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Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian RelationsAuthor(s): Lela Garner NobleSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May, 1975), pp. 453-472Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643257
Accessed: 24/10/2010 21:00
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ETHNICITY
ND
PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN
ELATIONS
Lela
Garner
Noble*
THE
NORMALIZATION
OF RELATIONS
between the
Philip-
pines and Malaysia
n
December 969
made
possible
he
development
f
ASEAN-the Association f Southeast
Asian
Nations-into a
regional
r-
ganizationharacterizedy ncreasing ooperation.
et the normalization
coincidedwith
he
development
f
growingnsurgency
n
Muslim reas
of
the
outhern
hilippines,
n
insurgencyllegedly ncouraged y
Tun
Musta-
pha, ChiefMinister f
the
Malaysian
tate
f Sabah.
The purpose f his rticle
s
to discuss hese wo
developments,
he
on-
tinuing ooperation f Malaysia and thePhilippines n ASEAN and the
emergencef a secessionist
movementmong he Philippine
minority ho
share
ommon eligious onds
with
heMalaysianmajority. he
argument
is
that hese wo
developments
re related n such
a
way
as
to reflect bar-
gain,
mplicit r
explicit,
etween
he
policy-makers
f the two states.
The
policy-makers
ct as
if
they
have
agreed
that
Malaysia
will refrain
rom
supportinghilippine
Muslims ut
will
not
top
Tun
Mustapha's
ssistance
to
them;
he
Philippines
ill
ontinue
o
attack
he
Muslim
eparatistmove-
ment utwillrefrain
rom
ction
gainst
abah or from irect ublic riti-
cismofMalaysia;thePhilippines illnotpress ts claim toSabah butwill
assert ts
right o thewaters round
he
Sulu archipelago.
Succeeding
ections f he
aper xplain
ow his
bargain was arrived
at,
how
t has
worked,
nd
what
onclusions
t
suggests bout therelation-
ships
between
thnicity
nd
Philippine-Malaysian
elations
nd,
more
gen-
erally,
etween
thnicity
nd
international
elations
heory.
The
Origin
f
the
Bargain
The
bargain ppeared
o be
the
result
f almost decadeof regional
friction.orMalaysia heproblems eremost eriouswith ndonesia n the
1963-1966period.
But
problems
with
the
Philippines,
rimarily ver the
claim to
Sabah, preceded,exacerbated,
and
outlasted4confrontation.
There
were also tensions
n
relations with
Singapore
and
Thailand.
Throughout
*
This
paper
is a
condensation f a
paper prepared
forthe
Annual
Meeting
of
the
American
Political Science
Association,August 29-September ,
1974.
453
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
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454
ETHNICITY N
THE
PHILIPPINES
these
experiences
Malaysian ecurity
was
dependentn military
rrange-
ments
with ritain,
ewZealand, nd
Australia,
utby
the ndof the1960s
it
was
clear that heBritish
military
resence
n the reawouldbe
reduced
drastically.
The ncreasedvidencef nternationalulnerabilityoincidedwith o-
mestic
trains hich ulminated
n
the 1969elections.
n peninsular
Malay-
sia, the
announcementf
election
esultswas followed
y Malay-Chinese
rioting, hich
n turn ed to thepostponement
f electionsn
the Bornean
states.
When lections
ere
finally eld n
Eastern
Malaysia n 1970, Tun
Mustaphadelivered abah's
votes
solidlyfor the
Alliance.
Sabah thus
emerged
s the
most table f all states-from
he tandpointf
theAlliance
leaders-and
Tun
Mustapha
s
the
most ndependent
f all state eaders.'
For the hilippines,
olicy n
Southeast sia between
962 and
1965was
dominated y
two ndeavors:
themakingnd prosecutionfthePhilippine
claim
to
Sabah
and the assumption
f a mediating
ole
n the confronta-
tion
between
Malaysiaand Indonesia.2
n both endeavors
thnic actors
wereof
minimalmportance:moreover,
oth endeavorswere
counterpro-
ductive.
AfterMarcos
became
resident
n
1966,
hePhilippines
moved
o re-es-
tablish elations ithMalaysia
and joined
Malaysia,Singapore,
ndonesia,
and
Thailand n
forming
SEAN.
Cooperation,
owever,
as shortlived.
t
was eopardized irst ythe Corregidorncident,whichpresumablye-
vealed he xistence f a
secret orce
fMuslims eing
rained y
thePhilip-
pines
o nfiltrate
abah.Then fter
hilippine
egislatorsassed
bill which
asserted
hilippine
overeigntyver Sabah
in the process
of redefining
Philippine
oundaries,
ctivediplomatic
elations etween he
Philippines
and
Malaysia
were
uspended.
Malaysia
brogated
he
nti-smuggling
gree-
mentwhich
t had
negotiated
ith
he
Philippines
ver
the
protests
f
Tun
Mustapha;
withdrew
ts
embassy
taff rom he
Philippines;
emanded
hat
thePhilippinesmplement
ts announcedwithdrawal
f
its own
staff;
nd
sharply urtailedts participationn international eetings. herewere
also reports
hat
abah,
f
not
Malaysia,
was
cultivating
ctive ontacts
with
Muslim
issidents
n the
outhern
hilippines.
Meanwhile omesticonditions
n the
Philippines
ere
worsening,
nd
protest
as becoming
more
widespread,
etter
rganized
nd
coordinated,
and more
xplicitly
urposeful.
iscontent
as
particularly
trong
mong
Muslims
n
Mindanao
nd Sulu.
The
Muslims
weredivided y
clan,
anguage,
nd
ocation,
nd also
by
themannern
which hey
had chosen
o
accommodate
hemselves
o a
na-
1It
s significanthat
while
Tun Mustaphawas
born
n a kampong n the
Kudat
Dis-
trict f
Sabah,
he claims
paternal ineage
from
he sultans
of Sulu, from
whose
claims
thePhilippine
government
erived
ts claim to
Sabah.
DuringWorld War
II lie made
contactswith
guerrillamovements
hrough
relatives n
Palawan.
Spotlight
on Sabah
(London:
The Diplomatist
Publications,
1972), pp. 4-5;
Tun Mustapha,
Houseboy,
Messenger,
lerk-and
Then
Came the War,
Malaysian
Business, October
1973,
pp.
33-36.
2There s
a more
detailed
treatment f Philippine-Malaysian
elations,
1962-1969,
in
Lela
G. Noble,
The National
nterest
nd theNational
Image: Philippine Policy
in
Asia,
Asian Survey,
XIII:6 (June
1973), pp.
560-576.
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
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LELA
GARNER
NOBLE
455
-tional
ystem
which they
perceived
as being dominated
by Christians.
Some,
particularly
Maranao in
the Lanao
area,
perpetuated
raditionalpatterns
of
clan organization
nd sought to
avoid
contact with
any alien
influences,
n-
cluding
electricity,chools,
and government
fficials.When challenged
they
fought.Othersopted forintegration,whichwas defined primarilyby edu-
cation in
a public or private
university,
requentlywith financial
assistance
from the government's
Commission
on National
Integration.
The third
option
was an explicitly
slamic
one and involved
training
n local
schools,
frequently
nes established
by
Egyptian, Arabian,
or Indonesian
mission-
aries; education
overseas at universities
n Egypt or
Arabia;
and/orpartici-
pating
n
Islamic
organizations
n the
Philippines
and outside it. Many
of
these Muslims were
reformists
n their
orientation
oward
Philippine
Islam
and Muslim
society.
They might
or might
not be secessionist
in relation
to
the
Philippines,
but their higher oyaltieswere clearly to Islam ratherthan
to the Philippines.
The three
options
were not
exclusive.
Muslim politicians
represented
a
fusion
of the
three:
theyparticipated
fully
n the party
alignments
nd pork-
barrel arrangements f
the
national political
scene,
but frequently
did
so
with traditional
lan base which
they
extended by
Islamic
symbols,bene-
fits nd
organizations.
They
arranged pilgrimages
to Mecca,
for example;
sent
their
sons and godsons
to
Cairo University;
had contacts with
Malay-
sian, Egyptian,Arabian,
and Libyan
leaders.
Muslims
who tried
the inte-
grationist
oute
were sometimes
frustrated
nd hence
found
common cause
with
traditionalists
or
reformers.
Traditionalists
frequently
respected
the
Islamic credentials
and
connections
of the reformers
nd
accepted their
leadership.
Whatever
heir
rientation,
he 3.5
million
Philippine
Muslims
were
sub-
ject
to
many of
the same
problems
affecting
ther
Filipinos.
They
also
had
problems
relating to continuing
Christian
migration
ntoMindanao,
which
by
the ate
1960s
had
reached
a level threatening
Muslim
economic,
political,
and cultural nterests. he economicconflict entered n thefactthatMuslim
landholding practices
were rooted
in a relationship
between
datus
(clan
chiefs)
and
clansmen,
not
necessarily
in
Philippine
law. The
migrating
Christians ended
to assume
that
they
were dealing
with a legal
situation,
and
usually also
that
they
had both
the
law
and
governmental
gencies
on
their ide. Since
there
was no
agreement
on
legal
systems
or
judges,
as
mi-
gration
increased
fightingbetween
Christian
settlers,
largely
Christian
Philippine
Constabulary,
nd
Muslims
ncreased
in
frequency,
ntensity,
nd
organization.
Fightingworsenedin the years precedingelections because migration
also had
political implications.
Muslim
families
and
groups
had
frequently
fought
mong
themselves
or
political
followings
nd
positions.
As
Christian
newcomers
n
some provinces
began
to
outnumber
Muslims,
changes
in
regis-
tration
patterns
nevitably
not
only
intensified
he conflict
but also
added
new,unpredictable
actors.Christians
ometimes imply
voted for
an
old
Muslim
politician,
for
at
least some of the
same
reasons
Muslims
did-his
connection
with
the
Liberal or
Nacionalista
benefit
network.
Frequently,
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
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456
ETHNICITY
N THE PHILIPPINES
however,
hifts
n
registration
roduced
new Christian
oliticians.
Under
these
onditions
here
was seldom
ny
reason
o
distinguish
etween
roups
organized
nd fighting
or conomic
easons
nd those
ighting
orpolitical
reasons.
Since
bothChristians
nd Muslims ad a tendencyoidentifyheir ife-
styles
s Christian
nd Muslim
espectively,
oth
dentifiedhilippine
ul-
ture s Christian,
nd
bothhad
a
tendency
o
regard
heir
wnreligion nd
lifestyles
s
superior,
he onflictppeared
o
be
irreconcilable.
hether
r
not
an Islamic
resurgence
as
inherently
ecessionist,
n the
context f
generally
orsening
onditions
nd
a
perceived
Christian
hreat,
rowing
Islamic
elf-consciousness
nd contacts ncouraged
alk
of
secession.
eces-
sionist
hreats
nd
organizations
ad
also
traditionally
een
part
of the
bargainingrocess etweenrovincialMuslimeaders ndnational hristian
ones:
Muslim
eaders
did not want
o
secede; they
wanted ewards or
not
seceding.
he formation
ftheMuslim
or
Mindanao) Independence
ove-
ment
y
Udtog,
atalam,
ormer
overnor
f
Cotabato,
n
1968
appeared
o
fit
he
old
model,
articularly
ince
he
seemed
emporarily
ollified
fter
Marcos
gave
him
a watch
nd
attention;
ut
the
Movement
apped
senti-
ments
which
went
eyond
Matalam's
ntentions
nd
control.
Thus
by-the
nd
of
the
1960s
Marcos
was
confronted
omestically ith
clear
evidence
f
deteriorating
ocio-economic
onditions,
idespread
is-
content,nd ncreasinglyrganizednd deological rotestroups. he evel
of
violence
hroughout
he
country
eemed
o
be
increasing.
here
were
reports
f outside
upport
orboth
he
New
People's
Army,
oncentrated
n
Luzon,
and
for
Muslim
dissidents,
oncentrated
n
Mindanao
and
Sulu.
There
was
also evidence
hat
foreign olicy,
articularly
olicy
oward he
claim
o
Sabah,
had
increased
he
possibility
hat nternal
roblems
would
be
worsened
y
external
nes.
For
Philippine
s well s
for
Malaysian
ead-
ers,
vulnerabilityotasictating
aution
n
foreign olicy
y
1969:
therefore
the
rationale
or he
Malaysian-Philippine
bargain
described arlier.
The Operation f the Bargain
During
he 1970s
the bargain
has been
tested
y
the
increase
n
the
level
and
scope
of
fighting
n
the southern
hilippines,
he
growing
vi-
dence
of
external
upport
or
he
Muslim
ctivists,
nd the
persistence
f
both
concern
nd
controversy
n Islamic
organizations
ver
treatmentf
Philippine
Muslims.
n March
1970
there
were
reports
n
the
Philippine
press
fthe
eturn
o
the
Philippines
f a
number
f Muslims
who
had
been
trained
broad.One
report,
ased
on
nformation
eceived
y
he
ommander
ofthePhilippine onstabularyP.C.) , was that120 Muslimyouth ad re-
turned
fter
eceiving
raining
nder
British
nd
British-trained
fficers.
second
ersion
eported
he
eturn
f
3475
Filipino
Muslims
rained
n
Mid-
dle Eastern
nd
nearby
ountries.
oth versions
inked he
trainees
with
secessionist
ovements
ike
heDarul
slam
and
M.I.M.
n
Cotabato,
amalip
in
Lanao,
the
Muslim
Brotherhood
f
Jolo,
nd the Green
Guards
of
Zam-
boanga
nd
Basilan.3
here
were lso
news tories
n
May
of
Muslim
youth
'Manila Bulletin,March 11, 15, 30, 1970;
Manila
Times,
March 26
and
27, 1970.
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LELA
GARNER
NOBLE 457
meetings
n which ecession
was
discussed,
sually
s
a last resort
f
de-
mands forreform
ere
notmet
by
the
Philippine overnment.
Whenthe
evelof violence scalated
n
Mindanao
n
October
970,
it
was more
related o
the
1971 elections
or
enatorial,
rovincial,
nd
local
officershan o secession. y early 1971 fighting as fiercestn provinces
in
Mindanaowhere
opulation nd
hence voting
atios werechanging-
Lanao
del Norte nd
Cotabatodel Norte.
Reports
dentified
he
Muslim
combatantss
blackshirts
n
Cotabato nd barracudas
n Lanao
del
Norte. t
was
usually ssumed hat he blackshirts ere
inkedwith
Mata-
lam's
M.I.M. and
that he
barracudas
were
he
private rmy f
Ali
Dima-
poro, the
Muslim
Nationalista arty
congressman.
he
Christianswere
identifieds
Ilagas'9: the
translation as
rats,
he ethnic
roup longo.
In
Lanao
the
lagas were llegedlyed by
Governor
rsenio
A.
Quibranza,Dimaporo's hief ival.4
Muslim nd
Christian
roups aided
villages,
urned ouses,
nd killed.
Therewere eports
hat ome
Muslimmembers f the
Philippine
onstabu-
laryparticipated
n
attacks n
Christians,ut
t
was
widely
ssumed hat
the
P.C. units,
redominantly
hristian
nd headedby
an
Ilongo,
generally
intervenedn behalf
f
Christians.
ertainlyhe
evel
of violence
xpanded
with
ncreasesn
thenumber
f P.C.
personnelentnto he rea.
Moreover,
while
asualty nd
refugee igures ere
high for
bothMuslims nd Chris-
tians, heworstncidentsnvolved hristian ttacks nMuslims.
Thefirst
ccurredn June
971,when
group f23 armed
longos,
ome
reportedly
n
P.C.
uniforms,
orced bout
70 Muslims
nto
mosque,
hrew
a
grenade t
them, nd shotanyonewho
escaped.
They raided thebarrio
school
nd killed
moreMuslim hildren.5
he
second ncident ccurred n
November
3,
election
ay n
Lanao delNorte.A
group f200 Muslims ad
been
persuaded
with
promises f safe
conduct
nd
a
P.C. escort o
return
home
o
vote.
According oone report
heywere
dentifieds
flying oters
and
were
not
allowed o votewhen hey
rrived.
hen on thereturn rip,
contraryo the afe-conductgreement,heywere toppedtan army heck-
point.The army
harged hat
he first
hot
came from
he
Maranaos,
but
army
ersonnel
ad only fewminor
njurieswhile he
Muslimswere
both
shot
by armymen
and boloed
by the Christian
ivilians
ccompanyinghe
soldiers.6
The
two
incidents, set in the context
of
continual fighting, roused
major
protest rom
Muslimpolitical
leaders outside the
country.
Col. Moam-
mer
Kadaffiof
Libya accused the
Philippine
government
f
having
a delib-
erate
plan
to
exterminate
Philippine
Muslims
and threatened
to
assume
responsibility or them. In an interview,Rascid Lucman, Philippine con-
gressman
from
Lanao
del
Sur, said that Libya was
already
supplying aid
to
the
opposition
in
the
Philippines.7
Reuters
quoted
Tunku Abdul Rah-
man,
in
his
new
role
as
head
of
the
Islamic
Secretariat,
as
saying
that
the
'New
York
Times,
eptember ,
1971.
'Far
Eastern
Economic
Review,
July ,
1971,
p. 15.
'Far
Eastern
Economic
Review,
December
18,
1971,
p. 17.
'Arab
Report
nd
Record,
October
1-15,
1971,p.
533.
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7/21
458 ETHNICITY N THE
PHILIPPINES
Secretariat
as considering
hemosquemassacre at
the
request
f
world-
wide
Muslims. 18
Claims that
the Philippines was persecutingMuslims
were
circulated t theUnited
Nations. n Septemberhe ndonesian ews gency
reported laims hatMuslim
eaders here ad made statements
xpressing
regret nd sympathyortheirPhilippine rothers nd appealing o the
Philippinegovernmentor
a peaceful ettlement.9n December, s
an
ASEAN foreign inisters
eeting as closing n Kuala
Lumpur,
heMalay-
sian primeministerondemned he killing f PhilippineMuslims.10
In
1972violence pread
nto ther reas of
Mindanao,
hough
he
verall
level ffightingppeared o
have subsided. n JuneRepresentative
alipada
Pendatun isitedMiddle
Eastern apitals nd reportedlyeceived promise
of aid forPhilippine
Muslims rom adat of Egypt.Meanwhile
adaffi e-
iterated harges f genocide
nd on June11 explicitly fferedrms
and
money o PhilippineMuslims. Marcos' reactionmarked significanthift
in
Philippine actics. arlier he Philippine esponse o statements
y out-
sidershad been to declare
hat he situationwas a purely nternal ispute
over
and claims nd that hepolicy nd practice f the Philippine
overn-
ment
were ohave a liberal
nd sympatheticttitude oward on-Christian
Filipinos.Kadaffi's
tatementsad been branded as mere
meddling. '2
Arrangements ade for
Muslim mbassadors n Manila to visit
the south-
ern
Philippines ad appeared o be a concession.
After
he statementsf
June,
owever,
Marcos nvited epresentatives
of theEgyptian nd Libyangovernmentso visitMindanao. He acted on
the
dviceof
SenatorMamintal amano a former ead of
the
Commission
on National
ntegration
nd
one of thefewMuslim
enators n
Philippine
history) nd over he
objections f othermembers f Congress.
His objec-
tivewas
clearly o demonstratehat riticismnd aid wereunwarranted.
Egypt nd Libya
responded y sending four-man elegation o the
Philippines n July -8.
Marcos,
who had earlier dentifiedheproblem
s
caused
partly y
a
struggle
orpolitical
power,
partly y contention ver
land
rights,
oldthem hathe believed
ommunists
nd other lements
ere
provoking iolence.Dissidents eeking o agitate and inflameMuslims
against heGovernmentndChristiansn general wereresponsibleor he
unrest;
ommunistsad
infiltratedhe lagas13
The
Egyptian pokesman's
conclusionswere that
the conflict ould
develop
nto religiouswar. He
cited
Philippine overnment
igures
f
1600
killed,
ncluding
ver
800
Muslims,
since
early
1971,
and
said,
We
will
follow our
mission
by
con-
vincing ur friends n thePhilippines o tryto do
theirbest
to
stop
the
massacre nd
establish rder.
A
Libyanofficialompared
he
situation
o
pre-1948 alestine.'4
8AsianResearchBulletin, (August 1-31,1971), p. 270.
9Asia Research Bulletin, (September 1-30, 1971), p.
352.
Far Eastern
Econo7mic
eview, December
11,
1971, p.
20.
Arab Report
nd
Record, June 16-30,1972, p. 297.
Arab Report and Record, October 1-15, 1971, p. 533; Asia Research Bulletin,
,
(October1-31, 971), p. 426.
Asia ResearchBulletin,
I
(July1-31, 972), p. 1099.
'4Asian Recorder,XVIII (September 16-22, 1972), p. 10988;
Arab
Report
and
Record,July -15, 972,p. 343.
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LELA GARNER NOBLE 459
The Philippine
overnmentppeared atisfiedwithhaving
won
a re-
prieve rom enocide
harges.
n
any
event,
espite oth he ntensity
fthe
violence nd its
growingnternational
amifications,
hroughout971
and
1972 mostFilipinos
onsidered
ther vents
o be
of
greatermportance.
The 1971 electionampaignwas bitterlyought,nd theresultswere nter-
preted s a major
oss
forMarcos.Debates n theConstitutionalonvention
werealso bitter ndhad pro- or anti-Marcosmplications. ombings nd
shootouts
ccurred
n
the
Manila area. Marcos attributed
hem
o
commu-
nists;his opponents
harged is ownmenwithhaving tarted hem. loods
deluged reasof
Luzon and
threatened nation-wideice crisis.
Amid
the
furor elations ith
eighboringtates emained ordial.ASEAN continued
its
meetings
nd
statements.uring
he
floodsTun Razak expressed ym-
pathy nd offered
elp.
WhenMarcosdeclaredmartial aw in September972,hisearly usti-
fications
mphasizedhe ommunisthreat, rimarilys representedy the
activities f theNew
People's Army. ronically, y October
Muslim ather
than
N.P.A.-led ebellion
onstitutedhe most ignificanthallenge o
his
regime.
The
first
arge-scale ttackwas on a P.C. camp
n
Marawi City, anao
del Sur.
Fighting pread
hrough
asilan and
the
Sulu
Archipelago.
n
late
February major
offensive as aunched n Cotabato. y theend of March
theMuslim orces
ad control f mostof Basilan and
Sulu and
large por-
tionsof the Lanao, Zamboanga, nd Cotabatoprovinces. stimates s to
their
umbersanged onsiderably,ut therewereprobably bout 15,000.
The forces ppearedbetter oordinated, etter
ed,
and better rmed
than
arlier. n some
areas they eft eaflets nnouncing heirobjectives.
Aimed at least
partly t reassuring
hristians,
he leaflets dentified he
armedmen s
members f theMuslimRevolutionaryorces
n
Mindanao.
They aid thatChristiansad no reason o fear
hat
heywouldbeharmed;
the
fighting as directedgainst hearmy nd the
P.C.,
notthe people. 5
Other eportsaid that he eaders alledfortheouster f all old Muslim
feudal
eaders nd
provincial fficials.
A
manifesto
ublishedby the underground
ree
PhilippineNews
Service ontained
ineteen emands. he first emandswereforthe with-
drawal
f government
roops,
he
disbandment
f
ocal self-defenseorces,
the removal f all
governmentfficials ho were not natives f the area,
and the
rrest nd
prosecution f
the
personnel uilty
f the
killings
f
in-
nocent
Muslims.
Otherdemands, pparently
ssuming hatthe
firstwould
not
be
met,dealtwith ontrols
n the
behaviorof military ersonnel.
third roupofdemands entered n recognitionhat he M.R.F. activists
were not
communist ut
God-fearing eople ;
on freedom
o
practice
Islamic awsand
customs ithout estriction;nd on requests hat foreign
dignitaries,
specially epresentatives
f
world
odies,
be allowed
o
travel
freely
n
affected
reas.l6
New York
Times,March
24,1973.
6An
Asian Theology f
Liberation: The
Philippines (IDOC
Documentation artici-
pationProject,The
Futureof the
Missionary nterprise,
o. 5;
New York: IDOC/North
America, 973),
p.
63.
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460
ETHNICITY IN THE
PHILIPPINES
What seemed o have emergedwas a looselyorganized
movementit
was
later
dentifieds
the
Moro National
Liberation
ront)
with core
of
young,university-traineduslim eaders.While
many
of
themhad
links
with he oldergeneration f Muslimpolitical eaders, hey ppeared
o be
renouncinghose inks nd callingforreform ithinMuslim ociety s well
as a change n therelationshipo Philippine ociety.
NurulHadji Misuari,
early dentifieds the main eader,had been
Lueman's
protege.Misuari's
wifewas thenieceofthewife f Salih Ututalum, ne of
the ong-timeoliti-
cal
contendersn Sulu. Nizam Abubakar, son of the
mayor f Jolo,
was
among herebels. ome reportedlyad doctoratesn
Islamic urisprudence
from airo University.erhaps mong he op eaders,
nd certainly ithin
the
movements a whole, herewere differences,articularly
n
defining
reform nd autonomy nd consequentlycceptable erms f settlement.
The external ontacts f themovement'seaderswerenotclear. Those
who wereeducated t Islamicuniversitiesbviously ad relationships ith
Muslims
n
other ountries. ews tories aid Misuariwas in Libya n 1972
and had
also spent ime n Sabah. It was reported hat
Libyanand Sabahan
aid went irsto Lucman, hen aterdirectlyo Misuari.
According o Philip-
pineofficials,apturedMuslims dmittedhat hey eceivedmilitaryraining
in
Malaysia. Libyans dmitted iving id; Malaysian
officials enied t.17
Within hePhilippines,n underground
ewspaper onnected ith he
N.P.A., the
Clenched ist,
eported NPA-MRF activities nd identified
the
Muslim ightings partof thecommon truggle. he Muslim
bjective,
the
paper alleged,was for autonomous ones
n
areas where
Muslimshave
85%
of thepopulation.18 ther eports uoted an
unnamed adical priest
as claiming
10% infiltrationf Muslimmovement
y
the
N.P.A.19
The
term
infiltration f course mplied hatfrom he
perspectivef
theMus-
lims
he ommonalityfthe trugglemight e less
clear.WhileMisuariwas
a
member
f
the
Kabataang Makabayan everalyears go,his friends
ave
said
that
e
left
t
becauseof
a
conviction
hat
heMaoists
n it
were
neither
understandingf nor sympathetico Muslims.Muslim spokesmen ave
denied hat
hey re communistr engaged n a
struggle o
overthrow
he
central
hilippine overnment.
In
Sulu, Cotabato,Zamboanga, nd Basilan, the
Front appeared to
includemostMuslimdissident roups nd to secure degree
of
coordina-
tion and discipline.Groups n Lanao appearedto remain
ndependent.
n
particular reas Muslim eizureof power was associated
with
peace
and
order:
price
ceilings
et
and
maintained, complete
an
on
liquor, roops
rigidly isciplined.
n
other
reas,
tactics
resembledmore
closely
he old
black shirt-barracuda-Sululanfeud tyle.
The martial aw regime's nalysis of
the
problem
distinguished
e-
17The ontrived
wording
f
some
of the
Malaysian
denials
suggests
hat
the
spokes-
men cannot
or
do
not
want
to
speak
for
Mustapha.
Both the
vagueness
and the contra-
dictions
ndicate
that,
whatever
Mustapha
is
doing,
he does
not want to
be
publicly
identified s giving
nything ther
han
refuge
o
Philippine
Muslims.
8See
Clenched
Fist,
I
(July 31,
1973 and
September 1, 1973)
and
II
(January15,
1974).
1;Asia Research
Bulletin,
II
(March 31,
1974), p.
2436.
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LELA GARNER NOBLE 461
tween
ocioeconomic
nd military
spects,
etween
eadersand
followers,
and
between
omestic nd foreign amifications.
o
deal with
he
socio-
economic
spects,
he
administration
roposed xpansion
f
airports
nd
ports to encourage ourism ),newprogramso trainfishermen,rovi-
sions
for limited
mount f
barter
radebetween abah
and
Zamboanga
and
Jolo,
n
Amanah
ank (primarily
o make oans to
Muslims),
govern-
ment harteringf
ship
for he
Mecca
pilgrimagepassage
was
free r
sub-
sidized
f
gunswere
urrendered),
tc.
t
also established number f or-
ganizations
o
plan toimplement
he
programs
nd announced he
commit-
ment
f
significant
esources.20
At the same time, the
administrationssued
reminders hat no
socio-economic
rograms ould be begun
until
peace
and
orderwerere-
stored.By April1973,half of the62,000men n thePhilippineArmed
Forces
were stimatedo be in
Mindanao,
nd thearmed
orceswere
being
expanded
steadily.21
They were also
being bolstered by deliveries of
mili-
tary quipment rom
heU.S. and bypurchases lsewhere.
ilitary erson-
nel
n
the
outh poke
of sanitizing reas and search
nd destroy
mis-
sions.There were
reports f planes
daily strafingreas ofpresumed ebel
concentration.n March
1973 thegovernment
egan ssuing
rms
to
local
self-defensenits.The
effect as to increase heweapons vailable
to
the
Ilagas and to give
hem aramilitarytatus.Apparently
uslimsweregiven
armsonly n Sulu, and thereMuslimgovernmentupportersomplained
that heywerenot
given dequate
mmunition.
Marcosmoved
mmediatelyo win the
support-or
neutralize he
op-
position-of
establishedMuslim eaders.
He called abouttwo hundred f
them-Conogressmen,
elegates o the
Constitutionalonvention,overnors,
mayors,
eaders fprominentlans-to a
peace conference
n
earlyJanuary
1973.
He offered
elective
mnesty
or
fighters
ho
surrendered,
eiterated
hisprograms f
economic eform,nd
said government
roopswere n
the
southern
hilippines
not to fight
Muslimsbut to
identify
nd
segregate
foreignnsurgents,ifany. He said hehad informationhat oreign-trained
and
foreign-armedroopswereactive n
Mindanao.22
The datushad
little nfluence,ince
martial aw left
hem o power nd
the
ebels'
deology
eft hem o
authority.ther ffortsenteredn extend-
ingamnesty eriods nd
sending pecial
delegations o
negotiate. he
ad-
ministration
as dealing, ccording o Press
Secretary rancisco
Tatad,
with
combined
lementsfoutlaws, iratesndsecessionists
ed by
a
young
Maoist
leadership. 23
The
basic scheme
orundercuttinghe rebels, hen,was
to offer
hem
hope hrough romises f socio-economicrograms,onvince hem hrough
military
orce hat
hey ould notwin on their wnterms,
rovide mnesty
as a
transition,
nd
usemediatorso make
ure hey eceived
ll themessages
20The
New York
Times
reported
n
May 11, 1973
that
the reconstructionnd
de-
velopment
rogram or
Mindanao was
budgeted
t
$135
million
for
three
years;
on
Sep-
tember
,
1974,
t
citeda
figure f
$63
million
for
four
years.
2 Los
Angeles
Times,
April 9,
1973.
22New
York
Times,
January ,
1973.
23NewYork
Times,
March
17,1973.
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462 ETHNICITY N THE PHILIPPINES
thegovernment anted ent.
For other
ilipinos hegovernment
estricted
information.ress ensorship as directed t minimizinghe
cale
of
fight-
ing,rebel
uccesses,
nd governmentasualties; and emphasizing
he
gov-
ernment's enerositynd rebel surrenders.
hose
who
surrendered
re.
turned o thefolds f he aw ; thosewho did notwere utlaws, andits, r
Maoists.
Some
of
these
actics
nd classifications
ad relevance
or he
foreign
audience f which hegovernmentas conscious. op governmentfficials
also deliberatelyefrainedrom aming ublicly heforeign ountries hey
suspected f iding he nsurgents. hile ecretaryfForeignAffairs arlos
Romulo nformedothSEATO and ASEAN that he governmentad evi-
denceofforeign
nvolvement,
e did notpress he ssue
n
either ase. Nor
did the governmentake the ssue to the UnitedNations, s it had done
regularly
ith he
claim to Sabah.
There
were ress eports
n
May and June 973 that hePhilippine
ov-
ernmentither irectlyr throughndonesiahad proposed o theMalaysian
government
hat t
wouldrenounce ubliclytsclaimto Sabah if theMalay-
sian
governmentouldgiveassurance hat abah wouldnot give sanctuary
to
Muslimdissidents.n response o questioning bout the reports, un
Razak,
the MalaysianPrime
Minister,
eniedthat the Philippine overn-
ment
ad made any formal roposal r that heMalaysiangovernmentad
any nvolvementith he insurgencyroblem. 24
The
government'sffortschieved omesuccesses. y December here
were
eports
n the
Manila papers fmass surrendersf rebels.Government
troops lso reoccupied reas
in
Basilan and Mindanao. The fighting e-
mained
egionalized;
heN.P.A. in Luzon was surprisinglyuiet.Some of
the ocioeconomic rograms erebegun.
Equally mportant ere ome nternationaluccesses. n late 1972 and
early 1973 a Libyan envoyvisited apitals of statesassociatedwiththe
Islamic ecretariat ith
message
rom adaffi
bout
he
ituation
f
Philip-
pineMuslims. resumablyheenvoywas trying o lobbyfor upport f the
proposals ibya
later made
at
the Islamic
Foreign
Ministers'
Gonference
held
n
Benghazi,
March24-26.Libya wanted
ll
Muslim tates
o
condemn
and severdiplomatic
nd
economicrelations
with
the Philippines.
he
Libyanproposals ost,and theproposals
passed,
after xtensive
ebate,
were
more
moderate.
The
conference
esolved to
appeal
to
peace-loving
tates,
eligious
nd
international
rganizations
o exert
heir
ood
offices ith
he Government
of thePhilippineso haltcampaigns f
violence
gainst
he
Muslim
om-
munity,oensureheirafetyndrealize heir asic iberties. t also named
a
five-man
eam o
visit
he
Philippines
n
three
months,
stablish
volun-
tary
und
o
help Philippine
Muslims,
nd
asked ndonesia
and
Malaysia
to
exert heir
ood
offices
ithinASEAN.25
Saudi
Arabia, ndonesia,
nd
Malaysia
were
redited
ith
aving uccessfullyrgued
he
dangers
f
nter-
fering
n
the nternal
ffairs f
a
sovereign
tate.
24ForeignAffairs
Malaysia,
VI (September
1973),
p. 41.
2'5Asia
Research
Bulletin,
I
(March
1-31,1973), p. 1699.
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LELA GARNER
NOBLE 463
InApril 973
ASEAN foreign
ministers
et
n
Pattaya,
hailand.
ress
reports
ndicated hat he
foreign
ministers onsidered t in
theirmutual
interesto avoidpublicdiscussion
f
divisive
ssues.
After privatemeeting
of
he
Malaysian,
ndonesian,
nd
Philippine
fficials,
he
hree efusedo dis-
cusswhat hey adtalked bout.26 ccording o thefinal ommunique,the
Ministersooknoteof
thepresentationf factsby the
Philippine oreign
Minister
oncerningheMuslimminority
n the Southern
hilippines, s-
pecially he fforts
eing xerted to mprove he
onditionsn thearea.
They lso noted hePhilippine xpression
f gratitudeo
Malaysia and In-
donesia or heir
upport t Benghazi.27
InJune
delegation rom heWorld
slamicLeaguewent o Mindanao
and,according o theManila Daily
Express,
ound roof f
rapid develop-
ment nd heardMuslim eaderspraise
Marcosforhis
concern. he Expressquoted
hehead ofthe
delegations saying, Separation s
absolutely ut of
the
question nd s not
o your nterest. 28hen n
mid-Augusthe slamic
foreignministers'
elegation isited hePhilippines. he
Philippinenews
agency uoted he
delegates s saying hat heywere
onvinced hatMarcos
was
incere
n
solving roblems nd that
ilipinoMuslims
ould xpect ome
aid but houldnot
allow themselveso be
used by extremistsr communist
groups.
9
Finally,
n
November,
n
the ftermath
f
heMiddleEast
war
nd
n
the
midst f oil shortages, arcos publicly ondemnedsrael and calledfor a
withdrawal
f sraeliforces
rom ccupiedArabterritory.he Arabsummit
meeting
n
Algiers
hen
decided o spare
the Philippines rom
urther
uts
in
oil deliveries.
There
was,
however,
n
illusionary
uality o manyof
the
successes.
Reoccupation
f
territory
as
as
frequently
result f rebel tactics
s of
military uccess and as frequently
ssociated with the deterioration
f
law and order s with
ts restoration.
hile one
of theearliest
ctions
of
he
martial
aw
regime
was
to round
p
guns,
henetresult f the
govern-
ment's olicy farmingivilianswastoputmore ndprobably etter eap-
onry
nto
the area. Most of
the
people
armed were avowed
enemiesof
Muslims,
hetherr not
hey
were
dentified ith
ebel
groups.
he
fighting
and
rising
fear
and tensions
reated
n
enormous
umber
f
refugees-
estimates
anged rom
00,000
Marcos'
figure
n
August)
to
980,000-and
the
refugee roblem
was further
omplicated
y
food
shortages
nd con-
tinuing, erhaps
ncreasing,
Muslim
distrust f
government
gencies.
The
government's
rograms,hen,
ppeared
o result
n
more
devastation,
ore
hostility,
nd more
guns.
Thenature fthe ituation as most learly evealed ytherebel's ei-
zure
of
Jolo
n
February
974.
Many
of the
rebelswhom he
Manila
papers
reporteds having urrendered
n
December
973 camefrom ulu. One was
identified
s having een
rained
broad
nd
responsible
ithin
he
M.N.L.F.
Bangkok
Post, April 18, 1973.
27Foreign
ffairs
Malaysia,
VI (June
1973), pp. 30-31.
28Asia
ResearchBulletin, II (August 1-31,
973), p.
1918.
29AsiaResearch Bulletin, II (August
1-31, 1973), p.
2077.
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464
ETHNICITY
N
THE
PHILIPPINES
for
ome
foreign-trained
roops.
everal
were
hadjis,
datus,
nd
imams,
titles
which
uggested
hat
hey
might
ot
fit hepattern
f
econd-generation
leadership.
Whatever
heir
ctual
positions,
hey
were flown o
Manila
to
meet
Marcos,
who
briefed
hem
n plans forthe socio-economic
rogram,
then lown
ack,
stensiblyowootheir ormerollowersnto urrendering.
Militaryeaders
aid that ormer
ebels
were aking he
nitiative
n
hunting
down
the Maoists,
stimated
o be
two or
threehundred
n
number.30
Some people
n
Jolo
believed
hat he
new role
of
these
returnees-armed
withgovernment
eapons
nd including
t least one
known
,outlaw -as
Marcos'
emissaries
t
leastpartially
rompted
he decision
o
seize
Jolo.
Descriptions
fwhat
happened
uring
he eizure
nd
subsequent
ight-
ing
differed,
ut
here
eemed
o be
a
consensus
hat
t east
half f
Jolo
City
wasdestroyed;bouthalfofthepopulationfJoloCity led oSabah,Basi-
lan,
or
Zamboanga;
oss
of
ifewas
high;
and
thegovernment
ontinued
o
use
massive
irepower
gainst
uspected
ebel
hideouts hroughout
he
sland.
These
facts,
lus
what
he
government
laimed
was
new nformation
bout
thenature
nd extent fforeign
nvolvement,
urther
eopardized
hilippine
relations
ith
Muslim ountries,
articularly
ithMalaysia.
n the
context
of
the
ontinuing
rab oil
boycott,
hese elations
were
critical.
The Philippines
ttempted
o deal
with
he
nternational
amifications
n
twoways.
t
tried
o
stop
Malaysia
from
iving
r permitting
hat
t
was
convinced asdirect ndcritical id totherebels, nd it tried o staveoff
condemnation
nd consequent
il
cuts.
About
80%
of
Philippine
il
came
from
Middle
Eastern ources, rimarily
audi
Arabia.31
A
widely
istributed
ssociated
ress dispatch
uoted
authoritatively
informed
iplomatic
ources
s saying
hat he
Philippine
overnment
ad
new
vidence
hatMalaysia
had supplied
raining,
rms
nd ammunition
or
therebels.
artially
ased
on
signed
tatements
rom
M.N.L.F.
captives,
he
informationas
that
Malaysian
raining
or
Muslim uerillas
egan
n
1969
when
ive atches
otaling
0
menwere
takento Pulau Pangkor,
ff
West
Malaysia, rtoLahad DatuandBangueysland, nSabah.NurMisuariwas
among
he 0
trained. ince
1972,
Malaysian
ources
ad
arranged
andings
to deliver
t east
200,000
rounds
f
ammunition
nd 5407 weapons.
Malay-
sian naval
boatsmade
their
astknown elivery
n December
1,
1973.
The
sources
lso
cited
n
intercepted
etter
ritten
y
Rascid
Lueman
on
June
,
1972;
it
said
that
un Mustapha
rovided
50,000
pesos
to Misuari nd
to
Dr. Saleh Loong,
whose
relatives
were dentified
s activist eaders.
The
money
was for ecruiting
00
men.32
An
article
n
the
Far
Eastern
EconomicReview
written
romManila
sources ontainedmuchofthe same nformation,ut said thatmoneywas
originally
hanneled hrough
lder
Mindanao
Muslims-including
ueman,
who
had
an
army
alled
Ansar
El
Islam. Misuari
nd his companions,
ho
had
formed
heM.N.L.F.
whileat
Pulau
Pangkor,
eturned
o work
with
8 Bulletin
oday,
Manila),
December
2, 6, 11,
1973.
81FarEastern
Economic
Review,
March 18, 1974,
p.
23.
2Asia
Research
Bulletin,
II (March
31, 1974), pp. 2535-2536;
Straits
Times,
March
11, 1974.
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466
ETHNICITY N
THE PHILIPPINES
Indonesian
onvictionhatManila
shouldmake
every fforto talk to
the
activists'
eadership. he Philippine
tatements
tressed he friendly
ela-
tions etween
hePhilippines
nd Indonesia nd
themultinational
haracter
of ASEAN
but omitted
referencen an earlier
draft, o which
he
Indo-
nesianshad apparentlybjected, o Indonesia's ppreciationorManila's
effortso
upliftts Muslim
minority.38
Philippineolicies
n relation o
otherMuslim tates nvolved
fforts
t
de-Muslimizingherebel
eadership
y
persistentlydentifyinghe
ttackers
on
Jolo s Maoist.
The
governmentlso tried o
revise ownward
stimates
of
damage,
articularly
hat ausedby government
helling.
he
primary
targetwas
Arnold eitlin,AP correspondent
n
the Philippines, hosere-
ports rom
olo
had been
widely irculated. letter
o theforeign
ministers
of
Egypt,
audi Arabia,
nd Kuwait,
igned y Romulo, laimed
o clarify
the false tory y Zeitlin,suspectedo be a Jewishournalist, f alleged
continued
illing fMuslims
y Philippine overnment
roops.
eitlin
im-
selfwas summoned
efore
heMediaAdvisory ouncil
o answer
harges f
malicious,
alse and
erroneous
eporting;. 39
Theattack n Zeitlin
was counterproductive,
ut theMaoist
dentifica-
tion ampaign
pparently elped.
Whether r not
he
M.N.L.F.
leaderswere
Maoist-and
Manilapresentedo evidence
hat hey
were-theywere learly
radical nd
secessionist,
nd too manyMuslim tates
ad their
wn ounter-
parts o be enthusiasticbout ondemning anila.The Saudi Arabianfor-
eign minister
aid another isit o
Manila,
talked
withPhilippineeaders,
pledged
is governments
upportor hePhilippine
overnment's
ttempts
to solve he
problem,
nd promised
hat il would ontinue o
flow.40
Manila
was also anxious
bout
he slamic ummit
cheduled
or
ahore
in
Februarynd the slamic
foreign
ministers
eeting cheduled
or
Kuala
Lumpur n
June. he issue apparently
as not
discussed t
Lahore,
hough
the
report rom he four
foreign
ministers hovisited
he
Philippines
n
August 973
was circulated
nd a
decisionwasmadeto keep
t
secret.
Therewas,however,onsiderableiscussionttheKuala Lumpurmeet-
ings,
despiteMalaysia's
position hat he situation
f
Muslim
minorities
n
the
Philippines
as besthandled
y
ASEAN.41
The
Libyanforeign
minister
raised he ssue
n his
opening peech.
He characterized
he
misery
f
Philip-
pine
Muslims s no
less horrifying
han hat
faced
by
the
Arabs and
their
sacraments
n
Palestine nd
said
that
he
conference
hould
onsider
ind-
ing
a
political
olution or a problem
which
was
not social
but
political.42
In an interviewe admitted
hat ibya
and
other
tates
were
ctivelyiding
the fighting
hilippineMuslims.
He
refused
o
name
the other
tates,
ut
denied hatLibyanarmswerebeingchanneled hroughMalaysia.He also
maintainedhat ibyawould ontinue
ts
support
ntil
he
Philippine ov-
ernmentegotiated
political
ettlement,
hich
was
possible,
e
thought,
f
8Far
asternEconomicReview,
June
10, 1974,pp.
16-17.
39Philippine imes,March31,1974.
40AsiaResearch Bulletin, II (March 31, 1974), p.
2535.
4 FarEasternEconomic
Review,June
24, 1974, p. 18.
42Malaysia, ressrelease
(PEN. 6/74/153 Haluar),
Libyan
Leader
Replies
to Tun
Razak's Address,
June 1,
1974.
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LELA GARNER NOBLE
467
Marcos wouldmeetwith
heFront eaders. If these eople re
listened
o,
they re reasonable nough orealize hat hey re part f hePhilippines
nd
will cooperatewithin he frameworkf the
Government,
e said.
But
he
notedthat hus
far,
rather han aking ny practical teps o improve
he
situation, he Philippines ad simply ncreased ts military orces n the
South.43
In contrast,he ndonesian
pening tatementeportedhat hePhilip-
pinegovernmentad accepted
he stablishmentf MuslimWelfare gency,
financed hroughhe slamicSecretariatn cooperation ith he
Philippine
government,nd that the inceritynd willingnessf PresidentMarcos
to
work oward n integratedhilippine
ociety n whichMuslims ould as-
sume heir ightfullace werenot o be
doubted.. 44
uring hedebate n-
donesia rgued hat call for just solution houldbe moderatedy the
phrase within he frame-work
f the national overeigntynd
territorial
integrity f the Philippines.
Malaysia reportedlywantedthe phrase
excised.45
Thefinal
ommunique
ontainedour oints. he firstalled
on
the
Phil-
ippinegovernmento stop all
actionsresultingn the killing f
Muslims
and destructionf heir roperties
nd placesofworship. hesecond
tated
the
conviction f the conference:
that he ocio-economiceasures roposed ythePhilippine overnment
to improve
he
condition
ftheMuslimswould
not
by
themselvesolve
the
problemndurged he
Philippine
overnment
o
find
political
nd
peacefulolutionhrough
egotiationithMuslimeaders
nd
particularly,
with
epresentatives
f heMoro
National
iberation
ront
n order o
ar-
rive
t
a
just
olutiono he light f he ilipino
Muslims ithin
he rame-
work f
he
national
overeignty
nd erritorial
ntegrity
f he
hilippines.
The
third ppealedto peace-lovingtates nd religious
nd
international
authorities, hile recognizing
he problem s an
internal
roblem
f
the
Philippines, ouse their ood officeso ensure he safetynd liberties f
PhilippineMuslims. he final
point nnounced decision
o
create
Fili-
pino
Muslim
Welfare nd Relief
Agency nd called
for contributions
o
supportts operation.46
After he
onferencewo
pokesmen
or heM.N.L.F.
n
Kuala
Lumpur
said
they
were
fullyn accord
with he etter nd spirit f
the
ommunique,
but
Marcos
wouldhave to take
the nitiative
n
starting egotiations.
is
43InMay Marcos announced that the manpowerof the PhilippineArmed Forces
would double in the next
year, going from
he current100,000 to 256,000.
Philippine
Times, May
5, 1974. An article n the
FEER
on May
20,
1974, contrasted
he
100,000
figurewith
60,000, he AFP
manpower t the time martial
aw was declared,
and
the
currentAFP
budget of $300
million,
22%
of the national
budget,
with the
1971
figure
of $90 million.
t said that
two-thirds f the
AFP's
maneuver
battalions
were
stationed
in Mindanao.
See also Far Eastern Economic
Review, July
1, 1974, pp.
12-13;
July
8,
1974,pp. 10-11; and Straits
Times,June
26,
1974;
New York
Times,June27,
1974.
Straits
Times,June 4,
1974.
New York Times,June
27,
1974.
StraitsTimes,June 6,
1974.
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
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468
ETHNICITY
N
THE
PHILIPPINES
failure o
meet he
demand or
political
olution
would
mean
hat
we
will
continue
ur
struggleor
iberation
ntil
wecan
enjoythe
blessing f
na-
tional
freedom
nd
independence.
he
Libyan
foreign
minister,
nother
Libyandiplomat,nd theSaudi Arabianforeignminister ent o Sabah,
where he
wo
Libyans,
utnot
he
Saudi
Arabian,
were
eported
s
receiv-
ing
Datukships
from
abah's head
of
state.47
The
Lebanese
oreign
minister ent
o
Manila,
where
Marcos
gave
him
the
Sultan
Kuderat
Award
for
his
role n
protecting
he
sovereignty
nd
integrity f
the
Philippines
at
the
slamic
ministers'
onference.
Marcos
also
proclaimed
mnesty
or ll
Muslim
ebels,
uled
ut
military
olution o
the
Muslim
nsurgency,
ledged
ncreased
conomic
id,
and
promised
hat
ll
Filipino
minority
roups
would
be given
an
active
political
voice
in
the
country. 48n Mindanao,Muslim ttacks ad beentimed o coincidewith
the
Kuala
Lumpur
meetings,
nd
intense
ighting
ontinued.
In the
ollowing
onths
eace
moves nd
fighting
emained
uxtaposed.
When
Tun
Razak
offered
he
defense
ortfolioo
Tun
Mustapha
fter
he
September
974
Malaysian
elections)
most
nalysts
houghthat
the
offer
representedn
effort,
ictated
y
both
nternalnd
international
onsidera-
tions,
o
get
Mustapha
utof
Sabah.Tun
Mustapha, owever,
ostponed
c-
cepting he
position.n
early
January
975the
Philippine
overnment
aid
that
Hassan
Al
Tohamy,
he
Egyptian
ecretaryf
the
slamic
Conference,
was nManilaonthe hirdhuttlef a peaceeffortndthatMarcoswasop-
timistic
hat
eacewas
n
sight.
hen
he
government
nnounced
hat
Marcos
had
sent
top
evel
delegation
o
meet
Al
Tohamy n
Jeddah
with he
hope
of
having
alkswith
Misuari nd
other
nsurgent
eaders.
he
talks
wereheld
and
deadlocked
uickly.
hey
were
re-scheduledor
April,
before nother
Islamic
meetingn
May.
News
reports
aid
that
oth
Muslim nd
government
forces
were
ntensifying
heir
military
fforts
ndcited
ncreasing
igures
f
dead
and
wounded,
s
many s
1.7
million
eople
dislocated,
roowingolar-
ization
fthe
population,
nd
disruption
f
economic
ctivities
hroughout
Mindanao ndSulu.
Conclusions
The
argument
asbeen
that
he
xperiencef
the
1960s
convinced he
policy-makers
fboth
Malaysia
and
the
Philippineshat
heir
egimeswere
unstable
nd
vulnerable.
he
vulnerability
as
caused
in
partby
internal
conflicts,
hich
n
both
ountries
ere
elated
o
ethnic
actors.
n
Malaysia,
the
cleavage
between
hinese
nd
Malayswas
perceived s
primary,
nd
conflicts
ithin
oth
he
Chinese nd
Malay
communitiesver
radical,
mod.
erate,ndconservativeositionswere inked othebasic conflictfChinese-
Malay
relationships.
here
was
another
leavage-ethnic
as well
as
geo-
graphic,
istorical,nd
economic-betweenhe
peoples
of
mainland
Malay-
sia
and
those
f
Sarawak
nd
Sabah.
This
cleavage
retained
potential
or
conflict
nd for
ecession. oth
cleavages
reenforced
he
political
owerof
Tun
Mustapha.
Far
Eastern
Economic
Review,
July ,
1974.
San
Francisco
Chronicle,
une 9
and 30,1974.
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LELA
GARNER
NOBLE
469
In the
Philippines
onflict as
defined
rimarily
n
socioeconomic,
political,
nd
ideological
erms.n
the southern
hilippines,
owever,
on-
flict
as
particularly
ntense,
as
defined
n
ethnic
or
religious)
erms,nd
had
clear
ethnic
manifestations.
A second esult f he 960swasthe ealizationhat elations ith eigh-
boring tateswere
mportant
orother
han
ymbolic
easons.
Malaysia
not
onlyhad
the
xperiencef
confrontation
ith
ndonesia,
with
ts
accom-
panying
nfiltrationf
guerrillas
nto he
Borneo
tates,
ut
also
the
aware-
ness hat
ritain
ould
notbe
counted
n
to
subsidize
second
uch
experi-
ence.
The
Philippines
ad
also had
some
ndonesian
nfiltration
uring
he
Sukarno
eriod,
nd
it
suspected hat
Malaysia,or
at least
Sabah,
had
re-
acted o
ts
pursuit
f
the laim
to
Sabah
by
supporting
uslim
dissidents.
The
lesson,
hen,
was that
nternational
onflict
ould
exacerbate
omesticconflict;heresultwas a major emphasisput on shared
cooperationn
ASEAN.
The maj
r
conflict
n
the
wo tates
fter heir
econciliationn
Decem-
ber
1969has been
the
Muslim
nsurgency
n the
Philippines.
espite
Malay-
sia's
self-conscious
dentifications a
Muslim
tate,Malaysian
olicy n
rela-
tion
o the
nsurgencyas
been
circumspect:
t has
denied
giving
upporto
the
ebels,
nd
n
slamic
meetings
thas
generally
nsisted
hat he
Philippine
situation
as an
internal
ffair f
the
Philippines nd
that
what
nterna-
tionalramificationshematter ad couldbestbe handledwithASEAN.
Sabah,
however,as continued
o
play
a
critical
ole
n
the
nsurgency,f t
has done
nothingmore han
provide
sanctuarynd
supply
depotfor he
rebels.
Philippine
fficial
pokesmen ave
refrained
rom
public
criticism
of
Malaysia
nd
also
worked o maintain
ooperation
n
ASEAN.
Bilaterally,
however,
he
wo tates
ave
had
significantly
ewer
irect
ontacts
ith
ach
other
han
ither as had
with
ny
other
tate n
ASEAN.
By 1974
therela-
tionship
as
showing
ncreasing
igns
f
train, hichwas
ikely o
continue
if
onflict
ontinued,
nd
certainly
f t
expanded,
n
the
outhern
hilippines.
Whetherrnotfightingxpandsdepends rimarilyn actions f the
Marcos dministration
nd theMuslim
ctivists.f
the
Marcos
regime
oes
what he slamic
oreign
ministers
uggested,
r
even
what
t
has
said it
will
do,
hen t
may
ucceed
n
stopping
he
nsurgency.
ost
observers,
owever,
doubt
he
apacity
f he
government
o
do
so,
whatever
heir
valuations
f
the
incerity
f ts
nnouncedntentions.
eservations
enter
n three
oints:
the
socio-economic
roposals,
olitical
power,
nd
implementation.
The
socioeconomic
roposals,
ritics
ay,
have
been
distressingly
uper-
ficial;
ome
fthem
ppear
o
have
the
potential
f
compounding
roblems,
particularlynMindanao.WhileMarcoshastalked f andreform-ofdis-
tributing
and not
only
o tenants ut also
to
non-landholding
uslims-he
has
allowed
oreign-backed
lantations
o
expand
heir
andholdings
n
Min-
danao.
Urging
ompanies
rom lsewhere
n
the
Philippines
o
expand
nto
Mindanao
eems ess
likely
o
increase
mployment,
ts
avowed
purpose,
than
o ncrease
urtherhe
nflux
f
Christians ith
ominatingositions
n
the
economy.
f
equal
importance
s
the
regime's
growing
ropensity
o
arrest
recisely
hose
people
whohave been
most
dentified
ith
fforts
o
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
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470
ETHNICITY
N THE
PHILIPPINES
bring bout
genuinely
edistributive
conomic
hange:
members
ftheFed.
eration f
Free Farmers
nd Catholic
nd Protestant
lergy
ssociatedwith
them, or xample.
Meanwhileolitical
ower
as been
teadilyentralized.
t is focused
n
Marcosandhisfamilynd friends; haredwith echnocrats hoseemto
haveauthority
ithin
imited
ontexts;
nd supplemented
y
relics
from r
recruits
nto
theold clientelist
ystem,
ith eaders
bribing
r frightening
followersnto
quiescence
r participation
n public
meetings.
n this itua-
tion t is difficult
o find olesfor
Muslims.
omeof
them
ave beenfitted
into
technocratic,
r at least
bureaucratic,
lots,
s indicated
y announce-
ments
f
Muslim
ppointments.
he Muslim
Council
nnounced
n
May was
composed
f
Muslimswho
wereformer
members f
Congressnd
the Con-
stitutionalonvention,
etiredmbassadors,
nd retiredmilitary
menwith
at east he ank fcolonel. uccessful ractitionersf theold-styleolitics,
they an hardly
e
expected
o give
advice on socio-economic
hange;
nor
can Rascid
Lucman,
ecognized
arlier
s the Paramount
ultan
of
the
nineteenRoyal
Houses of
Mindanao
nd Sulu. Subdividing rovinces
o
create
new
ones
has
primarily
xpanded
political
opportunities
or
army
commanders,
nd
Muslimofficers
ave been
noticeably
ew n thesouth.
M.N.L.F.
eaders
have
explicitly
ejected
hese
kinds
of
arrangements.
t is
difficulto
conceive
f
anyarrangements
hichwill
appeal
to them
nd
to
Marcos, incethe ssence f themartialawregimes concentrationf
au-
thority
hile
he
ctivists'
minimum
emands all for
utonomy.
Concern
ver he
apacity
f he egimeo mplement
eforms
as
noted
that
t ocal
evels oth
ivilian
nd
military
ersonnel
ave shown
ittle
vi-
dence
f new
society
haracteristics.
oldiers
n
Mindanao
nd
Sulu
have
been
criticized
requently
or
drunkenness,
andom
firings,
nd
looting.
Theymay
well
be
frightened
nd
alienated,
ut
they
re making
ittle
on-
tribution
o
encouraging
uslim rust
n the
regime.
Marcos'
advisers
nd
military
ommanders
re themselvesivided
s to therelative
riority
o
be
givento purelymilitary s comparedwithpoliticaland socio-economic
actions
n
the outh.
he division eems
ufficient
o obstruct
mplementation
as
well
s
formationf
policy.
As
for he
nsurgents,
heyppear
ohave everal ptions.
hey
an
con-
tinue
strategy
imed
at secession
nd the
formation
f
a
Moro
People's
Republic.
hey
an
align
with ther
nti-Mtiarcos
roups
n the
Philippines
in
an
effort
t internal
evolution.
r
they
an
stop
or
reduce
ighting,
ith
orwithout
negotiated
easefire
nd/or
peace
settlement,
ntil
onditions
under
Marcos
re
clearly
etter r
worse.
Secessionwouldbe difficultecause of theadamant pposition fthe
Philippine
overnment,
hich
s based
at least
partially
n Sulu's
recently
confirmed
il
potential.
hristians
ominate
n
many
reas ofMindanao nd
are
now
armed
o
such
a
degree
s to constitute
major
obstacle.Major
fighting
ould
have
to
be subsidized
eavily y
Muslim
tates,nd it s
du-
bious
that
upport
t
that evelwould
be
risked.
The second option
would
not
necessarily
nvolve acrificing
uslim
identity,
rievances,
r
causes,
but
would
emphasize
rievances
nd objec-
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
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LELA GARNER
NOBLE
471
tives
haredwith
ther
roups n the
Philippines. he
status fthe
National
Democratic ront
ndthe
elationshipmong
he
N.P.A. and thenow
argely
undergroundederation f
Free
Farmers nd
Christians or
National iber-
ation re
not lear t this
oint.
here
does,however,
eem o
be a basis
for
cooperation,ndcontinuingrrests freligiouseadersmaywell trengthen
that
asis.Needless o
say,
hiskind
of effort
as as much
otential or
vio-
lenceas
theothernd
considerably
orepotential or
hostile
utside
nter-
vention.
Whateverhe state
of
detentes
heUnited
States s
more ikely
o
provide
weapons or
ighting
communists hanfor
fighting
uslims.
ur-
rentMuslim id
might lso
be jeopardized.But if
the Muslim
eadership
chooses to
fight or
fundamental
hifts n
politicaland
socio-economic
power,
t
may find
moreallies
amongnon-Muslim
ilipinosthan
among
non-Filipinouslims.
Otherwiseeaders
ave
the
hoice
of
temporarily
r
permanently
ban-
doning he fight.
osses
like thosesufferedn
Jolo
might ncourage his
approach.
Pressure rom
Muslim tates nd
significant
oncessions rom
Marcos
might avethe ame
effect.
pecifically,
f
Marcosoffersoncessions
along
the
inesof the
proposals
n theKuala
Lumpur
ommunique,
nd
if
internationaluslim
eaders re
nvolved
n
negotiations
n a
way
that
on-
vinces
hem fMarcos'
intentions
oward nd
capability or their
mple-
mentation,
hen he ctivists'
eaders
may
have
o settle or
ess
than
ecession.
The subjectofethnicitynd internationalelations emands onclu-
sions
t another
evel.For
Malaysia
and the
Philippines,
nternationalon-
flictn
the1960s
appeared o have
the
potential or
exacerbating
omestic
conflict
nvolvingthnic
roups. n the
1970s,
domestic
onflict,
articularly
that
nvolving
hilippine
Muslims,
hreatened
o eopardize
deliberatelyul-
tivated
nternationalooperation.
Philippine-Malaysian
elationslso
suggest ther
onsiderations
hich
maybe
significant
ortheory
uilding.
hroughoutmostof the
period,
t
was more
mportantor
Philippine-Malaysianelations
hatboth tates
ad
plural ocietiesnd were n proximityo each other han hat heMuslims
in
the
Philippines ere
minority,
n
Malaysia majority. ut
more
trong-
ly,
the
dentity
f
the
ethnic roups
matteredess than
the factthat
here
were
thnic ivisions. he
fact hat
hetwostates
were djacent o one
an-
other nd
confronted
ommon egional
roblems
matteredmore
thanthat
they
had
common
opulations. he
decisive
factor ffecting
hilippine-
Malaysian
elations as
that heireadersfelt
mutually
ulnerable.
n
both
states
domesticnstability
as
accompanied y more
pragmatic
oreign
policies.
This is not to say that t was insignificanthat hePhilippine thnic
group
which
rganized or ecession
was
Muslim. t has been
argued
that
Islamic
heology
as distinctive
olitical
mplicationsnd has
linked
hose
implicationso the
nsistence f
twentieth
enturyndian
Muslims hat
hey
be
given
separate tate.49
Whether r not
the Islamic
resurgence
t-
49Wilfred
.
Smith,
slam
in
Modern
History
New
York:
The
New
American
Library,
nc.,
957).
8/11/2019 Ethnicity n Ppine Msia Relations
21/21
472
ETHNICITY N
THE
PHILIPPINES
tributedo
the
Philippinesn
the1950s
and
1960shad
direct
eparatistm-
plications,
t seems
clear
thatyoung
PhilippineMuslims
who
studied n
schools n
predominately
uslim
ountries
nd
participatedn
Islamic or-
ganizations ecame o discontented ithconditionsn theirowncountry
that
hey
rovided he
nucleus or he
secessionist
ovement.
Certainlycommon
dentifications
Muslims,
ccentuated
y the
con-
centration
f the
Muslim
population n a
geographically
arginal
rea of
the
ountry,
rovided
hebond
which
inkedeaders
nd
followers.
hough
themselves
ivided nto
ub-groupso
distinct
hat hey
an be
classified s
ethnic
ntities,he
Muslim
dentity as
the
critical ne.
PhilippineMuslims
felt ifferent
rom
Filipinos
because
Filipinos
were
Christian:
hey elt
Filipinos
iscriminated
gainst hem
ecause
theywere
Muslim.
Whether
ornota separate tatewas a religiousmperative,t seemed obe a logical
one. In
relation
o
the
Philippine
overnment,
uslim-ness as the
ethnic
identification
hichmattered.
Moreover,
most
fthe
external
ssistance
o
the
ecessionists as
come
from
wo of the
most
self-consciously
slamic
leaders,
Kadaffi nd
Tun
Mustapha.
t is
possible
o
argue
that,
fter
orregidor,
un
Mustapha
had
enough
ostility
oward he
Philippine
overnment
nd a
closeenough
er-
ritoryo
provide
ncentive
nd
capability or
nvolvement
n
any
nsurgency
in
the
Philippines,
nd
that
Kadaffi's
nvolvements
ith
nsurgentroups
havenotbeen imited o thosewithMuslimparticipation.till there s no
evidenceinking
ither
with ther
nsurgentroups n
the
Philippines,
nd
public
tatementsy
Libyan
officials
dmitting
nd
advocating
upport ave
stressed
slamic
bonds.
If
concern
ather
han ctive
upports
considered,
he
mportance
f
the
ebels'
Muslim
dentifications
alsoevident.While
he
oncern
as
been
qualified
ythe
ctivists'
ecessionism
s well as
by their
adicalism,
t has
remained
trong
nough
o give
Marcos
genuine
ause for
anxiety. ince
not
simply he
country's
eputationut
ts
oil
supply s at
stake,