ESTORE AT SHELL CANADA LIMITED INTRODUCTION It was September 2003, and Calvin Wright, the commercial eProducts manager at Shell Canada (Shell), was thinking about eStore. This Web-based system was launched as a pilot in May 2002 and launched officially in September 2002. The intent was to have agricultural customers use self-serve technology to place their orders, and Shell would be able to obtain account information directly, instead of using the more costly local sales representative. Wright had spent the past year in the field working with local sales representatives and the agricultural customers of Shell’s fuels and lubricants division in an attempt to understand the low use of the online eStore. During this time, he had extensive interactions with the information technology (IT) eBusiness team at Shell Canada, led by Roger Milley. The team helped Wright to understand the issues in coordinating work among the numerous business and technical teams involved in the system. He had also received input from RareMethod, a consulting company that had examined the system from a customer’s perspective. With all of this information now in hand, Wright knew that it was time to make some tough decisions about eStore. THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN CANADA Canada was the ninth largest producer of crude oil in the world with exports going almost exclusively to the United States. Of the 2.7 million barrels of crude oil produced in Canada per day, 1.7 million barrels were exported. Similarly, 3.8 trillion cubic feet of the 6.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas produced annually was exported. In 2002, after a period of considerable consolidation within the industry, upwards of 85 per cent of all oil refining in Canada was owned by a small number of large companies (Shell Canada, Imperial Oil, PetroCanada, Suncor and Husky Energy). These companies were involved in all major aspects of the oil and gas industry in Canada. Their upstream activities included both the search for and the recovery of oil and gas. Their downstream activities included refining, marketing, sale and distribution of oil, gas and chemical products to industrial and retail customers. Exploration and production formed the core of the petroleum industry and spanned the activities of searching for hydrocarbons through to the delivery of oil or gas to the refinery, processing plant or tanker ship for processing elsewhere.
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ESTORE AT SHELL CANADA LIMITED
INTRODUCTION
It was September 2003, and Calvin Wright, the commercial eProducts manager at Shell Canada (Shell),
was thinking about eStore. This Web-based system was launched as a pilot in May 2002 and launched
officially in September 2002. The intent was to have agricultural customers use self-serve technology to
place their orders, and Shell would be able to obtain account information directly, instead of using the
more costly local sales representative. Wright had spent the past year in the field working with local sales
representatives and the agricultural customers of Shell’s fuels and lubricants division in an attempt to
understand the low use of the online eStore. During this time, he had extensive interactions with the
information technology (IT) eBusiness team at Shell Canada, led by Roger Milley. The team helped
Wright to understand the issues in coordinating work among the numerous business and technical teams
involved in the system. He had also received input from RareMethod, a consulting company that had
examined the system from a customer’s perspective. With all of this information now in hand, Wright
knew that it was time to make some tough decisions about eStore.
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN CANADA
Canada was the ninth largest producer of crude oil in the world with exports going almost exclusively to
the United States. Of the 2.7 million barrels of crude oil produced in Canada per day, 1.7 million barrels
were exported. Similarly, 3.8 trillion cubic feet of the 6.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas produced
annually was exported. In 2002, after a period of considerable consolidation within the industry, upwards
of 85 per cent of all oil refining in Canada was owned by a small number of large companies (Shell
Canada, Imperial Oil, PetroCanada, Suncor and Husky Energy). These companies were involved in all
major aspects of the oil and gas industry in Canada. Their upstream activities included both the search for
and the recovery of oil and gas. Their downstream activities included refining, marketing, sale and
distribution of oil, gas and chemical products to industrial and retail customers. Exploration and production
formed the core of the petroleum industry and spanned the activities of searching for hydrocarbons through
to the delivery of oil or gas to the refinery, processing plant or tanker ship for processing elsewhere.
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Refineries manufactured end products, such as gasoline, diesel, chemicals, lubricants and heating oil.
These products were delivered to customers through a transportation and delivery network that was
coordinated with the manufacture and marketing of the products to commercial clients, while service
stations sold oil and gas products directly to retail consumers. Because of the integrated nature of the oil
and gas companies that dominated the Canadian marketplace, information and decisions were coordinated
across operations. Actions in the upstream could significantly affect the downstream activities and vice
versa, which necessitated, for example, coordinating production levels at the refineries with transportation,
storage, marketing and sales groups.
SHELL CANADA LIMITED
In 2003, Shell Canada Limited was one of the largest integrated petroleum companies in Canada, a leading
manufacturer, distributor and marketer of refined petroleum products and the 14th largest company in the
country. Shell Canada, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, employed 3,850 people, and reported
consolidated earnings of $810 million on $9.5 billion in assets in 2003. Ownership of Shell Canada was
split between public shareholders (22 per cent) and Shell Investments Limited (78 per cent). Shell
Investments Limited was wholly owned by Shell Petroleum N.V. of the Netherlands, which in turn was
owned by The Royal Dutch/Shell Group based upon a 60/40 split in group interest (see Exhibit 1). Shell
Canada operated independently but could draw upon resources and expertise of the Service and Operating
Companies of the Shell Group as needed. For example, if key people or technology were not available
within Shell Canada, they could be sourced from other members of the Shell Group in the United States,
Europe or worldwide.
Fuels and Lubricant Market Polarization
By 2002, there was a growing awareness, fueled by reports both internally at Shell Canada and from
outside consulting organizations, of a shift in the Canadian marketplace for fuel and lubricant products.
The net effect of this shift was a growing downward pressure on margins that were predicted to continue to
worsen into the future. As David Raynor, senior manager at Shell Canada pointed out:
What was happening with our customers was that our traditional value proposition, which
was all about quality, loyalty, trust, and competitive price, was becoming less attractive to
the kinds of customers we do business with and indeed we were seeing a polarization
happen.
In the past, Shell’s customers for lubricants and fuels had balanced the need for quality service and
reasonable prices in a relationship built upon trust. These customers were not excessively price-sensitive
and valued Shell’s products and services equally. This segment represented the vast majority of Shell’s
traditional customer base, but in recent years this group was disappearing as two very different customer
groups emerged. One customer group was highly price-sensitive and treated fuels and lubricants as a
commodity product that did not require valued-added consulting in order to fully take advantage of the
products in their respective operations (referred to within Shell as “transactors”). The other customer group
was price-insensitive and valued the Shell brand of products but required additional consulting services to
maximize the use of those products within their operations (referred to within Shell as “progressives”).
The vast majority of Shell’s customers (95 per cent) were transactors. The transactors were broadly
represented by agricultural, road transport, aviation, rail and marine customers. The transactors simply
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wished to obtain a commodity product as easily as possible for the lowest possible price. The progressives
were not as price-sensitive and instead looked for added value in the form of additional consulting services
to improve the efficiency of their operations. This segment was broadly represented by medium-size
operations in manufacturing, regional transportation, drilling and some larger operations in mining and
pulp and paper. The valued-added services offered included consulting on the most effective lubricant to
use and the most efficient lubrication schedule to follow in order to maximize the life of operational
equipment. The transactors were concerned about the cost per litre of Shell’s products and the cost per
transaction. The progressives were more concerned with the cost per unit of output in their respective
operations, and thus looked to Shell for services that increased those operational efficiencies.
Although the progressives were a small percentage (five per cent) of the total customer base, they were
significant since they typically made large purchases that were profitable for Shell and there was potential
for further profit margin expansion with this group. However, because the majority of customers were
transactors (or moving toward being transactors), addressing the needs of this group, with their larger
quantity of smaller lower margin sales, was critical.
The Agricultural Segment
Historically, the agricultural segment consisted of small and medium-sized operations, often family-based,
that worked independently to bring their products to market directly or through various cooperatives.
However, this segment changed dramatically with the formation of coordinated networks of producers, and
witnessed an increased consolidation of farms to produce the business-class farm operation. This shift to
larger, more capital-intensive operations was accompanied by an increased demand by these businesses for
bundled products and services and an increased reliance on new technologies (e.g. the Internet and the
Global Positioning System, or GPS). The business-class farm was rapidly replacing traditional farming
operations. Accompanying this business shift was a focus on cost savings. The purchase of fuels and
lubricants was viewed as a commodity purchase by these business-class farms and thus subject to high
price-sensitivity. The increased pressure that agricultural customers were placing on Shell’s prices was
quickly eroding profit margins at Shell. As Raynor explained:
This was happening in different customer segments and at differing paces but over a long
period of time the agricultural segment was an underperforming channel, and materially
underperforming. So this was all going to the fact that the channel was going to change
and I think that channel in distress was why agricultural customers were targeted first.
Abandoning these customers was expected to result in a two per cent decrease in market share, which
represented a significant revenue stream that Shell was unwilling to lose. The agricultural customer base
was essentially a rural customer, and this remoteness provided unique challenges in managing
communication, delivery and sales settlement for these customers. Local sales representatives throughout
these rural areas dealt directly with the agricultural customers for placing orders and account management.
The sales representatives operated in an agent capacity whereby they were paid a commission on sales.
Under this model, Shell retained ownership of the customer, and the sales representative acted on behalf of
the company for the sale of Shell-branded products. Customers appreciated this high level of service and
liked dealing with a local person who was also a member of their community.
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THE SELF-SERVE STRATEGY AT SHELL
Raynor noted that the first step towards more cost-effectively serving the transactors was to shift from
distributed local sales representatives in these rural areas to a centralized sales force located at Shell’s
headquarters in Calgary, Alberta. Customers would interact with these centrally located sales and support
representatives using technology-enabled communications via phone and fax. The reduced cost per
transaction, resulting from both the streamlined processes and the more flexible sales and support
personnel, could then be passed on, at least partially, to the customer in the form of lower prices. Providing
such a service required the creation of an inside sales force equipped with the tools needed to effectively
manage the customer relationship. This information needed to be available to all members of the sales and
support teams since the customer would no longer be dealing with just one individual. A holistic view of
the customer data was needed so the various interactions required by sales, support, procurement and
delivery were connected to the back-end operations at Shell.
Inside sales afforded significant cost savings but there was a concern that these sales might not be enough
to recover shrinking margins since the sales and support teams were still relatively expensive in light of the
increasing pressure on margins. It was also recognized that many of the interactions with customers were
simple requests for information, such as copies of invoices, order status or product and safety information.
Although providing this information in a timely fashion was important, the use of inside sales
representatives to fulfill these requests was not necessarily the most cost-effective method.
Shell had been pursuing a self-serve strategy for a number of years. This strategy began with an increased
reliance on telephone communications, then moved to electronic data interchange (EDI). Now,
eCommerce technologies moved away from using people to directly address customer requests. Instead,
technology was used to satisfy many of those requests. The current push for a reduction in the average cost
to serve customers represented a shift away from telephone and EDI technologies to more interactive
eCommerce approaches that paralleled initiatives implemented by the banks. When the banks were faced
with the increased costs of delivering services through their front counter staff they redirected their
customers over time to automatic teller machines (ATMs) and telephone/online banking technologies for
basic transaction and information requests. Senior management at Shell envisioned that self-serve
technologies based on the phone and Web-based applications could provide similar benefits within their
fuels and lubricants division. Customers could be redirected to phone and Web-based systems for basic
ordering transactions and for information requests, thus reducing the need for front-line sales and support
staff. A key technology for implementing this self-service strategy was eStore.
eStore
The initial competitor analysis showed that although there were many players in this market (e.g. Imperial
Oil, Irving Oil, UFA, PetroCanada and Federated Co-op), none was pursuing initiatives similar to eStore.
All of them, however, were likely experiencing the same margin compression being felt by Shell within
this segment. It was projected that eStore would salvage profit margins and potentially increase Shell’s
market share by two per cent within the agricultural segment by attracting new customers to this innovative
offering since it would be easier to do business with Shell.
Implementation of such an online system required the development of at least some of the applications
since they were not readily available within the marketplace. Raynor suggested that the unique
requirements and the novelty of the required technology eliminated the possibility of purchasing a solution
off the shelf. Shell had extensive application development skills for the development of applications that
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were mandated for use by employees. An information architecture was in place to guide the development
and deployment of applications at Shell. The IT Security Group developed policies for the secure use of
computer hardware and authentication processes that were used by all systems. For Web-based enterprise
applications, like that envisioned for customers of the fuels and lubricants division, the architecture
dictated integration of at least six technologies.
Initial estimates of the cost of building the application from the ground up were prohibitively expensive for
such a novel development project. However, key members of the Calgary IT group were involved with an
initiative within Shell International to develop a generic electronic store called eCATS — Electronic
Customer Access To Shell. The name eCATS was the internal code name for the Web platform to be
rolled out to Shell companies around the world. The Shell Canada IT group proposed that this system be
used as the basis for the self-serve application needed in the Canadian marketplace. This approach reduced
the estimates of development costs considerably.
In September of 2000, Roger Milley, then an eBusiness project manager for Shell Canada, was sent to
London, England, to evaluate the feasibility of the eCATS project. A Canadian colleague of Milley, an
eCommerce strategist, had already been in London for about a month working with the eCATS project to
identify specific functional requirements for the system. Milley, the eCommerce strategist and a senior
project manager from the IT vendor’s Canadian office conducted a quality assurance review of the project.
In concept, the design of the system appeared to be heading in the right direction, but there were challenges
with the project that posed a risk for both Shell International and Shell Canada. There was an urgent need
to produce the system for markets in South America and Europe, which led to aggressive project timelines.
The business requirements were reasonably well understood at a high-level but detailed analysis had yet to
be conducted. Furthermore, the international IT vendor selected for the project had two development
platforms to offer: one that was very mature based on old, withering technology, and one that was about to
be released based on new emerging technology. The decision regarding which technical platform to choose
was a complicated one, and it would have to involve the IT vendor’s software development lab in Toronto,
Canada. Due to the proximity to Shell Canada, Shell International felt the project would best be served if it
were based out of Canada, specifically, at Shell Canada’s head office in Calgary. The location would
provide better access to the IT vendor and would leverage Shell Canada’s existing relationship with that
vendor. In addition, Shell Canada had already chosen the IT vendor’s new emerging technology for its
general platform for eBusiness development. Shell Canada agreed to host the internationally funded project
and put several of its own people on the initiative, including Milley (assigned full-time), and Wright and an
eCommerce strategist, both playing part-time roles.
Most of the project team was transferred to Calgary, but sub-teams were positioned in the United Kingdom
(for eBusiness program management), Holland (for application hosting and support), Australia (for user
interface design) and Toronto (for software development by the vendor using its platform). Milley was
responsible for the Canadian project operations, including the relationship with, and the work provided by,
the IT vendor. Shortly after the transfer to Canada, the project team conducted a risk analysis of the
vendor’s two IT platforms vis-à-vis the urgent needs of Shell International. The team concluded that the
mature, withering technology was the best tactical solution for the urgent markets. The emerging platform
by contrast, was going to be released too late in order for the project to complete on time.
With the platform decision made, and a tighter relationship with the IT vendor in place, the eCATS team
produced a version of eCATS by the end of February 2001. A collaborative relationship with the IT vendor
emerged, and the vendor’s project manager played a key role in ensuring the deliverables were of sufficient
quality and on time. The eCATS platform was then transferred to Shell’s global hosting operations in
Holland and eventually implemented for markets in Holland, England and Brazil. Shell Canada could not,
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however, implement the tactical version of the software. The main issue was that the software could only
operate in one language at a time. For Shell Canada, the system had to be bilingual so it could service both
its French and English customers simultaneously. Shell Canada’s needs were not as urgent as Shell
International’s. Shell Canada preferred the emerging platform that was based on open technologies and
open standards, and it believed the new platform would make a better long-term investment.
Shell International shared the same long-term goals, and a second project was commissioned to develop a
new, strategic version of eCATS on the emerging platform. The new version would also be more flexible
for tailoring eCATS to a country’s local needs (such as language and currency). The second project was
also based out of Calgary and was led overall by Milley. The vendor’s project manager was brought back
once again to provide leadership over the development operations. This time, Milley, the Shell
International program manager from London and the vendor’s project manager planned the project from
the beginning. Timelines were more reasonable, resource planning was easier and the strategic platform for
developing the software was chosen.
Two companies were targeted for the initial implementation: a wholly owned Shell International company
in France and Shell Canada. The eCATS leadership designed the project to have linkages to the
implementations in both France and Canada. This relationship was forged in the first few weeks of the
project. The goal was to be proactive in building systems interfaces and managing organizational change.
In doing so, the implementation for each company could be expedited once the eCATS software was
released. Shell Canada went a step further and put a number of its people on the eCATS development
project. In addition to Milley, Shell Canada assigned software developers, business analysts, a quality/test
lead and an architecture lead. As these positions fulfilled specific roles on the development project, Shell
International covered their associated costs. Shell Canada’s implementation team by contrast, was separate
and represented a cost for the Canadian company.
The new version of eCATS was released in March 2002, roughly a year after the first version. A copy of
the software was transferred to Holland as part of the deployment to France, and a copy was transferred to
Shell Canada’s hosting operations. This version of eCATS was subsequently installed in Shell Canada (by
the separate implementation team) as eStore in May 2002. In addition, most of the Canadian individuals
working on the eCATS project returned to Shell Canada and seeded the organization with in-depth
knowledge of the platform. This approach ensured an effective way of transferring knowledge to the
operations.
The eStore implementation team was led by two Shell staff members: one representing the business and
the other representing IT. In their respective roles, Kathryn Wise and Marian Mann forged a collaborative
approach to ensure a successful transition of eCATS to eStore. In that regard, the implementation team
decided to run the software in pilot mode for about four months as a way of working through
implementation issues and readying the organization for a more formal launch. The transition was, by most
accounts, smooth, and by the end of the pilot, the software and operations were deemed to be robust,
reliable and ready for a larger audience.
In September 2002, eStore was officially launched with marketing and promotion efforts focused on
getting customers signed up to use the system. This process was also pushed out to the local
selling/distribution agents who were expected to play a role in making their client base aware of the
offering, in providing demonstrations and in guiding customers through the processes of signing up and
using the system. At the start of the project, the target was to have 2,000 customers signed up over the next
year.
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By involving staff through a series of projects over a two-year period, Shell Canada had successfully
developed a business and IT team with deep knowledge of the eStore application (see Exhibit 2).
eStore Operations and Management
To make eStore work, an array of business and technical operations had to be put in place. On the technical
side, the services were largely influenced by the systems architecture at Shell. The design for eStore was
broadly grouped into the front end and the back end. The front end referred to the part of the system that
the customer would interact with in order to browse a catalogue, get price quotes, place orders, review
reports and initiate requests for customer service. The back end of the system would provide all the
business logic, systems interfacing and data storage services. The architecture required numerous
technologies to be “stitched” together in a way that would be seamless and hidden from the customer. The
approach represented commonly accepted design conventions for Web-based development, but it led to
seven of Shell Canada’s IT teams being involved. There were teams to address the desktop standard, the
user log-on single sign-on mechanism, the Web application server software, the middle-ware transport
layer, the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, the data warehouse and reporting system, the product
catalogue system and the general infrastructure for security, servers and networking.
The business operations for eStore also involved numerous teams. The call centre received calls from
customers using the website; business subject matter experts worked on the ERP, the data warehouse and
the product catalogue; and marketing and sales teams rolled the eStore out to customers.
The eStore application was one of a portfolio of at least six other eBusiness applications; some shared
technologies and processes with eStore and some did not. Most of these applications came about as
separate initiatives that plugged into the eBusiness infrastructure. There were general user interface
standards implemented along the way, but the standards evolved and were not always retrofitted on the
older applications.
With the software built and rolled out at Shell Canada, Milley settled into an operational role as IT
eBusiness leader. Milley and Mann worked to establish the IT operations. Initially, it was the eCommerce
strategist, working with the eStore business lead team, Kathryn Wise, and former eCATS business analysts
who sorted out the associated business operations. Eventually, a new position on the business side was
created, the eProduct manager, a role assumed by Wright.
Collectively, those involved with eCATS development, its implementation as eStore and the operations to
support it, learned that interdepartmental coordination was going to be a key success factor. The Web-
enabled nature of eStore was forcing integration across organizational groups that had previously existed
as silos. According to Milley:
If there’s one place where business people and technical people must come together in a
collaborative way, it is eBusiness. Web-based applications, such as eStore, have to be very
easy to use and be perceived as adding value in the context of the relationship. The simpler
we make systems for users though, the more complex the backend—technically and
organizationally.
In recognition of the organizational challenges, the Shell Canadian contingent set up an IT operational
forum for eBusiness (see Exhibit 3). Bringing together representatives from different IT groups, Shell
Canada planned a rolling two-month schedule of work. This approach helped to prevent negative surprises
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from appearing when technical changes were moved to production. Shell Canada also put in place an
architectural forum for eBusiness that took a longer view on eBusiness technology as a way of forecasting
and planning for trends.
To manage shared eBusiness assets, Shell Canada set up a common eBusiness application forum, which
brought together eBusiness representatives from across the company. An example of such an asset was
Shell Canada’s main website (www.shell.ca) that contained information on eStore and numerous other
applications and initiatives. There was another website that allowed for secure log-on to the eBusiness
applications (https://services.shell.ca). In the case of both websites, stakeholders had a vested interest in
how they worked and how they were managed. In short, a committee managed those assets.
With respect to eStore specifically, Wright and his colleagues set up ways to gather and process
information about the rollout, by gathering information from customers, agents, inside sales and customer
service. Other sources of information included direct experience with the website (e.g. as demos were
given to customers) and the use of statistics that revealed a more granular view of customer setup and
behavior. Those ideas were brought forward to the eStore operational meeting that included the IT support
staff for eStore.
These organizational transformations were challenging. Some forums, such as that for common eBusiness
applications, lacked a single point of accountability. Sometimes weeks or months would go by without
meetings. With so many people involved with eStore, anecdotal information was pouring in from all sides,
and sometimes the information was contradictory. For example, some people believed the price quote
function was performing to specification, while others were saying that it was “incredibly slow . . . but not
always.” The statistics from eStore revealed that the number of customers signing up for eStore was
tracking upwards towards the target of 2,000; however, the number of customers actually using eStore was
staying flat.
During early 2003, Wright began investigating why customers were not using the system to the extent
envisioned by the organization. He headed to the field to observe the customer experience.
Report from the Field
The eStore usage data showed an interesting pattern whereby customers signed up for an account only to
not use the account again or use the system only perfunctorily. To obtain first-hand experience, Wright
began to accompany the local field agents as they visited their customers to see how the system was being
promoted, to obtain feedback from customers and to observe the experience of the customer using the
system.
The feedback Wright received from customers seemed to touch on a range of issues. Some customers had
not heard about eStore. Those who had heard about eStore expressed concerns: they preferred to deal with
their local sales representative who knew their requirements and knew how they operated their business.
These customers valued that relationship. Their sales representative had always provided excellent service
so they didn’t see any reason to use eStore. For those customers that were aware of eStore, there were
concerns that the online solution was no better than either placing their orders directly through the 1-800
call centre or faxing orders in directly. They always had their phone calls answered promptly and their
faxes acknowledged in a timely manner. Some even knew the people at the call centres by their first names
since they dealt with them on a regular basis. If they were going to use any technology, the phone and fax
machine seemed to be easier and cheaper than using an online system.