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ESTORE AT SHELL CANADA LIMITED INTRODUCTION It was September 2003, and Calvin Wright, the commercial eProducts manager at Shell Canada (Shell), was thinking about eStore. This Web-based system was launched as a pilot in May 2002 and launched officially in September 2002. The intent was to have agricultural customers use self-serve technology to place their orders, and Shell would be able to obtain account information directly, instead of using the more costly local sales representative. Wright had spent the past year in the field working with local sales representatives and the agricultural customers of Shell’s fuels and lubricants division in an attempt to understand the low use of the online eStore. During this time, he had extensive interactions with the information technology (IT) eBusiness team at Shell Canada, led by Roger Milley. The team helped Wright to understand the issues in coordinating work among the numerous business and technical teams involved in the system. He had also received input from RareMethod, a consulting company that had examined the system from a customer’s perspective. With all of this information now in hand, Wright knew that it was time to make some tough decisions about eStore. THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN CANADA Canada was the ninth largest producer of crude oil in the world with exports going almost exclusively to the United States. Of the 2.7 million barrels of crude oil produced in Canada per day, 1.7 million barrels were exported. Similarly, 3.8 trillion cubic feet of the 6.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas produced annually was exported. In 2002, after a period of considerable consolidation within the industry, upwards of 85 per cent of all oil refining in Canada was owned by a small number of large companies (Shell Canada, Imperial Oil, PetroCanada, Suncor and Husky Energy). These companies were involved in all major aspects of the oil and gas industry in Canada. Their upstream activities included both the search for and the recovery of oil and gas. Their downstream activities included refining, marketing, sale and distribution of oil, gas and chemical products to industrial and retail customers. Exploration and production formed the core of the petroleum industry and spanned the activities of searching for hydrocarbons through to the delivery of oil or gas to the refinery, processing plant or tanker ship for processing elsewhere.
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ESTORE_AT_SHELL_CANADA_LIMITED_-_Case_Assignment

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Page 1: ESTORE_AT_SHELL_CANADA_LIMITED_-_Case_Assignment

ESTORE AT SHELL CANADA LIMITED

INTRODUCTION

It was September 2003, and Calvin Wright, the commercial eProducts manager at Shell Canada (Shell),

was thinking about eStore. This Web-based system was launched as a pilot in May 2002 and launched

officially in September 2002. The intent was to have agricultural customers use self-serve technology to

place their orders, and Shell would be able to obtain account information directly, instead of using the

more costly local sales representative. Wright had spent the past year in the field working with local sales

representatives and the agricultural customers of Shell’s fuels and lubricants division in an attempt to

understand the low use of the online eStore. During this time, he had extensive interactions with the

information technology (IT) eBusiness team at Shell Canada, led by Roger Milley. The team helped

Wright to understand the issues in coordinating work among the numerous business and technical teams

involved in the system. He had also received input from RareMethod, a consulting company that had

examined the system from a customer’s perspective. With all of this information now in hand, Wright

knew that it was time to make some tough decisions about eStore.

THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN CANADA

Canada was the ninth largest producer of crude oil in the world with exports going almost exclusively to

the United States. Of the 2.7 million barrels of crude oil produced in Canada per day, 1.7 million barrels

were exported. Similarly, 3.8 trillion cubic feet of the 6.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas produced

annually was exported. In 2002, after a period of considerable consolidation within the industry, upwards

of 85 per cent of all oil refining in Canada was owned by a small number of large companies (Shell

Canada, Imperial Oil, PetroCanada, Suncor and Husky Energy). These companies were involved in all

major aspects of the oil and gas industry in Canada. Their upstream activities included both the search for

and the recovery of oil and gas. Their downstream activities included refining, marketing, sale and

distribution of oil, gas and chemical products to industrial and retail customers. Exploration and production

formed the core of the petroleum industry and spanned the activities of searching for hydrocarbons through

to the delivery of oil or gas to the refinery, processing plant or tanker ship for processing elsewhere.

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Refineries manufactured end products, such as gasoline, diesel, chemicals, lubricants and heating oil.

These products were delivered to customers through a transportation and delivery network that was

coordinated with the manufacture and marketing of the products to commercial clients, while service

stations sold oil and gas products directly to retail consumers. Because of the integrated nature of the oil

and gas companies that dominated the Canadian marketplace, information and decisions were coordinated

across operations. Actions in the upstream could significantly affect the downstream activities and vice

versa, which necessitated, for example, coordinating production levels at the refineries with transportation,

storage, marketing and sales groups.

SHELL CANADA LIMITED

In 2003, Shell Canada Limited was one of the largest integrated petroleum companies in Canada, a leading

manufacturer, distributor and marketer of refined petroleum products and the 14th largest company in the

country. Shell Canada, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, employed 3,850 people, and reported

consolidated earnings of $810 million on $9.5 billion in assets in 2003. Ownership of Shell Canada was

split between public shareholders (22 per cent) and Shell Investments Limited (78 per cent). Shell

Investments Limited was wholly owned by Shell Petroleum N.V. of the Netherlands, which in turn was

owned by The Royal Dutch/Shell Group based upon a 60/40 split in group interest (see Exhibit 1). Shell

Canada operated independently but could draw upon resources and expertise of the Service and Operating

Companies of the Shell Group as needed. For example, if key people or technology were not available

within Shell Canada, they could be sourced from other members of the Shell Group in the United States,

Europe or worldwide.

Fuels and Lubricant Market Polarization

By 2002, there was a growing awareness, fueled by reports both internally at Shell Canada and from

outside consulting organizations, of a shift in the Canadian marketplace for fuel and lubricant products.

The net effect of this shift was a growing downward pressure on margins that were predicted to continue to

worsen into the future. As David Raynor, senior manager at Shell Canada pointed out:

What was happening with our customers was that our traditional value proposition, which

was all about quality, loyalty, trust, and competitive price, was becoming less attractive to

the kinds of customers we do business with and indeed we were seeing a polarization

happen.

In the past, Shell’s customers for lubricants and fuels had balanced the need for quality service and

reasonable prices in a relationship built upon trust. These customers were not excessively price-sensitive

and valued Shell’s products and services equally. This segment represented the vast majority of Shell’s

traditional customer base, but in recent years this group was disappearing as two very different customer

groups emerged. One customer group was highly price-sensitive and treated fuels and lubricants as a

commodity product that did not require valued-added consulting in order to fully take advantage of the

products in their respective operations (referred to within Shell as “transactors”). The other customer group

was price-insensitive and valued the Shell brand of products but required additional consulting services to

maximize the use of those products within their operations (referred to within Shell as “progressives”).

The vast majority of Shell’s customers (95 per cent) were transactors. The transactors were broadly

represented by agricultural, road transport, aviation, rail and marine customers. The transactors simply

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wished to obtain a commodity product as easily as possible for the lowest possible price. The progressives

were not as price-sensitive and instead looked for added value in the form of additional consulting services

to improve the efficiency of their operations. This segment was broadly represented by medium-size

operations in manufacturing, regional transportation, drilling and some larger operations in mining and

pulp and paper. The valued-added services offered included consulting on the most effective lubricant to

use and the most efficient lubrication schedule to follow in order to maximize the life of operational

equipment. The transactors were concerned about the cost per litre of Shell’s products and the cost per

transaction. The progressives were more concerned with the cost per unit of output in their respective

operations, and thus looked to Shell for services that increased those operational efficiencies.

Although the progressives were a small percentage (five per cent) of the total customer base, they were

significant since they typically made large purchases that were profitable for Shell and there was potential

for further profit margin expansion with this group. However, because the majority of customers were

transactors (or moving toward being transactors), addressing the needs of this group, with their larger

quantity of smaller lower margin sales, was critical.

The Agricultural Segment

Historically, the agricultural segment consisted of small and medium-sized operations, often family-based,

that worked independently to bring their products to market directly or through various cooperatives.

However, this segment changed dramatically with the formation of coordinated networks of producers, and

witnessed an increased consolidation of farms to produce the business-class farm operation. This shift to

larger, more capital-intensive operations was accompanied by an increased demand by these businesses for

bundled products and services and an increased reliance on new technologies (e.g. the Internet and the

Global Positioning System, or GPS). The business-class farm was rapidly replacing traditional farming

operations. Accompanying this business shift was a focus on cost savings. The purchase of fuels and

lubricants was viewed as a commodity purchase by these business-class farms and thus subject to high

price-sensitivity. The increased pressure that agricultural customers were placing on Shell’s prices was

quickly eroding profit margins at Shell. As Raynor explained:

This was happening in different customer segments and at differing paces but over a long

period of time the agricultural segment was an underperforming channel, and materially

underperforming. So this was all going to the fact that the channel was going to change

and I think that channel in distress was why agricultural customers were targeted first.

Abandoning these customers was expected to result in a two per cent decrease in market share, which

represented a significant revenue stream that Shell was unwilling to lose. The agricultural customer base

was essentially a rural customer, and this remoteness provided unique challenges in managing

communication, delivery and sales settlement for these customers. Local sales representatives throughout

these rural areas dealt directly with the agricultural customers for placing orders and account management.

The sales representatives operated in an agent capacity whereby they were paid a commission on sales.

Under this model, Shell retained ownership of the customer, and the sales representative acted on behalf of

the company for the sale of Shell-branded products. Customers appreciated this high level of service and

liked dealing with a local person who was also a member of their community.

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THE SELF-SERVE STRATEGY AT SHELL

Raynor noted that the first step towards more cost-effectively serving the transactors was to shift from

distributed local sales representatives in these rural areas to a centralized sales force located at Shell’s

headquarters in Calgary, Alberta. Customers would interact with these centrally located sales and support

representatives using technology-enabled communications via phone and fax. The reduced cost per

transaction, resulting from both the streamlined processes and the more flexible sales and support

personnel, could then be passed on, at least partially, to the customer in the form of lower prices. Providing

such a service required the creation of an inside sales force equipped with the tools needed to effectively

manage the customer relationship. This information needed to be available to all members of the sales and

support teams since the customer would no longer be dealing with just one individual. A holistic view of

the customer data was needed so the various interactions required by sales, support, procurement and

delivery were connected to the back-end operations at Shell.

Inside sales afforded significant cost savings but there was a concern that these sales might not be enough

to recover shrinking margins since the sales and support teams were still relatively expensive in light of the

increasing pressure on margins. It was also recognized that many of the interactions with customers were

simple requests for information, such as copies of invoices, order status or product and safety information.

Although providing this information in a timely fashion was important, the use of inside sales

representatives to fulfill these requests was not necessarily the most cost-effective method.

Shell had been pursuing a self-serve strategy for a number of years. This strategy began with an increased

reliance on telephone communications, then moved to electronic data interchange (EDI). Now,

eCommerce technologies moved away from using people to directly address customer requests. Instead,

technology was used to satisfy many of those requests. The current push for a reduction in the average cost

to serve customers represented a shift away from telephone and EDI technologies to more interactive

eCommerce approaches that paralleled initiatives implemented by the banks. When the banks were faced

with the increased costs of delivering services through their front counter staff they redirected their

customers over time to automatic teller machines (ATMs) and telephone/online banking technologies for

basic transaction and information requests. Senior management at Shell envisioned that self-serve

technologies based on the phone and Web-based applications could provide similar benefits within their

fuels and lubricants division. Customers could be redirected to phone and Web-based systems for basic

ordering transactions and for information requests, thus reducing the need for front-line sales and support

staff. A key technology for implementing this self-service strategy was eStore.

eStore

The initial competitor analysis showed that although there were many players in this market (e.g. Imperial

Oil, Irving Oil, UFA, PetroCanada and Federated Co-op), none was pursuing initiatives similar to eStore.

All of them, however, were likely experiencing the same margin compression being felt by Shell within

this segment. It was projected that eStore would salvage profit margins and potentially increase Shell’s

market share by two per cent within the agricultural segment by attracting new customers to this innovative

offering since it would be easier to do business with Shell.

Implementation of such an online system required the development of at least some of the applications

since they were not readily available within the marketplace. Raynor suggested that the unique

requirements and the novelty of the required technology eliminated the possibility of purchasing a solution

off the shelf. Shell had extensive application development skills for the development of applications that

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were mandated for use by employees. An information architecture was in place to guide the development

and deployment of applications at Shell. The IT Security Group developed policies for the secure use of

computer hardware and authentication processes that were used by all systems. For Web-based enterprise

applications, like that envisioned for customers of the fuels and lubricants division, the architecture

dictated integration of at least six technologies.

Initial estimates of the cost of building the application from the ground up were prohibitively expensive for

such a novel development project. However, key members of the Calgary IT group were involved with an

initiative within Shell International to develop a generic electronic store called eCATS — Electronic

Customer Access To Shell. The name eCATS was the internal code name for the Web platform to be

rolled out to Shell companies around the world. The Shell Canada IT group proposed that this system be

used as the basis for the self-serve application needed in the Canadian marketplace. This approach reduced

the estimates of development costs considerably.

In September of 2000, Roger Milley, then an eBusiness project manager for Shell Canada, was sent to

London, England, to evaluate the feasibility of the eCATS project. A Canadian colleague of Milley, an

eCommerce strategist, had already been in London for about a month working with the eCATS project to

identify specific functional requirements for the system. Milley, the eCommerce strategist and a senior

project manager from the IT vendor’s Canadian office conducted a quality assurance review of the project.

In concept, the design of the system appeared to be heading in the right direction, but there were challenges

with the project that posed a risk for both Shell International and Shell Canada. There was an urgent need

to produce the system for markets in South America and Europe, which led to aggressive project timelines.

The business requirements were reasonably well understood at a high-level but detailed analysis had yet to

be conducted. Furthermore, the international IT vendor selected for the project had two development

platforms to offer: one that was very mature based on old, withering technology, and one that was about to

be released based on new emerging technology. The decision regarding which technical platform to choose

was a complicated one, and it would have to involve the IT vendor’s software development lab in Toronto,

Canada. Due to the proximity to Shell Canada, Shell International felt the project would best be served if it

were based out of Canada, specifically, at Shell Canada’s head office in Calgary. The location would

provide better access to the IT vendor and would leverage Shell Canada’s existing relationship with that

vendor. In addition, Shell Canada had already chosen the IT vendor’s new emerging technology for its

general platform for eBusiness development. Shell Canada agreed to host the internationally funded project

and put several of its own people on the initiative, including Milley (assigned full-time), and Wright and an

eCommerce strategist, both playing part-time roles.

Most of the project team was transferred to Calgary, but sub-teams were positioned in the United Kingdom

(for eBusiness program management), Holland (for application hosting and support), Australia (for user

interface design) and Toronto (for software development by the vendor using its platform). Milley was

responsible for the Canadian project operations, including the relationship with, and the work provided by,

the IT vendor. Shortly after the transfer to Canada, the project team conducted a risk analysis of the

vendor’s two IT platforms vis-à-vis the urgent needs of Shell International. The team concluded that the

mature, withering technology was the best tactical solution for the urgent markets. The emerging platform

by contrast, was going to be released too late in order for the project to complete on time.

With the platform decision made, and a tighter relationship with the IT vendor in place, the eCATS team

produced a version of eCATS by the end of February 2001. A collaborative relationship with the IT vendor

emerged, and the vendor’s project manager played a key role in ensuring the deliverables were of sufficient

quality and on time. The eCATS platform was then transferred to Shell’s global hosting operations in

Holland and eventually implemented for markets in Holland, England and Brazil. Shell Canada could not,

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however, implement the tactical version of the software. The main issue was that the software could only

operate in one language at a time. For Shell Canada, the system had to be bilingual so it could service both

its French and English customers simultaneously. Shell Canada’s needs were not as urgent as Shell

International’s. Shell Canada preferred the emerging platform that was based on open technologies and

open standards, and it believed the new platform would make a better long-term investment.

Shell International shared the same long-term goals, and a second project was commissioned to develop a

new, strategic version of eCATS on the emerging platform. The new version would also be more flexible

for tailoring eCATS to a country’s local needs (such as language and currency). The second project was

also based out of Calgary and was led overall by Milley. The vendor’s project manager was brought back

once again to provide leadership over the development operations. This time, Milley, the Shell

International program manager from London and the vendor’s project manager planned the project from

the beginning. Timelines were more reasonable, resource planning was easier and the strategic platform for

developing the software was chosen.

Two companies were targeted for the initial implementation: a wholly owned Shell International company

in France and Shell Canada. The eCATS leadership designed the project to have linkages to the

implementations in both France and Canada. This relationship was forged in the first few weeks of the

project. The goal was to be proactive in building systems interfaces and managing organizational change.

In doing so, the implementation for each company could be expedited once the eCATS software was

released. Shell Canada went a step further and put a number of its people on the eCATS development

project. In addition to Milley, Shell Canada assigned software developers, business analysts, a quality/test

lead and an architecture lead. As these positions fulfilled specific roles on the development project, Shell

International covered their associated costs. Shell Canada’s implementation team by contrast, was separate

and represented a cost for the Canadian company.

The new version of eCATS was released in March 2002, roughly a year after the first version. A copy of

the software was transferred to Holland as part of the deployment to France, and a copy was transferred to

Shell Canada’s hosting operations. This version of eCATS was subsequently installed in Shell Canada (by

the separate implementation team) as eStore in May 2002. In addition, most of the Canadian individuals

working on the eCATS project returned to Shell Canada and seeded the organization with in-depth

knowledge of the platform. This approach ensured an effective way of transferring knowledge to the

operations.

The eStore implementation team was led by two Shell staff members: one representing the business and

the other representing IT. In their respective roles, Kathryn Wise and Marian Mann forged a collaborative

approach to ensure a successful transition of eCATS to eStore. In that regard, the implementation team

decided to run the software in pilot mode for about four months as a way of working through

implementation issues and readying the organization for a more formal launch. The transition was, by most

accounts, smooth, and by the end of the pilot, the software and operations were deemed to be robust,

reliable and ready for a larger audience.

In September 2002, eStore was officially launched with marketing and promotion efforts focused on

getting customers signed up to use the system. This process was also pushed out to the local

selling/distribution agents who were expected to play a role in making their client base aware of the

offering, in providing demonstrations and in guiding customers through the processes of signing up and

using the system. At the start of the project, the target was to have 2,000 customers signed up over the next

year.

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By involving staff through a series of projects over a two-year period, Shell Canada had successfully

developed a business and IT team with deep knowledge of the eStore application (see Exhibit 2).

eStore Operations and Management

To make eStore work, an array of business and technical operations had to be put in place. On the technical

side, the services were largely influenced by the systems architecture at Shell. The design for eStore was

broadly grouped into the front end and the back end. The front end referred to the part of the system that

the customer would interact with in order to browse a catalogue, get price quotes, place orders, review

reports and initiate requests for customer service. The back end of the system would provide all the

business logic, systems interfacing and data storage services. The architecture required numerous

technologies to be “stitched” together in a way that would be seamless and hidden from the customer. The

approach represented commonly accepted design conventions for Web-based development, but it led to

seven of Shell Canada’s IT teams being involved. There were teams to address the desktop standard, the

user log-on single sign-on mechanism, the Web application server software, the middle-ware transport

layer, the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, the data warehouse and reporting system, the product

catalogue system and the general infrastructure for security, servers and networking.

The business operations for eStore also involved numerous teams. The call centre received calls from

customers using the website; business subject matter experts worked on the ERP, the data warehouse and

the product catalogue; and marketing and sales teams rolled the eStore out to customers.

The eStore application was one of a portfolio of at least six other eBusiness applications; some shared

technologies and processes with eStore and some did not. Most of these applications came about as

separate initiatives that plugged into the eBusiness infrastructure. There were general user interface

standards implemented along the way, but the standards evolved and were not always retrofitted on the

older applications.

With the software built and rolled out at Shell Canada, Milley settled into an operational role as IT

eBusiness leader. Milley and Mann worked to establish the IT operations. Initially, it was the eCommerce

strategist, working with the eStore business lead team, Kathryn Wise, and former eCATS business analysts

who sorted out the associated business operations. Eventually, a new position on the business side was

created, the eProduct manager, a role assumed by Wright.

Collectively, those involved with eCATS development, its implementation as eStore and the operations to

support it, learned that interdepartmental coordination was going to be a key success factor. The Web-

enabled nature of eStore was forcing integration across organizational groups that had previously existed

as silos. According to Milley:

If there’s one place where business people and technical people must come together in a

collaborative way, it is eBusiness. Web-based applications, such as eStore, have to be very

easy to use and be perceived as adding value in the context of the relationship. The simpler

we make systems for users though, the more complex the backend—technically and

organizationally.

In recognition of the organizational challenges, the Shell Canadian contingent set up an IT operational

forum for eBusiness (see Exhibit 3). Bringing together representatives from different IT groups, Shell

Canada planned a rolling two-month schedule of work. This approach helped to prevent negative surprises

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from appearing when technical changes were moved to production. Shell Canada also put in place an

architectural forum for eBusiness that took a longer view on eBusiness technology as a way of forecasting

and planning for trends.

To manage shared eBusiness assets, Shell Canada set up a common eBusiness application forum, which

brought together eBusiness representatives from across the company. An example of such an asset was

Shell Canada’s main website (www.shell.ca) that contained information on eStore and numerous other

applications and initiatives. There was another website that allowed for secure log-on to the eBusiness

applications (https://services.shell.ca). In the case of both websites, stakeholders had a vested interest in

how they worked and how they were managed. In short, a committee managed those assets.

With respect to eStore specifically, Wright and his colleagues set up ways to gather and process

information about the rollout, by gathering information from customers, agents, inside sales and customer

service. Other sources of information included direct experience with the website (e.g. as demos were

given to customers) and the use of statistics that revealed a more granular view of customer setup and

behavior. Those ideas were brought forward to the eStore operational meeting that included the IT support

staff for eStore.

These organizational transformations were challenging. Some forums, such as that for common eBusiness

applications, lacked a single point of accountability. Sometimes weeks or months would go by without

meetings. With so many people involved with eStore, anecdotal information was pouring in from all sides,

and sometimes the information was contradictory. For example, some people believed the price quote

function was performing to specification, while others were saying that it was “incredibly slow . . . but not

always.” The statistics from eStore revealed that the number of customers signing up for eStore was

tracking upwards towards the target of 2,000; however, the number of customers actually using eStore was

staying flat.

During early 2003, Wright began investigating why customers were not using the system to the extent

envisioned by the organization. He headed to the field to observe the customer experience.

Report from the Field

The eStore usage data showed an interesting pattern whereby customers signed up for an account only to

not use the account again or use the system only perfunctorily. To obtain first-hand experience, Wright

began to accompany the local field agents as they visited their customers to see how the system was being

promoted, to obtain feedback from customers and to observe the experience of the customer using the

system.

The feedback Wright received from customers seemed to touch on a range of issues. Some customers had

not heard about eStore. Those who had heard about eStore expressed concerns: they preferred to deal with

their local sales representative who knew their requirements and knew how they operated their business.

These customers valued that relationship. Their sales representative had always provided excellent service

so they didn’t see any reason to use eStore. For those customers that were aware of eStore, there were

concerns that the online solution was no better than either placing their orders directly through the 1-800

call centre or faxing orders in directly. They always had their phone calls answered promptly and their

faxes acknowledged in a timely manner. Some even knew the people at the call centres by their first names

since they dealt with them on a regular basis. If they were going to use any technology, the phone and fax

machine seemed to be easier and cheaper than using an online system.

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The response from the local sales agents was mixed, with some agents aggressively promoting the use of

eStore and others providing only minimal effort. Some of the agents expressed concerns that their time was

better spent dealing with client issues rather then promoting this new system. Others did not feel

comfortable using the system and found it challenging to show their clients how to use eStore. Customers

that were shown how to use the system signed up for an eStore account but they often never used the

system again and just returned to placing orders in the same way they always had. There was no follow-up

after the point where they signed up for the account so many just forgot about eStore.

The customer feedback convinced Wright that eStore was very different from anything the organization

had deployed before. Jean-Marc Morin, manager of Commercial Marketing at Shell Canada elaborated:

There was a realization that we may need some help, we didn’t necessarily know how to

effectively market over the Internet and effectively integrate a tool like eStore with our

traditional channels to market and our traditional marketing plans.

It was also felt that an outside consultant would be able to act more quickly on many of the issues that

would otherwise need to be vetted through internal processes if handled by Shell employees.

Initial work on identifying potential consultants with the needed experience in deploying and marketing

customer-facing applications resulted in the selection of a Calgary-based firm, RareMethod. Shell had

employed outside consultants in the past for technology-focused initiatives, but these firms tended to be

large consulting organizations. RareMethod, on the other hand, was a small firm focused on contemporary,

interactive marketing. Ultimately, Wright felt that this organization had the unique skills and resources

needed to assist in this particular project.

Report from the Consultant

The request for proposal that Shell issued for consulting services focused on the need for expertise in

marketing a Web-based application. Wright and Morin felt they needed assistance in branding and

positioning the eStore offering. They recognized that such efforts required specialized tools to implement

that were not available at Shell. As a first step to meeting these marketing objectives, Keith Dundas, the

strategy/client services lead at RareMethod, conducted a user experience review of eStore and interviewed

customers about their experience using the system. A number of issues were identified as a result of that

process.

Some customers did not remember the link (uniform resource locator, or URL) for the eStore website or

found it cryptic and often encountered trouble when typing the Web address. If they typed the familiar

http://<sitename.ca> instead of the secure connection https://<sitename.ca>, it appeared as if the system

was non-responsive.

There were also indications that customers were having problems remembering passwords. The passwords

were automatically generated by the system and conformed to strict security guidelines that required the

password to be random sequence of letters and numbers and of a certain minimum length. Furthermore, the

log-in screen seemed to confuse some customers since it presented what appeared to be two separate log-in

panes. The left-hand pane was for individuals with usernames and passwords, similar to those used by

eStore customers; whereas the right-hand pane was for employees who used a Shell-provided security

device (a key fob), essentially a piece of hardware that generated a secure pass code. Customers faced with

the choice between a log-in using “Regular UserIds” or “Security Devices” invariably chose, incorrectly,

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the latter option since it appeared more secure (see Exhibit 4). When customers logged in to the system,

they were immediately notified that their password had expired and were prompted to change their

password. It appeared to customers that they had done something wrong. The message required that

customers enter their old password and go through the process of creating a new password that adhered to

strict security guidelines.

The notification messages that customers were receiving from eStore were also confusing. These messages

appeared as system messages from the back-end eBusiness systems and were sent from the eBusiness

Centre at Shell and not from the eStore. Customers did not deal with the eBusiness Centre and only knew

about eStore so they often simply ignored the emails. The eStore application was part of a larger suite of

applications that fell under the purview of the eBusiness Centre. The eBusiness Centre served as a

clearinghouse for the various Web-based applications supported by Shell Canada so messages related to

these applications originated from this group. If an end-user needed to be notified concerning one of the

Web-based applications like eStore for issues like passwords or information updates, they received an e-

mail from the eBusiness Centre. This practice was originally set up for the internal eBusiness applications

at Shell, and then was replicated for the customer-facing application eStore.

Customers that navigated the log-in process expressed concern that they did not know which application to

choose from the selection menu since there seemed to be a number of applications available for use.

However, after trying several of applications in the list and receiving an error message saying that they did

not have access to that application they stopped trying. When employees logged in to the company’s

intranet, they were provided with a complete list of the applications available in the organization. The

application menu used on the company intranet was replicated for customer-facing applications in the

extranet.

Some customers saw the value of eStore, while others felt it was cumbersome to use and in particular

found that the process of placing orders seemed to take a long time. After entering their order information

and clicking on the button to place the order, there was a long delay before a response was received from

the system. Customers were not really sure whether their computers caused this delay, or whether it was an

issue with eStore.

Not all the findings were user interface-related issues. Dundas suggested that the eStore brand appeared to

be confusing to customers since the site was not really a store, in the sense that customers could connect to

the site and order whatever they wanted. Instead, there was a select product list available and an existing

relationship with Shell was required in order to gain access to the site. In addition, the store analogy did not

convey some of the more strategic functionality that would have allowed customers to streamline their own

accounting and purchasing processes. These other benefits had not been conveyed to the customers. In

addition to improving the value proposition for the customer, Dundas suggested that it might be possible to

reward customers for their use of eStore, although this posed some legal challenges since “use” in the form

of a purchase could not be a condition of participation in any promotion.

THE FUTURE OF eSTORE

Dundas’ interviews with customers concerning their experience with eStore echoed many of the insights

that Wright and others found during his time in the field. As Wright walked back to his office from the

presentation by RareMethod, he thought he should block off the next week to work out a comprehensive

plan for how to proceed with eStore, in light of his findings and those of the consultant. He knew that

Shell’s senior management team were committed to a cost-savings strategy using self-serve technologies,

but given the low usage levels they were receiving with their agricultural customers, he knew something

had to be done about eStore if they were to achieve this goal.

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Page 11

Exhibit 1

ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR SHELL

Shareholders Shareholders

Royal Dutch

Petroleum Company Netherlands

60% interest in the group

Shell Transport and

Trading Co. p.l.c. United Kingdom

40% interest in the group

Royal Dutch / Shell Group

Shell Petroleum N.V. Netherlands

Shell Petroleum

Company Limited United Kingdom

Service Companies

Operating Companies

Worldwide Shell Canada

Source: Company files.

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or y

Page 12

Exhibit 2

eBUSINESS KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION THROUGH PROJECTS

2002 2003 2004

F irs t eC A T S x3 Pro je c t w it h S he ll

In te r n a tio n a l x2

Se c o nd e C A T S x4 Pro je c t w ith S he ll

In te r n a tio n a l x7

x6

She ll C a na da e S to r e Im p le m e n ta tio n P ro j e c t

x6

S h e ll C a nada S ta ff A s s i g n e d to

In itia tiv es

eS t o r e

Op e ra ti o n s

> 100

x6

Bu s in es s S ta ff

P ilo t F u ll

L a unc h

Ra re M e th o d

P res en ta ti on

IT S ta ff

Source: Company files.

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or

y

Page 13

Exhibit 3

CROSS-FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION

Communication Flow Among Operational Forums

Common eBusiness Application Forum: •Obj: to jointly manage the shared eBusiness assets like

https://services.shell.ca , www.shell.ca, user

Other eBusiness

Application Forums

administration/login, etc.

•Met every 1-3 months

•Worked with a long list of urgent and longer-term ideas

•Business and IT Staff from numerous eBusiness Apps

eStore Operational Forum: •Obj: prioritize eStore operational issues, opportunities

•Met every 1-2 weeks

•Work with rolling 1-4 week plan + a long list of ideas

•Business and IT Staff supporting eStore

Operational Forum for eBusiness: •Obj: Plan and coordinate technological change

•Met every 2 weeks

•Worked with rolling 2 month plan showing who’s doing what

•IT Staff from all IT departments affecting eBusiness Apps

Architecture Forum for eBusiness: •Obj: Anticipate technological change

•Met about every 2 months

•Worked with a high-level plan showing emerging new technology

•IT Staff from all IT departments affecting eBusiness Apps

Source: Company files.

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Shell Canada Login Ouverture de session - Shell Canada

Page 14

Exhibit 4

DUAL LOGIN PANES

Shell Canada Login Ouverture de session - Shell Canada

Enter your username and password in the left column, then select Login.

If you have a Shell provided security device use the right column instead.

Saisissez votre nom d’utilisateur et votre mot de passe dans la colonne de gauche, puis cliquez sur

Lancer.

Si vous avez un dispositif de sécurité fourni par Shell, utilisez plutöt la colonne de droite.

For Regular UserIds For Use With Security Devices

Accès normal Accès avec dispositif de sécurité

User ID User ID

Code d’identification Code d’identification

Password Passcode

Mot de passe Code d’authentification

Login / Lancer

Source: Company files.