisdiction to entertain a case and the legality of a documentary evidence is contested, the court, has to allow the parties to argue on the matter and analyse the document applying the relevant law. The arguments on this document produced to prove a contested issue at the trial stage shall be in accordance with Articles 246, 247 and 248 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no procedure which allows for evidence (adduced to prove an issue) to be separately litigated in another court. There is also no procedure which imposes a duty on the petitioner to specifically request the invalidation of the donation contract in her suit, since such decision on the document has to be made in the light of the rules of evidence in the decision-making process.

The Cassation Division has decided to reverse the decision of the lower courts which found that the validity of the donation contract should be litigated in another court which has jurisdiction and not in the court where the petitioner filed her first suit.


Decree 1. The ruling of the Federal First Instance Court rendered in File Number

34398 on July 14, 2011 and the ruling of the Federal High Court confirming the ruling of the First Instance Court in File Number 115381 on November 28, 2011 are reversed.

2. The validity of the contested donation contract should be determined at the appropriate stage of the proceedings by taking the relevant law into consideration. The Cassation Division has thus remanded the case to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that the court shall re-open the file and render the appropriate decision.

…


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp. 131 – 133. Abridged translation: Tewodros Dawit


Gota Ejeta -v.- Musedir Redi Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 72017 (October 30, 2012)

Holding of the Court: If the winner of an auction conducted as part of judgment execution fails to execute his obligation as buyer, and where the property is out for a second auction as a result, the winner of the first auction (defaulting purchaser) is obliged to pay the difference (loss on resale) if the price obtained during the second auction is less than the one offered by the winner of the first auction.

Article 429 of the Civil Procedure Code _______________


20 Tikimt 2005 E.C. (October 30, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie, Mekonnen G/Hiwot

Petitioner: Gota Ejeta

Respondent: Musedir Redi


Judgment The property of the current petitioner, Diddis Pharmacy, located in Addis Ababa was offered for auction, based on a court order, so that the proceeds can be used to pay his debt. Accordingly, bidders were invited and the current respondent won the auction at Birr 1,000,000 (one million).

However, the respondent failed to pay the purchase price, as a result of which a second auction was conducted and Ato Abdu Mohammed won the auction with Birr 1,000,000 (one million). The second winner also failed to pay the purchase price. Thus, the property was auctioned for the third time and it was sold for Birr 265,000.00 (two hundred sixty five thousand).

This case was brought by the petitioner contesting the decision of the appellate courts at various levels which held that only the winner in the second auction is liable for paying the difference between the highest bid /purchase price/ offered in the first and second auction, and the price with which the


property was sold in the third auction. The petitioner argued that, according to Article 429 of the Civil Procedure Code, winners of the two auctions should have been jointly and severally liable for paying the difference, as both of them defaulted to pay the purchase price and caused the property to be sold at a lower price.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division examined the issue whether both winners of the first and second auctions, or only the winner in the second auction (who won the auction bidding to pay the same price as the winner in the first one), should be liable to pay the difference in the purchase price, where the property was finally sold for a lower price in the third auction. Even though Article 429 of the Civil Procedure Code does not give a direct answer in this regard, the Cassation Division noted that the purpose of this provision is to make sure that the judgment debtor receives as compensation, the difference in the purchase price, when the winner in an auction defaults to pay the pledged amount and the property was sold for a smaller price in another auction.

The Cassation Division further noted that, even though the current respondent, by failing to pay the purchase price after winning the first auction caused a second auction to be held, he did not cause damage to the judgment debtor, as the amount with which he won the auction is equal to the amount offered by the winner in the second auction i.e Birr one million. Thus, the Cassation Division found that there is no fundamental error in law in the decision of the appellate courts which held that the current respondent, does not have joint and several liability with the winner in the second auction, who should only be directly responsible for the third auction which resulted the property being sold at a difference of Birr 735,000.00 (seven hundred thirty five).

Decree 1. The Decision of the Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal File No. 69945

rendered on Hamle 8, 2003 EC (July 15, 2011) is affirmed. 2. The decision that the current respondent should not be jointly and severally

liable for paying the difference in the purchase price which resulted during the various auctions is found appropriate.

3. The injunction order granted by this cassation bench on 17 Tikimt 2004 EC (28 October 28, 2011) is lifted.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp. 121 – 124. Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey


Apeno Engineering Construction Enterprise v. Tiruneh Yimer

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 63699 (July 22, 2011)

Holding of the court A pleading that lacks clarity with regard to the claims shall not be accepted, and a judicial decision cannot be rendered thereupon unless the pleading is amended by the parties themselves or by order of the court.

Art. 91(1) of the Civil Procedure Code

______________


Hamle 15, 2003 E.C. (July 22, 2011)



Petitioner: Apeno Engineering Con. Enterprise

Respondent: Tiruneh Yimer

Judgment The present respondent brought legal action in the First Instance Court of Gambela City Administration claiming that the defendant (the present petitioner) owes him payments which are not settled since his employment as a guard was terminated due to illness.

The defendant (the present petitioner), on its part, responded that the plaintiff (the present respondent) was employed as a guard in the enterprise from Tahsas 2001 E.C. (December 2008) to Tikimt 2002 (October 2009) for 11 months, but he terminated his contract himself as a result of which the enterprise paid severance pay. It argued that there is no outstanding payment it owes to Ato Tiruneh. The court, satisfied by the evidence produced for the payment of the severance pay, decided that the plaintiff is not entitled to any other additional payment since he did not (in his statement of claim) specifically state other payments owed to him [if any] by the enterprise.

An appeal was brought to the Gambella Vicinity (Zuria) High Court and the court decided that since the employment for one year is proved, the


employee is entitled to get other payments such as overtime payment, annual leave payment and payments for public holidays since no evidence is produced to prove that these payments have been made to the employee.

A cassation petition is brought to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division against the decision of the Gambella Vicinity (Zuria) High Court. The petitioner contends that the decision rendered was based on the present respondent’s vague claims for various payments and is against the principles and procedures of pleading and production of evidence under the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code. The respondent has failed to appear at the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The case is thus adjudicated in his absence and the court has examined the validity of the decision of the lower courts.

Since a labour dispute is a civil case by its nature, it has to be governed by the Civil Procedure Code. Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code is the relevant provision in this regard. Under Article 222 (1)(f) of the Code, it is clearly stated that the facts constituting the cause of action must be specified. Moreover, Article 80(2) of the Code, requires the plaintiff to clearly and concisely state all the material facts and claims in detail in the pleading. In the present case, however, the present respondent has generally claimed to be paid a certain amount of money instead of listing them out specifically in accordance with the requirements of the law, and it is against the laws of procedure to have the other party to defend the case based on such kind of unclear and general claim.

A pleading which is not clear can be subject to compulsory or voluntary amendment as per Article 91(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Nevertheless, this has not been done. The lower court (Gambella City First Instance court) has committed a fundamental error of law and disregarded the basic principles of pleading and production of evidence in civil litigation in deciding the case in favour of the present respondent without determining the specific time for which the present respondent claims payments of annual leave, public holidays and overtime. The decision is rendered without any evidence which proves the entitlement of the present respondent to these payments.

Decree 1. The decision of Gambella City Zuria High Court dated of October 20,

2010 (Tikimt 10, 2003 E.C.) is reversed as per Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The decision of Gambela City Administration First Instance Court in File No. 03436 on July 6, 2010 (Sene 28, 2002 EC) is confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.


3. The petitioner is not required to make annual leave, public holiday and overtime payments to the present respondent.

...


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 12, pp. 375-376. Abridged translation: Aron Degol


African Insurance S.C. -v.- Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 57360 (July 22, 2011)

Holding of the court - There must be a good cause to invoke ‘a leave to appeal out of time’. - Courts can, within the meaning of the law, determine the reasons that

qualify as ‘good cause’ for failure to file a memorandum of appeal within the prescribed time.

- Lapse of time for appeal due to the pleader’s fault does not constitute good cause for permitting ‘leave to appeal out of time’.

Arts. 323 (2), 325, 326 (1)&(2) of the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia ________________

Cassation File No. 57360 Hamle 15, 2003 E.C. (July 22, 2011)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufsa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: African Insurance S.C. Respondent: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Judgment The case relates to a court’s authority to permit ‘leave to appeal out of time’. The appellant (the present respondent) has made an application for ‘leave to appeal out of time’ to the Federal Supreme Court appellate division. The appellant stated that the reason why the time for appeal lapsed is due the negligence of its former pleader who failed to observe the time limit for appeal. The court summoned the respondent (the present petitioner), heard the case and ruled that the ‘leave to appeal out of time’ is accepted because the time for appeal lapsed due to the failure of the appellant’s former pleader against whom a disciplinary measure has been taken.

A petition is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division against this ruling of the Federal Supreme Court appellate division. At the lower courts, the appellant (the present respondent) had applied for ‘leave to appeal out of time’ due to failure to lodge the appeal within the prescribed period of time under Article 323(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. An


application for ‘leave to appeal out of time’ must be made in accordance with Article 325 of the same Code and the application is examined pursuant to Art. 326 (1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Code.

According to Art. 326 (1), if the court to which the application is made is satisfied that the applicant was prevented to appeal within the time prescribed for ‘good cause’, the ‘leave to appeal out of time’ will be granted and the applicant will be ordered to file the memorandum of appeal within ten days of such an order. The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has noted that there is no clear standard stated in the law regarding the reasons that qualify as ‘good cause’. The standards are thus left for judicial interpretation. However, Article 326 (2) clearly provides that “where the failure to appeal in time is due to the default of the appellant’s pleader” good cause shall not be deemed to exist “within the meaning of Art. 326 (1).

In the present case, the respondent stated its reason for failure to appeal in time as being the default of its former pleader, and this court is aware of the fact that the Federal Supreme Court granted the leave based on the reason that the pleader failed to perform his duties with due diligence and honestly. However, the law is clear in this regard, and lack of honesty or breach of professional ethics does not constitute good cause within the meaning of Art. 326 (1); and should not be considered as an issue.

Perhaps, it may become an issue between the present respondent and the pleader to determine the scope, extent and effect of liability, but, it cannot be a justification to allow ‘leave to appeal out of time’. Courts should always adjudicate cases brought before them based on provisions of the law. A decision rendered in total deviation from the clear wordings of the provision of the law is not acceptable and constitutes a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal Supreme Court, Appellate File No. 54164

dated Ginbot 11, 2002 EC (May 18, 2010) is reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The respondent’s request for ‘leave to appeal out of time’ is rejected based on Article 326(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 12, pp. 369-370. Abridged translation: Aron Degol


Tirhas F. - v- Zenebech B. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 66856 (January 13, 2010)

Holding of the Court:

- The application for review of judgement made by the petitioner should not be dismissed merely because she has lodged an appeal and a decision has been rendered by the appellate court.

- The previous decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench on this issue has been changed.

Articles 6 (1)(a) & (b) of the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia ______________


Tir 5, 2002 E.C. (January 13, 2010)


Justices: Tegene Getahun , Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yiga, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: W/o Tirhas Fishaye

Respondent: W/o Zenebech Berihun

The court has rendered the following judgement.

Judgement The issue in this case is based on Art. 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiff who initially filed the case at Arsi Zone High Court is the current respondent. She brought the case seeking a declaratory judgment that the father of her two children is her late husband. The case was decided in her favour. The litigation continued until the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. After having gone through all this process, the current petitioner has asked for review of Judgment.

The petitioner accused the respondent of providing the court with false evidence and hence has brought her case to the attention of the Arsi Zone High Court to review its former judgement in light of the new finding. After hearing what respondent, the court decided to reject the complaint stating that this case had already gone to the level of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation


Division. Petition was brought to the Oromia State Supreme Court Cassation Bench which decided that no fundamental error of law had been committed. The current petitioner has submitted a petition to this Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench against this decision.

In her petition dated Yekatit 19, 2001 EC (February 26, 2009) the petitioner contended that the lower courts have wrongly interpreted the law and committed a fundamental error of law. She stated that, if the judgment is reviewed in light of the newly discovered evidence, the judgement would not be made in favour of the respondent.

The respondent, on the other hand, argued that according to Article 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, an application for review of judgment can only be made before an appeal has been made. She also stated that the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has, in Cassation File No. 16624, made a binding interpretation of the law that this provision is inapplicable if an appeal has been made. The respondent further contended that the newly found evidence that the petitioner claims to have obtained does not criminally implicate her, and asked the court to drop the petition.

Any analysis with regard to the first issue, i.e., whether an application for a review of judgment could be made after an appeal is lodged requires examining the spirit of the law. Article 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is not a provision that can be applied to a new case. It is a procedure for the review of judgment after a case has been brought to court and final judgment is rendered. The party applying for review of judgement is a person who was party to the original case from the beginning. Hence, he/she will be treated differently from a person filing for opposition as provided for on Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code. Furthermore, the application for review of judgement is not made to the appellate court but to the court that made the judgment which shows the unique nature of the provision. Article 6(1) of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Art. 5, any party considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal lies, but from which no appeal has been preferred, or by a decree or order from which no appeal lies, may, on payment of the prescribed court fee, apply for a review of judgment to the court which gave it where: (a) subsequently to the judgement he discovers new and important matter,

such as forgery, perjury or bribery which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge at the time of the giving of the judgment; and


(b) had such matter been known at the time of the giving of the judgment, it would have materially affected the substance of the decree or order the review of which is sought.

The elements embodied in Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(b) show that if an original judgement upon which an appeal had been made was based on false evidence, then it is not lawful. This leads to the conclusion that Article 6 is meant to stop the execution of such a judgment since the sole purpose of justice is to bring out the truth.

Evidence plays a big role in the process of finding out the truth in courts of law. Hence, in addition to its mode of presentation, the mode of acquisition of evidence must be legal.

Procedural law puts forth the mode of presentation of evidence as well as the time limit for presenting evidence. As a rule, evidence should be presented by a party who stands to gain from it as provided for in Articles 223 and 234 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, in the pursuit of truth, the court can of its own motion summon additional evidence as provided for in Article 264 of the Civil Procedure Code and other laws. Although there is, for example, a time limit to produce evidence as stated under Article 137 of the Civil Procedure Code, there could be instances, by virtue of Article 256, where evidence may be presented to the court even if the time for its submission has passed. We can also see that the appellate court may hear evidence that was not presented to the first court as provided under Art 345.

In light of these provisions, we can observe that evidence has a key role in finding out the truth, and there are procedural rules and exceptional circumstances outside of the ordinary rules that govern the submission of evidence. This is done to make sure that the judgement passed is based only on the truth.

The case brought before us involves a request for a review of judgement claiming that the previous judgment is made based on false evidence. This implies that the judgement rendered is not based on the truth.

The argument raised by the respondent that the time has passed to ask for review of judgement does not seem to take this into consideration. On the other hand, the point raised by the petitioner necessitates examining the truth. Hence, before we arrive at a conclusive interpretation of the law, we need to consider two perspectives in relation with this legislation.

The first perspective leads to the belief that as long as the legal arguments and the mode of submission of evidence are according to the law the outcome will always lead to the truth.


The second perspective could be divided into two. One could be to interpret and apply the law literally. If we take the phrase “from which no appeal has been preferred” in Art. 6(1) and give it a literal translation, it implies that one can only make an application for judgement review before making an appeal. But this provision should be interpreted in line with other phrases in Art. 6(1) (a)&(b) and in light of the general aim of the Civil Procedure Code as a whole.

The other factor that should be taken into consideration is whether there is any rationale to require that review of judgment should be brought before making an appeal. If one makes an application for review of judgment while an appellate court is adjudicating the case, it would mean that the case is being adjudicated by two courts at the same time. This would only be a waste of time, energy and resources in addition to complicating matters further.

We have found it reasonable to interpret Art. 6(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code in a way that helps to bring out the truth. Whether one has made an appeal or not, review of judgment should be allowed if there is sufficient evidence to make the judges believe that the evidence was false, or a crime had been committed in relation with the evidence thereby derailing to the previous judgement.

The next issue that needs a decision in this case relates to the interpretation rendered by this court on the same issue in Cassation File No. 16624, i.e. whether the analysis and interpretation pursued by this court in File No. 16624 is in conformity with the interpretation of Art. 6(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code. The reason why it was found necessary to revise this decision is that there are recurring requests for review of judgement, usually after appeal, and the reason which is frequently invoked in this regard is the need to have the truth revealed. Therefore, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Proc. No. 454/2005 we have changed the previous interpretation of Article 6 of the Civil Procedure Code and have made the interpretation given to the provision in the present case a binding interpretation. Hence, we have not accepted the argument of the respondent on the basis of this court’s interpretation in Cassation File No. 16624. We have thus accepted the petitioner’s request for review of judgement and have made the following decree.

Decree 1. The judgement given by the High Court of Arsi Zone in Case No. 01789

on Hidar 5, 2001 E.C. (November 14, 2008) and the Oromia Supreme Court in Case No. 70413 on Tahsas 14, 2001 E.C (December 23, 2008) are reversed in accordance with Art 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.


2. The interpretation of law regarding review of judgments given under Cassation File No. 16624 is changed.

3. The petitioner’s request for review of judgement should be entertained in accordance with Art. 6 of Civil Procedure Code.

4. This case is remanded to the High Court of Arsi Zone so that it can look into the matter and review the judgment if it finds it necessary to do so.

… Signature of seven justices

_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 9, pp. 295 – 300 Abridged translation: Deborah Haddis & Fasil Abebe

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 5: Contracts 73

5. Contracts

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Negussie H. & Mamitu L. v. Huressa D. & Lelise R.

72463 2012 13 209-210

2 Abrha B. v. Birkinesh H. 71927 2012 13 215-217

3 Dashen Printers and Trading PLC v. Fisseha Yihun

71375 2012 13 203-205

4 Andarge I. v. Zehra M. 64397 2012 13 200-202

5 Ethio-Telecom v. G. Ginaho 61331 2012 13 175-178

6 Birkinesh Birru v. Kifle Habdeta 25912 2008 5 343-345


Negussie H. & Mamitu L. v. Huressa D. & Lelise R. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 72463 (April 4, 2012)

Holding of the Court: A person who gives his immovable property as security in a contract of antichresis (woledagid) can reclaim his property anytime upon payment of his debt even after the end of the period stated in the contract.

Civil Code Arts. 3124, 3128(2), 3117-3130, 1845 ____________


Megabit 26, 2004 E.C. (April 4, 2012)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioners: Negussie Haile and Mamitu Leta

Respondents: Huressa Debel and Lelise Raya

Judgment In the petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, the petitioners requested that the decisions of Finfine Vicinity (Finfine Zuria) High Court and Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Division contain a fundamental error of law. The case started at Wolmera Woreda Court, and involves antichresis (woledagid). On Meskerem 28, [1983] EC (October 8, 1990), the petitioners concluded a contract of antichresis with the respondents, and they delivered House No. 777 and two rooms as security for a loan of Birr 2,500 (two thousand five hundred) payable in one year. The petitioners stated that their creditors invoked period of limitation and refused to receive the return of the money owed to the latter and return the immovable property. The petitioners as plaintiffs in the initial suit claimed that the creditors should receive the debt owed to them and return the immovable property under their possession.


The Wolmera Woreda Court decided that the claim is not barred by period of limitation and decided that the respondents should receive the debt owed to them and return the immovable property. Upon appeal, the Finfine Vicinity (Finfine Zuria) High Court [reversed the Woreda Court’s decision and] decided that the respondents had agreed to pay their debt on Meskerem 28, 1984 (October 9, 1991) and is therefore barred by period of limitation. The petition submitted to Oromia Region Supreme Court Cassation Division against this decision was rejected. The petitioners had argued that the High Court’s decision involves a fundamental error in law because it has not considered the special nature of the contract and is contrary to Article 3128(2) of the Civil Code. The respondents, on the other hand, invoked Article 1845 of the Civil Code and contended that the plaintiffs have not paid their debt within one year in accordance with their contractual obligation, and raising such a claim after sixteen years is barred by a period of limitation under Article 1845 of the Civil Code.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the issue whether the claim of the petitioners is barred by period of limitation. As stipulated under Article 3117 of the Civil Code, antichresis ‘is a contract whereby the debtor undertakes to deliver an immovable to his creditor as a security for the performance of his obligations’. The effect of the contract of antichresis is stated in Article 3124 of the Civil Code [regarding the relief of the creditor from payment of rent to the person who creates the antichresis, and the creditor’s corresponding duty not to require interest on the loan].

Article 3128(2) provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, the [debtor1] may at any time terminate the antichresis by performing the obligation secured by the antichresis.” The phrase ‘unless otherwise agreed’ should have been interpreted by the Zone’s High Court based on the spirit and objective of the provision. In this provision, the phrase ‘unless otherwise agreed’ shows that the petitioners delivered their immovable property as security to the loan payable on Meskerem 28, 1984 EC, and that they cannot claim the return of their property before that date by paying back the loan. This does not, however, mean that the petitioners cannot claim the return of their property any time after the lapse of the date stated in the contract of antichresis. There is no legal provision that allows creditors to acquire ownership of a house which they have held as security. Article 3128(1) only applies to creditors who may opt not to use the house and its benefit thereof so that such creditor can at any time renounce the antichresis.

1 The word ‘creditor’ in Article 3128(2) in the English version is a mistranslation, and the

binding Amharic version reads ‘bale’idaw’, i.e. the debtor.


Articles 3117 to 3130 of the Civil Code are specific provisions that define the nature of the contract of antichresis and deal with the effects of the contract and its termination. Article 1845 is a provision on contracts in general, and does not apply to this case for which the law has created special rules. Therefore, the decision rendered by the Oromia Region Supreme Court Cassation Division contains a fundamental error of law in holding that the claim of the petitioners is barred by the period of limitation of ten years.

Decree 1. The decisions of Finfine Vicinity High Court and Oromia Region Supreme

Court Cassation Division decision are reversed. 2. The claim of the petitioners shall not be barred by period of limitation. 3. The decision rendered by Wolmera Woreda Court is affirmed. 4. The petitioners have the right to take delivery of the house from the

respondents upon payment of Birr 2500 (Two thousand five hundred). ...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 209 – 210. Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Abrha B. -v.- Birkinesh H. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 71927 (April 18, 2012)

Holding of the Court: Where signature signed on a contract is disclaimed and cannot also be verified by forensic investigation, witnesses or other evidence can be used for the authentication of the signature. Civil Code Article 2472, 2008

_______________


Miazia 10, 2004 E.C. (April 18, 2012)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Sellasie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Abra B.

Respondent: Birkinesh H.

We have examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The petitioner claims that the Tigray Region Supreme Court and the Regional State’s Supreme Court Cassation Division have made fundamental error in oflaw. The case started at Mekele Worda Court, Kedamawi Woyane Chilot and the case involves contract of loan.

The statement of claim initially filed at the Woreda Court states that the respondent took a loan of Birr 12,000 (twelve thousand) in a contract concluded on Ginbot 7, 1993 EC (May 15, 2001), agreed to pay her debt until Yekatit 1994 EC (February 2002), and further agreed to pay a penalty of Birr 8,000 (eight thousand) if she fails to pay within the time agreed. The plaintiff requested for the payment of Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand) plus interest for the delay in payment because the respondent has not made the payment within the time agreed in the contract.

The respondent (defendant at the lower court) disclaimed the signature in the contract and stated that she has not taken the loan. The court ordered forensic investigation of the signature on the document and the report from the


investigation stated that it could not be verified that the signature is the defendant’s. The Woreda Court rejected the statement of claim. Upon appeal, the High Court reversed the decision and referred the case to the Woreda Court instructing it to hear witnesses on the veracity of the signature and render decision.

The witnesses testified that they were present when the respondent took the loan and that they have signed on the contract. The Woreda Court decided that the respondent should pay the loan, i.e Birr 12,000 plus the penalty Birr 8,000 as agreed upon in the contract because she failed to pay the loan within the time agreed. It also decided that the respondent should pay interest until she fully pays the aggregate amount of Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand).

Upon the respondent’s appeal, the High Court confirmed the decision of the Woreda Court with some variation with regard to the payment of interest which was not accepted.

However, the Region’s Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Woreda and High Courts stating that hearing witnesses to prove the existence of loan violates Article 2472 of the Civil Code. The petitioner submitted a petition to the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Division which affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court.

The petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, dated Nehassie 9, 2003 EC (August 15, 2011) states that the evidence submitted to prove the loan is documentary evidence. As a result of the respondent’s denial of her signature and the difficulty in proving her signature through forensic investigation, it was appropriate to use witnesses to whether the respondent had signed on the contract of loan. The respondent has also submitted her arguments in support of the decision of the Regional’s Supreme Court and Cassation Division.

We have examined the case. A document dated May 15, 2001 was presented to the lower court showing that a loan of Birr 12,000 was signed by the contracting parties. The requirement of Article 2472(1) is thus satisfied because the contract is made in writing. However, the respondent has disclaimed the signature based on Article 2008 of the Civil Code. Even if forensic investigation was made, the signature could not be verified by police forensic laboratory. The witnesses who have signed on the contract are thus duly heard to authenticate whether the signature was signed by the respondent during the conclusion of the contract.

Where a signature is disclaimed, the first option is forensic investigation. If it cannot be verified through forensic investigation, it can be observed from the general principles of the law of evidence that the signature can be authenticated by witnesses who were present when the contract was signed.


Under Ethiopian law, there is no specific legal provision which forbids authentication of a signature by witnesses or other evidence. On the other hand, the jurisprudence of courts that has developed over a long period of time shows that signature can be authenticated by witnesses or other evidence when the signature is disclaimed and cannot also be verified by forensic investigation. Therefore, the Tigray Region’s Supreme Court and the Regional Supreme Court’s Cassation Division have committed a fundamental error in law by not making a distinction between the submission of a contract in writing as required under Article 2472(1) of the Civil Code, and the issue of authentication if a signature on the contract is disclaimed. This fails to consider the content and basic objective of Article 2472(1).

On the other hand, the Woreda Court and the Zone High Court have duly proved that the respondent has signed on the contract, but they have erred in deciding that the respondent should pay Birr 20,000 (twenty thousand) which includes the principal loan of Birr 12,000 and the additional penalty of Birr 8,000 an amount which is neither a loan nor repayment as envisaged under Article 2472(3). We have thus decided that part of the decisions of the Woreda and High Courts have fundamental error in law.

Decree 1. The decisions of Tigray Region Supreme Court Appellate Division and the

Supreme Court’s Cassation Division are reversed. 2. Kedamawi Woyane Woreda Court’s and Mekele City High Court’s

decisions are varied. 3. The respondent shall pay Birr 12,000 (twelve thousand) to the petitioner

plus an interest of 9% (nine percent) to be computed since the suit was instituted at the Woreda Court.


_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 215 – 217. Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Dashen Printers and Trading PLC -v.- Fisseha Yihun

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 71375 (January 25, 2012)

Holding of the Court: Where specific form is not prescribed by the law, contracts may be made orally, by signs normally in use or by conduct which shows an unequivocal intention to enter into contractual obligations. Article 1681(1) of the Civil Code; Article 272 of the Civil Procedure Code

_____________


Tir 16, 2004 E.C. (January 25, 2012)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Nigussie

Petitioner: Dashen Printers and Trading PLC

Respondent: Fisseha Yihun

Judgment The current petitioner was the plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court. Its statement of claim stated that it had printed 300 books based on a contract with the respondent in which the latter had agreed to pay Birr 50,000 (fifty thousand). Advance payment of Birr 25,000 (twenty five thousand) was paid, and the respondent did not pay the remaining amount after the petitioner completed it tasks. The petitioner requested that the payment should also include interest because the payment is overdue for over a year.

The respondent has died and summons was posted at the residence of the deceased so that heirs could appear for the trial. The case was tried in the absence of the respondent’s heirs, and the First Instance Court decided that all documents submitted to the court are prepared by the plaintiff. It dismissed the suit on the ground that the existence of binding contractual obligations has not been sufficiently establsished.


The Federal High court confirmed the decision after an appeal was submitted to it. The court stated that the appeal is rejected in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code without the need to summon the respondent.

The petitioner has requested the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division to correct the error in the decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the order of the Federal High Court. The major argument presented by the petitioner is that contracts for printing services can be made orally, and the decisions of the lower courts which dismissed the case owing to the non-submission of a written contract is not appropriate.

The Cassation Division has sent summons to the heirs of the deceased, but they did not appear even if they had received the summons. The case was thus examined in their absence.

The issue examined by the Cassation Division is whether the ruling of the lower courts is appropriate in dismissing the petitioner’s claims on the ground that it has not produced evidence which proves the existence of a binding contractual obligation.

The documents submitted by the petitioner to the First Instance Court are advance payment receipts, receipts from the respondent and the proforma invoice given to the respondent. A written contract has not been submitted other than these documents. Failure to produce a written contract does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a contract has not been formed. Article 1681(1) of the Civil Code provides that “[o]ffer and acceptance may be made orally or in writing or by signs normally in use or by a conduct such that, in the circumstance of the case, there is no doubt as to the party's agreement.” This does not, however, mean that all contracts can be made orally, by signs normally in use or by conduct which unequivocally show a contracting party’s agreement. For example, Article 1725 of the Civil Code requires contracts for a long period of time, contracts of guarantee, insurance and other contracts in respect to which a specific form is prescribed should be made in writing.

In the case under consideration, the law does not require contracts of printing services to be in writing. The contract in dispute involves printing 300 (three hundred) copies of a book and this does not entail a contractual obligation which continues over a long period of time which could have rendered a written form necessary for its formation. The lower courts should have thus examined the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner and could have also examined whether the contract was concluded in the forms stated earlier (in accordance with Article 264(2) of the Civil Procedure Code).

Although the petitioner did not produce witnesses, the courts could itself have summoned witnesses, if necessary. However, the courts have failed to


pursue these procedures and have committed a fundamental error of law in dismissing the petitioner’s claims. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court in File No. 69348 (dated

Miaza 26, 2003 EC, i.e. May 4, 2011) and the order given by the Federal High Court, File No. 110517 (on Sene 23, 2003 EC, i.e. June 30, 2011) are reversed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The case is remanded to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, and it shall examine whether the petitioner has printed 300 copies of the book by appointing a court commissioner (mitik dagna) to the printing press in accordance with Article 272 of the Civil Procedure Code and render a decision based on the procès-verbal of the inspection submitted to the court by the commissioner (mitik dagna).

...




Andarge I. -v.- Zehra M. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 64397 (January 10, 2012)

Holding of the Court: - Article 2472 which requires a loan exceeding Birr 500 to be made in

writing or by a confession made in court or by oath taken in court shall not apply to payments outside loans.

- Failure to appear after summons does not constitute admission of the claims in a suit, but merely allows a hearing ex parte.

Civil Code, Article 2472 ______________


Tir 1, 2004 E.C. (January 10, 2012)



Petitioner: Andarge I. Respondent: Zehara M.

Judgment The case involves the petitioner’s claim that the respondent received money from him to buy for him a TV set and LCD and that she has neither bought the items nor returned the money. The case was initially brought to Addis Ketema Sub-city Kebele 10/11/12 Social Court in Addis Ababa by the current petitioner (plaintiff at the lower court). The statement of claim dated Meskerem 17, 2001 E.C. (September 27, 2008) states that the respondent came to the petitioner’s house and promised to buy for him a 21 inch Sony TV set with LCD at a price of Birr 4,750 (four thousand seven hundred and fifty) and that he gave the money to the respondent in the presence of witnesses. He claimed that she should either deliver the items or return the money along with the cost incurred due to the litigation.

The respondent (defendant at the lower court) was unwilling to receive summons as confirmed by the petitioner’s oath taken in court and the case was heard in her absence. The court decided that the respondent’s failure to appear can be regarded as admission of the claim and required the respondent to pay the amount stated in the suit plus the expenses incurred due to litigation.


The respondent appealed to the City’s First Instance Court, but the decision was affirmed. She further lodged a cassation petition to Addis Ababa City Cassation Chilot which cited Article 2472(1)(2) of the Civil Code and decided that loan that exceeds Birr 500 (five hundred) can be proved only in writing or by a confession made or oath taken in court. The Cassation Division of Addis Ababa City Administration, by a majority opinion, ruled that this requirement can be applied to similar monetary claims (other than loans) which exceed Birr 500 (five hundred). It thus reversed the decisions of the lower courts and relieved the respondent from the claims of the petitioner.

Petition is lodged to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court against this decision. The Cassation Division has examined the arguments of both parties in light of the issues of the case and the relevant provisions. The issue is whether the amount, i.e. Birr 4,750, which the petitioner claims to have given for the purchase of a TV and LCD can be proved by witnesses, or whether it must be proved only by providing a written contract.

The respondent did not receive the money as a loan, but under the promise that she will buy a TV and an LCD for the petitioner. In the absence of arguments by the parties which involve the issue of loan, it is a fundamental error in law to invoke Article 2472 of the Civil Code and decide that claims beyond Birr 500 cannot be proved by witnesses. We have found that the minority opinion of the Addis Ababa City Cassation Division was valid in this regard. The lower court has committed a fundamental error of law in considering the respondent’s refusal to receive summons as admission of the statement of claim, because the court should have merely ordered for a hearing in the absence of the respondent and could have ultimately arrived at a decision based on evidence submitted by the plaintiff.

Decree 1. The decisions of Addis Ababa City Cassation Division, Addis Ababa City

First Instance Court and Addis Ketema Sub-city Kebele 10/11/12 are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. An ex parte hearing does not constitute admission, and the case is referred to the social court in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it can render a decision after having examined the petitioner’s witnesses and other relevant evidence.




Ethio-Telecom -v.- G. Ginaho


Holding of the Court: Article 2024 of the Civil Code which provides for presumption of payment not claimed within two years shall not apply to telephone service bills.

Civil Code, Articles 2022, 2023, 2024(f), 2025, 2026 _____________




Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa

Petitioner: Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation

Respondent: G. Ginaho

The file is examined and we have rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case started based on the statement of claim filed at the Addis Ababa City First Instance Court by the current petitioner as plaintiff. Ethio-telecom requested that telephone bills of Birr 5,873.20 be paid by the respondent for the telephone services he obtained through phone number 200778 that was installed based on a contract dated Tir 10, 1998 EC (January 18, 2006).

The Federal Instance Court rejected the request stating that telephone bills are debts incurred every month and such debts are, in accordance with Article 2024(f) of the Civil Code, presumed to have been paid if they are not claimed within two years. The petitioner’s appeal to the Federal High Court was also rejected based on Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code. This petition is submitted against the decisions of the lower courts.

The petition states that the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent is contractual and Article 2024 [f] is not relevant to the case. The


petitioner requested that the respondent should pay the amount stated in the suit.

The major issue that needs interpretation is whether Article 2024(f) is relevant for telephone bills. It is thus necessary to carefully examine the provision.

Generally speaking, Article 2024 relates to legal presumptions. With regard to its features it must be interpreted in the context of Articles 2025 and 2026 which show that it is a legal presumption which is not feely rebuttable, but rebuttable in a limited way. Article 2024 enumerates various debts that are deemed to have been paid if they are not claimed within two years since they fell due thereby giving rise to the presumption. The provision does not specifically refer to telephone bills.

The provision that is invoked by the respondent and accepted by the lower courts is the presumption of payment stated under Article 2014(f). The provision titled ‘Presumption of payment after two years’ provides that “interest on loans and generally any sum payable annually or at shorter periodical intervals” shall be “deemed to have been paid where two years have elapsed since they fell due.”

Article 2024(f) refers to interest on loans or interest on any sum payable annually or at shorter intervals. The content and structure of Article 2024(f) indicate that the provision is applicable on interest on the loan and not on the principal loan. If the legislature had intended to make reference to the principal as well, the reading of the provisions would have been ‘loan and interest’. In this regard, this Cassation Division has, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Proclamation No. 454/2005 rendered a binding interpretation in File No. 29181 and File No. 35758. Thus Article 2024(f) applies to interest and not the principal loan. Moreover, telephone service bills are not loans and the provision is not relevant to the case.

The other provision that deals with presumption of payment is Article 2023 which provides for the presumption upon the expiry of six months. The provision specifies the circumstances in which such presumption of payment is made. Telephone service bills are not included in this provision. Nor does this case fall under Article 2022 of the Civil Code because this provision refers to a creditor who “gives receipt for a given period, without making any reservation” thereby leading to the presumption that the dues for the previous periods are deemed to have been collected. The respondent has not submitted arguments or evidence which can render this provision relevant to the case.

Telephone service bills are not loans, and they do not share characteristics of loans. The bills are paid in return to the petitioner’s services and it is based on a contract. The claim submitted by the petitioner is payment for the services


it has rendered for a certain period in accordance with the terms of the contract. The lower court’s decree does not show whether the respondent has appeared in court and submitted statement of defence. The lower court should have examined the merits of the evidence produced by the petitioner based on the contract to determine the validity of the telephone service bills, but has instead rendered a decree on the basis of a legal provision which is not relevant to the case. This constitutes a fundamental error of law because the lower courts have unduly applied Article 2024(f) for claims of telephone service bills. The court has thus rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court rendered on Miazia 7,

2002 EC (April 16, 2010), File No. 163107 and its confirmation by the Federal High Court on Hamle 22, 2002 EC (July 28, 2010), File No. 95515 are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. Unless a telephone service bill is barred by a receipt given to the respondent which refers to a later period as stipulated under Article 2022 of the Civil Code, it shall not be covered under Article 2024(f).

3. The case is remanded to the lower court in accordance to Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it can decide whether the respondent should pay Birr 5,873.20 after having examined the validity and strength of the arguments and evidence submitted to the court.

...




Birkinesh Birru -v.- Kifle Habdeta


Holding of the Court: A compromise is final and binding. It has the effect of res judicata.

Civil Code, Articles 3308(2), 3312 _____________


Miazia 2, 2000 E.C. (April 10, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Medhin Kiros, Ali Mohammed, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Birkinesh Birru (Birru Koricho’s heir)

Respondent: Kifle Habdeta

The file is examined and we have rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case was initially adjudicated by the Federal First Instance Court, File No. 00808, and the court rendered its decision on Pagumen 4, 1995 (September 9, 2003). Appeal was submitted to the Federal High Court which gave an order in File No. 26283 on Sene 10, 1998 (June 17, 2006). The petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court contends that there is fundamental error of law in the decision of the First Instance Court and the order given by the Federal High Court.

The issue in the dispute is the respondent’s claim that the petitioner should deliver the house, in Addis Ababa, Wordea 25, Keble 01, House No. 292 which the latter has sold to him for Birr 4,500 (four thousand five hundred). The petitioner argued that the case was settled by compromise on 27 Ginbot 1992 EC (June 4, 2000) and there is no legal ground for the respondent to seek delivery of the house.

The lower court decided that the petitioner has failed to return the advance payment he had taken for the sale of the house, Birr 760 (seven hundred sixty)


and the penalty payment (yegedeb mekecha) of Birr 2,000 (two thousand). It decided that he should deliver the house to the respondent. The High Court affirmed the decision stating that there is no ground of appeal.

The petitioner’s argument in the Cassation Division’s hearing is that the lower courts have set aside the compromise settlement and this constitutes a fundamental error of law. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the petitioner has not performed the obligations set forth in the compromise and stated that the decision of the lower court has no error in law.

The fact that this case was settled though compromise on June 4, 2000 is not contested by the parties. The compromise agreed upon by the parties was that the petitioner will return advance payment he received from the respondent, i.e. Birr 760 and will also pay Birr 2,000 as penalty due to the termination of the contract.

According to Article 3308(2) of the Civil Code, this compromise has the effect of extinguishing the previous contract of sale of a house. Thus, the respondent can only claim the payment of the money stated in the compromise, i.e. Birr 2,760 (two thousand seven hundred sixty) and cannot claim delivery of the house because compromise has the effect of res judicata without appeal by virtue of Article 3312 of the Civil Code. Therefore the decision of the First Instance Court which required the petitioner to deliver the house to the respondent has not taken the laws cited above into consideration and involves a fundamental error in law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court is reversed. 2. The order rendered by the Federal High Court is reversed.

...


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 5, pp. 343 – 345. Abridged translation: EN Stebek


6. Contracts related to Immovable Property

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Shiferaw Dejene et al v. Sisay Abebu

78398 2012 14 51-54

2 Alganesh Abebe v.. Gebru Eshetu & Workitu Eshetu

36887 2008 13 233-235

3 Yohannes T. v. Amarech M. 58157 2011 12 107-110

4 Meseret Bekele v.. Elza Somonella

57356 2011 12 98-100

5 Alehegn Gebrehiwot v. Etenesh Bekele et al

39803 2009 8 369-371

6 Berhane Abebe v. Markos Terfa et al

33295 2008 7 51-57

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Ch. 6: Contracts, Immovables 91

Shiferaw Dejene et al -v.- Sisay Abebu


Holding of the Court: - As between those who signed it, a written instrument shall be

conclusive evidence of the agreement therein and of the date it bears, only if the contract is made in accordance with any special form expressly prescribed by law.

- If a contract of sale of an immovable property is not registered with an authorized notary, it cannot be decided that all the terms in the agreement are incontestable by any testimony.

- If a contract is not made in accordance with the law that deals with formation of a contract and if the contract does not have a legal effect, a demand for performance in accordance with that contract is not acceptable.

Articles 1678(c), 1719(2), 1723 and 2005(1) of the Civil Code

______________


Tikimit 19, 2005 E.C. (October 29, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie, Mustefa Ahmed

Petitioners: (1) Shiferaw Dejene (2) W/ro Tsehay Tesfaye

Respondent: Sisay Abebu The court has examined the case and it has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment This case is related with contract of sale of a house made between the petitioner and the respondent. The issue relates to the price of the house and


the admissibility of the written contract as evidence showing the exact amount of the price of the house.

The case started when the current respondent (as plaintiff in the lower court) brought an action against the petitioners (defendants at the lower court). The pleading states that the current respondent and the petitioners entered into a contract of sale of a house found in Uke town on July 17, 2011. The house was in the name of the first petitioner. It was claimed that petitioners (defendants at the lower court) sold the house for Birr 20,000. However, after they took the money, as per the agreement, it is alleged that they refused to hand over the house and the documents related to the ownership of the house. The plaintiff at the lower court (current respondent) sought the performance of this contractual obligation.

The current petitioners, in their defense, argued that they sold the house mentioned in the address stated above for 40,000 Birr. They also stated that they entered into the contract of sale on July17, 2011 in which the buyer had agreed to make the payment within ten days. However, he has not made any payment. Therefore, they could not transfer the house and the documents that are related with the ownership of the house to the buyer who has not performed his obligation. They requested the plaintiff’s claim be rejected by the court and also sought payment of compensation for the expenses incurred due to the litigation.

The case was first taken to the Guto Gida First Instance Court of Eastern Wolega Eastern Zone. The court heard witnesses of both parties to identify the exact price of the house, and gave its decision on January 26, 2012, File No. 19594. The court stated that both parties have admitted that they have entered into a contract of sale on July 17, 2011. However, there is disagreement on the price of the house and whether the payment has been made by the buyer. However, there is a clear statement in the contract of sale that shows the price of the house is 20,000 Birr and that this payment has been fully paid. Article 2005(1) of the Civil Code states that a written instrument shall be conclusive evidence, as between those who signed it, of the agreement therein contained and of the date it bears. The statement contained in this written instrument can be challenged by those who signed it only by tendering an oath to the party who avails himself thereof. Therefore, the court decided that the sellers have not performed their obligation and that they should give the house and documents related to the ownership of the house to the buyer. It further decided that they should pay a fine of Birr 10,000 because they did not perform their obligation as per the agreement.

The appellate court reversed the decision with regard to the fine and affirmed the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case based on similar grounds.


The current petitioners were displeased by the decision rendered by the Eastern Zone High Court in the appeal and took the case to the region’s Supreme Court. However, the appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Then a cassation petition was submitted to the Cassation Division of the Oromia Supreme Court which decided that the decisions of the lower courts do not have fundamental error of law. Finally, the case has come to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court.

This court has examined the case. According to Article 2005 of the Civil Code, the written agreement of the parties suffices to show the agreement made between the parties. Further, it has to be examined whether the contract is made in accordance with Article 1678(c) and 1719(2) of the Civil Code. These provisions deal with formation and forms of a contract.

As per Article 1678(c) and 1719 (2) of the Civil Code, one of the special forms expressly prescribed by law is stated in Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code. In this provision, it is stated that a “contract creating or assigning rights in ownership or bare ownership on an immovable or an usufruct, servitude or mortgage of an immovable shall be in writing and registered with a court or a notary”. The requirement of the registration of the contract with a notary is meant to show the existence a contract of sale, the date of its formation, the property sold and the price thereof so that potential conflicts can be avoided.

In the case at hand, Article 2005(1) of the Civil Code which provides that a written instrument shall be conclusive evidence between those who signed it, cannot apply. When this article is read in conjunction with Articles 1678(c), 1719(2) and 1723(1), it can be observed that the provision does not invariably apply to all written agreements.

The contract of sale in this case is related with an immovable property. The contract was not entered into according to Article 1723 of the Civil Code. Had the contract been registered with a notary, the price of the house and the issue whether the payment has been made would have determined based on the terms of the contract, and it could have been decided that no evidence including the testimony of witnesses is admissible other than the contract as written evidence. However, the argument based on Article 2005(1) is not acceptable in this case.

Therefore, this court has decided that this contract of sale was not made in accordance with Article 1678(c), 1719(2) and 1723 of the Civil Code and that it does not have any legal effect. Therefore, the current respondent cannot demand for a forced performance based on this contract of sale.

However, the current petitioners, in the lower court, have argued that they sold the house for 40,000 Birr and that they do not accept the price stated by


the respondent. Therefore, if the current respondent agrees to pay the price stated by the petitioners, this decision of the court does not amount to prohibiting him from demanding the transfer of the house and the documents related to the ownership of the house. In conclusion, because of these reasons, Article 2005(1) of the Civil Code cannot apply to the contract of sale entered into by the parties, and this provision has to be read in light of other provisions that deal with sale of an immovable property. This court, thus, has found a fundamental error of law in the decision which considered the contract of sale of an immovable not registered with a notary as conclusive evidence which cannot be challenged by witnesses.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Guto Gida First Instance Court of Eastern

Wollega Eastern Zone File No. 19594 on Tir 17, 2004 E.C. (January 26, 2012), the decision of the Zone’s High Court, File No. 27455 on Yekatit 28, 2004 (March 7, 2012), the decision of the Region’s Supreme Court File No. 139094 on Megabit 11, 2004 E.C. (March 20, 2012) and the decision of the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court File No. 147416 on Megabit 18, 2004 E.C. (March 27, 2012) are varied.

2. The claim of the current respondent based on the contract of sale of a house, which was not registered with an authorized notary, is not acceptable.

3. Nevertheless, if the current respondent agrees to pay the price stated by the petitioners, this decision of the court does not amount to prohibiting him from demanding the transfer of the house and the documents related to the ownership of the house.

. . .

Concurring Opinion I, the judge listed as the third justice, agree with the decision made by majority opinion; however, I do not agree with the interpretation given by reading Article 1723(1) in conjunction with Article 2005 of the Civil Code. In my opinion, it would have been better to render the decision after having examined the educational background of the petitioners and applying Article 1728 (3) of the Civil Code.

Signatures of five justices _______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 14, pp. 51-54 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Alganesh Abebe -v.- Gebru E. & Workit E.

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 36887 (24 November 2008)

Holding of the Court - Where contracting parties admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of

an immovable, such contract binds them even if it is not registered with a court or notary.

- The interpretation of Articles 1723(1) and 2878 of the Civil Code by this Court in Cassation File No. 21448 does not include parties that admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house but argue that such contract is invalid for lack of registration.

Articles 1723(1) and 2878 of the Civil Code ______________


Hedar 15, 2001 E.C. (November 24, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Taffesse Yirga, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Alganesh Abebe

Respondents: (1) Gebru Eshetu Gebre (2) Workit Eshetu Hussen


Judgment The present petitioner was plaintiff and the present respondents were defendants when the case was initiated in South Wollo High Court. The plaintiff submitted that the defendants sold her a house of two rooms on a plot of land of 500 square metres in Kutaber Town, Kebele 01, for Birr 5,000 (five thousand). She also stated that the respondents (defendants at the lower court) have received the total price, and that they have refused to transfer ownership of the house to her. She requested the lower court to order the defendants to transfer to her both the possession and ownership of the house as well as rent arrears for 26 months at a rate of Birr 60 per month.


The defendants contested the jurisdiction of the High Court and stated that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Woreda Court. With regard to the merits of the case, they admitted that they had concluded the contract and received the price, but argued that they invalidated the contract [because it was not registered as required by the law] and further stated that the plaintiff is unwilling to take his money. Since the defendants admitted the conclusion of the contract, the Court rejected their argument and ordered them to transfer ownership title to the plaintiff and pay her rent arrears of Birr 1,500 (one thousand five hundred).

The defendants appealed to the Amhara State Supreme Court. The Court on Yekatit 5, 2000 E.C. (February 13, 2008), File No. 1051/99, held that the said contract was invalid because it did not comply with Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code since it was not registered. The Court decided that the parties should be reinstated according to Article 1815 of the Civil Code and ordered the appellants to pay Birr 5,000 (five thousand) to the present petitioner.

The petitioner submitted her petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division on Megabit 29, 2000 E.C. (April 7, 2008) stating that the decision of the Amhara Region Supreme Court has a fundamental error of law. The petitioner argued that since the defendants have admitted the conclusion of the contract of sale and the Birr 5000 that they have received as price, the interpretation of the Amhara State Supreme Court that there was no contract concluded according to Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code has fundamental error of law. She submitted that Article 1723(1) does not apply to cases where parties admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house. The respondents argued that the judgment of the lower court did not contain any error since the contract was not registered, and was merely awaiting registration.

This court has examined the issue whether parties, who admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house, can argue that such contract is invalid for lack of registration according to Article 1723(1).

The respondents have admitted the conclusion of the contract of sale of a house with the petitioner. But they argued that they invalidated the contract as it was not registered. The interpretation of Articles 1723(1) and 2878 of the Civil Code by this Court in Cassation File No. 21448 does not include parties that admit the conclusion of a contract of sale of a house but argue that such contract is invalid for lack of registration. According to Article 1723(1), the main aim of registration is to serve as evidence that a contract of sale of a house exists. Admitting the conclusion of a contract and receipt of payment and meanwhile arguing that a contract does not exist is not compatible with the aim of Article 1723. Therefore, the conclusion of the Amhara State Supreme Court in this regard involves fundamental error of law. Thus, there is a valid contract of sale of a house between the petitioner and the respondents.


Decree 1. The judgment of South Wollo High Court, File No. 013132 rendered on 11

Hamle 1999 E.C. (18 July 2007) is affirmed; the judgment of the Amhara Regional State Supreme Court is reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. Since the respondents have admitted the conclusion of the contract of sale of a house, they cannot argue that the said contract was invalid on the basis of Article 1723(1) for lack of registration. The interpretation by the Amhara State Supreme Court in this regard is incorrect. Therefore, the respondents should deliver the disputed house to the petitioner.

...


______________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Decisions Volume 13, pp. 233-235 Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali


Yohannes T. - v. - Amarech M.


Holding of the Court: - Though parties are free to determine the object of their contract,

contracts which disregard restrictions and prohibitions provided by law shall be of no effect.

- Individuals cannot create a right of ownership over state/public owned land for the benefit of another person.

Article 1716 of the Civil Code _____________


Miazia 6, 2003 E.C. (14 April 2011)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Yohannes Tadesse

Respondent: Amarech Mengesha


Judgment In the suit he filed with the First Instance Court, petitioner (who was the plaintiff at the lower court) complained that respondent, in breach of their boundary mark agreement and having obtained an unlawful certificate of possession, demolished his fence, destroyed the boundary mark, caused damage to his property and erected a new fence beyond the area she purchased from the heirs of Yirgedu Samuel – Woldeyes Ambaye et al. He then requested the court to enjoin respondent to destroy her new fence, to rebuild petitioner’s fence she had demolished, and to perform her obligations under the boundary mark agreement.

In her response to the suit, the respondent maintained that the petitioner cannot bring legal action as he has no evidence to support his right of possession; the suit should have been rejected as per Article 5 of the Civil


Procedure Code. She further maintained that she fenced the plot with a permission issued by the pertinent City Administration Office, denied causing any damage to property, and requested for dismissal of the suit.

The Court stated that the issuance as well as cancellation of a certificate of possession is, as per Proclamation No. 361/2003, the mandate of sub-cities and dismissed the petitioner’s suit on the ground that he should ask the issuing authority to cancel the certificate and should not bring the matter to the court. It also decided that the petitioner should pay Birr 10,000 (ten thousand) attorney fee to the respondent. The High Court to which the petitioner lodged an appeal affirmed the decision of the lower court and condemned the petitioner to pay Birr 6,000 (six thousand) to respondent for costs incurred during the appellate proceeding.

In his cassation petition, the petitioner stated his objection to the decisions the lower courts rendered on both the subject matter and payment of attorney fee and costs. Accordingly, the petitioner argued that although he requested performance of the contract, the court dismissed the suit misconceiving it as a request for cancellation of certificate of possession. The petitioner also challenged the propriety of the decision of the High Court condemning him to pay costs despite the fact that the First Instance Court had already condemned him to pay Birr 10,000 (ten thousand).

In her response to the cassation petition, the respondent reiterated her argument that the petitioner’s request for cancellation of an allegedly unlawful certificate should be made to the pertinent Sub-City and denied the existence of any agreement with petitioner pertaining to land and requested for dismissal of the petition. We have examined the case along the following issues:

1. Whether or not the contract is enforceable; 2. Whether or not petitioner should pay the attorney fees he is

ordered to pay by the lower courts. With regard to the first issue, the petitioner’s claim is based on an agreement he entered with respondent at Woreda 17 Kebele 14 administration office. In the agreement, the parties undertook to terminate the court case they had over their disputed boundary and agreed, instead, their boundary to run straight along petitioner’s old fence, and notified the same to the Kebele administration office.

Although contracting parties have the right to freely determine the object of their contract, it is provided under Article 1716 of the Civil Code that they should respect restrictions and prohibitions provided by law. Contracts which disregard such restrictions and prohibitions are of no effect.

In the case under consideration, the object of the disputed contract between the petitioner and the respondent is urban land. Article 40(3) of the


FDRE constitution vests the right of ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources exclusively in the state and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Hence, individuals cannot create right of ownership over state/public owned land for the benefit of another person.

The dispute between the parties pertains to urban land; hence, the petitioner should have challenged the respondent’s alleged unlawful possession of his land before the pertinent organ of the city administration in accordance with [Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter] Proclamation No. 361/2003. To exercise this right, the petitioner should have a certificate evidencing his possession over the plot allegedly taken over by respondent.

With regard to petitioner’s claim that respondent’s certificate of possession is secured unlawfully, verification of such allegations and cancellation of the certificate (in the event the allegation is proved to be right) is the mandate of the issuing authority of the City Administration; this is evident from the legal interpretation this Cassation Division gave in its decision of Tikemt 14, 2000 E.C (Cassation File No. 22719). This interpretation, according to Article 2(1) of Proclamation No. 454/2005, is binding on all courts; hence, the decision of the lower court which was given in full adherence to this binding interpretation of the Cassation Division has no fundamental error of law.

The second issue pertains to the payment of attorney fees ordered by the lower courts. Petitioner has been ordered to pay a total of Birr 16,000 attorney fee, Birr 10,000 by the First Instance Court and Birr 6,000 by the High Court.

Petitioner filed his suit with the First Instance Court on Hedar 24, 2001 E.C to which respondent submitted a reply on Megabit 04, 2001 E.C. The Court rejected petitioner’s suit on Sene 24, 2001 E.C stating that it has no material jurisdiction over the matter. It is evident that respondent’s attorney spent a relatively short time attending the case which did not involve much investigation of evidence as it was decided on material jurisdiction basis. Likewise, the High Court, following a brief hearing, affirmed the decision of the lower court invoking Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. It is evident, therefore, that respondent’s attorney cannot be deemed to have spent much time in court.

The fee respondent’s attorney is awarded by the decisions of the lower courts has been found to be higher in light of the actual professional service he has rendered. As provided under Article 2635 of the Civil Code, the court may reduce the remuneration agreed between the parties where it is so excessive as to be contrary to the etiquette of the profession of the person hiring out his work. The lower court should, in addressing the issue, have taken this and other relevant provisions of the Civil Code into account. Their failure to do so


and the resultant determination of excessive remuneration constitute a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision the First Instance Court rendered in File No.132135 on Sene

24, 2001 E.C (July 1, 2009) in which it ordered petitioner to pay Birr 10,000 in attorney fee, and the decision the High Court rendered in File No. 82975 on Nehassie 24, 2002 E.C (August 30, 2010) ordering petitioner to pay Birr 6,000 in attorney fee, have both been varied; petitioner shall therefore pay the respondent Birr 2,000 for her expenses in attorney fee.

2. The contract which the petitioners requested to be performed in not enforceable;

3. The decision of the First Instance Court which rejected the petitioner’s suit and the decision of the High Court which confirmed the same have been found to be appropriate and are thus affirmed.

…


______________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 12, pp. 107 – 110. Abridged translation: Dr. Dereje Zeleke


Meseret Bekele v. Elza Somonella


Holding of the Court

A contract of sale of an immovable is invalid unless it is signed by two witnesses despite its registration with a court or notary.

Articles 1678(c), 1719(2), 1723(1), 1727(1), 1727(2), 1729(1) and 2877 of the Civil Code

_______________


Megabit 22, 2003 E.C. (March 31, 2011)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Dagne Melaku, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Meseret Bekele

Respondent: Elza Somonella

The court has examined the case and rendered the following decision.

Judgment

The present respondent was a plaintiff and the present petitioner was a defendant when the case was initiated at the Federal First Instance Court. The plaintiff requested the lower court to invalidate a contract of sale of a house in Dire Dawa (Landholding Certificate No. 1813). The plaintiff (current respondent) stated that the defendant (current petitioner) had deceived her by claiming that she can communicate with a spirit (“Aulia”) that can cure the plaintiff’s husband who was very ill and had made her sign a contract of donation which was simulated as a contract of sale. She requested for the invalidation of the contract stating that it is unlawful, and does not fulfil the requirements of the law.


The defendant (current petitioner) argued that there was no ground for invalidation because the contract complies with the mandatory requirements including full consent of the plaintiff and registration requirements. The Court held that there was no contract since it was not attested by two witnesses as required under Article 1727(2) of the Civil Code and ordered the plaintiff to return Birr 23,000 (twenty three thousand) to the defendant. It also ordered the defendant to return the disputed house to the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant, the Federal High Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal First Instance Court.

The petitioner has submitted a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division and she argued that the contract was registered and complied with formal requirements of Articles 1723(1) and 2877 of the Civil Code as it was made in writing. She contended that the judgments invalidating the contract by invoking Article 1727(2) for lack of attestation by two witnesses contain a fundamental error of law. She submitted that the courts erred in invalidating the contract and reinstating the parties since she has invested Birr 300,000 (three hundred thousand) to improve the house.

The respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the registering authority did not witness the conclusion of the contract as it was not signed in public; She stated that the petitioner used threats by fraudulently claiming that her spirit (“Aulia”) has required the respondent to sign the contract. She argued that the fact that a contract is registered at a notary does not render the requirement of witnesses irrelevant.

In her counter-statement, the petitioner noted that the sale of the house was made on Sene 25, 1996 E.C. (July 7, 2004), i.e. more than a year after the respondent’s husband died on Tir 13, 1995 E.C. (January 21, 2003), and she argued that the issue of threats is untrue and is invoked in bad faith.

Based on the arguments of the parties, this court has examined the issue whether the decisions of the lower courts are appropriate in requiring reinstatement by holding that the contract is invalid because it is not attested by two witnesses.

One of the three requirements of a valid contract embodied in Article 1678(c) of the Civil Code is that a special form prescribed by the law be fulfilled. The petitioner and the respondent concluded a contract of sale of an immovable. Article 2877 provides that contract of sale of an immovable should be made in writing. Article 1719(2) requires contracting parties to observe a special form prescribed by law. Article 1727(1) requires signature of parties bound by a contract. When a written form is required by law, signatures of the parties alone are not sufficient to create a valid contract. Article 1727(2) provides that a written contract has no effect unless it is


attested by two witnesses, who, as per Article 1729(1), are of age and not judicially interdicted.

When the legislator required a contract of sale of an immovable to be registered with a court or notary under article 1723(1), it did not intend to leave out or replace the mandatory stipulations under Articles 1727(2) and 1729(1). It rather intended that an officer in charge ascertains that the three fundamental elements of contract provided under article 1678(c) are fulfilled. In particular, such officer should ensure compliance with the formal requirements under Article 1727. In the case at hand, since the said contract does not comply with the mandatory special forms provided under Articles 1678(c), 2877 and 1727(2), it should be invalidated. Therefore, the judgments of the lower courts do not contain error of law.

The petitioner submitted that she has made huge investment on the improvement of the disputed house. As she did not raise this issue in the lower courts, it is a new issue of fact. It does not have legal basis since it is raised contrary to Article 329(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High

Courts are affirmed. 2. The order by this Bench to stay execution of judgment (dated Meskerem 26,

2003 EC, i.e. October 6, 2010) is lifted.

...


_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 12, pp. 98-100 Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali


Alehegn Gebrehiwot - v.- Emahoy Atinesh Bekele et al


Holding of the Court A contract of donation of a house is valid although it is not made before a court or notary.

Articles 881, 882, 1723(1) and 2443 of the Civil Code ______________


Hamle 2, 2001 E.C. (July 9, 2009)



Petitioner: Alehegn Gebrehiwot

Respondents: Emahoy Atinesh Bekele and three others


Judgement The case concerns a contract of donation of a house. The petitioner had obtained judgment from the Federal First Instance Court that confirmed the donation made in his favour by the late Delelech Bekele regarding House No. 492 located in Yeka Sub-city, Keble 11.12. As heirs of the deceased, the respondents initiated the case by objecting to the judgment of the Federal First Instance Court which approved the contract of donation between the petitioner and the late Delelech Bekele. In their objection submitted (in accordance with Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code) to the court which rendered the decision of approval of the donation, the respondents argued that the judgment affected their rights and that it should be set aside since the contract of donation was not registered with a court or notary as per Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that the contract of donation was invalid as per Article 1723(1) of the Civil Code for lack of registration with a court or


notary. It stated that the contract shall be considered as a mere draft by virtue of Article 1720(2) of the Civil Code. The Court, in accordance with Article 360(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, set aside its previous decision rendered on 26 Megabit 1999 E.C. (07 April 2007) which had approved the contract of donation, and it stated that the contract is invalid. An appeal by the petitioner to the Federal High Court was cancelled based on Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined the judgments of the lower courts against Articles 2443, 881 and 882 of the Civil Code. The Federal First Instance Court held that the donation was invalid because contracts on immovable property should be registered with a court or notary as provided under Article 1723(1). According to Article 1723(1), contracts on immovable property should fulfil two requirements: it should be made in writing and it should be registered with a court or notary.

The case at hand concerns a contract of donation. A donation relating to an immovable or a right on an immovable is of no effect unless it is made in the form governing the making of a public will as per Article 2443 of the Civil Code. The form of a public will is regulated under Article 881 of the Civil Code. The contract of donation between the late Delelech Bekele and the petitioner fulfils these formalities.

Article 1723(1) requires that contract relating to immovable property should be registered with court or notary whereas Articles 2443 and 881 do not require contract of donation of immovable property to be registered. In the event of inconsistency between these provisions, it is necessary to determine the one which should prevail. Article 1723 is found under the title on Contracts in General and the chapter on Formation of Contracts. These general provisions require that any contract relating to immovable property should be registered with a court or notary. As a special law governing contract of donation of immovable property, Articles 2443 and 881 do not, however, require registration. When there is inconsistency between a general and a special law, the latter prevails over the general law.

The contract of donation concluded between the petitioner and the late Delelech Bekele was not registered with a court or notary. Such requirement is not provided under Articles 2443 and 881 of the Civil Code. Therefore, there is a fundamental error of law in the judgments of the lower courts that set aside the earlier decision of the Federal First Instance Court and held the contract of donation invalid by invoking Article 1723 of the Civil Code.


Decree 1. The judgement of the Federal First Instance Court in File No. 35057 on

Sene 10, 2000 E.C. (June 9, 2008) and the order of the Federal High Court in File No. 68860 on Hamle 10, 2000 E.C. (July 17, 2008) are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Code.

2. The contract concluded between the petitioner and the late Delelech Bekele is valid since it complies with the requirements of the law.

3. The initial decision of the Federal First Instance Court on Megabit 26, 1999 E.C. (April 7, 2007) which had approved the contract of donation should not be set aside for reasons stated above.

...


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 8, pp. 369-371 Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali


Berhane Abebe v. Markos Terfa et al


Holding of the Court Contract of mortgage is of no effect unless it is registered in the register of immovable property where the concerned immovable is situated.

Articles 1605, 1606, 1607(1), 3052 and 3053 of the Civil Code

_______________


Ginbot 21, 2000 E.C. (May 29, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Taffesse Yirga, Medhin Kiros, Ali Mohammed, Tsegaye Asmamaw

Petitioner: Berhane Abebe

Respondents: 1. Markos Terfa 2. Tsehai Menbere 3. Awash International Bank S.C. 4. Addis Ababa Administration Bureau of Works and

Urban Development


Judgement The case was initiated in the Federal First Instance Court over a house sold by the second respondent who sold the house to Shiro Gemechu in 1986 E.C.

The first respondent bought the house and obtained power of attorney authorising him to sell and transfer it. While the ownership title was in the name of the second respondent, the first respondent sold the house to the petitioner using the power of attorney. He delivered the house and title deed to the petitioner upon receipt of Birr 70,000 (seventy thousand) as price. The petitioner applied for a change of title deed to her name.


Meanwhile, the first respondent mortgaged the house to the third respondent and borrowed Birr 200,000 (two hundred thousand). The third respondent registered the mortgage with the fourth respondent. Twenty five days after the receipt of the loan, the first respondent obtained a substitute title deed and plan of the house by falsely claiming that he lost them.

The petitioner (plaintiff at the lower court) filed a suit before the Federal First Instance Court when she learned that her house was mortgaged. The third respondent argued that it has preferential right over the house since it has registered the mortgage and requested the court to transfer the ownership to it. The court rejected the petitioner’s claim of ownership and preferential rights over the house. On appeal, the Federal High Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

The petitioner argued before the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court that the judgments of the lower courts involve fundamental error of law since the mortgage executed based on false documents cannot give preferential rights to the third respondent while the latter argued that it has preferential rights according to the Civil Code. This Court examined whether the contract of mortgage under consideration was registered according to the law and gives preferential rights.

The third respondent obtained registration of the mortgage in a file opened in its name since records in the name of the second respondent were said to have been lost. There are questions that arise in this regard: How could the fourth respondent register the mortgage in the absence of records of the house? How can one ascertain that the petitioner did not apply for a change of title deed into her name?

A mortgage over immovable property is of no effect unless it is registered according to Article 3052 of the Civil Code. Such mortgage should be registered in the manner required under Article 3053(1) of Civil Code. Moreover, Title X of the Civil Code titled “Registers of Immovable Property” requires registration of mortgage to fulfil the requirements laid down under Articles 1605 and 1607.

The third respondent applied for registration in the absence of evidence that verifies the fulfilment of the requirements under Article 1606 and without evidence that must have been provided as per Article 1607(1). There was no title deed and construction plan of the house on the date the mortgage was registered. The registration was made solely based on the contract of mortgage.

The mortgage was not duly registered since it was entered in a new file opened in the name of the third respondent. The registration does not give the third respondent preferential rights better than the right held by the petitioner


who has all the documents necessary to prove her ownership of the house, and who possesses and lives in the house. Therefore, the judgments of the lower courts contain fundamental error of law.


Court are reversed. 2. The argument of Awash International Bank that it has preferential rights

better than that of the petitioner is not acceptable. 3. The ownership of the house should be transferred to the petitioner.

...


___________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 7, pp. 51-57 Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 7: Criminal law 111

7. Criminal Law

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Tesfaye T. v. Prosecutor of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission

73514 2012 14 240-244

2 Wudima A. v. Southern NNPR Public Prosecutor

66856 2012 13 296-298

3 Tesfaye A. v. Public Prosecutor 48617 2010 10 208-209

4 Fasil B. v. Oromia Regional State, Public Prosecutor

42703 2009 9 22-25

5 Jemila M. v. Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor

38161 2009 9 11-13

6 Seid Y. v. Amhara Reg. Ethics & Anti-Corr. Comm.

34077 2008 7 287-291

7 Asnake B. v. Public Prosecutor 31734 2007 7 283-286


Tesfaye T. -v.- Prosecutor of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission


Holding of the Court: - A court may give decision at any stage of the proceedings regarding the

non-retroactive application of criminal law if judges become aware that the act for which a person is charged did not constitute a crime when the act was committed.

- Courts have the obligation to make sure that the charges brought by a public prosecutor are consistent with the fundamental principles of the Constitution, the Criminal Code and human rights.

Articles 5(2) and 419 of the Criminal Code; Article 22(1) of the Constitution; and Article 15(2) of the ICCPR.

______________




Justices: Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Nigussie, Mustefa Ahmed

Petitioner: Tesfaye T.

Respondent: Prosecutor of the Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission


Judgment The case started at the Federal High Court. The petitioner was charged with contravening Article 419(1)(b) of the 2004 Criminal Code which controls the possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the official income from one’s present or past employment, without giving satisfactory explanation. The charge alleged that the petitioner worked as a civil servant at


different government offices from 2000-2004 during which he earned a monthly salary of Birr 420 (four hundred twenty) and Birr 530 (five hundred thirty). Yet, the public prosecutor alleged, he was found holding Birr 1,167,637.60 (one million one hundred sixty seven thousand six hundred thirty seven and sixty cents) in three accounts of three different local banks opened in his name, and has a car registered in his name.

The public prosecutor submitted as evidence income statements collected from the three different banks to show the amount held by the petitioner.

The petitioner pleaded not guilty and presented documentary evidence to show that the accounts the prosecutor presented as proof were used by him to save money received from selling the cement products of a legally registered company.

The Federal High Court, after examining the arguments of both parties, passed a decree which stated that the evidence adduced by the petitioner to show the legitimacy of the money saved in the different bank accounts and the car registered in his name were unreliable. The court, consequentially, found him guilty and sentenced him to two years and three months of imprisonment and imposed a fine of Birr 66,000 (sixty six thousand). In addition, it ruled for the confiscation of the car and the money kept in the bank accounts.

The petitioner appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

This petition against the Federal Supreme Court’s decision is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The petitioner argued that he was a public servant from 2000-2004, before the coming into effect of the Criminal Code invoked by the prosecutor. He contended that the retroactive application of the law contravenes Article 5 of the Criminal Code which stipulates the non-retroactive effect of criminal law. He further disputed the decision of the lower court to confiscate the car, as the car was bought in 2010 and he has proved the money used to buy the car was from a legitimate source.

The respondent contended the argument on the non-retroactive application of criminal law should have been presented as a preliminary objection at the lower court, in accordance with Article 130 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that there is no law which allows it to be presented before this court. The respondent further contended that the charge involved a continuous crime which continued during the time when the petitioner worked as a government employee. According to the prosecutor, the crime has continued during the investigation and indictment stages and argued that the petitioner’s arguments are not acceptable.


The petitioner responded that he was a civil servant before the Criminal Code came into force, and it is not thus possible for the crime to continue being committed until the time of investigation and indictment.

The issues identified by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division are: (1) whether the prosecutor’s procedural argument (in light of Article 130 of the Criminal Procedure Code) against the petitioner’s pleading of the non-retroactive applicability of the Criminal Code is valid; and (2) whether the decision of the two lower courts regarding the petitioner’s conviction under Article 419 is appropriate.

Article 130(1) allows the accused to raise preliminary objections on the form and contents of the charge, while sub-article (2), in an illustrative manner, lists down other preliminary objections that may be raised by the accused. Article 130(3) provides that these objections should be presented immediately after the accused has been required to do so by the court; or else they would be barred from being raised at a later stage in the trial. The point put forward by the petitioner as an objection is not explicitly mentioned under sub-article (2) although evidence has been adduced which proves that the petitioner was a public employee before the Criminal Code came into effect.

That criminal law should not be retroactively applied is enshrined, as a fundamental principle, under Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 5(2) of the Criminal Code. Hence, if judges find that the crime was committed before the Criminal Code came into force, they are not barred from making a determination on the matter at any time during the proceedings. This is in line with their obligation to enforce human rights as per Article 13 of the Constitution and the fundamental principles of the Constitution and Criminal Code which expressely prohibit charging an individual by retroactively applying the current Criminal Code for an act which did not constitute a crime during the time of its commission. Therefore, this court has found that the respondent’s argument in this regard is unacceptable because a court, at all levels, can decide whether Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the Criminal Code have been violated by a charge brought by the public prosecutor.

Regarding the second issue, the current Criminal Code (Proclamation No. 414/2004) of Ethiopia came into force on the May 9, 2005. The fundamental principles and details which hold public employees and officials responsible for corruption are embodied in Articles 402-419 of the Code. These provisions are applicable on perpetrators who hold public office after the effective date of the Code. Article 5(2) of the Criminal Code states that an act declared to be a crime under the Code but not under the repealed law and committed prior to the coming into effect of this Code is not punishable.


The respondent has clearly indicated on the charge it has brought before the lower court that the petitioner was a public servant from 2000 to 2004. The charge shows that the petitioner was not a public employee when the Criminal Code became effective. The defendant has charged the petitioner alleging that he was a public servant before the coming into force of the Criminal Code (May 9, 2005), and during the time he was investigated in 2009, for holding large amounts of money in three different bank accounts and owning a car the value of which are not commensurate with his salary as a public employee.

Article 22 of the Constitution stipulates “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed on any person than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed”. Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Ethiopia is a party also states that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law, at the time which the criminal offence was committed”.

Since the petitioner was a public employee before the current Criminal Code became effective, the criminal law regime that was applicable is the 1957 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia and the 1982 Revised Special Penal Code of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (Proclamation No. 214/1982). The contents of the crime found under Article 419 of the current Criminal Code dealing with possession of unexplained property are not declared to be a crime in these criminal laws that were in force during the time when the petitioner was a public servant.

The petitioner was not a public employee when the 2004 Criminal Code came into force and he was engaged in conducting his own personal business before the current Criminal Code came into force on May 9, 2005. Therefore charging him under Article 419 of the Criminal Code is contrary to Article 22 of the Constitution, Article 15(2) of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the Criminal Code, and violates the right of the petitioner.

The decisions of the High Court and Supreme Court which held the petitioner guilty of violating Article 419 of the Criminal Code for possessing money and property that could not be explained in the light of the salary he earned during his years of public employment, consequently involve fundamental error of law. The Division has thus reversed the decisions of the lower and appellate courts in accordance with Article 195(2)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code and has decided to acquit the petitioner.


Decree 1. The conviction and penalty imposed by the decisions of the Federal High

Court and Federal Supreme Court are reversed. 2. The petitioner is acquitted unless he is imprisoned for another offence. 3. As the petitioner is acquitted on all charges, the fine stated in the decisions

of the lower and appellate courts, the confiscation of the money found in bank and confiscation of the car are also reversed.


_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp. 240 – 244. Abridged translation: Tewodros Dawit


Wudima A. -v.- Southern NNPR1 Public Prosecutor


Holding of the Court: The accused have pursued their criminal activity of robbery to the end but there was no vehicle to be robbed. Their act on its own shows that they had reached the point of no return in their pursuits of committing robbery which makes them liable for attempted robbery.

Articles 27(1), 32(1)(a), and 671(1) of the Criminal Code

_____________


Megabit 26, 2004 E.C. (April 4, 2012)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Nigussie

Petitioner: Wudima A.

Respondent: Southern NNPR Public Prosecutor

The court has rendered the following judgement.

Judgment

The issue in this case is the determination of the stage at which an act can be considered as criminal attempt.

On Megabit 7 and 8, 2001 E.C., (March 16 and 17, 2009) in the Gurage Zone SNNPR, the petitioner and the co-offenders were in possession of [a pistol], masks, battery torch and knife. They waited for vehicles at night with the intention of robbery. Vehicles did not appear during the evening. As they were getting back to their village they were arrested based on the information 1 Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State


obtained and charged with attempt for aggravated robbery. The petitioner has contested the commission of the act and has pleaded not guilty.

The evidence is based on witnesses and the statements of the defendants made to the police and then to court in accordance with Articles 27 and 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to one witness, information was obtained from a driver about a planned robbery, but no evidence was obtained. Searches were made on passengers and three persons were found without ID cards. They said that they are engaged in construction work, and that they are going back to their village because there was shortage of instruments in their work place. When they were searched, a [pistol], a knife and mask were discovered. They had admitted during police investigation about their planned robbery.

The lower court had examined the defence submitted by the defendants and convicted the first and second defendants. The petitioner was sentenced to 22 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The petitioner was previously sentenced to 10 years for homicide and released on parole. The petitioner’s appeal has not been accepted by the Region’s appellate court, and the present petition which invokes fundamental error in law is submitted to this Cassation Division.

The issue that is involved in this case is whether the act of the defendants constitutes criminal attempt.

According to Article 27 of the Criminal Code, whosoever intentionally begins to commit a crime shall be guilty of criminal attempt even if he “does not pursue or is unable to pursue his criminal activity to its end”, or even if he does not achieve “the result necessary for the completion of the crime” after having pursued his criminal activity.

The facts indicate that the defendants had gone to the forest where robbery was usually being committed; information was obtained and they were arrested while travelling in public transport. During the search they were found to be in possession of [a pistol], a knife and a mask. During their statements, they admitted the commission of the offence and that they passed a night in the forest after arranging the necessary weapons for robbery, were waiting for vehicles to be robbed during the night but no vehicle appeared, and that they were arrested on their way back with all the weapons under their possession in the course their preparation for robbery.

The petitioner and the co-offenders thus pursued the criminal activity of robbery to the end but there was no vehicle to be robbed. In other words, the act committed by the petitioner and his co-offenders on its own shows that they had reached the point of no return in their pursuits of committing robbery. Therefore, the decision of the lower court has duly considered all these points


in accordance with the provisions stated in the charge, and there is no error of law committed by the court.

Decree The decision of SNPPR Supreme Court under Cassation File Number 33619 on Yekatit 12, 2002 E.C (February 19, 2010) is affirmed in accordance with Article 195(2)(b)(ii) of the [Criminal] Procedure Code. ...




Tesfaye A. -v.- Public Prosecutor

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 48617 (June 25, 2010)

Holding of the Court: Courts cannot increase or reduce punishment unless the issue is raised in the course of litigation.

Article 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code

_____________ Cassation File No. 48617

Sene 18, 2002 E.C. (June 25, 2010)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie

Petitioner: Tesfaye A.

Respondent: Public Prosecutor

The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgement.

Judgment The case started at the Hawassa Court of First Instance. The current respondent was the plaintiff in the lower court. The petitioner was charged with wilful bodily injury in violation of Article 555(b) of the Criminal Code against his wife on a date not specifically known in the month of Meskerem 2001 Ethiopian Calendar (September 2008) in the evening between 8 to 9 pm. He is accused of hitting the victim with closed fist punches and causing physical injury. The accused pleaded not guilty.

The public prosecutor submitted evidence based on the testimony witnesses and documents. The petitioner also submitted witnesses to show that the victim’s loss of teeth is attributable to other reasons. However, the lower court held that the witnesses have not been able to disprove the public prosecutor’s evidence and it convicted the petitioner for grave wilful injury and sentenced


him with two years of rigorous imprisonment or a fine of Birr 500 (five hundred).

The public prosecutor lodged an appeal stating that the lower court has, after convicting the accused of grave wilful injury, imposed a sentence of fine as an alternative which is not stated in the provision under which the accused is convicted. The appellate court increased the sentence to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The petition made to the Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court was not accepted, and the petitioner has further submitted this petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division.

The petition dated Hamle 9, 2001 (July 16, 2009) states that the decision of the lower court involves fundamental error of law. The petitioner invokes negligence as the mental condition in which the act was committed, and argues that the High Court raised the sentence to five years of rigorous imprisonment without a request by the public prosecutor to that effect. The petitioner requested the decision to be reversed or to be released on probation (gedeb). The public prosecutor has submitted its response on Tahsas 26, 2002 E.C. (January 4, 2010).

The petitioner was convicted under Article 555(b) of the Criminal Code. The provision imposes a sentence which may extend up to fifteen years of rigorous imprisonment or with a minimum of one year of simple imprisonment. The High Court did not state that it opted to impose simple imprisonment. Nor did it state whether it has changed its decision of simple imprisonment to fine [to mitigate the sentence in accordance with Article 179 of the Criminal Code].

The public prosecutor’s appeal clearly contested the imposition of fine as an alternative punishment. Moreover, its reply to this petition merely requests for the imposition of the appropriate punishment and has not raised an argument that it had requested for increase in the sentence of imprisonment. The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has thus observed that the public prosecutor only protested against the alternative imposition of fine in lieu of imprisonment.

In criminal cases, appeal is lodged based on Article 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-article 2(d) of the provision requires an appeal to clearly state a request on whether the sentence should be reduced or raised where the issue of sentence is contested. Therefore there is no legal procedure which allows increase in punishment unless it is requested. If a court does so, it amounts to rendering judgement on an issue that has not been raised. The lower courts have committed fundamental error of law in having raised the sentence from two years to five years in the absence of the public prosecutor’s


request for the increase of the sentence beyond two years. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Hawassa High Court and SNNP Supreme Court and

the decree rendered by the SNNP Supreme Court Cassation Bench are amended.

2. The decision rendered by Hawassa First Instance Court is amended. 3. The sentence to be imposed on the petitioner shall be two years of rigorous

imprisonment. ...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 10, Ser. No. 80, pp. 208 – 209. Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Fasil B. -v.- Oromia Region Public Prosecutor


Holding of the Court: In the absence of awareness about and disregard to the harm, or where a driver could not or should not have foreseen the result, the harm that is caused by force majeure or accident is not punishable under the criminal law.

Articles 57(2), 59, 543 (3) of the 2004 Criminal Code ______________


Hamle 22, 2001 E.C. (July 29, 2009)


Justices: Menberetshehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Belachew Anshiso, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Fasil B.

Respondent: Oromia Region Public Prosecutor

Judgement The petitioner was charged with negligent homicide against two victims who were passengers in an Isuzu minibus. According to the charge, the victims died when the vehicle overturned as a result of the petitioner’s negligent driving in violation of Article 543 (3) of the 2004 Criminal Code. It occurred on Yekatit 8, 2000 E.C. (February 16, 2008), around 9 am on the Jimma-Addis Ababa road, Jimma Zone, Sokuru Woreda, Betiro Qumbi Kebele.

The Jimma Zone High Court heard three prosecution witnesses, a traffic police map, a technical investigation report about the vehicle, and two defence witnesses.

The prosecution witnesses testified that the vehicle overturned at a curve on the Jimma-Addis Ababa Road. According to the first prosecution witness, the accused was driving at a moderate speed while the second witness stated that he could not assess the speed. The third witness said that the accused was driving with a speed and arrived at a curve with the same speed as a result of


which the vehicle overturned. Defence witnesses, who were also passengers, explained that an ox and a herd man unexpectedly entered the road and the defendant turned the wheels to save them, due to which it slipped and overturned causing the death of two passengers. One of the defence witnesses stated that it was a reasonable speed while the second said that the speed was between 50 to 60 kilometres per hour.

The Jimma High Court stated that the driver could not save the herd man and the ox that unexpectedly entered the road because he was driving at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour at a curve, and that the victims died as a result. It held that the defendant has violated Article 543(3) of the Criminal Code and convicted him of negligent homicide. The defendant was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Birr 10,000 (ten thousand).

The defendant appealed to Oromia Supreme Court which affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Birr 5,000 (five thousand). Cassation petition was lodged to the Cassation Division of the Oromia Regional State which, by a majority opinion, held that there is no error of law in the conviction and the sentence.

The arguments raised by the petitioner at the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is that the incidence is an accident that happened while he was trying to save the herd man and the ox that unexpectedly got into his way. He argued that the victims should be considered as having died due to accident and not due to his negligence. He further argued that Article 543(3) should apply to pedestrians hit by a vehicle and not to passengers. Both parties have also made oral arguments on the issue whether the act of the petitioner constitutes negligence.

The Cassation Division has examined the arguments of both sides including the oral arguments and has related them with the law. It has analyzed whether the conditions stated in Article 543(3) are fulfilled.

The fact that the vehicle overturned and the victims died as a result is established. The issue of driving at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour is also considered and the unexpected darting of a herd man and an ox into the road are taken into account. It is also proved that the vehicle did not have technical problems at the time. We need to relate these facts with the law under which the petitioner is convicted.

According to Article 57(2) “[n]o one can be convicted under criminal law for an act penalized by the law if it was performed or occurred without there being any guilt on his part, or was caused by force majeure, or occurred by accident”. This shows that for a person to be held criminally liable, the public prosecutor should prove that the act is committed with criminal intention or


criminal negligence. One cannot be held criminally liable unless the criminal guilt of the accused is proved, or if the accused proves that the act was caused by force majeure or by accident. For the case under consideration, the issue whether the petitioner was negligent is determined under Article 59 of the Criminal Code. Article 59(1) of the Criminal Code provides:

A person is deemed to have committed a criminal act negligently where he acts: (a) by imprudence or in disregard of the possible consequences of his act

while he was aware that his act will cause illegal and punishable consequences; or

(b) by a criminal lack of foresight or without consideration while he should or could have been aware that his act may cause illegal and punishable consequences.

According to this provision, criminal negligence is said to have been committed where the accused is aware of the possible harm and pursues his act by disregarding possible consequences believing that it will not occur [Art. 59(1)(a)], or where he acts without foreseeing or considering the possible harm while he should or could have been aware of the possible harm [Art. 59(1)(b)]. The mental condition of the accused with regard to the relationship between his act and the harm should be proved for conviction under negligence. According to Article 59(1(b) [para 2], this is determined by taking into account the level of the accused person’s age, circumstances, experience, education, occupation and social position.

The petitioner contends that the conditions that constitute negligence are not fulfilled while the public prosecutor argues otherwise. The judgment of Jimma Zone High Court which assumed first instance jurisdiction over the case does not show analysis of the facts and the evidence submitted to it on the basis of the elements or conditions that constitute criminal negligence.

The statement made by one of the witnesses that the petitioner was driving at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometres per hour is not expert testimony but a statement of [a passenger] in the vehicle whose estimation can be erroneous. This cannot thus be considered as reliable evidence in a court of law.

Even if the vehicle was at a speed of 50 to 6o kilometres per hour, it was at the Jimma-Addis Ababa road where such a speed does not constitute fault. No evidence is submitted about the speed limit for the place where the accident occurred. No technical defect of the car is proved that would have required the petitioner to drive at a speed limit below 60 kms per hour. Therefore no evidence has been submitted that proves the driver’s failure to exercise the proper care and prudence before the vehicle overturned.


The petitioner could not turn to the right side because there was a gorge. Nor did he want to kill the herd man and the ox, and rightly so. The driver had no option but to swerve to the left. Rather, the petitioner would have committed a grave offence had he ran over the person in front of the vehicle without attempting to save him. The question that arises in the determination of negligence is whether the driver was aware [as envisaged under Art. 59(1)(a)] that this act would cause the overturning of the vehicle and the death of the victims. If this issue is answered in the negative, the second question would be whether he should or could have been aware that the option he has taken could cause the death of the victims [as stipulated under Art. 59(1)(b)].

The public prosecutor has not submitted evidence that proves the existence of these conditions. Swerving to the left or the right in order to save life does not usually overturn a vehicle. Therefore the petitioner could not be aware of the possibility that the vehicle would overturn. Therefore the event was caused by accident which resulted from the unexpected entry of the herd man and an ox into the road and not by the negligent act of the petitioner. Causing another person’s death is punishable. However, criminal guilt, i.e. criminal intention or negligence should be proved.

The lower courts have not examined the distinction between criminal negligence and accident. We have thus found that the decisions of Jimma Zone High Court, Oromia Supreme Court and Oromia Supreme Court’s Cassaation Division should be reversed.

Decree 1. The decisions of Jimma Zone High Court (File No. 10769 on Tikimt 18,

2001 E.C. /October 28, 2008), Oromia Supreme Court (File No. 71726 on Tikimt 26, 2001 E.C. /05 November 2008) and Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Division (File No. 70164) are reversed.

2. The petitioner is acquitted of the charge filed under Article 543(3) of the Criminal Code.


_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 9, pp. 22 –25 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Jemila M. -v.- Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38161 (February 26, 2009)

Holding of the Court: A crime is deemed to be committed when its legal, material and moral elements are cumulatively present. The petitioners did not generally exercise authority which they do not possess or which they may not lawfully exercise.

Unlawful enforcement of right: Articles 23(2), 32(1)(a) and 436(c) of the Criminal Code

______________





Petitioner: Jemila M. et al

Respondent: Federal First Instance Public Prosecutor


Judgment The cassation petition dated Ginbot 26, 2000 EC (June 3, 2008) submits that there is a fundamental error of law in the decision rendered by the lower court.

The case started at the Federal First Instance Court. The current petitioners were charged with unlawful enforcement of right under Article 32(1)(a) and 436[a] of the Criminal Code. Mohammed H. was deported from Ethiopia in 1998 (during the Ethio-Eritrean War) after which Zerfe Tilahun who was working as his maid kept the house for him. On Hamle 21, 1997 EC (July 28, 2005), the petitioners took out the possessions of Zerfe from the house and put them in the compound [thereby taking possession of the house].


The lower court found the petitioners guilty of violating the provision cited in the charge by stating that they have not disproved the charge and evidence against them. A fine of Birr 800 (eight hundred) was imposed on the current petitioners. The petitioners appealed to the Federal High Court which examined the case; it changed the provision under which they were punished, but affirmed the payment of fine.

The petition is lodged against the decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court.

The petition states that the act of the petitioners does not fulfil the elements of the provision under which they are found guilty. The respondent on the other hand contends that the act of the petitioners satisfies the elements of the offence and that the conviction should be affirmed.

The issue examined by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is whether the act of the petitioners fulfils the elements of the offence?

The provisions under which the petitioners were convicted at the Federal First Instance Court are Articles 32(1)(a) and 436[a] of the Criminal Code. The Federal High Court confirmed the punishment after finding them guilty under a different sub-article of the same provision, i.e. Article 436(c)

According to Article 436(c) of the Criminal Code a person is said to have arbitrarily exercised a right which “he does not possess or which he may not lawfully exercise”.

In the case at hand, it is proved that Zerfe was in charge of keeping the house [in her capacity as the former maid of the owner], and that the first petitioner is the daughter of the owner of the house while the second petitioner was present during the act because he has power of attorney from the first petitioner. The first petitioner did not generally exercise an authority which she does not possess or which she may not lawfully exercise because she has rights over the house.

By virtue of Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code an offence is said to be committed when all its legal, material and moral ingredients are present. In the case under consideration, however, the constitutive elements of the provision under which the petitioners are found guilty are not fulfilled. The lower courts have committed a fundamental error in law in their decisions because they have not taken into account the elements of Articles 23(2) and 436(c) of the Criminal Code. We have thus rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court, File No. 35370 rendered

on Tir 21, 2000 E.C. (January 30, 2008) and the decision of the Federal


High Court, File No. 64237 rendered on Megabit 25, 2000 E.C. (April 3, 2008) are reversed in accordance with Article 195(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

2. The act of the petitioners does not constitute an offence.

...


____________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 9, p. 11-13 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Seid Y. -v.- Amhara Region Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission


Holding of the Court: The law which is more favourable to the accused than the one in force at the time of the commission of the crime shall be applicable, and the issue of bail shall be determined based on the sentence which can likely be imposed according to the new Criminal Code.

Articles 5, 6, 23 and 407 of the 2004 Criminal Code; Article 22(2) of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution; Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence

Proclamation No. 434/2005; Special Criminal Code Proclamation No. 214/1982

_____________ Cassation File No. 34077

Megabit 9, 2000 E.C. (March 18, 2008)


Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga

Petitioner: Seid Y.

Respondent: Amhara Regional State Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission

The following judgement is rendered.

Judgement The case started at the Southern Wollo Zone High Court. The petitioner was charged with three counts under the Special Criminal Code, Proclamation No. Proclamation No. 214/1982 which was in force when the act was committed. [A general provision in the Criminal Code, i.e.,] Article 23 of the 2004 Criminal Code was also cited in the charge.


The petitioner submitted preliminary objections contending that the charge should be based on the 2004 Criminal Code rather than the Special Criminal Code, Proclamation No. 214/1982 because the latter is repealed by the new Criminal Code. He requested for the revision of the charge on the ground that the new Code should be retroactively applied to his benefit.

The public prosecutor invoked Article 5(1) of the Criminal Code and argued that the trial of the act which was committed prior to the coming into force of the current code should be conducted under the repealed law.

After examining the arguments of both parties, the Southern Wollo Zone High Court passed a decree which stated that the law that existed when the act was committed is repealed and substituted by the new Criminal Code. The court held that the relevant provision is Article 407(1) of the 2004 Criminal Code because it imposes lesser sentence on the accused, and that the public prosecutor should revise the charge accordingly because the new Code applies retroactively for the benefit of the accused. The court further noted that this provision does not deny the right to bail and allowed the defendant to be released on bail bond of Birr 5,000 (five thousand) during the trial.

The public prosecutor appealed to the Amhara Region Supreme Court. The court examined the arguments of both parties and decided that although Article 6 of the Criminal Code allows courts to apply the provisions of the new Code if they are more favourable to the accused, this only applies at the stage of conviction and sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed the decree of the High Court which allowed release on bail and required the revision of the charge. It decided that the defendant (the current petitioner) should stay in custody during the trial.

This petition against the Amhara Region Supreme Court’s decision is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The Division has examined the arguments of both parties and the validity of the interpretation given to Article 6 of the Criminal Code by the Amhara Region Supreme Court.

The issue that needs analysis is whether the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail. It is not contested that the act stated in the charge was committed before the coming into force of the 2004 Criminal Code. Accordingly, the charge should be based on the law that was in force during the commission of the act as stipulated under Article 5 of the Criminal Code.

On the other hand, the new Criminal Code has repealed the law that was in force during the commission of the offence and this includes the provisions that deal with corruption which are now stipulated under Articles 407 ff.

Moreover, the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence [Proclamation No. 434/2005] provides that release on bail can be


allowed where the sentence of imprisonment that can be imposed is less than ten years.

The principle of legality requires that the petitioner be charged based on the law that he was aware of and that was in force during the commission of the act. Even if, the repealed law, in principle, is not currently in force, the charge should be made based on the repealed law the accused is aware of. This is what is reflected in Article 5 of the 2004 Criminal Code.

If the accused is to be charged under the repealed law, he should also be convicted on the same law. On the other hand, Article 6 of the Criminal Code and Article 22[2] of the Constitution provide for an exception and allow the retroactive application of the Code if it advantageous to the accused.

According to the Amhara Region Supreme Court, the exception of retroactive application should be applicable only for the purpose of sentencing after the decision of conviction is made based on the repealed law. It has accordingly rejected the petitioner’s release on bail because the Criminal Code shall not be applicable during the trial. In principle, no charge should be made based on a repealed law, however exceptions may warrant it because the repealed law was in force during the commission of the act and because the accused is deemed to have been aware of it. According to the inference that can be drawn from this, the purpose of applying the repealed law is to facilitate the defence of the accused during the trial, and it would not have any other purpose because the sentence is ultimately determined in accordance with the new law.

The issue whether the accused can be released on bail should be determined based on the prospective sentencing threshold that will apply if he is convicted. Even if the petitioner is charged based on a legal provision which denies release on bail, it can be noted that this law is solely used for the purpose of facilitating the trial, and thus the issue of bail should be determined in light of the sentence which can likely be imposed.

As long as the law that applies for the purpose of sentencing is the new law, failure to release the accused on bail is inconsistent with the intention of the legislature and obstructs the attainment of the objectives and purpose of the law.

As the prospective punishment in this case is expected to be based on Article 407(1) of the 2004 Criminal Code and because the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation [No. 434/2005] allows bail for cases that are punishable with less than ten years of imprisonment, the Cassation Division has found that the decision of Southern Wollo Zone High Court in granting bail was appropriate although it should not have required the charge to be revised and be framed under the 2004 Criminal


Code. The decision of the Amhara Region Supreme Court is found to have committed an error of law in reversing the decree of the lower court that had allowed bail.

Decree 1. The decision of the Amhara Region Supreme Court, File No. 285/99,

rendered on Tikimt 4, 2000 E.C. (October 15, 2007) is reversed because it has fundamental error in law.

2. The decree of the South Wollo High Court, File No.14168 (Yekatit 9, 1999 E.C, i.e. February 16, 2007 ) which granted release on bail to the petitioner is affirmed. The South Wollo High Court shall conduct the trial while the petitioner is released in bail.

...


_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 7, p. 287-291 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Asnake B. -v.- Public Prosecutor


Holding of the Court: There should be a strong ground that justifies the denial of release on bail by invoking the unlikelihood of the appearance of the accused to the trial.

Article 67(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code; Article 19(6) of the Constitution




Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Mesfin Equbeyonas, Hirut Mellese, Teshager G/Selassie, Taffesse Yirga

Petitioner: Asnake B.

Respondent: Public Prosecutor

We have examined the case and rendered the following judgement.

Judgement The case started at SNNPR Sidama Zone High Court which passed a decree that did not accept the petitioner’s request to be released on bail. He had appealed to the SNNPR Supreme Court but the court affirmed the High Court’s decision. The petitioner submits that that there is a fundamental error of law in the decisions.

The petitioner is charged with three counts of a criminal charge based on Articles 13(2), 14(2) and 17(2) of the Special Criminal Code [Proclamation No. 214/1982]. He submitted his request to be released on bail, but the public prosecutor contended that the accused has a passport and a visa and his appearance for the trial is unlikely if he is released on bail. The Sidama Zone High Court accepted the request of the public prosecutor and denied bail to the petitioner by invoking Article 67(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The SNNPR Supreme Court also confirmed the High Court’s decree regarding bail.


The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the arguments of both parties. The principle of the right to be released on bail is enshrined in Article 19(6) of the Constitution which further stipulates that courts can deny bail under the exceptional circumstances expressly stated in the law. The right to be released on bail is thus the principle, while its denial is an exception.

In the case under consideration, the denial of bail is not attributed to the nature of the offence, but is rather based on the assumption that the petitioner might not comply with the conditions of the bail bond. Where it is unlikely that the applicant would comply with the conditions of the bail bond, the application for bail shall not be allowed as stated under Article [67(a)] of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Even if bail can, according to the Criminal Procedure Code, be denied on the assumption of the applicant’s unlikely compliance with the conditions of the bail bond, there should be adequate ground to arrive at this assumption. Such ‘assumption’ should have restricted scope so that it does not lead to the denial of bail to persons whom the legislature had intended to allow bail. Thus the provision must be narrowly interpreted so that the law can achieve its objectives and purpose and in such a manner that the right would not be curtailed as a result of such interpretation.

The assumption of the Sidama Zone High Court and the SNNPR Supreme court that the accused may leave the country (in light of the gravity of the counts he is charged with) is based on the petitioner’s passport and visa. These factors can be taken into consideration in relation with the potential for the petitioner’s noncompliance to the conditions of the bail bond; however, there can be measures which can be taken so that the petitioner does not leave the country. The reasons for the denial of bail are not thus justified.

Order 1. The decree and order rendered by the Sidama Zone High Court, File No.

09054, on June18, 2007 and SNNPR Supreme Court, File No. 18698 on July 3, 2007 denying the petitioner’s release on bail are reversed.

2. We have hereby decided that the petitioner be released with a bail bond of Birr 100,000 by producing a guarantor or depositing the amount in court.


___________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 7, p. 283-286 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


8. Customs and Taxes

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 TeshoAB PLC v. Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority

71070 2012 14 175-177

2 Habesha Cultural Centre v. ERCA

74753 2011 13 514-516

3 Abebe G. v. Arada Sub-city Revenue Office

69921 2012 13 521-524

4 Akaki Adventist Missionary School v. Akaki-Kaliti Sub-city Woreda 01 Administration Revenues Office

66474 2011 13 506-510

5 ERCA v. Ato Adera Seid et.al 57100 2011 11 347-349

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 8: Customs & taxes 137

TeshoAb PLC -v.- Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 71070 (October 1, 2012)

Holdings of the Court: - If customs duties and taxes are overcharged as a result of incorrect

commodity classification, tariff setting, valuation or other calculation mistakes, reimbursement claims shall be considered only if such claims are submitted within six months after the goods are imported or exported upon completion of customs formalities.

- Customs formalities are considered to be completed from the time an importer takes out the imported goods from customs warehouse after fulfilling the necessary formalities.

Articles 2(17), 66(1) and 66(2) of Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009

______________


Meskerem 21, 2005 E.C (October 1, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: TeshoAb PLC

Respondent: Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority


Judgment This case is brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court challenging the decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court.

The current petitioner in the pleading it submitted to the Federal First Instance Court (as plaintiff) stated that it paid to the defendant (current respondent) the tax and customs duty necessary for the importation of 93 bundles of reinforcing steel bars (ferro) from Turkey, which were to be imported in two phases. In the first round, the petitioner received 36 bundles of reinforcing steel bars on Tir 28, 2001 E.C (February 5, 2009), and in the


second round it received 54 bundles on Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9, 2009). Out of the total of 93 bundles, three were confirmed to be missing as shown in a letter written on Nehassie 21, 2001 E.C (August 27, 2009). Their value was reimbursed to the petitioner by an insurance company. On Meskerem 30, 2002 E.C (October 10, 2009), the respondent requested that the declaration be sent out for verification and on Tikimt 11, 2002 E.C (October 21, 2009) the petitioner claimed to have received proof of the verification from the respondent.

Based on this, the petitioner brought a suit for the reimbursement of Birr 273,503.92 (two hundred seventy three thousand five hundred three birr and ninety two cents), which it claimed to have mistakenly paid overcharge. The respondent, in its defence, inter alia, argued that the suit is barred by a period of limitation as it was brought six months after the goods were imported into the country and the petitioner received them after the completion of the necessary customs formalities.

The Federal First Instance Court decided that the suit is barred by a period of limitation contending that the petitioner did not bring the suit within six months from the date it received the second round bundles of reinforcing steel bars on Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9, 2009). The Federal High Court to which the petitioner submitted an appeal from the decision of the First Instance Court dismissed the appeal based on Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

In a petition dated Hamle 12, 2003 E.C (July 19, 2011), the petitioner requested the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court for the reversal of the decisions of the lower courts arguing that the six months period of limitation has not passed as the customs formalities are considered completed starting from Tikimt 11, 2002 (October 21, 2009), the date on which a declaration was sent out for verification.

In the statement of defence it submitted on Meskerem 22, 2004 E.C. (October 3, 2011), the respondent argued that the custom formalities are considered to be completed starting from Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9, 2009), the date on which the goods were released and the petitioner received them. It thus contended that the decision of the lower courts does not have a fundamental error of law as the petitioner brought the suit after the lapse of period of limitation.

In addition to the written arguments of the parties, the Cassation Division heard oral arguments of the parties on Miazia 22, 2004 E.C (April 30, 2012). It then examined the issue whether the decision of the lower courts was correct in declaring that the suit is barred by a period of limitation.


This court noted that according to Article 66(1) of Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009, reimbursement claims shall be granted if duties and taxes are overcharged as a result of incorrect commodity classification, tariff setting, valuation or other calculation mistakes. However, according to Article 66(2), such claim for reimbursement of duties and taxes shall be considered only if it is submitted within six months after the goods are imported or exported upon completion of customs formalities.

In order to determine the period of limitation, the Cassation Division, looked into the definition of ‘customs formalities’ under Article 2(17) of Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009. This provision defines customs formalities as “any customs operations carried out in connection with importation, exportation and transit of goods from the time of arrival at the customs port until released from customs control”. The Cassation Division then noted from Articles 66(2) and Articles 2(17) of the Proclamation that these provisions stipulate as a fundamental matter the date on which the goods are imported into or exported out of the country after the completion of the customs formalities.

According to Articles 66(2) and 2(17) of Proclamation No. 622/2009, the customs formalities for the goods (on which a claim of overcharge is brought) are considered as completed, from the time the petitioner took them out of the customs warehouse. The bundles of reinforcing steel bars were taken out of the customs warehouse on Yekatit 2, 2001 E.C (February 9, 2009) after the completion of the necessary formalities. Accordingly, the Cassation Division has observed that the petitioner should have claimed for reimbursement within 6 months from this date and this court has rejected the petition because it is not in line with the content, spirit and objective of Articles 66(2) and 2(17) of Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009. The decisions of the lower courts which barred the request of the petitioner by a period of limitation do not have a fundamental error of law. Accordingly, the following decree is rendered.

Decree The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court are affirmed. ...


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp. 175 – 177. Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey


Habesha Cultural Centre and Art Gallery P.L.C et al -v.- Federal Revenue and Customs Authority Prosecutor


Holding of the Court: - Payers of Value Added Tax are required to use cash register machine in

the operation of the business activity stated on the business license. - The business licence of the petitioners is related to the sale of cultural

products and paintings, and the public announcement that referred to business activities related to gold and silver ornaments does not expressly include the business activity of the petitioners thereby rendering it difficult to prove the presence legal and moral elements of the offence.

Article 55 of VAT Proclamation No. 285/2002; Article 50(d)(2) of VAT (Amendment) Proclamation No. 609/2008; Article 5(1)(b) of Obligatory Use of Sales Register Machines Regulation No.

139/2007; Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code.

______________


Tahsas 17, 2004 E.C. (December 27, 2011)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Nigussie

Petitioners: 1. Habesha Cultural Centre and Paint Gallery P.L.C 2. Ato Bedru Muzeyuin 3. W/t Meskerem Chala

Respondent: Federal Revenue and Customs Authority Prosecutor


Judgment The case concerns a criminal litigation raised in relation to Value Added Tax and it started at the Federal First Instance Court where the current respondent


was the plaintiff and brought a charge against the current petitioners. The content of the charge was the following: - In contravention of Article 50(d)(2) of Proclamation No. 609/2008 (which

amended Proclamation No. 285/2002), and despite its obligation to use receipts generated by cash register machines for all business transactions, the first petitioner sold a necklace for Birr 93.15 (ninety three birr and fifteen cents), through the third respondent, who is employee of the company, using a receipt not generated by a cash register machine.

- The second respondent, in contravention of Article 50(d)(2) of Value Added Tax Proclamation No. 609/2008 (which amended Proclamation No. 285/2002), and in breach of his duty as the manager of the company of the first respondent, let transactions be made without a cash register machine, disregarding the obligation of the first respondent to do so.

- The third respondent, while working as a salesperson in the company, sold the 8.1 gram necklace, in contravention of Article 55 of the VAT Proclamation, with receipt not generated by a cash register machine.

The current respondents, admitting the act of selling the item mentioned by using a receipt not generated by a cash register machine, argued that they are not guilty of the crime stated in the charge. The prosecutor then brought evidence, and the current petitioners subsequently defended their case by bringing witnesses and other documents as evidence. The Federal First Instance Court decided that the petitioners could not disprove the evidence brought against them. It then found them criminally liable stating that: - the business license that is being litigated upon concerns the business of

the petitioners; - the public announcement made on Tikimt 01, 2002 E.C. (October 11,

2019) concerns traders of gold and silver ornaments; - even though the petitioners have not bought a cash register machine, it was

substantively proven that the transaction carried out on the date stated in the charge was done with a receipt not generated by a cash register machine.

The second and third petitioners were sentenced to three months imprisonment, and a fine of Birr 7,000 was imposed on the first petitioner. The petitioners lodged an appeal from the decision of the Federal First Instance Court. However, the Federal High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence.

The petitioners filed a petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court contending that the public announcement made on Tikimt 1, 2002 E.C (October 11, 2009) does not apply to them, as it concerns business


license holders who undertake business activities related to gold and silver ornaments, and not holders of business license for the sale of cultural artefacts and paintings. The respondent on the other hand argued that, even though the business license of the petitioners is for the sale of cultural products, their company is engaged in the sale of ornaments and gold. The respondent thus contended that the public announcement made on Tikimt 1, 2002 E.C (October 11, 2009) applies to the petitioners.

The Cassation Division has examined the issues whether the decision of the lower courts is appropriate in finding the petitioners liable and whether the act alleged to have been committed by them in contravention of the law was proven by the respondent. It then examined the case in light of the relevant laws and the substantive issues proven in the lower courts by the prosecutor.

According to Article 23(2) of Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, a person shall be criminally liable when the legal, material and moral elements of the crime under consideration are cumulatively fulfilled. The petitioners are charged for having transacted with a receipt not generated by a cash register machine despite their obligation to do so. In this regard, the relevant law alleged to have been contravened is Article 5(1) (b) of the Council of Minister’s Regulation No. 139/2007, which states that the vendor should use the machine exclusively in the operation of the business covered by the permit. This provision also stipulates that, a time-table which shows the starting date of the obligation for the different categories of tax payers will be publicly announced. It can also be discerned from the content of the provision that the tax payers who are required to use the cash register machine will be notified of the specific areas of business as well, at the time they are informed of their obligation to use the cash register machine.

In the case at hand, the petitioners are held criminally liable by applying the public announcement made on Tikimt 1, 2002 (October 11, 2009) regarding gold and silver ornaments. However, their business license shows that they are licensed to undertake business related to the sale of cultural products and paintings. Thus, the Cassation Division has inferred from the contents and spirit of Article 5(1(b)) of Regulation No. 139/2007 as well as Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code that, the public announcement does not apply to the business activity of the petitioners.

Moreover, considering the fact that the petitioners conducted the sale with a receipt not generated by the cash register machine, the Cassation Division has found that the mental element of the petitioners should be seen in light of how the act was undertaken. This court has thus concluded that the act does not fulfil the moral element requirements of Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code. In the absence of the legal and moral elements, the Cassation Division


found that the decision of the lower courts in holding the petitioners criminally liable has a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The conviction of the petitioners by the Federal First Instance Court and

the sentence thereof in File No. 169689 on Sene 20, 2003 E.C (June 27, 2011), and on Sene 24, 2003 (July 1, 2011) , and the decision of the Federal High Court in File No. 105743 on Hidar 20, 2004 (November 30, 2011) are reversed.

2. The petitioners are not criminally liable as the elements stated in Article 23(2) of the Criminal Code are not cumulatively fulfilled.

Order The petitioners shall be released unless they are required to serve a sentence for another criminal act.




Abebe G/Egziabher -v.- Arada Sub-city Revenue Office Prosecutor Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 69921 (January 11, 2012)

Holding of the Court: If no records and books of accounts are maintained by the taxpayer, or if, for any reason, the records and books of accounts are unacceptable to the tax authority, the latter may assess the tax by estimation.

Articles 69(1) and 71 of Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 _______________

Cassation File No. 69921 Tir 2, 2004 E.C (January 11, 2012)


Petitioners: Abebe G/Egziabher

Respondent: Arada Sub City Revenue Office Prosecutor


Judgment This case which invokes fundamental error of law is brought to the Cassation Division against the decisions of the Addis Ababa City Administration Tax Appeal Commission, the Addis Ababa City Administration Appellate Court and the Cassation Division of the Addis Ababa City Administration Appellate Court,

In the 2000 E.C fiscal year (i.e., July 2007 – June 2008), the petitioner paid Birr 83,507.02 (eighty three thousand five hundred seven birr and two cents) as business income tax, after submitting books of account which show gross profit of Birr 472,594.89 (four hundred seventy two thousand five hundred ninety four birr and eighty nine cents). The respondent, confirmed from the books of account submitted by the petitioner that the gross income obtained is Birr 5,647,298.90 (five million six hundred forty seven thousand two hundred ninety eight birr and ninety cents), and gave the latter a tax assessment notice for the payment of Birr 303,610.71 (three hundred three


thousand six hundred ten birr and seventy one cents). The respondent argued that, according to the study and checklist prepared by the Addis Ababa City Administration Revenue office, the business of importing stationery that the petitioner is engaged in, generates 15% (fifteen percent) gross profit from the time the goods are brought in after having gone through customs clearance formalities.

The petitioner then brought an appeal to the Addis Ababa Tax Appeal Commission challenging the tax assessment notice given by the respondent. The Commission confirmed the decision given by the respondent. Subsequently, the petitioner brought an appeal to the appellate division and then to the Cassation Bench of the Ababa City Administration Appellate Court, but it was not accepted.

The petitioner then submitted a petition dated Sene 10, 2003 E.C (June 17, 2011) to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court and requested for the reversal of the decision arguing that the books of account submitted were accepted by the respondent and do not involve under-invoicing, and thus the tax decision which is based on a presumed profit from the business of importing stationery has a fundamental error of law. The respondent on the other hand, in a response it submitted on Tikimt 14, 2004 E.C (October 25, 2011) argued that it only corrected minor errors on the books of account submitted by the petitioner as per the provisions of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002, and thus the decision does not have a fundamental error of law.

The Cassation Division has examined the issue whether requiring the petitioner to pay additional tax based on a guideline and checklist previously prepared would be appropriate. According to Article 69(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002, if no records and books of account are maintained by the taxpayer, or if, for any reason, the records and books of account are unacceptable to the tax authority, or if the taxpayer fails to declare his or its income within the time prescribed by this proclamation, the tax authority may assess the tax by estimation.

The Cassation Division then noted that the respondent has acknowledged the receipt of the books of account which show that Birr 5,647,298.90 Birr was reported by the petitioner as gross annual income. It also noted that the correction of minor calculation errors is based on a study and a directive previously issued. This shows that the profit declared by the petitioner for the year under consideration was smaller than the amount of profit presumed to have been obtained.

The tax assessment that requires the petitioner to pay an additional income tax after partially accepting and correcting the books of account, is not thus


contradictory to the basic content, spirit and objective of Article 71 of Proclamation No. 286/2002, which allows the respondent to totally reject the books of account and fix the amount of tax by estimation if it finds enough reason for not accepting the books of account submitted by the petitioner. This court has further noted that, the stipulation of Article 69 does not restrict the respondent from correcting errors committed in accounting, when the books of account submitted by the petitioner are only partially acceptable, having partial error of calculation.

The Cassation Division has found that correcting the gross profit acquired by the petitioner through a tax assessment notice and requiring him to pay an additional income tax based on the directive and the checklist issued to decide on a gross profit is based on Article 69 of Proclamation No. 286/2002. This does not thus constitute a fundamental error of law.

Decree The decisions rendered by the Addis Ababa City Administration Tax Appeal Commission, the Appellate Court of Addis Ababa City Administration and the Cassation Division of the Appellate Court are affirmed.

...




Akaki Adventist School -v.- Akaki-Kaliti Sub-City Woreda 01 Administration Revenues Office


Holding of the Court: - Akaki Adventist School is an entity separate from the Ethiopian Seventh

Day International Adventist Church; it is not a religious institution designated for prayers but is rather an institution that offers educational services.

- Proclamation No. 80/1976 allows exemption of land rent and house taxes to buildings intended for prayer services and their compounds; it does not invariably apply to all buildings and business entities owned by religious institutions.

- The petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the school is an institution that operates to provide education services without deriving profits and it has not proved that the school has been operating differently from other schools established for profit.

Proclamation No. 80/1976;

Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Code.

_____________





Petitioner: Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist International Church, Akaki Missionary School

Respondent: Akaki-Kaliti Sub-City Woreda 01 Administration Revenues Office Public Prosecutor



Judgment

The case was presented to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division by the petitioner who brought a cassation petition stating that the decisions passed by the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance, Appellate and Cassation benches contain fundamental error of law. The case concerns the application and enforcement of urban land rent and houses tax. The litigation began when the Akaki-Kaliti Sub-City Woreda 01 Administration Revenues Office filed a case at the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance Court for the enforcement of its tax decision. The suit stated that the petitioner owed unpaid taxes of Birr 734,110.20 (seven hundred thirty four thousand one hundred ten birr and twenty cents) for the years between 1968 and 1992 E.C. and that the Office has given the school a Tax Assessment Notification.

The petitioner argued that it should be exempted from paying urban land rent and house tax because it is a charitable organization. The trial court rejected this argument and after the decision was confirmed by both the Appellate and Cassation benches of the Addis Ababa City Administration, the case was brought before the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court which in turn remanded the case back to the trial court for it to properly investigate and decide on whether the applicant is a charitable organization or a company established for profit.

As per the instructions given by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench in Cassation File Number 42319 on Tir 18, 2002 (January 26, 2010), the trial court directed the issue to be investigated by the Charities and Societies Agency. The trial court also looked into the following facts: that the applicant charges its students monthly, annual as well as registration fees; that it grows various vegetables for sale, and derives income from poultry, dairy products, flour mill services, a retail shop and the sale of soft drinks. It concluded that the school could have been profitable had it not been for its poor administration and therefore does not meet the criteria to qualify as a charitable organization. It decided that the school should pay Birr 611,798.20 (six hundred eleven thousand seven hundred ninety eight birr and twenty cents) to the current respondent.

Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner brought an appeal to the Addis Ababa Appellate Court and then submitted a cassation petition to the Addis Ababa Cassation Bench. Both rejected the claim.

In its petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division dated Megabit 9, 2002 (March 18, 2010), the petitioner claimed that Akaki Adventist Mission School is not an entity with a separate legal personality since it was not established through a business license issued from the relevant authority as per Article 5 of the Commercial Code. Therefore, it argued that


the decision that requires the school to pay tax contains a fundamental error of law since the organization is exempt from tax as per Article 14 of Proclamation No. 80/1976. Moreover, the petitioner stated that the courts were wrong in overlooking the preliminary objection regarding period of limitation raised by the School and allowing the execution proceeding to continue when it was brought after 24 years contrary to Article 384(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. It further noted that the trial court failed to properly investigate the issue as directed by this Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench; and that the courts erred in basing their decision on the evidence presented by the Charities and Societies Agency while it did not have the authority to give such evidence. Therefore, the petitioner contended that the decisions of the lower courts which oblige it to pay tax contain a fundamental error of law because the institution is a religious entity.

The respondent stated that Akaki Adventist School is an entity separate from the Ethiopian Seventh Day International Adventist Church and not a religious institution. The School, obtains a permit from the Ministry of Education and enrols more than 2000 students charging them school fees for the education services it provides that are relatively high. It holds an area of 129,051 square meters allocated to it by the Works and Urban Development Office through a lease contract. The school uses the land under its possession to produce various products and conducts business deriving a lot of revenue in addition to school fees from students. The respondent also argued that the school is not a charitable organization as has been ascertained by the Addis Ababa Finance and Economic Development Office. The school is located far from the Seventh Day Adventist Church and it is not meant for prayers but is rather an institution that offers education services with a permit obtained from the appropriate governmental office and carrying out other trade activities.

In its counter-response, the petitioner stated that the school’s professional license does not make it a separate entity; and that it is rather established under the church which was not established for profit. The petitioner also contended that there is a prayer house in the school compound. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that since the tax arrears in question have been due for more than ten years, they are barred by period of limitation.

Given this background and the written pleadings of the parties, we have looked into the case and investigated the issue of whether the decisions given by the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance, Appellate and Supreme courts ordering the applicant to comply with the decision of the respondent contain fundamental error of law.

In order to decide on the issue, we found it relevant to first look into the appropriateness of the legal provision on which the petitioner has based its submission.


The petitioner claims that it should not pay urban land rent and house tax basing itself on Article 14 of Proclamation No. 80/1976- a proclamation enacted to enforce urban land rent and house tax payments. This provision titled ‘Exemption from Rent and Tax’, exempts the following from paying these taxes:

a) public roads, squares, recreation and sport centers, and cemeteries; b) place of worship , nonprofit-making private schools, hospitals,

charitable institutions; c) governmental institutions drawing their budgets from the central

treasury; d) dwelling houses whose annual return value is less than 300 Birr.

Proclamation No. 80/1976 exempts buildings intended for prayer services and their compounds from land rent and house taxes. The provision does not, however, apply to all buildings and business entities owned by religious institutions as can be seen from Article 14(b) that reads “prayer houses and their compounds”. Although it was claimed that the Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist Church established Akaki Adventist School for non-profit purposes, the petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proving that the school is an institution that operates to provide education services without deriving profits. On the contrary, as the judgment of the trial court clearly shows, the respondent has proved that using the recognition and permit given to it from the Ministry of Education, the school has enrolled more than 2,000 (two thousand) students charging them fees no less than the amount required in private schools established for profit. The petitioner is also engaged in business activities.

Proclamation No. 80/1976 must be interpreted and applied in conformity with Article 49 of the FDRE Constitution and the mandate given to the City Administration under the Addis Ababa City Charter. Charitable organizations in Addis Ababa that are established for non-profit purposes carry out charitable activities after having concluded agreements with the Addis Ababa Finance and Economic Development Office while the Akaki Adventist School has not entered into such agreement as ascertained in writing and recorded in the trial court’s judgment. Proclamation No. 80/1976 must be read together with Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009. The latter proclamation establishes the Charities and Societies Agency and contains detailed provisions on the registration, and regulation of the operations of charities and societies. Accordingly, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court found that it was right for the trial court to request the Agency for information on whether the school is currently registered as a charity.

The respondent has proved that the applicant charges its students fees, derives income from other profitable activities and that it is not entitled to exemption under Article 14(b) of Proclamation No. 80/1976. The petitioner


(Akaki Adventist School) has only shown that it is owned by the Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist Church and that it does not have a separate legal personality. But it failed to prove that the school has been operating any differently from other schools established for profit.

While the school is carrying out its task of shaping the next generation with the recognition and permit received from the Ministry of Education and holds an area of 129,051 square meters in its possession under its own name (as proved by the title deed from the City Administration), the argument of the petitioner that it does not have a separate legal personality (but is rather under the Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist Church) and should be exempt from taxes, is not supported by the content, spirit and purpose of Article 14(b) of Proclamation No. 80/1976 nor by the current constitutional structure. We have hence rejected it. Accordingly, we have found that the decisions of the lower courts requiring the Akaki Adventist School to pay land rent and house taxes were correct and do not contain a fundamental error of law.

The second question to be addressed is the amount of land rent and house taxes that should be paid by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that part of the amount requested by the respondent was barred by period of limitation and the trial court, accepting this objection, had reduced the amount to that period not affected by period of limitation.

The petitioner had relied on Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Code to raise period of limitation as a ground of objection. This provision, however, only provides for a period of limitation during execution of judgment. Since the respondent has applied for execution proceedings before the lapse of 10 years from the date of the assessment notification submitted to the applicant, we have found that this provision is not applicable.

Article 8 of Proclamation No. 80/1976 stipulates that an institution or individual who has the obligation to pay land rent and house taxes is required to do so until Yekatit 30 annually based on the rates stated in the Proclamation and Legal Notice No. 36/1976. Article 16 of Proclamation No. 80/1976 states that whoever fails to meet the deadline for these taxes shall pay a fine of 5% of the monthly rent or tax, subject to the condition that the penalty shall not exceed 50% of the principal payment. Seen in light of the content, spirit and purpose of these provisions, the contention of the petitioner that the payment of these taxes was barred by period of limitation is found to be without a legal basis and has not been accepted.

To sum up, the argument presented by the petitioner is without legal basis and support. The decision of Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance Court was duly confirmed by the City Administration Appellate and Cassation Benches all of which do not contain a fundamental error of law.


Decree 1. The decisions of Addis Ababa Administration First Instance Court,

Appellate Court and the city’s Cassation Division are affirmed. 2. The stay of execution ordered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation

Division is lifted. ….

Signature of five judges

_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 506-510 Abridged Translation: Hanna Araya


Ethiopian Income and Revenue Authority Jimma Branch office - v.- Adale S. & Phromisis PLC



The tax authority has preferential claim over the property of a tax debtor unless the property was initially held as security.

Article 80(1) of Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002; Article 78(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002.

_______________


Ginbot 30, 2003 E.C (June 8, 2011)


Petitioner: Ethiopian Income and Revenue Authority Jimma Branch

Office

Respondents: 1. Adale Seid 2. Phromisis Private Limited Company


Judgment The case relates to the preferential creditor claim submitted by the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs authority which started at Jimma Zone High Court, Oromia Regional State. The current first respondent sued the current second respondent and became judgment creditor for the latter. The clinic owned by the second respondent was offered for auction. Following the absence of buyers after two auctions, the judgment creditor (first respondent) requested to receive the property. The current petitioner intervened on Tikimit 9, 2002 EC (October 19, 2010) stating that it has a preferential claim guaranteed according to Article 80(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 because the


judgment-debtor (the current second respondent) owes the petitioner tax payments of Birr 508,564.67 (Five hundred eight thousand five hundred sixty four birr and sixty seven cents). The Zonal High Court rejected the petitioner’s claim stating that according to Article 78(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002, such preferential claims apply only where the property is not subject to an attachment or if it not held as security. The current petitioner lodged an appeal to the region’s Supreme Court which confirmed the decision of the lower court in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner has further lodged this petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division.

In a petition dated Sene 8, 2002 EC (June 16, 2011), the petitioner invoked preferential claim embodied in Article 80(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002 next to secured claims of creditors (banks). The petitioner argued that the decisions rendered by the lower courts involve fundamental error of law as they were based on Article 78(1) which is not relevant to the issue at hand because it relates to the recovery of property from third parties.

The respondents submitted their responses on Tahsas 20, 2003 E.C. (December 29, 2010). The first respondent stated that the petitioner cannot claim preferential rights because its request was submitted late, after he was already appointed to temporarily administer the property. The second respondent also requested the decisions of the lower courts to be reversed.

Based on Article 80(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the issue whether the petitioner has preferential claim over property held by another creditor. The court has observed that the first respondent is the creditor of the second respondent and that his share from the latter (Phromisis PLC) is not contested. On the other hand, in the judgment execution suit brought by the first respondent against second respondent, the fact that the property in question is not given as security is not contested. Article 80(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 provides the following:

From the date on which tax becomes due and payable under this Proclamation, subject to the prior secured claims of creditors, the Authority has a preferential claim over all other claims upon the assets of the person liable to pay the tax until the tax is paid.

As can be clearly understood from this provision, claims can precede that of the petitioner’s only if the property was initially held as security.

With regard to the applicability of Article 78(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002 to the issue at hand, this court has found that, although this provision is not directly relevant to the issue at hand, it stipulates the procedures to be followed by the tax authority during enforcement of seizure. Generally, the preferential claim brought by the petitioner should have been decided in


accordance with Article 80(1) of Proclamation No. 286/2002, and not on the basis of another provision in the proclamation that is not relevant to the issue. Jimma Zone High Court has thus committed fundamental error of law and the appellate court has done the same in affirming the decision. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1. The decisions of Jimma Zone High court, File No. 10/86 dated Tikimt 18,

2002 E.C. (October 28, 2010) and Oromia Region Supreme Court, File No. 89407 rendered on Tir 9, 2002 E.C (January 17, 2011) are reversed.

2. The petitioner has preferential claim over the first respondent in accordance with Article 80(1) of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002.

…


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 348-350 Abridged translation: Seble G. Baraki


9. Family law

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Dereje M. v. Frehiwot P. 74451 2013 14 160-162

2 Yeromwork et al v. Asegid 54827 2011 11 129-131

3 Gebreselassie Amare -v.- Abrehet Techane

46608 2010 11 6-7

4 Seniya v. Belaynesh & Sherif 43988 2007 11 107-109

5 Poster v. Veno & Leitiya 44101 2010 10 44-47

6 Fantanesh et al v. Molla 42682 2009 10 8-9

7 Zenebetch v. Birkinesh 42648 2009 10 21-22

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 9: Family law 157

Dereje M. –v.- Frehiwot P. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 74451 (October 30, 2012)

Holding of the Court: Men and women should be treated equally during dissolution of marriage and any common property shall be divided equally. This includes a condominium house.

Article 35 of the Constitution; Articles 72, 102 and 103 of Proclamation No. 75/96 EC on the Family

Law of the SNNPR; Article 2 of Proclamation 454/2005; The decision of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court File

No. 51893 rendered on 15 July 2010. _______________

Cassation File No. 74451 Tikimt 20, 2005 E.C. (October 30, 2012)


Petitioner: Dereje M. Respondent: Frehiwot P.

The case was examined and the following judgment was rendered.

Judgment The case came to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court because the petitioner submitted a petition stating that the decisions made by the Hawasa First Instance Court and the Hawasa High Court have fundamental error of law and he requested for the decisions to be reversed. The issue is related with division of common property in marriage.

The case started with the request of the respondent to share the common property after their marriage was terminated by divorce. The respondent listed 63 items of property and requested to take her share. One of the items listed was a condominium house acquired during marriage. The condominium house was in her name and they both have paid half of the instalment to bank. She then requested for the house to be given to her after she fully pays the remaining amount, as it cannot be sold and divided.


The petitioner on the other side argued that the house is common property, and the rights and debts thereof should be shared. He requested for the house to be rented so that the debt owed to the bank can be paid off while the house remains shared property. The lower court decided that the amount spent for paying half of the instalment, furnishing and building the partition should be calculated, after which the respondent should pay the petitioner half of this amount and keep the house to herself. The petitioner was displeased with this decision and appealed to the Hawasa City High Court. The High Court heard the arguments of both sides and confirmed the decision of the lower court. The petitioner, then, submitted a petition to the Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court. However, the court did not accept the petition.

The petitioner then submitted his petition on November 22, 2011 to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. He stated that the condominium house was acquired during marriage, a fact proven by the lower court. Thus, as it is part of common property, he argued that the issue should have been addressed in accordance with Family Law. He contended that the decision of the lower courts has a fundamental error of law.

The respondent, on March 7, 2012, submitted her response stating that a condominium house cannot be sold nor exchanged. Moreover, the decision should be seen in light of Article 35 of the Constitution and the efforts of the government to empower women. Thus, she argued that the decisions of the lower courts have no fundamental error of law.

The issue that should be examined is whether the decision of the lower courts that entitles the respondent to pay half of the expenses incurred and keep the house is appropriate. The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has observed that the respondent got the house in her name while she was married to the petitioner. The lower court has also proved that half of the instalment that should be made for the house, furnishing expenses and the cost incurred for building the partition were taken from the income and common property of the couple while they were married. From this, it can be concluded that, as per Article 72 of Proclamation No. 75/96 EC of the Family Law of the SNNPR, the condominium is part of their common property.

It is imperative to see how the rights and responsibilities in the context of common property are to be shared when marriage is dissolved by divorce. Sub-Articles 1 and 2 of Article 35 of the Constitution state that women shall, in the enjoyment of rights and protections provided by the Constitution, have equal rights with men and that they shall have equal rights with men in marriage. When the argument of the respondent is seen in light of this provision, this court has found no legal ground for her request for a special privilege to take the condominium house when the common property is divided.


The condominium house, like any other common property, shall be divided based on the agreement of the husband and wife. If they cannot reach an agreement and if the property can be divided in kind, they shall divide it accordingly. However, if neither of these two options can be effected, the house shall be sold through auction and the debt of the bank shall be paid off. Then, the couple can divide the remaining money. The decision is in conformity with the decree that this same Cassation Division of the Supreme Court had rendered in File No. 51893, on July 15, 2010.

The decisions of the lower court for which entitled the respondent to pay half the expenses and keep the condominium house to herself do not follow the spirit and objective of the contents of Articles 72, 102 and 103 of Proclamation No. 75/96 EC on the Family Law of the SNNPR. Moreover, these decisions do not go in line with the decision of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court in File No. 51893 rendered on July 15, 2010. This decision is binding in the interpretation of the principle enshrined in Article 35(1) of the Constitution regarding equal treatment of men and women which includes equality during the dissolution of marriage.

This court has found that the decisions of Hawasa City First Instance Court, Hawassa City High Court and the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court are not in line with the above mentioned provisions and the decision of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division in File No. 51893. They are also inconsistent with Article 2 of Proclamation No. 454/2005. Thus, they have a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Hawassa City First Instance Court, the Hawassa City

High Court and the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme made regarding the Condominium House are reversed.

2. The condominium house is part of common property. It shall be divided between them equally if the petitioner and the respondent can reach an agreement regarding the condominium and on how the remaining debt of the bank shall be paid. However, if they cannot reach an agreement, they can divide the house in kind. They should share the debt of the bank and make the payment. If neither of these two options can be effected, this court has decided that the house shall be sold at auction and the couple can divide the money that remains after their bank loan is paid.

… Signatures of five justices

_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 14. pp 160-162 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Yeromwork T. et al - v.- Asegid S. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 54827 (April 29, 2011)

Holding of the court: - Property of the child which can be sold by the curator (tutor) is only

movable property, shares and transferable securities; - The curator (tutor) is not empowered to sell immovable property

belonging to a minor; - Contract of sale of an immobile property entered into by the curator

(tutor) of a minor is a voidable. Art. [1266] of the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia; Art. 294 of the Family Code of Oromia Regional State, Proc. No 69/1995.

______________

Mizia 21, 2003 E.C (April 29, 2011) Cassation File No. 54827

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices : Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Yeromwork Tesfaye, in her own name and on behalf her wards: Elsi Tesfaye, Fasil Tesfaye and Dereje Tesfaye

Respondent: Asegid Shenegelegn

We have examined the file and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case started at the High Court of South Shewa Zone. The respondent (a plaintiff at the High Court) requested that the defendant should make delivery of the house sold to him and transfer its title of ownership. The defendant (current petitioner) responded that because there was no valid contract, she would not be compelled to perform the contract. The court examined the case, found in favour of the defendant and ordered the reinstatement of the parties to the position they had before the conclusion of the contract.

The respondent lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court of Oromia Region. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court and decided that the petitioner should perform the contract. Although cassation petition was presented to the Cassation Bench of the Supreme Court of Oromia Region, the Bench dismissed the petition. This petition is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division against the decision of the Cassation Bench


of the Oromia Supreme Court. Following this petition filed on Miazia 7, 2002 E.C, (April 15, 2010) we have summoned the respondent and heard the case.

As indicated in the suit, Elsi, Fasil and Dereje did not attain the age of majority when the suit was instituted and they were represented by their tutor (curator). The respondent claimed that he concluded a contract of sale with the tutor (curator) and the children.

The issue that should be framed is whether the contract has legal effect. The petitioners (defendants in the suit) can only be compelled to perform the contract where it is possible to say that the contract has legal effect. At the time of the conclusion of the contract, Elsi, Fasil and Dereje were 12, 14 and 10 years of age respectively.

This means that the contract of sale of the house was entered into by their tutor (curator). Because the house is the joint property of the petitioners, it could be sold only when the consent of all is obtained as stipulated in Art. [1266] of the Civil Code. However, most of the joint owners of the house did not attain the age of majority at the time of the conclusion of the contract of sale. Hence, it is appropriate to take into account the protection accorded by the law to minors.

Chapter 12 of the Oromia Region Family Code, Proclamation No. 69/1995 EC (as amended by Oromia Regional State Proclamation No. 83/1996 EC contains provisions that deal with minors. As stipulated under Article 294 of this Proclamation, property of the child which can be sold by the tutor (mogzit) is only movable property, shares and transferable securities. The tutor (mogzit) is not thus empowered to sell an immovable property that belongs to a minor. Hence, the contract of sale of the house cannot be enforceable.

Decree 1. The decision of Oromia Supreme Court rendered under File No. 31454 on

January 26, 2010 and the order of the Cassation Bench of Oromia Supreme Court made on April 7, 2010 under File No. 100903 are reversed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The contract of sale of the house concluded on May 13, 2001 is not enforceable. The decision of West Shewa Zone rendered under File No. 16777 on Hidar 3, 2001 E.C (November 12, 2008) is affirmed.

… Signature of five justices

_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 129-131 Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


Gebreselassie A. - v. - Abrehet T.


Holding of the court: The fact that one of the spouses was registered for a condominium house before the conclusion of marriage does not make the house the personal property of such spouse so long as he/she gets the house during marriage; such house is the common property of the spouses.

Article 62 of the Revised Family Code of the FDRE. _______________

Tikimt 2, 2003 E.C (October 12, 2010) Cassation file, No. 46608


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Berhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Gebreselassie A. Respondent: Abrehet T.

Having examined the file, we have rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case involves division of common property of spouses. In her statement of claim, the respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) stated that the marriage that she had with the petitioner was dissolved by divorce and claimed the partition of a one room-house constructed during marriage, household utensils and a condominium house located in Nifas Silk-Lafto Sub-city, site 2, block No. 29, house No. B29/48. The petitioner (defendant at the lower court), in his statement of defence, argued that the one-room house was constructed before the conclusion of the marriage. He also argued that he got the condominium house after the dissolution of the marriage by agreement on Tahsas 18, 1999 E.C. (December 27, 2006). The Federal First Instance Court found that the afore-mentioned one-room house was the personal property of the petitioner; so were the household utensils. However, the court decided that the condominium house was common property and the parties have equal rights and obligations on this house. The petitioner was aggrieved by the decision of


the Federal First Instance Court and lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court, having heard the arguments of both sides, confirmed the decision of the lower court.

In a cassation petition filed on Sene 8, 2001 E.C (June 15, 2009), the petitioner stated that he was registered to get a condominium house before he married the respondent, and that their marriage was dissolved on Hidar 23, 1999 E.C (December 2, 2006) by mutual consent. He argued that he was registered for condominium before the conclusion of the marriage and he won the lot after the marriage was dissolved by mutual agreement, and claimed that the condominium house is his personal property. He thus contended that the decisions of the lower courts have fundamental error of law in declaring that the condominium house is common property.

The respondent, on her part, argued that she left the conjugal home not because their marriage was dissolved by their mutual agreement but because of the repeated beating inflicted against her by her husband. She further stated that the condominium house is common property because they got it house before the dissolution of the marriage and the 10% advance payment was made from common property,

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the file. It was proved in the lower courts that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was dissolved on Megabit 24, 2000 E.C. (April 2, 2008) and the spouses got the condominium house before the dissolution of their marriage. Although the petitioner argued that he was registered for condominium before the conclusion of the marriage, the condominium house could not be his personal property as he got the house during marriage. Therefore, the petitioner’s argument does not have legal basis in light of Article 62 (1) of the Revised Family Code. Moreover, we have observed in the decisions of the lower courts that there is due recognition to the respective equal rights and obligations of the petitioner and the respondent with regard to the house. Therefore, we have found no fundamental error of law in the decisions of the lower courts, and we have confirmed the decisions of the lower courts pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

Decree Decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court are affirmed. …

Signatures of five justices ________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 6-7 Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


Seniya– v.- Belaynesh & Sherif

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 43988 (October 4, 2007) Holding of the court

If a spouse deserts the conjugal home before the marriage is legally dissolved, such spouse cannot benefit from the presumption of common property where it is proved that the other spouse acquired the property during the separation period. The spouse who did not make any contribution cannot be entitled to take a share from such property.

Article 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution; Article 33 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia; Art. 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution

______________

Cassation File No. 43988 Meskerem 24, 2000 E.C (October 4, 2007)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Seniya Sh. T. Respondents: 1. Belaynesh M. 2. Sherif A.

Having examined the file, we have made the following judgment.

Judgment The case involves partition of common property whereby a husband married to two wives divorced one of his wives. The litigation commenced when the first respondent (Belaynesh) brought suit against the second respondent (Sherif) in Guraghe Zone, Mesqan Woreda Court. The first respondent claimed that she and the second respondent constructed a one room-house roofed with corrugated iron sheet and they had land close to one hectare. Hence, she requested the division of their common property. In his statement of defense,


the second respondent stated that he and the first respondent got married in 1988 E.C and lived together up to 1990 E.C. Then she left the conjugal home, and in 1994 E.C she declared that she had another marital relationship, thereby dissolving the marriage that existed between them. He also added that they did not have common property. He stated that the property alleged to be common by the first respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) was acquired with the present petitioner (Seniya).

The present petitioner, another wife of the plaintiff, intervened in the proceeding and claimed that the property under litigation was acquired by her and the second respondent. Guraghe Zone Mesqan Woreda Court decided that the rural land was the common property of the petitioner (Seniya) and the second respondent while the house belonged to the two respondents. The petitioner was aggrieved by the decision of the court regarding the house and lodged her appeal to all levels of the courts of the region; but her claims were not accepted.

The present petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division was made to get the decision of the lower courts reversed. This court has examined whether the lower of courts are correct in deciding that the house is common property of the respondents. This Cassation Bench has investigated the matter on the basis of the arguments of both sides, the decision of the lower courts and in light of the pertinent provisions of the law.

The petitioner and the second respondent got married in 1980 E.C and are still in marital relation. The first respondent and the second respondent got married in 1988 E.C and lived together up to 1990 E.C. Then the first respondent deserted her husband up to 1994 E.C and petitioned for divorce as a result of which the marriage was dissolved.

Regarding land located in Enseno Town, a house with thatched roof was demolished and the house under litigation was constructed by the petitioner and the second respondent. The lower court decided that the petitioner was not entitled to the share of the house under litigation by stating that she did not prove the circumstance and the time of her possession of the land on which the house was constructed.

According to the content and spirit of Article 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, a plaintiff is entitled to institute a suit only when he is able to show that he has vested interest. The obligation to show vested interest is borne by the plaintiff, not by the defendant. In the case under consideration, although it was proved that the first and the second respondents had marital relationship, it has not been proven that the house was constructed by these respondents. Rather it was proved that the house was constructed by the petitioner and the second respondent. Most importantly, the decision of the lower court demonstrates


that the first respondent and the second respondent were married in 1988 E.C and separated since 1990 E.C. The house under litigation was constructed after they had separated.

There is the legal presumption that property acquired before the dissolution of marriage pursuant to the law is common property of the spouses. However, when a spouse deserts conjugal life before the marriage is legally dissolved, such spouse cannot benefit from the presumption of common property where it is proved that the other spouse acquired the property during the period of separation. The spouse who did not make any contribution cannot be entitled to take a share from such property as it would be contrary to right of ownership to property stipulated in Article 40(1) of the FDRE Constitution.

Consequently, it will be contrary to what is embodied in the Constitution to accept a claim of common property by a spouse, who deserted the conjugal life even if the marriage was not legally dissolved. Such spouse shall not be entitled to a share from the property acquired by the other spouse during the time of separation. Therefore, the decision of the lower courts which declared that the petitioner is not entitled to a share of the house is not appropriate and contains a fundamental error of law. We have, therefore, decreed as follows.

Decree 1. The decisions of the lower courts, which declared that the respondents had

the right to divide the house, are reversed pursuant to Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. It is the petitioner, and not the first respondent, who is entitled to claim a share in the ownership of the house with the second respondent.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 107-109 Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


Poster -v.- Veno & Letitiya


Holding of the Court - In all actions concerning children undertaken by the public and

private welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and legislative bodies, the primary consideration shall be the best interest of the child.

- If the adoptive parents treat the adopted child in a manner contrary to international child conventions and human rights conventions and where it is proved that the interest and welfare of the child is jeopardized, it is of no value to allow the adoption agreement to continue.

Art.9 (4) and Art.36(2) of the FDRE Constitution. ______________


Yekatit 24, 2002 E.C (March 3, 2010)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hirut Mellese, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: F. Poster

Respondents: 1. D. Veno 2. B. Letitiya

Having examined the file, we have given the following judgment.

Judgment The case concerns the legal ground upon which an adoption agreement can be revoked. The case started at the Federal First Instance Court as a Family and Children Relief Organization called Berhane-Hiwot brought suit against the present respondents. The respondents had requested to adopt a baby named Tullu and the organization led by the present petitioner was facilitating the adoption process in court. As the respondents abandoned their idea of taking the child, the petitioner requested the court which was examining the adoption


to reject the adoption agreement. However, the court approved the adoption agreement. As the respondents were not willing to take the child even after the approval of the adoption agreement, the baby was compelled to stay in a temporary child care facility administered by the petitioner.

Because the action of the respondents was injurious to the present and future life of the child, a suit was brought against the respondents so that the adoption agreement would be revoked in accordance with the Revised Family Code. The court which handled the case rejected the suit stating that it was not proved that the actions of the respondents would endanger the life of the child in the future. The appellate court also confirmed the decision of the first instance court.

The cassation petition was filed to get the decision of the lower courts reversed. The decisions of the lower courts have been examined. As stipulated under Art. 195(1) of the Revised Family Code, an adoption agreement cannot be revoked if it is approved. However, Article 195(2) provides the grounds which can lead to the revocation of an adoption agreement. As we can understand from the spirit of this provision, an adoption agreement can be revoked where it is proved that the acts of the adopter are contrary to the provisions of the international child conventions, the provisions of other human right conventions and the interest and welfare of the child.

Adoption is recognized by law with a view to safeguarding the interest of children. In order to safeguard the interests of children, international and regional conventions were adopted and have entered into force. These conventions include the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Ethiopia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991 and the African Charter on the Right and Welfare of the Child on October 2, 2002.

The FDRE Constitution, the Revised Family Code and other laws embody provisions that deal with the rights and welfare of children. The international, regional and national legal instruments contain basic principles regarding the right of the child. One of these is the principle which declares that in all actions, the primary consideration should be the best interest of the child. The FDRE Constitution, not only declares that international conventions ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land (Art.9(4)), but has also incorporated a number of human right provisions which should be interpreted in light of international human right conventions to which the country is a party. Moreover, the Constitution contains a provision, i.e., Article 36, which specifically addresses the special problems of children. Sub-Article 2 of this provision provides that in all actions concerning children undertaken by public and private welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and


legislative bodies, the primary consideration shall be the best interest of the child.

If the adoptive parents treat the adopted child in a manner contrary to international child conventions and human rights conventions and where it is proved that the interest and welfare of the child is jeopardized, it is of no value to allow the adoption agreement to subsist. The decision of the lower courts has not considered the spirit of the law, and this Bench has thus found that the decision contains fundamental error of law. We have rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court on Hidar 05,

2001 E.C (November 14, 2008) under File No. 111497 and which was confirmed by the appellate court on Yekatit 12, 2001 E.C. (February 19, 2009) under File No. 75193, is reversed in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The adoption agreement made on Yekatit 26, 2000 E.C (March 5, 2008) and its confirmation by the appellate court on Megabit 25, 2000 E.C (April 3, 2008) are revoked.


____________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 10, pp.41-43 Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


Fantanesh S. et al –v.- Molla D. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 42682 (October 20, 2009)

Holding of the Court: - Judicial declaration of paternity may be obtained where the alleged

father and the mother of the child have lived together in continuous sexual relation, without having legally recognized relation, in the period regarded by laws as the period of pregnancy;

- Judicial declaration of paternity may be made where one of the conditions provided in Article 143 of the Revised Family Code is satisfied.

Article 143 of the Revised Family Code of the FDRE _______________

Cassation File No. 42682 Tikimit 10, 2002 E.C. (October 20, 2009)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie

Petitioners: 1. Fantanesh S. 2. Alemu D. 3. Tigist D.

Respondent: Molla D.

Judgment The case concerns the establishment of paternal filiation of a child. The basis of the litigation is the judicial declaration of the Federal First Instance Court that the respondent was the son of Demissie T. The petitioners intervened contesting the decision of the court and requested for the annulment of the declaration of paternity. In their opposition, the petitioners claimed that the respondent was not the child of the deceased. The Federal First Instance Court, to which the opposition was filed, summoned the respondent, heard the case and examined the evidence. Finally, the court found that evidence produced by the respondent establishes that he was the child of the deceased.

The Federal High Court, to which an appeal was lodged, confirmed the decision. The petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court was made against these decisions. In the petition filed on Tir


12, 2001 E.C (January 20, 2009), the petitioners claimed that there is fundamental error of law committed by the lower courts. This court has summoned the respondent and heard the arguments of both parties in light with the law to see whether the decision of paternal filiation was appropriate under Article 143 of the Revised Family Code.

The Federal First Instance Court, which first entertained the case, heard witnesses and stated in its decision that the deceased was like a father to the respondent in treating the latter, that the deceased got the respondent enrolled in a school, and that the deceased made his son live with his family members. The court further observed in its decision that the petitioners were unable to introduce evidence which should outweigh the evidence of the respondent. This Cassation Bench has found that the facts proved by evidence enabled the First Instance Court to declare that the respondent was the son of the deceased as per Article 143(e) of the Revised Family Code.

Art. 143 deals with judicial declaration of paternity, and the point of contention between the petitioners and the respondent is covered by Article 143(d) of the Code. This provision stipulates that judicial declaration of paternity may be obtained in the case where the alleged father and the mother of the child have lived together in a continuous sexual relation, without having a legally recognized relation, in the period regarded by law as the period of pregnancy. Paternity can be established where any one of the conditions embodied in sub-Articles (a) to (e) of Article Art. 143 of the Revised Family Code is satisfied. Therefore, the argument of the petitioners that the respondent was not able to prove that there was a continuous sexual relation between the mother and the deceased is not acceptable. We have come to the conclusion that no fundamental error of law was committed by the lower courts.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court under File No.

27622 on Tikimt 1, 2000 E.C. (October 11, 2007) and the decision of the Federal High Court rendered under File No. 63272 on Hidar 4, 2001 E.C. (November 13, 2008) are affirmed as per Article 348 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The decision declaring that the respondent is the son of the deceased is affirmed.


____________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 10, pp. 8-9 Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


Zenebech B. - v.- Birknesh K.


Holding of the Court: Proof of filiation by possession of status is not conclusive proof; it is rather presumption of law which is not a compulsory (irrefutable) presumption. However, the party who opposes the presumption is required to rebut it by producing contrary proof.

Arts. 154, 155, 156 and 157 of the Revised Family Code of the FDRE _______________


Tahsas 6, 2002 E.C (December 15, 2009)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Menberetsehai Taddese, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie

Petitioner: Zenebech B.

Respondent: Birknesh K.

Judgment The case relates to proof of filiation. The present respondent, filed her claim at the Federal First Instance Court stating that she was born in 1964 E.C from her father Sergeant Kebede B. and her mother W/ro Berhane H. who were married. After the death of Kebede, she requested to be declared the daughter of Kebede B. The petitioner appeared in court and contested the respondent’s claim stating that the deceased, Kebede B., and W/ro Berhane H. did not have a child from their marriage, and she argued that the respondent was the goddaughter of W/ro Berhane. The court, having heard the testimonies of the witnesses of both sides, decided that the respondent was the child of Kebede B. Aggrieved by the decision of the court, the applicant lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court. The appellate court rejected her appeal.

The cassation petition is lodged against the decision of the appellate court. The petitioner stated that Kebede B. and Berhane H.did not have any child during their conjugal life as W/ro Berhane had the problem of infertility. She


further stated that the lower court declared the respondent as the daughter of the deceased without making an appropriate examination and that the decision has fundamental error of law.

This Cassation Bench has examined the case. According to the Revised Family Code, filiation is proved by producing a birth certificate or in the absence of birth certificate by possession of status as indicated under Articles 154 and 155 of the afore-mentioned law. According to Article 156 of the Revised Family Code, possession of status exists where a person “is treated by the community as being the child” of the person alleged to be the father. If it is possible to prove the possession of status of such filiation, the court may presume that such child is the child of the alleged father as stipulated under Article 157 of the Code.

As can be understood from this legal provision, proof of filiation by possession of status is not a conclusive proof. It is rather a presumption of the law. It must also be noted that this presumption is not a compulsory (irrefutable) presumption. The party who opposes the presumption can rebut it by producing contrary proof as stipulated under Article 157(2). In the case under consideration, we have observed that while the witnesses of the respondent testified that the respondent was born to Kebede B. and W/ro Berhane H. and that the community considered her as the child of the deceased, the witnesses of the petitioner were not able to disprove the testimony of the witnesses of the respondent. Hence, because the respondent was able to prove filiation by possession of status, it is not possible to say that the decision of the lower court contains fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court, rendered on Ginbot 4,

2000 E.C (May 12, 2008) under File No. 12503 and the order of the Federal High Court made on Tikimt 13, 2001 E.C (October 23, 2008) under File No. 68578 are affirmed.

2. We have hereby declared that the respondent is the child of Kebede B.. …


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 10, pp 19-20. Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


10. Intellectual Property

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Association of Red Terror Martyrs Friends and Family v. Elias Asegahegn

78856 2013 14 269-274

2 Samuel Haile et al v. Simret Ayalew et al

68369 2011 13 576-581

3 Ethio Cement v. IP office 57179 2011 12 544 -548

4 Artistic Printing Press v. Getahun Shiberu

44520 2010 10 339-341

5 Mulu Hailesellasie v. Zemenai Printing Press PLC

42253 2009 9 149-151

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Ch. 10: Intellectual Property 175

Red Terror Martyrs’ Families and Friends Association -v.- Elias Asegahegn


Holding of the Court: Publishing and disseminating a three dimensional design on paper without the permission and consent of the owner constitute an act of copyright infringement.

Article 34(4) of Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004

_______________

Cassation File No. 78856 Tahsas 15, 2005 E.C (December 25, 2012)


Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie, Mustefa Ahmed

Petitioner: ‘Red Terror Martyrs’ Families and Friends Association Respondent: Elias Asegahegn

After examining the case, the court has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case started at the Federal High Court where the current respondent (plaintiff at the High Court) sued the current petitioner as the first defendant and Ethiopian Postal Services Enterprise as the second defendant. In a statement of claim submitted on Yekatit 16, 2002 E.C. (February 24, 2010), the current respondent stated that the first defendant issued a bid announcement to gather designs for the construction of a monument to commemorate victims of the Red Terror, and that after receiving his design in 1990 EC (1998), the first defendant disseminated the design as its own on mass media without announcing the selection of the design. The suit further stated that the second defendant (Ethiopian Postal Services Enterprise) published and sold 60,000 stamps containing the design for three Birr each, i.e, a total Birr 180,000. The plaintiff (current respondent) claimed in the lower court a compensation of Birr 100,000 for the design, consequential damages of Birr 280,000 and moral damages of Birr 150,000.


As preliminary objection, the defendants argued that the suit is barred by period of limitation which was rejected by the Court on Tahsas 12 2003 EC. (December 21, 2010). They also presented alternative defenses on the issue. The first defendant claimed to have been founded in 1995 E.C. (2003) and denied receiving the design that the plaintiff allegedly submitted in 1990 EC (1998). The first defendant also argued that the evidence submitted in support of the statement of claim is not valid and the design on the stamps and that of the plaintiff are different. It also argued that in the absence of contractual or non-contractual relationship with the plaintiff, the respondent’s claim is not acceptable.

On the other hand, the second defendant contended that, the stamps were published following a request from the first defendant and an authorization from the Ministry of Transport and Communication without any knowledge about the bid announcement on its part. It also argued that the design on the stamp and the one claimed by the plaintiff are different and the compensation demanded by the plaintiff is exaggerated.

In its judgment, the court observed that Addis Ababa Human Rights Association for the Prosecution of the Oppression and Massacre Committed by the Dergue issued the bid announcement to which the plaintiff submitted his design. It is also noted from a letter written on Hamle 07, 2000 E.C. (July 14, 2008) that the current petitioner received the design and continued negotiations with the respondent regarding the design. Based on the claims and evidence presented by the parties, the Federal High Court found that first, second and third place winners were to be awarded monetary prize after which the ownership of the designs shall be vested in the Association. The court also confirmed that while the originality of the plaintiff’s design is not contested, the fact that the first defendant sent three designs to be published, including that of the plaintiff’s, is established. The court disregarded expert testimonies which regarded the design on the stamp and the one submitted by the plaintiff as different, i.e. as two and three dimensional, respectively.

Therefore, the court held the first defendant liable of copyright infringement for altering the plaintiff’s design from three dimensional to two dimensional and sending it to the second defendant to be published on stamps. On the other hand, the court found the second defendant not liable because it did not select the plaintiff’s design to be published on the stamps and had no obligation to ensure whether the first defendant had ownership of the design. Therefore, the court ordered the first defendant to pay the minimum amount (Birr 100,000) for moral damages stated under Article 34(4) of the Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004. The court took into consideration the amount of the prize for the winning design (Birr 12,900.00) and the fact that the plaintiff could not have generated profit if the


design was sold to others as the purpose of the design was to commemorate the Martyrs of the Red Terror. Aggrieved by this decision, the first defendant lodged an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court which rejected the appeal in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The petitioner has further lodged a petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The petition raises the following:

- The rejection of the preliminary objection is not appropriate as the action brought by the respondent in the lower court was barred by period of limitation stated under Article 1845 of the Civil Code.

- The decision of the courts that held the petitioner liable for copyright infringement is not acceptable since it has been proved by expert witnesses that the design published on the stamps has no relation with the design that the current respondent claims to have copyright on.

The respondent (plaintiff at the Federal High Court) on the other hand argued that the period of limitation should be calculated in accordance with Article 2143(1) of the Civil Code applicable to non-contractual obligations rather than Article 1845 applicable to contracts. In support of this, the respondent argued that because the claim was based on a legal right and the action was brought on Yekatit 16, 2002 E.C. (February 23, 2010), the period of limitation which is 2 years has not lapsed from the date of the copyright infringement on Nehassie 20, 2000 E.C. (August 26, 2008). The respondent also contested the claim that the design on the stamps was two dimensional while his design was three dimensional by stating that any movable or immovable object becomes two dimensional when it is put on paper or photographed.

This court has examined the case in the light of the following issues: - Whether the suit instituted by the current respondent is barred by period of

limitation; - If the suit is not barred by period of limitation, whether the petitioner is

liable.

With regard to the first issue, the court observed that despite the absence of clear written agreement, there is a contractual relationship between the parties following the bid announcement by the petitioner and the submission of the design by the respondent to the former. In accordance with Article 1681(1) of the Civil Code, acceptance “may be made orally or in writing or by signs normally in use or by a conduct such that, in the circumstances of the case, there is no doubt as to the party’s agreement”.

This court thus rejected the argument concerning the absence of contractual relationship and it examined the issue of period of limitation in accordance with Article 1845 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to this provision,


unless otherwise provided by law, actions for the performance of a contract, actions based on the non-performance of a contract and actions for the invalidation of a contract shall be barred if not brought within ten years. In the case under consideration, the period between the respondent’s submission of the design to the petitioner’s previous association and the date on which action was brought, is over ten years. The court observed that, an important point that should be addressed here would be determining the beginning point in the calculation of the period of limitation.

In light of the letter written by the Ministry of Transport and Communication on Tahsas 02, 2000 E.C. (December 12, 2007) which granted permission for the publication of the stamps for commemoration day, the respondent can be assumed to have known about the publication of the stamps containing his design only after the commemoration day, Ginbot 19, 2000 E.C. (May 27, 2008). According to a decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Cassation Division in a similar issue under File No. 67376 on Hamle 30, 2004 E.C. (August 6, 2012), the respondent can demand his right under the contract only after he came to know that the petitioner has failed to fulfil his obligation under the contract. The period of limitation does not thus lapse, and this court has rejected the petitioner’s preliminary objection.

Concerning the second issue, this court has examined the reasoning in the Federal High Court’s decision which stated that although the petitioner claimed the design on the stamps to be two dimensional and the respondent’s design three dimensional, the design published on the stamps was found to be the original work of the current respondent. This court has accepted the decisions of the lower courts which had jurisdiction to examine and render decisions on the facts of the case. As stipulated under Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation No. 25/1996, the Cassation Division can only revise cases which contain fundamental error of law. After examining the facts and evidence with the issues of the case, this court has found that the decisions rendered by the Federal High court and Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench do not contain fundamental error of law. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1. The decisions rendered by Federal High Court under File No. 90008 on

Megabit 27, 2003 E.C (April 5, 2011) and the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench under File No. 72497 on Tahsas, 16, 2004 E.C (December 26, 2011) are hereby affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.


2. The decision which holds the petitioner liable to pay Birr 100,000 (one hundred thousand) for having failed to pay the respondent for his design in accordance with the contract is found consistent with Article 34(4) of the Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation.

…




Samuel Hailu & Horizon Printing Press PLC – v. – Simret Ayalew et. al.


Holding of the Court: Copyright law protects original expressions of an author, but not ideas or information included in a particular work. Disseminating expression of ideas constitutes copyright infringement while using one’s own way of expressing ideas or information contained in an original work does not. The right includes both economic and moral rights.

Articles 2(6), 7, 9-19, 13(1) of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004

_______________

Cassation File No. 68369 Tir 4, 2004 EC (January 13, 2012)



Petitioners: 1. Samuel Hailu 2. Horizon Printing Press PLC

Respondents: Simret Ayalew et.al.

The court has examined the case jointly with Cassation File No.70380 and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case started at the Federal High Court where the current respondents were the plaintiff and the current petitioners the defendants. It relates to the right protected, the right holders, infringement and available remedies under the copyright law. In the lower court, the current respondents argued that their late father Aleka Ayalew Tameru was the copyright owner of various religious works such as literature and sermons which were transmitted in newspapers and magazines as interviews. They claimed that, while rights emanating from such works would be transferred to the original owner’s heirs upon the death of the right holder, the current first petitioner published these works as a book


entitled “Religious Teaching”. The book includes expression of condolences prepared for the sixth month commemoration service of Aleka Ayalew including the photograph of the deceased is used without permission. The current second petitioner (second defendant at the lower court) is the printing press which published the book.

In their statement of claim, the current respondents demanded material damages of Birr 60,000 for the sale of 3,000 copies of the book and moral compensation of Birr 100,000 to be paid jointly and severally by the current petitioners. They also requested for the discontinuation of the printing of the book and the destruction of the printed ones. The current petitioners had submitted preliminary objections and defense on the merits of the case. Among the preliminary objections, the current first petitioner argued that, the evidence presented does not prove that Aleka Ayalew Tameru was the owner of the copyright in these works and sole right holder for their distribution. He also argued that the works in question are not personal works of Aleka Ayalew but are rather his position on current religious questions which he expressed as a member of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.

Alternatively, the current first petitioner argued that as Aleka Ayalew has failed to protect these works and also the right to distribute them, he cannot prevent others from distributing them. He also contended that the works in question are based on the teachings of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church and the deceased cannot be considered as the author. Moreover, he contended that the works are not original and should not be protected by law. The current first petitioner requested the case to be dismissed indicating that he was only attempting to distribute knowledge initiated by the deceased.

On the other hand, the current second petitioner denied its liability since Aleka Ayalew was acknowledged as the source of the work. It also contended that the responsibility to request permission from heirs does not lie with the printing press since it did not initiate the publishing of the works. Thus, it requested the case to be dismissed as no evidence is presented proving that the works included in the book are that of the deceased and it was not aware that the works were the original works of the deceased.

The High Court after examining the arguments of the parties, found the second current petitioner not liable while the first current petitioner was held accountable to pay material and moral damages of Birr 160,000. The court ordered the first defendant (current first petitioner) to refrain from infringing the rights of the copyright owners. It also ordered for the destruction of the printed books.

The current first petitioner dissatisfied by this decision submitted its appeal to the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench. The current respondents


also submitted their appeal to the Appellate Bench against the decision which found the current second petitioner not liable. The appellate bench dismissed the appeal of the current first petitioner in accordance with Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code and accepted that of the current respondents. After hearing the arguments of the parties and basing itself on Articles 27, 29 and 2027 of the Civil Code, the appellate bench found the current second petitioner jointly and severally liable with the current first petitioner as it published the works including the photograph of the deceased without the permission of the heirs.

This cassation petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is brought against this decision. The first petitioner claimed that the decision of the appellate division of the Federal Supreme Court contains fundamental error of law as it was given without considering his evidence and also because the works of the deceased are not original. He also argued it was inappropriate to consider the work copyrightable where the deceased did not prevent its dissemination. The second petitioner argued that as a printer, there is no legal ground holding it liable for a publication requested by a third party. It also argued that the works of the deceased were not original works. The respondents presented their response in writing.

In light of the objectives of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004, this court has observed that a work is considered copyrightable where it is original or different by its nature. A work is considered original or different by its nature if it is the result of a creative effort of the individual. The court observed that copyright law protects only expressions of an author not ideas or information included in a particular work. The court noted from the reading of the law that disseminating expression of ideas constitutes copyright infringement while using one’s own way of expressing ideas or information contained in an original work does not.

In accordance with the copyright law, authors are the first owners of copyright. Under Proclamation No. 410/2004, copyright includes both economic and moral rights, and the infringement of one of the economic rights under Article 7 of this Proclamation results in moral damages. The economic rights which are stipulated under Article 7 of Proclamation No. 410/2004 allow the author or owner, subject to the provisions of Articles 9 to 19 of this Proclamation, to have the exclusive right to carry out or authorize the acts stipulated in relation to the work.

From the arguments of the first current petitioner, this court observed in accordance with Articles 83 and 235 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the statement inserted in the book that income generated from its sale goes to the family of the deceased shows the admission of the petitioners that the deceased, Aleka Ayalew, is the owner of the work. Since the petitioners did


not clearly deny the deceased as the author of the works, this court has rejected the arguments of the current first petitioner that he was prevented from presenting his evidence.

The court has further examined whether it is proper to publish the opinion of the deceased that was made while he was serving the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The court observed from the judgment of the lower courts that while the ideas expressed by the deceased emanate from the teachings of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the expression of these ideas by the deceased makes them the original works of the deceased.

The fact that the first petitioner published and disseminated the entire expression of the deceased as a book is not contested, and this constitutes infringement of rights under Article 7 of Proclamation No. 410/2004. The argument raised by the petitioners based on Article 13 of the Proclamation does not satisfy the definition of communication of the work to the public; nor is it reproduction as envisaged under Articles 2(6) and 2(25). In other words, dissemination and reproduction of works without permission of a copyright owner and on the pretext that such act is not prohibited by the right owner does not fall under Article 13(1).

Under Article 2(6) of Proclamation No. 410/2004, communication of the work means the transmission by wire or without wire images or sounds or both of a work, a performance, a sound recording or a broadcast, while reproduction as stipulated under Article 2(26) means the making of facsimile copies of the original or a copy of a work by means other than printing such as photocopying, whether or not they are reduced or enlarged in scale.

The court noted the limitations imposed on the author or owner under Article 13(1) of Proclamation No. 410/2004 which does not allow the owner to forbid:

‘the reproduction in a newspaper or periodical, the broadcasting or other communication to the public of an article published in a newspaper or periodical on current economic, political, social or religious or similar topics unless the ... reproduction or broadcasting or the communication to the public is expressly reserved on the copies by the author or owner of copyright or in connection with broadcasting or other communication to the public of the work.’

These do not require the permission of the copyright owner. It can be observed that the act of publishing the works of the deceased as a book would not have been necessary had the intention of the petitioners been to disseminate the teachings of the deceased. This court has also observed that the translation of the term ‘periodical’ to Amharic under Article 13(1) is not equivalent to ‘book’. Therefore, the court has rejected the arguments raised by the


petitioners based on Article 13(1) and found that the petitioners have infringed the original works of the deceased stipulated under Article 7(1)(a),(f) & (i) of the Proclamation as the work was circulated in the market and read by the public without permission from the right holder(s).

Such infringement results in moral damage with a compensation of not less than Birr 100,000 in accordance with Article 34(4) of Proclamation No. 40/2004. Therefore, the first petitioner is held liable to pay a compensation of Birr 100,000 for moral damage. The court has further noted Articles 27, 29 and 2027 of the Civil Code cited by the Appellate Bench of the Federal Supreme Court in holding the second petitioner liable, and found the second petitioner liable as it failed to check whether the first petitioner had the authority to publish the photograph of the deceased in the book which was circulated in the market. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1. With regard to the first petitioner, this court has, in accordance with

Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, affirmed the decisions rendered by the Federal High Court under File No. 88615 on Tikimt 16, 2003 E.C. (October 26, 2010) and the Federal Supreme Court under File No. 62371 on Yekatit 4, 2003 E.C (February 11, 2011).

2. Regarding the second petitioner, the decision rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Bench under File No. 63119 on Miazia 12, 2003 E.C. (April 20, 2011) is hereby affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

3. The decision that renders the petitioners liable to pay the respondents a total of Birr 160,000 as material and moral compensation, to refrain from publishing the works of Aleka Ayalew Tameru, and to destroy the books published is appropriate.


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 576-581 Abridged translation: Seble G. Baraki


Ethio Ceramic PLC -v.- Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office & Ovorgiga Technology Ltd.


Holding of the Court: While giving a decision on a request for trademark registration certificate, the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office should take the necessary measures so as to avoid confusion on the part of the public, thereby causing unfair trade competition.

Articles 10 (1), 2(a) & (b) of Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003; Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006; Article 6(1) of Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office Establishment

Proclamation No. 320/2003 ______________


Yekatit 22, 2003 E.C (March 1, 2011)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Ethio Ceramic PLC

Respondents: 1. Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office 2. OvorgigaTechnology Limited


Judgment This case is brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court challenging the decisions of the Federal High Court.

The second respondent submitted an application in which it requested the first respondent to register the phrase “Ethio Cement” written within a frame surrounded by ten stars as a trademark for its international standard cement product. The first respondent, before registering the trademark announced it in Addis Zemen Newspaper dated Megabit 15, 2000 E.C (March 24, 2008)


which requested any interested party to submit its objection. The current petitioner then submitted an objection arguing that, it is on the process of having its investment permit issued for the purpose of establishing a cement factory using the phrase “Ethio Cement” as a trade name, and that the trademark proposed for registration by the second respondent will confuse customers, considering the fact that both companies will produce the same product, i.e. cement.

Subsequently, the first respondent rejected the objection of the petitioner as having no legal basis, and registered the trademark requested by the second respondent stating that: - Even though the petitioner submitted evidence to prove that it is using the

phrase “Ethio Cement” as its trade name, it did not get it registered as trademark;

- As the second respondent brought the phrase “Ethio Cement” with the stars surrounding it, it has the right to get the phrase “Ethio Cement” registered together with another symbol that is eligible for registration.

The Federal High Court which entertained the appeal of the petitioner from the decision of the first respondent (i.e. Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office), rendered a decision confirming that the phrase “Ethio Cement” written inside a square and surrounded by ten stars is the property and trademark of the second respondent, and therefore it shall not be cancelled as it does not affect the rights and benefits of the petitioner.

The petitioner submitted its petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court on Sene 10, 2002 E.C (June 17, 2010) and contended that the phrase “Ethio Cement” which is registered as the trademark of the second respondent, is also registered by the relevant bodies as the trade name of the product it produces. The petitioner further underlined that the first respondent, in registering the trademark of the second respondent, is granting it the right to use a trade name which is in the course of being used by the petitioner for its cement product. This, according to the petitioner, in addition to confusing customers, also violates the relevant laws and contravenes the fundamental goals and objectives stated in the Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003 as well as Article 5 and other provisions of the Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006. The petitioner requested for the reversal of the decision stating that it has fundamental error of law.

The first respondent in a statement of defence it submitted on Tahsas 13, 2003 (December 22, 2010) explained the justification for its decision and the difference between a trademark and a trade name. It stated that a trade name is a name under which a person operates his business and its purpose it to


clearly distinguish the business from other businesses, and it is registered by the Ministry of Trade or regional Trade Bureaus. A trademark, the first respondent added, is protected and registered by virtue of Proclamation No. 501/2006, and this responsibility is given to the first respondent by Proclamation No. 320/2003. The first respondent argued that, even though it is clearly stipulated in Articles 5(1) and 7(2) of Proclamation No. 501/2006 that business organizations, by getting their trade names registered as trademarks, can be owners, this has not been done. The first respondent further contended that it gave protection to the stars and not to the phrase “Ethio Cement” and requested the petition to be rejected as it does not have any legal basis.

In its statement of defence submitted on Tir 30, 2003 (February 7, 2011), the second respondent argued that trade name and trademark are different. As the petitioner did not start producing and selling cement, the trademark that it will put on the cement it will produce is not yet known. Thus, it requested the court to cancel the petition arguing that the petitioner did not start distributing products, and that it did not use the trade name of the petitioner as a trademark.

The Cassation Division then examined the case, holding as an issue whether the decisions of the first respondent and the Federal High Court are appropriate. To decide on this issue, the Cassation Division examined the relevant laws, in particular: Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 67/1997, Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003, Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office Establishment Proclamation No. 320/2003 and Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006.

The court has noted from the evidence submitted by the petitioner to the first respondent that, the petitioner is a business organization registered under the trade name of “Ethio Cement PLC” and that is a cement factory established to avail its products for local market as per the stipulations of Article 16 (1) of Proclamation No. 329/2003 which has amended Proclamation No. 67/1997 and Article 135 (1&2) of the Commercial Code. It can also export its product to international markets as per Article 32 of the Commercial Registration and Business Licensing (Amendment) Proclamation No. 328/2003. While the petitioner is protected by the Commercial Code and the Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003 when undertaking these activities, it is also required to discharge its obligations stated under this proclamation as well as other laws.

When the petitioner avails its product to the market, Article 21(3) of Proclamation 329/2003 requires it to fix explanatory labels; the net weight, the name and address of the factory or packer as well as the production and expiry date. Thus, it can be observed from this provision that the petitioner, after


finishing the construction of its company and when it starts production and distribution of its products, should fix on them the information that the “Ethio Cement PLC” is the producer. Even though it has not yet distributed cement products using its trade name, it has the obligation to fix its trade name and address on the cement product it makes available to the market.

The Cassation Division also noted from the application submitted by the second respondent to the first respondent that the work it will be engaged in relates to the production and distribution of cement, and that it requested the latter to register the phrase “Ethio Cement” written inside a square and surrounded by ten stars as its trade mark and to be the only owner and user thereto. The court also noted in this regard that, even though the trademark of the second respondent is written in a square and surrounded by ten stars, it will be similar with the English version of the trade name of the petitioner’s product on which it has the obligation to fix “Ethio Cement Private Ltd.”, as per Article 21(3(b)) of Proclamation No. 329/2003. This means, the trade mark which is registered by the first respondent enabling the second respondent to post it on the cement product (which it produces and distributes) will be similar to the trade name “Ethio Cement” which the petitioner is required by law to fix on the cement it produces.

As stipulated under Article 3(1) of Proclamation No. 329/2003, the objective of the Trade Practices Proclamation is to secure fair competition processes through the prevention and elimination of anti-competition and unfair trade practices. According to Article 10(1) of the same Proclamation, what is considered as unfair competition is any act or commercial practice that aims at eliminating competitors through different methods. Arts. 10(2)(a)&(c) of this proclamation also respectively define unfair trade competition as “[a]ny act that causes, or is likely to cause, confusion with respect to another enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products or services offered by such enterprise”, and as “[a]ny act that misleads or is likely to mislead the public with respect to an enterprise or its activities, in particular the products or serves offered by such enterprise”.

Likewise, it is indicated in the first paragraph of the preamble of the Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006 that, the objective of the proclamation is to protect the reputation and goodwill of business persons engaged in manufacturing and distribution of goods as well as rendering services by protecting trademarks to avoid confusion between similar goods and services. Moreover, it is also clearly indicated in Article 6(1) of Proclamation No. 320/2003 that, the first respondent, before giving decision on patent and trademark registration certificate applications, has the obligation to examine content or let the content be examined, and also look into the fundamental objective and detailed provisions of the Trademark


Registration and Protection Proclamation as well as other relevant laws. Thus, the Cassation Division noted that, the first respondent, when requested by the second respondent to register the phrase “Ethio Cement” as a trademark, should have been mindful that, the petitioner which is called with the trade name “Ethio Cement” has, as per Article 21(3) (b) of Proclamation No. 329/2003, the obligation to put this phrase on the cement product that it produces; this would have the effect of making available to the public, a cement product by the second respondent with a phrase “Ethio Cement” written in a square and surrounded by ten stars as its trademark, and on the other hand a cement product on which the trade name of the petitioner Ethio Cement PLC” is written.

When these products are made available to the consumers, they will cause confusion in violation of the objective of the Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation thereby resulting in unfair competition prohibited under Article 10(2)(b)&(c) of Proclamation No. 329/2003. The Cassation Division has found that the decision of the first respondent was given without carefully examining Article 6(1) of Proclamation No. 320/2003, and will not provide the legal protection that the legislator envisaged to give to the trader and the consumer.

This Cassation Division has thus found a fundamental error of law in the decision of the Federal High Court, by confirming the decision which was given by the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (first respondent), without having due regard to the content, fundamental objective and goal of the laws stated above and other relevant laws. The first respondent gave the decision without examining and taking into account the pertinent legal regime and provisions as per Article 6(1) of Proclamation 320/2001. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1. The decisions of the first respondent and the Federal High Court which

allowed the registration of the trademark requested by the second respondent are reversed.

2. The second respondent cannot be allowed to use the trademark which is legally protected, unless the phrase “Ethio Cement” is removed and substituted by another name.




Artistic Printing Press -v.- Getahun Shibiru


Holding of the Court: A person who has translated a book shall be considered an author and is entitled to compensation for moral and material damage.

Articles 2(2), 6(1) and 8 of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004

_______________



Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justice: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie

Petitioner: Artistic Printing Press

Respondent: Getahun Shibiru

Judgment This case involves a claim for compensation based on Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004. The case started at the Federal High Court and the current respondent Dr. Getahun Shibiru was the plaintiff. This court has found that the current petitioner and the respondent entered into an agreement on October 4, 2006 in which the current petitioner agreed to print 5,000 (five thousand) copies of an Amharic book titled “Yeteseberu Kinfoch” (Broken Wings). The book was a translation and the translator used a pen name - “Ritu’a Emlak”. As per the agreement, the current petitioner received half of the payment for the printing, Birr 14,929.50, and agreed to deliver the work within three weeks. Before the delivery of this work, it was discovered that a book titled “Yeteseberu Kinfoch” (Broken Wings) was made available in the market by two individuals who then became second and third defendants in the case presented to the Federal High Court. The plaintiff at the lower court (current respondent) claimed a compensation of Birr 160,079.50 for moral and material damage.


The Federal High Court examined the arguments and evidence of both sides and discharged the two individuals who were selling the book. It further decided that the current petitioner (Artistic Printing Press) is liable to pay moral and material damage to the current respondent. Displeased with this decision, the current petitioner appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. But the court confirmed the decision of the lower court.

Cassation petition is submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. This court called the current respondent based on the petition submitted on March 25, 2009 and heard the arguments of both parties. The major issue of the case was seen in light of Article 8 of Proclamation No. 410/2004. The issue examined by this court is whether moral rights, including compensation, apply to translation works.

The fact that the respondent translated the book and gave it to the petitioner to have it printed is not an issue. It was also proven in the lower courts that the books were being sold to the public before delivery was made to the respondent. The major argument raised by the petitioner was that since the respondent was merely a translator and not an author of the book, he should not have the right to claim compensation for moral and material damage. On the other hand, the respondent argued that his copyright is protected by law and that the decision made by the lower courts in his favor was appropriate.

The relevant law for this case is Proclamation No. 410/2004. The preamble of this proclamation recognizes the major role literary, artistic and similar creative works play in enhancing cultural, social, economic, scientific and technological development and the need to establish a conducive environment for such works by giving them legal protection. Literary works are among such creative works that are given legal recognition under the Proclamation. Authorship of a novel falls under this category, and the case at hand is related with this. Thus, the detailed provisions of this proclamation must be seen in order to decide whether the law gives recognition and protection to translation works.

The petitioner argued that the respondent’s work is not protected by law because the original idea of the book is not his, and that he only translated the English version of the book. This court thus observed the need to determine what constitutes an original and creative work in light of the provisions of the law. The word ‘author’ is defined in Article 2(2) of the Proclamation as the person who has intellectually created a work. It can be understood from this provision that a work would be recognized and be protected by the law when it is proven that it has been intellectually created. The requirements for getting legal protection are also listed under Article 6. The relevant provision for the case at hand is stated under Article 6(1) which states that the author of a work


shall, irrespective of the quality of the work and the purpose, for which the work may have been created, be entitled to protection, for his work without any formality and upon its creation where it is original and corporeal.

It is obvious that the petitioner translated the book into Amharic so that the Amharic speaking society can read it. Language is deeply connected to the values and customs of a society. Thus, it can be understood that when a book is translated into a different language, these values and traditions of the society would be taken into consideration. The work of the respondent should be seen from this perspective. When the petitioner translated the book from English to Amharic, he has made an effort to customize the content of the book in such a way the society would be able to understand and relate it with its own values and customs. This involves intellectual inputs and competence. Therefore, it can be concluded that a translation work is a result of the intellect. Moreover, since the work is done in Amharic, it is different from the English version of the novel. This makes it an original and tangible work as per the requirement stated under Article 6(1). Therefore, the petitioner’s claim against the copyright protection accorded to the respondent’s translation does not have a legal ground. The decisions of the lower courts, thus, have no fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High Court, File Number 54181 rendered on

Ginbot 25, 2000 EC (June 2, 2008) and the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, File Number 39233 given on Megabit 7, 2001 EC (March 16, 2009) are affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The court has not accepted the petition because it does not have legal ground.

3. The decision that the respondent is entitled to the moral and material compensation is appropriate.

...

Signatures of Five Justices

__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 10, pp 339-341 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Mulu Haile Selassie –v. – Zemenawi Printing Press

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 42253 (July15, 2009)

Holding of the Court Public display of the original or a copy of a copyrightable work without the permission or consent of the owner constitutes copyright infringement.

Articles 1791, 1771(1), 1790, 2090-2123 of the Civil Code; Article 7 of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection Proclamation

No. 410/2004 ______________


Hamle 8, 2001 EC (July 15, 2009)


Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Belachew Anshiso, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Mulu Haile Selassie

Respondent: Zemenawi Printing Press

The court has examined the case and rendered the following Judgment.

Judgment The Case started at the Mekelle Zone High Court where the current petitioner was the plaintiff and the current respondent was the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that, after entering into a contract with the defendant to publish his book, an employee of the defendant stole and sold nine books which caused him damage. The plaintiff invoked Proclamation No. 410/2004 and claimed a total compensation of Birr 260,000.00 for material and moral damages. On the other hand, the defendant argued in the Zone High Court that the books that were stolen are only seven and it should not be liable to pay for the rest. The defendant also argued that the individual/employee who stole the books should be joined in the case because a criminal act is a personal matter and the individual who committed the crime should be liable to pay damages to the plaintiff.


The High court after examining the arguments and the evidence presented by the parties ordered the defendant to pay a total of Birr 100,180.00 (one hundred thousand and one hundred eighty) including the value of the 9 books each sold for Birr 20 and the minimum amount of moral compensation stipulated under Article 34(4) of the Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410.2004. The defendant lodged an appeal to the Region’s Supreme Court which confirmed the decision of the High court.

The Supreme Court Cassation Division of the Regional State of Tigray examined the case and reversed the decisions of the Mekelle Zone High Court and the region’s Supreme Court stating that the current respondent could not have been aware about the criminal act. The regional Cassation Division ordered the value of the 7 books stolen, i.e., Birr 140.00, to be paid to the plaintiff.

A petition is lodged against this decision. In the petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court on Tahsas 4, 2001 E.C (December 13, 2008), the petitioner argued that unawareness about the theft does not exonerate the respondent from liability to the moral compensation stipulated under Article 34(4) of Proclamation No. 410/2004. Both parties presented their arguments on Megabit 2, 2001 E.C (March 11, 2009). The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has examined the arguments of the parties in light of the law as follows.

The respondent agreed to print and deliver 5,000 (five thousand) books for the payment stated in the contract. The court has examined whether the arguments of the parties should be seen in the light of contractual or non-contractual obligations. It observed that, according to Article 2027 of the Civil Code, a person shall be liable for the damage he causes to another due to fault irrespective of any undertaking/obligation on his part. In the case at hand, the parties have reached at clear agreements and have a contractual relationship. In this regard, the court observed that the relationship between the two was not extra-contractual.

The book which was the subject of the contract was stolen by the employee of the respondent and circulated in the market before the delivery of the books to the petitioner and this constitutes non-performance of the obligation in accordance with the time and place stated in the contract. The fact that few books (copies) were stolen by the employee of the respondent shows that there was a breach of contract. In this regard, the court noted that breach of contract or improper performance of the contract cannot be seen as extra-contractual. Hence, the analysis made by the courts based on extra-contractual liability is inappropriate because the books were stolen by the respondent’s employee.


This court noted that the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court based its decision on the interpretation of Article 34(5) of Proclamation No. 410/2004. The phrase which is the basis of the interpretation reads ‘…is not aware or there is no reasonable ground he can be aware’. However, this phrase does not relate to the theft of a book but to the infringement of protected intellectual property rights. That is, it would be applicable under circumstances where part of the book is copied or if other similar acts are committed without the knowledge of the respondent. It does not thus apply to the issue at hand whereby the obligation was printing the book as per the contract. Therefore, the court held that the interpretation given to the law by the Region’s Cassation Division was erroneous.

With regard to the argument presented by the respondent as to the nature of theft and liability thereof, this court noted that such relationship relates to the employee and the respondent, and is not related with the petitioner. The court also observed that, according to Article 1791(2), a party who fails to perform his contractual obligation shall not be released unless he can show that performance was prevented by force majeure. As the person who stole the book was the employee of the respondent and not an outsider, the court observed that the latter cannot claim force majeure under Article 1791(2) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division observed that, in accordance with Article 1771(1) of the Civil Code, non-performance of the contract (as stipulated under Article 1791(1) of the Civil Code) gives the petitioner the right to demand material damages even though the respondent was not at fault.

Damages may arise from contractual or non-contractual acts and may include material as well as moral damages in accordance with Articles 1790(2) and 2090-2123. This court has found that, the intellectual property of the petitioner was stolen and circulated in the market without his consent in breach of fundamental principles of contract. The economic right stipulated under of Article 7(1)(f) of Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Proclamation No. 410/2004 prohibits “public display of the original or a copy of the work”, and this has been infringed by the respondent as the book was made available to the public without the consent of the petitioner.

The court observed that, as the public display of a film affects the economic right of the author/owner, the public display of the original or copies of the book without the consent of the petitioner infringes the right of the petitioner stipulated under the law. It also noted that, such infringement results in moral damages. The minimum amount of compensation for such moral damage is Birr 100,000 as stipulated under Article 34(4) of Proclamation No. 410/2004. Therefore, the respondent is liable to pay Birr 100,000 for the moral damage inflicted on the petitioner. Although the analysis given by the Zone


High Court and Supreme Court Appellate Division were erroneous in categorizing the issue as extra-contractual, this court concurs with their conclusions. We have, however, found that the decision of the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Division contains fundamental error of law. The following decree is thus rendered.

Decree 1) The decision of the Tigray National Regional State Supreme Court

Cassation Division rendered under File No. 25/99 on Hidar 11 2001 EC (November 20, 2008) is reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2) The decision of Mekelle Zone High Court with regard to its conclusion is confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner shall be paid a compensation of Birr 100,140.00 (one hundred thousand and one hundred forty), i.e., Birr 100,000.00 as compensation for moral damage and Birr 140.00 for the value of the seven books.

…



Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Ch. 11: Judgment Execution 197

11. Judgment Execution

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Wegagen Bank S.C. v. Selamawit Tilahun et al

81616 2013 14 265-267

2 Rakeb Melese v. Federal Prosecutor

79860 2012 14 261-264

3 Seida Debele v. Sherif Shikur 73041 2012 13 596 -597

4 Lulseged A et al. v. Flora Eco & Flora Eco Labour Union

70378 2012 13 585-587

5 Atatu Kebede v. Steps at Educational PLC

59301 2011 11 451-453

6 Mohammed Ismael v. Mohammed Ahmed

32143 2008 8 382-383


Wegagen Bank S.C. - v.- Selamawit Tilahun et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 81616 (23 January 2013)

Holding of the Court: An application for execution of judgment on property which is already under an order of injunction is not acceptable. Such application made being aware of the earlier injunction is not proper.

______________


Tir 15, 2005 E.C. (January 23, 2013)


Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Wegagen Bank S.C Respondents: 1. Selamawit Tilahun 2. Negasi Berhe

The following judgment is rendered.

Judgment This case is related with execution of judgment. It began in the Tigray Regional State Axum Zone Central Court. The current petitioner (as plaintiff at the Zone Central Court) applied for execution of judgment against the respondents. It requested for an auction sale of the first respondent’s vehicle, Plate Number 3-27506 AA, for the execution of judgment rendered in its favour. The court, accordingly, ordered for the attachment of the aforementioned vehicle. However, it received a letter informing it that there is already an injunction ordered by the Federal First Instance court regarding the same vehicle, but related with a different case. The court, further, found that the current petitioner was a party to this other case. As the vehicle cannot be sold until the first injunction is lifted, the court temporarily closed the file until the petitioner submits another list of property for the execution of judgment. Displeased with this decision, the petitioner appealed to the Region’s Supreme Court. However, the appeal was not accepted. The petition is submitted to this Cassation Division to have the judgment reversed.

The petition submitted on July 19, 2012 states that there is no other party claiming a preferential right over the vehicle, but the lower court decided that unless the injunction by the other court is lifted, the vehicle cannot be sold.


The petitioner contended that it was the petitioner, in the first place, that had the vehicle as a security. However, the lower court decided that the judgment cannot be executed unless the earlier injunction is lifted. The petitioner claimed that there is a fundamental error of law.

The respondents were called to give their response and they explained to the court that they borrowed money from the petitioner and the vehicle was held as a security. When an individual by the name Dereje Wendimu bought the car, the current petitioner refused to hand over the documents related with the ownership of the vehicle. Then it was decided by a Federal First Instance Court File No. 179925 that as the money borrowed has been returned and thus, the current petitioner should hand over the documents to the individual who bought the car. The document was given to the person as per the order of execution of judgment given by the Federal First Instance Court File No. 195425. Therefore, they requested for the rejection of the petition made in bad faith. The petitioner also responded to this.

This court has examined whether the decision that the vehicle cannot be sold unless the first injunction has been lifted is appropriate. The petitioner does not deny the fact that there was an order of injunction given by the Federal First Instance Court on the vehicle in a case in which the petitioner was a party. Thus, this court has found that the petitioner is acting contrary to procedural law and good faith to acquire a property it lost in accordance with the law in a decision rendered by an appropriate court of law. In this situation, there is no legal ground for having this vehicle sold under execution of judgment. If this is already established, there is no need for the court to check whether there are other parties that have claim over the property or not.

Moreover, the argument that the petitioner had the car as a security was not raised in the lower court and it should not be raised in this court. The petitioner should have raised it at the Federal First Instance Court. This court has not found fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower courts and it has given the following decree.

Decree The decisions Axum Zone Central Court File Number 17188 on May 4, 2012 and the order of the Regional Supreme Court File Number 52873 on June 26, 2012 are confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. ….


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp 265-267 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Rakeb M. v. Federal Prosecutor

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 79860 (15 November 2012)

Holding of the Court: When the defendant is found guilty in a criminal case and if the decision involves confiscation of property, the innocent spouse can have a preferential right over half of the common property. In relation to expenses for the livelihood of the family, courts only have the obligation to calculate the amount needed for not less than six months.

Article 98(3) (b) and (d) of the Criminal Code

______________


Hidar 6, 2005 E.C. (15 November 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Adane Negussie, Mekonnen G/Hiwot, Teklit Yimsel

Petitioner: Rakeb M. Respondent: Federal Prosecutor

The following judgment is rendered.

Judgment This case is related with properties of a convicted person to be confiscated by the government and the amount and types of expenses that should be reserved for the livelihood of the offender’s family. The issue that initiated this case is the decision rendered by the Federal High Court on Tahsas 13, 2002 EC (December 22, 2009) File No. 81406. The decision was made in favour of the current petitioner.

Getu W. was found guilty in a criminal charge as a third defendant, after which an application was made for the execution of the judgment listing the types of property of the convict that were to be confiscated. This request was made to the Federal First Instance Court and the court summoned the debtor to defend his case. The current petitioner then submitted her written objection against the application for the execution of judgment on Sene 09, 2003 EC


(June 16, 2011). The court, then, stated that as the defendant was found guilty [in an offence that entails confiscation of his property], it was decided that his property be confiscated. Moreover, the court pointed out that the rights of his children and third parties were protected.

The Federal First Instance Court held that the current petitioner, (Getu’s wife), is entitled to half of the common property of the spouses and that her share should not be affected by the confiscation. With regard to the children, the court invoked Article 98(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, and stated that the confiscation shall not affect the amount of foodstuff and the expenses necessary for the support of the family for a period of six months. This also includes medical expenses, expenses for education and transportation needed for six months. Furthermore, the court considered other necessities for their livelihood until they reach majority such as housing, clothing and food. However, the expense listed for higher education was rejected because it was not supported by evidence.

Accordingly the court found that the following should not be subject to confiscation: Medical expenses: Birr 1,500 per month; educational expenses of six months Birr 6,243 for each child; transportation expense for each child, Birr 1,000 and a total amount of Birr 3,000 for six months; F or clothing and food, Birr 1,500 per month for each child and the total amount was to be calculated until the children reach majority. The total amount of money to be reserved for the children was calculated to be Birr 428,286. As Ato Getu has the responsibility to cover half of this amount, the court decided that Birr 214,143 was to be deducted from the property of Ato Getu that was going to be confiscated.

The current petitioner was displeased by this decision. She appealed to the Federal High Court but the appeal was rejected. She has now submitted a petition to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The petition contests the court’s rejection of her preferential claim to buy her husband’s share in the property to be confiscated. Moreover, she stated that the calculation that considered only six months in determining the expense for the children’s medical needs, education and transportation goes against the best interest of the children.

The petition was examined by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court in light of Article 98(3)(b) of the Criminal Code. This court has examined whether the rights of the petitioner have been overlooked and whether the six-month delimitation was proper in the calculation of the expenses for the children’s medical needs, education and transportation. The current respondent was then called and both parties have submitted their arguments.


This court has observed that the lower court recognized the petitioner’s entitlement to half of the property that is to be confiscated. The lower court also decided that half of the expenses for the benefits of the children shall be deducted from the share that will be confiscated. However, it did not state anything in reference to the petitioner’s right to have preferential claim to buy part of the property that will be confiscated. The lower court calculated the children’s medical needs, education and transportation needed for six months. As to their clothing and food, the court calculated the expenses until they reach majority. It determined Birr 1,500 per month for these necessities.

With regard to the petitioner’s request for a preferential right to buy the property, Article 98(3) (d) of the Criminal Code does not clearly state that the innocent spouse shall have preferential claim to buy the property other than stating that confiscation due to conviction shall have no effect over the share of the innocent spouse of the person convicted. The current respondent has given its opinion in the lower court that it has no objection against the petitioner’s request. Thus, since there is no legal ground that prohibits this, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has found that it was not proper for the lower court to overlook the request.

In relation to the expense for the children’s education, medical needs and transportation, the lower court decided that the request was exaggerated and it determined an amount it found appropriate. Article 98(3)(b) of the Criminal Code states that confiscation shall not affect “such amount of foodstuffs and of money as are necessary for the support of the family of the [offender] for a period of not less than six months or for such longer period as the Court, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and for reasons to be given in its judgment, considers just”. It can be understood from the content and spirit of this provision that the amount of foodstuffs and of money necessary for the support of the family of the offender for a period of not less than six months shall not be affected by confiscation and there could be instances where the period can be longer than six months.

Thus, it is clear that the court can neither reduce the period nor allow deduction (from the property that is to be confiscated) for longer than six months. It cannot also allow deduction for purposes that are not expressly stated in the law. The main objective of the provision is to protect innocent family members of the convicted person, rehabilitate the offender and to deter others from committing similar crimes. These go in line with the objectives provided under Articles 1 and 87 of the Criminal Code. Thus, Article 98(3)(d) determines the period as six months, and this does not take into consideration the long term needs of the convicted person’s family.

With regard to the complaint of the petitioner that the amount calculated for six months is inadequate, this court has found that the issue falls under the


power of the lower courts and that it does not fall under this court’s jurisdiction in accordance with Article 80(3) (a) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of the Proclamation No. 25/1996. The request thus falls outside this court’s function whose mandate is to look into whether there exists a fundamental error of law in court decisions.

In relation to the children’s best interest in the realms of education and medical needs, this court has found the request stated in the petition unacceptable because the lower court has, in accordance with the law, determined an amount they would need for six months. No evidence was presented supporting the claim that their needs are in jeopardy after the lapse of the six months.

Therefore, there is no fundamental error of law in the lower court’s decision which considered only six months in calculating the expenses for the children’s medical needs and education. The court has rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court, File No. 175740 rendered

on Hamle 20, 2003 EC (July 27, 2011) and confirmed by the decision of the Federal High Court File Number 115859 on Megabit 21, 2004 EC (March 30, 2012) is amended in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The preferential claim of the petitioner to buy the property half of which she owns as common property shall be protected as the respondent has no objection on the matter.

3. With regard to expenses for the children’s medical needs, education and transportation, this court has, in light of Article 98(3)(d), found no fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower court that calculated the amount for the period of six months.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp 261-264 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Seida Debele -v.- Sherif Shekur Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 73041 (June 29, 2012)

Holding of the Court After a judgement regarding common property of a husband and a wife, the court that executes the partition of this property cannot close the file simply because the property does not have a title deed.

Articles 225(2), 423, 392(1) and 371(1) of the Civil Procedure Code

_____________


Sene 22, 2004 E.C. (June 29, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,

Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Seida Debele Respondent: Sherif Shikur


Judgment The case started at the Federal First Instance Court, and relates to execution of a judgement which involved the partition of a house between the petitioner and the respondent placed on 800 square meters land. The parties have indicated different demarcations of the area and the land does not have a title deed. Owing to these factors and taking into consideration the statements of the Land Administration Authority and the Kebele [the lowest administrative organ of the government] on the difficulty of partitioning or selling the property, the court closed the file stating that the execution of the judgement could not proceed. Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner appealed to the Federal High Court which confirmed the decision of the lower court.

This petition against the Federal High Court’s decision is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The petitioner claims that the decision of the lower courts to close the file has fundamental error of law and should be corrected by this Division stating that her pleading was filed to


execute the judgement rendered for the partition of the common property obtained during the marriage she had with the respondent.

The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined the issue without the presence of the respondent, because the petitioner declared under oath that the former declined to receive the summons taken by her.

As examined by this Division, a judgement has been rendered that the house which was found difficult for partitioning is common property of the parties. It is understood from the arguments made by the petitioner at the lower court and this Division that the land and the house have been in the possession of the parties for a long time. The lower court decided to close the execution file stating that the house and land can neither be sold by auction nor be partitioned between the parties in accordance with the judgement, based on the statements it received from the Land Administration Authority and the Kebele that the property does not have title deeds.

It has been stated under Article 378 of the Civil Procedure Code that “[w]here the holder of a decree wishes to execute it, he shall apply to the court which passed such decree to issue process for its execution”. The court is then expected to take the response of the judgement-debtor and pass appropriate order as per Article 386 of the same Code.

As can be understood from the readings of Articles 225(2) and 423 of the Civil Procedure Code, the property of the petitioner and the respondent on which judgement is passed shall be partitioned equally, or where that is found to be difficult, it shall be sold so that the money can be divided equally among the parties. Even if the property does not have a title deed, special markers and adjacent features which help to demarcate the area covered by an immovable property may be taken into account, so as to give order for the judgement-debtor and judgement-creditor to divide the property equally among themselves, and where this is not possible, for the property to be sold through auction.

According to Article 392(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, a court which examines judgement execution has the power and obligation to proceed with the execution of the decree in a manner required by the nature of the relief granted. Accordingly, the act of the Federal First Instance Court contradicts with the powers of the court accorded under Articles 371(1) and 392(1) of the Civil Procedure Code because it has unduly closed the execution file stating that administrative organs of the state have written to it that the common property of the petitioner and respondent, which are subjects of the execution, do not have title deeds. Moreover, the order of the Federal High Court which confirmed the lower court’s decision, without correcting it, has fundamental error of law.



Court are reversed. 2. The case is remanded to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance

with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that the court can, as per Article 392(1), re-examine the matter and pass the necessary order to execute the judgement.


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 596 – 597 Abridged translation: Tewodros Dawit


Leulseged Atlabachew et al -v.- Flora Eco Power Plc & Flora Eco Power Labour Union


Holding of the Court: - An auction marred by material irregularity can be set aside. - Article 435 is the relevant provision that can be invoked to set aside

sale of movable property, whereas Article 445 applies if an auction that involves immovable property is marred by material irregularity.

Articles 435 and 445 of Civil Procedure Code _____________

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Cassation File No. 70378

Tir 4, 2004 E.C (January 13, 2012)


Petitioners: Leulseged Atlabachew et al Respondents: 1. Flora Eco-power Plc. 2. Flora Eco-power Employees Association

Judgment This case involves execution of a decree, and began in east Harerge Zone High Court. The petitioners bought motor vehicles and machinery of the first respondent when the sale was put on auction. But, the sale is set aside and the petitioners are ordered to return back the property by the court since the auction is found by the court to have been marred by irregularities. The petitioners lodged an appeal to the Oromia Supreme Court. But, their appeal to the regular bench of Oromia Supreme Court and their petition to the Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench were rejected.

They have brought their petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division stating that they bought the motor vehicles properly at the auction. The petitioners contested that the lower court has erred in setting aside the sale without giving them the chance to respond to the case. They further argued that the court erred by applying Article 445 Civil Procedure Code rather than Art 435, and that it is an error to set aside the sale without the issuance of an order with regard to the money the petitioners have paid for the sale.


The respondents argued that the sale was conducted without ascertaining the value of the property and without proper publication. They contended that the lower courts have proved that the property was bought by the judgment creditor indirectly through the petitioners. The respondents argued that the lower courts have duly set aside the sale and there is no error of law. The applicants have attached their counter reply.

This court has investigated the case by framing the issue whether the setting aside of the auction by the lower courts was appropriate based on Article 435 of the Civil Procedure Code. This provision stipulates that “no irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale of movable property shall vitiate the sale”. But if damage is sustained, legal action for compensation on the person liable can be brought. On the other hand, based on the gravity of the irregularity, the sale can be set aside and the buyer may be forced to return the property. Therefore, the argument of the petitioners that sale of movable property by auction cannot be set aside is not tenable in light of the law and fairness.

The decisions of the lower courts are thus based on Article 435 of the Civil Procedure Code and they do not have fundamental error of law. In fact, the lower courts should not have cited Art 445 of the Civil Procedure Code which is applicable for sale of immovable property. But, this does not alter the validity of the conclusion because setting aside the auction was appropriate. In connection with a similar case, the judgment creditors had brought a petition to this bench and the decisions of lower courts were confirmed in File No. 64628. In the case at hand, material irregularity was proved in the auction in a manner that warrants the setting aside of the sale by the lower courts. Therefore, no fundamental error of law is made by the lower courts.

Decree 1. The decision of Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Bench rendered in File

No. 124624, the decision of Oromia Supreme Court regular bench and the decision of East Harerge Zonal High Court are affirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The lower courts have duly concluded that an auction which is marred by material irregularity can be set aside.


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 585-587 Abridged translation: Yoseph Aemero


Atatu Kebede -v.-Steps at Educational PLC Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 59301 (May 12, 2011)

Holding of the Court: - Execution of judgement shall be in accordance with the decree

rendered originally by the court. Accordingly, execution should be guided by the decree unless the latter is changed by an appeal or unless other legal grounds (expressly stated in the law) warrant non-execution.

- The execution of a decree cannot be changed or revoked by merely alleging that the decision is erroneous.

Articles 378 and 386 of the Civil Procedure Code

_______________


Ginbot 4, 2003 E.C (May 12, 2011)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, AlmawWolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Atatu Kebede Respondent: Steps at Educational PLC


Judgment The case started in the Federal Instance Court where the current petitioner was the plaintiff in a suit filed against Steps School. In her statement of claim, the petitioner stated that she had a contract of employment to teach at Steps School starting from Meskerem 1998 EC (September 2005) earning a monthly salary of Birr 1,050.00 (one thousand fifty). She stated that she worked at the school until she was unlawfully dismissed by the current respondent on Tikimt 23, 2002 EC (November 2, 2009), and claimed payments she is entitled to receive because of such dismissal.

In its statement of defence, the current respondent raised a preliminary objection arguing that the suit should be amended and be brought against Steps


at Educational PLC, as Steps School was the name of another legal person during the time stated as the petitioner’s period of employment, and that the petitioner was not an employee at Steps School. As a substantive argument, the respondent (defendant at the lower court) argued that the School has ceased operating and thus will only provide a response concerning its respective responsibility. The Federal First Instance Court decided that the requested payments should be made to the petitioner stating that the petitioner started working with one of the spouses, while the married couple had the school as common property, and should not be deprived of her rights even if the common property was divided among the husband and wife as a result of their divorce. The court found the dismissal as unlawful and stated that the spouse did not contest the fact that the petitioner was dismissed.

The respondent then brought an appeal to the Federal High Court challenging the decision of the Federal First Instance Court. The Federal High Court, after hearing the litigation of the parties, reversed the decision of the lower court stating that the business license of Steps at Educational School is cancelled, and that the respondent should not have been the only party to the suit because the managers and shareholders of the school should have been included.

The petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division seeks the decision of the Federal High Court to be reversed on the ground that it has unduly reversed the decision of the Federal First Instance court by having erroneously considered the two schools as one, while in fact Steps School in which the petitioner was employed is different from Steps at Educational School which is now dissolved. The Cassation Division found that the petition can be adjudicated even if the respondent’s business licence is revoked.

As the respondent did not receive the summons, the suit was heard ex-parte. The Cassation Division then examined the decision in the light of what was substantively proven at the lower court and the relevant law.

The person who was sued as the alleged owner of Step School argued that the petitioner filed the suit against Steps School, while the suit should not have been brought against this school, as the petitioner started working with the School named Steps at Educational PLC, which was common property of the spouses until it was divided among them as a result of a divorce proceeding.

The lower court proved that, even after the property was divided among the husband and wife, the petitioner continued working as a teacher with Steps School, which was the property of the wife (Madam Push Palata), and that it ordered payments to be made to the petitioner, and it was proved that this school did not contest the fact that it dismissed the petitioner.


The decision of the lower court was sustained by the other courts and an application for execution of judgement was submitted based on which an execution file was opened under File No. 16902. An order of decree execution was also given to the judgment debtor Steps School. The Federal High Court, to which an appeal was brought from the order for the execution of the decree given by the Federal First Instance Court, reversed the decision of the lower court after hearing the litigation of the petitioner and the appellant (current respondent) Steps at Educational PLC. The Federal High Court relieved the respondent from liability stating that one should not be liable merely because he was the manager of the school which has ceased operating due to the cancellation of its business license.

The Cassation Division has further noted from the litigation of the parties that the institution mentioned by the appellant at the High Court (current respondent) and the institution which was held liable by the First Instance Court in its order for execution of judgment are different.

By virtue of Article 378 and the subsequent provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, execution of judgment shall be in accordance with the decree rendered originally by the court. Accordingly, execution should be guided by the decree unless the latter is changed on appeal or unless other legal grounds warrant non-execution as per Article 386 of the Civil Procedure Code. The execution of a decree cannot thus be changed or revoked by merely alleging that the decision is erroneous. Rather, such measures require having the court decision (which is the basis of the execution order) changed through appeal/cassation procedure by a court of law.

In the case at hand, the Federal High Court reversed the order of the lower court stating that the manager should not be held solely responsible on behalf of an institution which has stopped working. The Cassation Division noted that this decision of the High Court departs from the main decree which should have been executed, and it observed that this issue was raised and rejected during the litigation.

Moreover, as the decree of the Federal First Instance Court was not changed in the upper court in accordance with the relevant procedure, the decision of the Federal High Court did not pursue the appropriate procedures with regard to the manner in which a decree is executed, as it, in an execution file, reversed the decision of the lower court rendered after adjudication. This Cassation Division has thus found that the decision of the Federal High Court has fundamental error of law.


Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High Court, File No. 93697, Sene 24, 2002

E.C (July 1, 2010) is reversed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The execution order given by the Federal First Instance Court, File No. 16902, is affirmed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, as per Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, this case is remanded to the First Instance Court so that it can continue with executing the decision as part of the main judgment.

...


________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 451 – 453. Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey


Mohammed Ismail - v.- Mohammed Ahmed Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 32143 (October 28, 2008)

Holding of the Court: - Opposition is filed to oppose a judgment already given before the court of

rendition by the person who is not a party to the suit but who could or should have been made a party.

- Objection to attachment can be submitted to the court which directs the execution process, but any objection or claim which is designedly or unnecessarily delayed is not acceptable

Articles 358 and 418 of the Civil Procedure Code _______________


Tikimt 18, 2001 E.C (October 28, 2008)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Teshager G/Selasie, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Mohammed Ismail Respondent: Mohammed Ahmed

Judgment

This execution process began in Somali Regional State Jijiga High Court where the petitioner as a judgment creditor brought execution proceedings against the respondent (judgment debtor). The respondent’s house was put on auction but no one appeared during the bid to buy the house. Therefore, the court ordered that the house be delivered to the petitioner with a view to executing the decree. The respondent appealed to the higher court but his appeal was dismissed and the respondent was ordered by the court which rendered the decision to deliver the house to the petitioner.

However, the Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division decided that the house should not be delivered to the petitioner stating that the respondent and other six persons have submitted opposition in accordance with Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code.

A cassation petition is brought to this bench against the decision of the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Division. Summon was issued for the respondent but failed to appear and the hearing was conducted ex parte. The


Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has examined whether the Regional State’s Cassation Bench has erred under Art 358 of Civil Procedure Code when it reversed the decision of the delivery of the house.

The respondent is judgment-debtor for a sum of money owed to the petitioner. He failed to pay the debt and execution order is given on his house. He appealed to the Regional Supreme Court and got a reversal order. But the order of the regular bench of the Regional Supreme Court was reversed by the Cassation Bench of the same court and the execution process was underway. The respondent then brought an opposition based on Art 358 of Civil Procedure Code to the Regional State’s Cassation Bench. It is on the basis of this opposition that the Regional State’s Cassation Bench issued another order.

An opposition under Art 358 is lodged to oppose a judgment already given and it can be filed only by a person who was not a party to the litigation. The respondent was a party to the litigation and is judgment-debtor. Therefore, he shall not be entitled to bring opposition under the law.

With regard to the other persons who brought the opposition by stating that the house is their joint property through inheritance, they could have lodged their opposition to Jijiga High Court which initially adjudicated the case. Article 418 of the Civil Procedure Code allows such objections if the objection was not designedly or unnecessarily delayed. In this case, the objection is lodged to the regional Cassation Bench rather than regional High Court which is in charge of the execution process. On the other hand, the parties who filed the objection to the execution did not present their opposition while the case was being examined at Jijiga High Court, the regional Supreme Court and the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Bench. They remained silent for a long time. An opposition which is designedly or unnecessarily delayed is not acceptable. Therefore, the Somali Regional State Supreme Court Cassation Bench has made fundamental error of law by investigating an opposition which is brought in the context of design and unnecessary delay contrary to Art 418(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Somali Regional State Supreme Court

Cassation Bench in File No. M.G.12/99 on June 27, 2007 is reversed. 2. The case is remanded to the Jijiga Zonal High Court to continue the

execution process in accordance with order given on Sene 26, 1998 (July 3, 2006) in File No. 15/95. …

Signature of five justices _______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 8, pp. 382-383 Abridged translation: Yoseph Aemero

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 12: Jurisdiction 215

12. Jurisdiction

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Wasihun Mekonnen’s spouse & heirs v. Agency for Government Houses

43511

2013 14 211-215

2 Weldai Zeru et al (71 plaintiffs) v. Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority

51790 2011 12 482-485

3 Ethiopian Electric Power Corp. v. Dragados Const.

42928 2010 10 262-263

4 Nigist H. v. Legessie A. 37339 2009 9 101- 103

5 Office of the Patriarchate v. Mezgebu Belayneh

34440 2008 9 85-86

6 Assefa B. v. Military Prosecutor 33368 2008 9 89-91


Wasihun Mekonnen’s Spouse and Heirs -v.- Agency for Government Houses


Holding of the Court: Executive bodies that have quasi judicial power shall not disregard the right to be heard in a suit. The decisions of the House of Federation are always final and they should be observed by the concerned parties.

Articles 62 (1) and 37 of the Constitution; Articles 3(1) and 56(1) of Proclamation No. 251/2001; Articles 8 and 9 of Proclamation No. 87/1986 E.C.; Articles 337, 338 and 339 of the Civil Procedure Code

______________


Tikimt 23, 2005 E.C. (November 2, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie, Teklit Yimsel

Petitioners: Heirs and wife of the deceased Ato Wasihun Mekonnen 1. W/tsadiq Deme 2. Meseret Wasihun 3. Tesfaye Wasihun 4. Abebe Wasihun 5. Fasika Wasihun 6. Yeshimebet Wasihun 7. Teshome Wasihun 8. Hana Wasihun

Respondent: Agency for Government Houses

After having examined the case, the following judgment is rendered.


Judgment The case involves a request for the return of a business premise which began at the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. On October 24, 1995, the father of the current second to eighth petitioners stated that House No. 703 located in Addis Ababa, Wereda 7, Kebelle 34 was his business premise which was illegally confiscated by the Derg Government. He had submitted the document that proved his ownership of the property and many other documents to prove that the premise was confiscated unlawfully.

The petition was submitted to the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. The Rented Houses Administration (currently renamed Agency of Government Houses) responded that the house is state-owned. However, there was no evidence that can show how it ended up being public property. After examining the case and hearing both sides, the Ethiopian Privatization Agency decided on January 23, 2001, File No. 20/12/497/9987/93 that the business premise shall be returned to the father of the current petitioners.

The Rented Houses Agency appealed to the Board of the Privatization Agency. The Board reversed the decision of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. The current petitioners then brought the case to the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court. However, before the case reached this bench, it was decided [upon preliminary screening of admissible cassation petitions] that the decision of the Board was an administrative one and that the court does not have jurisdiction to decide whether or not the decision had a fundamental error of law. The case was closed on April 29, 2009.

The current petitioners, then, took the case to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry stating that the case raises a constitutional matter. However, their petition was not accepted. They further took the case to the FDRE House of Federation. The House examined the case and unanimously decided that since the Board of Privatization Agency has quasi judicial power, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to see the case according to Article 37 and 80(3) (a) of the Constitution, Arts. 2(3) and 5(3) of Proclamation No 110/1987 E.C., and Art. 8(5) of Proclamation 87/1986 E.C.

The case was presented to this bench to determine whether the procedures followed by the Board of Privatization Agency to reach at its decision, on the case brought to it as per Article 8(5) of Proclamation No. 87/1986 E.C., was appropriate. The respondent was summoned and in its argument, it was stated that the court does not have jurisdiction over the matter. It also added that the procedure followed by the Board was correct and there was no legal ground for the business premise to be returned to the petitioners. Thus, it requested for the petition to be turned down. The petitioners have, then, submitted their counter-reply strengthening their petition.


This court has examined the case in light of the relevant provisions of the law and based on the arguments of both sides. This court has found that the major issues of the case are the following:

1. Whether this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the matter;

2. If so, whether the procedure followed by the Board of the Privatization Agency to render its decision on November 7, 2008 was appropriate.

Regarding the First Issue:

The decision of the Board of Privatization Agency was made on November 7, 2008. The petitioners submitted their petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court on February16, 2009. However, the case was rejected stating that this court does not have jurisdiction over the matter to determine whether the decision has a fundamental error of law, as it is an administrative decision. The case finally reached the House of Federation that returned the case to this court deciding that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the matter.

According to Article 62(1) of the Constitution, the House of Federation is the organ that has the power to interpret the Constitution. Article 3(1) of Proclamation No. 251/2001 on the Consolidation of the House of Federation and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities further confirms the power of the House to Interpret the Constitution.

Article 56(1) of this proclamation states that decisions of the House on matters submitted to it shall be final and Article 56(2) requires the concerned parties to observe and execute decisions of the House. According to this power given to it, the House examined the case presented to it and decided that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court had the jurisdiction to handle the case. According to Article 56 of Proclamation No. 251/2001, this decision is final and should be observed by all the parties concerned. Therefore, this court has found that the objection of the respondent that the court does not have jurisdiction does not go in line with the decision of the House and Article 56 of Proclamation No. 251/2001. Regarding the Second Issue: It has been gathered from the case that the Board of the Privatization Agency reversed the decision of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency without giving the current petitioners the chance to present their arguments and evidence. On the other hand, the current respondent is arguing that this action of the Board was in line with the directives of the Board that were enacted according to Proclamation 87/1986 EC.


Article 8 of Proclamation 87/1986 EC, the legislation that deals with the establishment of the Privatization Agency, provides the powers and duties of the Board. According to Article 8(5) of this proclamation, the Board can accept appeals against the decisions of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. This provision does not show any procedural step the Board should follow in making its decisions. Nonetheless, Article 9(4) of the same proclamation provides that the Board can enact its own procedures regarding meetings of the Board. On the other hand, it has been decided by this court in File No. 63627 that as the Board has quasi judicial power, its decisions should be enforced. According to Article 2(1) of Proclamation No. 454/1997, this interpretation has mandatory precedence over interpretation of laws. Here, it should be noted that since the Board has quasi judicial power, it should follow the procedures of the law in making its decisions.

However, there is no specific procedural law designed for guiding organs with quasi judicial power in making their decisions. Nevertheless, they are still required to respect the Right to Access Justice, the right to be heard and the right to be treated equally that are enshrined in the Constitution. One other right protected by the Constitution is the right to defend oneself and present evidence. If a person is not given the chance to defend himself, his right to access justice stated under Article 37 of the Constitution is not protected. Therefore, the right to be heard should be protected in the process of making decisions. It can be understood from the spirit and content of the Constitution and other related legislation such as the Civil Procedure Code, that the right to be heard should be protected starting from the initial point until the case reaches the final decision-making judicial organ. Moreover, the spirit and content of Articles 337, 338 and 339 of the Civil Procedure Code and other provisions dealing with evidence show that appellate judicial bodies, either regular courts or bodies with quasi judicial power, shall not make any decision without ensuring that the right to be heard is protected.

Coming to the case at hand, the fact that the Board of Privatization Agency reached its decision in the absence of the parties is not challenged by the respondent. The respondent argues that Articles 8(1) to 8(6) and Articles 9(1) to 9(4)(3) of the executive directive of the board provide detailed procedures dealing with registration of petitions, examination and decision-making. Therefore, since it has its own special procedural rules, it cannot be concluded that there is a fundamental error of law in the decision of the Board merely because it did not follow the procedural rules of regular courts.

This directive should be based on Article 9 of Proclamation No. 87/1986 EC that deals with meetings of the Board. Under the English version of sub-Article 4 of this provision, it is stated that the Board may determine its own rules of procedure. However, the Amharic version of the provision states that


the Board may determine its own rules of procedure for its meetings. From this provision, it can be understood that the Proclamation does not deal with hearing of cases and the rights of parties to be heard. Article 9(4) deals with procedures of meetings of the Board.

Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the directive was enacted by an authorized body to allow the Board to disregard the right to be heard during an appeal. Even if, it can be said that the directive was enacted by an appropriate organ, it can be understood from the content and spirit of the directive that it was not meant to curb the right to be heard. It was simply a means to let the Board devise its own work management. Any other procedural rule contravenes Article 37 of the Constitution. Moreover, it would erode the basic foundation of the right to access justice and the right to be heard that are enshrined in the International Conventions Ethiopia is signatory to. Here, it is obvious that the Board of the Agency made its decisions without having regard to the right of the parties to be heard. This, of course, goes against the rules stated in the Civil Procedure Code and this clearly qualifies as a fundamental error of law. This court, according to the powers given to it by Article 80(3) (a) of the Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation 25/1996, has decided that the decision of the Board has a fundamental error of law. Thus, the following decree has been delivered.

Decree 1. The decision of the Board of Privatization Agency made on November 7,

2008 that House No. 703 located in Addis Ababa, Wereda 7, Kebelle 34, should not be returned to the father of the current petitioners, Ato Wasihun Mekonnen, is reversed because it violates the right of the petitioner to be heard.

2. The case is remanded to the Board of the Privatization Agency as per Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it shall review the decision made on Tir 15, 1993 E.C. (January 23, 2001) File No. 20/N2/497/9987/93 in the presence of the petitioners and determine whether or not the decision was appropriate.

…. Signatures of five justices

_____________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 14, pp. 211-215 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Weldai Zeru et al –v.- Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority


Holding of the Court - Courts have no jurisdiction over administrative matters which have been

finally decided by administrative organs as determined by the law. - A dismissed employee of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority

has no right to be reinstated by the decision of any judicial organ.

Articles 37(1) and 79(1) of the Constitution; Article 19(1) (b) of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority

Establishment Proclamation No. 587/2008; Articles 37(1) and 37(2) of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority

Employees Administration Council of Ministers Regulation No 155/2008; Article 4 of the Civil Procedure Code.

______________

Cassation File No. 51790 Ginbot 16, 2003 E.C. (May 24, 2011)



Petitioners: Weldai Zeru et al


The Court has consolidated this file with File Numbers 51789, 51792, 51794, 51798, 53301, 53460 and 57247 since they involve similar issues of law. The court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The petitioners initiated the case at the Administrative Tribunal of the Federal Civil Service Agency due to their dismissal. The legal provision invoked by the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority for their dismissal is Article 37(1) of (the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Employee Administration) Council of Ministers Regulation No 155/2008. They


complained that the respondent failed to assign them according to its new business process re-engineering but paid them salary for 11 months and unlawfully dismissed them. They requested the Tribunal to order the respondent to re-instate them. Alternatively, they requested the Tribunal to ensure that their right to be heard be respected by requiring the respondent to provide the reasons for their dismissal.

The respondent argued before the Administrative Tribunal that the dismissal of the petitioners was appropriate because it was based on Article 19(1)(b) of Proclamation No. 587/2008 and Article 37(1) of Regulation No. 155/2008. The Tribunal dismissed the case by majority vote. The petitioners’ appeal to the Federal Supreme Court Appellate Division was also dismissed.

The petitioners argued before this Court that their dismissal from work by the respondent violates their right of access to justice guaranteed in the Constitution of the FDRE, and that the decision of the lower courts contains basic error of law. In principle, Article 37(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone “has the right to bring a justiciable matter to, and to obtain a decision or judgement by, a court of law or any other competent body with judicial power”. It is also clear from this provision that courts have jurisdiction to determine matters which have not been given to other organs by law.

Ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain or determine matters that have been settled by administrative decisions or that should have been submitted for determination to administrative organs. Laws that give power to some administrative organs to determine certain matters should be respected. Since judicial power is granted by law, interpretation should be made within the purview of that law. Article 4 of the Civil Procedure Code also shows that courts have no jurisdiction over matters expressly barred by other laws. A cumulative reading of Articles 79(1) and 37 of the Constitution reveals that courts have power to entertain and determine only justiciable matter.

In the present case, Proclamation No. 587/2008 establishes the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority. Article 19(1)(b) of the Proclamation reads “Notwithstanding the provisions of the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 515/2007… the administration of the employees of the Authority shall be governed by regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers.” Based on the Proclamation, the Council of Ministers issued Regulation No. 155/2008. Article 37(1) of the Regulation empowers the Director to dismiss any employee who is suspected of corruption and who has lost the Director’s confidence without following regular disciplinary procedures. An employee dismissed according to this procedure does not have a right to be reinstated by decision of any judicial body as per Article 37(2).


According to the principle of separation of powers, the legislative branch of a government has the power to make laws. Laws enacted by a legislature are called primary legislation while laws enacted by appropriate organs are called subsidiary legislation. When it considers necessary to implement primary legislation, a legislature may give the power to issue detailed subsidiary legislation to an appropriate organ for technical, economic and social reasons. This practice is clear since it is supported by laws and reasons.

The Council of Ministers issued Regulation No. 155/2008 based on the power entrusted to it by the legislature. Article 37 of the Regulation shows that reinstatement of a dismissed employee or the right to be heard under such circumstances is not a justiciable matter. The petitioners were dismissed according to the system put in place by the legislature. Their request to be reinstated or to be heard is not justiciable.

According to the content and spirit of Article 19(1)(b) of Proclamation No. 587/2008 and Article 37(1) and (2) of the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 155/2008, the majority decision of the Administrative Tribunal that the petitioners’ request to be reinstated or to be heard was not justiciable respects executive prerogative. Therefore, it does not contain a fundamental error of law.

Decree The decision of the Federal Civil Service Administrative Tribunal has been affirmed.

...


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 12, pp. 482-485 Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali


Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation –v.- Dragados Construction


Holding of the Court A company incorporated according to foreign law is liable before Ethiopian courts for torts it commits although it is not established or registered in Ethiopia.

Articles 11(2)(a) of the Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/1996; Article 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

______________

Cassation File No. 42928 Ginbot 16, 2003 E.C. (January 20, 2010)


Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation

Respondent: Dragados Construction


Judgment The case relates to extra-contractual liability and it was initiated at the Federal First Instance Court. The petitioner sued the respondent and claimed compensation of Birr 25,569.85 (twenty five thousand five hundred sixty nine Birr and eighty five cents) for causing damage to its property while constructing road in Addis Ababa. In its preliminary objection, the respondent submitted that it was a foreign company incorporated according to Greek law and its address was Athens; and that it is not registered in Ethiopia. It argued that the lower court had no jurisdiction since the suit involved questions of private international law, i.e. the area of the law that deals with the issue of the law that is applicable to the case and the court that has jurisdiction. The Court accepted the respondent’s preliminary objection and dismissed the case. On

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Ch. 12: Jurisdiction 225

appeal, the Federal High Court dismissed the case as per Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The petitioner argued before this Court that the decisions of the lower courts have incorrectly invoked Article 11(2)(a) of Proclamation No. 25/1996, and contain a basic error of law as the respondent caused the damage while carrying out its activities in Ethiopia. It argued that suits concerning damage to property should to be filed according to the laws of and in the courts of the country where the damage has taken place.

It is clear from the records that the suit was based on provisions of extra-contractual liability. This court has observed that the respondent caused the damage while working in Ethiopia and that the suit was filed in the court of the place where the property was situated and where the damage was caused. Thus, the suit should be filed in a court of the place where the property was situated and damage was caused since it concerns damage to property. The amount of the claim and material jurisdiction based on that amount should be taken into consideration. This is clearly indicated under Article 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore the decision of the First Instance Court that disclaimed jurisdiction by incorrectly relying on Article 11(2)(a) of Proclamation No. 25/1996 and dismissed the petitioner’s claim, and the appellate decision of the Federal High Court contain fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court affirmed by the Federal

High Court on appeal is reversed according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The case is remanded to the Federal First Instance Court according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code since it has jurisdiction. It should accept the claim of the petitioner, hear the remaining arguments of the parties and render appropriate judgment.

….


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 10, pp. 262-263 Abridged translation: Abdi Jibril Ali


Nigist H. –v.- Legesse A.


Holding of the Court The Federal High Court has jurisdiction over suits concerning partition of property situated outside Ethiopia upon divorce.

Article 37 of the Constitution; Article 4 of Proclamation No. 25/1996.

______________


Tir 28, 2001 E.C. (February 5, 2009)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hirut Mellese, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Belachew Anshiso, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Nigist H. Respondent: Legesse A.


Judgement The petitioner was a plaintiff when a suit for divorce and division of common property was initiated at the Federal First Instance Court. The parties had common property in Ethiopia and in the United States. The Court heard arguments of both sides and divided the property situated in Ethiopia between them. It held that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction over property situated in the United States.

The petitioner submitted her claim for division of common property in the United States to the Federal High Court while the respondent objected to this claim. The Federal High Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it did not involve issues of private international law; and that there was no procedure for separately entertaining the division of property found in the United States. The


petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Supreme Court was dismissed according to Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The petitioner argued before this Court that the Federal High Court’s decision in dismissing her claim for the division of a saving of $9,713.12 (nine thousand seven hundred and thirteen USD and twelve cents) which was common property in the United States contains a basic error of law because it involved issues of private international law. She also argued that the matter has not been finally decided as both courts disclaimed jurisdiction. In his reply, the respondent argued that the petitioner did not follow appropriate procedures since she filed new suit in the Federal High Court instead of appealing against the decision of the Federal Instance Court. He further submitted that the decisions of the lower courts do not contain a basic error of law since the petitioner filed a suit on a matter that has been finally decided.

Based on the arguments of the parties presented above, this Court has framed the following issues.

1. Whether the matter been finally decided; 2. Whether it is appropriate for the lower courts to adjudicate the

petitioner’s claim and request.

With regard to the first issue, the Federal First Instance Court heard the arguments of the parties regarding the property situated in Ethiopia and it decided that the common property in Ethiopia should be divided between petitioner and the respondent, whereas it held that the claim for the division of common property situated in the United States involves issues of private international law for which it does not have jurisdiction thereby sending the file to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court dismissed the petitioner’s claim on the ground that there was no procedure for entertaining the matter that had been partially decided by the lower court since the petitioner instituted a new suit based on its jurisdiction according to Proclamation No. 25/1996. The matter that relates to the partition of the property in the United States has not been decided because both courts disclaimed jurisdiction.

Regarding the second issue, both courts left the petitioner’s claim for division of common property undecided by disclaiming jurisdiction. According to Article 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, “[e]veryone has the right of access to justice by bringing a justiciable matter to a court of law or any other competent body with judicial power”. The petitioner has a constitutional right to bring her claim for division of common property situated abroad and to obtain justice. However, by disclaiming jurisdiction, the lower courts made decisions that violate this constitutional right of the petitioner.


Although the Federal High Court decided that the suit involves issues of private international law, it rejected the petitioner’s claim stating that the issue of common property has been adjudicated, albeit wrongly, at the Federal First Instance Court. This decision of the Federal High Court contains error since it is contrary to the power vested in the court by virtue of Article 4 of Proclamation No. 25/1996 and it violates the petitioner’s right of access to justice guaranteed by the Constitution. This decision of the Federal High Court and its confirmation by the Federal Supreme Court’s Appellate Division thus contain a basic error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High Court is reversed. 2. The decision of the Federal Supreme Court is reversed. 3. The case is remanded to the Federal High Court according to Article 341(1)

of the Civil Procedure Code so that it shall decide the matter after adjudication by examining the claim and evidence of the petitioner and the reply and evidence of the respondent.

…




Office of the Patriarchate –v.- Mezgebu Belayneh


Holding of the Court As teaching of qinie is a direct spiritual service, it cannot be adjudicated in labour benches.

Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003 ______________




Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Supreme Office of the Patriarchate Respondent: Megabi Mistir Mezgebu Belayneh


Judgment The petitioner was a defendant in a case filed by the current respondent who was the plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court. The plaintiff had been a teacher of qinie and aquaquam since 1957 E.C. (1965) in South Wollo until 7 July 1994 when he was transferred to Addis Ababa by the decision of the respondent. He requested the lower court to order the respondent to pay him salary which was interrupted since 7 July 1994 together with the cost incurred due to litigation. In its preliminary objection, the petitioner (defendant at the lower court) argued that the lower court had no jurisdiction and that the claim was barred by period of limitation. It also argued that the plaintiff (current respondent) had been giving service in another Church in Addis Ababa and he had been paid. It stated that another person (who receives payment for the task) has been assigned to the respondent’s previous position. The lower court held that the plaintiff should be paid salary. On appeal, the Federal High Court confirmed the judgment.


The petitioner argued before this Court that the lower courts did not have jurisdiction and that the respondent’s claim was barred by a period of limitation since it was made after 12 years. In his reply, the respondent argued that the lower courts have jurisdiction and that his claim was not barred by limitation since he did not request payment of arrears. This court has examined whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.

The petitioner argued that the matter should not be entertained by an organ hearing labour disputes since the respondent was providing spiritual service as a qinie teacher. The lower court rejected this argument on the ground that the respondent’s service cannot be considered as direct spiritual service related to the religious institution although the respondent did not argue that his service was not spiritual and was not related to the religious institution. The fact that the respondent was providing spiritual service as a qinie teacher was not a fact in issue. Therefore, the conclusion of the lower court was not based on the arguments of the parties.

In its decision of May 12, 2006 rendered on cassation File No 18419, this Court divided employees of religious institutions into two and determined the application of the Labour Proclamation thereto. The Labour Proclamation does not apply to disputes between a religious institution and its employees such as priest, kahin and deacon who provide services that are directly related to the religious organisation and that cannot be disassociated from the religion. The conclusion of the Cassation Division was based on the reasoning that individuals who provide spiritual services should fulfil the special criteria in the religion since their services emanate from the religion or from the belief followed by the religious institution and are inseparably linked to the religion.

The respondent was able to be employed as a qinie teacher because he fulfilled the special criteria provided by the petitioner’s belief and it is clear that the nature of the respondent’s service has direct relationship with spiritual services. By assimilating services of a qinie teacher to services rendered by an accountant, property administrator, statistical worker, etc and holding that qinie teaching is not considered as a direct spiritual service is inappropriate.

As long as the respondent provides direct spiritual services, his dispute with the petitioner should not be determined by an organ that hears labour disputes. Rather, such dispute should be resolved according to dispute resolution mechanisms of the religious institution as per the judgment of this Division in the File cited stated above, i.e. File No. 18419. Therefore, the decisions of the lower courts contain a fundamental error of law.


Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court confirmed by the Federal

High Court has been reversed according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The respondent’s claim should be entertained according to dispute resolution mechanisms of the religious institution. There is no legal basis on which an organ hearing labour disputes entertains this case.

…..




Assefa Belay Zegeye - v.- Military Prosecutor


Holding of the Court Military courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases concerning members of the defence force who are on duty.

Articles 26, 27 and 28 of Proclamation No. 27/1996; Articles 2(9) and 26(1) of Proclamation No. 343/2003.

______________


Hidar 9, 2001 E.C. (November 18, 2008)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Teshager G/Selassie, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Assefa B. Respondent: Military Prosecutor


Judgement The present petitioner was a defendant in a criminal case based on Articles 386 and 642 of the 1957 Penal Code when the case was initiated in the Primary Military Court. The Court found the petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years of rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by the Appellate Military Court.

The issue before this Court was whether the suit against the petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of military courts. This requires examining the source of a certain court’s jurisdiction and the consequence of a court decision in a case that does not fall within its jurisdiction.

As courts are established by law, their jurisdiction emanates from that law. Any court has the responsibility to ascertain its jurisdiction before adjudicating a case. A decision of a court rendered without having jurisdiction does not have a legal basis.

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Ch. 12: Jurisdiction 233

In the present case, the military courts are established by the law which determines their jurisdiction. Proclamation No. 27/1996 establishes a Primary Military Court and an Appellate Military Court and states their jurisdiction under Articles 26, 27 and 28. Article 26 provides that the military courts have jurisdiction “over persons accused of military offences enumerated in the 1957 Penal Code (Articles 296-331, inclusive)”; “any offence committed by a member of the Defence Forces on combat duty”; “civilians deployed with members of the Defence Forces on combat duty abroad”; and “offences committed by prisoners-of-war”. Moreover, Article 28 provides that all the charges should be brought before the military courts where “one of the several offences an accused person is charged with comes under the jurisdiction of a military court”.

The petitioner relied on Article 26(1) and argued that the military courts do not have jurisdiction over his case. When this sub-Article is considered separately, it refers to only Articles 296-331 of the Penal Code and it does not include Articles 386 and 642 which are the basis of the charge against the petitioner. As a result, the argument of the petitioner appears to be valid. However, the provisions of sub-Articles (2), (3), and (4) show that the jurisdiction of the military courts is broader than what is indicated under sub-Article (1). For instance, the provision of sub-article (2) extends jurisdiction of the military courts to any offence committed by a member of the Defence Forces on combat duty without prejudice to sub-Article (1). That is why the argument of the petitioner is not tenable.

On the other hand, since the Proclamation does not define the word ‘combat’ and because the petitioner was charged with crimes related to financial administration, whether the petitioner committed the crime while on combat duty within the meaning of Article 26(2) is contentious.

Article 2 on interpretation and Article 26 on jurisdiction of the military courts are among the provisions of Proclamation No. 27/1996 that have been amended by Proclamation No. 343/2003. Article 2(9) of Proclamation No. 343/2003 defines ‘combat’ as ‘all military duties performed by a member of the Defence Force from the time of employment until discharged from service.’ Article 26(2) has also been amended as per the meaning given to the word ‘combat’ under Article 2(9) of Proclamation No. 343/2003. As a result, the jurisdiction of the military courts has expanded by the amendment. It is clear that the amendment was intended to bring all crimes committed by members of the Defence Forces within the jurisdiction of the military courts.

The petitioner was a member of the Defence Forces when he was said to have committed the crime. This means that he was on combat duty according to Article 2(9) of Proclamation No. 343/2003. Although the crimes said to have been committed by the petitioner do not fall under the provisions of the


Penal Code indicated under Article 26(1) of the Proclamation, they fall within the jurisdiction of the military courts since they were committed during the time of his employment and while he was carrying out combat duty. In sum, the military courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. Therefore, the decision which is the subject of this petition does not contain fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Appellate Military Court is affirmed according to

Article 195(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The argument of the petitioner is not tenable since the military courts have

jurisdiction over the case

...



Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 13: Labour Law 235

13. Labour Law

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Wesene Medical Service PLC v. K. A.

77134 2012 14 5-7

2 World Vision Ethiopia v. Mezemir M.

79105 2012 13 94-96

3 Mitiku H. v.Mesfin T. 67201 2012 13 64-65

4 SOS Children’s Village v. Kebede Kumsa et al

38435 2009 8 169-170

5 Addis Ababa Restaurant v. Yewibdar T.

37256 2008 8 116-118

6 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia v. Alemayehu Woldie

33314 2008 6 355-360


Wesene Medical Service PLC -v.- Kibrewesen A. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 77134 (October 18, 2012)


When an employee endangers the goodwill, profit and survival of the employer, the measure that should be taken must be examined in light of the specific demands and features of the profession of the employee and the spirit and objectives of the Labour Law. Article 27(1)(f) and (h) of Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003

______________

Cassation File No. 77134 Tikimt 8, 2005 E.C. (October 18, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Wesen Medical Services PLC Respondent: K.A.

Judgment The respondent, Dr. K. A., was the plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court and claimed that his contract of employment was unlawfully terminated by the petitioner and he sought compensation. The petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the contract was terminated on lawful grounds as the respondent was repeatedly tardy and constantly in disagreement with patients. The Federal First Instance Court heard both parties and witnesses who testified that the respondent has divulged confidential information of patients to third parties. The witnesses also stated that he is not in good terms with patients and that patients usually ask for a refund because he comes in late. The respondent did not rebut these testimonies. So, the court decided that the termination was lawful.

The respondent, then, appealed to the Federal High Court. The court heard both sides and decided that the decision of the lower court based on the interpretation of sub-Articles (a) and (b) of Article 27(1) of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003 that deal with damages caused due to an employee’s tardiness was wrong. Furthermore, it reversed the decision of the lower court stating that the termination of the contract of employment was unlawful because violation of discipline in the medical profession is not a ground for terminating that contract under the proclamation.


This petition submitted to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court on February 9, 2012 states that the respondent has caused damage to the goodwill and profit of the organization. The respondent has the responsibility to abide by professional ethics. However, even though it was proven that he was violating these ethical rules, it was decided by the lower courts that the termination of the contract of employment was unlawful. Thus, the petitioner argued that there is a fundamental error of law in this decision.

The respondent in his response submitted on 27 June 2012 argued that the grounds raised by the petitioner are not sufficient for termination of the contract of employment without notice.

This court has examined whether the decision rendered by the Federal High Court has a fundamental error of law. This court has found that it has been proven in the lower courts that the respondent has gone against the ethics of the medical profession by revealing confidential information of patients to third parties. Moreover, there were testimonies that the respondent has verbally abused patients and had conflicts with them.

A colleague of the respondent testified that he divulged confidential information of patients to unauthorized third parties. She added that around the time of the termination of his contract of employment, she heard him telling third parties that a certain lady was living with HIV/AIDS and he was even calling her name. Patients of the respondent, while he was an employee of the petitioner, also testified that he mistreated and insulted them. They also added that they stopped going to the petitioner’s medical services. The credibility and weight of these testimonies were examined by the lower court.

In spite of such testimony, the appellate court found the decision of the lower court to be wrong, stating that the lower court’s finding about the damage caused by the respondent on the goodwill and profit of the petitioner was based on insufficient evidence. The appellate court did not question the credibility and weight of these testimonies. However, it overruled the decision of the lower court stating that these testimonies were not sufficient to show that the termination of the contract of employment was lawful.

The fact that the respondent has not contested the credibility and weight of the testimonies given against his misconduct, and whether these faults are sufficient grounds to terminate the contract of employment must be evaluated in light of the type of services the petitioner provides and its responsibilities along with the damages caused by the respondent.

According to Article 13(1) and (2) of the Proclamation No 377/2003, every worker has the obligation to perform in person the work specified in the contract of employment and to follow instructions given by the employer


based on the terms of the contract and work rules. It can also be understood from Article 11(1) of Regulation No. 174/1986 E.C. of the Council of Ministers that the respondent should perform his duties in accordance with rules of professional ethics, respecting patients and keeping confidential information. If he does not do so and if he continues to work for the petitioner, the petitioner’s license may be suspended or revoked. In addition to these, it can be gathered from Articles 399 and 400 of the Criminal Code that the respondent’s act of disclosing patients’ confidential information to third parties results in criminal liability.

It can be understood from the above mentioned Regulation No. 174/1986 E.C. that the acts of the respondent which are proven have negatively affected the goodwill of the petitioner, made it less competitive in the market and it could have resulted in the suspension or cancellation of its license. Therefore, according to Article 27 (1)(f) of the Labour Proclamation, the respondent is responsible for causing quarrels with his patients at the work place, violating the medical profession’s ethical code and jeopardizing the goodwill, profit and survival of the petitioner’s medical services.

Article 27 (1)(h) of Proclamation No 377/2003, the respondent’s disregard of his professional ethical responsibilities, the utmost ethical expectations and unique features of the medical profession and the damages caused or that could have been caused on the petitioner must be carefully examined. The case must be examined in light of the objective of the Labour Law, its contents and all other legislation enacted to regulate licensing of medical services.

This court has found that the respondent’s violations fall under Article 27(1)(f)&(h) of Proclamation No 377/2003 and the contract of employment can be terminated without notice. In spite of this, however, the Federal High Court decided that the respondent’s violations are not sufficient to cause the termination of the contract based on this provision. This court has thus found that the decision of the Federal High Court has a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High Court is reversed. 2. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court is affirmed. 3. The court has decided that the petitioner’s termination of the contract of

employment of the respondent is lawful. ….

Signatures of five justices _________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 14, pp 5-7. Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


World Vision Ethiopia -v.- Mezemir M. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 79105 (July 10, 2012)

Holding of the Court Assault committed by a workmate residing in a living quarter assigned by the employer shall not be interpreted as falling outside “violence at workplace” even where it is performed outside working hours. Labour Proclamation No.377/2003, Articles 4, 27(1)(f), 97

______________

Cassation File No. 79105 Hamle 3, 2004 E.C. (July 10, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: World Vision Ethiopia Respondent: Mezemir M.

Judgment The issue analyzed in this case is the meaning and spatial scope that should be attached to “violence at work place”.

The petitioner dismissed the respondent for serious misconduct that the latter was alleged to have committed at the place of work. The respondent instituted a court action before the Federal First Instance Court claiming that he has been unlawfully dismissed and requested for reinstatement together with back pay. The present petitioner replied that the respondent was summarily dismissed because of the sexual harassment, brawls and quarrels he committed against a female workmate at the camp where the employer has established as its employees’ residence, and argued that the measure taken against the respondent is lawful. The court, after hearing the litigation and the examining the evidence of the disputing parties upheld the measure taken by the petitioner and affirmed the dismissal.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, the present respondent lodged an appeal before the Federal High Court. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and awarded reinstatement with six months back pay to the respondent. The reasoning of the Federal High Court was that although the misconduct was indeed committed, it was committed outside the


workplace and working hours, and did not satisfy the requirement of the law for summary dismissal.

The petitioner subsequently filed a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division against the decision of the High Court. While affirming the decision of the First Instance Court and reversing the holding of the Federal High Court, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme analyzed the case as follows:

It has been verified from the files of the lower court that the respondent was responsible for quarrels and brawls against a fellow employee at a camp where employees resided. The decision of the High Court emanated from its interpretation that since the victim was assaulted during the night and at the dormitory allocated for employees, the act did not satisfy the requirement of Article 27(1)(f) of Proclamation No.377/2003.

However, it must be noted that where an employee is held responsible for brawls or quarrels during the time of work or in a place where he performs the orders of the employer, he shall be liable for dismissal without notice. It is believed that the objective of this provision is to ensure industrial peace and productivity. Thus, the concept ‘place of work’ should be interpreted in line with such an objective.

In the case before us, it is proved that the respondent assaulted an employee of the petitioner and this is admitted by the respondent. Based on the relevant provision of the law, this act entails responsibility for quarrels. Considering an assault committed by an employee against a workmate while residing in a living quarter assigned by the employer as an act that falls outside of the definition “violence at workplace” would be contrary to the purpose and intent of the law. As a result, the Federal High Court has committed a fundamental error of law in its decision rendering a decision in the present case.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High Court, File No.116083 is reversed

pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court in File No.74140 is

affirmed. 3. The measure of termination taken by the petitioner is lawful. .... Signature of five justices ____________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Case Reports Volume 13, pp. 94-96 Abridged translation: Mehari Redae


Mitiku H. -v.- Mesfin T.


Holding of the Court The employer shall not be liable for intentionally self-inflicted injury at the workplace. Injury incurred due to the violation of safety regulations by intoxication in such a manner that the employee cannot control himself shall be considered as intentionally self-inflicted and the employer shall be exonerated from liability.

Labour Proclamation No.377/2003, Articles 96(1), 96(2)(a)(b), ______________


Yekatit 26, 2004 E.C. (March 3, 2012)



Petitioner: Mitiku H.

Respondent: Mesfin T.


Judgement The issue in the present case is the scope of liability of the employer for an employment injury sustained by the employee at a place and time of work.

The respondent brought an action against the petitioner before the Hawassa First Instance Court alleging that he sustained employment injury while at work and claimed compensation from the employer for bodily harm.

The present petitioner contended that since the respondent reported for duty in a state of intoxication and sustained an injury as a result of it, the employer is exonerated from liability as per Article 96(2)(b) of Labour Proclamation No.377/2003. The court accepted this contention and denied compensation to the plaintiff at the lower court (current respondent). The latter


took the case on appeal. However, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

He then took the case to the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court arguing that there is fundamental error of law committed by the lower courts which needs to be rectified. The Regional Cassation Division cited the extra-contractual liability provisions of the Ethiopian Civil Code and held the present petitioner liable to compensate the employee.

The petitioner submitted his petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division stating that the Regional Cassation Division erred in applying extra-contractual provisions of the law in order to hold the employer liable while the relationship between the disputing parties was contractual.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has observed from the facts verified by the lower courts that the present respondent reported for duty in the morning but left the premises as soon as the manager (owner) of the enterprise was not around. He again came back to the premises after a while. By realizing that the respondent was in a state of intoxication from the way he spoke and walked, the petitioner instructed him to go out of the premises and banned him from working. Despite the instruction of the petitioner, the respondent continued working and sustained injury instantly.

Based on the facts of the case and the relevant law, an employer is, in principle, liable irrespective of fault, for employment injuries sustained by his employee(s). Nevertheless, it has also been stated that the employer shall not be liable for any injury intentionally inflicted by the injured worker himself. According to Article 96(2) of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, “non-obedience of express safety instructions or non-observance of the provisions of accident prevention” or “reporting for work in a state of intoxication that prevents him from regulating his body or understanding” is deemed to be intentional infliction of injury upon oneself.

At the time of the injury, it was shown that the respondent was intoxicated; as a result of this he was instructed to leave the premises. However, he failed to comply with the instruction of the employer and resumed working and sustained the injury. Under these circumstances the decisions of the lower courts that relieved the employer from liability are in accordance with the letters and spirit of the law and there is no fundamental error of law. Rather, there is fundamental error of law in the decision of the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court which held the petitioner liable for the injury. The court has thus rendered the following decree.


Decree 1. The decision of the Regional Supreme Court Cassation Division of the

Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State in File No.51342 is reversed pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The decisions of the Hawassa First Instance Court and Hawassa High Court are affirmed.

3. As the injury sustained by the respondent in the present case is not an employment injury, the employer shall not be liable for the injury.

...


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 64-65 Abridged translation: Mehari Redae


SOS Children’s Village -v.- Kebede Kumsa et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38435 (February 24, 2009)

Holding of the Court: Outsourcing certain tasks and the termination of job positions can be a legal ground to terminate contract of employment. Labour Proclamation No.377/2003, Article 28




Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Belachew Anshiso, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: SOS Children’s Village Respondents: Kebede Kumsa et al

The Court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment This case was initiated by the present respondents before the Federal First Instance Court. The respondents (plaintiffs at the lower court) stated that the petitioner unlawfully terminated their contract of employment on the pretext that the service has been outsourced to be provided by another company. They requested the court to award reinstatement, and alternatively they claimed for compensation and other benefits associated with unlawful termination.

The petitioner (defendant at the lower court) in its reply to the suit contended that the security service of the enterprise has been outsourced to a third party (i.e. Trust PLC) on a contractual arrangement; and it stated that the termination is lawful because their job positions were, as a result, cancelled on justified grounds.

The Federal First Instance Court, after examining the facts of the case in light of the law, held that the termination was unlawful and awarded the respondents six months wage in the form of compensation. Although the petitioner lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court against the decision of the lower court, the appellate court affirmed the previous decision. The petitioner then filed a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench


contending that the lower courts committed “fundamental error of law” that should be rectified by the Cassation Bench. The Cassation Bench has examined the petition.

It has been admitted by the respondents that their contract of employment was terminated because their jobs were outsourced to a third party. It is provided under Article 28 of the Labour Proclamation that an employer is allowed to terminate a contract of employment with notice where ‘a decision has been taken to alter the work methods or introduce new technology with a view to raise productivity…’

From the files of the lower courts, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court noted that the reason why the lower courts held the termination unlawful was that the petitioner did not show the cancellation of the job positions which were held by the employees and, in effect, the courts considered Article 28 inapplicable to the case at hand.

The Cassation Bench, however, observed that where a certain job is transferred to another company, the tasks of the employees (whose service is outsourced) are to be handled by the new service provider. Hence, this implies that the job positions of such employees are cancelled. The employer should have provided notice to the employees, but it was found that this requirement has not been complied with. Nevertheless, this cannot make the termination unlawful; it will rather entitle the employees to compensation in lieu of notice.

Although outsourcing may seem to infringe the rights of the employees, it is a lawful act under the Labour Proclamation. Therefore, the decision of the lower courts which held the termination unlawful and that entitled the employees to the compensation stated above has fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court is reversed pursuant to

Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. It is held that the termination of employment is lawful. 3. Respondents shall be awarded payment in lieu the petitioner’s failure to

give notice, and the period of notice shall be proportionate to their length of service as stipulated under Article 35 of Proclamation No.377/2003.

4. As the payment claimed for unutilized leave was not objected by the petitioner, it is affirmed.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 8, pp. 169-170 Abridged translation: Mehari Redae


Addis Ababa Restaurant -v.- Yewubdar T.


Holding of the Court In spite of an employee’s acquittal in a criminal charge, he/she may be transferred to a different job assignment as long as the employer’s level of trust on the employee is adversely affected. This measure does not conflict with the object and purpose of the law.

Proclamation No. 377/2003, Article 15

______________




Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Teffesse Yirga, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Addis Ababa Restaurant

Respondent: Yewubdar T.

The Court has examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgement The suit initially submitted to the Federal First Instance Court involved the effect of subsequent criminal acquittal on previous disciplinary dismissal. The case was initiated by the present respondent with a view to obtaining reinstatement and back pay for alleged unlawful termination of her contract of employment by petitioner.

The following facts were proved. The respondent was an employee of the petitioner in a job position of a cashier. But her employment was terminated due to a criminal action instituted against her in connection with an alleged misappropriation of money. However, the public prosecutor withdrew the criminal charge against her and the petitioner reinstated her to employment but assigned her to another position. She then filed a suit at the Federal First Instance Court to obtain an order requiring the petitioner to reinstate her as a cashier and for back pay.


In its reply, the petitioner argued that the reason for her termination was misappropriation of cash which she has partly repaid, and noted that it is difficult to assign her as a cashier again. The petitioner stated that the respondent would have deserved termination but she was reinstated taking her family responsibilities into consideration. The petitioner (defendant at the lower court) also contested the respondent’s claim for back pay as she did not render service to the employer while her employment was terminated.

The First Instance Court held that the employer’s measure in changing the respondent’s job position was modification of contract and that the employer cannot unilaterally modify a contract of employment. It thus ordered the petitioner to reinstate her to a position of a cashier with four months salary in the form of back pay. Although the petitioner lodged an appeal before the Federal High Court, the appellate court also affirmed the lower ruling.

Finally, the petitioner filed a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division stating that the lower courts have committed a fundamental error of law in interpreting the provisions of the labour law.

The Cassation Division has examined the case. The lower court’s record shows that the respondent was employed in 1991 in a job position of a cashier at the petitioner’s enterprise. She was alleged to have misappropriated Birr 4,219 (four thousand two hundred nineteen) out of which she has paid back Birr 1,950 (one thousand nine hundred fifty) but failed to pay the remaining balance. She was thus suspended from job and a criminal action was brought against her. However, she was acquitted from the criminal proceedings. It was as a result of the acquittal that she claimed reinstatement and back pay.

The Cassation Division framed the issue whether an employee entitled to reinstatement and back pay where misappropriation of money was verified but criminal prosecution was dropped by the public prosecutor.

This Cassation Division observed that a criminal charge and legal actions based on the labour law have different contents and goals. While criminal liability addresses state and societal concerns, a disciplinary measure is an internal and administrative measure. In addition to their differences in purpose and goal, the level of evidence required to prove a criminal charge is different from the standard of proof required under labour law. Conviction under criminal charge requires evidence that proves the case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. However, less convincing evidence is sufficient to succeed in a disciplinary action based on the labour law. Thus it is highly likely that a person who is acquitted from a criminal charge may still be held liable for breach of discipline.

In the case at hand, the lower court has verified that the respondent admitted to have repaid a certain amount of money. Although the petitioner


did not assign her in her previous job position, it has reinstated her in another job position. The reason why the lower courts nullified the petitioner’s measure was that such a change in the contract of employment does not meet the requirements of Art.15 of Proclamation No. 377/2003. Nevertheless, the cause for the change of job position is that the respondent has breached the trust placed in her while she was serving in the previous position. It should be borne in mind that it is a managerial prerogative to assign employees in a position that fits them. Hence, the petitioner’s measure in the present case is not in conflict with the object and purpose of the law.

The respondent did not contest the allegation of misappropriation, but rather argued that she was acquitted from the criminal charge. Hence the allegation that the petitioner’s property was misappropriated is [impliedly] admitted. Thus, the petitioner should not be compelled to reinstate the respondent to her previous job position under these circumstances as long as it does not have trust on the employee.

Therefore, the holding of the lower court that regarded the petitioner’s measure as unlawful emanated from the failure to examine the litigation of the parties and by unduly citing Article 15 of Proclamation No. 377/2003. As the ruling of the lower courts was against the sprit and purpose of the law, it is held that it contains a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High

Court are reversed pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The respondent shall not be reinstated in the job position of a cashier.

...


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 8, pp. 116-118 Abridged translation: Mehari Redae


Commercial Bank of Ethiopia - v.- Alemayehu Woldie et al

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 33314 (05 June 2008)

Holding of the Court Where a factory is taken over by a bank due to default in the payment of loan, the law does not entail obligation on the bank to retain the contract with the employees where the bank does not intend or desire to resume production, but opts to sell it out with a view to recovering the debt.

Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks Proclamation No. 97/1998; Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, Article 16.

______________


Ginbot 28, 2000 E.C. (June 5, 2008)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Tegene Getaneh, Teffesse Yirga, Medhin Kiros, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Respondent: Alemayehu Woldie et al


Judgement The litigation commenced with an action instituted by respondents against the petitioner and the former owner of Birale Edible Oil Factory before the Federal First Instance Court alleging that the latter unlawfully terminated their contract of employment and they requested for compensation and other entitlements associated with unlawful termination.

The former owner replied that since the factory was mortgaged property taken over by the Bank because of default in loan payment, there was no legal reason to make him liable as he is no longer the owner of the factory.

The Bank also contended that the reason why it took over ownership of the factory was not in order to produce and sell edible oil, but to sell it with a view to recovering the debt. Therefore, it argued that it should not be required to retain the contract with the employees.


The Federal First Instance Court dropped the suit against the former owner of the factory. The Court, however, held the Bank responsible by citing Article 16 of Proclamation No.377/2003 which provides that “change of ownership of the enterprise does not have the effect of modifying a contract of employment”.

Although the Bank lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court against the decision of the lower court, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision as per Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.

On the basis of the existing procedural rules, the Bank brought the case to the attention of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench with a view to rectifying an alleged fundamental error of law committed by the lower courts. The Cassation Bench framed an issue as to whether the Bank which took-over the Factory in order to recover its loans can be compelled to inherit the claims of the employees.

According to Article 16 of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, change of transfer of ownership shall not have the effect of modifying the contract of employment, and the Cassation Bench found that this requirement applies when the new owner sustains the operation of the enterprise. However, in the case at hand, the Bank has no intention and desire to resume the production of edible oil and the sale of the same. Hence, Article 16 of the Labour Proclamation is not relevant to the present case. Consequently, the decisions of the lower courts are not tenable.


Court are reversed pursuant to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The obligation envisaged under Article 16 of Proclamation No. 377/2003

cannot be imposed on the Bank and the claims of the employees cannot be accepted because the Bank took possession of the factory to sell it in order to recover unpaid loan and not to resume the factory’s operation.

...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 6, pp. 355-360 Abridged translation: Mehari Redae

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 14: Property Law 251

14. Property Law

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Frehiwot M. G. v. Mebrahtu G. & & Desta W.

81081 2013 14 191-194

2 Kirkos Sub-City Woreda 6 Admin. v. Alemtsehay W.

67691 2011 13 460-462

3 Taitu Kebede’s Heirs v. Tirunesh et al

67011 2012 13 450-452

4 Genet S. v. Kirkos Sub-City Keb. 17/18 Admin. et al

64014 2012 13 437-440

5 Heria M. v. Shemsu Y. 60720 2011 11 289-292

6 Rahel Sinetsehay v. Mesfin Tamrat.

55081 2010 11 256-257

7 Abadit L. v. Zalambesa Town Admin. & Berhane Z.

48217 2010 11 249-251

8 Samuel T. v. Ayisha A. et al 43081 2010 10 232-234


Frehiwot M. G. -v.- Mebrahtu G. & Desta W. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 81081 (January 21, 2013)

Holding of the Court: - A person who possesses another person’s property using it for some

time and incurs expenses necessary to prevent the loss or deterioration of the property, can request reimbursement from the owner only if it can be proved that the expense incurred is absolutely necessary and is done in good faith.

- Where this has not been done, judges may reduce or refuse to grant the reimbursement requested.

Articles 2168, 2169, 2171(1) and 2172(1) of the Civil Code

______________


Tir 13, 2005 E.C. (January 21, 2013)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa,

Mustefa Ahmed

Petitioner: Frehiwot M.

Respondent: Mebrahtu G/Medhin & Desta Woldegabir


Judgment The case started at the Federal First Instance Court. The current petitioner was the plaintiff in the lower court. The petitioner brought a suit against the two respondents alleging that when the latter went to the United States, the former took out a renovation and improvement permit to refurbish the house owned by the respondents in which she was living. She claimed to have spent a total of 265,815.92 (two hundred sixty five thousand eight hundred fifteen birr and ninety two cents), indicating the reasons for each expenditure. She pleaded for the ownership of the house to be transferred to her to offset the expense she has incurred and owed by the respondents.

The respondents argued that the petitioner’s cost reimbursement request does not have legal ground and that the cost is exaggerated. After considering


and examining the arguments of both sides, the court found that the respondents had legal right over the house during the time of the renovation and that the petitioner did the renovation knowing that she had to give back the house to them. The Federal First Instance Court indicated that the necessity of having the renovation done was not supported by evidence and stated that it is inappropriate to pass a decision that requires the respondents to indemnify the total cost of the renovation. The Court cited Articles 2169, 2170 and 2174 of the Civil Code, and stated the need to apply the principle of equity, and passed a decree which required the respondents to pay 15,000 (fifteen thousand birr) to the petitioner.

Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner appealed to the Federal High Court. The court upheld the decision of the lower court. This petition against the Federal High Court’s decision is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The petitioner argued that the renovation has been proved and the amount spent is verified by two bodies, to be 42,338.80 (forty two thousand three hundred thirty eight birr and eighty cents) and 63,942.43 (sixty three thousand nine hundred forty two birr and forty three cents) respectively. One of these organs that estimated the renovation is a government organ, and it is wrong for the lower court to only award Birr 15,000 (fifteen thousand) based on equity without at least taking the lower cost estimate into consideration. Hence she requested for the decision of the lower court to be reversed and a decision to be made in her favour as per the claim she made at the First Instance Court.

The Federal First Instance Court did not accept the cost-reimbursement request of the petitioner because she incurred cost for renovation of the house knowing that the house was to be returned to the respondents and she did not produce evidence to prove the necessity of the renovation. The court found that the petitioner did not prove that the house would have sustained damage had the renovation not been done and did not show that she made it in good faith to keep the integrity of the house from being damaged. The Federal High Court confirmed the decision of the lower court.

Article 2169 of the Civil Code stipulates that “[t]he person who is required to make restitution shall be entitled to the reimbursement of the expenses he has incurred in preventing the loss or deterioration of the property, unless the expenses were not useful ...”. Likewise, Article 2171(1) provides that “[w]here expenses incurred on the property have increased its value, the person required to make restitution shall be entitled to their reimbursement”. If, however, it has been proved that this expense is incurred as a result of bad faith or where equity so requires, judges may reduce or refuse any indemnity, in accordance with Article 2172(1).


This provision outlines the criteria that are used to determine whether the expense incurred is in bad faith. The criteria include examining whether the person who claims indemnity knows or ought to have known that he is required to return the property at the time when the expense was incurred or the need to apply equity. In the light of these provisions, if an individual uses another person’s property which is in his possession and during this time incurs expense to prevent the loss or deterioration of the property, he can request for the expense to be reimbursed by the owner of the property if the expense is necessary and is incurred in good faith. But, these Articles show that if the expense is proved to have been sustained as a result of bad faith, judges can reduce or totally refuse the reimbursement requested.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has found the issues identified by the lower courts to be acceptable as per the power granted to it under Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation 25/1996 [Federal Courts Proclamation]. This Division has examined the issues based on the contents and spirit of Articles 2169, 2171 and 2172 of the Civil Code. Accordingly the expense incurred by the petitioner has not been found to warrant full reimbursement. The fact that the lower court decided to award Birr 15,000 (fifteen thousand) even without taking the lower expense estimates presented before it by the two institutions requested to do so, cannot be said to be beyond the power the court granted under Articles 2171 and 2172 of the Civil Code. Hence the Division has not found fundamental error of law in the decree of the lower courts. This court has thus rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and Federal High Court

are affirmed, according to Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The decisions rendered do not have fundamental error of law because they

have taken into consideration the petitioner’s failure to prove good faith and the absolute necessity of the renovation as stipulated under Articles 2169, 2171 and 2172 of the Civil Code.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp. 191-194. Abridged translation: Tewodros Dawit


Kirkos Sub-City Woreda 06 Administration -v.- Alemtsehay W.


Holding of the Court: A house owner’s act of giving notice to a lessee (tenant) requesting the termination of the contract falls under the law of contracts, and this cannot be regarded as causing interference in the possession of another person which entails the legal remedy of possessory action by the lessee.

Articles 1149(1) and 2966(1) of the Civil Code ______________


Tahsas16, 2004 E.C. (December 26, 2011)



Petitioner: Kirkos Sub-City Woreda 06 Administration

Respondent: Alemtsehay W.

We have examined the case and rendered the following Judgment.

Judgment The case is presented to this Cassation Division because the petitioner submits that there is basic error of law in the decision of Addis Ababa Administration Appellate Court Cassation Bench regarding possessory action.

The case was first brought by the current respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) to Addis Ababa Administration First Instance Court who filed possessory action against the petitioner. The respondent lives in Kirkos Sub-City Kebele 10, House No. 059 which is publicly owned. The petitioner (defendant at the lower court) gave the respondent written notice requiring her to deliver the house stating that she owns another house in the name of her husband. She contended that the Kebele has not ascertained whether she is married, and demanded for the cessation of the interference thereby objecting the petitioner’s act of giving her notice to deliver the house.


In its reply at the First Instance Court, the petitioner argued that the notice is appropriate because its relationship with Alemtsehay is contractual, and that she has a house in Keble 02 Nefas Silk Lafto Sub-city in the name of Kiflu I. with whom she lives in wedlock and who is the father of her two children. The First Instance Court rejected the possessory action of the current respondent for cessation of interference and decided that the notice is appropriate.

The respondent appealed to Addis Ababa Administration Appellate Court which confirmed the lower court’s decision. She further filed a petition to the City’s Cassation Bench which reversed the decisions of the lower courts on the ground that the petitioner has not proved whether she has concluded marriage with Kiflu I.

The issue examined by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is whether the decision which held that the petitioner has caused interference is appropriate.

The fact that respondent lives in House No. 059 based on the contract she has concluded with the petitioner has not been contested. The propriety of the notice given to the respondent to terminate the contract and the issue whether the petitioner will be bound by the terms of the contract are determined on the basis of the contract and the relevant legal provisions.

As stipulated under Article 1149(1) of the Civil Code, one is said to have interfered in another person’s possession only if the latter’s possession is deprived or interfered. The notice given by the owner of the house requesting the lessee to leave the house shows intention to terminate a contract in accordance with Article 2966(1) of the Civil Code and this cannot be regarded as an act of interference in possession. The act rather falls under a contractual relationship between the lessor and the lessee.

The relief sought by the respondent in the pleading submitted to the Addis Ababa Administration First Instance Court did not contest the legality of the petitioner’s measures to terminate the contract. Nor has the respondent requested for a relief requiring the petitioner to be bound by the contract. Instead, the respondent challenged the notice on the ground that it constitutes interference in possession.

The lower court has infringed Article 182(2) of the Civil Procedure Code in examining whether the contract can be terminated while it should have rendered a decision based on the issue whether there is interference of possession. The City’s Cassation Division has also erred because it rendered a decision based on the issue whether the notice given was appropriate, while it should have confined its decision to the question whether there is interference in possession. Therefore, we have found that Addis Ababa courts have made


fundamental error of law in having rendered decisions regarding the validity of the notice, which relates to an issue outside the relief sought by the respondent.

Decree 1. The decisions of Addis Ababa First Instance Court, Addis Ababa

Administration Appellate Court and the City’s Cassation Division are reversed.

2. The petitioner has not interfered in the possession of the respondent. 3. This decision does not deny the respondent of her right to submit her

claims to the relevant authority based on the contract. ...




Taitu Kebede’s Heirs v. Tirunesh et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 67011 (March 20, 2012)

Holding of the Court: The issuance of ownership certificates for immovable property should be in conformity with the proper legal procedures. Their revocation should also pursue legal procedures

Articles 1191-1198 of the Civil Code; Articles 246-248 of the Civil Procedure Code

____________ Cassation File No. 67011

Megabit 11, 2004 E.C. (March 20, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,

Nega Dufesa

Petitioners: Taitu Kebede’s Heirs: 1. Hilina Fekadu 2. Mekdes Fekadu Respondents: 1. Tirunesh Haile

2. Tewodros Mekonnen, 3. Arada Sub-City Kebele 03/09 Administration

The court has examined the case and rendered the following Judgment.

Judgment The case involves title deeds of an immovable and it started at the Federal First Instance Court with the petitioners as plaintiffs. The statement of claim stated that the mother of the petitioners (Taitu Kebede) inherited House No. 615 located in Addis Ababa, Arada Sub-city, Keble 03/09, from their grandfather (Wondtegegn Belayneh). According to the petitioners, the house falls under the category of ‘house allowed to be retained by the owner’ (yetefekede bet) [which means a house that has not been nationalized under Proclamation No. 47/1975], and they requested for declaratory judgment about their status as heirs of their deceased mother Taitu Kebede.

Taitu, the deceased, had earlier submitted her claim of ownership to the Federal First Instance Court. Although her request was rejected by the lower


court, the Federal Supreme Court (File No. 11399) had on Yekatit 4, 1996 (February 12, 2004) decided that Taitu is entitled to own the house. She was given land holding certificate (yebota karta) No. 03/09/0673 on Meskerem 12, 1998 (September 22, 2005) and has been paying taxes for the house and the land.

The petition states that the third respondent (i.e. the Keble Administration) is still unlawfully obtaining the proceeds from rent from the first and second respondents. The latter are not willing to leave the house despite repeated notice. The petitioners requested that the first and the second respondents should either deliver the house to them or pay house rent.

In its reply to the petition, the third respondent argued that the house was nationalized based on Proclamation No. 47/1975 and stated that the petitioners have no right over the house.

The Federal First Instance Court decided that the claim for the house is based on the title deed that was given in 2005, and the request of the plaintiffs (current petitioners) is not acceptable because the landholding certificate was revoked on Megabit 12, 2002 E.C. (March 21, 2010). The appeal submitted to the Federal High Court has also been rejected.

The petition is submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division which has examined the arguments of both parties along with the issues involved and the relevant laws. The Cassation Division has examined whether the lower courts have erred in solely basing their decisions on the revocation of the landholding certificate.

It can be noted from the lower court’s decision that Taitu could on the one hand be considered as the owner of the house based on the landholding title certificate provided to her in 2005, while on the other hand the court rejected her claim over the house because the relevant Administration revoked the landholding title certificate on 21 March 2010 while the parties were under litigation.

According to Article 1195 of the Civil Code, the issuance of title certificate relating to an immovable by administrative authorities gives presumption of ownership in favour of the person who holds the title certificate. However, this presumption is rebuttable based on Article 1196 of the Civil Code by proof to the contrary where a title certificate was not issued [“in accordance with the law or without authority”]. Moreover, the relevant administrative office that fails to duly perform its responsibility in this regard incurs liability in accordance with Article 1198 of the Civil Code.

These provisions show that although the issuance of landholding title certificate entails presumption of ownership of an immovable, the presumption is not conclusive evidence. It is rather rebuttable by contrary evidence and can


be evaluated against such evidence. The procedures and rules that should be pursued in providing title deeds should apply mutatis mutandis to the procedures and rules of their revocation, and this can be noted from the objectives, content and spirit of Articles 1195 to 1198 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the dismissal of the case by the lower courts merely because the relevant administrative authority revoked the title certificate while the case is under litigation is not appropriate. The lower courts should have evaluated the evidence produced by both parties and they have thus erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioners solely based on the revocation of title certificate, and this is not consistent with the objectives and content of the Civil Code provisions indicated earlier.

The other argument that is raised by the petitioners is that the house which belonged to their grandparent Wondtegegn Belayneh is a house chosen and retained by the owner (yemircha bet) and was not nationalized. The third respondent on the contrary argues otherwise.

The lower courts have not framed this issue and have failed to examine the facts thereof. They should have pursued the binding interpretation in [Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division] File No. 24627 in which it was decided that the issue whether a house was nationalized or not can be decided upon by courts where the issue is presented to them.

We have therefore found the decisions of the lower courts unacceptable as they are rendered without framing and examining the issues that are relevant to the adjudication of the case in accordance with Articles 246 to 248 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The courts have arrived at decisions without framing and analyzing the pertinent issues and have thus made fundamental error of law. We have therefore rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Federal First Instance Court and the High Court are

reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The Federal First Instance Court is instructed to frame the relevant issues

in accordance with the analysis made in this judgment and examine the evidence of both parties. The case is, in accordance with Article 343(1), remanded to the Federal First Instance Court for trial




Genet Seyoum v. Kirkos Sub-City Kebele 17/18 Administration et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 64014 (March 7, 2012)

Holding of the Court: After judicial decision by a lower court based on title certificate, the revocation of title certificate by the administrative authority during an appellate litigation cannot lead to the immediate dismissal of the case. The party against whom the landholding certificate is revoked can contest the legality of the action, and courts can examine the validity and legality of the administrative act.

Articles 1195, 1195, 1206 of the Civil Code; Article 40 (1) (2) of the FDRE Constitution;

Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code _____________


Yekatit 28, 2004 E.C. (March 7, 2012)



Petitioner: Genet Seyoum

Respondents: 1. Kirkos Sub-City Kebele 17/18 Administration 2. Amelework Mulate

3. Bahre W/Giorgis

We have examined the case and rendered the following Judgement.

Judgment The case involves the request of the petitioner (plaintiff at the lower court) for the return of her house based on her claim which was initially brought to the Federal First Instance Court.

Dr. Genet’s statement of claim states that she was a political refugee outside Ethiopia while the Dergue was in power, that she has obtained title deed for her house located in Kirkos Sub-City in 1985 EC (1993) under No. 15/31238 from the Ministry of Urban Development and Houses. She contested


the first respondent’s act of giving numbers 268, 269 and 270 to her house and renting it to three persons including the second and third respondents. Moreover, the statement of claim submits that the first respondent collects rent from the houses and is unwilling to deliver it to her. The first respondent had submitted a preliminary objection mainly by arguing that the house was nationalized in accordance with [Proclamation No. 47/1975] and requested for the dismissal of the case.

The Federal First Instance Court rejected the preliminary objections, examined the merits of the case, and decided that the petitioner is the owner of the house thereby ordering the respondents to deliver the house to the petitioner. The respondents appealed to the Federal High Court and the first respondent submitted additional evidence. The court reversed the lower court’s decision stating that the title deed which was submitted by the petitioner as evidence for her claims has been revoked. The petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Supreme Court was also rejected.

This petition is submitted against these decisions. The petitioner stated that the Federal High Court has not taken Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code into account when it admitted evidence and she requested that this error of law be corrected. The Cassation Division has examined the issue whether it was proper for the title deed to be revoked while the parties were under litigation. The petitioner argued that she has neither received a house in replacement nor has she received compensation which is the modus operandi in relation with houses that are nationalized.

When a plaintiff institutes a statement of claim in accordance with Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, the law, i.e. Article 223 of the same Code requires the submission of the list of witnesses and documentary evidence, and the original and authenticated copies of the documents. Article 234 imposes the same requirements for the respondent. With regard to documents, in particular, Article 137(3) of the Civil Procedure Code requires the litigating parties to annex them before the date of trial. It provides that no document shall be received unless it is annexed with the pleading. The exception to this rule is the court’s recognition of serious and adequate cause envisaged under Article 256 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The other possibility is that the court may of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties admit additional evidence based on Articles 345 and 145(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

As stated above, the Federal High Court rejected the petitioner’s right over the house based on the additional evidence of the first respondent that it has admitted based on Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code. It stated that the admission of the new evidence is necessary for proper adjudication.


However, the decision does not indicate whether the petitioner was given the opportunity to contest the validity of the revocation of the title deed after the judgment of the First Instance Court.

A person who has a title certificate issued by an administrative authority is presumed to be the owner by virtue of Article 1195 of the Civil Code. Reading this provision in conjunction with Article 1196 indicates that the presumption is not conclusive. In other words, the issuance of title certificate cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence. The presumption embodied in Article 1195 is a rebuttable legal presumption under the circumstances stated in Article 1196.

On the other hand, if the revocation of the title certificate is contested, decision should be given after examining whether the revocation is lawful, and the mere claim that the title certificate is revoked does not render it valid unless the issue is argued upon. The security of property rights enshrined in Articles 40(1) and 40(2) of the Constitution will be violated if it is held that the person whose holding certificate is revoked by an administrative organ does not have judicial recourse.

Petitory action by an owner based on Article 1206 of the Civil Code should not be set aside without adequate scrutiny and the plaintiff should be allowed to submit arguments. The Civil Procedure Code entrusts courts with the responsibility of finding out truth by pursuing appropriate procedures in the admission of evidence. This shows that judicial decisions should be given through due process, in the absence of which the judgement does not become tenable at law.

In the case under consideration, the admission of additional evidence on the revocation of the petitioner’s title certificate on Yekatit 16, 2001 E.C. (February 23, 2009) does not in principle violate Article 345(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Code. However, concluding that the petitioner does not own the house without examining the legality of the revocation and the evidence regarding the ownership of the house is found to have error of law because it has not pursued the Civil Procedure Code provisions as shown earlier and has not considered the content and spirit of Articles 1195 and 1196 of the Civil Code.

The decisions of the lower courts should thus be reversed, and the legality of the revocation of the petitioner’s title deed and the issue regarding who owns the house should be examined, thereby rendering it necessary to remand the case to the lower court. Accordingly the following decree is rendered.


Decree 1. The order of the Federal Supreme Court (File No. 58891, dated October

22, 2010 and the decision of the Federal High Court (File No. 78798), dated March 31, 2010 are reversed based on Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The case is remanded to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it can examine the petitioner’s title deed, the legality of the first respondent’s act of revocation of title deed on 16 Yekatit 2001 E.C. (February 23, 2009), and the issue of who owns the house by allowing the parties to present their respective evidence and arguments.

...




Heria M. -v.- Shemsu Y. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 60720 (May 23, 2011)

Holding of the Court: - Sale of immovable property without valid title of ownership shall not be

protected irrespective of the buyer’s good faith and even if the sale is made at the notary by using fraudulent documents presented by the seller.

- Buyer of an immovable from a person whom he knows is not authorized to sell it cannot be considered as having good faith, and has no ground for legal protection.

Articles 1195, 1196, 2882-2884 of the Civil Code

______________


Ginbot 15, 2003 E.C. (May 23, 2011)



Petitioner: Heria Mohammed Girgibo

Respondent: Shemsu Y.

Judgment The case involves sale of a house by misrepresenting identity of names and a forged document. The current petitioner obtained judgment from the Federal First Instance Court after which the current respondent filed an opposition to the judgement [before its execution] in accordance with Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The respondent has obtained landholding certificate and is in possession of the house based on sale of House No. 1413 in Woreda 25, Keble 04. The sale was made at the notary on Hamle 25, 1998 EC (August 1, 2006). The respondent knew that the petitioner is the judgment creditor regarding the house only after he saw the notice posted at the gate on Ginbot 3, 2001 EC (May 11, 2009). He requested that the court decision issued on Miazia 8, 1995 EC (April 16, 2003) be revoked and his ownership be confirmed.


In her reply to the respondent’s opposition to judgment, the current petitioner stated that the respondent cannot oppose the judgment noting that her ownership is established by court of law. The petitioner stated that the house was sold to Mudi Y. by Heria M. I. [who used her namesake]. The petitioner argued that Mudi Y. (who also had obtained landholding certificate) should have given the house to the petitioner according to court decisions rather than selling it to the respondent. She contended that valid title cannot emerge from Heria M. I.’s sale who does not have ownership rights, and then from Mudi Y. who had no valid title.

The lower court decided that the respondent bought the house from Mudi Y. and a landholding certificate is issued in his name. It set aside its former decision that had confirmed the petitioner’s ownership by citing Article 360(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and stating that unless the administrative authority which issued landholding certificate cancels the certificate’s validity, the respondent should be considered owner of the house. The Federal High court did not accept the petitioner’s appeal and confirmed the lower court’s decision after examining the arguments of both parties.

In a petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division on Meskerem 20, 2003 (September 30, 2010), the petitioner stated that the lower courts have erred in deciding in favour of the respondent merely because he produced a title certificate which is obtained through a chain of two sales without valid titles. She indicated that the house belongs to her and the respondent has bought the house from a person who does not have valid title, and that the courts have erred in failing to consider Articles 1195 and 1196 of the Civil Code while rendering decisions.

The Cassation Division has examined the arguments of both parties and observed the following: On Miazia 8, 1987 EC (April 16, 1995), the petitioner filed a suit against (1) Mudi Y., (2) Lieutenant Sisay M., (3) Siga Meda Terara Residential Houses Cooperative, (4) Kemal H., and (5) Heria M. I. The Federal First Instance Court examined the evidence from both sides and decided that Mudi took possession of the house from a person [Heria M. I.] who does not have valid title and that the sale was conducted by using forged document. It found that the contract of sale between Heria M. I. and Mudi Y. is void and ordered Mudi Y. to return the house to the petitioner [former plaintiff].

The respondents appealed to the Federal High Court individually. Mudi Y.’s appeal (File No. 20831) was rejected on Hamle 2, 1995 EC (July 9, 2003). The appeal submitted by Kemal and Heria M. I. was accepted by the Federal High Court (File No. 21687) on Megabit 5, 1999 EC (March 14, 2007), but was later reversed upon the petitioner’s appeal to the Federal


Supreme Court which referred the case to the Federal High Court in File No. 29978 (on Sene 11, 2000 EC, i.e. June 18, 2008). On Megabit 23, 2001 EC (April 1, 2009) the Federal High Court confirmed the decision that was originally rendered by the Federal First Instance Court. The petition of Kemal H. and Heria M. I. submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division was rejected on Gibot 10, 2001 EC (May 18, 2009), File No. 45100.

The respondent’s argument is that he has in good faith bought the house based on a contract of sale made at the notary [Documents Authentication and Registration Office] and that he has obtained landholding certificate. He does not claim to have built the house, nor does he contest the ownership that the petitioner has over the house.

It is proved that Mudi Y. bought the house from Kemal H. and Heria M. I. who used forged documents. Mudi Y. obtained a landholding certificate in his name and sold the house to the respondent based on a contract concluded at the notary.

Article 1195 of the Civil Code stipulates that a person who receives title deed from the relevant authority shall be presumed as the owner of immovable property. When such a person sells the property to another person, the sale cannot be regarded as illegal. However, the legal presumption embodied in Article 1195 of the Civil Code is not conclusive evidence because it can be rebutted by any other evidence that can prove the existence of the conditions stated under Article 1196. Even if a person who produces landholding certificate from the relevant authority is presumed to be the owner of a house, Article 1196 clearly shows that the presumption can be refuted if it can be proved that the title certificate was given outside the rules, procedures and authority thereof.

Mudi took possession of the house and passed it over to the current respondent after having bought it from persons without valid title who used forged documents as indicated by court decisions at various levels. There is thus no legal ground to consider the sale made by Mudi to the respondent as valid. The fact that the respondent has concluded the contract at the notary cannot legalize a contract which is initially unlawful. A contract relating to an immovable shall not be granted legal protection merely on the ground of good faith.

Where a person without valid title sells property with warranty to the buyer, the rightful owner has recourse against the seller as embodied in Articles 2282-2284 of the Civil Code. Mudi was aware that he does not have a valid title over the house since Hamle 2, 1995 EC (July 9, 2003), and it was with this awareness that he sold the house on Hamle 25, 1998 EC (August 1, 2006). He has not also given warranty to the buyer. There is no legal ground


to accept the validity of the sale made to the respondent by the seller who sold the property after having known the court decisions against various persons who had court litigation with the petitioner. In sum, the mere fact that the sale of the house under dispute is made at the notary and that the respondent is now in possession of landholding certificate shall not render the contract valid as long as the seller did not have valid title at the time of sale. We have thus found that the [Federal High Court’s] decision which rejected the petitioner’s claims involves error in law. We have accordingly rendered the following decree:

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court on Tikimt 10,

2002 E.C., i.e. October 20, 2010 (File No. 04917) and confirmed by the Federal High Court on Sene 29, 2002, i.e. July 6, 2010 (File No. 88537) are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The respondent does not have legal right over the house in dispute. The petitioner is the owner of the house.

...




Rahel S. -v.- Mesfin T.


Holding of the Court: The act of a judgment debtor who transfers property to his child who cannot be presumed to have earned it through labour, creativity, enterprise or capital is not legally tenable. Such fraudulent alienation of property is meant to evade execution of judgment and its validity can be challenged.

Articles [1995 and 1996(1)] of the Civil Code; Article 40(2) of the FDRE Constitution.

_____________




Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Rahel S.

Respondent: Mesfin T.


Judgment The petitioner claimed that there is fundamental error of law that should be corrected in the order rendered by the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court. The petitioner, a judgment creditor, has requested that the respondent’s house be sold to settle the debt he owes her. The house is transferred to and registered in his daughter’s name. The petitioner requested that the judgment debtor has done this transfer of title to evade execution of the judgement on the property and demanded that the house be sold to settle the debt.

The First Instance Court’s order stated that the execution of judgement is requested on a house not registered under the debtor’s name but under the name of Maramawit Mesfin. Moreover, the Federal High Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal by invoking Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code.


Rahel S. brought her petition to this Cassation Division requesting that the judgment debtor has transferred his property to his daughter who is a minor, and she sought the error of law to be examined and corrected. The respondent argued that the house belongs to Maramawit Mesfin, and stated that it can be verified by a contract and various receipts.

The Order of the lower court shows that the ownership title of the house was transferred to the respondent’s daughter when there were efforts to recover the debt. The girl in whose name the house is registered is a child.

According to Article 40(2) of the Constitution, a person becomes an owner of property produced by his labour, creativity, enterprise or capital. The mere fact that the house that was registered under the name of the respondent and his wife Alem Z. has now been registered under their daughter’s name does not lead to the conclusion that their daughter becomes an owner. This rather shows the respondent’s attempt to evade payment of debt by transferring the house to his daughter.

Ethiopian law does not allow a judgement debtor to evade the execution of his debt by transferring property to his child who is a minor and then act in the capacity of a guardian and a tutor to administer, sell and exchange the same property. It can be observed from Articles [1995 and 1996] of the Civil Code that a creditor can challenge the validity of acts to execute debts where the debtor, in fraud of the creditor's rights, alienates property. We have thus found fundamental error of law in the decisions which should not have dismissed the petitioner’s request that the transfer of the house to the respondent’s minor child, Maramawit is fraudulent as it has the objective of evading the execution of debt.

Decree 1. The orders of the Federal First Instance Court and the Federal High Court

are reversed. 2. The case is referred to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance with

Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it shall execute the respondent’s debt through auction sale of the house that was previously registered under the names of the respondent and his wife, and which is currently registered under the name of Maramawit.




Abadit L. v. Zalambesa Town Administration & Berhane Z. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 48217 (October 13, 2010)

Holding of the Court: A statement of claim about improper revocation of landholding and ownership of a house can be adjudicated in courts. It shall not be considered as a purely administrative function outside the jurisdiction of courts.

Articles 37 and 79(b) of the FDRE Constitution; Article 4 of the Civil Procedure Code

______________




Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Abadit Lemlem

Respondents: 1. Zalanbesa Town Administration; 2. Berhane Zerefe


Judgment The case started with the current petitioner as plaintiff regarding her claim over a house. She was allocated land at Zalanbesa Town and she built a house with the money she received from the Zalanbesa Town Administration and her own money. Her statement of claim shows that the land and the house were registered in her name, and she contested the first respondent’s act of taking her house and giving it to the second respondent.

The first respondent submitted preliminary objections and a statement of defence on the merits of the case. The preliminary objections stated that the petitioner was given the land and monetary support to build the house because her house was destroyed due to the [Ethio-Eritrean] war. This was based on the government’s administrative decision so that persons under such


circumstances could be given land and monetary support for building their houses. The preliminary objections noted that the termination of her entitlement was an administrative decision which should not be adjudicated by a court. With regard to the merits of the case, the first respondent stated that the petitioner’s request to the Administration was not accepted because it discovered reasons which do not entitle the petitioner to get land and monetary support. The second respondent also replied that he has received the property based on the decision of a public administrative organ and he asked for the dismissal of the petitioner’s request.

The court that initially adjudicated the case decided that the house should be returned to the petitioner. The second respondent appealed to the Tigray Supreme Court which reversed the lower court’s decision by stating that the case should be examined and decided administratively and that it does not fall under the jurisdiction of courts. Abadit’s petition to Tigray Supreme Court Cassation Division was also rejected. A petition is brought to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division against this decision.

Due to the destruction of their houses as a result of the war, 969 (nine hundred and sixty nine) dwellers were living in plastic tents. The rehabilitation scheme designed by a committee of various organs established by the government devised criteria regarding persons who deserve assistance. It was decided that each person will be given land and Birr 25,000 (twenty five thousand) in three instalments. It was confirmed that the petitioner was displaced due to the war, was living in plastic tent, and was given landholding certificate. She has built a house by using the Birr 7,500 (seven thousand five hundred) which she received as the first instalment of monetary support, plus her own Birr 7,000 (seven thousand). The house was nearly complete except roofing.

In principle, adjudication at the federal or regional levels is the power of courts as enshrined in Article 79(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Yet, Article 37 of the Constitution shows that the power of courts in this regard is not absolute. The joint reading of Articles 79(b) and 37 of the Constitution shows that courts have jurisdiction only where a case involves justiciable matter.

According to Article 37(1) of the Constitution, “Everyone has the right to bring a justiciable matter” to courts, and “to obtain a decision or judgement by court of law or any other competent body with judicial power”. The phrase “or any other competent body with judicial power” in Article 37(1) of the Constitution and the stipulation in Article 4 of he Civil Procedure Code show that any justiciable matter can be adjudicated by courts unless it is expressly stated as the function of another organ.


The petitioner’s claim is that her house and landholding is unduly taken away from her and she is claiming that her property right be respected. There is no law which forbids such cases to be adjudicated by courts. No organ is expressly entrusted with the task of adjudicating the case. Therefore it is not a case that should be administratively decided; it is rather a justiciable matter which should be decided by court. We have found fundamental error of law in the reversal of the lower court’s decision by the appellate court which considered the case as an administrative matter. We have thus decided the following.

Decree 1. The decision of Tigray Region Supreme Court Appellate Division (File

No, 23281 dated Ginbot 14 2000 E.C.: May 22, 2008) that was confirmed by a majority opinion of the Tigray Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 25845 dated Tir 28, 2001 E.C. (February 5, 2009) are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The petitioner’s request regarding the improper takeover of her house and landholding is an issue that should be decided by courts and cannot be settled by administrative decision.

3. As the case can be adjudicated in court, it is remanded to Tigray Region Supreme Court Appellate Division in accordance with Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that it can render its decision by examining whether the Zone Court’s decision on the merits of the case had related the evidence produced by both parties with the relevant laws. ...




Samuel T. - v. - Ayisha A. et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 43081 (May 14, 2010)

Holding of the Court: Possessory action by a person not residing in the house or by a person who is not in actual control thereof is inadmissible.

Articles 1206 and 1149 of the Civil Code ________________


Ginbot 6, 2002 E.C. (May 14, 2010)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hirut Mellsse, Teshager G/Selassie, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Samuel Tonoro Respondents: Ayisha Argessa et al


Judgment The case was commenced by a suit respondents filed with the lower court requesting an injunction against petitioner who allegedly obstructed them from renovating the house which had been under their possession since 1957 E.C. In his reply to the suit, the petitioner argued that the house belongs not to the respondents but to the parents of his spouse who, upon going abroad, authorized his spouse to administer the house as agent; that the house was first rented to the spouse of first respondent whom petitioner allowed to live in the house for free until he died in 1995 E.C. Petitioner further argued that the house has never been in the possession of respondents and he has not caused any nuisance.

The Woreda Court stated the fact that the first respondent’s actual control over the house has been established by the testimony of witnesses and ruled that the petitioner shall cease the interference. The petitioner appealed against the decision but the appeal was rejected by the Kembata and Tembaro Zone High Court; likewise, his petition to the Cassation Division of the SNNPR Supreme Court was rejected.


In his cassation petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, the petitioner argued that the legal action brought by the first respondent more than 15 years after she had left the area should have been barred. Petitioner also reiterated that sufficient documentary evidence has been adduced to prove the fact that the house belonged to the parents of his spouse who authorized her to administer the house when they travelled abroad. He pointed out that the respondents had never lived in the house and requested for reversal of the decisions of the lower courts. The cassation petition was accepted with a view to determine whether the subject matter of the dispute should be handled by the competent court or, should this be overruled, to determine the propriety of the ruling that petitioner has interfered with the possession of respondents.

In the suit they brought against the petitioner in the lower court, respondents alleged that petitioner interfered with their possession by obstructing the renovation of a house. They also stated that they have been in actual possession since 1957 E.C. Petitioner, on his part, argued that the house belongs to the parents of his spouse; that respondents lived in another place, and the house has never been under their possession.

It is evident from Article 1149 of the Civil Code that a person whose possession is interfered with or who is deprived of his possession may require the cessation of the interference or restoration of the thing. Accordingly, the respondents who have brought action alleging interference by the petitioner have to prove that the property interfered with is under their possession and their possession has actually been interfered with.

Possession, as defined under Article 1140 of the Civil Code, consists in the actual control which a person exercises over a thing; hence, respondents bear the burden of proving the fact that they have been in actual control of the disputed house. In the course of the proceeding, we have come to realize that the spouse of first respondent had been living in the house until 1995 E.C., and the house was not in the possession of the respondents thereafter as it was rather held by another person (holder). Respondents have also admitted this fact in their response to the cassation petition; the same fact has been affirmed by the witnesses who testified before the appellate court that first respondent, who resided in Alaba city, occasionally came to check out the house. All this shows that respondents neither lived in the house nor exercised actual control over it; hence, they had no right to bring legal action under Article 1149.

We have thus found out that the issue in the dispute pertains to who the owner of the disputed house is, thus requiring a petitory action, rather than interference with possession. The decisions of the lower courts are thus found to involve fundamental error of law; hence, the following decree has been rendered:


Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Woreda Court in File No. 00928 on Yekatit

28, 2000 E.C (March 7, 2008), the decision of the Kembata Tembaro Zone High Court (File No. 02325) rendered on Hamle 17, 2000 E.C, (July 24, 2008) and the decree issued by the SNNPR Supreme Court Cassation Division (File No. 23840) on Hidar 23, 2001 (December 2, 2009) have all been reversed.

2. The possessory action brought by respondents is inadmissible. ...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 10, pp. 232 – 234. Abridged translation: Dr. Dereje Zeleke

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 15: Successions 277

15. Successions

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Leul K.v. Seble K. 73247 2013 14 175- 177

2 Daniel T. & Tsion T. v. Asalefe T. (Child), Tutor: Tamirat B.

58338 2011 11 135-138

3 Hanna T.v. Ta’emu D. 57114 2011 11 66-67

4 Tutor of Robel Neguse, W/ro Tarikua Abebe

49851 2010 10 68-69

5 Amare R.v. Solomon K. 43069 2010 10 70-73

6 Tewodros M. v. G/Hiwot T. 40510 2009 8 269-271


Leul K. -v.- Seble K. et al Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 73247 (January 22, 2013)

Holding of the Court: An action can be instituted to have a certificate of heir annulled if it is issued on a property over which a person does not have a right. Article 998(1) of the Civil Code

______________

Cassation File No. 73247 Tir 14, 2005 E.C. (22 January 2013)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,

Adane Negussie, Mustefa Ahmed

Petitioner: Leul K. Respondent: Seble K. and others

Judgment This case started at the Tigray Woreda Court when the current petitioner together with Michael K. and Alem G. ascertained the property making up the inheritance from the deceased, Bashay K., and claimed the transfer the estate to the heirs. The respondents filed an opposition as per Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code arguing the evidence obtained by the petitioner, in a manner not clear to them, incorporates a house used for business located at Adigrat and placed on 43 square meter area, and which has been given to them by donation. They stated that this house is inappropriately transferred to the heirs.

The current petitioner and the other heirs responded to the opposition stating that the issue has been decided in a litigation that had gone up to the regional Cassation Division and it was proved that the deceased and the mother of the respondents were not married. They further argued that thirteen of the deceased’s heirs are listed in the certificate of heir, and contested the respondents’ claim of donation on the ground that it is untrue and unregistered at the notary. The petitioner recalled the litigation between heirs of the deceased and the mother of the respondents and stated that it has been proved that she does not have a right on the land and house and that this decision has not been reversed.


The Woreda Court examined the arguments and evidence of both sides and found that the contested house was given as a donation to the respondents in on Megabit 26, 1964 E.C. (April 4, 1972) and this was confirmed by the Family Council on Tir 8, 1972 E.C. (January 17, 1980). The Court further observed that the donation was authenticated by a court and that this has been confirmed by the Tigray Regional State Supreme Court. Hence, the Court decided that the contested house shall be given to the respondents and it annulled part of the certificate of heir that makes reference to the house. The current petitioner and the other heirs appealed to the Adigrat Central Court which reversed the decree of the lower court on the ground that it is inappropriate to annul the certificate of heir as long as the contested house is registered in the name of the deceased, and noted that the certificate of heir obtained by the petitioner and other heirs does not bar the respondents from exercising their right under the donation. The court added that the respondents could bring a suit on the property to protect their right. Afterwards, the current respondents brought their petition before the Region’s Supreme Court which reversed the decision of the High Court and confirmed the decree of the Woreda Court. The cassation petition to the Region’s Cassation Division was not accepted.

This petition is as a result brought to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The petitioner stated that there is fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower courts. The Division has examined the relevant law and the decision of the lower court that led to this petition. Accordingly, the Division has framed the issue whether it was inappropriate for the lower court not to consider the petitioner’s opposition that the issue has been heard and decided upon by another court.

As can be learned from the proceedings, the respondents requested for the annulment of certificate of heir obtained by the petitioner and other heirs on a house with an area of 43 square meters located at Adigrat. They claimed that their deceased father, Bashay K., has given it to them in the form of donation in 1972, and that the donation was authenticated in conformity with the law. Even if the petitioner claimed to have litigated over the property with the mother of the respondents, courts having jurisdiction to see the matter have rejected the argument finding that the court case involving the mother of the respondents is over a property other than the one contested in this case and that even if it can be said that the litigation was made it does not concern the respondents. The lower courts also found that the petitioner brought a suit to have the 1972 donation contract invalidated, but the Region’s Supreme Court decided against the invalidation request, and the donation has been authenticated in 1980 in line with the law.


As can be understood from the contents of Article 998 of the Civil Code, if it is proved that an heir has without a valid right obtained a certificate of heir, the court may annul the certificate it issued. According to Article 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, a court shall not try a suit or issue where the matter which is directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and has received a final decision. When the issue is viewed in the light of these provisions, the petitioner has not received a final decision on the litigation related to the contested house with the mother of the respondents.

Moreover, it is proved that the deceased made donation to his children, who are the respondents. The decision that the mother of the respondents does not have a right on the property does not annul the legal argument raised by the respondents. On the contrary, it can be understood from the contents and spirit of Article 998(1) of the Civil Code that the donation made in favour of the respondents has been authenticated by courts at different times and this proves the right of the respondents on the contested property. This entitlement of the respondents is a valid ground for annulling the certificate of heir obtained by the petitioner and other heirs.

Therefore, the petitioner’s argument that he has taken delivery of the house in accordance with a decision made in 1984 E.C. (1992) is not in congruence with the litigation process and content. This issue was not also brought in a clear manner before the lower courts, and raising it as a new issue at this Division is contrary to Article 329(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. This Cassation Division has not found the argument acceptable. We have not thus found fundamental error of law in the decision of the courts.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Tigray Regional Supreme Court’s Appellate

Division and which has been affirmed by the Region’s Cassation Division is confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. There is no fundamental error of law in the decision which nullifies the certificate of heir obtained by the petitioner on the contested house that is being used for business.


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 14, pp. 171-173. Abridged translation: Tewodros Dawit


Daniel T. & Tsion T. -v.- Asalefe T. (Child), Tutor: Tamrat B.


Holding of the court - A small amount of disposition made in favor of an heir at law amounts to

a disinhersion, and in such a case the heir shall be entitled to a partition of the estate along with the legatee by universal title;

- … “posing a serious problem in my life” does not suffice as a reason to disinherit an heir.

- An heir at law disinherited without sufficient legal reason or by omission shall have equal share in the estate as the legatee by universal title

Article 912, 938, 939, 915, 1014, 1123 of the Civil Code

_____________

Cassation Case No.58338

Miazia 06, 2003 E.C. (April 14, 2011)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioners: Daniel T. & Tsion T.

Respondent: Asalefe Tsigie (Child); Tutor/curator: Tamrat Birru

The court examined the case and rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case started when the respondent Tamrat Birru, tutor of Asalefe T. submitted application to the Addis Ababa City First Instance Court asking the court to declare Asalefe T. legatee of the deceased Ato Tsigie Z., based of the latter’s will made on Hamle 7, 1998 E.C. (July 14, 2006). After the court gave declaratory judgment accepting the application, the petitioners filed an application as per Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Code requesting that the status of legatee given to the respondent be cancelled.

They stated that the deceased, in his will, has disinherited them by entitling each them to only Birr 5 (five) alleging that they have posed serious problems


in his life. The petitioners requested to be declared heirs of the deceased and stated that they have been disinherited without reason. The court ruled that the will made by the deceased has disinherited the petitioners without sufficient reason. Thus the court entitled the petitioners to have equal share in the inheritance with the respondents.

The respondents dissatisfied with this decision appealed to Addis Ababa City Appellate court. The court after examining the case decided that the deceased in his will has only reduced the shares of the petitioners (plaintiffs at the lower court), but has not disinherited them. It reversed the decision given by the First Instance Court and upheld the will. The petitioners dissatisfied by the decision of the court brought their case to the Cassation Bench of the Addis Ababa City Court. The City’s Cassation Bench after hearing both parties affirmed the decision of Addis Ababa City Appellate Court.

The petition to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court is made against these decisions which upheld the will of the deceased. The petitioners claim that there is fundamental error of law committed by the lowers courts. The petitioners argued that the will of the deceased entitled each of them to only Five Birr out of the whole estate which is worth over Birr 600,000 (six hundred thousand), in effect disinheriting the first degree heirs. The petitioners stated that the interpretation of the deceased’s will as a reduced share in inheritance rather than disherison fails to take into account Articles 938, 939 and 1123 of the Civil Code and they sought reversal of the decisions given by Addis Ababa Appellate Court and the City’s Cassation Bench

This Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has noted that the issues to be considered are whether the deceased Tsigie Z. has, in the will he made on July 14, 2006, disinherited the petitioners and what should be the consequence thereof. As stipulated under Articles 938 and 939 of the Civil Code, a parent cannot expressly or by omission disinherit his heirs at law without sufficient and legitimate reason. If a parent disinherits his/her heirs at law without sufficient and legitimate reason or by omission as envisaged under Article 915 of the Civil Code, the heirs at law shall have equal share of the inheritance. This court found that the Five Birr given to the petitioners out of the estate of the deceased estimated at six hundred thousand Birr cannot be considered as a case of reduced share of legacy but as an act of disinheriting the petitioners.

The Court further noted that the reason of the disherison which reads “posing a serious problem in my life” lacks clarity. By taking this statement as true, based on Article 938[2&3] of the Civil Code, the court has examined whether this reason falls under the grounds that justify disinheriting an heir at law as stipulated under Article 938[2] of the Civil Code. The court reasoned that “posing a serious problem in a person’s life” (behiywote lai kefitegna


chigir silefeterubign) can have several degrees of gravity and manifestations, and is insufficient as a legitimate reason for disinheriting.

The court held that the will made by the deceased shall not be invalid on the ground of formalities. Yet, the money allocated for the petitioners amounts to disherison in light of the value of the inheritance, and such an amount cannot be regarded as receipt of a share in inheritance and falls under lesion as envisaged in Article 1123 of the Civil Code. Therefore the legacy cannot be regarded as legacy by singular title, but as legacy by universal title which has, in effect, disinherited the petitioners without a legitimate reason. The remedy does not thus lie in Article 1014(e) which applies to cases of legacy by singular title, but rather warrants the application of Articles 938, 939 and 915 of the Civil Code so that the petitioners will be entitled to equal share in the legacy with the legatee by universal title, i.e. the respondent.

Therefore the decisions of the Addis Ababa City Appellate Court and the City’s Cassation Bench contain fundamental error of law because they related the issue with reduced share in inheritance without taking into consideration the disinheritance effect of the will in light of the value of the deceased’s estate.

Decree 1. The decision of Addis Ababa Appellate Court, File No. 12988 rendered on

Megabit 17, 2002 E.C. (March 26, 2010) and its confirmation by the Addis Ababa City Cassation Bench File No. 13364 on Ginbot 19, 2002 E.C. (May 27, 2010) are amended in accordance with Art. 348 of the Civil Procedure Code

2. The Addis Ababa City First Instance Court decision, File No. 137/02, rendered on Yekatit 26, 2002 E.C. (March 5, 2010), is affirmed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code

3. The will of the deceased made on July 14, 2006 has, in effect, disinherited the petitioners without sufficient and legitimate reason and shall not thus be applicable. Since the will has only made the respondent an heir, he shall divide the property of the deceased equally with the other heirs, i.e., the petitioners.

… Signature of five judges

_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 135-138 Abridged translation: Tsedey Girma & G. Habteyes


Hanna T.e –v.-. Ta’emu D. Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 57114 (Ginbot 3, 2003)

Holding of the Court: Period of limitation shall run from the date an heir, who is a minor, reaches the age majority, or from the time he/she starts to exercise rights. Article 1845 of the Civil Code

________________ Cassation File No. 57114

Ginbot 3, 2003 E.C (May 11, 2011)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammad, Nega Dufesa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Hanna T. Respondent: Ta’emu D.

Judgment The case started at the Federal First Instance Court where the petitioner, and Dawit T., a brother of the current petitioner, were the plaintiffs. They brought a suit claiming partition of inheritance. The respondent, Ta’emu, in her statement of defense argued that the case is barred by a period of limitation, as ten years have passed since the death of the father of the plaintiffs. However, the respondent had withdrawn the preliminary objection of period of limitation which she had invoked against Dawit T. as she was his guardian/tutor who brought him up. The Court after examining the case rejected the claims of the current petitioner stating that the suit is barred by a period of limitation.

An appeal was brought to the Federal High Court from the decision, but the court affirmed the decision of the Federal First Instance Court. This petition is thus brought to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court from this decision of the Federal High Court.

The Cassation Division has examined the petition dated Sene 10, 2002 (June 17, 2010) after calling upon and hearing the respondent. It then examined the propriety of enforcing the period of limitation on the petitioner, given the substantively proven fact that the respondent is the step mother of the petitioner. In its examination of the matter, the Cassation Division noted that it was only Dawit Tsegaye, brother of the petitioner, and not the petitioner


herself, who was under the guardianship of the respondent. It can however be understood from the decision of the First Instance Court that the petitioner, same as her brother (Dawit T.), was also a minor.

One of the reasons that led the First Instance Court to decide that the period of limitation objection raised by the respondent is applicable only on the petitioner was because guardians and tutors are required to have a minor’s rights protected on time. With regard to the petitioner, the Court took the date on which her father died for the purpose of counting the period of limitation. However, the Court did not indicate as to when the petitioner was emancipated. Moreover, even though the respondent, invoked the 10 years period of limitation citing Article 1845 of the Civil Code, she has failed to establish that the petitioner has let the period of limitation lapse after she reached the age of majority, i.e. after her emancipation from minority.

The Cassation Division observed that there is no reason why the period of limitation which is said to be inapplicable on Dawit T. would not be applicable on the petitioner. Moreover, the Cassation Division has found no legal ground that supports the argument that the guardians/tutors of the petitioner should have protected the rights of the petitioner. This court has further observed that the main issue that should be underscored is that the petitioner is her father’s heir and that she seeks to secure her right of succession. The period of limitation should run from the time she reached the age of majority, the time during which she can start to exercise her right. This Court has thus found the decision of the lower courts as having fundamental error of law. Accordingly, the following decree is rendered.

Decree 1. The orders given by the Federal First Instance Court in File No. 14168 on

Megabit 24, 2001 (April 2, 2009) and by the Federal First Instance Court on File No. 79963 on Ginbot 17, 2002 (May 25, 2010) are amended in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The request of the petitioner for liquidation of succession is not barred by a period of limitation. Hence, it shall be seen with the pleading of Dawit T..




Robel Negussie’s Tutor, Tarikua Abebe



- In a will that is authenticated by an appropriate official of the Document Registration and Authentication office, it is mandatory for the name and signature of the notary to be put as one of the witnesses where there is only one witness other than the official at the notary present during the authentication.

- If there are two witnesses during the will that is authenticated, it is not mandatory for the name of the official to be put along with the other witnesses as long as the fact that the will was done before an appropriate official is confirmed by a signature of the official and a stamp of the Office

Article 882 of the Civil Code ______________


Miazia 4, 2002 E.C. (April 12, 2010)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,

Petitioner: Robel Negussie’s Tutor, Tarikua Abebe

Respondent: None

The court has examined the case and it has rendered the following judgment.

Judgment The case came before this Court by a petition written on Tikimt 16, 2002 E.C. (26 October 2009). The petitioner stated that the decisions rendered by the Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance Court, the City’s Appellate Court and the Cassation Division have fundamental error of law.

The case was first seen at the Addis Ababa First Instance City Court and the petitioner stated that W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye Desta, the grandmother of


Robel Neguse, has made a will stating that the heir to her house (Address: Addis Ababa, Kebelle 01, House No. 872) is Robel Neguse. The will has been signed by two witnesses in front of an appropriate official of the Document Authentication and Registration Office and it was authenticated on the Meskerem 27, 2001 E.C. (October 7, 2008). The Office registered the will and kept one copy for itself and gave another to the beneficiary of the will. Then, Robel Neguse submitted application to the Addis Ababa First Instance City Court for certificate of heir which shows that he is the heir of the late W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye. Two witnesses have also testified at the court and they have stated that the deceased made his will at the Document Authentication and Registration Office.

The Addis Ababa City Administration First Instance Court examined the will and the testimony and decided that the formalities under Article 881 of the Civil Code have not been fulfilled. Moreover, the name of the official of the Document and Authentication and Registration office has not been mentioned as a witness and that it has not been signed. This falls short of the formality stated under Article 882 of the Civil Code.

The petitioner argued that the deceased W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye had her will authenticated at the Will Department of the FDRE Ministry of Justice Document Authentication and Registration Office Addis Ketama Branch and the official at the department has given a signed proof showing this. It has been proven by the official at the Will Department of this office showing that the will has been signed by two witnesses in front of the appropriate official on a working day. She argued that the decision that the will does not fulfill the formalities under 882 of the Civil Code has a fundamental error in the interpretation of the law. The decision in addition to nullifying the value of the will of the deceased, it is against the best interest of the child. She thus requested for the correction of the error and for the will to be recognized. There was no defendant in both lower courts.

This court has examined the files and has observed that the deceased W/ro Tesfanesh Ambaye appeared before the Document Authentication and Registration on 7 October 2008 and her will was done in the presence of two witnesses in front of an appropriate official of the Office. The will was signed forthwith by the deceased and by the witnesses. Then an appropriate official of the Office authenticated the will with his signature and a stamp of the office. This should be evaluated based on Article 882 of the Civil Code. Article 882 of the Civil Code states that a public will “shall be valid where it is made in the presence of two witnesses one of whom is a registrar or a notary acting in the discharge of his duties”.

The Addis Ababa City Administration Court decided that the name of the official of the office should have been put as one of the witnesses. The court


stated that even though the will was done before the appropriate official, since his name was not put as one of the witnesses, the will would not have any legal value.

Such interpretation does not comply with the spirit and objective of the law. The proof of the will shows that the will was done before an appropriate official of the Office and that after the will was read out loud the deceased and the two witnesses signed on it. The appropriate official, who was overseeing the whole process then authenticated the will with his signature, put a stamp on it, numbered it, kept one copy for the Office and gave another copy to the deceased. This fulfills the formalities under Article 882 of the Civil Code and ensures that the will is actually the last word of the deceased.

Therefore, it generally is not mandatory for the name of the official to be put along with the other witnesses as long as the fact that the will was done before an appropriate official is confirmed by a signature of the official and a stamp of the Office. The name of the official has to be put as one of the witnesses only if there is only one other witness beside him. In the case at hand, there are two other witnesses in addition to the official. Therefore, this court has decided that the decision made by the lower court based on Article 882 has a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decisions of the Addis Ababa City Administration Court, the City’s

Appellate Bench and the City’s Cassation Division are reversed. 2. The will made on in writing October 7, 2008 by Tesfanesh Ambaye in

favour of Robel Neguse fulfils the formalities under Article 882 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the will shall have legal effect.


_______________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume: 10, pp 68-69 Abridged translation: Selam Abraham


Amare R. -v.- Solomon K.


Holding of the Court: A legatee by universal title and an heir-at-law should divide the property equally if the will that gives the property to the legatee is a universal will and where the heirs at law have not been disinherited based on legally acceptable grounds.

Articles 911(1), 912(1), 939(3) and 915(1/) of the Civil Code _____________


Miazia 6, 2002 E.C. (April 14, 2010)


Justices: Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wollie, Ali Mohammed,

Petitioner: Amare Reta Respondent: Solomon K.

Judgment This case was brought before the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court because the petitioner claimed that there is a fundamental error of law in the decision of the lower court which held that the heir-at-law and the legatee should divide the property among themselves.

The current petitioner is now in possession of a house located in Akaki Sub City, Kebelle 01 in accordance with a will written on Ginbot 23, 1992 EC (May 31, 2000) by the deceased Kassaye K.. The current respondent, at the lower court, requested for a judgment stating that the current petitioner should leave the house to him. The lower court, after examining the arguments and the evidence, recognized the fact that the deceased disinherited his son without giving sufficient reason and gave his property to the petitioner. Therefore, in accordance with Article 939(3) of the Civil Code, it decided that the property should be equally divided between the heir-at-law and the legatee. An appeal was submitted to the Federal High court, but the court confirmed the earlier decision.


The petitioner, then, brought the case to this court on Tahsas 9, 2001 E.C. (December 18, 2008) stating that there is a fundamental error of law in these decisions. The main content of the petition is that the property given to the legatee is only one house, not the whole property of the deceased. He contended that the lower court wrongly interpreted Article 939(3) and considered him as a legatee by universal title, and he requested for the reversal of the decisions of the lower courts.

This Court has examined the petition and summoned the respondent to examine whether the decisions of the lower courts based on Articles 939 and 852 were appropriate. In his defense submitted to the court on Nehassie 15, 2001 E.C. (August 21, 2009), the respondent argued that the heirs-at-law were disinherited contrary the law and that the deceased did not have any other property besides the house mentioned. So, he requested for the decision of the lower courts to be confirmed.

This court has examined the case based on the arguments and analyzed the law in relation to the issue at hand. The petitioner claims that he should be the sole owner of the house he has obtained by virtue of the will while the respondent seeks to be regarded as an heir. The respondent is requesting for the confirmation of the decision of the lower court so that he can share the property with the legatee.

The major issue that needs the decision of this court is whether the will written in favor of the petitioner is a legacy by universal title or a legacy by singular title. The petitioner, in this regard, argues that he was given only the house by the will, while the respondent contends that the house was the only property the deceased had.

The will written by the deceased dated May 31, 2002 states that he has left his house along with its roof, walls and soil to his God-son Ato Amare R. because his children did not visit him. The will further reads, if there is anything in the house that his wife claims, it belongs to her, and she should have it. There is also a one-room house left for his wife W/ro Enat M. which has been confiscated by the government. It has also been stated that the wife can use the house until she passes away, after which it will pass onto Ato Amare R..

It can be recognized from the will that the deceased has put everything he owned in the will. Article 911(1) of the Civil Code provides that where the testator has used expressions like “my heirs” or “my property” or “my immovable property”, in order to give meaning to such words, he shall be deemed to have envisaged the position at the time of his death. Moreover, Article 912(1) states that a legacy by universal title is a disposition whereby


the testator calls one or more persons to receive the full ownership or the bare ownership of one whole or of a portion of the property.

Therefore the lower courts have not erred in finding that the petitioner is a legatee by universal title.

There is no argument as to whether the respondent is an heir-at-law. The Court has also seen from the files that the petitioner has received property from the deceased as a legatee by universal title. On the other hand, there is no legally acceptable ground for disinheriting the children of the deceased. The lower court, after examining these facts, gave its decision based on Article 939(3) of the Civil Code and ruled that the heir-at-law and the legatee should equally divide the property among themselves. For this to take place, the requirements under Article 915(1) of the Civil Code should be fulfilled. As mentioned above, the petitioner is a legatee while the respondent is heir of the deceased entitled for intestate succession. If this is the case, the division of the property would be in accordance with Article 939(3) of the Civil Code.

Therefore, the decision of the lower court which was based on these provisions was in accordance with the spirit of the law and there is no sufficient ground to say there is a fundamental error of law.

Decree The decision of Federal First Instance Court, File Number 09965 on Miazia 10, 2000 EC (April 18, 2008) and the decision of the Federal High Court, File Number 68488 are affirmed. ...




Tewodros M. -v.- G/Hiwot T.


Holding of the Court: Estimation of price done for the purpose of division of an inheritance among heirs should take into account the market price of the inherited property, not the construction cost.

______________


Sene 23, 2001 E.C (June 30, 2009)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammad, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Belachew Anshiso, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Tewodros M.

Respondents: G/Hiwot T.


Judgment The case started at the Federal First Instance court where the current petitioner was the plaintiff. The petitioner brought a suit against the respondent claiming a share in the property he is entitled to inherit from his deceased mother. The Court, after receiving the estimation of the price of the property from the Land Development Administration Office, decided that the petitioner shall get as his share, one-fourth out of the total value of the property. The petitioner dissatisfied with the decision of the Court brought an appeal to the Federal High Court. After hearing the litigation and having the price of the property estimated by the Land Development Administration Office for the second time, the Federal High Court decided that the petitioner shall get one fourth of the total value of the house as his share. The current petition is brought from this decision.

Based on the petition submitted by the petitioner on Meskerem 5, 2001 (September 15, 2008), the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court, examined the case after summoning the respondent. The Cassation Division


decided to entertain the petition with a view to examining the appropriateness of the decision which apportions one-fourth of the value of the house to the petitioner.

As indicated above, the petitioner requested his share of the inheritance devolving from his deceased mother. It is made clear in the litigation that the property on which a division was requested is an urban house, a common property acquired during the marriage between the petitioner’s mother and the respondent. The petitioner has established that while he was born from another father, his mother has given birth to three children in her marriage with the respondent. Accordingly, the Cassation Division noted that it is half of the house that remains after the respondent takes his half, not the total value of the property. The remaining half will thus be divided among the four children of the deceased.

The Cassation Division further noted that the petitioner, during the litigation in lower courts, brought an objection only on the price estimation of the house. However, in his petition submitted to the Cassation Division, he raised an objection arguing that he should get his share after the house is sold by auction. In this regard, the Cassation Division observed that, as half of the share of the house belongs to the respondent, three-fourth of the remaining half belongs to the other three siblings of the petitioner. This court has found that selling the house by auction so that the petitioner can get one fourth of his deceased mother’s share would not be appropriate or just, as it will adversely affect the respondent and his children. Thus, we have rejected this request because it is found unjust and was not also raised at the lower court.

In this regard, given the fact that the price estimation made by the Land Development Administration was not based on market price, the Cassation Division found it important to examine whether the partition of the inheritance based on the price estimation done only by taking into account the construction cost of the house could be regarded as just.

The Cassation Division maintained that, in allocating half of the house among the four children of the deceased, all of them should be treated equally and the rights of each child shall be ensured. To this end, this Court has observed that the price estimation of the house used by the lower courts only takes construction cost into account rather than the market price that the house had at the time. The construction cost of the house only includes expenses for buying the necessary building materials and paying the workers involved in its construction. The market price, on the other hand, indicates the price at which the house would be sold if it was made available for sale. In order to estimate the market value of the house various factors such as location and the market situation at the time will be taken into account.


This gives a better opportunity in making an estimation of the current value of the house under consideration instead of merely estimating the amount spent for constructing the house. Hence, this Cassation Division has found that equal rights of the parties will be better ensured if the price estimation of the house is calculated based on the market price. This court thus holds that the decision of the lower courts needs to be amended.

Decree 1. The order given by the Federal First Instance Court on File No. 01411/99

on Tir 23, 2001 (January 31, 2009) and the decision of the Federal High Court, File No 0172/2000 are amended as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code

2. The petitioner shall get his share (i.e. one-fourth of his deceased mother’s share from the house) after the price estimation is made based on the market price at the time the petitioner’s claim for its division was brought to the lower court.


__________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 8, pp. 269-271 Abridged translation: Maereg G. Gidey

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 16: Torts 295

16. Torts (Non-contractual Liability)

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Ethiotelecom v. Nigussie Tefera 77238 2012 14 203-206

2 Alemnesh Ermo v. Alem Mesfin 74111 2012 13 495-497

3 Government Housing Agency v. Tsehaye Zemuy and Sultan Kahsay

54518 2011 11 419 -421

4 Ayele Admasu v. Ajebu Shume 42962 2010 10 244-245

5 Ethiopian Roads Authority v. Temegnehu E.

38457 2009 9 79-81

6 Ministry of Agri. and Rural Devpt v. Alsha

32144 2008 5 156-157


Ethiotelecom -v.- Negussie Tefera Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 72238 (November 12, 2012)

Holding of the Court: An administrative body shall ensure whether there are telecommunications or electric power cables prior to the issuance of construction license, and any person who acquires license shall guarantee that no damage shall occur on telecommunications or electric cables. Thus, anyone who negligently causes damage while carrying out construction will be held liable. Article 3(3), Protection of Telecommunication and Electric Power

Networks Proclamation No. 464/2005; Articles 2027(1), 2028 and 2035 of the Civil Code

_______________




Petitioner: Ethiotelecom

Respondent: Negussie Tefera


Judgment The case started in South-West Shewa Zone High Court where the current petitioner was the plaintiff. He claimed that the defendant (current respondent) caused damage amounting to Birr 48,998.72 to the optical fibre cable, property of the petitioner, while digging the land under his possession, on Yekatit 10, 2001 E.C (February 17, 2009) at 10:30 a.m, and causing the cable from Addis Ababa to Jimma to be severed, knowing that it is buried in the ground at the depth of half a meter. The petitioner further stated that, the defendant refused to pay the 48,998.72 Birr (forty eight thousand nine hundred ninety eight birr and seventy two cents) (inclusive of VAT) required of him. The petitioner claimed that the defendant had written a letter dated Megabit 08, 2001 (March 17, 2009) admitting liability for the damage caused and requesting to


reimburse the cost incurred in the maintenance, transport as well remuneration paid to professionals and labourers.

In his statement of defence, the defendant (current respondent), argued that the Woliso City Administration while allocating the 1,888 square meters of land to him and when it provided him with the plan in 1997 E.C as per Article 3(3) of Proclamation No. 464/2005, did not inform him that there is an optical fibre cable buried in the land. He further argued that, there is no sign put by the plaintiff to this effect, and the cable is buried more than 150 meters from the main road, while this distance should not have been more than 15 meters. He argued that the letter written to the plaintiff was not a statement of admission of liability but was written in good faith as the damage was unintentionally caused to state property. The defendant also raised an alternative argument for the reduction of the amount of compensation. He contended that he is not liable for the damage, but in case the court finds enough reason to decide otherwise, the amount of damage claimed is exaggerated.

The High Court requested the City Administration to confirm whether it had informed the defendant that there is an optical fibre cable buried in the ground, to which the latter responded to the negative arguing that the plan of Ethiotelecom was not delivered to it. The court then found that it cannot be maintained that the defendant had prior knowledge of this fact, as the plan given to him does not show the existence of a cable buried in the land.

Regarding the alleged letter of admission of the defendant, the High Court noted that the content of the letter does not show an admission of liability, stating that he is not expected to know whether there was a buried cable, as the location is 150 meters from the main road. The Court further stated that the defendant proposed to pay the amount incurred for the maintenance of the cable as well as the money paid to the professionals and labourers, with the intention of reimbursing the expenses incurred. Moreover, the Court, found that the defendant’s contention of the amount claimed by the plaintiff does not amount to an admission of guilt, and it rejected the claim of the plaintiff (current petitioner).

The Oromia Regional Supreme Court to which an appeal was brought affirmed the decision of the High Court. The petitioner then brought this petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court alleging that the lower courts have committed a fundamental error of law. The petitioner stated that, as per Article 3(3) of Protection of Telecommunications and Electric Power Networks Proclamation No. 464/2005, it is the responsibility of the Woliso City Administration and the respondent (who requested for a construction permit) to check whether there is a telecommunication cable. It


further argued that Art. 23(1) of Telecommunications Proclamation No. 49/1996 requires the City Administration and the respondent to obtain the prior consent of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the court has unduly rejected the suit by stating that what the respondent stated in the letter does not amount to admission, while the latter had admitted that he has negligently caused damage and that he is willing to pay a reduced amount.

The respondent on the other hand, argued that the City Administration did not inform him that there is a cable buried in the land given to him, and the petitioner’s argument which alleges that the respondent should have known is not acceptable. He further stated that what he admitted about the damage during the litigation conducted in the lower courts was not admission of liability.

The Cassation Division after hearing the litigation has identified two issues, i.e. whether the respondent is liable for the damage caused, and if the respondent is liable, the amount that should be paid as compensation.

This court has examined the first issue in the light of Proclamation No. 464/2005, issued to protect telecommunication and electric networks. According to Article 3(3) of the Proclamation, Federal and City Administration bodies are required to make sure that damage will not be caused to a telecommunication or electric network before giving a construction permit, and the applicant for a construction permit should do the same before undertaking the construction. Article 4 of the Proclamation states that, anyone who causes damage to a telecommunication or electric network, intentionally or negligently, is punishable. The Cassation Division noted that the respondent caused the damage by negligently digging the ground contravening its obligation of making sure that damage will not be caused to a telecommunication network.

Furthermore, Article 2027(1) of the Civil Code states that irrespective of any undertaking on his part, a person shall be liable for the damage he causes to another by fault. If a person, intentionally or negligently commits a fault causing damage to another, he shall be liable for the damage caused, without there being a prior contractual relationship between them. Article 2035(1) also renders a person liable if he/she infringes any specific and explicit provision of the law, decree or administrative regulation. Despite these stipulations embodied in the Proclamation and the Civil Code, the lower courts decided that the respondent is not liable stating that the City Administration did not inform him about the existence of the cable and because the petitioner did not put any sign on the place where the damage occurred. The lower court further stated lack of proof to show that the current respondent committed the fault knowingly, despite the fact that the respondent has not denied causing the


damage. The decision of the lower courts in relation to the first issue is not thus acceptable.

Regarding the second issue, i.e. amount of the damage, Article 2028 of the Civil Code provides that anyone who caused damage to another by fault has to make it good. Moreover, Articles 2090(1) and 2091 of the Civil Code stipulate that the damages due by the person legally declared to be liable shall be equal to the damage caused to the victim by the act giving rise to the liability. In this regard, the Cassation Division found it important to examine the reasons submitted by the respondent and the evidence he has produced to support his argument that the amount of compensation claimed by the petitioner is exaggerated.

The Cassation Division then observed that the decision of the lower courts relieved the respondent from liability although he did not deny causing damage to the property of the petitioner. This is not in conformity with Article 3(3) of Proclamation No. 464/2005 which stipulates that anyone who seeks a construction permit shall, before carrying out the construction, make sure that damage will not be caused to telecommunication and electric networks. This court has further found that the lower courts have failed to note Articles 2027(1), 2028 and 2035 of the Civil Code based on which a non contractual liability may arise. Therefore the decisions of the lower courts have fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the South West Shewa Zone High Court, File No. 21371

delivered on Tahsat 07, 2003 E.C. (December 16, 2010), and the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, File No. 112894 rendered on Hedar 28, 2004 E.C. (December 8, 2011), are reversed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The Respondent is liable for the damage caused. Thus, according to Article 343(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, the case is returned to the South West Shewa Zone High Court, so that it shall assess and decide on the amount of damage based on the litigation of the parties, examining the evidence, and if necessary hearing an independent expert.

...




Alemnesh Ermo -v.- Alem Mesfin Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 74111 (July 11, 2012)

Holding of the Court: - An employment agency is duty-bound to make sure that the

dignity and security of workers sent abroad are respected. - An employment agency which fails to observe its obligations shall

pay compensation to workers who sustain damage in the hands of their employers abroad.

Employment Exchange Services Proclamation No. 632/2009 ______________


Hamle 4, 2004 E.C (July 11, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,

Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Alemnesh Ermo Respondent: Alem Mesfin

The following judgment has been rendered.

Judgment The case involves compensation for damage. The respondent was a plaintiff at the Federal First Instance Court. The plaintiff alleged that she was sent to Beirut by the petitioner (defendant at the lower court) by paying Birr 8,000 (eight thousand) and she was dropped from the third floor by her employer as a result of which she sustained 30% permanent damage on her leg. The plaintiff stated that her employer was not willing to pay her salary for six months amounting to US Dollars 600 (six hundred). She also claimed the expenses she has incurred for food, medical and transportation. She argued that the petitioner (defendant at the lower court) is responsible for the damage and must pay Birr 130 (one hundred and thirty) per month for 33 years which amounts to a total compensation of Birr 200,430 (two hundred thousand four hundred and thirty birr).


The defendant (current petitioner) contended that she did not receive Birr 8,000 from the plaintiff, and she alternatively argued that if at all this sum was paid, it was non-refundable. She stated that all salaries were paid to the plaintiff by her employer and the six-month salary stated in the pleading was transferred via Western Union to Ato Ayalneh Genna on behalf of the plaintiff (current respondent). The petitioner also argued that she did everything appropriate to ensure the security of the plaintiff, and stated that no evidence was adduced which proves that the plaintiff was dropped by her employer. The petitioner also argued that the plaintiff sustained the damage on account of cancer.

The Federal First Instance Court decided that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff could not establish that she sustained that damage because she was dropped from the third floor by her employer. However, the court decided that the applicant should reimburse the Birr 8,000 she took from the respondent as the petitioner should not have taken any sum from the respondent as per Employment Exchange Services Proclamation 632/2009. The court also required the petitioner to pay salary to the respondent for five months since the respondent had worked for 11 months while the salary paid to the respondent was only for six months.

As the respondent was aggrieved by the decision of the court, she lodged her appeal to the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court accepted her appeal, summoned the other party and heard the case. Then the appellate court found in favor of the appellant and decided that she was entitled to Birr 154,440 (one hundred fifty four thousand four hundred and forty) for material compensation and Birr 1,000 (one thousand) as moral compensation. According to the appellate court, the fact that the appellant was dropped from a third floor by her employer in Beirut was proved. It was also observed by the appellate court that the respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) was on wheelchair. The Federal High Court further stated that the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant and the medical evidence received from Back Lion Hospital together with the testimony from the respondent (Alem Mesfin) demonstrates that she has sustained 30% total disability.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Federal Hight court, the petitioner (defendant at the lower court) appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. However, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal pursuant to Article 337 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitin to the Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court was filed against the decision of the Federal Supreme Court. The Cassation Bench has examined the case in light of the issues framed and the relevant legal provisions.


As it is possible to understand from the overall reading of Proclamation No. 632/2009, an employment agency is duty-bound to make sure the dignity and security of workers sent aboard are respected. In the lower courts, the petitioner did not argue that she was not liable; rather she argued that she did everything possible to ensure the protection of the security of the respondent. Hence, the argument raised by the petitioner against her liability for injury caused by the employer of the respondent is not acceptable.

As far as payment of compensation is concerned, the decision of the Federal High Court and its confirmation by the Federal Supreme Court is appropriate and acceptable. We have found that no fundamental error of law was committed by the lower courts.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal High Court on Hamle 6, 2003 E.C. (July 13,

2011) under File No. 3953 and that of the Federal Supreme Court made on Tikimit 22, 2004 E.C. (November 2, 2011) under File No. 72389 are confirmed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The decisions of the Federal High Court and the Federal Supreme Court which declared that the petitioner is responsible for the permanent bodily harm caused to the respondent are appropriate.

3. The injunction order made by this Bench on Tahsas 2, 2004 E.C (December 12, 2011) is lifted.




Government Housing Agency -v.- Tsehaye Zemuy & Sultan Kahsay Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 54518 (February 21, 2011)

Holding of the Court: In a non-contractual relationship, Article 2024 of the Civil Code is not applicable where a claim of payment is made for the period a property is used by another person.

Articles 2024 and 2162 of the Civil Code

_______________


Yekatit 14, 2003 E.C (February 21, 2011)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hagos Woldu, Dagne Melaku, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Agency for Government Houses Respondents: 1. Tsehaye Zemuy

2. Sultan Kahsay


Judgment The case started at the Federal First Instance Court where the current petitioner was the plaintiff and brought a suit against the current respondents alleging that they have unduly enriched themselves by using a house, property of the Agency for Government Houses, without having a proper rental agreement and in disregard of the relevant rental regulations. The Agency claimed to be indemnified with an amount commensurate with the benefit they have unduly obtained.

In their statement of defence, the respondents (defendants at the lower court) submitted preliminary objection stating the suit should not be entertained because the petitioner does not have the right to sue them as there is no contractual relationship between them and because it is brought after the lapse of the period of limitation. With regard to the merits of the case the respondents requested for the dismissal of the case arguing that they became possessors of the house by buying the business from the previous tenant.


The First Instance Court which adjudicated the case, after hearing the litigation of the parties, dismissed the suit arguing that, according to Article 2024(d) of the Civil Code, the rental is deemed to have been paid as two years have elapsed since it fell due and the suit was not brought within this time.

The Federal High Court, to which an appeal was brought by the petitioner from the decision of the Federal Instance Court, also dismissed the appeal stating that the decision of the lower court does not have an error.

Subsequently, the petitioner submitted a petition dated Megabit 16, 2002 E.C. (March 25, 2010) to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court challenging the decision of the lower courts. The Cassation Division framed the issue whether the decision of the lower courts which presumed rent to have been paid as per Article 2024(d) of the Civil Code is appropriate; i.e. whether the decision of the lower courts is based on valid interpretation of the law.

The Cassation Division noted that the non existence of a prior rental agreement between the petitioner and the respondents is not disputed by both parties. The petitioner did not sue the respondents alleging that they did not perform their contractual obligation; nor did it state that they failed to pay rent as per their agreement. Rather, the petitioner alleged that the respondents have unduly enriched themselves by unlawfully occupying the house, and claimed the amount of money it would have gained had the respondents lawfully rented the house. On the other hand, the respondents also did not argue that they did not use the house; they argued that they did not have a contractual relationship with the petitioner. Thus, the Cassation Division noted that the litigation has nothing to do with the payment of rent.

Article 2024 of the Civil Code which the lower courts cited as a pertinent provision to the case at hand lists the instances in respect of which presumption of payment is made. In this regard, Article 2024(d) states that debts due in respect of rents for houses are deemed to have been paid where two years have elapsed since they fell due. In light of this provision and the arguments of the parties, the Cassation Division noted that Article 2024 is not the right provision that should be used to decide on the case at hand. Even though the two parties do not have a contractual relationship, as the respondents have been using the house without paying rent, it is established that the petitioner has the legal ground to bring suit against them.

The provision that governs this relationship is found in parts of the Civil Code that deal with extra-contractual liability and unlawful enrichment. It is stated under Article 2162 that, “[w]hosoever has derived gain from the work or property of another without just cause shall indemnify the person at whose expense he has enriched himself to the extent to which he has benefited from his work or property”.


The respondents did not raise an argument that they did not use the house. They also did not oppose the amount of money claimed by the petitioner which was calculated as per the directive of the Agency for Government Houses, issued to determine the rate when business premises are transferred to another party through a business sale agreement. What the petitioner requested is thus the income it would have gained from the house, as the house has been occupied by the respondents. Therefore, the Cassation Division has found the respondents liable to pay the amount of money the petitioner would have gained had it rented the house as per the directive. We have thus found that the decisions of the lower courts failed to give due regard to this fact thereby having fundamental error of law. Accordingly, the following decree is rendered.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court rendered on Hamle 24,

2001 E.C (July 31, 2009), File No. 130183 and the order given by the Federal High Court, Tir 18, 2002 E.C (January 26, 2010) in File No. 84627 are reversed as per Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The respondents shall be jointly and severally liable for petitioner’s claim of Birr 138,122.19 (one hundred thirty eight one hundred twenty two birr and ninety cents).

...




Ayele Admasu -v.- Ajebu Shume Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 42962 (January 6, 2010)

Holding of the Court: Where it was proved that the working capacity of a victim is reduced, a fair compensation is to be fixed even if it is difficult to determine the compensation equivalent to such damage; the amount of compensation shall be determined on the basis of equity; denying compensation alleging that the petitioner did not have any income before the occurrence of the damage is a fundamental error of law. Articles 2025, 2066, 2081, 2090, 2091, 2092, and 2102(1) of the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia

_______________


Tahsas 28, 2002 E.C (January 6, 2010)


Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed,

Petitioner: Ayele Admasu

Respondent: Ajebu Shume

Judgment The case pertains to compensation. The petitioner filed a case to the Federal First instance Court claiming a compensation of Birr 50,000 (fifty thousand) alleging that he sustained bodily injury as he was knocked down by the vehicle owned by the respondent. In his statement of defense, the respondent argued that the amount of compensation claimed by the respondent was exaggerated. The court, having examined the arguments of both sides, dismissed the claim of the petitioner stating that he was unable to prove that he had income before the occurrence of the accident.

The petitioner lodged an appeal to the Federal High Court, but the appellate court dismissed his appeal. The present petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court was submitted against this decision. This court has, in light of the relevant law, examined the legality of the denial


of compensation by the appellate court although it was proved that the petitioner sustained bodily injury.

It was proved that the vehicle belonging to the respondent knocked down and caused bodily injury to the petitioner. The respondent did not deny that his vehicle caused the injury. At stipulated in Art. 2081(1) of the Civil Code, the owner of the vehicle is responsible for any harm caused by his vehicle. Even if the respondent has not committed fault, he shall be responsible for the damage caused to the petitioner by the mere fact he is the owner of the vehicle which caused the injury.

The lower court accepted that the respondent is responsible for the injury. What was, however, arguable was whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation. The lower court decided that although the petitioner sustained bodily injury, he was not entitled to compensation as he was not able to prove that he was earning income before the occurrence of the accident. This decision of the court leads to the conclusion that an individual is entitled to compensation as a result of bodily injury only when he/she proves that he was earning income before the injury and that such income was lost as a result of the injury. This conclusion shall mean denial of compensation, irrespective of the degree of the bodily injury, unless loss of pecuniary interest is shown. Therefore, this Cassation Bench has examined the issue as to when compensation is to be paid in such situation.

By virtue of Article 14 of the Constitution, “[e]very person has the inviolable and inalienable right to life, the security of persons and liberty”. Article 16 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that every person “has the right to be protected against bodily harm”. As the Constitution is the supreme law of the country it protects the security of individuals. Without prejudice to the fact that infringement of this law entails criminal liability, the victim has the right to get compensation for bodily harm. The provisions of the Civil Code dealing with compensation are among those provisions of law which are instrumental to ensure the protection of human rights enshrined in the Constitution.

Accordingly, where a person, owing to his fault, causes harm on another person, he shall be responsible to the harm and is duty-bound to pay compensation as stipulated in Article 2028 of the Civil Code. Therefore, as a matter of principle, a person is obliged to pay compensation where he commits fault although there are certain exceptional circumstances whereby a person shall be strictly liable as per Articles 2066 ff. One of these exceptional situations is the fact that the owner of a vehicle is strictly liable to a damage caused by his vehicle as provided in Article 2081(1) of the Civil Code.


Therefore, an individual who is responsible for the bodily injury of a person is duty-bound to pay compensation thereof.

The next issue relates to the amount of compensation. As provided in Articles 2090 and 2091 of the Civil Code, the person who is liable to pay compensation is required to pay an amount which is equivalent to the amount of damage. Moreover, Art. 2092 provides that future damage which is certain to occur shall be compensated without waiting for its materialization. In the case at hand, we have realized that the petitioner sustained 18% bodily harm. The lower court observed that the petitioner has sustained injury even if it decided that he is not entitled to compensation as he did not prove that he was earning income before the occurrence of the injury. Although it was not medically proved that the petitioner sustained total permanent disability, it was proved that his working capacity is reduced by 18%. Fair compensation should thus be fixed equitably as provided in Article 2102(1) of the Civil Code even if it is difficult to fix equivalent compensation to such harm,. Hence, as it was proved that the petitioner has lost 18% of his working capacity, the amount of compensation should be determined on the basis of equity. Therefore, denial of compensation to the petitioner because he did not have any income before the occurrence of the damage is a fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision made by the Federal First Instance Court under file No.

107806 on Miazia 24, 2000 E.C (May 2, 2008 ) and the decision made by the Federal High Court under File No. 68949 on Tikimit 28, 2001 E.C (November 7, 2008) are hereby reversed.

2. Because the petitioner has sustained 18% bodily harm, it is equitably decided that the respondent shall pay Birr 30,000 (thirty thousand) to the petitioner.

…




Ethiopian Roads Authority -v.- Temegnehu Endashaw Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 38457 (June 9, 2009)

Holding of the Court: - Where damage or harm occurs while using a vehicle or property, its

owner cannot be held responsible if the victim was using the property without giving any benefit to the owner;

- Under such circumstance, the owner cannot be held liable unless he/she/it commits fault.

Articles 2081(1) and 2089(1) of the Civil Code of Ethiopia ______________

Cassation File No. 38457 Sene 2, 2001 E.C (June 9, 2009)


Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Belachew Anshiso, Sultan Abatemam

Petitioner: Ethiopian Roads Authority

Respondent: Temegnehu Endashaw

Judgment

The case involves the issue of compensation caused by a car accident. The respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) sued the petitioner stating that he sustained physical injury on his leg because the vehicle in which he was travelling overturned while it was driven by the petitioner’s driver. Hence, he claimed compensation.

In its statement of defense, the petitioner argued that the vehicle was not meant to give commercial public transportation services. As the plaintiff was in the vehicle inappropriately and without the purpose of giving any service to the petitioner (defendant at the lower court), the petitioner argued that it is not legally liable to such individual.

The court which entertained the suit decided that the defendant was liable to pay compensation to the plaintiff. The Federal High Court, to which an appeal was lodged, confirmed the decision of the lower court. The petition to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court was brought against this decision.


On the basis of the petition filed on Sene 9, 2000 E.C (June 16, 2008), the respondent was summoned and the Cassation Bench has examined whether the petitioner is liable to the respondent in light of Article 2089(1) of the Civil Code. Accordingly, we have examined this issue in light of the arguments of both sides, the decisions of the lower court against which petition was filed and the relevant provisions of the law. The legal provision which needs to be examined is Article 2089(1) of the Civil Code which is found under Title 13 of the Civil Code and that deals with extra-contractual liability and unlawful enrichment. During the proceedings in the lower courts, it was proved that the respondent sustained the injury not because he was knocked down by the vehicle belonging to the petitioner, but because the car in which he was a passenger was overturned.

The vehicle was meant for the use of the office and not for commercial transportation services. The petitioner was not aware of the fact that the respondent was in the vehicle. The petitioner derived no benefit from the respondent. If these facts are proved, the next issue to be entertained is whether there is any legal ground that makes the petitioner liable to the respondent. According to Article 2081(1) of the Civil Code, the owner of a vehicle shall be responsible to damage caused by his vehicle. However, Article 2089 stipulates the exception in which the owner of a car cannot be held liable. According to this provision, the owner of an object, which caused the damage, cannot be held responsible in the event that the victim made use of the property without giving any benefit to the owner.

As we have seen above, the respondent made use of the vehicle without giving any benefit to the petitioner. Moreover, it was not alleged that the petitioner committed fault. Therefore, there is no legal ground which makes the petitioner liable. This court has thus found that the decision of the lower courts contain fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the High Court of Sheka Zone on the Hidar 12, 2002

E.C. (Nov. 21, 2009) under File No. 03066 and the decision of the Federal High Court on Miazia 14, 2000 E.C. (April 22, 2008) under File No. 63179 are reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The petitioner is not responsible for the injury sustained by the respondent. …

Signatures of five justices _________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 9, pp.77-78 Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre


Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development -v.- Alsha Siraj Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 32144 (April 1, 2008)

Holding of the Court: - Moral compensation is awarded to victims where it is expressly provided

by the law; and it shall not exceed Birr 1,000 (one thousand) [unless a specific law provides otherwise];

- Where the law has determined the ceiling of the amount of compensation, it is not possible to go beyond the legal limit;

- The basis for the calculation of material compensation shall be the net salary of the deceased.

Articles 2105 and 2116 of the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia _______________

Cassation File No. 32144 Megabit 23, 2000 E.C. (April 1, 2008)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Abdulkadir Mohammed, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Taffesse

Yirga, Medhin Kiros

Petitioner: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Respondent: Alsha Siraj

Judgment The respondent W/ro Alsha was plaintiff at the lower court and she sued the petitioner alleging that a vehicle belonging to the petitioner knocked down and killed her husband. She claimed compensation for herself and on behalf of her two minor children. In its statement of defense, the petitioner pleaded that it was not liable to pay compensation, and alternatively it pleaded that if it is to be held liable, the amount claimed by the plaintiff was exaggerated. The court decided that the petitioner should pay compensation of Birr 61,275.90 (sixty one thousand two hundred seventy five and ninety cents) to the respondent and her children as compensation to the damage sustained by them as the result of the death of her husband, Birr 2,000 (two thousand) for funeral expenses and a monument, and Birr 1,000 (one thousand) as moral compensation for each, i.e. the respondent and her two minor children. An appeal lodged to the Federal High Court against the decision of the lower court was rejected. A petition is brought to this Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court.


Following the petition on Hamle 24, 1999 E.C. (July 31, 2007), this court summoned the respondent and heard the case. We have examined the way the amount of compensation was calculated and moral compensation was fixed.

The respondent (plaintiff at the lower court) stated the interests affected due to the death of her husband. This court has observed from the file that the basis for the calculation of the amount of compensation was the salary of the deceased. The Federal First Instance Court determined the amount of compensation on the basis of the gross monthly salary of the deceased, i.e. Birr (eight hundred ninety five). The petitioner did not contest the amount of the deceased’s salary, but argued that it was not proper to determine the amount of compensation on the basis of the gross salary of the deceased without deducting legally recognized deductible sums from the gross salary. However, the lower courts calculated the amount of compensation without taking this reality into account. Hence, this Cassation Division has observed that the lower courts committed error in this regard.

With regard to moral compensation, the amount of compensation to the respondent and her two minor children was Birr 3,000 (three thousand). This compensation was awarded based on the amount of Birr 1,000 stipulated under Article 2116 of the Civil Code and it was taken as compensation to be given to the respondent and her two children individually. This Cassation Bench has, however, observed that, moral compensation is, according to Article 2105 of the Civil Code, awarded to victims only where it is expressly provided by law. With regard to the amount of moral compensation, Article 2116 of the Civil Code provides that it shall, in no event, exceed Birr 1000 (one thousand). As the law has determined the ceiling, it is not thus possible to go beyond the legal limit. The decisions rendered by the lower courts regarding the amount of moral compensation thus have fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court on Ginbot 23,1999 E.C.

(May 31, 2007) under File No. 05585 and confirmed by the Federal High Court on Hamle 9, 1999 E.C (July 16, 2007) under File No. 5689 are varied in accordance with Art. 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The amount of material compensation shall be calculated based on the net salary of the deceased by subtracting legally recognized deductible sums.

3. The amount of moral compensation shall be Birr 1,000 (one thousand).

Signatures of five justices _________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 5, pp. 156-157. Abridged translation: Aschalew Ashagre

Selected FSC Cassation Decisions, Abridged Translation Chapter 17: Miscellaneous 313

17. Miscellaneous

File No.

Year

Vol.

Pages

1 Wegagen Bank v. Ethiopian Revenues & Customs Authority

81215 2013 14 290-294

2 Getachew Deyas & Fantu Tesfaye v. Rukiya Kedir

68573 2012 13 623-625

3 Getnet Yenew v. Iyob Binyam 60392 2011 11 557 -559

4 Bahir Dar City Administration Service v. Bahir Dar Textile Factory (Three respondents)

54567 2011 11 522-524

5 Berhane Tessema v. Tamrat Kidane et al

42824 2009 11 539 -541

6 Mukmil Mohammed v. Miftah Kekir

38794 2009 9 173-175


Wegagen Bank -v.- Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 81215 (January 11, 2013)

Holding of the Court: The bank with which a vehicle is pledged shall have priority right to recover the loan from its pledge where the debtor, after having pledged the vehicle with the bank commits customs offence which led to a judicial decision for the confiscation of the vehicle.

Civil Code, Articles 2628, 2857(1), 3059 Art. 3, Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks Proclamation No.

97/1998 Criminal Code, Article 98(1) Customs Proclamation No. 622/2009, Article 91(2)

_________________


Tir 3, 2005 E.C. (January 11, 2013)


Justices: Teshager Gebreselassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Reta Tolosa, Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Wegagen Bank


The court has rendered the following judgment after having examined the case.

Judgment The legal issue in this case is whether priority right is accorded to a bank with which a vehicle is pledged for loan, or whether the confiscation of the pledged vehicle as a result of customs offence committed by the debtor (while using the pledged vehicle) should be implemented irrespective of the pledge.

The case started at Mekele City Central Court on Miazia 01, 2002 E.C. (April 9, 2010). The petitioner (plaintiff in the lower court) stated that the Isuzu truck Plate No. 3-29644, owned by Berhe H. A. is pledged with the bank


for a loan of Birr 90,000 (ninety thousand). As the debtor is in default of paying Birr 2,905 per month, the petitioner is entitled to recover the loan from the sale of the vehicle by virtue of the Foreclosure Law. However, the respondent (defendant in the lower court) claimed to have confiscated the vehicle due to the customs offence of contraband. The petitioner (pledgee) thus requested the lower court that it should have priority of debt recovery from the pledge.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division had previously decided that the vehicle shall be confiscated, and the respondent argued that the petitioner does not have any right over it. The respondent contended that the petitioner cannot invoke claims because final judgment is given over the issue of confiscation.

During the litigation at Mekele City Central Court, the petitioner contested the respondent’s arguments on the ground that its priority right on the pledge should be respected as it is a different from the theme of the judgment of the Federal Supreme Court with regard to confiscation.

Mekele City Central Court dismissed the petitioner’s claim by invoking Articles 32(2) and 244(2)(b)&(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, and it stated that there is final decision of confiscation rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The petitioner’s appeal to Tigray Regional State Supreme Court was not accepted.

This petition is submitted against these decisions. The petitioner states that the vehicle is pledged property and it cannot be subject to confiscation as a result of a criminal offence committed after the pledge. The petitioner contended that the application of res judicata without the fulfilment of the requirements thereof and the failure to apply the relevant provisions of the law that apply to pledge constitute fundamental error of law.

This Cassation Division has examined whether it was appropriate to reject the priority claim of the petitioner due to the judgment of confiscation of the vehicle.

The respondent argued that the issue of priority claims apply only in civil cases and shall not be applicable to criminal cases, and it stated that the petitioner resorted to this claim after its initial attempt to institute a suit at Maichew High Court was rejected in accordance with Article 418 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has observed that Berhe pledged his vehicle, Plate No. 3-29644 with the petitioner for the loan of Birr 90,000 based on a contract dated Meskerem 02, 1997 E.C. (September 12, 2004). This court has also noted that the pledge is registered at Addis Ababa Transport Authority. Thereafter, Berhe used the vehicle for contraband on


Yekatit 24, 2001 E.C. (March 3, 2009) as a result of which the Prosecutor instituted a criminal charge at the Tigray Regional Southern Zone. The litigation continued until a decision was rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division on Ginbot 05, 2003 E.C. (May13, 2011) in File No. 48628 which affirmed the sentence of three years of simple imprisonment and fine of Birr 5,000. Moreover, the court varied the lower court’s decision and gave final decree regarding the confiscation of the vehicle.

While the litigation of the criminal case was underway at the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, the petitioner had, on Tikimt 16, 2002 E.C. (October 26, 2009), requested to intervene in the litigation. The core argument of the petitioner was that the vehicle in question was pledged property before the commission of the offence. The respondent, on the other hand, argued against the petitioner’s claim on procedural grounds, without, however, denying that the vehicle is pledged property.

The legal issue that needs to be resolved is the manner in which the creditor of loan secured by pledged property can enforce its right where final court decision is rendered regarding the confiscation of the vehicle due to an offence committed after the pledge.

As stipulated under Articles 2828, 2857(1) and 3059, a pledgee or mortgagee has priority in loan recovery. Article 3 of Proclamation No. 97/1998 further allows banks to foreclose any property pledged or mortgaged as security to loan by giving a notice 30 days before the foreclosure. Moreover, Article 2857(1) of the Civil Code entitles the pledgee to be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of the pledge before all other creditors. These provisions thus show that the petitioner has priority in recovering its claims from pledged property.

On the other hand, Article 98 of the Criminal Code does not deal with the situation in which the property that is subject to confiscation was, prior to the commission of the offence, pledged as security. Nor does the law that is used as a special legislation regarding customs offences, i.e. Proclamation No. 622/2009 (or other proclamations enacted prior to it) deal with this issue. As long as the laws that are directly relevant to the issue are not clear, principles of statutory interpretation require reference to other laws with a view to examining how they deal with the issue.

With regard to labour relations, Article 167 of Proclamation No. 377/2003 provides that “Any claim of payment of a worker arising from employment relationship shall have priority over other payments or debts”. Workers shall thus have priority over both secure creditors (that are in a similar position as the petitioner) or ordinary creditors. The legislature has clearly given due priority to the claims of workers for whom such payments are crucial for the


fulfillment of basic needs. Another area of the law that can inform our analysis on priority claims relates to Article 80 of the Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 which entitles the Tax Authority to have priority to other debts other than the priority claims from secured creditors.

Even if the issue of priority in claims is not expressly articulated in the Criminal Code, it becomes necessary to resolve the issue under consideration by interpreting the objective of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article 91(2) of Proclamation No. 622/2009 and the rationale of the laws applicable to pledged property.

The purpose of a contract of pledge is to secure business transactions and criminal law aims at securing the peace and security of the public. These rights extend to legal persons including banks. The function of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority is generally to put in place appropriate tax collection systems and this can be observed from the content and spirit of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Establishment Proclamation No. 587/2008 and other tax laws.

As Article 80 of Proclamation No. 286/2002 provides that secured creditors shall be paid prior to the Tax Authority, this principle should not be altered where the Authority obtains judgment that enables the state to collect the proceeds of confiscated property due to tax and customs offences. In other words, secured creditors should not lose their priority merely because the revenue emanates from confiscation of property in accordance with the law. The petitioner is thus entitled to priority claims because the status of the vehicle as pledged property has not been contested and the pledge was made before the commission of the offence. The lower courts should have resolved the issue from this perspective and they have erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioner by citing legal provisions that do not have relevance to the issue under consideration.

The other issue that should be considered is the manner in which the respondent’s rights can be addressed. The law envisages that the vehicle used by the offender during the commission of contraband offences shall be subject to confiscation. After the debt owed to the pledgee is paid, any remaining amount from the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle shall thus be paid to the respondent. In case, however, all the proceeds from the sale of the pledge are paid to the pledgee, the respondent should have recourse to other property owned by the debtor worth the value of the vehicle that was subject to confiscation. This is because the offender should not benefit from his criminal act.

Therefore it is found that the balance from the sale of the vehicle after payment is made to the petitioner should be considered as the proceeds of


confiscation. In the event that no proceeds are left after the debt owed to the pledgee is paid, the execution of judgment for the confiscation shall apply to other property of the offender to the extent of the value of the vehicle that shall be determined based on its price on the date of the confiscation judgment.

The pledgee, i.e. the petitioner, shall have priority to be paid from the sale of the vehicle, and the rejection of this claim by the lower courts contains fundamental error of law.

Decree 1. The decisions of the lower courts are reversed in accordance with Article

348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The Isuzu truck Plate No. 3-29644 owned by Berhe H. was a pledge prior

to the commission of the offence by its owner, and the debt owed to the pledgee shall have priority in payment. If this amount is less than the proceeds to be obtained from the sale of the truck, the remaining amount shall be confiscated, and if there is no remaining amount from the sale, this decision of confiscation shall be executed on the offender’s private property the amount of which shall be determined based on the price of the vehicle that existed on the date of the confiscation decree.

. ..




Getachew Deyas & Fantu Tesfaye v. Rukiya Kedir



The interpretation in the decision of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division shall not retroactively apply to cases that were decided based the Cassation Division’s earlier interpretation even where the Division has changed its interpretation in a later case.

Proclamation No. 454/2005, Article 2 ______________


Megabit 12, 2004 E.C. (March 21, 2012)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed, Nega Dufesa,

Adane Negussie

Petitioner: Getachew Deyas & Fentu Tesfaye

Respondents: Rukia Kedir

Judgment This cassation case involves the applicability and interpretation of Article 2 of Proclamation No. 454/2005 (Federal courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation). The present petitioners were sellers in a contract of sale of a house on Tir 24, 1999 E.C. (February 2, 2006) and they were litigating parties in File No. 05508 over the issue whether the contract should be invalidated. Adama Zone Liyu Zone High Court decided that contract of sale of immovables which is not made at a notary or court shall not be valid, and decided that this contract is invalid by citing the decision of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division in File No. 21448.

After the decision of the High Court, the current petitioner has filed a suit at Adama Liyu Zone High Court requesting that the parties be reinstated in the position which would have existed had the contract not been made.

320 EtLex, Volume 1 Ethiopian Legal Information Consortium November 2013

The buyer of the house (present respondent) argued that the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has rendered a decision in File No. 36887, on Tahsas 10, 2001 EC (December 20, 2008). The court (on May 27, 2010, File No. 06799) reiterated its earlier position that the decision was rendered based on the FSC Cassation Division’s decision (File No. 21448) on a similar issue. It stated that decision has been rendered over the issue under consideration and the only issue that can be litigated upon is the issue of reinstatement. The court decided that the contract was found to be invalid during the earlier litigation, and the request for the validity of the contract cannot be raised by invoking a different interpretation rendered by the FSC Cassation Division in File No. 36887.

However, Oromia Supreme Court reversed the decision upon appeal by stating that even if the lower court’s decision was correct when it was rendered, the decision of the FSC Cassation Division on Tahsas 18, 2001 (December 28, 2008) states that such contracts are valid as long as the contract is not denied by the parties. The Supreme Court held that as long as the FSC Cassation Division has changed its interpretation, lower court interpretations of the issue should also be changed, thereby deciding that the contract for the sale of the house should not be invalidated. Oromia Supreme Court Cassation Division confirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

We have examined the case. According to Article 90(3) of the FDRE Constitution and Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation No. 25/1996, the purpose of enabling the FSC Cassation Division decisions to have binding effect in interpretation is to enhance consistency in the judicial interpretation of laws. Articles 2 ff of Proclamation No. 454/2005 thus bind lower courts to pursue the interpretation rendered by the FSC Cassation Division on similar issues. This binding interpretation applies on courts where the FSC Cassation Division has rendered a decision on the interpretation of a similar issue. Adama Liyu Zone High Court has accordingly pursued the interpretation of the FSC Cassation Divsion based on Article 2 of Proclamation No. 25/1996.

Where the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division renders an interpretation which is different from its earlier decision, the latter interpretation only applies to cases that are filed after the decision or that have not yet been decided at courts of first instance. Proclamation No. 454/2005 does not allow courts to re-adjudicate cases that have already been decided based on the previous binding interpretation of the FSC Cassation Division. The purpose of the law is to render consistency to


judicial interpretation where an issue is decided by the FSC Cassation Division, and it is not meant to allow revisiting cases that have been decided after the exhaustion of all adjudication procedures. This disturbs stability and exposes litigants to an unpredictable judicial system. We have thus found that the decisions of Oromia Supreme Court Appellate Bench and the Region’s Cassation Division have fundamental errors of law in the application of Proclamation No. 454/2005.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Oromia Supreme Court Appellate Bench

File No. 106340 dated Tir 10, 2003 EC (October 19, 2010) and confirmed by the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 124793 (on Megabit 19, 2003 EC, i.e. March 28, 2011) is reversed.

2. The decision of Oromia Liyu Zone High Court’s decision, File No. 06799 dated Ginbot 19, 2002 EC (May 27, 2010) is confirmed.

3. The decision rendered by Adama Liyu Zone on Sene 23, 2003 EC (June 30, 2011) File No. 05508 was given in accordance with Article 2 of Proclamation No. 454/2005 and should be considered as the final judgment because there is no valid procedure which allows re-adjudication and review. ...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 13, pp. 623-625 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Getnet Yenew -v.- Iyob Binyam

Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No. 60392 (4 January 2011)

Holding of the Court: The period of limitation that bars possessory action for the cessation of interference shall run from the date the petitioner receives possession of landholding title and not from the starting date of the interference which is contested.

Civil Code, Articles 1140, 1149, 1146(1), 1144(2) ______________


Tahsas 26, 2003 E.C. (January 4, 2011)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/Selassie, Birhanu Amenew, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Getnet Yanew Respondent: Iyob Binyam

Judgment The case started with the petitioner’s possessory action for the cessation of interference which was accepted by the lower court. The appellate court, however, reversed the decision stating that possessory action is barred by period of limitation. This petition is submitted against the appellate court’s decision.

The case was initially adjudicated by Dire Dawa First Instance Court which required the Dire Daw Urban Land Administration Authority to submit evidence about the landholding rights over the land contested. Thereupon the Court decided that the respondent has interfered in the possession of the petitioner.

The appellate court stated that the respondent built the fence in 1987 EC (1994/95) on the contested land while the possessory action was submitted to court on Tir 14, 2002 EC (January 22, 2010). It decided in favour of the respondent by stating that the suit is barred by period of limitation in accordance with Article 1149(2) of the Civil Code. Moreover, it stated that by


virtue of Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, the party that actually controls the property contested shall be preferred in possessory disputes.

The petition to this Cassation Division is submitted against this decision. This court required the respondent to respond to the petition so that the Cassation Division can examine the validity of the decision of the appellate court by setting aside the landholding certificate submitted by the petitioner.

The respondent submitted his reply dated Hedar 29, 2003 (December 8, 2010). He argued that the contested 52 (fifty two) square meters have been under his possession since 1987 EC (1994/95), and the petitioner’s claim of interference in possession relates to land that is not under the petitioner’s possession.

The Cassation Division has duly examined the facts briefly stated above based on the issue in dispute and the relevant legal provisions.

It can be observed from the evidence submitted to and accepted by the lower courts that the petitioner has a landholding certificate dated Megabit 10, 2000 EC (March 18, 2008) over the contested land. The fact that the area of land stated in the landholding certificate is 180 (one hundred and eighty) square meters out of which 52 (fifty two) square meters are under the respondent’s possession are also facts established by the lower courts.

Even though the respondent argues that he is in possession of the land since 1987 EC (1994/95), the Kebele Administration has verified that the respondent’s construction of fence was unlawful, i.e. done without permit.

The decision of the appellate court which cites Articles 1140 and 1144(2) of the Civil Code thus amounts to giving protection to the respondent’s unlawful possession.

It should be noted that the objective of the Civil Code provisions is to protect lawful possessions and not to encourage unlawful acts. As can be observed from the stipulation under Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code, “secret or dubious possession shall give rise to no right.”

We have thus found that the legal provision that is invoked by the appellate court to reverse the lower court’s decision has not taken the facts that are established by the lower court.

Moreover, the period of limitation of two years stated under Article 1149(2) has not lapsed because the landholding certificate was issued to the petitioner on March 18, 2008 and the petitioner has filed the suit on January 22, 2010.

Therefore, the petitioner has a better right than the respondent because his possessory action is based on the landholding certificate obtained from the relevant authority and the period of limitation should run from the date on


which he obtained the landholding certificate and not from the date of the respondent’s unlawful possession.

We have thus found that the appellate court’s decision should be rectified because it has not related the law with the facts established by the lower court.

Decree 1. The decision of Dire Dawa Appellate Court, File No. 00514/2002, dated

Hamle 27, 2002 EC (August 3, 2010) is reversed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. The decision of Dire Dawa First Instance Court, File No. 01098 dated Sene 28, 2002 (July 5, 2010) is confirmed.

...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 557 – 559 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Bahir Dar City Service Office -v.- Bahir Dar Textile Factory et al


Holding of the Court: Where property under court injunction to restrain sale is found to have been sold, the judgment creditor shall have recourse, and the failure to respect the injunction (igid) entails liability. Civil Code, Articles 2028, 2035, 2126.

_______________


Yekatit 10, 2003 E.C. (17 February 2011)


Justices: Tegene Getaneh, Dagne Melaku, Teshager G/Selassie, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Bahir Dar City Service Office

Respondents: 1. Bahir Dar Textile Factory 2. Roman Gebru 3. Maru Alamirew

Judgment The case relates to the remedy available to a judgment creditor where property under suspension of sale (igid) is found to have been sold. The case started based on the statement of claim submitted to the lower court by the current first respondent against the current petitioner. The current second and third respondents were made parties to the suit upon the request of the present petitioner after it received the statement of claim.

The initial plaintiff (i.e. the present first respondent) filed a suit which states that Berhanu T. was employed as a cashier from 1988 EC to 1994 EC and he has misappropriated Birr 28,794.70 (twenty eight thousand seven hundred ninety four birr and seventy cents). The statement of claim further states that Western Gojam Administration Zone High Court had held Berhanu T. liable for the amount stated in the suit plus interest and had granted a temporary injunction to restrain sale and exchange of Berhanu’s house as security for the judgment creditor. The suit indicates that Bahir Dar City


Service (Municipality) Office has violated the Court’s injunction of sale and requested that it should be liable to pay the amount that was secured by the injunction.

The present petitioner admits the injunction that was ordered by the court, and argued that it is not liable for the mistake stated in the suit because it occurred due to the fault of two employees whom it requested to be joined in the suit as respondents. The second and third respondents who were included in the suit argued against the liability raised in the suit.

The lower court decided that the present petitioner is liable to pay the amount that was secured by the judgment and found that the second and third respondents are not liable. The petitioner’s appeal to the Amhara Region Supreme Court and its cassation petition to the Region’s Supreme Court Cassation Bench were not accepted.

The petitioner has further lodged a petition to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. The core theme of the petition is that the second and third respondents, and not the petitioner should have been held liable. It further complained against the decisions of the lower court regarding the amount that it was made liable to pay, by stating that the liability should have been only for the amount obtained from the sale of the house and not the entire debt for which Birhanu was made liable for misappropriation, i.e Birr 28,794.70.

The judgment debtor has sold the house that had secured his debt and which was under injunction. The judgment creditor had submitted the injunction order for the suspension of sale to the present petitioner, in spite of which the latter failed to suspend the sale. The petitioner does not deny the receipt of the injunction, but rather argues that the liability solely goes to the second and third respondents. The decision of the lower courts found the petitioner liable on the ground that it has allowed the sale of the house in violation of the injunction, and that it has not proved the fault of the second and third respondents.

By virtue of the content and spirit of Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 10 of Proclamation No. 25/1996, this cassation bench does not address issues of fact, and the decisions of the lower courts regarding the petitioner’s failure to prove the fault of the second and third respondents cannot be re-examined by this bench. In light of its failure to prove the fault of the second and third respondents, there is no ground for the petitioner not to shoulder liability. This is because the violation of the injunction to restrain sale constitutes infringement of clearly stipulated rules and procedures which entail liability in accordance with Articles 2028, 2035 and 2126 of the Civil Code. The decision of the lower court has not thus made error of law in rendering the petitioner liable.


The other argument submitted by the petitioner relates to the amount of liability, and the petitioner contends that the liability should extend only to the amount received as proceeds of the sale of the house and not the whole amount for which the judgment debtor was liable. However, as the sale was not sold by auction, it cannot be ascertained whether the house was sold at its real market value. Thus the petitioner has no valid ground to contest the amount of liability. We have rendered the following decision because there is no valid ground which shows fundamental error of law.

Decree The decision rendered in this case is confirmed in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

...




Berhane Tessema v. Tamirat Kidane et al


Holding of the Court: Excessive noise pollution is said to occur when it causes nuisance. The claim for its cessation is not barred by period of limitation. The remedy cannot be sought from the licensing authority.

Civil Code, Articles 1225, 1226, 1149; Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proc. No. 67/1997



Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Menberetsehai Tadesse, Hagos Woldu, Hirut Mellese, Almaw Wolie, Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Berhane Tessema Respondents: 1. Tamirat Ayane

2. Kolfe Keraniyo Sub-City Trade and Industry Development Bureau

Judgment The case involves the issue of nuisance embodied in Article 1225 of the Civil Code and it started at the Federal First Instance Court. The present petitioner was the plaintiff. In a statement of claim dated Yekatit 28, 2000 EC (March 7, 2008), the petitioner stated that he owns a house adjacent to the first respondent, and that the latter is causing nuisance due to the excessive noise caused by metal works welding machine. He further requested that the second respondent revoke the business licence it has given to the first respondent because such activity should only be conducted in an industrial zone.

The first respondent contended that the claim should be barred by a limitation period of two years and that the noise created by the welding machine is not excessive. The second respondent also argued that the issuance of the licence was appropriate.

The Federal First Instance Court decided that the claim is barred by a period of limitation of two years. It also held the licence can only be revoked


by the entity that is authorized for its issuance, and not by a court thereby rejecting the petitioner’s claims. This decision was confirmed by the Federal High Court, and the petition to this cassation bench is made against these decisions.

The petition submitted to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division dated Tir 18, 2001 EC (January 26, 2009) states that the nuisance had ceased due to the intervention of community police (denb askbari) and the statement of claim [dated March 7, 2008] was submitted as soon as the nuisance restarted. The first respondent on the other hand contended that new issues cannot be raised at the Cassation Bench and that the claim is barred by period of limitation.

The Cassation Bench has examined the arguments raised by both parties in light of the relevant legal provisions and the issues involved the case. The petitioner and the first respondent are neighbours and the latter is found to be undertaking mental works welding since 1993 Ethiopian Calendar, i.e. 2000.

Article 1225 of the Civil Code which deals with abuse of ownership against good neighbourly behaviour is different from Article 1149 which addresses the issue of the cessation of interference. Article 1225 embodies restriction on ownership right even when it is exercised on one’s own property; it requires that the external manifestations of an owner’s acts should not disturb or adversely affect a neighbour or another owner. The reading of Article 1225 in conjunction with Article 1226 and the subsequent provisions requires an owner to use his rights within the limits set forth by the law in such a manner that his lawful use of property does not cause nuisance or damage. Therefore, the period of limitation that applies to Article 1149 is not relevant in this case.

In the case under consideration, the nature of the arguments show that the petitioner is not requesting cessation of interference [as envisaged under Article 1149 of the Civil Code] but the cessation of the nuisance caused by the machine. The noise from the machine is bound to continue as long as the business undertaking continues. In other words, the lapse of time does not bar suits against nuisance. The key issue is proving nuisance due to the noise. The major objective of Article 1225 to protect the use rights of neighbours. There is no legal stipulation which allows the continuity of noise pollution [merely because it existed for a certain period of time].

Adjudication procedures do not allow decisions that emanate from mere focus on legal provisions cited by litigating parties where such provisions are not relevant for the issues in the case. The task of identifying the relevant provisions that should constitute the basis of judgments is the role of courts. Therefore, there is fundamental error of law in the lower court’s decision that


the petitioner’s request against the first respondent’s act is barred by limitation. The court has erroneously based its decision on a legal provision that applies for interference in possession while the provisions that are applicable to this case are Articles 1225 and 1226 of the Civil Code.

With regard to the second respondent, the lower court has found that the respondent is not authorized to determine the modes of urban land use, but to merely issue licences where the legal requirements are met, and suspend or revoke them in the event of defects based on Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation. The petition submitted to this Cassation Division deals with the lower court’s decision which invoked period of limitation. However, the petition does not indicate the error of law in the decision of the lower court with regard to the second respondent.

The Cassation Division has observed from Article 10 of the Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 67/1997 that the proclamation does not provide for the revocation of a business licence by the authority that is entrusted with its issuance in the event of nuisance caused to another person. Therefore, we have found no error of law in the decision of the lower court with regard to the second respondent. We have thus rendered the following decree.

Decree 1. The decision of the Federal First Instance Court (File No. 69348) dated

Sene 26, 2000 (July 3, 2008) and confirmed by the Federal High Court (File No. 69348) on Hedar 24, 2001 (December 3, 2008) are amended in accordance with Article 348(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. As there is no legal ground to bar the petitioner’s claims by period of limitation against, the case is referred to the Federal First Instance Court in accordance with Article 341(1) of the Civil Procedure Code so that the court can, based on Article 1225 of the Civil Code render its decision by examining whether the noise created by the first respondent’s welding activity causes nuisance at the petitioner’s house, and whether the respondent has made efforts to control the noise.

3. The decision of the lower court with regard to the second respondent is confirmed. ...


_________________________________________________ Source: Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions Volume 11, pp. 539 – 541 Abridged translation: EN Stebek


Mukmil Mohammed -v.- Miftah Kedir


Holding of the Court: The parties have agreed on an alternative dispute settlement mechanism, and their agreement shows that the scheme they have opted to undertake is arbitration whose decision is binding.

Civil Code, Articles 3318, 3324, 3325 3346 1731; Civil Procedure Code Articles 315,319, 350, 357

_______________


Megabit 24, 2001 E.C. (April 3, 2009)

Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Justices: Hirut Mellese, Taffesse Yirga, Tsegaye Asmamaw, Almaw Wolie,

Ali Mohammed

Petitioner: Mukmil Mohammed Respondent: Miftah Kedir

Judgment The case relates to the petitioner’s application for execution of arbitral award submitted to the Federal First Instance Court. The application dated Tahsas 3, 1994 EC (December 12, 2001) stated that the plaintiff (present petitioner) and respondent had business relations and that they had assigned arbitrators who passed an arbitral award dated Hedar 8, 1990 (November 17, 1997). The petitioner’s request to the Federal First Instance Court was that the court execute the arbitral award of Birr 170,122.75 (one hundred seventy thousand one hundred twenty two birr and seventy five cents) which the respondent has failed to pay.

The arbitral award debtor, i.e. the present respondent had contested the petitioner’s request stating that there was merely conciliation, and not arbitration, and that if the conciliation is regarded as agreement, he has not given an undertaking in writing to confirm the compromise. He further stated that it was not legally valid to consider that the compromise made on Tikimt 23, 1990 EC (November 2, 1997) for an amicable settlement would lead to


arbitration. After having examined the arguments and the evidence submitted by both parties, the Federal First Instance Court rejected the application for execution by stating that the agreement of the parties constitutes conciliation and that it does not indicate the written undertaking of the parties to confirm the compromise as required under Article 3322(2) of the Civil Code. The Federal High Court confirmed the decision, and this petition to the Federal Cassation Division is submitted against these decisions.

The cassation petition dated Sene 25, 2000 (July 2, 2008) states that the lower court has made fundamental error of law in considering an arbitral award as a compromise. The petitioner argues that the agreement made by the parties on Tikimt 23, 1990 (November 2, 1997) is arbitral submission and the decision of the arbitrators based on the evidence submitted by both parties cannot be considered as conciliation even if did not strictly pursue court procedures. The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has further allowed oral arguments to be made by both parties.

The issue examined by the Cassation Bench is whether the lower court’s rejection of the application for execution is valid.

As the facts established in the course of the litigation indicate, agreement was made between the parties on November 2, 1997 and decision was awarded by arbitrators on November 12, 1997. The lower court accepted the existence of the November 2nd agreement between the parties, and the decision of the arbitrators on 17th November, but it stated that the decision rendered was not arbitration but conciliation which does not fulfil Article 3322(2) of the Civil Code.

Conciliation, mediation, arbitration and negotiation are generally considered as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The lower court has considered conciliation and arbitration in its legal reasoning, and it is necessary to look into their interpretation and application pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code.

The dispute resolution process of conciliation involves negotiation and compromise by the parties in the presence of a third party [referred to as the conciliator] who shall not interfere in the compromise beyond observation as stipulated under Articles 3318-3324 of the Civil Code. In arbitration, on the other hand, the parties present their cases to a third party after which the arbitrator renders decision. Articles 3325-3346 of the Civil Code and Articles 315-319, 350-357 of the Civil Procedure Code regulate the process and the application of arbitration. This indicates that arbitral submissions based on the law can be executed. Particular reference to Articles 3325-3346 indicates that arbitral submissions can be considered as special contracts.


Article 3325 defines arbitration. As contracts are agreements to create, vary and extinguish obligations the elements that must be fulfilled for the formation of a valid contract are also application to arbitral submission. The fulfilment of the conditions of capacity of contracting parties and the requirement of lawful object and the form required by the law are the factors that determine the existence of arbitral submission. The initial step in arbitration is the conclusion of a valid arbitral submission.

Article of the 3345 of the Civil Code stipulates that the procedures of the arbitration shall be in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code and this constitutes the process after the arbitrator starts hearing the arguments of both sides subsequent to the conclusion of valid arbitral submission. This shows that the rights of the disputing parties to hearing, submission of evidence and examination of the other party’s evidence should be respected and the arbitrator should as much as possible conduct the hearing under the procedures applicable to ordinary courts. However, the spirit of same provision indicates that the procedures applicable to ordinary courts may not be rigidly implemented.

As long as the arbitral award is not altered as a result of appeal based on Articles 350 ff of the Civil Procedure Code, it can be executed same as decisions of ordinary courts. Therefore an arbitral award rendered by an arbitrator [which is not altered by an appeal] is final. Moreover the reading of Article 3325 in conjunction with Article 1731 of the Civil Code indicate that a valid arbitral submission which is formed shall bind the contracting parties as law.

In the case under consideration, the respondent does not deny the conclusion of arbitral submission, and this is confirmed by the lower court. The arbitral submission concluded on Tikimt 23, 1990 (November 2, 1997) shows the formation of council of arbitrators and it states that the parties are willing to be bound by the decision of the arbitrators. The arbitral award given on November 17, 1997 is based on this arbitral submission and it states that the arbitrators have identified the shares of each party in the property and money under dispute. The lower court has considered the document signed on November 2, 1997 as a compromise by citing Article 3322(2) and also stating that witnesses have testified that it was a compromise.

However, the content of the agreement concluded between the parties on November 2, 1997 shows that it does not fall under Articles 3318-3324, but rather falls under Articles 3325-3346 of the Civil Code. In light of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code which does not require arbitrators to rigidly follow court procedures, the decision rendered on November 17, 1997 by bringing the parties into terms and by examining the case is arbitration.


In the arbitral submission dated November 2, 1997, the petitioner and the respondent have agreed that they will accept the arbitral award and have given mandate to the arbitrators to render decision. The lower court has committed fundamental error of law in considering this as conciliation and not as arbitration thereby deciding that the respondent is not bound to pay the amount stated. This decision has failed to relate the content of the evidence submitted to the lower court with Articles 3325-3346 of the Civil Code and Articles 315-319 and 350-357 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Decree 1. The decision rendered by the Federal First Instance Court File No. 00136

dated Meskerem 30, 2000 EC (October 10, 2007) and which is confirmed by the Federal High Court File No. 60538 (on Miazia 09, 2000, i.e. April 17, 2008) is reversed.

2. The respondent shall pay the amount (i.e. Birr 170,122.75) as decided by the arbitrators.

...



Part Two: Index of Proclamations and Regulations (1995‐2012) 335

Part Two

Index of Proclamations and Regulations

(1995 2012)


Index 1 Constitution, Codes of Law and State Organs

1, Constitution

001/1995

Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Repealed Constitutions

1987 People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution 1955 Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia 1931 Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia

2. Codes of Law

414/2004 213/2000 52/1965 185/1961 166/1960 165/1960 164/1960

Criminal Code of the FDRE Revised Family Code Civil Procedure Code (Decree No. 52/1965) Criminal Procedure Code Commercial Code Civil Code Maritime Code

Amendments to Codes of Law

639/2009 141/1998 065/1997

Civil Code (amendment) Penal Code (amendment) Civil Code (amendment)

3. FDRE, Flag, Emblem and Holidays 673/2010 654/2009 048/1996 029/1996 016/1996 002/1995

Ethiopian National Anthem Flag Flag and Emblem (amendment) Public Holidays and Rest Day (amendment) Flag and Emblem Declaration of Establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

4. Executive Organs 691/2010 642/2009 641/2009 603/2008 546/2007 471/2005 465/2005 411/2004 380/2004 256/2001 255/2001 134/1998 093/1997 006/1995 004/2005

Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) A Proclamation to Amend the Reorganization of the Executive Organs of the FDRE A Proclamation to Amend the Reorganization of the Executive Organs of the FDRE Re‐organization of the Executive Organs of the FDRE of Ethiopia Administration of the President of the FDRE Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE (amendment) Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority Establishment Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE


5. Legislative organs 556/2007 519/2007 503/2006 470/2005 271/2002 263/2002 253/2001 251/2001 088/1997 033/1996 032/1996 014/1995 013/1995 003/1995

Establishment of the Secretariat of the House of Federation The Secretariat of the House of Peoples’ Representatives Establishment (amendment) The Proclamation to Repeal the Amended Proclamation of the House of People's Representatives Working Procedures and Members' Code of Conduct House of People's Representatives Working Procedure House of People's Representatives Legislative Procedure, Committees Structure and Working Recess and Time‐in Session of the House of People's Representatives (amendment) Establishment of the Secretariat of the House of People's Representatives Consolidation of the House of Federation and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities Loss of Mandate of Members of House of People's Representatives House of People's Representatives Procedure (amendment) Recess and Time‐in Session of the House of People's Representatives House of People's Representatives Legislative Procedure Establishment of the Secretariat of the House of Federation Federal Negarit Gazeta Establishment

6. Judicial Organs 684/2010 454/2005 434/2005 322/2003 321/2003 254/2001 188/1999 138/1998 025/1996 024/1996

Amended Federal Judicial Administration Council Establishment Federal Courts Proclamation Re‐amendment Federal Courts Proclamation (reamendment) The Federal High Court Establishment Federal Courts (amendment) Federal Courts (amendment) Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Federal Courts (amendment) Federal Courts Establishment Federal Judicial Administration Council Establishment

7. Various organs 692/2010 669/2010 649/2009 593/2008 555/2007 535/2007 534/2007 510/2007 478/2005 459/2005 449/2005

Sports Commission Establishment Office of the Auditor General Establishment (amendment) The Ethiopian Federal Government Procurement and Property Administration Transfer of Rights and Obligations of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Agency for Government Houses Establishment National Lottery Administration Re‐establishment River Basin Councils and Authorities National Lottery Administration Establishment An Inquiry Commission to Investigate the Disorder Occurred in Addis Ababa and in Some Parts of the Country Palace Administration Establishment Census Commission Re‐establishment


442/2005 413/2004 412/2004 383/2004 364/2003 360/2003 277/2002 274/2002 257/2001 250/2001 212/2000 209/2000 208/2000 194/2000 180/1999 179/1999 173/1999 151/1999 133/1998 129/1998 102/1998 084/1997 082/1997 068/1997 057/1996 052/1996 051/1996 050/1996 047/1996 017/1996 012/1995 011/1995 010/1995 008/1995

Central Statistics Authority Establishment Quality and Standards Authority of Ethiopia Establishment (amendment) Privatization and Public Enterprises Supervising Authority A Proclamation to Amend the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission Establishment Proclamation The Justice Sector Personnel Training Center Establishment Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology Development Authority Establishment Public Enterprises Supervising Authority Cooperatives Commission Establishment Ethiopian National Security Council Council of Constitutional Inquiry National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund Establishment Research and Conservation of Cultural Heritage Board of Trustee for Public Enterprises Establishment Geological Survey of Ethiopia Establishment Census Commission Establishment Ethiopian National Archives and Library Pre‐shipment Inspection Scheme Establishment Ethiopian Film Corporation Dissolution Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses Establishment (amendment) Awash Basin Water Resources Administration Agency Establishment Quality and Standards Authority of Ethiopia Establishment Census Commission Establishment National Petroleum Reserve Depots Administration Office of the Federal Auditor General Establishment Federal Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Ethiopian Privatization Agency Establishment Office for the Sale of Government‐Owned Houses Establishment Establishment of the Board of Trustee for Privatized Public Enterprise (amendment) Basic Metals Engineering Industry Agency Establishment Establishment of the Board of Trustee for Privatized Public Enterprise Sports Commission Establishment Tourism Commission Establishment Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission Establishment Federal Civil Service Commission Establishment

8. City Charters 536/2007 514/2007 483/2006 416/2004 408/2004 361/2003 311/2003 087/1997

The Proclamation to Amend the Dire Dawa Administration Charter (amendment) The Proclamation to Amend the Dire Dawa Administration Charter (amendment) The Dire Dawa Administration Charter (amended) The Dire Dawa Administration Charter Addis Ababa Government Revised Charter Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Addis Ababa City Government Charter


9. Defense and Police 343/2003 327/2003 313/2003 207/2000 123/1998 027/1996

Defense Forces (amendment) Establishment of the National Reserve Force Federal Police Commission Federal Police Defense Forces (amendment) Defense Forces

10. Fund Establishment 708/2011 589/2008 581/2008 521/2007 415/2004 342/2003 317/2003 268/2002 247/2001 240/2001 066/1997 019/1996

Ethiopian Women's Development Fund Dissolution Road Development Projects Revolving Fund Establishment Water Resources Development Fund Establishment and Administration (amendment) Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund Dissolution Sugar Industry Development Fund Establishment Fuel Price Stabilization Fund Establishment (amendment) Rural Electrification Fund Establishment Water Resources Development Fund Establishment Fuel Price Stabilization Fund Establishment Ethiopian Women's Development Fund Establishment Road Fund Establishment Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund Establishment

11. Budget, Fiscal Year: Ethiopian Calendar (1995‐2005 Ethiopian Calendar)

766/2012 738/2012 719/2011 704/2011 687/2010 672/2010 647/2009 598/2008 579/2008 552/2007 502/2006 469/2005 444/2005 419/2004 418/2004 358/2003 344/2003 282/2002

2005 Fiscal Year Budget 2004 E.C. Fiscal Year Federal Government Supplementary Budget 2004 Fiscal Year Federal Government Budget 2003 Fiscal Year Federal Government Supplementary Budget 2003 Fiscal Year Federal Government Budget 2002 Fiscal Year Federal Government Supplementary Budget 2002 (E.C.) Fiscal Year Federal Government Budget 2001 Fiscal Year Federal Government Budget 2000 Fiscal Year Supplementary Budget 2000 Fiscal Year Budget 1999 Fiscal Year Budget 1998 [2005] Fiscal Year Budget 1997 Fiscal Year Supplementary Budget Federal Budget The Proclamation to Ratify the Budget for the Inquiry Commission to Investigate the Incident Occurred in Gambella Regional State on December 03, 2003 1996 Fiscal Year Budget 1995 Fiscal Year Supplementary Budget 1995 Fiscal Year Budget


Index 2 Thematic Index of Proclamations (1995‐2012)

Themes and Organs 1. Agriculture and Rural Development

782/2012 660/2009 488/2006 315/2003 267/2002 238/2001 206/2000 330/2003

Seed Apiculture Resources Development and Protection Ethiopian Organic Agriculture System Fisheries Development and Utilization Animal Diseases Prevention and Control Ethiopian Agricultural Sample Enumeration Seed _____________________________________________________ The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture

Institutions 504/2006 390/2004 382/2004 288/2002 269/2002 198/2000 145/1998 122/1998 117/1998 079/1997 041/1996

Ethiopian Sugar Development Agency Establishment Agricultural Mechanization Services Corporation Establishment Proclamation Repeal A Proclamation to Amend the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization Establishment National Agricultural Input Authority Establishment Ethiopian Rural Energy Development and Promotion Center Establishment Animal, Animal Products and By‐Products Markets Development Authority Establishment (amendment) National Fertilizer Industry Agency Establishment National Seed Industry Agency Establishment (amendment) Animal, Animal Products and By‐Products Markets Development Authority Establishment Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization National Fertilizer Industry Agency Establishment

2. Banking and Insurance 746/2012 626/2009 592/2008 559/2008 306/2002 216/2000 193/2000 097/1998 040/1996

Insurance Business Micro‐Financing Business Banking Business Vehicle Insurance Against Third Party Risks Transfer of Doubtful Bank Debt to the Government (amendment) Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks (amendment) Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks Licensing and Supervision of Micro‐Financing Institutions

591/2008 The National Bank of Ethiopia Establishment (as amended)


3. Business related

A. Ethiopia Commodity Exchange 665/2010 550/2007

Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (amendment) Ethiopia Commodity Exchange B. Mining

678/2010 118/1998 022/1996

Mining Operations Mining (amendment) Mining (amendment)

C. Registration and Licensing

731/2012 686/2010 376/2003 328/2003 171/1999 113/1998 067/1997

Commercial Registration and Business Licensing (amendment) Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Commercial Registration and Business Licensing (amendment) Commercial Registration and Business Licensing (amendment) Commercial Registration and Business Licensing (amendment) Authorization of a Special Time‐Limit for Business License Renewal Commercial Registration and Business Licensing D. Trade Practice and Consumer Protection

685/2010 329/2003

Trade Practice and Consumers' Protection Trade Practice E. Transport

681/2010 616/2008 600/2008 548/2007 547/2007 468/2005

Vehicles Identification, Inspection and Registration Civil Aviation Driver's Qualification Certification Multimodal Transport of Goods Proclamation to Amend Carriage of Goods by Land Transport

743/2012 Revised African Maritime Transport Charter 121/1998 African Maritime Transport Charter

F. Others 651/2009 624/2009 602/2008 588/2008 457/2005 440/2005 372/2003 182/1999 146/1998 137/1998 104/1998 103/1998 098/1998

Transaction of Precious Minerals Ethiopian Building Coffee Quality Control and Marketing Proclamation to Define the Liability of the Dry Port to the Consignee Raw Hide and Skin Marketing System The Granting of Exclusive Agency on Certain Export Sectors for a Limited Period of Time The Proclamation to Provide for a Warehouse Receipt System Privatization of Public Enterprises (amendment) Privatization of Public Enterprises Fertilizer Manufacturing and Trade Private Employment Agency Capital Goods Leasing Business Business Mortgage


G. Instituitons

341/2003 273/2002 181/1999 177/1999 132/1998 080/1997 042/1996 034/1996 028/1996

Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Association Establishment Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority Re‐establishment Transfer of the Monopoly Right of the National Tobacco Enterprise to the National Tobacco Enterprise (Ethiopia) Share Company Registration and Control of Construction Machinery Ethiopian Export Promotion Agency Establishment Ethiopian Roads Authority Re‐establishment Ethiopian Road Authority Re‐establishment Small‐Scale Industries and Handicrafts Development Agency Establishment Proclamation RepealingSmall‐Scale Industries and Handicrafts Development Agency Establishment Proclamation

4. Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure 780/2012 761/2012 699/2010 657/2009 652/2009 434/2005 432/2004 414/2004 395/2004 384/2004 239/2001 236/2001 031/1996

Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism Telecom Fraud Offence Protection of Witnesses and Whistle‐blowers of Criminal Offences Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism Anti‐Terrorism Revised Anti‐Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Ethiopian Aviation Security The Criminal Code of the FDRE Procedure of Pardon Vagrancy Control Anti‐Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence (amendment) Anti‐Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Offences against the Safety of Aviation

737/2012 736/2012 735/2012 734/2012 733/2012 732/2012 614/2008 545/2007 544/2007 526/2007 302/2002

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism IGAD Convention on Extradition IGAD Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters The Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption Ratification United Nations Convention against Corruption Ratification The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) Institutions

235/2001 365/2003

Federal Ethics and Anti‐Corruption Commission Establishment Federal Prisons Commission Establishment


433/2005 Revised Federal Ethics and Anti‐Corruption Commission

5. Customs and Taxes 768/2012 767/2012 693/2010 622/2009 612/2008 611/2008 610/2008 609/2008 608/2008 570/2008 567/2008 543/2007 308/2002 307/2002 287/2002 286/2002 285/2002 249/2001 237/2001 228/2001 227/2001 226/2000 149/1999 125/1998 110/1998 099/1998 077/1997 036/1996 023/1996

Export Trade Duty Incentive Schemes Chat Excise Tax Income Tax (amendment) Customs Stamp Duty (amendment) Turnover Tax (Amendment) Excise Tax (amendment) VAT (amendment) Income Tax (amendment) Excise Tax (amendment) Raw and Semi‐processed Hides and Skins Export Tax Revised Export Trade Duty Incentive Scheme Establishment Turnover Tax Excise Tax Tax on Coffee Exported from Ethiopia (amendment) Income Tax VAT Export Trade Duty Incentive Scheme Establishment Sales and Excise Tax (amendment) Sales and Excise Tax (amendment) Income Tax (amendment) Petroleum Operations Income Tax (amendment) Sales and Excise Tax (amendment) The Customs Authority (amendment) Stamp Duty Tax on Coffee Exported from Ethiopia Sales and Excise Tax (Amendment) Income Tax (amendment) Mining Income Tax (amendment)

540/2007

Agreement of Customs Cooperation and Anti‐Smuggling and Illicit Trafficking between the Member States of the Sana'a Forum

Institutions 587/2008 368/2003 367/2003 233/2001 061/1997 060/1997

Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Establishment Re‐establishment and Modernization of Customs Authority (amendment) The Re‐establishment of the Federal Inland Revenue Authority Federal Tax Appeal Tribunal Establishment Federal Inland Revenue Authority Establishment The Re‐establishment and Modernization of Customs Authority

6. Education 650/2009 391/2004 351/2003 217/2000

Higher Education Technical and Vocational Education and Training Higher Education Strengthening of the Management and Administration of Schools (amendment)


160/1999

Education Materials Production and Distribution Agency Establishment Proclamation Repealing

7. Electoral law

662/2009 573/2008 532/2007 438/2005 187/1999

Proclamation on the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties The Revised Political Parties Registration The Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia Proclamation to Make Electoral Law of Ethiopia Conform with the Constitution of the FDRE (amendment) A Proclamation to Make the Electoral Law of Ethiopia Conform with the Constitution of the FDRE (amendment)

613/2008 The African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance

8. Environmental Law

655/2009 542/2007 541/2007 513/2007 300/2002 299/2002 197/2000

Biosafety Forest Development, Conservation, and Utilization Development Conservation and Utilization of Wildlife Solid Waste Management Environmental Pollution Control Environmental Impact Assessment Ethiopian Water Resources Management

753/2012 656/2009 635/2009 634/2009

Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising from their Utilization Ratification Montreal Protocol Amendments African‐Eurasian Migratory Water Birds Agreement Convention of the Migratory Species of Wild Animals

629/2009 620/2009 439/2005 362/2003 357/2003 356/2003 355/2003 279/2002 278/2002 192/2000 081/1997

The Convention on the Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea The Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Convention Kyoto Protoco Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety Basel Protocol Basel Convention Amendment Bamako Convention Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Rotterdam Convention Basel Convention on the Control of the Trans‐boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and‐or Desertification, Particularly in Africa

Instituitons 575/2008 381/2004 295/2002

Ethiopian Wildlife Development and Conservation Authority Establishment A Proclamation to Amend the Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and Research Institute Environmental Protection Authority Establishment


167/1999 120/1998 009/1995

Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and Research Establishment (amendment) Institute of Biodiversity Conservation and Research Establishment Environmental Protection Authority Establishment

9. Health 674/2010 661/2009 571/2008 200/2000

Pesticide Registration and Control Food, Medicine and Health Care Administration and Control Radiation Protection Public Health Instituitons

553/2007 276/2002 176/1999 026/1996

Drug Fund and Pharmaceuticals Supply Agency Establishment National HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control and HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office Establishment Drug Administration and Control National Research Institute of Health Establishment

10. Human Rghts 676/2010 336/2003 335/2003 283/2002 114/1998 100/1998

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability Ratification Convention on Forced or Compulsory Labor Ratification Convention Concerning Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor Ratification African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Ratification Accession to African Human and Peoples' Rights Charter Ratification Amendment to the Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification Instituitons

211/2000 210/2000

Institution of the Ombudsman Establishment Ethiopian Human Rights Commission Establishment

11. Intellectual Property 501/2006 482/2006 481/2006 410/2004

Trade Mark Registration and Protection Access to Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge Plant Breeders' Right Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection

601/2008 484/2006 090/1997

Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization Accession Ratification

Instituiton 320/2003 Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office Establishment

12. Investment 769/2012 375/2003 280/2002 168/1999 116/1998 037/1996

Investment Investment (amendment) Investment Investment (amendment) Investment (amendment) Investment


13. Labour Law, Civil Service, Pensions

715/2011 714/2011 633/2009 568/2008 515/2007 494/2006 466/2005 424/2004 377/2003 345/2003 262/2002 190/1999

Private Organizations Pension Public Servants' Pension Public Servants' Pensions (as amended) Right to Employment of Persons with Disability Federal Civil Servants Labor (amendment) Labor (amendment) Public Servants' Pensions (amendment) Labor Public Servants' Pensions Federal Civil Servants Public Servants' Pension (amendment)

709/2011 128/1998 152/1999

Tripartite Consultation (International Labor Standards) Convention Constitution of the ILO Instrument of Amendment ILO Conventions

Institutions 495/2006 038/1996

Social Security Authority Re‐establishment Social Security Authority Establishment

14. Land Law and Urban Planning 721/2011 574/2008 456/2005 455/2005 401/2004 272/2002 089/1997

Urban Lands Lease Holding Urban Planning FDRE Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation Expropriation of Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation Appropriation of Land for Government Works Re‐enactment of Urban Lands Lease Holding Federal Rural Land Administration

Institutions 558/2007 450/2005

Proclamation to Repeal the Federal Urban Planning Institute Establishment Federal Urban Planning Institute Establishment

15. Media law 759/2012 590/2008 533/2007 178/1999

Advertisement Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Broadcasting Service Broadcasting

Institutions 075/1997 074/1997 073/1997

Ethiopian Press Agency Establishment (amendment) Ethiopian News Agency Establishment (amendment) Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency Establishment (amendment)


16. Nationality, Registration of Vital Events and Immigration 760/2012 409/2004 378/2003 354/2003 270/2002

Registration of Vital Events and National Identity Card Refugee Ethiopian Nationality Immigration Providing Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with Certain Rights to be Exercised in their Country of Origin

17. Societies and Foundations 781/2012 621/2009 402/2004 153/1999 147/1998

Meles Foundation Establishment Charities and Societies Cooperative Societies (amendment) Revised Charter of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society Cooperative Societies

18. Professional Services: Advocates, Auditors, Medical Practitioners, Consultants 218/2000 199/2000

Medical Practitioners Registration (repealing) Federal Courts Advocates' Licensing and Registration

19. Utilities: Electricity, Telecommunication

A. Electricity 086/1997 043/1996

Electricity Charter of Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (amendment)

B. Telecommunication 464/2005 281/2002 049/1996

Protection of Telecommunication and Electric Power Networks Telecommunication (amendment) Telecommunication

707/2011 African Telecommunication Union Constitution and Convention

20. Miscellaneous 718/2011 690/2010 668/2010 653/2009 648/2009 632/2009 572/2008 531/2007 467/2005 430/2005 398/2004 370/2003 359/2003 334/2003

National Payment System Social Health Insurance Disclosure and Registration of Assets Rights and Benefits of Outgoing Heads of State and Government, Senior Government Officials, Members of Parliament and Judges The Federal Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Employment Exchange Services Period of Limitation for Submission of Restitution Claims and the Repossession of Public Properties Taken Through Unlawful Restitutions Special Government Bond Authentication and Registration of Documents (amendment) Determining Procedures for Public Procurement and Establishing Its Supervisory Agency Inquiry Commission to Investigate the Conflict Occurred in Gambela Regional State on December 13, 2003 Establishment Condominium System for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions Authentication and Registration of Documents


Index 3 Agreements not classified under Themes and Organs

1. African and Sub‐regional 713/2011 710/2011 618/2008 617/2008 607/2008 606/2008 605/2008 565/2008 429/2004 396/2004 394/2004 333/2003 332/2003 297/2002 232/2001 225/2000 139/1998 366/2003

Charter for the Cultural Renaissance of Africa Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of Gabon Concerning the Abolition of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic and Service Passports Additional Protocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and Immunity Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute The Inter‐African Convention Establishing an African Technical Cooperation Program Convention of the African Energy Commission Convention for the Establishment of the African Center for Fertilizer Development African Nuclear Weapon‐Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) The Sub‐Regional Nairobi Protocol for Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa Protocol for the Inter‐Parliamentary Union of IGAD Member States The Protocol Relating to the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Ratification of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Community Relating to the Pan‐African Parliament Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States African Union Establishment Agreement Peace Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the State of Eritrea Agreement for the Amendment of the Agreement with the Republic of Djibouti Regarding the Railway Line Laid between Djbouti and Addis Ababa Inter‐Governmental Authority on Development Establishment Agreement

2. Air Transport Agreements 640/2009 615/2008 527/2007 500/2006 499/2006

Bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Tunisia Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China Concerning Air Services Government of Equatorial Guinea Air Transport Services Agreement The Government of the USA Air Transport Services Agreement The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nigeria Bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement


399/2004 393/2004 392/2004 337/2003 157/1999 108/1998 101/1998 063/1997

Government of Burkina Faso Air Transport Services Agreement Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Air Transport Services Agreement The Republic of Yemen Bilateral Air Services Agreement The Swiss Federal Council Air Transport Agreement State of Kuwait Air Transport Services Agreement The Republic of Djbouti Air Transport Service Agreement The Republic of South Africa Air Transport Service Agreement The Government of Japan Air Transport Agreement

3. Avoidance of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion Agreements 774/2012 773/2012 750/2012 749/2012 748/2012 747/2012 585/2008 584/2008 508/2006 507/2006 505/2006 486/2006 480/2005

Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Ratification Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of Seychelles for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Ratification Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Ratification Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Ratification Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Ratification Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of Sudan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Ratification Proclamation Agreement between the FDRE and the Czech Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of French Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Republic of Tunisia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and People's Democratic Republic of Algeria for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Convention between the Government of FDRE and the State of Israel for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Convention between the Government of FDRE and Romania for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Republic of Turkey for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income


479/2005 296/2002 223/2000 095/1998 092/1997

Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income with the Government of the Republic of Yemen Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with the Government of the Italian Republic Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital between the FDRE and the State of Kuwait

4. Cooperation, Trade, Investment Promotion & Protection Agreements 779/2012 758/2012 757/2012 752/2012 751/2012 745/2012 744/2012 675/2010 663/2010 644/2009 638/2009 637/2009 636/2009 619/2008 604/2008

Cotonou ACP‐EU Partnership Agreement Amendment Ratification Bilateral Trade Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of Kenya Ratification Bilateral Trade Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of Gambia Ratification Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Tourism between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Kuwait Ratification Agreement on Cultural and Arts Cooperation between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Kuwait Ratification Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of Korea Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China International Coffee Agreement 2007 The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment Agreement with the Republic of Equatorial Guinea Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Agreement with the Kingdom of Spain Agreement on Education, Culture and Youth Cooperation with the Kingdom of Spain Agreement on Education, Science, Higher Education, Culture, Youth, Sports, Tourism and Media Cooperation with Portugese Republic Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of India on the Establishment of Joint Ministerial Commission The Ethiopia and Kuwait Joint Committee for Cooperation Establishment Agreement on Youth and Sport Cooperation with the Republic of Yemen


599/2008 586/2008 580/2008 578/2008 577/2008 562/2008 561/2008 560/2008 537/2007 525/2007 524/2007 518/2007 517/2007 516/2007 509/2006 489/2006 477/2005 463/2005 462/2005 461/2005 460/2005 453/2005 452/2005 437/2005 423/2004 422/2004 421/2004 420/2004 417/2004 407/2004

Agreement between the FDRE and the Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investment Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of India on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology Ethio‐Spain General Agreement of Cooperation Agreement on Culture and Tourism Cooperation with the Federal Republic of Nigeria Agreement on Tourism Cooperation with Republic of Turkey The Protocol on Technical, Scientific and Economic Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture between the Government of the FDRE and the Republic of Turkey Ethio‐Yemen Bilateral Trade Agreement Ethio‐Equatorial Guinea Bilateral Trade Agreement The Belgian‐Luxembourg Economic Union Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment Ethio‐Nigeria Bilateral Trade Agreement Cotonou ACP‐EU Partnership Agreement Amendment The Republic of Finland Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investment The Arab Republic of Egypt Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investment The Ethio‐Djbouti Preferential Investment Facilitation and Property Acquisition Agreement Agreement on Cultural, Educational and Scientific Cooperation with the State of Israel Government of the State of Israel Science and Technological Cooperation Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Educational Cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran Ethio‐Sudan‐Yemen Tripartite Maritime Affairs Cooperation Agreement Agreement on Culture, Education, Science, Mass media, Youth and Sports Cooperation with the Republic of Turkey Investment Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Kingdom of Sweden Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement with the Republic of Austria Ethio‐Turkey Cooperation in Maritime Field Agreement Amendment on the Ethio‐Iran Trade Agreement Tourism Cooperation Treaty between the FDRE and the Republic of Sudan A Proclamation to Ratify the Agreement Signed on the Promotion and Protection of Investments with the Islamic Republic of Iran Ratification of the Agreement between the FDRE and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on Cooperation in the Field of Culture, Youth and Sports Ethio‐Libya Trade Agreement Ethio‐Algeria Trade Agreement Investment Reciprocal Promotion and Protection Agreement with the Republic of Tunisia Agreement Establishing the Sana'a Forum for Cooperation


406/2004 405/2004 404/2004 403/2004 397/2004 389/2004 388/2004 353/2003 352/2003 350/2003 347/2003 346/2003 339/2003 326/2003 325/2003 324/2003 323/2003 319/2003 318/2003 316/2003 312/2003 292/2002 284/2002 261/2001 242/2001 222/2000 221/2000 220/2000 215/2000

Investment Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Treaty with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Investment Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Treaty with the Republic of France Investment Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of Sudan on Cooperation in the Field of Culture The Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment with the Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria The State of Israel Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment The Treaty on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment with the Kingdom of the Netherlands The Amendment to the Protocol Agreement on Port Sudan Utilization A Protocol Agreement on Port Sudan Utilization Ethio‐Saudi Arabia General Cooperation Agreement Ethio‐Iran Trade Agreement Ethio‐Cuba Trade Agreement Cooperation Agreement with Republic of Turkey in Fighting Against International Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substances, International Terrorism and Organized Crime Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Hellenic Republic on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism The Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Republic of Turkey on Cooperation in the Field of Health The Investment Incentive Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the USA The Treaty on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment with the Republic of Turkey Ethio‐Korea Republic Trade Agreement Ethio‐Sudan Preferential Trade Agreement International Coffee Agreement 2001 Ethio‐Belgium Development Cooperation Agreement Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Agreement with the Kingdom of Denmark Ethio‐Djbouti Utilization of Port of Djbouti and Services to Cargo in Transit Agreement Export of Textile and Apparel Products to the United States of America under the AGOA Cotonou Agreement Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement with the Government of the Hellenic Republic Ethio‐Sudan Trade Agreement Investment Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Sudan Ethio‐Russia Trade Agreement


214/2000 205/2000 196/2000 195/2000 191/2000 186/1999 185/1999 184/1999 183/1999 174/1999 172/1999 164/1999 163/1999 162/1999 161/1999 130/1998 127/1998 107/1998 072/1997 070/1997 069/1997 056/1996 044/1996 021/1996 020/1996

Investment Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation Ethio‐Russia Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States Customs Bond Guarantee Agreement Ethio‐Cuba Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement Ethio‐Libya Economic, Scientific, Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agreement Ethio‐Yemen Agreement on Culture Ethio‐Yemen Export Promotion Agencies Technical Cooperation Agreement Ethio‐Yemen Industrial Cooperation Agreement Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment Agreement with the Republic of Yemen Ethio‐Yemen Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation and Trade Relations Agreement Ethio‐Malaysia Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement The Investment Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Kingdom of the Netherlands The Investment Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Government of the People's Republic of China The Investment Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Government of Malasia Ethio‐Malasia Trade Agreement Ethio‐Norway Development Cooperation Agreement Investments Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Agreement with the Government of the Swiss Confederation Ethio‐Italian Cultural Cooperation Agreement Ethio‐Kuwait Economic, Commercial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement State of Kuwait Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection Republic of Italy Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection Ethio‐Austrian Development Cooperation Agreement Ethio‐Chinese Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement Republic of Tunisia Trade Agreement Republic of Tunisia Agreement on Economic, Scientific, Cultural and Technical Cooperation

5. Peace and Security 493/2006 485/2006 428/2004 348/2003 331/2003 304/2002

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test‐Ban Treaty The Security Cooperation between the FDRE and the Republic of Yemen Agreement Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti‐personnel Mines and on Their Destruction Ratification of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899) Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979)


303/2002 301/2002 030/1996

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents (1973) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction

6. Other agreements and conventions 742/2012 703/2011 677/2010 628/2009 576/2008 554/2007 523/2007 522/2007 379/2003 374/2003 373/2003 371/2003 369/2003 349/2003 275/2002 055/1996 054/1996

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Amendments of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF Agreement between the FDRE and the Government of the State of Kuwait on the Field of Exchange of Manpower The Control of Harmful Anti‐Fouling Systems Convention International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System Ratification Proclamation Amendment Convention against Doping in Sport Agreement between the Government of the FDRE and the Government of the Republic of Italy on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Customs Offences OPEC Fund for the International Development Debt Relief Agreement Ratification of the Amendment to Article IV of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its First Protocol Accession The Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol to the Convention on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment OPEC Fund for International Development Debt Relief Agreement Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as Amended in 1995 Fourth Amendment of the Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund Ratification of the Protocol on the Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the Fourth Lome Convention Revised Fourth Lome Convention

7. Loan and Financing, 2012 785/2012 784/2012 778/2012 777/2012 776/2012

African Development Fund Loan Agreement for Financing Ethiopia‐Kenya Electricity Highway Project Ratification International Development Association Financing Agreement for Eastern Electricity Highway Project under the First Phase of the Regional Eastern Africa Power Integration Program Ratification International Development Association Financing Agreement for the Transport Sector Project in Support of the 4th Road Sector Development Program Saudi Fund for Development Loan Agreement for Financing the Gedo‐Lemlem Bereha Road Project Ratification Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Loan Agreement for Financing the Gedo‐Lemlem Bereha Road Project Ratification


775/2012 772/2012 771/2012 770/2012 765/2012 764/2012 762/2012 756/2012 755/2012 754/2012 741/2012 740/2012 739/2012

Abu Dhabi Fund for Development Loan Agreement for Financing the Gedo‐Lemlem Bereha Road Project Ratification African Development Fund Loan Agreement for Promoting Basic Services Program (PBS III) Project Ratification International Development Association Financing Agreement for Promoting Basic Services Program Phase III Ratification Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development Loan Agreement for Financing the Dessie‐Kutaber‐Tenta Junction Road Project Ratification International Development Association Amended and Restated Financing Agreement to Provide Additional Finance to Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project Ratification International Development Association Financing Agreement for Financing Women Entrepreneurship Development Project Ratification International Development Association Financing Agreement for Electricity Network Reinforcement and Expansion Project Ratification International Development Association Additional Financing Agreement for Productive Safety Net APL III Project Ratification Export‐Import Bank of India Credit Line Agreement to Provide Additional Loan for Financing Projects for the Development of Sugar Industry Ratification Export‐Import Bank of China Loan Agreement for Financing Addis Ababa Deep Wells Water Supply Project (Phase III) Ratification International Fund for Agricultural Development Loan Agreement for Financing Rural Financial Intermediation Program II African Development Fund Loan Agreement for Financing Bedele‐Metu Road Upgrading Project African Development Fund Loan Agreement for Financing Hawassa‐Agere Mariam Road Project


Index 4 Regulations: Themes, Sectors and Institutions

1. Agriculture and Rural Development 253/2011 207/2011 178/2010 161/2009 156/2008 151/2008 016/1997

Rift Valley Lakes Basin Coucil and Authority Establishment Code of Practice of the Floriculture Sector Sesame and White Pea Beans Transaction Coffee Quality Control and Transaction Awash Basin High Council and Authority Establishment Abay Basin High Council and Authority Establishment Ethiopian Seed

2. Banking and Insurance 201/2011 172/2009 134/2007 116/2005 104/2004 083/2003 033/1998

Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency Establishment Re‐organization of the Management of the National Bank of Ethiopia Commercial Bank of Ethiopia Establishment (amendment) Development Bank of Ethiopia Re‐establishment (amendment) Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency Establishment (amendment) Development Bank of Ethiopia Re‐establishment Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency Establishment

3. Business related

A. Mining

124/2006 070/2001 027/1998

Mining Operations (amendment) Ethiopian Mine Action Office Establishment Mining Operations (amendment)

B. Registration and Licencing 246/2011 139/2007 095/2003 087/2003 066/2000 034/1998 014/1997 013/1997

Commercial Registration and Business Licensing and Related Sevices Fees Tariffs Obligatory Use of Sales Register Machines Commercial Registration and Licensing (amendment) Commercial Registration and Licensing (amendment) Film Shooting Permit Private Employment Agency License Fees Addis Ababa/Dire Dawa Administration Commercial Registration and Licensing Federal Government Commercial Registration and Licensing

C. Trade and Industry

020/1997 Ethiopian Trade Point Establishment

D. Transport 248/2011 247/2011 208/2011 206/2011 205/2011 141/2007

Ethiopian Road Construction Corporation Establishment Ethiopian Roads Authority Re‐establishment Road Transport Traffic Control Vehicles Identification, Inspection and Registration Fees National Road Traffic Safety Council Establishment Ethiopian Railway Corporation Establishment


074/2001 051/1999

Motor Vehicles and Trailers Identification, Inspection and Registration (amendment) Road Transport Tariffs (amendment)

E. Others

126/2007 Export Prize Awards

4. Criminal Law

072/2001 044/1998

Special Public Prosecutors Administration Federal Prosecutor Administration

5. Education 210/2011 154/2008 091/2003

Federal Universities Higher Education Cost‐Sharing Higher Education Cost‐Sharing Establshment

245/2011 241/2011 240/2011 239/2011 238/2011 237/2011 236/2011 235/2011 234/2011 233/2011 232/2011 231/2011 230/2011 229/2011 228/2011 227/2011 226/2011 225/2011 224/2011 223/2011 222/2011 221/2011 220/2011 219/2011 218/2011 217/2011 216/2011 215/2011 214/2011 213/2011 212/2011

Technical and Vocational Education and Training Institute Establishment Gonder University Re‐establishment Jimma University Re‐establishment Metu University Establishment Dilla University Re‐establishment Adama Science and Technology University Establishment Meda Wolabu University Establishment Arbaminch University Re‐establishment Bahir Dar University Re‐establishment Mekelle University Re‐establishment Haremaya University Re‐establishment Hawassa University Re‐establishment Dire Dawa University Establishment Debre Tabor University Establishment Debre Birhan University Establishment Debre Markos University Establishment Jigiga University Establishment Axum University Establishment Mizan Tepi University Establishment Adigrat University Establishment Wachamo University Establishment Wello University Establishment Woldia University Establishment Wolkite University Establishment Wolaita Sodo University Establishment Wellega University Establishment Addis Ababa Science and Technology University Establishment Assosa University Establishment Addis Ababa University Re‐establishment Bule Hora University Establishment Ambo University Establishment


211/2011 200/2011 199/2011 132/2007 129/2006 127/2006 123/2006 121/2006 120/2006 112/2004 111/2004 068/2001 063/1999 062/1999 061/1999 060/1999 050/1999 019/1997 003/1996

Semera University Establishment Saint Paul Hospital Millenium Medical College Establishment Technical and Vocational Education and Training Agency Establishment Ethiopian Police University College Establishment Regulations to Establish the Dilla University Debub University Establishment (amendment) Alemaya University of Agriculture Establishment Ethiopian Civil Service College Re‐establishment Adama University Establishing Charter Charter Regulation Establishing Gonder University Arbaminch University Establishing Charter National Defense University College Establishment Jimma University Establishment Debub University Establishment Mekelle University Establishment Bahir Dar University Establishment Education Materials Production and Distribution Enterprise Establishment Mass Media Training Institute Establishment The Ethiopian Civil Service College Establishment

6. Environmental Law 163/2009 159/2008

Wildlife Development, Conservation and Utilization Prevention of Industrial Pollution

7. Health 191/2010 189/2010 167/2009 076/2002 040/1998 004/1996

The Ethiopian Health Insurance Agency Establishment Ethiopion Food, Medicine and Health Care Administration and Control Authority Establishment Federal Hospitals Administration Ethiopian Health Professionals Council Establishment Health Education Center Establishment The Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute Establishment

8. Intellectual Property

012/1997 Inventions, Minor Inventions, and Industrial Designs

9. Investment 162/2009 146/2008 084/2003 036/1998 035/1998 009/1996 007/1996

Irrigation Development Investment Incentives Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors (amendment) Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Investment Incentives (amendment) Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Investment Incentives (amendment) Investment Incentives


10. Labour Law, Civil Service, Pensions 203/2011 202/2011 166/2009 157/2008 155/2008 077/2002 032/1998

Public Servants Social Security Agency Establishment Private Organizations Employees' Social Security Agency Establishment Work Permit Fees (as amended) Administration of Employees of the National Bank of Ethiopia Administration of Employees of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority [AMHARIC] Federal Civil Servants Disciplinary and Grievance Procedure Public Service (amendment)

11. Media Law

019/1997 Mass Media Training Institute Establishment

12. Nationality, Registration of Vital Events and Immigration 252/2011 114/2004 101/2004

Certain Rights and Privileges of Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin to be Exercised in their Country of Origin (amendment) Immigration Providing Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with Certain Rights and Privileges to be Exercised in their Country of Origin

13. Professional Services 065/2000 057/1999

Federal Courts Advocates' License, Exam. Registration and Registration of Law Firm Fees Federal Court Advocates' Code of Conduct

14. Societies and Foundations 106/2004 168/2009

Regulation to Provide for the Implementation of Cooperative Societies Proclamation Charities and Societies

15. Utilities

A. Electricity

170/2009 140/2007 094/2003 090/2003 049/1999 018/1997

Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Re‐establishment Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Establishment (amendment) Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Establishment (amendment) Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Establishment (amendment) Electricity Operations Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation Establishment

B. Telecommunications

197/2010 099/2004 093/2003 047/1998 010/1996

Ethio‐Telecom Establishment Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation Establishment (amendment) Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation Establishment (amendment) Telecommunication Services Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation Establishment


16. Water Resources and Water Works 115/2005 110/2004 109/2004 042/1998

Ethiopian Water Resources Management Water Works Design and Supervision Enterprise Establishment (amendment) Water Works Construction Enterprise Establishment (amendment) Water Work Design and Supervision Enterprise Establishment

17. Miscellaneous 255/2011 254/2011 251/2011 250/2011 244/2011 243/2011 242/2011 204/2011 196/2010 195/2010 194/2010 193/2010 190/2010 188/2010 187/2010 186/2010 185/2010 177/2010 173/2009 171/2009 169/2009 165/2009 160/2009 158/2008 145/2008 144/2008 142/2008 138/2007 136/2007 135/2007 130/2006 128/2006 117/2005 103/2004

Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise Establishment Ethiopian National Theatre Establishment Federal Urban Real Property Registration and Information Agency Establishment Information Network Security Agency Re‐establishment National Council for the Coordination of Public Mobilization for the Construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Establishment Building Regulation Federal Board Providing Affirmative Support for Regions Establishment Salt Iodization Ethiopian Conformity Assessment Enterprise Establishment Ethiopian National Accreditation Office Establishment National Metrology Institute Establishment Ethiopian Standards Agency Establishment Financial Administration Repealing of the Regulation for the Implementation of African Peer Review Mechanism in Ethiopia Defense Construction Design Enterprise Establishment Defense Construction Materials Manufucturing Enterprise Establishment Defense Construction Enterprise Establishment Information Technology Park Corporation Establishment Classification of Tourist Facilities Financial Intelligence Center Establishment Access to Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge and Community Rights Ethiopian Postal Service Enterprise National Lottery Administration Re‐establishment Government Communication Affairs Office Establishment Establishment of the Ethiopian Scientific Equipment Center The Functioning of Ethics Liaison Units The Implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism in Ethiopia Treatment of Federal Prisoners Dry Port Administration Enterprise Establishment Payment of Compensation for Property Situated on Landholding Expropriated Information Network Security Agency Establishment Federal Board to Provide Affirmative Action to Less Developed Regions Establishment (amendment) Ethiopian Millenium Festival National Council Establishment Establishment of Federal Board to Provide Affirmative Support for Less Developed Regions


085/2003 071/2001 067/2000 064/1999 056/1999 054/1999 037/1998 023/1997 021/1997 017/1997 005/1996 001/1996

Emergency Relief Transport Enterprise Establishment (amendment) Council of Ministers Financial (amendment) Regulations Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration Establishment Council of Ministers Financial (amendment) Regulations Pre‐Shipment Inspecton Service Fees Ethiopian Development Research Institute Establishment Freight Forwarding and Ship Agency Licence Issuance Ethiopian Conference Center Establishment Emergency Relief Transport Enterprise Establishment Council of Ministers Financial Regulations Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development Establishment Registration of Ships

18. Various Organs and Institutions 249/2011 209/2011 198/2010 192/2010 183/2010 182/2010 181/2010 180/2010 179/2010 176/2010 175/2010 152/2008 150/2008 149/2008 148/2008 147/2008 143/2008 131/2007 125/2006 122/2006 119/2005 118/2005 113/2004 107/2004 105/2004 102/2004 100/2004 098/2004 097/2004 096/2003

Ethiopian Youth Sports Academy Establishment Nazareth Tractor Assembly Factory Dissolution Agricultural Transformation Council and Agency Establishment Sugar Corporation Establishment Metal and Engineering Corporation Establishment Metals Industry Development Institute Establishment Leather Industry Development Institute Establishment Textile Industry Development Institute Establishment Army Foundation Establishment Ethiopian Meat and Diary Technology Institute Establishment (amendment) Genet Hotel Enterprise Establishment The Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency Establishment Nazareth Canvas Sewing and Garment Factory Establishment Kality Construction and Construction Materials Production Enterprise Establishment Defense Construction and Engineering Enterprise Establishment Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise Establishment (amendment) The Ethiopian Meat and Diary Technology Institute Establishment Tendaho Sugar Factory Establishment (amendment) Regulations to Establish Textile and Leather Industry Development Center Tendaho Sugar Factory Establishment Construction Works & Coffee Technology Development Enterprise Establishment Textile and Apparel Industry Institute Establishment Dissolution of Lalibela Engineering and Construction Enterprise Distribution of Profits of Public Enterprises Leather and Leather Products Technology Institute Establishment (amendment) Dissolution of the Addis Metal Pressings Enterprise Ethiopian Seed Enterprise Establishment (amendment) Financial Public Enterprises Agency Establishment Agricultural Mechanization Service Enterprise Establishment Addis Ababa Police Commission Establishment


092/2003 086/2003 082/2003 081/2003 058/1999 053/1999 045/1998 041/1998 038/1998 031/1998 030/1998 029/1998 028/1998 026/1998 015/1997 174/2009 137/2007 022/1997

Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise Establishment (amendment) Federal Police Administration Ethiopian Airports Enterprise Establishment Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise Establishment Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise Re‐establishment Mugher Cement Factory Re‐establishment Kality Construction Materials Production Enterprise Establishment Leather and Leather Products Technology Institute Establishment Addis Metal Pressings Enterprise Establishment Dissolution of the Tea Production and Management Enterprise Wush Wush Tea Development Enterprise Gumaro Tea Development Enterprise Tea Production and Management Enterprise Establishment Zequalla Steel Rolling Mill Enterprise Establishment Dissolution of the Engineering Design and Tool Enterprise Catering and Tourism Training Center Establishment Federal Prison Wardens Administration Justice and Legal System Research Institute Establishment


Index 5 List of Proclamations (Amharic)

Aዋጅ ቁጥር የAዋጆቹ መጠሪያና ይዘት

001/1987 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ-መንግሥት

002/1987 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መመሥረቱን ለማስታወቅ የወጣ

003/1987 የፌደራል ነጋሪት ጋዜጣ ማቋቋሚያ

004/1987

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን ሥልጣንና ተግባር ለመወሰን የወጣ

005/1987 የፌደራል መንግሥት የገቢዎች ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ

006/1987 የደህንነት፣ የIሚግሬሽንና የስደተኞች ጉዳይ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

007/1987 የIትዮጵያ ሳይንስና ቴክኖሎጂ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

008/1987 የፌደራል ሲቪል ሰርቪስ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

009/1987 የAካባቢ ጥበቃ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

010/1987 የAደጋ መከላከልና ዝግጁነት ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

011/1987 የቱሪዝም ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

012/1987 የስፖርት ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

013/1988 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤትና የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ

014/1988 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የሕግ Aወጣጥ ሥነ-ሥርዓት

016/1988 የሰንደቅ ዓላማና Aርማ 017/1988 ወደ ግል ይዞታ የተዛወሩ የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶች ባለ Aደራ ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ

019/1988 የIትዮጵያ ማኅበራዊ ተሃድሶና ልማት ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

020/1988 የቱኒዝያ ሪፐብሊክ የIኮኖሚ፣ የባህል፣ የልማትና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

021/1988 የቱኒዝያ ሪፐብሊክ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

022/1988 የማEድን (ማሻሻያ)

023/1988 የማEድን ሥራዎች ገቢ ግብር (ማሻሻያ)

024/1988 የፌደራል ዳኞች Aስተዳደር ጉባዔ ማቋቋሚያ

025/1988 የፌደራል ፍርድ ቤቶች

026/1988 የብሔራዊ ጤና ምርምር Iንስቲቱት ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለመሻር የወጣ

027/1988 የመከላከያ ሠራዊት

028/1988 የAነስተኛ Iንዱስትሪዎችና Eደ-ጥበባት ልማት ማስፋፊያ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ

029/1988 የሕዝብ በዓላትና የEረፍት ቀን (ማሻሻያ)

030/1988

የኬሚካል ጦር መሣሪያዎችን ዝግጅት፣ መመረት፣ ክምችትና በጥቅም ላይ መዋል ለመከላከልና የተመረቱትንም ለማስወገድ የተደረገውን ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

031/1988 በበረራ ደህንነት ላይ ስለሚፈጸሙ ወንጀሎች

032/1988 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የEረፍትና የሥራ ጊዜ

033/1988 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የሕግ Aወጣጥ ሥነ ሥርዓት (ማሻሻያ)


034/1988

የAነስተኛ Iንዱስትሪዎችና Eደ-ጥበባት ልማት ማስፋፊያ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለመሻር የወጣ

036/1988 ከማናቸውም ገቢ ግብር ስለማስከፈል የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

037/1988 የIንቨስትመንት

038/1988 የማኅበራዊ ዋስትና ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

039/1988 የ1989 በጀት ዓመት የበጀት

040/1988 የAነስተኛ ብድር Aቅራቢ የገንዘብ ድርጅቶች ፈቃድ Aሰጣጥና ቁጥጥር

041/1988 ብሔራዊ ማዳበሪያ Iንዱስትሪ ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

042/1988 የIትዮጵያ የመንገዶች ባለሥልጣን Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

043/1988 የIትዮጵያ ኤሌክትሪክ መብራትና ኃይል ባለሥልጣን ቻርተር ማሻሻያ

044/1988 የIትዮ ቻይና የንግድ፣ የIኮኖሚና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

047/1989 የመሠረታዊ ብረታ ብረትና Iንጂኔሪንግ Iንዱስትሪ ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ

048/1989 የሰንደቅ ዓላማና ዓርማ (ማሻሻያ)

049/1989 የቴሌኮሙኒኬሽን

050/1989 ወደ ግል ይዞታ የተዛወሩ የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶች ባለ Aደራ ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

051/1989 የመንግሥት ቤቶች ሽያጭ Aስፈጻሚ ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

052/1989 የIትዮጵያ ፕራይቬታይዜሽን ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

054/1989 የተሻሻለው የሎሜ Aራት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

055/1989

Oስትሪያ፣ ፊንላንድና ኖርዌይ የተሻሻለው የሎሜ Aራት ፕሮቶኮል ተዋዋይ የሆኑበት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

056/1989 የIትዮ-Oስትሪያ የልማት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

057/1989 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ መንግሥት የፋይናንስ Aስተዳደር

060/1989 የጉምሩክ ባለሥልጣንን Eንደገና ለማቋቋምና Aሠራሩን ለመወሰን የወጣ

061/1989 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራል መንግሥት Aገር ውስጥ ገቢ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

063/1989 ከጃፓን መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

065/1989 የፍትሐ-ብሔር ሕግ (ማሻሻያ)

066/1989 የመንገድ ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

067/1989 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ

068/1989 የፌደራል ዋናው Oዲተር መሥሪያ ቤት ማቋቋሚያ

069/1989

ከIጣሊያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

070/1989

ከኩዌት መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

072/1989 የIትዮ-ኩዌት የንግድ፣ የIኮኖሚና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

073/1989 የIትዮጵያ ሬዲዮና ቴሌቪዢን ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

074/1989 የIትዮጵያ ዜና Aገልግሎት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

075/1989 የIትዮጵያ ፕሬስ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)



077/1989 የሽያጭና Iክሳይስ ታክስ (ማሻሻያ)

079/1989 የIትዮጵያ Eርሻ ምርምር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ

080/1989 የIትዮጵያ መንገዶች ባለሥልጣን Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

081/1989 የተባበሩት መንግሥታት ድርጅት የበረሃማነትን በAፍሪካ መከላከል ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

082/1989 የብሔራዊ ፔትሮሊየም ክምችት Aስተዳደር


084/1989 የሕዝብ ቆጠራ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

085/1989 ከAውሮፓ Iንቨስትመንት ባንክ ብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

086/1989 የኤሌክትሪክ

087/1989 የAዲስ Aበባ ከተማ ቻርተር

088/1989 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት Aባላት ዋስትና ስለሚያጡበት ሁኔታ

089/1989 የፌደራል ገጠር መሬት Aስተዳደር

090/1989 የዓለም Aቀፍ የAEምሮዓዊ ባለንብረትነት ጥበቃ ድርጅት Aባልነት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

092/1989 የIትዮ-ኩዌት የተደራራቢ ግብር ማስወገጃ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

093/1989

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን ሥልጣንና ተግባር ለመወሰን የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

094/1989 የ1990 በጀት ዓመት Aዋጅ ተጨማሪ ፕሮጀክትና በጀት

095/1990 የIትዮ-ጣሊያን የተደራራቢ ግብር ማስወገጃ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

096/1990 የ1990 በጀት ዓመት Aዋጅ ተጨማሪ በጀት

097/1990 በባንኮች በዋስትና ስለሚያዙ ንብረቶች

098/1990 የንግድ ዋስትና መያዣ

099/1990 ወደ ውጭ ስለሚላክ ቡና ግብር

100/1990 የሕፃናት መብቶች ኮንቬንሽን ማሻሻያን ማፅደቂያ

101/1990 ከደቡብ Aፍሪካ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

102/1990 የIትዮጵያ ጥራትና ደረጃዎች ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

103/1990 የካፒታል Eቃ ኪራይ የንግድ ሥራ

104/1990 የግል ሥራና ሠራተኛ Aገናኝ ኤጀንሲ

107/1990 የIትዮጵያና የጣሊያን የባህል ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

108/1990 ከጂቡቲ ሪፑብሊክ ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

109/1990 የ1990 በጀት ዓመት የተጨማሪ በጀት

110/1990 የቴምብር ቀረጥ

112/1990 የ1990 በጀት ዓመት የተጨማሪ በጀት

113/1990 ለንግድ ሥራ ፈቃድ ማደሻ ልዩ የጊዜ ገደብ መፍቀጃ

114/1990 የAፍሪካ የሰብAዊና የሕዝቦች መብቶች ቻርተር መቀበያ

116/1990 የIንቨስትመንት (ማሻሻያ)

117/1990 የEንስሳት፣ የEንስሳት ምርትና ተዋጽO ገበያ ልማት ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

118/1990 የማEድን (ማሻሻያ)


119/1990 የ1990 በጀት ዓመት የተጨማሪ ፕሮጀክት ተጨማሪ በጀት

120/1990 የሕይወታዊ ሀብት ጥበቃና ምርምር Iንስቲቱት ማቋቋሚያ

121/1990 የAፍሪካ ማሪታይም ትራንስፖርት ቻርተር ማፅደቂያ

122/1990 የብሔራዊ የEጽዋት ዘር Iንዱስትሪ ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

123/1990 የመከላከያ ሠራዊት (ማሻሻያ)

125/1990 ስለጉምሩክ ባለሥልጣን የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)


127/1990

ከስዊስ ኮንፌደሬሽን መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

128/1991 የዓለም የሥራ ድርጅት መተዳደሪያ ደንብ ማሻሻያ ሰነድ ማፅደቂያ

129/1991 የAዋሽ ተፋሰስ ውሀ ሃብት Aስተዳዳር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ

130/1991 የIትዮ-ኖርዌይ የልማት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

131/1991 የፕሬዝዳንቱ ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ

132/1991 የIትዮጵያ የዉጪ ንግድ ማስፋፊያ ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ

133/1991 የኪራይ ቤቶች Aስተዳዳር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ማሻሻያ 134/1991


137/1991 የማዳበሪያ ማምረትና ንግድ

138/1991 የፌደራል ፍርድ ቤቶች (ማሻሻያ)

139/1991

ከጂቡቲ-Aዲስ Aበባ ስለተዘረጋው የምድር ባቡር ከጂቡቲ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማሻሻል የተደረገው ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

141/1991 የ1949 የወንጀለኛ መቅጫ ሕግ (ማሻሻያ)

145/1991 ብሔራዊ የማዳበሪያ Iንዱስትሪ ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

146/1991 የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶችን ወደ ግል ለማዞር የወጣ

147/1991 የኅብረት ሥራ ማኅበራት


151/1991 የIትዮጵያ ፊልም ኮርፖሬሽንን ለማፍረስ የወጣ

152/1991 የዓለም የሥራ ድርጅት ስምምነቶች ማፅደቂያ

153/1991 የIትዮጵያ ቀይ መስቀል ማኅበር የተሻሻለው ቻርተር

157/1991 ከኩዌት መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

160/1991 የትምህርት መሣሪያዎች ማምረቻና ማከፋፈያ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለመሻር የወጣ

161/1991 የIትዮ-ማሌዥያ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

162/1991

ከማሌዥያ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

163/1991

ከሕዝባዊ ቻይና ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

164/1991

ከኔዘርላንድ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

167/1991 የሕይወታዊ ሀብት ጥበቃና ምርምር Iንስቲቱት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)



171/1991 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ (ማሻሻያ)

172/1991 የIትዮ-ማሌዥያ የIኮኖሚ፣ የሣይንስና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

173/1991 የቅድመ-ጭነት ምርመራ ሥርዓት ማቋቋሚያ

174/1991

የIትዮ-የመን የIኮኖሚ፣ የሣይንስ፣ የቴክኒክ ትብብር Eና የንግድ ግንኙነት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


176/1991 የመድኃኒት Aስተዳደርና ቁጥጥር

177/1991 የኮንስትራክሽን መሳሪያዎች ምዝገባና ቁጥጥር

178/1991 የብሮድካስት

179/1991 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ቤተ-መዛግብትና ቤተ-መጻሕፍት

180/1991 የሕዝብ ቆጠራ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

181/1992

የብሔራዊ የትንባሆ ድርጅት የሞኖፖል መብትን ለብሔራዊ የትንባሆ ድርጅት (Iትዮጵያ) Aክስዮን ማኅበር ለማስተላለፍ የወጣ

182/1992 የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶችን ወደ ግል ስለማዞር የወጣ (ማሻሻያ) 183/1992

ከየመን መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

184/1992 የIትዮ-የመን የIንዱስትሪ ዘርፍ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

185/1992 የIትዮ-የመን የዉጪ ንግድ ማስፋፊያ ኤጀንሲዎች የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

186/1992 የIትዮጵያና የየመን የባህል ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

187/1992

የIትዮጵያን የምርጫ ሕግ Aዋጅ ከIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ሕገ መንግሥት ጋር ለማጣጣም የወጣው (ማሻሻያ)

188/1992 የፌደራል ሸሪዓ ፍርድ ቤቶችን Aቋም ለማጠናከር የወጣ

190/1992 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች የጡረታ (ማሻሻያ)

191/1992 የIትዮ-ሊቢያ የIኮኖሚ፣ የሣይንስ፣ የባሕልና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

192/1992

የAደገኛ ዝቃጮች ድንበር ዘለል ዝውውርን Eና Aወጋገድን ለመቆጣጠር የወጣው የባዝል ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

193/1992 በባንክ በመያዣ ስለተያዘ ንብረት የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

194/1992 የIትዮጵያ ጂOሎጂካል ሰርቬይ ማቋቋሚያ

195/1992 የIትዮ-ኩባ የ Iኮኖሚ፣ የሣይንስና የማህበራዊና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

196/1992

የምሥራቅና ደቡብ Aፍሪካ Aገራት Aመች የንግድ ቀጣና የጉምሩክ ዋስትና ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

197/1992 የIትዮጵያ ውሀ ሀብት Aስተዳደር

198/1992 የEንስሳት፣ የEንስሳት ምርትና ተዋጽO ገበያ ልማት ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

199/1992 የፌደራል ፍርድ ቤቶች ጠበቆች ፈቃድ Aሰጣጥና ምዝገባ

200/1992 የሕዝብ ጤና Aጠባበቅ

205/1992 የIትዮ-ሩሲያ የIኮኖሚ፣የሳይንስና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

206/1992 የEጽዋት ዘር

207/1992 የፌደራል ፖሊስ


208/1992 የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶች ባከAደራ ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ

209/1992 ስለቅርስ ጥናትና Aጠባበቅ የወጣ

210/1992 የIትዮጵያ የሰብዓዊ መብት ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

211/1992 የሕዝብ Eንባ ጠባቂ ተቋም ማቋቋሚያ

212/1992 የAደጋ መከላከልና ዝግጁነት ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

213/1992 የተሻሻለው የቤተሰብ ሕግ

214/1992

ከሩሲያ ፌደሬሽን መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

215/1992 የIትዮ-ሩሲያ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

216/1992 በባንክ በመያዣ ስለተያዘ ንብረት የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

217/1992 የትምህርት ቤቶችን Aመራርና Aስተዳደር ለማጠናከር የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

218/1992 ስለሀኪሞች መመዝገብ የወጣውን Aዋጅ ለመሻር የወጣ


220/1993

ከሱዳን ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

221/1993 የIትዮ-ሱዳን የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

222/1993 ከግሪክ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገውን የIኮኖሚና የቴክኒክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

223/1993

በገቢና በካፒታል የሚከፈለውን ግብር በሚመለከት ተደራራቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት ከሩሲያ ፌደሬሽን መንግሥት ጋርየተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

225/1993

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክና በኤርትራ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገው የሰላም ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

226/1993 የነዳጅ ሥራዎች ገቢ ግብር (ማሻሻያ)

227/1993 ከማናቸውም ገቢ ግብር ስለማስከፈል የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)


232/1993 የAፍሪካ ሕብረት ማቋቋሚያ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

233/1993 የፌደራል የግብር ይግባኝ ሰሚ ጉባኤ ማቋቋሚያ

235/1993 የፌደራል ሥነ-ምግባርና ጸረ-ሙስና ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

236/1993 የፀረ-ሙስና ልዩ የሥነ-ሥርዓትና የማስረጃ ሕግ


238/1993 የIትዮጵያ ግብርና ቆጠራ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

239/1993 የፀረ-ሙስና ልዩ የሥነ-ሥርዓትና የማስረጃ ሕግ (ማሻሻያ)

240/1993 የIትዮጵያ ሴቶች ልማት ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

242/1993 የኮቶኑ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

247/1993 የነዳጅ ዋጋ ማረጋጊያ ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ


249/1993 ለውጪ ንግድ የቀረጥ ማበረታቻ ሥርዓት ለማቋቋም የወጣ

250/1993 የፌደራሉ የሕገ-መንግሥት ጉዳዮች Aጣሪ ጉባኤ

251/1993 የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤትን ለማጠናከርና ሥልጣንና ተግባሩን ለመዘርዘር የወጣ


253/1993 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ


255/1994 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ፕሬዝደንት መተዳደሪያ

256/1994 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን Aደረጃጀት ለማሻሻል የወጣ

257/1994 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ደህንነት ምክር ቤት ማቋቋሚያ

258/1994 የ1994 በጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግሥት ተጨማሪ በጀት

261/1994

በAፍሪካ የEድገትና የተጠቃሚነት ሕግ መሠረት የጨርቃ ጨርቅ Eና Aልባሳት ምርቶችን ወደ Aሜሪካ ሀገር ስለመላክ የወጣ

262/1994 የፌደራል መንግሥት ሠራተኞች

263/1994 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የEረፍትና የሥራ ጊዜ (ማሻሻያ)

267/1994 የEንስሳት በሽታዎችን ለመከላከልና ለመቆጣጠር የወጣ

268/1994 የውሃ ልማት ፈንድን ለማቋቋምና Aስተዳደሩን ለመወሰን የወጣ

269/1994 የIትዮጵያ የገጠር Iነርጂ ልማት ማስፋፊያ ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ

270/1994

የIትዮጵያ ተወላጅ የሆኑ የውጭ ዜጎችን በትውልድ Aገራቸው የተለያዩ መብቶች ተጠቃሚ ለማድረግ ለመወሰን የወጣ

271/1994

የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የሕግ Aወጣጥ ሥነ-ሥርዓት፣ የኮሚቴዎች Aደረጃጀትና Aሠራር

272/1994 የከተማ ቦታ በሊዝ ስለመያዝን Eንደገና ለመደንገግ የወጣ

273/1994 የIትዮጵያ ሲቪል Aቪዬሽን ባለሥልጣን Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ

274/1994 የሕብረት ሥራ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

275/1994 የዓለም Aቀፍ የገንዘብ ድርጅት ስምምነት (Aራተኛ ማሻሻያ) ማፅደቂያ

276/1994

ሀገር Aቀፍ የኤች.Aይ.ቪ./ኤድስ መከላከያና መቆጣጠሪያ ምክር ቤትና የኤች.Aይ.ቪ./ኤድስ መከላከያና መቆጣጠሪያ ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ

277/1994

የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶች ተቆጣጣሪ ባለሥልጣንና የ Iንዱስትሪ ልማት ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

278/1994 የሮተርዳም ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

279/1994

ለረዥም ጊዜ ሳይረክሱ ከካርቦን የተሰሩ ኬሚካሎች ወለድ ብክለት መቆጣጠሪያ የስቶክሆልም ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

280/1994 የIንቨስትመንት

281/1994 የቴሌኮሙኒኬሽን (ማሻሻያ)

282/1994 የ1995 የበጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግሥት የበጀት

283/1994 የሕጻናት መብትና ደኅንነት የAፍሪካ ቻርተር ማፅደቂያ

284/1994

የIትዮ-ጂቡቲ፣ የጅቡቲ ወደብ Aጠቃቀምና በትራንዚት ላይ ያለ ጭነት Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

285/1994 የተጨማሪ Eሴት ታክስ

286/1994 የገቢ ግብር

287/1994 ወደ ውጭ Aገር በሚላክ ቡና ላይ ስለሚከፈል ታክስ የወጣው (ማሻሻያ)

288/1994 የብሔራዊ የግብርና ግብዓት ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

292/1995

ከዴንማርክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


295/1995 የAካባቢ ጥበቃ Aካላት ማቋቋሚያ

296/1995

በገቢ ላይ የሚከፈለውን ግብር በሚመለከት ተደራራቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት ከየመን ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

297/1995

በIጋድ Aባል Aገራት መካከል የግጭቶች ቅድመ ማስጠንቀቂያና የመከላከያ ዘዴዎች መመስረቻ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

299/1995 የAካባቢ ተጽEኖ ግምገማ

300/1995 የAካባቢ ብክለት ቁጥጥር

301/1995 የAሸባሪዎችን የፈንጅ ጥቃት ለመከላከል የወጣውን ዓለም Aቀፍ ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

302/1995

ሽብርተኝነትን ለመከላከልና ለመዋጋት በAፍሪካ Aንድነት ድርጅት የወጣው ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

303/1995

ዲፕሎማቶችን ጨምሮ በዓለም Aቀፍ ደረጃ ጥበቃ ባላቸው ሰዎች ላይ የሚፈጸሙትን ወንጀሎች ለመከላከልና ለመቅጣት የወጣው ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

304/1995 Eገታን ለመከላከል የወጣው ዓለም Aቀፍ ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

306/1995 ሊሰበሰብ ያልቻለ የባንኮች ብድር Eዳን ወደ መንግሥት ስለማስተላለፍ የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

307/1995 የIክሳይስ ታክስ

308/1995 የተርን Oቨር ታክስ

311/1995 የተሻሻለው የAዲስ Aበባ ከተማ ቻርተር

312/1995 የIትዮ-ቤልጅየም Aጠቃላይ የልማት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

313/1995 የፌደራል ፖሊስ ኮሚሽን

315/1995 የዓሣ ሀብት ልማትና Aጠቃቀም

316/1995 የዓለም Aቀፍ የቡና ስምምነት 2001 ማፅደቂያ

317/1995 የገጠር ኤሌክትሪፊኬሽን ፈንድ

318/1995 የIትዮ-ሱዳን ልዩ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

319/1995 የIትዮ-ኮሪያ ሪፐብሊክ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

320/1995 የIትዮጵያ AEምሯዊ ንብረት ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ


322/1995 የፌደራል ከፍተኛ ፍርድ ቤት ማደራጃ

323/1995

ከቱርክ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

324/1995 ከAሜሪካ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

325/1995

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በቱርክ መንግሥት መካከል በጤና መስክ ትብብር ለማድረግ የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

326/1995

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በሄሌኒክ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል በቱሪዝም መስክ ትብብር ለማድረግ የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

327/1995 የብሔራዊ ተጠባባቂ ኃይል ማቋቋሚያ

328/1995 የንግድ ፈቃድና ምዝገባ (ማሻሻያ)

329/1995 የንግድ Aሠራር

330/1995 የምግብና ግብርና Eጽዋት ጄነቲክ ሀብት ዓለም Aቀፍ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

331/1995 የኬሚካል ጦር መሣሪያዎች ክልከላ ኮንቬንሽን ማስፈጸሚያ


332/1995

የመላ Aፍሪካን ፓርላማ ለማቋቋም በAፍሪካ የIኮኖሚ ማኅበረሰብ ማቋቋሚያ ስምምነት ስር የወጣውን ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

333/1995 የAፍሪካ ኅብረት የሰላምና የደኅንነት ምክር ቤት ማቋቋሚያ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

334/1995 የሰነዶች ማረጋገጥና ምዝገባ 335/1995

Aስከፊ የሆኑ የሕጻናት የጉልበት ሥራን ለመከላከልና ለማስወገድ Aፋጣኝ Eርምጃ ስለመውሰድ ድንጋጌን ማፅደቂያ

336/1995 የግዴታ ሥራ ድንጋጌን ማፅደቂያ 337/1995 ከስዊዝ ፌደራል ካውንስል ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

339/1995

የናርኮቲክ Eጾችና የሳይኮትሮፒክ ንጥረ-ነገሮች ዓለም Aቀፋዊ ሕገ-ወጥ ዝውውር፣ የዓለም Aቀፋዊ ሽብርተኝትና የተደራጁ ወንጀሎችን መከላከያ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

341/1995 የንግድ Eና የዘርፍ ማህበራት ምክር ቤቶች ማቋቋሚያ

342/1995 የነዳጅ ዋጋ ማረጋጊያ ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለማሻሻል የወጣ

343/1995 የመከላከያ ሠራዊት (ማሻሻያ)

344/1995 የ1995 በጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግሥት የተጨማሪ በጀት

345/1995 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች ጡረታ

346/1995 የIትዮ-ኩባ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

347/1995 የIትዮ-Iራን የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

348/1995 ዓለም Aቀፋዊ ውዝግቦ ችን በሰላማዊ መንገድ ለመፍታት የወጣውን ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

349/1995

የባህር ላይ ሠራተኞች ሥልጠና፣ የሙያ ብቃት ማረጋገጫ ሰርተፊኬትና ዎችኪፒንግ ደረጃዎች ለመወሰን የወጣውን የኤስ.ቲ.ሲ. ደብሊዩ ኮንቬንሽን (Eንደተሻሻለ) ማፅደቂያ

350/1995 የIትዮ-ሳUዲ Aረቢያ Aጠቃላይ የትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

351/1995 የከፍተኛ ትምህርት

352/1995 የሱዳን ወደብ Aጠቃቀም የስምምነት ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

353/1995

በIትዮጵያና በሱዳን መንግሥታት መካከል የሱዳን ወደብ Aጠቃቀም የስምምነት ፕሮቶኮል ማሻሻያ ማፅደቂያ

354/1995 የIሚግሬሽን

355/1995 የባማኮ ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

356/1995 የባዝል ኮንቬንሽን ማሻሻያ ማፅደቂያ

357/1995 የባዝል ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

358/1995 የ1996 በጀት Aመት የፌደራል መንግሥት የበጀት

359/1995 ፌደራል መንግሥት በክልል ጣልቃ የሚገባበትን ሥርዓት ለመደንገግ የወጣ

360/1995 የIትዮጵያ የIንፎርሜሽንና ኮሙኒኬሽን ልማት ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

361/1995 የተሻሻለው የAዲስ Aበባ ከተማ ቻርተር

362/1995 የካርታጄና የደህንነት ሕይወት ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

364/1995 የፍትህ ባለሙያዎች የሥልጠና ማEከልን ማቋቋሚያ

365/1995 የፌደራል ማረሚያ ቤቶች ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

366/1995 በይነ-መንግሥታዊ የልማት በለሥልጣንን ማቋቋሚ ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

367/1995 የፌደራል Aገር ውስጥ ገቢ ባለሥልጣንን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ

368/1995 የጉምሩክ ባለሥልጣንን Eንደገና ለማቋቋምና Aሠራሩን ለመወሰን የወጣውን Aዋጅ (ማሻሻያ)


369/1995 ከOፔክ ፈንድ ለዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ጋር የተደረገው የEዳ ቅነሳ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

370/1995 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ የጋራ ሕንጻ ቤት ባለቤትነት

371/1996

ዓለም Aቀፍ ጠቀሜታ ያላቸው ተንቀሳቃሽ Eቃዎች ኮንቬንሽንና የAውሮፕላን Eቃዎች ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

372/1996 የEቃ ማከማቻ ደረሰኝ ሥርዓት

373/1996 በጦርነት ጊዜ ቅርሶችን ለመጠበቅ የተፈረመውን ስምምነት Eና ፕሮቶኮሉን ለመቀበል የወጣ

374/1996

ቅርስን በሕገ-ወጥ መንገድ ከሀገር ማስወጣት፣ ወደ ሀገር ውስጥ ማስገባትና ባለቤትን ማዞርን ለመከላከል የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


376/1996 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ /Eንደገና/ ለማሻሻል የወጣ

377/1996 የAሠሪና ሠራተኛ ጉዳይ

378/1996 የIትዮጵያ ዜግነት

379/1996

የዓለም Aቀፍ Aቶሚክ Iነርጂ ኤጀንሲ መመሥረቻ ደንብ የAንቀጽ 6 ማሻሻያን ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

380/1996

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን Aደረጃጀት ለማሻሻል የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

381/1996 የሕይወታዊ ሀብት ጥበቃና ምርምር Iንስቲቱት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

382/1996 የIትዮጵያ የግብርና ምርምር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

383/1996 የAደጋ መከላከልና ዝግጁነት ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

384/1996 የAደገኛ ቦዘኔነት መቆጣጠሪያ

388/1996

ከኔዘርላንድ ንጉሠ-ነገሥት መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

389/1996

ከEሥራኤል መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

390/1996 የግብርና ሜካኔዛይዜሽን Aገልግሎት ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለማሻር የወጣ

391/1996 የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና

392/1996 ከየመን ሪፐብሊክ ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት Aገለግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

393/1996

ከሳUዲ Aረቢያ ንጉሠ ነገሥት መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት Aገለግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

394/1996

የምሥራቃዊና ደቡባዊ Aፍሪካ የጋራ (ኮሜሳ) የትብብር፣ የማካካሻና የልማት ፈንድ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

395/1996 የይቅርታ ሥነ-ሥርዓት

396/1996 የIጋድ Aባል ሀገራት በይነ -ፓርላሜንታዊ ኅብረት መመሥረቻ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

397/1996

ከAልጀሪያ ሕዝባዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበረታትና ጥበቃ ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

398/1996

ታህሳስ 3 ቀን 1996 ዓ.ም. በጋምቤላ ብሔራዊ ክልል የተከሰተው ግጭት Aጣሪ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

399/1996 ከቡርኪናፋሶ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር ትራንስፖርት Aገለግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

401/1996

ለመንግሥት ሥራዎች መሬት የሚለቀቅበትንና ለንብረት ካሣ የሚከፈልበትን ሁኔታዎች ለመወሰን የወጣ

402/1996 የኅብረት ሥራ ማኅበራት Aዋጅ ማሻሻያ


403/1996

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በሱዳን ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል በባህል መስክ ትብብር ለማድረግ የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

404/1996

ከጀርመን ፌደራላዊ ሪፐብሊክ ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበራታትና የሁለትዮሽ ጥበቃ ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

405/1996

ከፈረንሣይ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበራታትና የሁለትዮሽ ጥበቃ ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

406/1996

ከታላቋ ሶሻሊስትና ሕዝባዊ ሊቢያ Aረብ ጀማህሪያ ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበራታትና የሁለትዮሽ ጥበቃ ለመስጠትየተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

407/1996 የሰነዓ የትብብር ፎረም ማቋቋሚያ ስምምነትን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

408/1996 የተሻሻለው የAዲስ Aበባ ከተማ Aስተዳደር ቻርተር ማሻሻያ

409/1996 የስደተኖች ጉዳይ

410/1996 የቅጅና ተዛማጅ መብቶች ጥበቃ

411/1996

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን Aደረጃጀት ለማሻሻል የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

412/1996 የፕራይቬታይዜሽንና የመንግሥት የልማት ድርጅቶች ተቆጣጣሪ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

413/1996 የIትዮጵያ ጥራትና ደረጃዎች ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

414/1996 የወንጀል ሕግ

415/1996 የስኳር Iንዱስትሪ ልማት ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

416/1996 የድሬዳዋ Aስተዳደር ቻርተር

417/1998

ከቱኒዝያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበራታትና የሁለትዮሽ ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

420/1997 የIትዮ-Aልጄሪያ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

421/1997 የIትዮ-ሊቢያ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

422/1997

በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በታላቋ ሕዝባዊ ሶሻሊስት ሊቢያ Aረብ ጀማህሪያ መንግሥት መካከል በባህል፣ የወጣቶችና ስፖርት መስክ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

423/1997

ከIራን Eስላማዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን በሁለትዮሽ ለማበራታትና ጥበቃ ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

424/1997 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች የጡረታ (ማሻሻያ)

428/1997

ፀረ-ሰው ፈንጅን መጠቀም፣ ማከማቸት፣ማምረትና ማስተላለፍን ለመከላከልና ጨርሶ ለማውደም የወጣውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

429/1997

በAፍሪቃ ቀንድ Eና በታላላቅ ሐይቆች Aካባቢ ህገ ወጥ፣ ትናንሽና ቀላል የጦር መሣሪያዎች ዝውውርን ለመቆጣጠርና ለመከላከል የተፈረመውን የናይሮቢ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

430/1997

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት የግዥ ሥርዓትን ለመወሰን Eና ተቆጣጣሪ ኤጀንሲውን ለማቋቋም የወጣ

432/1997 የIትዮጵያ Aቪዬሽን ሴኩሪቲ

433/1997 የተሻሻለው የፌደራል የሥነ-ምግባርና የፀረ-ሙስና ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

434/1997 የተሻሻለው የጸረ-ሙስና ልዩ የሥነ-ሥርዓትና የማስረጃ ሕግ

435/1997 ለAዘዞ መተማ መንገድ ፕሮጀክት ከፊል ማስፈጸሚያ ከAረብ ባንክ ብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

437/1997

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በሱዳን ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል በቱሪዝም መስክ ትብብር ለማድረግ የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

438/1997

የIትዮጵያን የምርጫ ሕግ Aዋጅ ከIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ ከሕገ -መንግሥት ጋር ለማጣጣም የወጣውን Aዋጅ (ለማሻሻል) የወጣ

439/1997 የኪዮቶ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ


440/1997 በተወሰኑ የውጭ ንግድ ዘርፎች ለተወሰነ ጊዜ ብቸኛ ውክልና መስጫ

441/1997

በማምረት ተግባር ላይ ለተመሠረተ የማቋቋሚያ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈጸሚያ የሚውል ገንዘብ ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

442/1997 የማEከላዊ ስታቲስቲክስ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

443/1997

ለድህረ ሁለተኛ ደረጃ ትምህርት Aቅም ግንባታ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈጸሚያ የሚውል ገንዘብ ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


446/1997

ለሁለተኛው የመንገድ ዘርፍ ልማት ድጋፍ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈጸሚያ የሚውል ገንዘብ ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

449/1997 የሕዝብ ቆጠራ ኮሚሽንን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ

450/1997 የፌደራል የከተሞች ፕላን Iንስቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ

451/1997

በመረጃና በመገናኛ ቴክኖሎጂ የተደገፈ ልማት ፕሮጀክት ማስፈጸሚያ የሚውል ገንዘብ ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

452/1997 የIትዮ-Iራን የንግድ ስምምነት ማሻሻያ ማፅደቂያ

453/1997 የIትዮ-ቱርክ የማሪታይም ዘርፍ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

454/1997 የፌደራል ፍርድ ቤቶች Aዋጅ Eንደገና ማሻሻያ

455/1997

ለሕዝብ ጥቅም ሲባል የመሬት ይዞታ የሚለቀቅበትና ለንብረት ካሣ የሚከፈልበትን ሥርዓት ለመወሰን የወጣ

456/1997

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት የገጠር መሬት Aስተዳደርና Aጠቃቀም

457/1997 የጥሬ ቆዳና ሌጦ ግብይት ሥርዓት

459/1997 የቤተ-መንግሥት Aስተዳደር ማቋቋሚያ

460/1997

ከOስትሪያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበረታታትና ጥበቃ ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

461/1997

ከስዊድን ንጉሠ-ነገሥታዊ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማበረታታትና የሁለትዮሽ ጥበቃ ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

462/1997

ከቱርክ ሪፐብሊክ ጋር የተደረገው የባህል፣ የትምህርት፣ የሣይንስ፣ የመገናኛ ብዙሃን፣ የወጣቶችና ስፖርት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

463/1997 የIትዮ-ሱዳን-የመን የሦስትዮሽ የማሪታይም ጉዳዮች የትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

464/1997 የቴሌኮሙኒኬሽንና የኤሌክትሪክ ኃይል Aውታሮችን ደህንነት ለመጠበቅ የወጣ

465/1997


466/1997 የAሠሪና ሠራተኛ ጉዳይ (ማሻሻያ)

467/1997 የሰነዶች ማረጋገጥና ምዝገባ (ማሻሻያ)

468/1997 የትራንስፖርት

469/1997 የ1998 በጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግሥት የበጀት

470/1997 የተሻሻለው የI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር የAሠራርና የAባላት የሥነ-ምግባር

471/1998

የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን ሥልጣንና ተግባር ለመወሰን የወጣ

477/1998

ከIራን Eስላማዊ ሪፐብሊክ ጋር የተደረገው የባህል፣ የሳይንስና የትምህርት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


478/1998 በAዲስ Aበባና በAንዳንድ የAገራችን Aካባቢዎች የተፈጠረውን ሁከት Aጣሪ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

479/1998

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በደ/Aፍሪካ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

480/1998

በገቢ ላይ የሚከፈለውን ግብር በሚመለከት ተደራራቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በቱርክ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

481/1998 የEጽዋት Aዳቃዮች መብት

482/1998 የጀነቲክ ሃብትና የማህበረሰብ Eውቀት Aርክቦትና የማህበረሰብ መብት

483/1998 የድሬዳዋ ቻርተር Aስተዳደር Aዋጅ ማሻሻያ

484/1998 የIንታንጀብል ባህላዊ ቅርሶችን ለመጠበቅ የተደረገው ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

485/1998

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በየመን ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል የተደረገ የደኅንነት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

486/1998

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በሩማንያ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

488/1998 የIትዮጵያ የተፈጥሮ ግብርና ሥርAት

489/1998 ከEስራኤል መንግሥት ጋር የሣይንስና ቴክኖሎጂ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

493/1998 የኒውክሊየር ሙከራ Aጠቃላይ Eገዳ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

494/1998 የAሠሪና ሠራተኛ ጉዳይ (ማሻሻያ)

495/1998 የማህበራዊ ዋስትና ኤጀንሲን Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ

499/1998

ከናይጄሪያ ፌደራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

500/1998 ከAሜሪካን መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

501/1998 የንግድ ምልክት ምዝገባና ጥበቃ

502/1998 የ1999 በጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግስት የበጀት

503/1998 የተሻሻለው የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት የAሠራርና የAባላት ሥነ-ምግባር Aዋጅን ለመሻር የወጣ

504/1998 የIትዮጵያ ስኳር ልማት ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ

505/1999

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለማስቀረት በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በEስራኤል መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

507/1999

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለማስቀረት በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በAልጄሪያ መንግሥታት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያAዋጅ

508/1999

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለማስቀረት በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በቱኒዚያ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

509/1999

ከEስራኤል መንግስት ጋር የተደረገው የባህል፣ የትምህርትና የሳይንስ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

510/1999 የብሔራዊ ሎተሪ Aስተዳደርን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ

513/1999 የደረቅ ቆሻሻ Aያያዝ

514/1999 የድሬዳዋ Aስተዳደር ቻርተር የማሻሻያ Aዋጅን ለማሻሻል የወጣ

515/1999 የፌደራል መንግሥት ሠራተኞች

516/1999 የIትዮ-ጂቡቲ ልዩ የIንቨስትመንት ማመቻቻ Eና የንብረት ባለቤትነት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

517/1999

ከግብጽ Aረብ ሪፐብሊክ ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ


518/1999

ከፊንላንድ ሪፐብሊክ ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

519/1999 የሕዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት ጽህፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)

520/1999 የIትዮ-ጂቡቲ መልቲ-ሞዳል ትራንስፖርት ሥርዓት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

521/1999 የIትዮጵያ ማኅበራዊ ተሃድሶ Eና ልማት ፈንድን ለማፍረስ የወጣ

522/1999 ከOፔክ ፈንድ ከዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ጋር የተደረገው የEዳ ቅነሳ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

523/1999

በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በጣሊያን መንግሥት መካከል በጉምሩክ ሕጎች ላይ የሚፈጸሙ ወንጀሎችን በጋራ ለመከላከል፣ ለመመርመርና ለመግታት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

524/1999 በኮቶኑ የተፈረመውን የAካፓና የAውሮፓ ህብረት ትብብር ስምምነት ማሻሻያ ማፅደቂያ

525/1999 የIትዮ-ናይጄሪያ የሁለትዮሽ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

526/1999 የተደራጁ ድንበር ዘለል ወንጀሎችን ለመከላከል የተደረሰውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

527/1999 ከኤኳቶሪያ ጊኒ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

531/1999 የልዩ የመንግሥት Eዳ ሰነድ

532/1999 የተሻሻለው የIትዮጵያ የምርጫ ሕግ

533/1999 የብሮድካስት Aገለግሎት

534/1999 የተፋሰስ ምክር ቤቶችና ባለሥልጣናት

535/1999 የብሔራዊ ሎተሪ Aስተዳደርን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ

536/1999 የድሬዳዋ Aስተዳደር ቻርተር የማሻሻያ Aዋጅን ለማሻሻል የወጣ

537/1999

ከቤልጄም-ሉክሰምበርግ Iኮኖሚክ ዩኒየን ጋር በሁለትዮሽ Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውን ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

540/1999

በሰነዓ ፎረም Aባል Aገራት መካከል በጉምሩክ ዙሪያ በጋራ ለመሥራትና ኮንትሮባንድንና ሕገ ወጥ ንግድን ለመከላከል የተደረገው የትብብር ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

541/1999 የዱር Eንስሳት ልማት፣ ጥበቃና Aጠቃቀም

542/1999 የደን ልማት፣ ጥበቃና Aጠቃቀም

543/1999 የተሻሻለው የውጪ ንግድ የቀረጥ ማበረታቻ ሥርዓት ለማቋቋም የወጣ

544/1999 የተባበሩት መንግሥታት ድርጅት የጸረ-ሙስና ኮንቬንሽንን ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

545/1999 የAፍሪካ ሕብረት የሙስና መዋጊያና መከላከያ ኮንቬንሽንን ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

546/1999


547/1999 በየብስ የEቃ ማጓጓዝ ሥራን ለመደንገግ ተሻሽሎ የወጣ

548/1999 የመልቲ-ሞዳል ትራንስፖርት

550/1999 የIትዮጵያ የምርት ገበያ ማቋቋሚያ

551/1999 የIትዮጵያ ምርት ገበያ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

552/1999 የ2000 በጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግሥት በጀት

553/1999 የመድኃኒት ፈንድን Eና የመድኃኒት Aቅርቦት ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ

554/1999 ስፖርትን በተመለከተ የውጣው የፀረ Aበረታች ቅመሞች ዓለም Aቀፍ ኮንቬንሽንን ማፅደቂያ

555/2000 የመንግሥት ቤቶች ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ

556/2000 የፌደሬሽን ምክር ቤት ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ

558/2000 የፌደራል የከተሞች ፕላን Iንስቲቱት ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለመሻር የወጣ


559/2000 የተሽከርካሪ Aደጋ የሦስተኛ ወገን መድን ዋስትና

560/2000 የIትዮ-Iኳቶሪያል ጊኒ የሁለትዮሽ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

561/2000 የIትዮ-የመን የሁለትዮሽ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ 562/2000

በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በቱርክ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል በግብርና መስክ የቴክኒክ፣ የሳይንስና የIኮኖሚ ትብብር ለማድረግ የተፈረመው ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

565/2000

Aፍሪካን ከኒውክሌር ጦር መሣሪያ ነፃ ለማድረግ የተደረገ ስምምነት/ፐሊንዳባ ስምምነት/ ማፅደቂያ

566/2000 የIትዮጵያ የምርት ገበያ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ Aዋጅን ለማሻሻል የወጣ

567/2000 ለውጭ ገበያ በሚቀርብ ጥሬና በከፊል የተዘጋጀ ቆዳና ሌጦ ላይ ታክስ ለማስከፈል የወጣ

568/2000 የAካል ጉዳተኞች የሥራ ሥምሪት መብት

570/2000 የኤክሳይዝ ታክስ (ማሻሻያ)

571/2000 የጨረራ መከላከያ

572/2000

ከAዋጅ ውጭ የተወሰዱ ንብረቶችን የማስመለሻ Aቤቱታዎች የመቀበያ ጊዜ ገደብ መወሰኛና AለAግባብ የተወሰዱ የመንግሥት ንብረቶችን Eንደገና ማስመለሻ

573/2000 የተሻሻለው የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች ምዝገባ

574/2000 የከተማ ፕላን Aዋጅ

575/2000 የዱር Eንስሳት ልማትና ጥበቃ ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ

576/2000

ዓለም Aቀፍ የተዋሀደ የሸቀጦች Aሰያየምና Aመዳደብ ሥርዓት ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ Aዋጅን ለማሻሻል የወጣ

577/2000 ከቱርክ ሪፐብሊክ ጋር የተደረገውን የቱሪዝም ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

578/2000

ከናይጄሪያ ፌደራላዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገን የባህልና የቱሪዝም ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


580/2000 የIትዮ-ስፔን Aጠቃላይ የትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

581/2000 የውሃ ልማት ፈንድን ለማቋቋምና Aስተዳደሩን ለመወሰን የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

584/2000

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለማስቀረት በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በፈረንሳይ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

585/2000

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈጸምን ማጭበርበር ለማስቀረት በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ.ና በቼክ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

586/2000

በIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በህንድ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል የተደረገው የሣይንስና የቴክኖሎጂ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

587/2000 የIትዮጵያ ገቢዎችና ጉምሩክ ባለስልጣንን ለማቋቋም የወጣ

588/2000 ደረቅ ወደብ ለባለ Eቃው ስለሚኖረው ኃላፊነት ለመወሰን የወጣ

589/2000 የመንገድ ልማት ፕሮጀክቶች ተዘዋዋሪ ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ

590/2000 የመገናኛ ብዙሃንና የመረጃ ነፃነት

591/2000 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ባንክ ማቋቋሚያ (Eንደተሻሻለ)

592/2000 የባንክ ሥራ

593/2000

የAደጋ መከላከልና ዝግጁነት ኮሚሽን መብትና ግዴታዎች ለግብርናና ገጠር ልማት ሚኒስቴር ማስተላለፊያ

598/2000 የ2001 በጀት ዓመት የፌደራል መንግሥት


599/2000

በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በህንድ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተፈረመው ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

600/2000 የAሽከርካሪ ብቃት ማረጋገጫ ፈቃድ

601/2000 የብዝኃ-ባህል መገለጫዎችን ለመጠበቅና ለማስተዋወቅ የተፈረመውን ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

602/2000 የቡና ጥራት ቁጥጥርና ግብይት

603/2001 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላትን ሥልጣንና ተግባር ለመወሰን የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

604/2001 ከየመን ሪፐብሊክ ጋር የተደረገው የወጣቶችና የስፖርት ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

605/2001 የAፍሪካ የማዳበሪያ ልማት ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ ኮንቬንሽንን ማፅደቂያ

606/2001 የAፍሪካ Iነርጂ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ ኮንቬንሽንን ማፅደቂያ

607/2001

በAፍሪካ Aገራት መካከል Aፍሪካዊ የቴክኒክ ትብብር መርሐ-ግብር መመስረቻ ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

608/2001 የገቢ ግብር (ማሻሻያ)

609/2001 የተጨማሪ Eሴት ታክስ (ማሻሻያ)

610/2001 የኤክሳይዝ ታክስ (ማሻሻያ)

611/2001 የተርን Oቨር ታክስ (ማሻሻያ)

612/2001 የቴምብር ቀረጥ (ማሻሻያ)

613/2001 የAፍሪካ የዲሞክራሲ፣ የሕዝብ ምርጫና መልካም Aስተዳደር ቻርተር ማፅደቂያ

614/2001

ሽብርተኝነትን ለመከላከልና ለመዋጋት የወጣውን የAፍሪካ Aንድነት ድርጅት ኮንቬንሽን ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

615/2001

በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በሕዝባዊት ሪፐብሊክ ቻይና የሆንግ ኮንግ ልዩ Aስተዳደር መንግሥት መካከል የተደረገውን የAየር Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

616/2001 የሲቪል Aቬሽን

617/2001 የAፍሪካ መልሶ ማቋቋሚያ Iንስቲቲዩት መመስረቻ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

618/2001 የAፍሪካ Aንድነት ድርጅት ልዩ ቅማጥቅሞችና መብቶች ጠቅላላ ኮንቬንሽን ተጨማሪ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

619/2001

በIትዮጵያ በኩዌት መንግሥታት መካከል የተፈረመውን የጋራ የትብብር ኮሚቴ ማቋቋሚያ ስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ

620/2001

በመርከብ የፍጆታ ነዳጅ ፍሳሽ ሳቢያ ለሚደርስ የከባቢ ብከላ ጉዳት ስለሚኖር የፍትሐ-ብሔር ኃላፊነት Aስመልክቶ የወጣውን ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

621/2001 የበጎ Aድራጎት ድርጅቶችና ማሕበራት

622/2001 የጉምሩክ

624/2001 የIትዮጵያ የሕንፃ Aዋጅ

626/2001 Aነስተኛ የፋይናንስ ሥራ

628/2001

የባህር ወለድ Eጽዋትን ከመርከብ ቅብ ንጥረ ነገሮች ለመከላከል የተደረገ ዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

629/2001

በባህር ላይ በሚጓጓዙ Aደገኛና ጎጂ Eቃዎች ሳቢያ ለሚደርስ ጉዳት ስለሚኖር ኃላፊነትና ካሳን Aስመልክቶ የወጣው ዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

631/2001

ለመሠረታዊ Aገልግሎቶች Aሰጣጥ ድጋፍ ምEራፍ ሁለት ፕሮግራም ማስፈጸሚያ ከዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ማኅበር የተፈረመው ፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

632/2001 የሥራና ሠራተኛ ማገናኘት Aገልግሎት

633/2001 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች ጡረታ (Eንደተሻሻለ)


634/2001

ስደተኛ የዱር Eንስሳት ዝርያዎችን ለመጠበቅ የተፈረመው ዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

635/2001

የAፍሪካና የAውሮEስያ ስደተኛ AEዋፋትን ዝርያ ለመጠበቅ የተፈረመው ዓለም Aቀፍ ልማት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

636/2001

የIትዮጵያ Eና የሕንድ መንግሥታት የሚኒስትሮች የጋራ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

637/2001

ከፖርቹጋል ሪፐብሊክ ጋር የተደረገው የትምህርት፣ የሳይንስ፣ የከፍተኛ ትምህርት፣ የባህል፣ የወጣቶች፣ የስፖርት፣ የቱሪዝምና የመገናኛ ብዙሃን ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

638/2001

ከስፔን ንጉሠ-ነገሥት መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገው የትምህርት፣የወጣቶችና የባህል ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

639/2001 የፍትሐብሔር ሕግ (Eንደተሻሻለ)

640/2001 ከቱኒዝያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር የተደረገ የAየር Aገልግሎት ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ 641/2001


642/2001


643/2001

በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በደቡብ Aፍሪካ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተፈረመው ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

644/2001

ከስፔን ንጉሣዊ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋትና ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገውንስምምነት ለማጽደቅ የወጣ


648/2001 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራል መንግሥት የፋይናንስ Aስተዳደር

649/2001 የIትዮጵያ ፌደራል መንግሥት የግዥና ንብረት Aስተዳደር

650/2001 የከፍተኛ ትምህርት

651/2001 የከበሩ ማEድናት ግብይት

652/2001 ፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት

653/2001

ከኃላፊነት የተነሱ የሀገርና የመንግሥት መሪዎች፤ ከፍተኛ የመንግሥት ኃላፊዎች፤ የምክር ቤት Aባላትና ዳኞች መብቶችና ጥቅሞች

654/2001 ሰንደቅ ዓላማ

655/2001 የደህንነት ሕይወት

656/2001 በሞንትሪያል ፕሮቶኮል ላይ የተደረጉ ማሻሻያዎች ማፅደቂያ

657/2002

በወንጀል ድርጊት የተገኘ ገንዘብ ወይም ንብረት ሕጋዊ Aስመስሎ ማቅረብንና ሽብርተኘነትን በገንዘብ መርዳትን ለመከላከልና ለመቆጣጠር የወጣ

660/2002 የንብ ሀብት ልማትና ጥበቃ

661/2002 የምግብ፤ የመድኃኒትና የጤና ክብካቤ Aስተዳደርና ቁጥጥር

662/2002 የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች የምርጫ ሥነ-ምግባር

663/2002

ከIኳቶሪያል ጊኒ ረፐብሊክ መንግሥት ጋር Iንቨስትመንትን ለማስፋፋት ዋስትና ለመስጠት የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

665/2002 የIትዮጵያ ምርት ገበያ ማቋቋሚያ/ማሻሻያ/

666/2002

ለIትዮጵያ ቱሪዝም ዘላቂ ልማት ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ገንዘብ ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የተፈረመው የፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


667/2002

የምሥራቅ Aፍሪካ የግብርና ምርታማነት ማሻሻያ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኀበር ጋር የተፈረመው የፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

668/2002 የሀብት ማሳወቂያና ማስመዝገቢያ

669/2002 የፌዴራል ዋና Oዲተር መሥሪያ ቤት ማቋቋሚያ/ማሻሻያ/

672/2002 የ2002 በጀት ዓመት የፌዴራል መንግሥት ተጨማሪ በጀት

673/2002 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ መዝሙር

674/2002 የፀረ-ተባይ ምዝገባና ቁጥጥር

675/2002 የ2007 ዓለም Aቀፍ የቡና ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

676/2002 የAካል ጉዳተኞች መብቶች ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

677/2002

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Eና በኩዌት መንግሥት መካከል የተደረገው የሰው ኃይል ልውውጥ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

678/2002 የማEድን ሥራዎች

681/2002 የተሽከርካሪ መለያ፤ መመርመሪያና መመዝገቢያ

684/2002 የተሻሻለው የፌዴራል ዳኞች Aስተዳደር ጉባዔ ማቋቋሚያ

685/2002 የንግድ Aሠራርና የሸማቾች ጥበቃ

686/2002 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ

687/2002 የ2003 በጀት ዓመት የፌዴራል መንግሥት የበጀት Aዋጅ

690/2002 የማኅበራዊ ጤና መድህን

691/2003

የIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Aስፈጻሚ Aካላት ሥልጣንና ተግባር ለመወሰን የወጣ

692/2003 የስፖርት ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ

693/2003 የገቢ ግብር ማሻሻያ

699/2003 የወንጀል ምስክሮችና ጠቋሚዎች ጥበቃ

703/2003 የዓለም የገንዘብ ስምምነት ማሻሻያዎች ማፅደቂያ


706/2003

ለመሠረታዊ Aገልግሎቶች Aሰጣጥ ድጋፍ ምEራፍ ሁለት ፕሮግራም ማስፈፀሚያ ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

707/2003 የAፍሪካ ቴሌኮሚኒኬሽን ሕብረት ኮኒቲትዩሽንና ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

708/2003 የIትዮጵያ ሴቶች ልማት ፈንድ ማፍረሻ

709/2003 የሦስትዮሽ ምክክር (ዓለም Aቀፍ የሥራ ደረጃዎች) ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

710/2003

በI.ፌ.ዴ.ሪ. መንግሥትና በጋቦን ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል ዲፕሎማቲክና ሰርቪስ ፓስፖርት ለያዙ ቪዛን ለማስቀረት የተደረገ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

713/2003 የAፍሪካ የባህል ሕዳሴ ቻርተር ማፅደቂያ

714/2003 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች ጡረታ

715/2003 የግል ድርጅት ሠራተኞች ጡረታ

716/2003 የOዞን ንጣፍን የሚያሳሱ ኬሚካሎችን ለመቆጣጠር የወጣ

718/2003 የብሔራዊ የክፍያ ሥርዓት


721/2004 የከተማ መሬት ሊዝ


731/2004 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ (ማሻሻያ)

732/2004 የIጋድ የወንጀል ጉዳዮች የጋራ የፍትሕ ትብብር ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

733/2004 የIጋድ Aሳልፎ የመስጠት ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

734/2004 ሽብርተኝነትን በገንዘብ መደገፍን ለመቆጣጠር የወጣው ዓለም Aቀፍ ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

735/2004

የጦር መሣሪያዎችን፤ መለዋወጫቸውንና Aካሎቻቸውን Eንዲሁም ፈንጂዎችን በሕገ-ወጥ መንገድ ማምረትና ማዘዋወርን ለመከላከል የወጣው ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

736/2004

ስደተኞችን በሕገ-ወጥ መንገድ በየብስ፤ በባሕርና በAየር ማስወጣትና ማስወጣት ለመከላከል የወጣው ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

737/2004

ሕገ-ወጥ የሰዎች በተለይም የሴቶችና የሕፃናትን ዝውውር ለመከላከል፤ ለማቆጣጠርና የወንጀሉን ፈፃሚዎችለመቅጣት የወጣው ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ


739/2004

የሐዋሳ Aገረ-ማሪያም የመንገድ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ከAፍሪካ ልማት ፈንድ ጋር የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

740/2004

ለበደሌ-መቱ የመንገድ ማሻሻያ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ከAፍሪካ ልማት ፈንድ ጋር የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

741/2004

ለገጠር የፋይናንስ ሥርዓት ማስፋፊያ ሁለተኛ ፕሮግራም ማስፈፀሚያ ከAለም ዓቀፍ የግብርና ልማት ፈንድ ጋር የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

742/2004 የተባበሩት መንግሥታት የባህር ሕግ ኮንቬንሽን ማፅደቂያ

743/2004 የተሸሻው የEፍሪካ ማሪታይም ቻርተር ማፅደቂያ

744/2004

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Eና ቻይና ሕዝባዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገው የሳይንስና የቴክኖሎጂ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

745/2004

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ Eና ኮሪያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረገው የሳይንስና የቴክኖሎጂ ትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

746/2004 የመድን ሥራ 747/2004

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈፀምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በሱዳን መንግሥታት መካከል የተደረ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

748/2004

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈፀምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በቻይና ሕዝባዊ መንግሥታት መካከል ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

749/2004

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈፀምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በሕንድ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥታት መካከል ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

750/2004

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈፀምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በግብፅ መንግሥታት መካከል ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

751/2004

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በኩዌት መንግሥት መካከል የባህልና ጥበባት የትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

752/2004

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በኩዌት መንግሥት መካከል በቱሪዝም መስክ የተደረገው የትብብር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

753/2004

የጀኔትክ ሀብቶች Aቅርባት Eና ሀብቶችን ከመጠቀም የሚገኙ ጥቅሞች ሚዛናዊና ተመጣጣነኝ ተጋሪነት ለማስጠበቅ የተፈረመውን የናጎያ ፕሮቶኮል ማፅደቂያ

754/2004

ለAዲስ Aበባ ከተማ ጥልቅ የውሃ ጉድጓድ ልማት ፕሮጀክት (ክፍል III) ማስፈፀሚያ ከቻይና የኤክስፖርት-Iምፖርት ባንክ የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

755/2004

ለስኳር ልማት ፕሮጀክቶች ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ተጨማሪ ብድር ከሕንድ የኤክስፖርት-Iምፖርት ባንክ ለማግኘት የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

756/2004

የሦስተኛ የሴፍቲኔት ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ተጨማሪ ብድር ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ለማግኘት የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

757/2004

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በጋምቢያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል የተደረገው የሁለትሽ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


758/2004

በIትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥትና በኬኒያ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት መካከል የተደረገው የሁለትሽ የንግድ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

759/2004 ማስታወቂያ

760/2004 የወሳኘ ኩነት ምዝገባ Eና የብሔራዊ መታወቂያ 761/2004 የቴሌኮም ማጭበርበር ወንጀል

762/2004

ለኤሌክትሪክ መረብ ማጠናከሪያና ማስፋፊያ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ለሚውል ተጨማሪ ብድር ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

763/2004

የሱሉልታ-ገብረ ጉራቻ የኃይል ማስተላለፊያ የሚውል ብድር ከኮሪያ ኤክስፖርት-Iምፖርት ባንክ ለማግኘት የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

764/2004

የሴቶች የሥራ ፈጠራ ብቃት ለማሳደግ ለሚያስችለው ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ብድር ለማግኘት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

765/2004

ለከተሞች መጠጥ ውሃና ሳኒቴሸን ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ተጨማሪ ብድር ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የፋይናንስ ስምምነት ማሻሻያና ክለሳ ማፅደቂያ


767/2004 የጫት ኤክሳይዝ ታክሳስ

768/2004 የውጪ ንግድ የቀረጥ ማበረታቻ ሥርዓት

769/2004 Iንቨስትመንት

770/2005

ለደሴ-ኩታበር-ተንታ መገንጠያ የመንገድ ሥራ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ከኩዌት ፈንድ ለAረብ Iኮኖሚ ልማት የተገኘው ብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

771/2005

ለመሠረታዊ Aገልግሎቶች ማስፋፊያ ድጋፍ ምEራፍ ሦስት ፕሮግራም ማስፈፀሚያ ከAፍሪካ ልማት ፈንድ ጋር የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማማፅደቂያ

772/2005

ለመሠረታዊ Aገልግሎቶች ማስፋፊያ ድጋፍ ምEራፍ ሦስት ፕሮግራም ማስፈፀሚያ ከዓለም ዓቀፍ የልማት ማህበር ለማግኘት የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

773/2012

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈፀምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በሲሼልስ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥታት መካከል ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

774/2005

ተደራራቢ የገቢ ግብርን ለማስቀረት Eና በታክስ ላይ የሚፈፀምን ማጭበርበር ለመከላከል በI.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ. Eና በታላቋ ብራታኒያ ሰ/Aየርላንድ መንግሥታት መካከል ስምምነት

775/2005

ለጌዶ-ለምለም በረሀ የመንገድ ሥራ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ብድር ከAቡዳቢ የልማት ፈንድ ለማግኘት የተፈረመው ብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

776/2005

ለጌዶ-ለምለም በረሀ የመንገድ ሥራ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ከAረብ ባንክ ለAፍሪካ Iኮኖሚ ልማት የተገፈኘው ብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

777/2005

ለጌዶ-ለምለም በረሀ የመንገድ ሥራ ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ ከሳውዲ የልማት ፈንድ ለማግኘት የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

778/2005

4ኛውን የመንገድ ዘርፍ ልማት ለሚደግፈው የትራንስፖርት ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ብድር ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ጋር የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

779/2005

በኮቶኑ የተፈራረመውን የAካፓና የAውሮፓ ኅብረት ትብብር ስምምነት ሁለተኛ ማሻሻያ ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

780/2005

በወንጀል ድርጊት የተገኘ ገንዘብ ወይም ንብረት ሕጋዊ Aስመስሎ ማቅረብንና ሽብርተኘነትን በገንዘብ መርዳትን ለመከላከልና ለመቆጣጠር የወጣ

781/2005 የመለስ ፋውንዴሽን ማቋቋሚያ 782/2005 የEጽዋት ዘር

784/2005

የምስ/Aፍሪካ Aህጉራዊ የኃይል ትስስር መርሀ-ግብር ከፍተኛ የኤሌክትሪክ ኃይል ማስተላለፊያ ምEራፍ I ፕሮጀክት ከዓለም Aቀፍ የልማት ማኅበር ብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ

785/2005

ለIትዮጵያ-ኬንያ ከፍተኛ የኤሌክትሪክ ኃይል ፕሮጀክት ማስፈፀሚያ የሚውል ብድር ከAፍሪካ ልማት ባንክ ለማግኘት የተፈረመው የብድር ስምምነት ማፅደቂያ


Index 6

List of Regulations (Amharic)

ደንብ ቁጥር የሚኒስትሮች ምክር ቤት ደንቦች 001/1989 የመርከብ ምዝገባ 002/1989 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 003/1989 የIትዮጵያ ሲቪል ሰርቨስ ኮሌጅ ማቋቋሚያ 004/1989 የIትዮጵያ የጤናና የሥነ-ምግብ Iንሰቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ

005/1989 የIትዮጵያ የሰላምና የልማት ዓለም Aቀፍ Iንሰቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ 006/1989 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 007/1989 የIንቨትስመንት ማበረታቻ

008/1989 ያለውጭ ምንዛሬ ወደ ሀገር ውስጥ የሚገቡ መሣሪያዎችና Eቃዎቸ 009/1989 የIንቨስመነት ማበረታቻ (ማሻሻያ) 010/1989 የIትዮጵያ ቴሌኮሙኒኬሽን ኮርፖሬሽን 011/1989 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 012/1990 የፈጠራ፣ የAነስተኛ ፈጠራና የIንዱስትሪያዊ ንድፍ 013/1990 የፌደራል መንግሥት የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ 014/1990 የAዲስ Aበባ/ድሬዳዋ Aስተዳደር የንግድ ምዝጋባና ፍቃድ 015/1990 የAንጂነሪንግ ዲዛይንና ቱል ድርጅትን ለማፍሰስ የወጣ 016/1990 የIትዮጵያ የEጽዋት ዘር 017/1990 የሚኒስትሮች ምክር ቤት የፋይናንስ ደንብ 018/1990 የIትዮጵያ የኤሌትሪክ ኃይል ኮርፖሪሸን ማቋቋሚያ 019/1990 የመዝናኛ ብዙኃን ማሠልጠኛ Iንስቲቲዩት ማቋቋሚያ 020/1990 የIትዮጵያ የንግድ ማስተባበሪያና የመረጃ ልውውጥ ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ 021/1990 Eለት ደራሽ የEርዳታ ትራንስፖርት ማቋቋሚያ 022/1990 የፍትህና የሕግ ሥርዓት ምርምር Iንስቲተትዩት 023/1990 የIትዮጵያ የስብሰባ ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ 024/1990 የጉምሩክ መጋዘን ሥራ ፍቃድ የሚሰጥብትን ሁኔታ ለመወሰን የወጣ 025/1990 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 026/1991 ዝቋላ ስቲል ሮሊንግ ሚል ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 027/1998 የማEድን ሥራዎች (ማሻሻያ) 028/1998 የሻይ ምርትና ገበያ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 029/1998 የጉሞሮ ሻይ ልማት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 030/1998 የዉሽዉሽ ሻይ ልማት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 031/1998 የሻይ ልማትና ገበያ ድርጅት ማፍረሻ 032/1998 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች ደንብ ማሻሻያ 033/1998 የጥቃቅንና Aነስተኛ የንግድ ሥራዎች ልማት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 034/1998 የግል ሥራና ሠራተኛ Aገናኝ ኤጀንሲ የፈቃድ ክፍያ 035/1998 ለሀገር ዉስጥ ባለሀብቶች ስለተከለከሉ የሥራ መስኮች 036/1998 የIንቨስመንት ማበረታቻ (ማሻሻያ) 037/1998 የEቃ Aስተላላፊነት Aና የመርከብ ውክልና ሥራ ፍቃድ 038/1998 የAዲስ ሜታል ፕሬሲንግ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 039/1998 የጥሪት ፈንድ ማቋቋሚያ 040/1998 የጤና Aጠባበቅ ትምህርት ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ 041/1998 የቆዳና የቆዳ ዉጤቶቸች ቴክኖሎጂ Iንስትቲዩት ማቋቋሚያ 042/1998 የውሀ ሥራዎች ዲዛይን Eና ቁጥጥር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 043/1998 የገቢ ግብር (ማሻሻያ)


044/1998 የፌዴራል Aቃብያን ሕግ መተዳደሪያ 045/1998 የቃሊቲ ኮንስትራክሽን Eቃዎች ማምራቻ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 046/1998 የግዢ Aገልግሎት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 047/1998 የቴሌኮሚኒኬሽን Aገልግሎት 048/1998 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 049/1999 የኤሌክትሪክ ሥራዎች 050/1999 የትምህርት መሣሪያዎች ማምረቻና ማከፋፈያ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 051/1999 የንግድ የመንገድ ማመላለሻ ታራፍ ደንብን ለማሻሻል የወጣ 052/1999 ብሔራዊ የEንስሳት ጤና ጥበቃ Iንስትቲዩትን በልማት ድርጅትነት ማቋቋሚያ 053/1999 የሙገር ሲሚንቶ ፋብሪካን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ 054/1999 የIትዮጵያ ልማት ምርምር Iንስትቲዩት 055/1999 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 056/1999 የቅድመ-ጭነት ምርመራ Aገልግሎት ክፍያ 057/1999 የፌዴራል ፍርድ ቤቶች ጠበቆች የሥነ-ምግባር ደንብ 058/1999 የIትዮጵያ የEህል ንግድ ድርጅትን Aንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 059/1999 ወደ Aገር የሚገቡ Eቃዎች ላይ ተጨማሪ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ 060/1999 የባህር ዳር ዩኒቨርስቲን ማቋቋሚያ 061/1999 የመቐለ ዩኒቨርስቲን ማቋቋሚያ 062/1999 የደቡብ ዩኒቨርስቲን ማቋቋሚያ 063/1999 የጅማ ዩኒቨርስቲን ማቋቋሚያ 064/1999 የሚኒስትሮች ምክር ቤት የፋይናንስ ደንብ (ማሻሻያ) 065/2000

የፌዴራል ፍርድ ቤቶች የጥብቅና ፈቃድ፤ የፈተና መመዝገቢያ Eና የጥብቅና ሙያ Aገልግሎት ድርጅት መመዝጋቢያ ክፍያ መወሰኛ

066/2000 የውጭ ሀገር ዜጎች በIትዮጵያ ፊልም ስለሚያነሱበት ሁኔታ የወጣ

067/2000 የመጠባበቂያ ምግብ ክምችት Aስተዳደር ማቋቋሚያ 068/2001 የሀገር መከላከያ ዩኒቨርስቲን ኮሌጅ ማቋቋሚያ 069/2001 ወደ Aገር የሚገቡ Eቃዎች ላይ የተጣለውን ሱር ታክስ ለመሰረዝ የወጣ 070/2001 የIትዮጵያ ፈንጂ Aምካኝ ጽሐፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ 071/2001 የሚኒስትሮች ምክር ቤት የፋይናንስ (ማሻሻያ) ደንብ 072/2001 የልዩ Aቃቢያን ሕግ መተዳደሪያ 073/2001 ወደ ውጭ Aገር በሚላክ ቡና ላይ የሚከፈለዉን ታክስ ለማሻሻልየወጣ 074/2001 የባለሞተር ተሽከርከርና የተሳቢ መለያ፤ መመርመሪያና መመዝገቢያ ደንብ (Eንደተሻሻለ) 075/2001 ከተከፋይ ሒሳብ ላይ ግብር ቀንሶ ገቢ የማድረግን ሥርAት ተፈጻሚነት ለመወሰን 076/2002 የIትዮጵያ ጤና ባለሙያዎች መማክርት ጉባኤ ማቋቋሚያ 077/2002 የፌዴራል መንግሥት ሠራተኞች የዲሲፕሊን Aፈጸጸምና የቅሪታ Aቀራረብ ሥነ-ሥርዓት 078/2002 የገቢ ግብር 079/2002 የተጨማሪ Eሴት ታክስ 080/2003 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 081/2003 የIትዮጵያ Aየር መንገድ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 082/2003 የIትዮጵያ ኤርፖርቶች ድርጅትን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 083/2003 የIትዮጵያ ልማት ባንክን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ 084/2003 የIንቨስትመንትን ማበረታቻና ለሀገር ውስጥ ባለሀብቶች ስለተከለከሉ የሥራ መስኮች 085/2003 የEለት ደራሽ የEርዳታ ትራንስፖርት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 086/2003 የፌዴራል ፖሊስ ኮሚሽን መተዳደሪያ 087/2003 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ (ማሻሻያ) 088/2003 ያለውጭ ምንዛሬ ወደሀገር ውስጥ ስለሚገቡ Eቃዎች ተሻሽሎ የወጣ 089/2003 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 090/2003 የIትዮጵያ የኤሌትሪክ ኃይል ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 091/2003 የከፍተኛ ትምህርት የወጪ መጋራት 092/2003 የIትዮጵያ Aየር መንገድ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ)


093/2003 የIትዮጵያ ቴሌኮምኒኬሽን ኮርፖራሽን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 094/2003 የIትዮጵያ የኤሌትሪክ ኃይል ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 095/2003 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ (ማሻሻያ) 096/2003 የAዲስ Aበባ ከተማ ፖሊስ ኮሚሽን ማቋቋሚያ 097/2004 የግብርና ሜካናይዜሽን Aገልግሎት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 098/2004 የመንግሥት የፋያናንስ ድርጅቶች ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 099/1996 የIትዮጵያ ቴሌኮምኒኬሽን ኮርፖራሽን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 100/1996 የIትዮጵያ የምርጥ ዘር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 101/1996

የIትዮጵያ ተወላጅ የሆኑ የዉጭ ዜጎችን በትዉልድ ሀገራቸው የተለያዩ መብቶች ተጠቃሚ ለማድረግ የወጣ ደንብ

102/1996 የAዲስ ሜታል ፕሬሲንግ ድርጅትን ለማፍረስ የወጣ 103/1996 በልማት ወደኋላ ለቀሩ ክልሎች ልዩ ድጋፍ ለማድረግ የፌዴራል ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ 104/1996 የጥቃቅንና Aነስተኛ የንግደድ ሥራዎች ልማት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 105/1996 የቆዳና የቆዳ ዉጤቶቸች ቴክኖሎጂ Eንስትቲዩት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 106/1996 የኅብረት ማኅበረት Aዋጅ ቁጥር 106/2004 ለማስፈጸም የወጣ 107/1996 የመንግሥት ልማት ድርጅቶች የትርፍ ድልድል 108/1996 የጉምሩክ Aስተላላፊዎች 109/1996 የውሀ ሥራዎች ኮንስትራክሽን ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 110/1996 የውሀሥራዎች ዲዛይንና ቁጥጥር ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 111/1997 የAርባ ምንጭ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ (ቻርተር) 112/1997 የጎንደር ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ ደንብ (ቻርተር) 113/1997 የላሊበላ Iንጅነሪንግ ኮንስትራክሽን ድርጅትን ለማፍረስ የወጣ 114/1997 የIሚግሬሽን 115/1997 የIትዮጵያ የውሀ ሀብት Aስተዳደር

116/1997 የIትዮጵያ ልማት ባንክን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣን ደንብ ለማሻሻል 117/1997 የIትዮጵያ ሚሌኒየም በዓል Aከባበር ብሔራዊ ምክር ቤት ማቋቋሚያ 118/1997 የጨርቃ ጨርቅና ስፌት Iንዱስትሪ Iንስትቲዩት ማቋቋሚያ 119/1997 የኮንስትራክሽን ሥራዎችና የቡና ቴክኖሎጂ ማስፋፊያ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 120/1998 የAዳማ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ (ቻርተር)

121/1998 የIትዮጵያ ሲቪል ሰርቪስ ኮሌጅን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ 122/1998 የተንዳሆ ስኳር ፋብሪካ ማቋቋሚያ 123/1998 የዓለማያ ግብርና ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 124/1998 የማEድን ሥራዎች (ማሻሻያ) 125/1998 የጨርቃ ጨርቅና የቆዳ Iንዱስትር ልማት ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ 126/1998 የውጭ ንግድ ሽልማት Aሰጣጥ 127/1999 የደቡብ ዩኒቨርስቲን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 128/1999 በልማት ወደኋላ ለቀሩ ክልሎች ልዪ ድጋፍ የሚያደርግ የፌዴራል ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 129/1999 የዲላ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 130/1999 የIንፎርሜሽን መረብ ደኅንነት ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 131/1999 የተንዳሆ ስኳር ፋብሪካ ማቋቋሚያ (ማቋቋሚያ) 132/1999 የIትዮጵያ ፖሊስ ዩኒቨርስቲ ኮሌጅ ማቋቋሚያ 133/1999 ወደ Aገር በሚገቡ Eቃዎች ላይ ስለተጣለ ተጨማሪ ቀረጥ የወጣ 134/1999 የIትዮጵያ ንግድ ባንክ ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 135/1999 ለሕዝብ ጥቅም ሲባል በሚለቀቅ መሬት ላይ ለሰፈረ ንብረት ስለሚከፈል ካሳ የወጣ 136/1999 የደረቅ ወደብ Aገልግሎት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 137/1999 የፌዴራል ማረሚያ ቤቶች የጥበቃ Aባሎች መተዳደሪያ 138/1999 የፌዴራል ታራሚዎች Aያያዝ 139/1999 በሽያጭ መመዝገቢያ መሣሪያዎች ስለመጠቀም ግዴታ የወጣ 140/1999 የIትዮጵያ የኤሌትሪክ ኃይል ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻየያ) 141/2000 የIትዮጵያ የምድር ባቡር ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ


142/2000 የAፍሪካ የEርስ በርስ መገማገሚያ ስልትን በIትዮጵያ ማስመጸሚያ

143/2000 የIትዮጵያ የሥጋና ወተት ቴክኖሎጂ Iንስትተዩት ማቋቋሚያ 144/2000 የሥነ-ምግባር መከታተያ ክፍሎች Aሠራር 145/2000 የIትዮጵያ የሣይንስ መሣሪያዎች ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ 146/2000

ስለIንቨስትመንት ማበረታቻዎችና ለAገር ውስጥ ባለሀብቶች ስለተከለሉ የሥራ መስኮች የወጣ (ማሻሻያ)

147/2000 የIትዮጵያ Aየር መንገድ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ (Eንደተሻሻለ) 148/2000 የመከላከያ ኮንስትራክሽንና Iንጅነሪንግ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 149/2000 የቃሊቲ ኮንስትራክሽንና የኮንስትራክሽን Eቃዎች ማምራቻ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 150/2000 የናዝሬት ሸራና ልብስ ስፌት ፋብሪካ ማቋቋሚያ 151/2000 የAባይ ተፈሰስ ከፍተኛ ምክር ቤት Eና ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ 152/2000 የIትዮጵያ ሖርቲካልቸር ልማት ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 153/2000 የጉምሩክ ቀረጥ ማስከፈያ (ማሻሻያ) 154/2000 የከፍተኛ ትምህርት የወጪ መጋራት 155/2000 የIትዮጵያ ገቢዎችና ጉምሩክ ባለሥልጣን ሠራተኞች Aስተዳደር 156/2000 የAዋሽ ተፋሰስ ከፍተኛ ምክር ቤት Eና ባለሥልጣን ማቋቋሚያ 157/2001 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ባንክ ሠራተኞች Aስተዳደር 158/2001 የመንግሥት ኮሚኒኬሽን ጉዳዮች ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ 159/2001 የIንዱስትሪ ብክለት መከላከያ 160/2001 የብሔራዊ ሎተሪ Aስተዳደርን Eንደገና ለማቋቋም የወጣ 161/2001 የቡና ጥራት ቁጥጥርና ግብይት 162/2001 የመሰኖ ልማት Iንቨስትመትን ማበረታቻ 163/2001 የዱር Eንስሳት ልማት፤ጥበቃና Aጠቃቀም 164/2001 የገቢ ግብር (ማሻሻያ) 165/2001 የIትዮጵያ ፖስታ Aገልግሎት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 166/2001 የሥራ ፈቃድ Aገልግሎት ዋጋ (Eንደ ማሻሻያ) 167/2001 የፌዴራል ሆስፒታሎች Aስተዳደር 168/2001 የበጎ Aድራጎት ድርጅቶች Eና ማኅበራት 169/2001 የጄኔቲክ ሀብትና የማኅበረሰብ Eውቀት Aርክቦት Eና የማኅበረሰብ መብቶች 170/2002 የIትዮጵያ የኤሌትሪክ ኃይል ኮርፖሬሽን Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 171/2002 የፋይናንስ ደህንነት መረጃ መEከል 172/2002 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ባንክ Aስተዳደርን Eንደገና ለማደራጀት የወጣ 173/2002 የቱሪስት Aገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅቶች ደረጃ ምደባ 174/2002 የሆቴልና ቱሪዝም ሥራ ማሰልጠኛ ማEከል ማቋቋሚያ 175/2002 የገነት ሆቴል ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 176/2002 የIትዮጵያ የሥጋና ወተት ቴክኖሎጂ Iንስቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ (ማሻሻያ) 177/2002 የIንፎርሜሽን ቴክኖሎጂ ፓርክ ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ 178/2002 የሰሊጥና ነጭ ቦሎቄ ግብይት 179/2002 የመከላከያ ሠራዊት ፋውንዴሽን ማቋቋሚያ 180/2002 የጨርቃ ጨርቅ Iንዱስትሪ ልማት Iንስትቲዩት ማቋቋሚያ 181/2002 የቆዳ Iንዱስትሪ ልማት Iንስቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ 182/2002 የብረታ ብረት Iንዱስትር ልማት Iንስቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ 183/2002 የብረታ ብረት Iንጅነሪንግ ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ 184/2002 የመንግሥት ግዥና ንብረት ማስወገድ Aገልግሎት ማቋቋሚያ 185/2002 የመከላከያ ኮንስትራክሽንና Iንተርፕራያዝ ማቋቋሚያ 186/2002 የመከላከያ ግንባታ ግብዓቶች ማምረቻ ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 187/2002 የመከላከያ ኮንስትራክሽንና ዲዛይን ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 188/2002 የAፍሪካ የEርስ በርስ መገማገሚያ ስልትን በIትዮጵያ ማስፈጸሚያ ደንብን ለማሻሻል የወጣ 189/2002 የIትዮጵያ የምግብ፤ የመድኃኒትና የጤና ክብካቤ Aስተዳደርና ቁጥጥር 190/2002 የፋይናንስ Aስተዳደር


191/2003 የIትዮጵያ የጤና መድህን ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 192/2003 የስኳር ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ 193/2003 የIትዮጵያ ደረጃዎች ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 194/2003 ብሔራዊ የሥነ-ልክ Iንስቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ 195/2003 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ Aክሬዲቴሽን ጽሕፈት ቤት ማቋቋሚያ 196/2003 የIትዮጵያ ተስማሚነት ምዘና ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 197/2003 የIትዮ-ቴሌኮም ማቋቋሚያ 198/2003 የግብርና ትራንስፎርሜሽን ምክር ቤት Eና ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 199/2003 የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 200/2003 የቅዱስ ጳውሎስ ሆስፒታል ሚሊኒየም ሜዲካል ኮሌጅ ማቋቋሚያ 201/2003 የፌዴራል የጥቃቅንና Aነስተኛ Iንተርፕራይዞች ልማት ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 202/2003 የግል ድርጅቶች ሠራተኞች ማኅበራዊ ዋስትና ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 203/2003 የመንግሥት ሠራተኞች ማኅበራዊ ዋስትና ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 204/2003 የምግብ ጨው Aዮዲን Eንዲኖረው ለማድረግ የወጣ 205/2003 ብሔራዊ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ምክር ቤት ማቋቋሚያ 206/2003 የተሽከርካሪ መለያ፤ መመርመሪያና መመዝገቢያ ክፍያ 207/2003 የAበባ ልማት ዘርፍ የAሠራርና ሥነ-ምግባር ሥርዓት 208/2003 የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ትራፊክ መቆጣጠሪያ 209/2003 የናዝሬት ትራክተር መገጣጠሚያ ፋብሪካ ማፍረሻ 210/2003 የፌደራል ዩኒቨርሲቲዎች 211/2003 የሠመራ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ማቋቋሚያ 212/2003 የAምቦ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ማቋቋሚያ 213/2003 የቡሌ ሆራ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ማቋቋሚያ 214/2003 የAዲስ Aበባ ዩኒቨርሲቲ Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 215/2003 የAሶሳ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 216/2003 የAዲስ Aበባ ሳይንስና ቴክኖሎጂ ዩኒቨርሲቲ ማቋቋሚያ 217/2003 የወለጋ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 218/2003 የወላይታ ሶዶ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 219/2003 የወልቅጤ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 220/2003 የወልዲያ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 221/2003 የወሎ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 222/2003 የዋቻሞ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 223/2003 የዓዲግራት ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 224/2003 የሚዛን ቴፒ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 225/2003 የAክሱም ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 226/2003 የጅግጅጋ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 227/2003 የደብረ ማርቆስ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 228/2003 የደብረ ብርሃን ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 229/2003 የደብረ ታቦር ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 230/2003 የዲሬዳዋ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 231/2003 የሀዋሳ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 232/2003 የሀረሚያ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 233/2003 የመቐለ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 234/2003 የባህር ዳር ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 235/2003 የAርባ ምንጭ ዩኒቨርስቲ Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 236/2003 የመደወላቡ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 237/2003 የAዳማ ሳይንስና ቴክኖሎጂ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 238/2003 የዲላ ዩኒቨርስቲ Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 239/2003 የመቱ ዩኒቨርስቲ ማቋቋሚያ 240/2003 የጅማ ዩኒቨርስቲ Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ


241/2003 የጎንደር ዩኒቨርስቲ Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 242/2003 ለክልሎች ልዩ ድጋፍ የሚያደርግ ፌዴራል ቦርድ ማቋቋሚያ 243/2003 የሕንጻ 244/2003 የታላቁ የIትዮጵያ ግድብ ግንባታ ሕዝባዊ ተሳትፎ Aስተባባሪ ብሔራዊ ምክር ቤት ማቋቋሚያ 245/2003 የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና Iንስትቲዩት ማቋቋሚያ 246/2003 የንግድ ምዝገባና ፈቃድ Eና ተያያዥ Aገልግሎቶች ክፍያዎች ተመኖች 247/2003 የIትዮጵያ መንገዶች ባለሥልጣን Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 248/2003 የIትዮጵያ መንገድ ኮንስትራክሽን ኮርፖሬሽን ማቋቋሚያ 249/2003 የIትዮጵያ ወጣቶች የስፖርት Aካዳሚ ማቋቋሚያ 250/2003 የኤንፎርሜሽን መረብ ደህንነት ኤጀንሲ Eንደገና ማቋቋሚያ 251/2003 የፌዴራል መሬትና መሬት-ነክ ምዝገባና መረጃ ኤጀንሲ ማቋቋሚያ 252/2003

የIትዮጵያ ተወላጅ የሆኑ የዉጭ ዜጎችን በትውልድ ሀገራቸው የተለያዮ መብቶች ተጠቃሚ ለማድረግ የወጣ ደንብ (ማሻሻያ)

253/2003 የስምጥ ሸለቆ ሐይቆች ተፋሰስ ከፍተኛ ምክር ቤት Eና ባለስልጣን ማቋቋሚያ 254/2003 የIትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ትያትር ማቋቋሚያ 255/2004 የIትዮጵያ የባህር ትራንስፖርትና ሎጂስቲክስ Aገልግሎት ድርጅት ማቋቋሚያ 256/2004 የIትዮጵያ ካይዘን Iንስቲትዩት ማቋቋሚያ

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