ESTATE AND DONORS TAXG.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977TEODORICO
ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO,
SALUD ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA
ALEJANDRO,petitioners,vs.HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria,
ANDREA DIAZ and ANGEL DIAZ,respondents.G.R. No. L-33968 August 18,
1977ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,vs.HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch V, TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA
ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO
and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, respondents.Ponciano G. Hernandez for
Teodorico Alejandro, et al.Porfirio Villaroman for Andrea Diaz and
Angel Diaz.AQUINO.J.This is a case about donationsinter
vivosandmortis causa. The bone of contention is Lot No. 2502 of the
Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate with an area of 5,678 square meters,
situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 7336. The facts are as follows: On January 20, 1949
the spouses Gabino (Gavino) Diaz and Severa Mendoza, their
daughter-in-law Regina Fernando and their three children, Olimpia
Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation
covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate, owned by
the Diaz spouses, located at Barrio Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
The deed reads as follows:KASULATAN NG PAGKAKALOOB (A DEED OF
DONATION)ALAMIN NG LAHAT NG MAKATUTUNGHAY NITO:Ang pagkakaloob
(donation) na ito, ginawa at pinagtibay dito sa municipio ng Sta.
Maria, lalawigan ng Bulacan, Pilipinas, ngayong ika 20 ng Enero,
1949, ng mag-asawang GABINO DIAZ at SEVERA MENDOZA, filipinos, may
mga sapat na gulang, naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan na dito'y kinikilalang NAGKALOOB (DONORS), sa kapakanan
nila REGINA FERNANDO, filipina, may sapat na gulang, viuda; OLIMPIA
DIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Teodorico Alejandro,
ANGEL DIAZ, filipino, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Catalina
Marcelo, at ANDREA DIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay
Perfecto Marcelo, mga naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, na dito'y kinikilalang PINAGKALOOBAN
(DONEES).PAGPAPATUNAY:Na ang Nagkaloob (DONORS) ay siyang mayari,
at kamayari at namomosision sa kasalukuyan ng mga parcelang lupa
kasama ang mga kagalingan na nasa lugar ng Parada, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, mapagkikilala sa paraang mga sumusunod (description and
statements as to registration are omitted):1. TCT No. 7336, Lot No.
2502, 5,678 square meters.2. TCT No. 10998, Lot No. 2485, 640
square meters.3. TCT No. 10840, Lot No. 2377,16,600 square
meters.4. TCT No. 10997, Lot No. 2448,12,478 square meters.5. TCT
No. 2051, Lot No. 4168, 1,522 square meters.6. TCT No. 17960, Lot
No. 2522, 3,418 square meters.7. TCT No. 17961, Lot No. 2521, 715
square meters.8. TCT No. 21453, Lot No. 2634, 8,162 square
meters.Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin
na taglay ng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun
din sa tapat at mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na
panahon na ginawa ng huli sa una, ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong
pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sa nasabing
pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at makikilala sa unahan
nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at pagkakautang, katulad nito:(a) Na
ang lupang sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2502 o Titulo No. 7336, (No. 1)
sa unahan nito ay hinati sa dalawang parte ang unang parte (1/2) na
nasa bandang Kanluran (West) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang
Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Angel Diaz,
kasal kay Catalina Marcelo; at ang ikalawang parte (1/2) na nasa
'bandang silangan (East) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino
Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Andrea Diaz, kasal
kay Perfecto Marcelo."(Note Some dispositions are not reproduced
verbatim but are merely summarized because they are not involved in
this case. Paragraph (a) above is the one involved herein).(b) Lot
No. 2485, TCT No.10998, to Regina Fernando (daughter- in-law of the
donors and widow of their deceased son, Miguel Diaz) and Olimpia
Diaz in equal shares.(c) Lot No. 2377, TCT No. 10840, 1/3 to Angel
Diaz, 1/3 to Andrea Diaz, and 1/3 "ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng
mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang sariling
kapakanan o mga gastos nila.(d) Lot No. 2448, TCT No. 10997 to
Olimpia Diaz sa condicion na pagkakalooban ni Olimpia Diaz si
Crisanta de la Cruz, asawa ni Alejandro - - - - - (sic) sakaling si
Crisanta ay mamatay ng halagang isang daang piso (P100), bilang
gastos sa libing."(e) Na ang lupang-solar na sinasaysay sa Lote No.
4168 o Titulo No. 2051 (No. 5); lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote
No. 25?2 o Titulo No. 17960 (No. 6); at lupang-bukid na sinasaysay
sa Lote No. 2521 o Titulo No. 17961 (No. 7) sa unahan nito ay
inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza
sa kanilang sariling kapakanan o mga gastos nila.(f) Lot No. 2643,
TCT No. 21453, to Regina Fernando and her children with the
deceased Miguel Diaz in whose name the said Lot was already
registered.Na kaming mga pinagkakalooban (DONEES) na sila Regina
Fernando, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz at Andrea Diaz ay tinatanggap
namin ng buong kasiyahang loob ang pagkakaloob (Donation.) na ito,
at sa pamamagitan nito ay kinikilala, pinahahalagahan, at lubos na
pinasasalamatan namin ang kagandahang loob at paglingap na
ipinakita at ginawa ng nagkakaloob (Donors).AT SA WAKAS, ang
pagkakaloob na ito (DONATION), ay sumasailalim sa paraang mga
sumusunod:1. Ang mga Pinagkakalooban (Donatarios) na sila Regina
Fernando, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz, at Andrea Diaz, siyang
nakaaalam sa mga gastos sa pagkakasakit at sa libing ng NAGKALOOB
(DONANTE);2. Na ang mga Pinagkalooban (DONATARIOS) ay hindi
maaaring makapagbili sa pangatlong tao ng nasabing mga pagaari
samantalang ang nagkaloob (Donante) ay buhay Datapwa't kung ang
pagbibiling gagawin ay upang malunasan ang mga gastos at
menitencion ng Nagkaloob (Donante) samakatuwid ang nasabing
pagbibili ay matuwid;3. Gayun din, samantalang kaming mag-asawang
Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza ay buhay, patuloy ang aming
pamamahala, karapatan, at pagkamay-ari sa mga nasabing pagaari na
sinasaysay sa unahan nito na pag-aari namin; ngunit sakaling kami
ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong Dios at mamatay na ang mga
karapatan at pagkamay-ari ng bawa't Pinagkalooban (Donatarios) sa
bawa't pag-aari na nauukol sa bawa't isa ay may lubos na
kapangyarihan."SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, linagdaan namin ang
kasulatang ito, dito sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan, ngayon ika 20 ng
Enero, 1949, sa patibay ng dalawang sacsing kaharap.Signature
Thumbmark SignatureGABINO DIAZ SEVERA MENDOZA REGINA
FERNANDOThumbmarkSignatureSignatureOLIMPIA DIAZ ANGEL DIAZ ANDREA
DIAZ(Acknowledgment signed by Notary Celedonio Reyes is
omitted)Gabino Diaz died in 1962. On October 20, 1964 Severa
Mendoza and her two children, Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed
a deed of donation denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay na
Magkakabisa Pagkamatay (DonationMortis causa)" over one-half of Lot
No. 2377-A, which is a portion of Lot No. 2377 of the Lolomboy
Friar Lands Estate (which in turn is item 3 or [c] in the 1949 deed
of donation already mentioned).In that deed of donation, Severa
Mendoza donated to Andrea Diaz her one-half share in Lot 2377-A,
which one-half share is Identified as Lot 2377-A-1, on condition
that Andrea Diaz would bear the funeral expenses to be incurred
after the donor's death. She died in 1964.It should be noted that
the other one-half share in Lot 2377-A or Lot No. 2377-A-2 was
previously adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he defrayed the
funeral expenses on the occasion of the death of Gabino Diaz.On May
12, 1970 Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Sta. Maria Branch V for the partition of
Lots Nos. 2377-A and 2502 (Civil Case No. SM-357). Teodorico
Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz, and their children
intervened in the said case. They claimed one-third of Lot No.
2502. Angel Diaz alleged in his answer that he had. been occupying
his share of Lot No. 2502 "for more than twenty years". The
intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a voidmortis
causadisposition.On March 15, 1971 the lower court rendered a
partial decision with respect to Lot No. 2377-A. The case was
continued with respect to Lot No. 2502 which is item No. 1 or (a)
in the 1949 deed of donation. The record does not show what
happened to the other six lots mentioned in the deed of
donation.The trial court in its decision of June 30, 1971 held that
the said deed of donation was a donationmortis causabecause the
ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the donees
during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only
"upon the death of the donors".However, it sustained the division
of Lot No. 2502 into two equal parts between Angel Diaz and Andrea
Diaz on the theory that the said deed of donation was effective "as
an extra-judicial partition among the parents and their children.
Consequently, the Alejandro intervenors were not given any share in
Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz and the intervenors were ordered to pay
Andrea Diaz "attorney's fees of P1,000 each or a total of
P2,000".The Alejandro intervenors filed a motion for
reconsideration, On July 16, 1971 the trial court denied that
motion but eliminated the attorney's fees.Andrea Diaz and the
Alejandro intervenors filed separate appeals to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440. Andrea Diaz contends that the 1949 deed of
donation is a valid donationinter vivosand that the trial court
erred in deleting the award for attorney's fees. The Alejandro
intervenors contend that the said donation ismortis causa; that
they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No, 2502, and that
the trial court erred in characterizing the deed as a valid
partition. In the ultimate analysis, the appeal involves the issue
of whether the Alejandro intervenors should be awarded one-third of
Lot No. 2502, or 1,892 square meters thereof, as intestate heirs of
the Diaz spouses.To resolve that issue, it is necessary to
determine whether the deed of donation isinter vivosormortis causa.
A brief exposition on the nature of donationinter vivosandmortis
causamay facilitate the resolution of that issue. Many legal
battles have been fought on the question of whether a particular
deed is aninter vivosormortis causadonation. The copious
jurisprudence on that point sheds light on that vexed question. The
Civil Code provides:ART. 728. Donations which are to take effect
upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the
Title on Succession. (620).ART. 729. When the donor intends that
the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor,
though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor's
death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall
pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)ART.
730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive
condition, which may take place beyond the natural expectation of
life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a
donationinter vivosunless a contrary intention appears. (n)ART.
731. When a person donates something subject to the resolutory
condition of the donor's survival, there is a donation inter vivos.
(n)ART. 732. Donations which are to take effectinter vivosshall be
governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in
all that is not determined in this Title. (621)."Nature of
donations inter vivos and mortis causa transfers. Before tackling
the issues raised in this appeal, it is necessary to have some
familiarization with the distinctions between donationsinter
vivosandmortis causabecause the Code prescribes different
formalities for the two kinds of donations. An utter vivos donation
of real property must be evidenced by a public document and should
be accepted by the donee in the same deed of donation or in a
separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be
notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step
should be noted in both instruments. (Art. 749, Civil Code. As
tointer vivosdonation of personal property, see art. 748).On the
other hand, a transfermortis causashould be embodied in a last will
and testament (Art. 728,supra). It should not be called
donationmortis causa. It is in reality a legacy (5 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 6th Ed., p. 107). If not embodied in a valid will, the
donation is void (Narag vs. Cecilio, 109 Phil. 299; Aznar vs.
Sucilla 102 Phil. 902; Tuazon vs. Posadas, 54 Phil. 289; Serrano
vs. Solomon, 105 Phil. 998, 1002).This Court advised notaries to
apprise donors of the necessity of clearly specifying whether,
notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to
control and dispose at will of the property before their death,
without the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the
reservation of such right would be a conclusive indication that the
transfer' would be effective only at the donor's death, and,
therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed;
while,a converso,the express waiver of the right of free
disposition would place theinter vivoscharacter of the donation
beyond dispute (Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68,72).From the
aforequoted articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time
of effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a
donationinter vivosfrom a donationmortis causa. And the effectivity
is determined by the time when the full or naked ownership (dominum
plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties is
transmitted to the donees. (See Lopez vs. Olbes, 15 Phil. 540;
Gonzales and Fuster Fabra vs. Gonzales Mondragon, 35 Phil. 105).
The execution of a public instrument is a mode of delivery or
tradition (Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 46).If the donation
is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the
full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the
donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time
that the donation takes effect, and it is a donationmortis
causawhich should be embodied in a last will and testament (Bonsato
vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).But if the donation takes
effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) )
of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's
lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of
donation, then the donation isinter vivos(Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, L-20122, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1076).The effectivity of
the donation should be ascertained from the deed of donation and
the circumstances surrounding its execution. Where, for example, it
is apparent from the document of trust that the donee's acquisition
of the property or right accrued immediately upon the effectivity
of the instrument and not upon the donor's death, the donation
isinter vivos(Kiene vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 97 Phil.
352).There used to be a prevailing notion, spawned by a study of
Roman Law, that the Civil Code recognizes a donation mortis as a
juridical act in contraposition to a donation inter vivos. That
impression persisted because the implications of article 620 of the
Spanish Civil Code, now article 728, that "las donaciones que hayan
de producir sus efectos pro muerte del donante participan de la
naturaleza de las disposiciones de ultima voluntad, y se regiran
por las reglas establecidas en el capitulo de la sucesion
testamentaria" had not been fully expounded in the law schools.
Notaries assumed that the donationmortis causaof the Roman Law was
incorporated into the Civil Code.As explained by Justice J. B. L.
Reyes in the Bonsato case,supra, article 620 broke away from the
Roman Law tradition and followed the French doctrine that no one
may both donate and retain. Article 620 merged donationsmortis
causawith testamentary dispositions and thus suppressed the said
donations as an independent legal concept. Castan Tobenas says:(b)
Subsisten hoy en nuestro Derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De lo
que acabamos de decir se desprende que las donacionesmortis
causahan perdido en el Codigo civil su caracter distintivo y su
naturaleza, y hay que considerarlas hoy como una institucion
suspirimida, refundida en la del legado. ...La tesis de la
desaparicion de las donacionesmortis causaen nuestro Codigo Civil,
acusada ya precedentemente por el projecto de 1851, puede decirse
que constituye unacommunis opinioentre nuestros expositores,
incluso los mas recientes. ...Garcia Goyena, comentando dicho
proyecto, decia que la Comision se habia adherido al acuerdo de
suprimir las donacionesmortis causa, seguido por casi todos los
Codigos modernos. Las donacionesmortis causa a;adia-eran una
especie demontsruoentre los contratos y ultimas voluntades; las
algarabia del Derecho romano y patrio sobre los puntos de
semenjanza y disparidad de estas donaciones con los pactos y
legados no podia producir sino dudas, confusion y pleitos en los
rarisimos casos que ocurriesen por la dificuldad de apreciar y
fijar sus verdaderos caracteres' "(4 Derecho Civil Espanol, Comun y
Foral, 8th Ed., 1956, pp. 182-3).Manresa is more explicit. He says
that "la disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: (1)
que han desaperacido las llamadas antes donacionesmortis causa, por
lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; (2) que toda
disposicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue las reglas
establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria" (5 Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Espanol, 6th Ed., p.107). Note that the Civil Code
does not use the term donationmortis causa. ( Section 1536 of the
Revised Administrative Code in imposing the inheritance tax uses
the term "giftmortis causa").lwphl@itWhat are the distinguishing
characteristics of a donationmortis causa? Justice Reyes in the
Bonsato case says that in a dispositionpost mortem(1) the transfer
conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the tansferor, or the transferor (meaning testator) retains the
ownership, full or naked (domino absoluto or nuda proprietas)
(Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108; De Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil. 633;
(2) the transfer is revocable before the transferor's death and
revocabllity may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista
vs. Sabiniano, 92 Phil. 244), and (3) the transfer would be void if
the transferor survived the transferee.In other words, in a
donationmortis causait is the donor's death that determines that
acquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the
donation is revocable at the donor's will, Where the donation took
effect immediately upon the donee's acceptance thereof and it was
subject to the resolutory condition that the donation would be
revoked if the donee did not give the donor a certain quantity of
rice or a sum of money, the donation isinter vivos(Zapanta vs.
Posadas, Jr., 52 Phil. 557).Justice Reyes in the subsequent cast
ofPuig vs. Penaflorida, L-15939, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 276,
synthesized the rules as follows:1. That the Civil Code recognizes
only gratuitous transfers of property which are effected by means
of donationsinter vivosor by last will and testament executed with
the requisite legal formalities.2. That ininter vivosdonations the
act is immediately operative even if the material or physical
deliver (execution) of the property may be deferred until the
donor's death, whereas, in a testamentary disposition, nothing is
conveyed to the grantee and nothing is acquired by him until the
death of the grantortestator. The disposition is ambulatory and not
final.3. That in amortis causadisposition the conveyance or
alienation should be (expressly or by necessary implication)
revocablead nutumor at the discretion of the grantor or so called
donor if he changes his mind (Bautista vs. Saniniano, 92 Phil.
244).4. That, consequently, the specification in the deed of the
cases whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that
the donation isinter vivosand not amortis causadisposition (Zapanta
vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557).5. That the designation of the donation
asmortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect the
donation "is to take effect at the death of the donor", is not a
controlling criterion because those statements are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument in order to give effect to
the real intent of the transferor (Laureta vs. Mata and Mango, 44
Phil. 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823; Cuevas vs.
Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68).6. That a conveyance for an onerous
consideration is governed by the rules of contracts and not by
those of donations or testaments (Carlos vs. Ramil, 20 Phil. 183;
Manalo vs. De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495).7. That in case of doubt the
conveyance should be deemed a donationinter vivosrather thanmortis
causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.It may be added that the fact that the
donation is given in consideration of love and affection or past or
future services is not a characteristic of donationsinter
vivosbecause transfersmortis causamay be made also for those
reasons. There is difficulty in applying the distinctions to
controversial cases because it is not easy sometimes to ascertain
when the donation takes effect or when the full or naked title
passes to the transferee. As Manresa observes, "when the time fixed
for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at
the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related
to his death, confusion might arise" (5 Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p.
108).The existence in the deed of donation of conflicting
stipulations as to its effectivity may generate doubt as to the
donor's intention and as to the nature of the donation (Concepcion
vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823).Where the donor declared in the deed
that the conveyance wasmortis causaand forbade the registration of
the deed before her death, the clear inference is that the
conveyance was not intended to produce any definitive effect nor to
pass any interest to the grantee except after her death. In such a
case, the grantor's reservation of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime means that the transfer is not binding
on her until she dies. It does not mean that the title passed to
the grantee during her lifetime. (Ubalde Puig vs. Magbanua
Penaflorida, L-15939, Resolution of January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA
136).In the following cases, the conveyance was considered a
voidmortis causatransfer because it was not cast in the form of a
last will and testament as required in article 728, formerly
article 620:(a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that
the donor wanted to give the donee something "to take effect after
his death" and that "this donation shall produce effect only by and
because of the death of the donor, the property herein donated to
pass title after the donor's death" (Howard vs. Padilla, 96 Phil.
983). In the Padilla case the donation was regarded asmortis
causaalthough the donated property was delivered to the donee upon
the execution of the deed and although the donation was accepted in
the same deed.(b) Where it was provided that the donated properties
would be given to the donees after the expiration of thirty days
from the donor's death, the grant was made in the future tense, and
the word "inherit" was used (Carino vs. Abaya, 70 Phil. 182).(c)
Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated
properties and the products thereof. Such reservation is tantamount
to a reservation of the right to revoke the donation (Bautista vs.
Sabiniano 92 Phil. 244).(d) Where the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed of donation reveal that the donation could
not have taken effect before the donor's death and the rights to
dispose of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained
with the donor during her lifetime (David vs. Sison, 76 Phil.
418).But if the deed of donation makes an actual conveyance of the
property to the donee, subject to a life estate in the donors, the
donation is isinter vivos(Guarin vs. De Vera, 100 Phil.
1100).Articles 729, 730 and 731 have to some extent dissipated the
confusion surrounding the two kinds of donation. The rule in
article 729 is a crystallization of the doctrine announced in
decided cases.A clear instance where the donor made aninter
vivosdonation is found in De Guzman vs. Ibea 67 Phil. 633. In that
case, it was provided in the deed that the donor donated to the
donee certain properties so that the donee "may hold the same as
her own and always" and that the donee would administer the lands
donated and deliver the fruits thereof to the donor, as long as the
donor was alive, but upon the donor's death the said fruits would
belong to the donee. It was held that the naked ownership was
conveyed to the donee upon the execution of the deed of donation
and, therefore, the donation became effective during the donor's
lifetime.InSambaan vs. Villanueva, 71 Phil. 303, the deed of
donation, as in Balaqui vs. Dongso, 53 Phil. 673, contained
conflicting provision. It was provided in the deed that the
donation was made "en consideracion al afecto y carino" of the
donor for the donee but that the donation "surtira efectos despues
de ocurrida mi muerte (donor's death).That donation was held to
beinter vivosbecause death was not the consideration for the
donation but rather the donor's love and affection for the donee.
The stipulation that the properties would be delivered only after
the donor's death was regarded as a mere modality of the contract
which did not change itsinter vivoscharacter. The donor had stated
in the deed that he was donating, ceding and transferring the
donated properties to the donee. (See Joya vs. Tiongco, 71 Phil.
379).In Laureta vs. Mata and Magno, 44 Phil. 668 the deed of
donation provided that the donor was donatingmortis causacertain
properties as a reward for the donee's services to the donor and as
a token of the donor's affection for him. The donation was made
under the condition that "the donee cannot take possession of the
properties donated before the death of the donor"; that the ' donee
should cause to be held annually masses for the repose of the
donor's soul, and that he should defray the expenses for the
donor's funeral.It was held that the said donation wasinter
vivosdespite the statement in the deed that it wasmortis causa. The
donation was construed as a conveyance inpraesenti("a present grant
of a future interest") because it conveyed to the donee the title
to the properties donated "subject only to the life estate of the
donor" and because the conveyance took effect upon the making and
delivery of the deed. The acceptance of the donation was a
circumstance which was taken into account in characterizing the
donation as inter vivos.InBalacui vs. Dongso,supra, the deed of
donation involved was more confusing than that found in
theLauretacase. In theBalaquicase, it was provided in the deed that
the donation was made in consideration of the services rendered to
the donor by the donee; that "title" to the donated properties
would not pass to the donee during the donor's lifetime, and that
it would be only upon the donor's death that the donee would become
the "true owner" of the donated properties. However, there was the
stipulation that the donor bound herself to answer to the donee for
the property donated and that she warranted that nobody would
disturb or question the donee's right.Notwithstanding the provision
in the deed that it was only after the donor's death when the
'title' to the donated properties would pass to the donee and when
the donee would become the owner thereof, it was held in the
Balaqui case that the donation was inter vivos.It was noted in that
case that the donor, in making a warranty, implied that the title
had already been conveyed to the donee upon the execution of the
deed and that the donor merely reserved to herself the "possesion
and usufruct" of the donated properties.In Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, it was provided in the deed of donation,
which was also styled asmortis causa, that the donation was made in
consideration of the services rendered by the donee to the donor
and of the donor's affection for the donee; that the donor had
reserved what was necessary for his maintenance, and that the
donation "ha de producir efectos solamente por muerte de la
donante".It was ruled that the donation wasinter vivosbecause the
stipulation that the donation would take effect only after the
donor's death "simply meant that the possession and enjoyment, of
the fruits of the properties donated' should take effect only after
the donor's death and not before".Resolution of the instant case.
The donation in the instant case isinter vivosbecause it took
effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was already effective
during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of
the deed, as shown by the granting,habendumand warranty clause of
the deed (quoted below).In that clause it is stated that, in
consideration of the affection and esteem of the donors for the
donees and the valuable services rendered by the donees to the
donors, the latter, by means of the deed of donation,
wholeheartedly transfer and unconditionally give to the donees the
lots mentioned and described in the early part of the deed, free
from any kind of liens and debts:Na dahil at alang-alang sa
pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglay ng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS)
sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa tapat at mahalagang
paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahon na ginawa ng huli sa una
ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng
pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat at lubos na
ibinibigay sa nasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at
makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at
pagkakautang, katulad nito:Following the above-ousted
granting,habendumand warranty clause is the donors' declaration
that they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No. 2502, the property in
litigation, in equal shares to their children Angel Diaz and Andrea
Diaz, the western part to Angel and the eastern part to Andrea.The
acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter
vivos. Donationsmortis causa, being in the form of a will, are
never accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.In the
acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they accept the
donation to their entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed,
they acknowledge and give importance to the generosity and
solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thank them.In
thereddendumor reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is
stipulated that the donees would shoulder the expenses for the
illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot
sell to a third person the donated properties during the donors'
lifetime but if the sale is necessary to defray the expenses and
support of the donors, then the sale is valid.The limited right to
dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees,
implies that ownership had passed to them by means of' the donation
and that, therefore, the donation was already effective during the
donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter
vivos.However, paragraph 3 of thereddendumin or reservation clause
provides that "also, while we, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa
Mendoza, are alive, our administration, right, and ownership of the
lots mentioned earlier as our properties shall continue but, upon
our death, the right and ownership of the donees to each of the
properties allocated to each of them shall be fully effective." The
foregoing is the translation of the last paragraph of the deed of
donation which reads:(3) Gayun din samantalang kaming mag-asawang
Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza ay buhay, patuloy and aming
pamamahala, karapatan, at pagkamayari sa mga nasabing pagaari na
sinasaysay sa unahan nito na pagaari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay
bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong Dios at mamatay na, ang mga karapatan
at pagkamayari ng bawa't pinagkalooban (Donatorios) sa bawa't
pagaari nauukol sa bawa't isa ay may lubos na
kapangyarihan.Evidently, the draftsman of the deed did not realize
the discordant and ambivalent provisions thereof. Thehabendumclause
indicates the transfer of the ownership over the donated properties
to the donees upon the execution of the deed. But
thereddendumclause seems to imply that the ownership was retained
by the donors and would be transferred to the donees only after
their death.We have reflected on the meaning of the said
contradictory clauses. All the provisions of the deed, like those
of a statute and testament, should be construed together in order
to ascertain the intention of the parties. That task would have
been rendered easier if the record shows the conduct of the donors
and the donees after the execution of the deed of donation.But the
record is silent on that point, except for the allegation of Angel
Diaz in his answer (already mentioned) that he received his share
of the disputed lot long before the donors' death and that he had
been "openly and adversely occupying" his share "for more than
twenty years". (Andrea Diaz on page 17 of her brief in L-33849
states that the donees took possession of their respective shares
as stipulated in the deed of donation. Pages 3,4,18 and 19, tsn
March, 1971).Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of
thereddendumor reservation clause refers to thebeneficial
ownership(dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what
the donors reserved to themselves, by means of that clause, was the
management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof. But,
notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as shown in
thehabendumclause, was already effective during their lifetime and
was not made in contemplation of their death because the deed
transferred to the donees the naked ownership of the donated
properties.That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in
the deed of donation, out of the eight lots owned by the donors,
only five were donated. Three lots, Lots Nos. 4168, 2522 and 2521
were superflously reserved for the spouses or donors in addition to
one- third of Lot No. 2377. If the deed of donation in question was
intended to be amortis causadisposition, then all the eight lots
would have been donated or devised to the three children and
daughter-in-law of the donors.The trial court's conclusion that the
said deed of donation, although void as a donationinter vivosis
valid "as an extrajudicial partition among the parents and their
children" is not well-taken. Article 1080 of the Civil Code
provides that 46 should a person make a partition ofhis estateby an
actinter vivosor by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs."We have already observed that the said donation was not a
partition of the entire estate of the Diaz spouses since, actually,
only five of the eight lots, constituting their estate, were
partitioned. Hence, that partition is not the one contemplated in
article 1080.There is another circumstance which strengthens ' the
view that the1949deed of donation in question took effect during
the donors' lifetime. It may he noted that in that deed Lot No.
2377 (items 3 and [c]) was divided into three equal parts:
one-third was donated to Andrea Diaz and one-third to Angel Diaz.
The remaining one-third was reserved and retained by the donors,
the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severo Mendoza, for their support. That
reserved one-third portion came to be known as Lot No.
2377-A.In1964or after the death of Gabino Diaz, his surviving
spouse Severa Mendoza executed a donationmortis causawherein she
conveyed to her daughter, Andrea Diaz (plaintiff-appellant herein),
her one-half share in Lot No. 2377-A, which one-half share is known
as Lot No. 2377-A-1, the other half or Lot No. 2377-A-2 having been
already conveyed to Angel Diaz.That disposition of Lot No. 2377-A-2
clearly implies that the conveyance in the 1949 deed of donation as
to Lot No. 2377 took effect during the lifetime of the donors,
Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, and proves that the 1949 donation
was inter vivos.The instant case has a close similarity to the
pre-war cases already cited and to three post-liberation cases. In
theBonsatocase, the deed of donation also contained contradictory
dispositions which rendered the deed susceptible of being construed
as a donationinter vivosor as a donation causa.It was stated in one
part of the deed that the donor was executing "una donacion
perfects e irrevocable consumada" in favor of the donee in
consideration of his past services to the donor; that at the time
of the execution of the deed, the donor "ha entregado" to the donee
"dichos terrenos donados'; that while the donor was alive, he would
receive the share of the fruits corresponding to the owner; and
"que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatario Felipe Bonsato
tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor".
These provisions indicate that the donation in question wasinter
vivosHowever, in the last clause of the deed in the Bonsato case
(as in the instant case), it was provided 'que despues de la muerte
del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe
Bonsato tendra todos log derechos de dichos terrernos en concepto
de dueno absolute de la propriedad libre de toda responsabilidad y
gravemen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente". These
provisions would seem to show that the donation wasmortis
causa.Nevertheless, it was held in the Bonsato case that the
donation wasinter vivosbecause (1) the ownership of the things
donated passed to the donee; (2) it was not provided that the
transfer was revocable before the donor's death, and (3) it was not
stated that the transfer would be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.It was further held in theBonsatocase that
the stipulation "que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en
vigor dicha donacion", should be interpreted together with the
prior provision regarding its irrevocable and consummated
character, and that would mean that the charge or condition as to
the donor's share of the fruits would be terminated upon the
donor's death.ThePuigcase,supra, is even more doubtful and
controversial than the instant case. In thePuigcase, the donor,
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon, in a deed entitled "DonacionMortis
causadated November 24, 1948 cede y transfiere en concepto de
donacionmortis causato the donee, Estela Magbanua Penaflorida three
parcels of land in consideration of the donee's past services and
the donor's love and affection for the latter.It was stipulated in
the deed that thedonorcould alienate or mortgage the donated
properties "cuando y si necesita fondos para satisfacer sus
proprias necesidades sin que para ello tega que intervener la
Donataria, pues su consentimiento se sobre entiende aqui parte de
que la donacion que aqui se hace esmortis causa, es decir que la
donacion surtira sus efectos a la muerte de la donante". It was
repeated in another clause of the deed "que lacesion y
transferencia aqui provista surtira efecto al fallecer la
Donante".It was further stipulated that the donee would defray the
medical and funeral expen of the donor unless the donor had funds
in the bank or "haya cosecho levantada or recogida en cual caso
dichos recursos responderan portales gastos a disposicion y
direccion de la donataria". Another provision of the deed was that
it would be registered only after the donor's death. In the same
deed the donee accepted the donation.In the Puig case the donor in
another deed entitled Escritura de Donacionmortis causa" dated
December 28, 1949 donated to the same donee, Estela Magbanua
Penaflorida three parcels of land en concepto de una donacionmortis
causa" in consideration of past services. It was provided in the
deed "que antes de su nuerte la donante, podra enajenar vender
traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquiera persona o entidades los bienes
aqui donados a favor de la donataria en concepto de una
donacionmortis causa". The donee accepted the donation in the same
deed.After the donor's death both deeds were recorded in the
registry of deeds. In the donor's will dated March 26, 1951, which
was duly probated, the donation of a parcel of land in the second
deed of donation was confirmed.Under these facts, it was held that
the 1948 deed of donationmortis causawasinter vivosin character in
spite of repeated expressions therein that it was amortis
causadonation and that it would take effect only upon the donor's
death. Those expressions were not regarded as controlling because
they were contradicted by the provisions that the donee would
defray the donor's expenses even if not connected with her illness
and that the donee's husband would assume her obligations under the
deed, should the donee predecease the donor. Moreover, the donor
did not reserve in the deed the absolute right to revoke the
donation.But the1949deed of donation was declared void because it
was a true conveyancemortis causawhich was not embodied in a last
will and testament. Themortis causacharacter of the disposition is
shown by the donor's reservation of the right to alienate or
encumber the donated properties to any person or entity.In
theCuevascase,supra, one Antonina Cuevas executed on September 18,
1950 a notarial conveyance styled as "DonacionMortis causa" where
she ceded to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas a parcel of unregistered
land. Crispulo accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Subsequently, or on May 26, 1952, the donor revoked the
donation.The deed of donation in theCuevascase contained the
following provisions which, as in similar cases, are susceptible of
being construed as making the conveyance aninter vivosor amortis
causatransfer:"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako
ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin
ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabajo, makikinabang at
ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang
hindi ako binabawian ng buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko
nga iyaalis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa
kaniya."Translation"Crispulo Cuevas should know that while I am
alive, the land which I donated to him will still be under my
continued possession; I will be the one to have it cultivated; I
will enjoy its fruits and all the other rights of ownership until
Providence deprives me of life and I cannot take away the property
from him because when I die I reserve the property for him."
(sic)It was held that the donation wasinter vivosbecause the phrase
"hindi ko nga iyaalis (I will not take away the property") meant
that the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of
the property in favor of another person and thereby manifested the
irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the donee.
The donor retained the beneficial ownership ordominium utileBeing
aninter vivosdonation, it could be revoked by the donor only on the
grounds specified by law. No such grounds existed. The donee was
not guilty of ingratitude. The other point to be disposed of is the
matter of the claim for attorney's fees of Andrea Diaz against the
Alejandro intervenors.The other point to be disposed of is the
matter of the claim for attorney's fees of Andrea Diaz against the
Alejandro intervenors.After a careful consideration of the facts
and circumstances of the case, particularly the apparent good faith
of the Alejandro intervenors in asserting a one-third interest in
the disputed lot and their close relationship to Andrea Diaz, we
find that it is not proper to require them to pay attorney's fees
(Salao vs. Salao, L-26699, March 16, 1976, 70 SCRA 65). (Andrea
Diaz did not implead Angel Diaz as a respondent in her petition for
review.)WHEREFORE, the trial court's amended decision is reversed
insofar as it pronounces that the deed of donation is void. That
donation is declared valid as a donationinter vivos.The disputed
lot should be partitioned in accordance with that deed between
Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.The decision is affirmed insofar as it
does not require the Alejandro intervenors to pay attorney's fees
to Andrea Diaz. No costs. SO ORDERED.Fernando (Chairman), Barredo,
Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.Separate
OpinionsANTONIO,J.,concurring:I concur. I agree that all the
features pointed out by Justice Aquino indicate that the conveyance
was intended to produce definitive effect upon the execution of
said instrument. For the important characteristic of a
donationinter vivosis that it takes effect independently of the
donor's death. Thus, when the donor states that he donates the
properties subject to the "condition that the donee cannot take ion
of the properties donated until after my death'.1or the ownership
and possession of the property, as wen as its administration,. were
turned over to the donee, but the right to reap and dispose of the
fruits was deferred until after the death of the donor2or when it
was expressly stated that the donation would take effect upon
acceptance, but would be revokedipso factoupon the non-fulfillment
of certain conditions,3it has been held that the donation is inter
vivos, and the ownership over the property donated is transferred
to the donee.4A donationinter vivosis a gratuitous contract whereby
the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing
given in favor of the donee and, therefore, like any other
contract, requires the concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the
parties, and does not become perfect until it is accepted by the
donee.5As observed by Manresa,6upon acceptance by the donee, the
donor can no longer withdraw, and he can be compelled to comply
with his offering or to deliver the things he wanted to donate.
Consequently, it may not be revoked unilaterally or by the sole and
arbitrary will of the donor. The donation, however, may be made
revocable upon the fulfillment of resolutory conditions,7or may be
revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765
of the Civil Code. As explained inBautista, et al. v.
Sabiniano,8except "in the instances expressly provided by law, such
as the subsequent birth of children of the donor, failure by the
donee to comply with the conditions imposed, ingratitude of the
donee and reduction of the donation in the event of inofficiousness
thereof, a donation is irrevocable. If the donor reserves the right
to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the
properties purportedly donated, there is no donation. If the
disposition or conveyance or transfer takes effect. upon the
donor's death and becomesirrevocableonly upon his death, it is
notinter vivosbut amortis causadonation." Here, the conveyance or
alienation of the properties donated is not revocablead
nutumSeparate OpinionsANTONIO,J.,concurring:I concur. I agree that
all the features pointed out by Justice Aquino indicate that the
conveyance was intended to produce definitive effect upon the
execution of said instrument. For the important characteristic of a
donationinter vivosis that it takes effect independently of the
donor's death. Thus, when the donor states that he donates the
properties subject to the "condition that the donee cannot take ion
of the properties donated until after my death'.1or the ownership
and possession of the property, as wen as its administration,. were
turned over to the donee, but the right to reap and dispose of the
fruits was deferred until after the death of the donor2or when it
was expressly stated that the donation would take effect upon
acceptance, but would be revokedipso factoupon the non-fulfillment
of certain conditions,3it has been held that the donation is inter
vivos, and the ownership over the property donated is transferred
to the donee.4A donationinter vivosis a gratuitous contract whereby
the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing
given in favor of the donee and, therefore, like any other
contract, requires the concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the
parties, and does not become perfect until it is accepted by the
donee.5As observed by Manresa,6upon acceptance by the donee, the
donor can no longer withdraw, and he can be compelled to comply
with his offering or to deliver the things he wanted to donate.
Consequently, it may not be revoked unilaterally or by the sole and
arbitrary will of the donor. The donation, however, may be made
revocable upon the fulfillment of resolutory conditions,7or may be
revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765
of the Civil Code. As explained inBautista, et al. v.
Sabiniano,8except "in the instances expressly provided by law, such
as the subsequent birth of children of the donor, failure by the
donee to comply with the conditions imposed, ingratitude of the
donee and reduction of the donation in the event of inofficiousness
thereof, a donation is irrevocable. If the donor reserves the right
to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the
properties purportedly donated, there is no donation. If the
disposition or conveyance or transfer takes effect. upon the
donor's death and becomesirrevocableonly upon his death, it is
notinter vivosbut amortis causadonation." Here, the conveyance or
alienation of the properties donated is not revocablead nutum
G.R. No. L-36770 November 4, 1932LUIS W.
DISON,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of
Internal Revenue,defendant-appellant.Marcelino Aguas for
plaintiff-appellant.Attorney-General Jaranilla for
defendant-appellant.BUTTE,J.:This is an appeal from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of the defendant
Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, in a suit filed
by the plaintiffs, Luis W. Dison, for the recovery of an
inheritance tax in the sum of P2,808.73 paid under protest. The
petitioner alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal because
he received the property, which is the basis of the tax, from his
father before his death by a deed of giftinter vivoswhich was duly
accepted and registered before the death of his father. The
defendant answered with a general denial and with a counterdemand
for the sum of P1,245.56 which it was alleged is a balance still
due and unpaid on account of said tax. The plaintiff replied to the
counterdemand with a general denial. The courta quoheld that the
cause of action set up in the counterdemand was not proven and
dismissed the same. Both sides appealed to this court, but the
cross-complaint and appeal of the Collector of Internal Revenue
were dismissed by this court on March 17, 1932, on motion of the
Attorney-General.1awphil.netThe only evidence introduced at the
trial of this cause was the proof of payment of the tax under
protest, as stated, and the deed of gift executed by Felix Dison on
April 9, 1928, in favor of his sons Luis W. Dison, the
plaintiff-appellant. This deed of gift transferred twenty-two
tracts of land to the donee, reserving to the donor for his life
the usufruct of three tracts. This deed was acknowledged by the
donor before a notary public on April 16, 1928. Luis W. Dison, on
April 17, 1928, formally accepted said gift by an instrument in
writing which he acknowledged before a notary public on April 20,
1928.At the trial the parties agreed to and filed the following
ingenious stipulation of fact:1. That Don Felix Dison died on April
21, 1928;2. That Don Felix Dison, before his death, made a
giftinter vivosin favor of the plaintiff Luis W. Dison of all his
property according to a deed of gift (Exhibit D) which includes all
the property of Don Felix Dizon;3. That the plaintiff did not
receive property of any kind of Don Felix Dison upon the death of
the latter;4. That Don Luis W. Dison was the legitimate and only
child of Don Felix Dison.It is inferred from Exhibit D that Felix
Dison was a widower at the time of his death.The theory of the
plaintiff-appellant is that he received and holds the property
mentioned by a consummated gift and that Act No. 2601 (Chapter 40
of the Administrative Code) being the inheritance tax statute, does
not tax gifts. The provision directly here involved is section 1540
of the Administrative Code which reads as follows:Additions of
Gifts and Advances. After the aforementioned deductions have been
made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all
gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any of those who,
after his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devises, legatees, or
doneesmortis causa.The question to be resolved may be stated thus:
Does section 1540 of the Administrative Code subject the
plaintiff-appellant to the payment of an inheritance tax?The
appellant argues that there is no evidence in this case to support
a finding that the gift was simulated and that it was an artifice
for evading the payment of the inheritance tax, as is intimated in
the decision of the court below and the brief of the
Attorney-General. We see no reason why the court may not go behind
the language in which the transaction is masked in order to
ascertain its true character and purpose. In this case the scanty
facts before us may not warrant the inference that the conveyance,
acknowledged by the donor five days before his death and accepted
by the donee one day before the donor's death, was fraudulently
made for the purpose of evading the inheritance tax. But the facts,
in our opinion, do warrant the inference that the transfer was an
advancement upon the inheritance which the donee, as the sole and
forced heir of the donor, would be entitled to receive upon the
death of the donor.The argument advanced by the appellant that he
is not an heir of his deceased father within the meaning of section
1540 of the Administrative Code because his father in his lifetime
had given the appellant all his property and left no property to be
inherited, is so fallacious that the urging of it here casts a
suspicion upon the appellants reason for completing the legal
formalities of the transfer on the eve of the latter's death. We do
not know whether or not the father in this case left a will; in any
event, this appellant could not be deprived of his share of the
inheritance because the Civil Code confers upon him the status of a
forced heir. We construe the expression in section 1540 "any of
those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs", to
include those who, by our law, are given the status and rights of
heirs, regardless of the quantity of property they may receive as
such heirs. That the appellant in this case occupies the status of
heir to his deceased father cannot be questioned. Construing the
conveyance here in question, under the facts presented, as an
advance made by Felix Dison to his only child, we hold section 1540
to be applicable and the tax to have been properly assessed by the
Collector of Internal Revenue.This appeal was originally assigned
to a Division of five but referred to the courtin bancby reason of
the appellant's attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540.
This attack is based on the sole ground that insofar as section
1540 levies a tax upon giftsinter vivos, it violates that provision
of section 3 of the organic Act of the Philippine Islands (39 Stat.
L., 545) which reads as follows: "That no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embraced more than one subject, and that subject
shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Neither the title of
Act No. 2601 nor chapter 40 of the Administrative Code makes any
reference to a tax on gifts. Perhaps it is enough to say of this
contention that section 1540 plainly does not tax giftsper sebut
only when those gifts are made to those who shall prove to be the
heirs, devisees, legatees or doneesmortis causaof the donor. This
court said in the case of Tuason and Tuasonvs.Posadas 954 Phil.,
289):lawphil.netWhen the law saysall gifts, it doubtless refers to
giftsinter vivos, and notmortis causa. Both the letter and the
spirit of the law leave no room for any other interpretation. Such,
clearly, is the tenor of the language which refers to donations
that took effect before the donor's death, and not tomortis
causadonations, which can only be made with the formalities of a
will, and can only take effect after the donor's death. Any other
construction would virtually change this provision into:". . .
there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all
giftsmortis causa. . . made by the predecessor to those who, after
his death, shall prove to be his . . . doneesmortis causa." We
cannot give to the law an interpretation that would so vitiate its
language. The truth of the matter is that in this section (1540)
the law presumes that such gifts have been made in anticipation of
inheritance, devise, bequest, or giftmortis causa, when the donee,
after the death of the donor proves to be his heir, devisee or
doneemortis causa, for the purpose of evading the tax, and it is to
prevent this that it provides that they shall be added to the
resulting amount." However much appellant's argument on this point
may fit his preconceived notion that the transaction between him
and his father was a consummated gift with no relation to the
inheritance, we hold that there is not merit in this attack upon
the constitutionality of section 1540 under our view of the facts.
No other constitutional questions were raised in this case.The
judgment below is affirmed with costs in this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad
Santos, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.G.R. No. L-34937 March
13, 1933CONCEPCION VIDAL DE ROCES and her husband,MARCOS ROCES, and
ELVIRA VIDAL DE RICHARDS,plaintiff-appellants,vs.JUAN POSADAS, JR.,
Collector of Internal Revenue,defendant-appellee.Feria and La O for
appellants.Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.IMPERIAL,J.:The
plaintiffs herein brought this action to recover from the
defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, certain sums of money
paid by them under protest as inheritance tax. They appealed from
the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the action, without costs.On March 10 and 12, 1925,
Esperanza Tuazon, by means of public documents, donated certain
parcels of land situated in Manila to the plaintiffs herein, who,
with their respective husbands, accepted them in the same public
documents, which were duly recorded in the registry of deeds. By
virtue of said donations, the plaintiffs took possession of the
said lands, received the fruits thereof and obtained the
corresponding transfer certificates of title.On January 5, 1926,
the donor died in the City of Manila without leaving any forced
heir and her will which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to
each of the donees the sum of P5,000. After the estate had been
distributed among the instituted legatees and before delivery of
their respective shares, the appellee herein, as Collector of
Internal Revenue, ruled that the appellants, as donees and
legatees, should pay as inheritance tax the sums of P16,673 and
P13,951.45, respectively. Of these sums P15,191.48 was levied as
tax on the donation to Concepcion Vidal de Roces and P1,481.52 on
her legacy, and, likewise, P12,388.95 was imposed upon the donation
made to Elvira Vidal de Richards and P1,462.50 on her legacy. At
first the appellants refused to pay the aforementioned taxes but,
at the insistence of the appellee and in order not to delay the
adjudication of the legacies, they agreed at last, to pay them
under protest.The appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint on the
ground that the facts alleged therein were not sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. After the legal questions raised
therein had been discussed, the court sustained the demurrer and
ordered the amendment of the complaint which the appellants failed
to do, whereupon the trial court dismissed the action on the ground
that the afore- mentioned appellants did not really have a right of
action.In their brief, the appellants assign only one alleged
error, to wit: that the demurrer interposed by the appellee was
sustained without sufficient ground.The judgment appealed from was
based on the provisions of section 1540 Administrative Code which
reads as follows:SEC. 1540.Additions of gifts and advances. After
the aforementioned deductions have been made, there shall be added
to the resulting amount the value of all gifts or advances made by
the predecessor to any those who, after his death, shall prove to
be his heirs, devisees, legatees, or doneesmortis causa.The
appellants contend that the above-mentioned legal provision does
not include donationsinter vivosand if it does, it is
unconstitutional, null and void for the following reasons: first,
because it violates section 3 of the Jones Law which provides that
no law should embrace more than one subject, and that subject
should be expressed in the title thereof; second that the
Legislature has no authority to impose inheritance tax on
donationsinter vivos; and third, because a legal provision of this
character contravenes the fundamental rule of uniformity of
taxation. The appellee, in turn, contends that the words "all
gifts" refer clearly to donationsinter vivosand, in support of his
theory, cites the doctrine laid in the case ofTuason and Tuason vs.
Posadas(54 Phil., 289). After a careful study of the law and the
authorities applicable thereto, we are the opinion that neither
theory reflects the true spirit of the aforementioned provision.
The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the Revised Administration
Code are, obviously, those donationsinter vivosthat take effect
immediately or during the lifetime of the donor but are made in
consideration or in contemplation of death. Giftsinter vivos, the
transmission of which is not made in contemplation of the donor's
death should not be understood as included within the said legal
provision for the reason that it would amount to imposing a direct
tax on property and not on the transmission thereof, which act does
not come within the scope of the provisions contained in Article XI
of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which deals expressly with
the tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitionsmortis
causa.Our interpretation of the law is not in conflict with the
rule laid down in the case ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas,supra.
We said therein, as we say now, that the expression "all gifts"
refers to giftsinter vivosinasmuch as the law considers them as
advances on inheritance, in the sense that they are giftsinter
vivosmade in contemplation or in consideration of death. In that
case, it was not held that that kind of gifts consisted in those
made completely independent of death or without regard to it.Said
legal provision is not null and void on the alleged ground that the
subject matter thereof is not embraced in the title of the section
under which it is enumerated. On the contrary, its provisions are
perfectly summarized in the heading, "Tax on Inheritance, etc."
which is the title of Article XI. Furthermore, the constitutional
provision cited should not be strictly construed as to make it
necessary that the title contain a full index to all the contents
of the law. It is sufficient if the language used therein is
expressed in such a way that in case of doubt it would afford a
means of determining the legislators intention. (Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, Vol. II, p. 651.) Lastly, the circumstance
that the Administrative Code was prepared and compiled strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law on that matter
should not be overlooked and that, in a compilation of laws such as
the Administrative Code, it is but natural and proper that
provisions referring to diverse matters should be found. (Ayson and
Ignaciovs. Provincial Board of Rizal and Municipal Council of
Navotas, 39 Phil., 931.)The appellants question the power of the
Legislature to impose taxes on the transmission of real estate that
takes effect immediately and during the lifetime of the donor, and
allege as their reason that such tax partakes of the nature of the
land tax which the law has already created in another part of the
Administrative Code. Without making express pronouncement on this
question, for it is unnecessary, we wish to state that such is not
the case in these instance. The tax collected by the appellee on
the properties donated in 1925 really constitutes an inheritance
tax imposed on the transmission of said properties in contemplation
or in consideration of the donor's death and under the circumstance
that the donees were later instituted as the former's legatees. For
this reason, the law considers such transmissions in the form of
giftsinter vivos, as advances on inheritance and nothing therein
violates any constitutional provision, inasmuch as said legislation
is within the power of the Legislature.Property Subject to
Inheritance Tax. The inheritance tax ordinarily applies to all
property within the power of the state to reach passing by will or
the laws regulating intestate succession or by giftinter vivosin
the manner designated by statute, whether such property be real or
personal, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal. (26
R.C.L., p. 208, par. 177.)In the case ofTuason and Tuason vs.
Posadas,supra, it was also held that section 1540 of the
Administrative Code did not violate the constitutional provision
regarding uniformity of taxation. It cannot be null and void on
this ground because it equally subjects to the same tax all of
those donees who later become heirs, legatees or doneesmortis
causaby the will of the donor. There would be a repugnant and
arbitrary exception if the provisions of the law were not
applicable to all donees of the same kind. In the case cited above,
it was said: "At any rate the argument adduced against its
constitutionality, which is the lack of Uniformity, does not seem
to be well founded. It was said that under such an interpretation,
while a doneeinter vivoswho, after the predecessor's death proved
to be an heir, a legatee, or a doneemortis causa, would have to pay
the tax, another doneeinter vivoswho did not prove to he an heir, a
legatee, or a doneemortis causaof the predecessor, would be exempt
from such a tax. But as these are two different cases, the
principle of uniformity is inapplicable to them."The last question
of a procedural nature arising from the case at bar, which should
be passed upon, is whether the case, as it now stands, can be
decided on the merits or should be remanded to the courta quofor
further proceedings. According to our view of the case, it follows
that, if the gifts received by the appellants would have the right
to recover the sums of money claimed by them. Hence the necessity
of ascertaining whether the complaint contains an allegation to
that effect. We have examined said complaint and found nothing of
that nature. On the contrary, it be may be inferred from the
allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 7 thereof that said
donationsinter vivoswere made in consideration of the donor's
death. We refer to the allegations that such transmissions were
effected in the month of March, 1925, that the donor died in
January, 1926, and that the donees were instituted legatees in the
donor's will which was admitted to probate. It is from these
allegations, especially the last, that we infer a presumptionjuris
tantumthat said donations were mademortis causaand, as such, are
subject to the payment of inheritance tax.Wherefore, the demurrer
interposed by the appellee was well-founded because it appears that
the complaint did not allege fact sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. When the appellants refused to amend the same, spite of
the court's order to that effect, they voluntarily waived the
opportunity offered them and they are not now entitled to have the
case remanded for further proceedings, which would serve no purpose
altogether in view of the insufficiency of the complaint.Wherefore,
the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs of this
instance against the appellants. So ordered.Avancea, C.J.,
Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Buttes, JJ.,
concur.
Separate OpinionsVILLA-REAL,J.,dissenting:I sustain my
concurrence in Justice Street's dissenting opinion in the case
ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas(54 Phil., 289).The majority opinion
to distinguish the present case from above-mentioned case ofTuason
and Tuason vs. Posadas, by interpreting section 1540 of the
Administrative Code in the sense that it establishes the legal
presumptionjuris tantumthat all giftsinter vivosmade to persons who
are not forced heirs but who are instituted legatees in the donor's
will, have been made in contemplation of the donor's death.
Presumptions are of two kinds: One determined by law which is also
called presumption of law or of right; and another which is formed
by the judge from circumstances antecedent to, coincident with or
subsequent to the principal fact under investigation, which is also
called presumption of man(presuncion de hombre). (Escriche, Vol.
IV, p. 662.) The Civil Code as well as the code of Civil Procedure
establishes presumptionsjuris et de jureandjuris tantumwhich the
courts should take into account in deciding questions of law
submitted to them for decision. The presumption which majority
opinion wishes to draw from said section 1540 of the Administrative
Code can neither be found in this Code nor in any of the
aforementioned Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore,
said presumption cannot be called legal or of law. Neither can it
be called a presumption of man(presuncion de hombre)inasmuch as the
majority opinion did not infer it from circumstances antecedent to,
coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact with is the
donation itself. In view of the nature, mode of making and effects
of donationsinter vivos, the contrary presumption would be more
reasonable and logical; in other words, donationsinter vivosmade to
persons who are not forced heirs, but who are instituted legatees
in the donor's will, should be presumed as not mademortis causa,
unless the contrary is proven. In the case under consideration, the
burden of the proof rests with the person who contends that the
donationinter vivoshas been mademortis causa.It is therefore, the
undersigned's humble opinion that the order appealed from should be
reversed and the demurrer overruled, and the defendant ordered to
file his answer to the complaint.Street, J., concurs.Republic of
the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-9374 February
16, 1915FRANCISCO DEL VAL, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.ANDRES
DEL VAL,defendant-appellee.Ledesma, Lim and Irureta Goyena for
appellants.O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.MORELAND,J.:This is an
appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila dismissing the complaint with costs.The pleadings set
forth that the plaintiffs and defendant are brother and sisters;
that they are the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio
Nacianceno del Val, who died in Manila on August 4, 1910,
intestate; that an administrator was appointed for the estate of
the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed
and the administrator discharged by order of the Court of First
Instance dated December 9, 1911; that during the lifetime of the
deceased he took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000
and made it payable to the defendant as sole beneficiary; that
after his death the defendant collected the face of the policy;
that of said policy he paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain
real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a
right to repurchase; that the redemption of said premises was made
by the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and
the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor; that the redemption
of said premises they have had the use and benefit thereof; that
during that time the plaintiffs paid no taxes and made no
repairs.It further appears from the pleadings that the defendant,
on the death of the deceased, took possession of most of his
personal property, which he still has in his possession, and that
he has also the balance on said insurance policy amounting to
P21,634.80.Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance
policy belonged to the estate of the deceased and not to the
defendant personally; that, therefore, they are entitled to a
partition not only of the real and personal property, but also of
the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all
the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased; that
the defendant account for P21,634.80, and that that sum be divided
equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other
property of deceased.The defendant denies the material allegations
of the complaint and sets up as special defense and counterclaim
that the redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made
in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name
alone without his knowledge or consent; and that it was not his
intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the
benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is
the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property. He,
therefore, asks that he be declared the owner of the real estate
redeemed by the payment of the P18,365.20, the owner of the
remaining P21,634.80, the balance of the insurance policy, and that
the plaintiff's account for the use and occupation of the premises
so redeemed since the date of the redemption.The learned trial
court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the
action.It says in its opinion: "This purports to be an action for
partition, brought against an heir by his coheirs. The complaint,
however, fails to comply with Code Civ., Pro. sec. 183, in that it
does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of
which partition is demanded.' Because of this defect (which has not
been called to our attention and was discovered only after the
cause was submitted) it is more than doubtful whether any relief
can be awarded under the complaint, except by agreement of all the
parties."This alleged defect of the complaint was made one of the
two bases for the dismissal of the action.We do not regard this as
sufficient reason for dismissing the action. It is the doctrine of
this court, set down in several decisions, Lizarraga Hermanos vs.
Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504, that, even though the complaint is
defective to the extent of failing in allegations necessary to
constitute a cause of action, if, on the trial of the cause,
evidence is offered which establishes the cause of action which the
complaint intended to allege, and such evidence is received without
objection, the defect is thereby cured and cannot be made the
ground of a subsequent objection. If, therefore, evidence was
introduced on the trial in this case definitely and clearly
describing the real estate sought to be partitioned, the defect in
the complaint was cured in that regard and should not have been
used to dismiss the action. We do not stop to inquire whether such
evidence was or was not introduced on the trial, inasmuch as this
case must be turned for a new trial with opportunity to both
parties to present such evidence as is necessary to establish their
respective claims.The court in its decision further says: "It will
be noticed that the provision above quoted refers exclusively to
real estate. . . . It is, in other words, an exclusive real
property action, and the institution thereof gives the court no
jurisdiction over chattels. . . . But no relief could possibly be
granted in this action as to any property except the last (real
estate), for the law contemplated that all the personal property of
an estate be distributed before the administration is closed.
Indeed, it is only in exceptional cases that the partition of the
real estate is provided for, and this too is evidently intended to
be effected as a part of the administration, but here the complaint
alleges that the estate was finally closed on December 9, 1911, and
we find upon referring to the record in that case that subsequent
motion to reopen the same were denied; so that the matter of the
personal property at least must be consideredres judicata(for the
final judgment in the administration proceedings must be treated as
concluding not merely what was adjudicated, but what might have
been). So far, therefore, as the personal property at least is
concerned, plaintiffs' only remedy was an appeal from said
order."We do not believe that the law is correctly laid down in
this quotation. The courts of the Islands have jurisdiction to
divide personal property between the common owners thereof and that
power is as full and complete as is the power to partition real
property. If an actual partition of personal property cannot be
made it will be sold under the direction of the court and the
proceeds divided among the owners after the necessary expenses have
been deducted.The administration of the estate of the decedent
consisted simply, so far as the record shows, in the payment of the
debts. No division of the property, either real or personal, seems
to have been made. On the contrary, the property appears, from the
record, to have been turned over to the heirs in bulk. The failure
to partition the real property may have been due either to the lack
of request to the court by one or more of the heirs to do so, as
the court has no authority to make a partition of the real estate
without such request; or it may have been due to the fact that all
the real property of decedent had been sold underpacto de retroand
that, therefore, he was not the owner of any real estate at the
time of his death. As to the personal property, it does not appear
that it was disposed of in the manner provided by law. (Sec. 753,
Code of Civil Procedure.) So far as this action is concerned,
however, it is sufficient for us to know that none of the property
was actually divided among the heirs in the administration
proceeding and that they remain coowners and tenants-in- common
thereof at the present time. To maintain an action to partition
real or personal property it is necessary to show only that it is
owned in common.The order finally closing the administration and
discharging the administrator, referred to in the opinion of the
trial court, has nothing to do with the division of either the real
or the personal property. The heirs have the right to ask the
probate court to turn over to them both the real and personal
property without division; and where that request is unanimous it
is the duty of the court to comply with it, and there is nothing in
section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits it. In
such case an order finally settling the estate and discharging the
administrator would not bar a subsequent action to require a
division of either the real or personal property. If, on the other
hand, an order had been made in the administration proceedings
dividing the personal or the real property, or both, among the
heirs, then it is quite possible that, to a subsequent action
brought by one of the heirs for a partition of the real or personal
property, or both, there could have been interposed a plea ofres
judicatabased on such order. As the matter now stands, however,
there is no ground on which to base such a plea. Moreover, no such
plea has been made and no evidence offered to support it.With the
finding of the trial court that the proceeds of the life-insurance
policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual and
separate property, we agree. That the proceeds of an insurance
policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate
of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are
the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of
the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in
America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains in these Islands
by virtue of section 428 of the Code of Commerce, which reads:The
amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in
fulfillment of the contract, shall be the property of the latter,
even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors of any
kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor
of the former.It is claimed by the attorney for the plaintiffs that
the section just quoted is subordinate to the provisions of the
Civil Code as found in article 1035. This article reads:An heir by
force of law surviving with others of the same character to a
succession must bring into the hereditary estate the property or
securities he may have received from the deceased during the life
of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration,
in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the
account of the division.Counsel also claim that the proceeds of the
insurance policy were a donation or gift made by the father during
his lifetime to the defendant and that, as such, its ultimate
destination is determined by those provisions of the Civil Code
which relate to donations, especially article 819. This article
provides that "gifts made to children which are not betterments
shall be considered as part of their legal portion."We cannot agree
with these contentions. The contract of life insurance is a special
contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined
by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil
Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to
life- insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance
proceeds. That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of
Commerce which provides for the terms of the contract, the
relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of the
policy.The proceeds of the life-insurance policy being the
exclusive property of the defendant and he having used a portion
thereof in the repurchase of the real estate sold by the decedent
prior to his death with right to repurchase, and such repurchase
having been made and the conveyance taken in the names of all of
the heirs instead of the defendant alone, plaintiffs claim that the
property belongs to the heirs in common and not to the defendant
alone.We are not inclined to agree with this contention unless the
fact appear or be shown that the defendant acted as he did with the
intention that the other heirs should enjoy with him the ownership
of the estate in other words, that he proposed, in effect, to make
a gift of the real estate to the other heirs. If it is established
by the evidence that that was his intention and that the real
estate was delivered to the plaintiffs with that understanding,
then it is probable that their contention is correct and that they
are entitled to share equally with the defendant therein. If,
however, it appears from the evidence in the case that the
conveyances were taken in the name of the plaintiffs without his
knowledge or consent, or that it was not his intention to make a
gift to them of the real estate, then it belongs to him. If that
facts are as stated, he has two remedies. The one is to compel the
plaintiffs to reconvey to him and the other is to let the title
stand with them and to recover from them the sum he paid on their
behalf.For the complete and proper determination of the questions
at issue in this case, we are of the opinion that the cause should
be returned to the trial court with instructions to permit the
parties to frame such issues as will permit the settlement of all
the questions involved and to introduce such evidence as may be
necessary for the full determination of the issues framed. Upon
such issues and evidence taken thereunder the court will decide the
questions involved according to the evidence, subordinating his
conclusions of law to the rules laid down in this opinion.We do not
wish to be understood as having decided in this opinion any
question of fact which will arise on the trial and be there in
controversy. The trial court is left free to find the facts as the
evidence requires. To the facts as so found he will apply the law
as herein laid down.The judgment appealed from is set aside and the
cause returned to the Court of First Instance whence it came for
the purpose hereinabove stated. So ordered.Arellano, C.J., and
Carson, J.,concur.Torres, J.,concurs in the result.
Separate OpinionsARAULLO,J.,concurring:I concur in the result
and with the reasoning of the foregoing decision, only in so far as
concerns the return of the record to the lower court in order that
it fully and correctly decide all the issues raised therein, allow
the parties to raise such questions as may help to decide all those
involved in the case, and to present such evidence as they may deem
requisite for a complete resolution of all the issues in
discussion, because it is my opinion that it is inopportune to
make, and there should not be made in the said majority decision
the findings therein set forth in connection with articles 428 of
the Code of Commerce and 1035 of the Civil Code, in order to arrive
at the conclusion that the amount of the insurance policy referred
to belongs exclusively to the defendant, inasmuch a this is one of
the questions which, according to the decision itself, should be
decided by the lower court after an examination of the evidence
introduced by the parties; it is the lower court that should make
those findings, which ought afterwards to be submitted to this
court, if any appeal be taken from the judgment rendered in the
case by the trial court in compliance with the foregoing
decision.EN BANCG.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937PABLO LORENZO, as
trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley,
deceased,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of
Internal Revenue,defendant-appellant.Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven
for plaintiff-appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
defendant-appellant.LAUREL,J.:On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff
Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas
Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr.,
then the Collector of Internal Revenue, for the refund of the
amount of P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on
the estate of the deceased, and for the collection of interst
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from
September 15, 1932, the date when the aforesaid tax was [paid under
protest. The defendant set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged
to be interest due on the tax in question and which was not
included in the original assessment. From the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga dismissing both the plaintiff's
complaint and the defendant's counterclaim, both parties appealed
to this court.It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley
died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will (Exhibit 5) and
considerable amount of real and personal properties. On june 14,
1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement
and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. Said will
provides, among other things, as follows:4. I direct that any money
left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley.5. I direct that
all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or
otherwise disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after my
death, and that the same be handled and managed by the executors,
and proceeds thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at
Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that
he be directed that the same be used only for the education of my
brother's children and their descendants.6. I direct that ten (10)
years after my death my property be given to the above mentioned
Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks most
advantageous.x x x x x x x x x8. I state at this time I have one
brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew, Matthew
Hanley, is a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.The Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best
interests of ther estate to appoint a trustee to administer the
real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew
Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the will, was, on
March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and
gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29,
1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in
his stead.During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the
defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate
left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty
valued at P27,920 and personalty valued at P1,465, and allowing a
deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance
tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties
for deliquency in payment consisting of a 1 per cent