Ethnic Minorities and the Quest for Development in Nigeria

Published in: Federalism, Politics and Minorities in Nigeria: Essays in honour of Professor G. N. Hembe. Editors Victor Egwemi, Terhemba Wuam and Chris S. Orngu. pages 283-300. Lagos, Bahiti & Dalila.

ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENTMohammed Usman

Department of SociologyIbrahim Badamasi Babangida University

ABSTRACTPolitics, intergroup relations and economic development are factorsthat impinge on ethnic majorities and minorities. Ethnic minorities inNigeria aspire for political space, economic empowerment and bettersocial conditions like other similar groups. The minority-majorityphenomenon has been used as an instrument for attaining collectivedevelopment goals and aspirations within the ambit of the nationstate. The supposedly agitations by ethnic groups in Nigeria is used asa façade by the elite to entrench itself and promote its own interests.This paper attempts to analyse the dimensions of the ethnic minorityissue and its likely ramifications for development in Nigeria.

IntroductionOver the decades, governments have overtime introduced variousplans and programmes aimed at bringing about economic and socialdevelopment. A large proportion of the populace are indigent anddeprivation is widespread. Most government policies are aimed atattenuating living conditions. As a developmental state, Nigeriais a long shot from attaining its development goals. With sixtynine percent of the population living in relative poverty andinfant mortality rate stands at 143 per thousand, while maternalmortality is as high as 23 per thousand; compared to developednations, life expectancy remains low at 51 years, the journey tothe desired status of the twentieth largest economy in the worldis still far off (NBS, 2012; UNICEF, 2012). The low indices arenot unrelated to the manner in which the elite have managed the

1

affairs of the nation. One of the instruments used to divide andrule, and perpetuate elite interest and policies have beenethnicity. One of which has supposedly been the minority majoritydichotomy. The elite has played on the size of ethnic groups andsentiments of ethnic identity to mobilize their ethnic ‘kinsmen’,‘brothers/sisters’ and ‘towns’ or ‘village’ people to fight forwhat they believe is their due from the nation. These could bepolitical offices, appointments, allocation of plants orindustries, infrastructure etc. Most often, the major attractionare election or appointments into government offices associatedwith huge budgetary allocation; the same applies to revenuegenerating ministries departments and agencies. The yearning fordevelopment has put men in a struggle to conquer the physical andsocial environment; according to Rodney (1972:4) ‘[d]evelopmentin the past has always meant the increase in the ability to guardthe independence of the social group and indeed to infringe onthe freedom of others’. The Nigerian elite seem to literallyapproach issues of development from this perspective.

Conceptual ClarificationsThe tower of Babel may have broken in Nigeria if the plethora ofethnic groups could be accepted as evidence of this occurrence.For a simple working definition of the term ethnic, thedefinition advanced by Okpu (1977) will be adopted; he statesthat an ethnic group is a "group of people having a commonlanguage and cultural values". A concise and acceptabledefinition of the term could be cantankerous this is due to themany facets from which it could be approached; the various facetsare language, myth of origin, cultural traits, territory, andreligion. A closely related term is ethnicity, which Macionis(2009:61) describes as “a shared cultural heritage, whichtypically involves common ancestors, language and religion”. Theterms are often used to denote people who share a common identitybased on the above mentioned variables. Tribe is a commonly used

2

in Nigeria and is coterminous to ethnic group. Even though it isbelieved to be denigrating, it is still in use even after beingsystematically discredited. Thus in official and formal setting,tribe has been jettisoned for ethnic group, but in practice bothinvariably mean the same phenomenon (Mustapha, 2003).

Theoretical FrameworkIntergroup relations, in this case ethnicity can be analysed byadopting the conflict perspective. The basic assumption of theconflict perspective is that the social structure is bestunderstood in terms of tensions or conflict between competinggroups. The result of conflict is not necessarily violence, butmore significantly is structural, economic and educationalinequality among others. It results in differential access to jobopportunities, housing, healthcare etc by groups due to certainsocial distinguishing factors.

According to the conflict perspective, groups with differenteconomic and political power compete over control of the economyand power. Conflict perspective with regards to ethnic groups canbe approached from two levels. The first is at the inter-ethniclevel; minority ethnic groups are exploited by the dominantmajority group who control the economy and political power. Whileon the second level the conflicting relationship is intra-ethnic,whereby the dominant elite in an ethnic group subjugate andexploit the masses of the same ethnic group from within.

Anthropologists adopt two major theoretical perspectives whenanalysing ethnic groups, primordialism and social constructionismof ethnicity are in broad are the two main approaches to thestudy of ethnicity. The primordialist approach views ethnicity asrelatively permanent features that are deeply rooted in theessential and particularistic experiences of groups of people.Integral to this is the view that ethnic groups are seen as

3

distinctive units usually based on the idea of a common descent,where the commonality of culture is inherited and therefore givenfrom the past, and people are born into particular ethnic groups(Usman, 2006; Jimada, 2012).

On the other hand, the social constructionist approach viewethnicity as a modern instrumentalist symbol in advancing thematerial interests of groups whose composition may change inresponse to competitive opportunities. In this sense ethnicitiesare created or "invented" by elites as they seek to manipulateideas about ethnicity in order to secure their own interests. Theprimordialist/constructionist divide has had a profound impact onthe debate about the significance of ethnicity in Africa. Themain terms of this debate concern whether ethnic groups connotereal categories of people or whether cultural differences aremanipulated by pernicious political leaders for their own reasonsof personal aggrandizement and petty ambitions of power (Jimada,2012). The position of the primordialists on ethnicity comesclose to the concept of race as a historical given, and thedistinctions between these are quite blurred. However, theconstructionists reject these essentialisms and instead allowroom for choice and individual agency in the formation ofethnicities.

Ethnic Identity: we versus themDiscourse of ethnic identity and its interface with politics inNigeria is an old one, dating far back to the colonial period. Itwas the subject of the writings of some anthropologists whoworked in Nigeria in the colonial period (Forde and Jones, 1950;Lloyd, 1960; Smith, 1965; Meek, 1937; Green, 1948). Many of thesestudies idealize ethnic identities and the cultural, social andpolitical systems of the various ethnic groups. But tend toignore other important subjective factors. Firstly, groupboundaries are dynamic; they constantly change depending on thecontext. Group identities, which might be of no significance at

4

the national level, remain extremely salient at the local level.Secondly, similarly assimilation or affiliation to groups isshaped by the ever changing political and economic factors.Finally, it is axiomatic that group identities are often subsumedunder broader identities which result in concealing a group’sself-identification. Very often ethnic minorities in one part ofthe country are subsumed under the three major ethnic groups inthe nation.

While one acknowledges that people who speak a similar languagealso share similarities in terms of concepts or ideas,historically the peoples of Nigeria did not identify themselvesmerely based on biological and shared experiences, but were moreinclined to identify with people with whom they shared a commonresidence, experiences and goals. Usman (2006) shows that thepropensity to identify nations and nationalities became morepronounced in the colonial and post-colonial era. For instance,most pre-colonial states were poly-ethnic due to in and outmigrations. People moved in and out of these nations, and mostsocieties were virtually in a state of flux; political wrangling,war, and epidemic put people on the move; for instance Sule(2011) and Jimada (2005) capture these movements in turbulenttimes in the Emirate of Bida and in the evolution of the Yorubain the 1800s. A case in point is the Niger Delta where Usman(2006, citing Dike; 1956) notes that:

....no Nigerian tribe had monopoly, Benis,Ijaws, Sobos, Jekris, Ekoi, Ibibio, Efik andeven the northern Nigerian tribes wererepresented (Usman 2006:127).

The various tribes of Nigeria even today continue to berepresented in many communities where they would be regarded as‘non-indigenes’. They live, work, and own property in their

5

places of residence. It must have been this freedom to integratethat gave way to a Sokoto prince becoming mayor of Enugu in the1950s (Ujorha, 2013). Given the foregoing dimension to ethnicityin Nigeria, the distinct ethnic categories in terms of politicalsystems, religion, and spatial location as often presented inmany treatises might not be telling the whole story. Usman (2006)theses shatters the myth of distinct tribal states in pre-colonial Nigeria. Political power is explicitly and implicitly viewed as the key tosocial and economic development by the majority of people whoconstitute the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. The veracity ofthis correlation is not the focus of this treatise; however, areoccurring decimal and contentious issue is the undue emphasison ethnicity and its role in national development. Therelationship between the socioeconomic development of any part ofthe nation, most especially of people who see themselves asdistinct and constitute and ethnic group, cannot be conclusivelyconnected to the acquisition or retention of political power byany group. The general issue of minority and majority groups hastaken centre stage in political and development discourse leavingpertinent matters that have to do with particularistic,individualistic, families and households, out of the equation.This is so even with people sense of belonging to virtually allsizes of ethnic group, they all seek a better standard of livingfor themselves or their family/household.

Interaction between groups cannot fully account for theacrimonious relation between ethnic groups at all times and overcertain issues of common value. Even as members of an ethnicgroup, people as human beings hold divergent worldviews, havebasic needs such as food and shelter, and the desire for securityand a peaceful environment is invariably shared by all. Integralto modernity is the division of labour in society which entails

6

reliance on other people from different backgrounds (Durkheim,1997). Modernization has given rise to rapid urbanization andmigration; both of which enhance interaction between people ofdifferent cultures, religious belief, life styles and outlook onlife. It is common to see individuals who have nothing in commoninteract without rancour. People from majority or minorityethnic groups engage in social and economic interactions on aregular basis without recourse to the divisive variable ofethnicity. Interethnic competition for resources and especiallypolitical power was advanced by Nnoli (1978) as one of the baneof Nigeria. It should be added that ethnic rivalry is a veritablefactor, among several others, hampering the socio-economicdevelopment of communities nationwide.

Henri Tajfel views social identity as one of the contributingfactors to inter-group rivalry. Tajfel notes that physicalcharacteristics do not count much when there are cleavages withina social group. Social identity theory as it came to be calledsuggests that people identify with groups in such a way as tomaximize positive distinctiveness; by being member of a group anindividual enjoys both identity and self-esteem (Tajfel andTurner, 1979: 1986). The theory could be applied to issues ofrace and ethnicity; people are often stereotyped based onphysical or biological attributes as belonging to either a raceor ethnic group, irrespective of the fact that suchcategorization are sometimes incorrect (Kottak, 2008). The socialpsychology of and ethnicism offers an insight that is complex andparadoxical and no single variable can have a cause- effectrelationship to ethnic nationalism. However, one of the factorsis the class interest of the upper class and in particular theelite.

The Power Elite

7

The elite as a higher social class is viewed from differentperspectives by various scholars (Mills, 1956; Mosca, 1939;Pareto, 1935). The term elite as Lasswell describes it‘...comprises the power holders of a body politic’. As powerholders and pace setters of the society, the elite can be foundin various sectors of a nation. As a class, they have become morerelevant in the modern nation states, the political system andprocesses may be democratic or otherwise. It will be simplisticto assume that the elite have no support base; they are not agroup raised high above society, but are rather ‘intimatelyconnected to society through a sub-elite, a much larger groupwhich comprises....middle class, civil servants, managers andwhite collar workers...(cited in Bottomore, 1966). The termencapsulates elites of various walks of life, the political,business, academic, military etc. In this treatise Bottomore’sdefinition of the terminology is adopted; he views the term asconsisting of occupational groups which have high status; thisdefinition incorporates different elite from differentbackgrounds, sectors, and occupations.

The structure and method of incorporation or cooptation into thegroup varies depends on pertinent issues that have to do with thesocial structure, social mobility, and inequality. The Nigerianelite invariably co-opt other members of the society based on amultitude of factors, but of fundamental importance is theinterest of the elite, one of which is ethnic jingoism. The eliteare therefore not one group but number as many as the ethnicgroups and interests in the nation (Jega, 2000; Ibrahim, 2000;Mustapha, 2000). Ethnic identity, even though having undergonetransformation over the decades still remains a potent element inconsideration for appointment into offices, positions, orelection (Mustapha, 2012). The Problem of Minority Ethnic groups

8

Two regions in Nigeria have been identified as being the mostturbulent in terms of minority politics and identity: the north-western, the middle-belt, and the delta regions. Both regions arecomprised of several states 1. These states have been flashpointsof ethnic contestations some of which have been violent(Mustapha, 2012). According to Tyoden (1993), the hegemony of twolarge ethnic groups, the Hausa and Fulani, is at the basis of theacrimonious relationship between them and other minority groupsin the region. Clashes have been recorded between minority ethnicgroups. For instance, the Ugep-Idomi (1992), Tiv-Jukun (1990-92),Ife- Modakeke (1981, 1997), and Mangu-Bokkos (1992) conflictsoccurred between various minority ethnic groups in the nation.Similarly, one of these minority tribes is the Birom of Plateaustate. The yearnings and aspirations for development of the Birompeople have put it at conflict with the Hausa and Fulani on onehand and other minority ethnic groups in the state. The Hausa andFulani are viewed as ‘settlers’ or ‘non indigenes who have ahidden agenda and are on a mission to ‘Islamise’ the Plateau(Ostien, 2010; Daily Trust, July 23, 2012:62).

The generally accepted narrative was the dominance and hegemonyof the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group over other minority groups 2

(Coomasie, 1998 ; Higazi, 2011) in spite of the fact thatother majority ethnic groups like Yoruba and Igbo also live inPlateau state. The protracted violent conflict in the plateau isviewed from two perspectives and often a combination of both:ethnic identity and religion; the two can hardly be divorced.Imnakoya (2010), observes that:

Nigeria is a nation of natives and settlers; theNigerian constitution even empowers this ethnicaffiliation by giving credence to the of “state oforigin” status. Any official job posting, local orfederal, asks applicants for their states of

9

origin, likewise, political appointments are basedon ethnic and state of origin.

Inequality and the rising number of ‘non indigenous’ people are also a trigger factors:

This inequality is made even more potent at thestate levels, and the crisis in Jos is not immuneto the “state of origin” contraption: theChristians are the natives, while the Muslims arethe settlers; the natives feel entitled to thelargess but not the settlers. The natives feelthreatened by the increasing population andprominence of the settlers. The natives are nottoo keen to share their lands with the settlers,nor offer their hands in partnership on thepolitical tuft (Imnakoya, 2010).

The crises is attributed to the political interests of the Hausaand Fulani, the majority who are Muslims, and wish is to takeover the political leadership, with a view to using resources forthe exclusive benefit of their people and at the same timesubjugate the many minority tribes of the plateau. Elections andland have been the objects of agitation between the belligerentgroups with each contesting the claims of its opponents (Umar,2011). The contestations have led to violence, loss of lives andproperty on both sides 3. In 2004, a state of emergency wasdeclared in Plateau State after more than two hundred Muslimswere killed in attacks by Christian militia men. The scale ofattacks has since spiralled out of control with revenge killingsby both sides. A minority ethnic group, depending in which partor state of the nation could be termed a ‘minority’ in one and‘majority’ in another depending on its numerical strength, thusthere are groups termed ‘majority-minorities’. The Birom, is alarge minority group in the Plateau and have held tenaciouslyonto political power, cutting off other groups. Relegation to

10

marginality often generates tension and sometimes violentconfrontation. The actions and inactions of the Birom Governorshave served to create hostility between the various peoples ofthe State.

There were indications of dissatisfaction with the manner theState Governor handles the ethno-religious and political crisesin the State. The interests of the political elite havecontributed to fuelling the crises; of particular importance, theGovernor and his close associates have been identified assignificant factors behind the lingering crises (Maimzeng et al,2012; Jimoh and Mukhtar, 2012:1). The leadership fails to carrypeople of all ethnic groups along; even autochthons fault theruling political elite for its marginalization of other ethnicgroups from power. In reference to Jonah Jang, Useni, a prominentcitizen and retired army General observes that ‘...as a governorof a state, everyone should be yours irrespective of tribe andother affiliations...’ and views failure to do so by theGovernor, as tantamount to an invitation to anarchy (Jimoh andMukhtar, 2012:5). Another elder statesman and one time ministerof defence registers his displeasure with the “know it allattitude” of the Governor who refuses to consult with elders. Oneof the attitude in reference is fight by the Birom over controlof Jos North territory which originally is owned by anotherminority tribe, the Jarawa (Igidi, 2013; Mohammed and Alao, 2013)

The elite have encouraged these divisions and conflicts not onlybecause of threats, real or imagined, but have fuelled and fannedand the embers of religious and ethnic sentiments to gain respectand enjoy privileges. Commoners tend to respect people who theyperceive as championing their rights as a religious or ethnicgroup irrespective of the intentions of such champions. Even atthe cost of peaceful coexistence, they are accorded a high placein the political, economic or social life of the group thereby

11

making jingoism a valued pursuit. For aspiring and upcomingmembers who desire to be identified with the elite, whipping uptribal sentiments affords a quick route to cooptation into theupper class. Indeed, many admire the life style of the upperclass; the brazen display of wealth and power, sleek cars,beautiful mansions, foreign travel, exotic food and expensiveapparels are among the many tangible benefits of being a memberof the elite. Other intangible advantages like having a say inthe society’s matters and being an opinion leader among others,are some of the privileges enjoined by the group. In reference tothe ruling elite, Achebe (2012) observes that;

The chaos enveloping all of us in Nigeria, wasdue to the incompetence of the Nigerian rulingclass. They clearly had a poor grasp of historyand found difficult to appreciate and grapplewith ethnic and political complexity. Thisclique, stunted by ineptitude, distracted bypower games and the pursuit of material comfortwas unwilling if not incapable of saving .....[the] nation (2012:69)

To be reckoned as a member of the elite, many often acquire theprop and trappings of that go with the upper class: “Flashy cars.Praise singers. Elite group membership. British or Americanaccent. Armed escort”. All these smooth the way and ensureefficient service (Nwaubani, 2013:35).

The Niger Delta region has been, in a sort of ‘eye of the storm’,in issues of national development because of the crude oildeposits in this region. The region is home to several minorityethnic group prominent amongst them are the Ijaw, Itsekiri, andOgoni. In the 1990s the Ogoni people, a minority ethnic groupbegan their clamour for the allocation of more resources from thecentre to their homeland and the protection of the environment

12

from multinational oil company. However, the cause took anotherdimension when the protagonist, Ken Saro Wiwa was hanged forsedition. Movement for the Survival of Ogoni (MOSOP) which wasborn at the height of the struggle transformed into a militantmovement. Other groups involved in militant agitation in theregion include Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta(MEND), and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) introducedguerrilla tactics to the people’s agitation (Suberu, 1996). Thehome state of the President Jonathan, Bayelsa state, lies in theregion. The inordinate allocation of 80% of the 2012 nationalbudget to the region can be understood in the context of thedevelopmental aspirations of the people this region, and thePresident for his “constituency”, however, it is egregious tosuppose some regions deserve more development than others even inthe face of data by the National Bureau of statistics showing thepoverty rate to be higher in other regions. Derivation principleis a common refrain of the political elite from oil producingstates who advocated and got 13% extra budgetary allocation forthe contribution of their states to national revenue. Suberu(1996) captures the mood of minority ethnic groups in what heviews as the “failure of redistributive and reorganizationalpolicies of government” that were led by men of northernprovenance. The reduction in derivation from 20% down to 3% bythe Federal government is seen as a deliberate ploy to underminethe development of oil producing states (Suberu, 1996:30). Twelveyears after the implementation of the thirteen percent derivationpolicy, oil producing states4 had a sum of oil receipts totallingN 2.7 trillion which are believed to have been frittered away.The former governor and boss of President Jonathan was foundguilty of embezzling billions by a United Kingdom court; the samegoes for a former governor of Delta state. In spite of these hugesums of money, most of these states are still “trapped in crisisof development”. As in other states of the Federation, theregions is still mired in lack of motorable roads, inadequate and

13

unstable power supply, growing unemployment, paucity of cheapmodern transport system, and poor social and economicinfrastructure (Abdallah, 2012). Issues that politicizedevelopment and rents are common feature of Nigerian democracy,the petroleum industry bill (PIB) is one of such issues. Apartfrom the 13% derivation, the creation of Niger Delta DevelopmentCommission (NDDC) devoted to the development of the region, andthe allocation of Billions of naira for the creation of jobs andtraining of militants in the much vaunted amnesty programme, thebill allows for the payment of 10% to oil producing states. Otherstates of the federation are not taken into account (Wakili,2013; Agbo 2013).

An emerging and disturbing trend is the legitimization ofdissident individuals and groups. Some who have taken up armsagainst the state or convicted of corruption all in the name ofethnicity and minority group. The amnesty granted the Niger deltamilitants were aimed at assuaging the perception ofmarginalization and placating their ill feeling towards thestate. Similar in intent and purpose to the ‘no victor, novanquished’ post civil war policy, the amnesty has been hijackedand used as an instrument to marginalize other parts of thenation. The former war lords and Niger Delta militants afterbeing granted absolution for their crimes against the state arebeing rewarded with contracts worth billions of naira. This hassecurity implications in a nation where sectional and ethnicchauvinists unabashedly call for the breakup of the nation(Akinrinade, 2012: 48 – 55) or outright war (Uwazuruike, 2012: 16– 19). The engagement of former dissident elements to guardvital, crucial security infrastructure is at best unconscionable(Williams, 2012). For people who once vandalised the samepipelines in the hey days of their insurgencies, it is not onlycathartic victory but a physical one. Taken from anotherdimension, the Ijaw president, and supposedly the chief security

14

officer of the Federation, is bent on pacifying his‘constituency’ with largesse contracts and at the same timeequipping them with arms; they could come to serve as a personalor regional army in readiness for the United States predicteddooms day for Nigeria by 2015.

ConclusionThe politics of ethnicity continues to be played in spite of thedire consequences it has for the national coexistence. Thepervasive sense of disenchantment and disillusionment can betraced to elitist politics to the exclusion of the vulnerable.The poor and other groups continue to be sidetracked in manyimportant issues that touch on their lives. Islands of affluenceand sufficiency coexist with vast seas of poverty and deprivationall. The current trajectory to a developed state does not holdhope at its end for the majority of Nigerians. The nationalbureau of statistics (NBS, 2012) estimates that the incidence ofpoverty has risen from 54% in 2004 to 69% by 2010, with 112million of the total population of 163 million living in poverty.Dilapidated roads and other infrastructure hinder transport.Power outage is still endemic in spite of the claims ofimprovement. Industries have collapsed and job creation is at itslowest ebb (Usman, 2008). The litanies of woes continue on andon. As aptly observed by the Central Bank governor, Sanusi,government expenditure on security is only addressed to thesymptoms and fails to address the underlying causes of thecurrent state of insecurity (Abdallah, 2013). Other sectors likeeducation and industry are underfunded compared to security.Human capital development is low and so could be said ofindustrialization. Even with a purported high economic growthrate, the trickledown effect is marginal. The heightened state ofinsecurity brought about by crime and insurgencies can only berolled back with policies targeted at the whole nation. Some

15

suggestions are proffered below, however, they are notexhaustive.

To bring about abatement in unemployment, a factor drivingmilitants and insurgencies, Government should jettison theneoliberal approach to business and promptly embark onestablishing large scale manufacturing industries. A watered downneo-liberal approach that takes cognisance of local conditionsand peculiarities as evinced by the Asian Tiger economies mightwork well for Nigeria too.

The pervasive and growing poverty rate could be tackled withequitable distribution of resources to states and localgovernments. Government needs to b ring on board credible peopleand listen to criticism of its policies and practices with a viewto making rectifications and bridge the chasm between policydesign, implementation and results. A unit of government couldbe dedicated to measuring the effectiveness of government or non-governmental organizations may serve as watch dogs.

The lopsided allocation of resources to security and a part ofthe country needs to be corrected as the current trend will onlybe a justification for further unequal allocation by futuregovernments. The current joint account operated by some states inconjunction with unwilling local governments needs to bejettisoned. The undue reliance on oil as the only source ofrevenue has to change in favour of agriculture and industry.Internally generated revenue has been exploited to its fullestpotential. Lagos and Abuja generate revenue from taxes, forinstance Abuja Municipal Area Council collects about 18 billionnaira per annum. If other states of the Federation explore thisavenue, the proceeds could be used in improving social amenities;this would put many regions and states on the path to the muchneeded development, human infrastructural, social and economic.

16

Notes1. By the north-western region, I refer to the administrative

units/states Kaduna and Bauchi. The middle belt-states withregards to this treatise are Plateau, Benue, Nassarawa.While the States of the Delta region are Rivers, Akwa Ibom,Delta, Cross Rivers, Bayelsa states.

2. The Hausa and Fulani have often been maligned because oftheir relationship with the British Colonialists (seeAchebe, 2012; pages 50, 67). For what is seen as theirseemingly similar political structure and, misrepresentationof the call for postponement of independence by the northernpoliticians in the 1950s some who happened to be from theseethnic groups. A common refrain found in most literatureauthored by non- Hausa and Fulani is to jumble them as oneethnic group Hausa-Fulani. The two are distinct ethnicgroups living in the same geographical area, with differentlanguages and culture.

3. There are many ethnic groups living in Plateau State and Josthe state capital is host and home to several peoples fromaround the nation. The recent violence is often between, butnot restricted to the Birom on one hand, and the Hausa andFulani on the other. However, there are other indigenousethnic groups like the Afizere and Anaguta, and non-indigenous peoples from around the nation, including otherethnic majorities like Yoruba and Igbo.

4. The oil producing states include the six states politicallydesignated as south-south states: Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta,Cross Rivers, Bayelsa, and Edo. Two others are located inthe south- east, they are: Imo and Abia state; and one inthe south-west Ondo state.

17

References Abdallah, Nurudeen M. (2012), Derivation: How Oil States shared N 2.7trn. DailyTrust. Decemeber 31 (1 & 5)

Abdallah, Nurudeen M. (2013), Insecuirty: Gov’t fighting symptom only –Sanusi. Daily Trust. April 12 (1 & 5)

Abah, Oga S. [Ed](2003), Geographies of Citizenship in Nigeria. Kaduna: Baraka Press.

Achebe, Chinua (2012), There was a country: A personal history of Biafra. London: AllenLane, Penguin Books.

Agbo, Anayochukwu (2013), War Over Oil. TELL Magazine. April 15, 2013 (48 –55).

Akinrinade, Alani I. (2012), Nigeria May Break If... TELL magazine. September24 (48 – 55)

Bottomore, T. B. (1966), Elites and Society. Hammondworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

Coomasie, Abidina . (1998), Democracy and Political Opportunism in Nigeria. Abuja: Sputnik Publications.

Daily Trust (2012), Genocide in Plateau State (Advertorial). July, 23:62.

Dike, K. O. (1956), Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885. An introduction to Economic and Political History of Nigeria.Oxford: Clarendon Press. Durkheim, Emile. (1997), The Division of Labour in Society. New York: The Free PressForde, D. and G. I. Jones (1950): The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples of South-eastern Nigeria. London: International African Institute.

Green, M. M. (1948), Ibo Village Affairs, London: Sidgwick and Jackson

Higazi, Adam. (2011), The Jos Crises: A recurrent Nigerian Tragedy. DiscussionPaper No. 2. Abuja: Freidrich-Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07812.pdf. accessed august 30, 2012.

18

Ibrahim, Jibrin. (2000), The Transformation of Ethno-Regional Identities inNigeria. In Jega, A (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics ander StructuralAdjustment in Nigeria. Nordiska Afrikainstutet, Uppsala and The centre for Researchand Documentation, Kano.

Igidi, Terkula (2013), Why Jos Crisis Persists – Gen Bomkat Bali. Sunday Trust.February 24 (1).

Imnakoya/ In governance, Human Rights, Nigeria (2010), Jos: A Crisis Trigerredby Inequality. http://grandioseparlor.com/2010/03/jos-a-crisis-triggered-by-inequality/. Accessed 23/08/2012.

Jega, Attahiru (2000). The State and Identity Transformation under StructuralAdjustment in Nigeria. In Jega, A (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics anderStructural Adjustment in Nigeria. Nordiska Afrikainstutet, Uppsala and The centre forResearch and Documentation, Kano.

Jimada, Sha’aba I. (2005), The Nupe and the Origins and Evolution of the Yoruba c.1275-1897.Zaria: Abdullahi Smith Centre of Historical Research.

Jimada, Sha’aba I. (2012),Beyond Traditions and Primordialism: Tackling thechallenges of multiculturalism in Africa. Lapai Journal of Central Nigeria History. Vol6(2): 34-46.

Jimoh, Abbas and Mukhtar, Abdulkadir Badsha. (2012). Jang is Plateau’sproblem, Useni says; in Daily Trust July 12:1& 5.

Kottak, Conrad Philip (2008), Anthropolgy: The Exploration of Human Diversity. New York:McGraw Hill.

Lasswell, Harold D.; Lerner, Daniel; and Rothwell C. Easton (1952), TheComparative Study of Elites (Hover Institute Studies, Series B)

Lloyd, P. C. (1960), Sacred Kingship and Government among the Yoruba.Africa, Vol. 30.

Macionis, John J. (2009), Social Problems. New Jersey, USA: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Maimzeng, D. G.; Abinatus, S. Z.; Dung, G. C.; Azi, J. N. (2012). Why Jang isthe Problem of Plateau State in Daily Trust July, 25: 34-35.

19

Meek, C. K. (1937): Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe. London: OxfordUniversity Press.

Mohammed, Suleiman and Alao, O. (2013), I’d have become head of state if Iwanted – Domkat Bali. Sunday Trust. February 24 (6-8).

Mustapha, Abdurauf (2000), Transformation of Minority Identities in Post-Colonial Nigeria. In Jega, A (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics anderStructural Adjustment in Nigeria. Nordiska Afrikainstutet, Uppsala and The centre forResearch and Documentation, Kano.

Mustapha, Abdurauf (2003) Ethnic Minority Groups in Nigeria: Current Situationand Major Problems. Paper prepared for United Nations Commission on HumanRights. Source:www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/.../$FILE/G0314157.doc –Cached -. Accessed 20/6/2012.

Mustapha, Abdurauf (2012), Transformation of Minority Identities in Post-Colonial Nigeria. Source: http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps09.pdf.Accessed 14 June, 2012.

National Bureau of statistics (2012), Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010.

Nnoli, O. (1978), Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth DimensionPublishers.

Nnoli, O. (1992), "Reflections on Ethnicity and Multiparty Democracyin Africa". Paper presented at the Bellagio Conference of Fellows ofthe Rockefeller Reflections Programme (21-26 September).

Nnoli, O. (1995a), "Ethnic Conflicts and Democratization in Africa".Dakar: Paper presented at the 8th General Assembly of CODESRIA,.

Nnoli, O. (1995b), Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria. Aldershot, England:UNRISD and Avebury.

Nwaubani, Adaobi, T. (2013), In Nigeria, you ‘re either somebody or nobody.Sunday Trust. February 24 (35).

Ostien, Philip. (2010), Historical background of the Jos crisis (2). Source: http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3114%3Ahistorical-background-of-the-jos-crisis&Itemid=54. Accessed: 23/08/2012. 12:25pm

20

Okpu, Ubgana. (1977). Ethnic Minority Problems in Nigerian Politics: 1960-1965. Stockholm: LiberTryck AB.

Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington D. C.: HowardUniversity Press.

Smith, M. G. (1960), Government in Zazzau, London: Oxford University Press.

Sule, Mohammed (2011), History of the Emirate of Bida to 1899AD. Zaria: ABU Press.

Suberu, R. (1996), Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria. Ibadan: SpectrumBooks.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An Integrative Theory of IntergroupConflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of IntergroupRelations. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-groupehaviour. In S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations.Chigago: Nelson-Hall

Tyoden, S. G. (1993), The middle belt in Nigeria Politics. Jos: AHA Publishing House.

Umar,  Ado (2011), Nigeria: Jos Crisis - Genesis and Solution.http://allafrica.com/stories/201110111064.html

Uwazuruike, Ralph (2012), Igbo Will Go To War. The News. February 20 (16 – 19).

Usman, Yusuf B. (2006), Beyond Fairy Tales. Zaria: Abdullahi Smith Centre forHistorical Research.

Wakili, Isiaka (2013), PIB: North, South rift deepens in Senate. Daily Trustmarch, 7 (1 & 5)

Williams, Sunday (2012). ‘Tompolo, Dokubo get N5bn to guard pipes’.Daily Trust, August 23.

Wiwa, Ken (2000), In the Shadow of A Saint. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

21