Essential Histories - Higher Intellect northern Thirteen Colonies and in the ... 8 Essential Histories • The French-Indian War 1754 -1760 ... Great Britain was at war with the colonists

Essential Histories

The French-Indian War1754-1760

Daniel MarstonOSPREYP U B L I S H I N G

First published in Great Britain in 2002 by Osprey Publishing,

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ISBN : 84176 456 6

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Dedication

To Nancy

02 03 04 05 06 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I

Contents

Introduction 7

Chronology 10

Background to war

Tension in the Ohio River valley 11

Warring sides

The French and British armies in North America 14

Outbreak

Entry of the regular soldiers 27

The fighting

War of the forest and fortress 28

Portrait of a soldier

Joshua Goodenough, a Rogers' Ranger 73

The world around war

The economic and civilian costs 76

Portrait of a civilian

Jean Lowry and Titus King 81

How the war ended

Treaty of Paris and the Indian uprising 84

Conclusion and consequences

Ramifications for the future 90

Further reading 92

Index 94

Introduction

The French-Indian War is the namecommonly given to the conflict which arosein North America in 1754-55, between theBritish Thirteen Colonies (and Nova Scotia)and New France (comprising Louisiana, theOhio River Valley, Quebec [known asCanada], and Cape Breton and St. JeanIslands). Following the War of the AustrianSuccession, which was officially concluded bythe Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Great Britainand France continued their disputes over landboundaries in North America. The fightingchiefly took place along the frontier regions ofthe northern Thirteen Colonies and in theQuebec and Cape Breton regions of NewFrance. New France was at a numericaldisadvantage due to a disparity in population:

New France had 75,000 settlers, while theThirteen Colonies had 1.5 million people.

The frontier skirmishes of 1754 propelledboth France and Great Britain to seekContinental allies. With Europe firmlydivided into two camps - France, Austria andRussia on one side and Prussia and GreatBritain on the other - conflict was inevitable.By 1756, the frontier skirmishes haddeveloped into a fully-fledged war in NorthAmerica and spilled over into conflict inEurope itself. While it was connected to thelarger, worldwide campaign known as theSeven Years' War, the French-Indian Waranticipated that conflict by a year and servedas one of the spurs to the eventual outbreakof hostilities in Europe and on the Indian

8 Essential Histories • The French-Indian War 1754 -1760

George II, King of Great Britain. (Ann Ronan PictureLibrary)

subcontinent. (For more detail on the war inthe rest of the world, please see the EssentialHistories The Seven Years' War.)

The French-Indian War was fought in theforests, open plains, and forts of the NorthAmerican frontier. The French Army,supported by allied Indian tribes and localcolonial forces, initially benefited from asuperior understanding of how to operate inthe forests of North America, althoughthroughout the conflict it was numericallyinferior to the British Army. The British Army

was also bolstered by colonial forces andallied Indian tribes, but in the early days ofthe war suffered from lack of experience andtactical knowledge of fighting in forestterrain. The British learned the lessons oftheir early defeats, however, and theirsubsequent tactical and training reformsultimately enabled them to outperformFrench forces, both in skirmishes in theforests of the frontier and in continental-stylebattles at Louisbourg and Quebec.

Great Britain was to emerge from theFrench-Indian War as the dominantEuropean power on the eastern seaboard ofNorth America. As with the War of Austrian

Introduction 9

Louis XV, King of France, (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Succession, however, the French-Indian Wardid not signal the end of conflict in theregion. Within 13 years of its conclusion,Great Britain was at war with the colonistsshe had sought to protect in North America.

The war strained relations between themother country and her colonial subjects.France, seeking to reverse the misfortunes ofthe French-Indian War, was only too happyto undermine British superiority in theregion, and threw her support behind thefledgling United States in 1778.

Chronology

1754 27 March Skirmish at Great Meadows3 July Battle at Fort Necessity

1755 June British siege and capture ofFort Beausejour6-9 July Braddock's Defeat17 August British force arrivesat Oswego8 September Battle of Lake George

1756 17 May Formal Declaration of Warbetween France and Britain14 August British Fort Ontario, FortPepperell, and Fort George at Oswegocapitulate

1757 9 August British Fort WilliamHenry capitulates

1758 8 July Battle at Fort Carillon(Ticonderoga)1 August French port of Louisbourgcapitulates27 August French Fort Frontenac issacked14 September Grant's Battle outsideFort Duquesne12 October French repelled atFort Ligonier24 November French Fort Duquesneis abandoned

1759 24 July Battle of La Belle Famille26 July French Fort Niagaracapitulates

26 July French Fort Carillon isabandoned31 July French Fort St. Frederic(Crown Point) is abandoned31 July British attack onMontmorency FallsAugust Countryside around Quebeclaid waste by British forces13 September First battle of thePlains of Abraham17 September Surrender of Quebec

1760 28 April Second battle of the Plainsof Abraham (Sainte-Foy)Early September Montrealsurrounded by three British columns8/9 September Montreal surrenders

1761-62 War continues in the Caribbean,India, and Europe

1763 10 February Treaty of Paris15 February Treaty of Hubertusburg10 May-15 October Indian siege ofFort DetroitEnd of June All British forts in thewest captured except for Forts Detroit,Niagara, and Pitt31 July Battle of Bloody Run5/6 August Battle of Bushy Run10 August Fort Pitt relieved byBritish forces.7 October Royal Proclamation of 1763

1764 December End of the Indian Uprising

Background to war

Tension in the OhioRiver valley

The conflict in North America had its formalbeginnings in 1754. Following the end of theWar of the Austrian Succession (1740-48),French and British colonists, motivated bydesire to expand their domains into the richOhio River valley, edged closer to armedconflict. The area along the Ohio River wasconsidered to be uncharted, and thusformally unclaimed by either side. TheBritish contended that the area should beopen to both sides for trade, and followedthis claim with the establishment of theOhio Company. The French, however,viewed this as a British attempt to claim theentire area, and responded by sending bothmilitia and regular troops into the region tobuild forts and eject any British settlers ortraders found there.

Tensions had also risen in AcadianNova Scotia, particularly along the Bay ofFundy. The French had established severalnew forts whose locations the Britishcolonial governments considered to be inviolation of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle(1748). Both sides claimed large areas ofpresent day New Brunswick, and consideredthe other the transgressor. The insultoffered by these encroachments wascompounded by the French government'srelations with the Acadians, a French-speaking population who, as a result oftreaty agreements, had become subjects ofthe British Crown. The French authoritiesdeliberately stirred the Acadians' aspirationsto independence, incensing the Britishgovernors. The establishment of FortBeausejour in the disputed area was the laststraw, as this made it apparent to the Britishcolonists that the French had themsurrounded. They were not being paranoid;the French did in fact intend to construct aseries of forts from Louisbourg to NewOrleans, enclosing the British colonies. The

hostility between the two countries wasnear to breaking point.

Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginiadecided to make a move against the Frenchin the Ohio River valley, while GovernorWilliam Shirley of the Massachusetts BayColony was to organize a move against theFrench in the Bay of Fundy. (This secondcampaign will be discussed later, as it tookplace in 1755.)

The British had begun to build a fort atthe forks of the Ohio River in 1754. AVirginia militia officer, Lieutenant ColonelGeorge Washington, then 23 years old, wasordered to march into the Ohio River valleywith 200 men, to assist with and protect the

George Washington as an officer in the VirginianProvincials. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)


fort's construction. Washington and his menleft on 2 April. News arrived on 20 April thatthe French had already moved against theBritish at the forks of the Ohio and forcedthem from the area. The French seized thefort and renamed it Fort Duquesne, after theGovernor of New France, Marquis Duquesne.After a council of war at Wills Creek,Washington decided to continue to movetowards the region, after establishing FortCumberland at Wills Creek.

Various other colonies decided to sendreinforcements to the region. A RegularIndependent Company from South Carolinamoved into Virginia. Militia troops fromNorth Carolina marched north to providesupport, while Pennsylvania decided to grantmoney towards the cost of the expedition.These were helpful gestures, but thereinforcements were small and inadequate tothe task that they potentially faced:undertaking the defense of the frontier.Washington continued marching towards anenemy that vastly outnumbered him, whenhe should have remained at Wills Creek andwaited for reinforcements.

On 7 May Washington and his small forcereached Little Meadows. Ten days later, on17 May, the force reached the Great Crossingof the Youghiogheny. By 24 May,Washington reached an area named GreatMeadows where, after receiving intelligencethat a party of French troops was movingagainst him, he began to build fortifications,naming the structure Fort Necessity. On27 May, Washington and 40 militia soldiersmoved 9 km (six miles) distant to ambushthe French detachment. Washington hopedto surprise the French camp, but the alarmwas sounded. The battle was short but brisk.The French commander, Ensign Coulon deJumonville, was killed, along with nineFrench soldiers, and 21 French soldiers weretaken prisoner. One French soldier escapedand reported back to Fort Duquesne. TheVirginia troops lost one killed and threewounded. This skirmish signified theopening of armed hostilities.

Washington decided to remain in thearea, to build up the defenses of the fort and

the road towards Fort Duquesne. On 9 June,a further reinforcement of 200 Virginiamilitiamen arrived, followed byreinforcements from the IndependentCompanies of South Carolina on 12 June.Welcome as fresh troops were, their arrivalsparked an immediate tussle over the politicsof command. The Independent Companieswere on the British Establishment, whichmeant that their commander, Captain JamesMacKay, was senior to Washington. WhileMacKay did not attempt to assumecommand, he refused any orders fromWashington for his men.

On 16 June, Washington moved outtowards Fort Duquesne with his Virginiatroops, while the Independent Companiesremained at Fort Necessity. Reports fromscouts claimed that the French garrison wasreinforced by more than a thousand men,and that the Shawnee and Delaware Indianshad sided with the French. Less than 32 km(20 miles) from Fort Duquesne, Washingtonstopped to hold a war council with theDelawares and Shawnees, hoping to convincethem to switch their allegiance. On 28 Junereports arrived that the French, with theirIndian allies, were moving towards him.

The Independent Companies caught upwith Washington on 29 June, and MacKay andWashington agreed to withdraw towards WillsCreek and then on to Fort Necessity. Thewithdrawal to Fort Necessity was hard going,due to the number of horses and wagonsthat had to be left behind. The exhaustedtroops arrived at Fort Necessity on 1 July andbegan to prepare the area for battle.

A French detachment of 500 soldiersand allied Indian warriors, led by CaptainCoulon de Villiers, brother of Jumonville,marched on the heels of Washington's force.The French came upon the Great Meadowsarea on the morning of 3 July. Villiers decidedto fan out his troops to draw fire and locatethe enemy forces. The French and Indianforces immediately drew heavy fire, soVilliers kept the majority of his men in theforests to the west and south of the Britishpositions. Villiers advanced cautiously asthe British troops withdrew into the

Background to war 13

entrenchment surrounding the fort. TheFrench and Indian troops fired into the Britishpositions from the edge of the woods. Thefighting lasted for nine hours, and the Britishsuffered not only losses under fire but alsofrom a considerable number of desertions. Therainy weather also played a significant role inthe outcome of the battle. The British trenchesbecame waterlogged and, as one Britishobserver noted: 'by the continued Rains andWater in the trenches, the most of our Armswere out of order' (Gipson, VI, p. 39). Ataround 8.00 pm on 3 July, Villiers called for apossible negotiated settlement. Villiersemphasized that he had carried out his attacknot because a state of war existed, but toavenge the death of his brother. He alsopromised that he would allow the Britishtroops to march back to Virginia withoutharassment from the Indians. Two Britishofficers, Captains Van Braam and Stobo, wereto serve as hostages in return for the Frenchprisoners taken on 27 May.

The terms were agreed and on themorning of 4 July, the French marched in to

take possession of Fort Necessity. During thistransition, the Indians decided to attack theBritish troops, scalping and killing severalmen. The French officers and men did littleto stop them. While this incident was minorcompared to the outrages that were to followat Fort William Henry in 1757, it clearlydemonstrated the problems inherent inpromising protection from the Indiansfollowing surrender.

The British force marched slowly but ingood order towards Wills Creek. The Frenchhad effectively forced them out of the OhioRiver valley, and Villiers finished the job bydestroying Fort Necessity and withdrawing toFort Duquesne. This defeat galvanized theBritish government, prompting the decisionto deploy British Regular regiments to theOhio River area. Regular regiments werealready stationed in Nova Scotia, and the FortDuquesne incident convinced British leadersthat their presence was required elsewhere. Asa result, this engagement was one of the lastwaged against the French without a sizableBritish Regular Army presence.

Warring sides

The French and British armiesin North America

Warfare in the mid- to late-18th century wascharacterized by two dissimilar fightingstyles, commonly known as linear warfareand irregular or frontier-style warfare. Thefirst was the traditional style in which battleswere fought in Europe, whilst the secondarose in response to the particular demandsof fighting on the North American frontier.

Soldiers of all armies were armed with theflintlock musket, but how they were useddiffered depending on the style of warfareemployed. In any situation, the weapon'srange was only 200-300 paces, so no stylewas developed that was based on the needfor accurate fire. Extending the usefulness ofthe musket during this period was thedevelopment of the socket bayonet, whichpermitted firing with the bayonet alreadyfixed on the musket barrel. The socketbayonet could be attached before troopswent into battle, permitting troops to godirectly from short-range firing tohand-to-hand combat.

Linear warfare

Given the relative inaccuracy of the flintlockmusket, the linear or continental style wasdesigned to maximize its effectiveness.Troops were intended to deploy in a line anddeliver a synchronized volley of fire againstthe opposing line of enemy troops. Bytraining soldiers to fire simultaneously,leaders hoped to offset the musket'sinaccuracy with sheer volume ofcoordinated fire. To accomplish this quicklyand effectively required intensive training,not only in firing techniques, but also toenable troops to march overland incolumn formation, and then rapidlydeploy into lines using a series ofcomplicated maneuvers.

The deployment of the front line oftroops, or frontage, was determined by theterrain of the battlefield and the position ofthe enemy. As armies came within sight ofone another, each side attempted tomaneuver to flank the enemy's position,enabling them to deliver a devastating fireon the enemy, either when they were alreadyin line or attempting to deploy. Thebattalion deployed in either two, three, orfour lines, depending upon the army. Theidea was that the forward line fired, thenmoved back to reload their muskets. Theywould be replaced by the second line, whichwould repeat the process and then befollowed by the third line and so on.

The French Army deployed its battalionsinto four lines, with a frontage of 162 men.French battalions were drawn up into10 companies, consisting of eight fusilier, onegrenadier, and one light company. The BritishArmy deployed its battalions into three lines,also with 10 companies of soldiers. The Britishdeployed nine line companies and onegrenadier company. As the war progressedthey switched to eight line companies, onegrenadier company, and one light infantrycompany. The British frontage was 260 men;some experts argue that this gave the Britishan advantage by providing a bigger volley,while others claim that the French system wasmore compact and more maneuverable, andthus superior. In 1758, the British expandedtheir frontage even further by deploying theirbattalions in only two lines.

The line of fire was also varied, dependingon the situation. The officers would assessthe battle situation and order the men eitherto fire one synchronized volley from theentire line, or a series of volleys from the endof the wings to the center (or vice versa),known as platoon firing. The British Army,for example, divided the men into

Warring sides 15

This image of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham showsthe two different styles of warfare. (National ArmyMuseum, Chelsea)

companies that would fire as one unit. Themen in each company were then dividedinto two platoons, which could fire either astwo individual units or one larger one. Asdescribed above, battalion firing would begineither in the center or on the wings, hittingthe enemy at different locations. It wascommon for both sides to fire at least one ortwo coordinated volleys before the battledeteriorated into men firing at will. This waspartly due to the fact that the powder andnoise of battle often made the soldiers deaf.Fire commands were normallycommunicated by the battalion drummers,but the escalation of battle made the drumsdifficult to hear.

The ability to deliver a coordinated heavyvolley, and preferably more than one, on themain body of the enemy line was paramountto an army's successful performance. Themain intention of this tactic was to createhavoc and disorder within the enemy'sranks. A successful volley could break enemylines, and the firing side would attempt tocapitalize on the confusion by advancing on

the enemy position. The infantry advancewould force the other side to attempt towithdraw, while the advancing side closed inwith bayonets to engage in hand to handfighting. Often units failed to hold the linein the face of a bayonet charge, escalatingthe disorder and confusion in the ranks ofthe side under attack.

Troop discipline was critical. Soldiers weredrilled exhaustively in the complexprocedures involved in deployment, firing,and reloading. In addition to mastering thevarious techniques, discipline also requiredtroops to stand to attention under enemyfire, retaining a cohesive line while beingshot at close range, and returning fire onlywhen ordered to do so. The opposing sidesviewed one another as single, massivetargets, and soldiers were expected to behaveaccordingly, functioning as parts of a whole.It was common for a soldier to require18 months of training to perform the variousdrills required, and most generals felt it tookfive years to create a well-trained soldiercapable of withstanding the rigors of battle.Contrary to popular perception, the regularsoldier of the 18th century was highlytrained and proficient; in fact, some rulers'tactics to avoid battle when they were


Rogers' Rangers Officer by Gerry Embleton.

outnumbered or outmaneuvered was due totheir unwillingness to risk losing costly andvalued regular soldiers.

Artillery was also used in linear warfare ofthis period, principally as siege weaponry,although smaller pieces were used ininfantry battles. These were employed as firesupport and also served as markers toindicate divisions between battalionsdrawing up in linear formation. During theFrench-Indian War, artillery was used duringthe small number of linear-style battles, butnot to the same extent as in Europe. It wasmore likely to be used in a conventionalmanner during sieges of the forts in theNorth American interior, as theseengagements operated in more traditionalContinental fashion.

The terrain where most of the NorthAmerican engagements were fought

prohibited the use of cavalry. If there hadbeen engagements in the south, cavalrymight have been required, but the heavilyforested frontier made operating onhorseback both difficult and dangerous.Some senior officers rode to battle onhorseback, but tended to dismount beforeleading a charge.

Irregular warfare

The French-Indian War was instrumental inthe further development of a new style offighting, known as irregular warfare. Thisapproach was characterized by the use oflightly armed troops who could march easilyin heavily wooded terrain and fight in small,flexible units. This system was not anentirely North American phenomenon; theAustrians, British, French and Prussians hademployed light troops in the Europeantheater of the Seven Years' War. However,the majority of the fighting in NorthAmerica took place in woodlands, andthis necessitated the development anddeployment of light troops and otherspecialists, such as bateaux men (pilots ofwhale boats and canoes) and Indian scouts,in much greater numbers than had everbeen used before.

The Indians of North America wereexcellent woodsmen; their warriors wereskilled not only in fighting one anotherin forested terrain, but also in hunting inthe same woodlands. The frontierpopulations of both the French and Britishcolonies had also grown adept atmaneuvering and fighting in the woods;frontiersmen had extensive contact, bothpositive and negative, with local Indianpopulations. In addition, many men weretraders or hunters, used to marchingoverland into harsh territory. Not everyonewas an expert however; in fact, a largeproportion of people in North America,both recently-arrived Europeans andcolonists living in the more developedareas, were utterly unfamiliar withwoodland operations.

Warring sides 17

The North American terrain andconditions dictated not only the strategiesof the war but also its progress. Roads andtracks were minimal and poorly developed,and the armies had to take the time (andpossess the capability) to build roads as theyprogressed, as well as forts to protect theroads once completed. Given theseconditions, lakes and rivers were ready-madeconduits for the movement of men andsupplies, and both sides made use of themwhenever possible. The ability to movetroops and re-supply forward unitsefficiently was critical to success in thefield. The French forces were able to relyon a supply network that operated largelyover waterways. The British more oftenhad to build new roads and forts to securetheir supply lines, and over time theirskills increased through repeatedemployment. Despite limited opportunity,the British military also performed well inmoving both troops and supplies overwaterways.

While both France and England had acore of woodland expertise among theirfighting men, each side perceived that thewar was not going to be won solely onfamiliarity with the ways of the woods andthe Indians. Strategy for both sides involveddeploying large numbers of regular troopsfrom Europe who would be able to wage atraditional linear-style battle when terrainpermitted. The senior commanders of botharmies recognized, to varying degrees, theusefulness of the irregular troops, butpreferred linear-style engagements to providea decisive conclusion to the conflict. In theend, however, the ways in which each sideattempted to reform its army to adapt tonew conditions in North America proved tobe the critical factor in determining a victor.

The following section is an examinationof the two military forces involved in theFrench and Indian War. This will includeconsideration of the regular forces: theirassets, weaknesses, and attempts to reform.The local colonial, militia, and provincialforces will also be discussed. Finally, thefighting capabilities of the Indian

Light Infantryman, 1759 by Gerry Embleton.

participants, as well as their alliances withboth sides, will be assessed.

Great Britain

The British Army had four differentCommanders-in-Chief over the course of thewar in North America. Some, such as MajorGeneral Jeffrey Amherst, were successful inbattle, while others, such as LieutenantGeneral John Campbell, Earl Loudon, made aless obvious but more profound organizationalimpact upon the army. Loudon, while not assuccessful as Amherst, deserves credit forlaying the foundations that gave the Armyvictory in the campaigns of 1758-60.Although he was only in command during1756-57, his tenure was marked by significantreforms in methods of supply and tacticaldevelopment of the regular army.


Loudon centralized the system of suppliesfor British regular and provincial soldiers to adegree previously unheard of in the ThirteenColonies. As a result of his restructuringefforts, soldiers reporting for duty in NorthAmerica were consistently able to receiveadequate uniforms and arms - the minimumrequired for undertaking active service. Mainstorehouses were created at Halifax, NewYork, and Albany.

Loudon also recognized that transportationof supplies to troops in the field was anecessary element of successful performance,and set out to reform the army's systemsaccordingly. The army had previously reliedupon local wagoneers to move suppliesforward. This system was generallyunsatisfactory, as it was unreliable and forcedthe army to rely upon civilians who wereoften unwilling to venture very far into thewoods. Loudon replaced this system with acorps of army wagons, and undertook a roadimprovement program at the same time. Healso appreciated the potential advantages ofusing waterways for transportation, anddelegated John Bradstreet, a leader of armedboatmen, to investigate alternative plans ofmoving material. This led to an initiative tobuild a fleet of standardized supply boatspiloted by armed and experienced boatmen. Aprogram of creating portages was undertakento complement the boat-building initiative, tofacilitate the forward movement of supplies.The army and navy also built sloops to movesupplies from coastal cities upriver to theArmy's major staging areas.

Following the defeats of 1755 and 1756,British Army leaders realized that the troops,in their present state of training andequipment, were not capable of effectiveoperation in the forests of North America. Itwould be necessary to train and equip menspecifically for these conditions; troopswould be so equipped as to enable them tomaneuver more efficiently in difficultterrain, and would be trained to move informations other than the large columnsused in the linear-style of warfare. Soldierstrained in these unconventional methodswere commonly known as rangers.

The concept of rangers did not originatewith the onset of the Seven Years' War;ranger troops are recorded as being raised asearly as 1744, when a unit named Gorham'sRangers (after its founder, John Gorham),was raised in Nova Scotia. When war brokeout in North America in 1754, the numberof rangers in Nova Scotia was increased, atthe expense of the British government. Thefollowing year, a second group of rangers wasorganized, consisting of men from thefrontiers of New York and New England. Thisgroup was raised and commanded by MajorRobert Rogers, and again took their name,Rogers' Rangers, from him. The ranger corpsquickly demonstrated their value in bothskirmishes and scouting expeditions on thefrontier, but some members of the militaryestablishment remained skeptical,considering the ranger units too expensive tojustify their continued existence.

During his tenure as Commander-in-Chief,Loudon, in response to this assessment,encouraged regular soldiers and officers toattach themselves to the ranger corps to learnmethods of forest fighting. He set up atraining cadre of 50 rangers at Fort Edward tosupport this suggestion. Despite attemptssuch as this to curb the numbers of rangersby creating 'regular' light infantry, thenumbers of Rogers' Rangers continued to rise.By 1759 there were six companies of rangers,comprising more than 1,000 men, allfinanced by the British government.

Loudon decided to create units that wouldbe made up of regulars who would receivespecial ranger-type training as well asinstruction in traditional linear methods. Heexpected, with this initiative, to manage costand discipline issues simultaneously: the firstby training the same men for different typesof warfare, and the second by instilling the'regular' discipline that was thought to belacking in rangers. In the event, Loudon'sscheme took shape in two different forms.The 60th Regiment of Foot was raisedinitially from the frontier peoples ofPennsylvania and Virginia, with the intentthat the regiment would embody the spiritand abilities of the frontiersman, tempered

Warring sides 19

by the discipline of the regular soldier.Four battalions of the 60th were raised; the1st and 4th were deployed more often infrontier fighting situations, and fought insuccessful engagements in Pennsylvania andNew York. The 2nd and 3rd battalions servedmost of their time as regular linear soldiers,and saw action at Louisbourg and Quebec.

Two other regiments were raised under adifferent interpretation of Loudon's initiative,and these were to have a greater influenceon the army as a whole. The 55th and80th Regiments of Foot were raised specificallyas light infantry. They were trained in thetactics used by the ranger corps, but were alsosubjected to the discipline imposed uponregular troops. (Rangers were not expected toconform to the same standards of discipline asother Army units.) As a result of this successfuldevelopment, by 1759 all regular British Armyregiments, including the 60th, had adopted alight infantry company. These could bedeployed as needed in specific situations;their uniforms, weaponry, and tactical trainingwere adapted for marching in the woods,fighting skirmishing actions, and carryingout ambushes in the manner of Indiansand rangers.

Three contemporary accountsdemonstrate the range and effects of thesereforms. The first is a manual, published inPhiladelphia in 1759, which discusses thespecifics involved in waging war in NorthAmerica, including operating in the forest:

[I]n passing through close or woodedcountry ...I would have the regiment march twodeep, in four columns ... having small parties oflight infantry advanced [one] hundred paces intheir front; but the main party of the lightinfantry should be on the flanks ... [I]fthe frontshould be attacked, the grenadiers and lightinfantry will be sufficient to keep the enemy inplay till the regiment is formed (MilitaryTreatise, pp. 66-67).

In the second, a ranger named JohnGoodenough describes the differences betweenthe British regular soldier of 1758 and hisprevious experience of only one year earlier:

The British soldiers were by this time madeserviceable for forest warfare, since the officersand men had been forced to rid themselves oftheir useless encumbrances and had cut off thetails of their long coats till they scarcely reachedbelow their middles - they had also left theirwomen at the fort, browned their gun barrelsand carried their provisions on their backs, eachman enough for himself, as was our rangercustom (Goodenough, p. 9).

Finally, William Amherst, brother ofJeffrey, notes in his journal a typical trainingday for two regiments in 1758, including adetailed description of a newly developedfiring sequence to be used by Britishcolumns if they were attacked on the marchin the woods:

the advanced party if attacked, the twoplatoons marching abreast, the left platoon firessingly, every man, the right platoon keepsrecovered, both platoons moving on very slowlyand inclining to the right (William Amherst,pp. 40-41;.

The aim of such exercises was to accustomthe soldiers to wooded conditions, and soneutralize the fear instilled by stories ofIndian tactics.

The innovations made in training andequipment improved British performance inthe forest but it did not make them invincible.On several occasions during both the French-Indian War and the subsequent Indianuprising of 1763-64, British troops wereambushed and suffered accordingly. TheBritish regular soldier became the equal in theforest of his French equivalent, although theIndian remained, for the most part, the masterof forest operation. This expertise, however,was offset by a lack of discipline andcoordinated command and control expertise,which benefited the regulars on both sides.Most important, the average British soldierhad, by 1759, largely lost his fear of operatingin the forest, having received the trainingrequired to cope with most situations.

The average British battalion numberedfrom 500-900 men. Numbers fluctuated due


to battle casualties, illness, and desertion. In1754 there were no British line regimentsstationed in the Thirteen Colonies, only inNova Scotia and the Caribbean. The ThirteenColonies had seven regular units namedIndependent Companies, which were postedalong areas of the South Carolina andNew York frontiers. By 1757, more than14,000 regulars had been deployed to theThirteen Colonies as a result of the conflictin North America. By 1759, the peak ofregular establishment in North America,nearly 24,000 men were under arms. TheBritish Army included mostly regular lineregiments with 10 companies (eight line,one grenadier and one light infantry). Therewere also dedicated ad hoc light infantryand grenadier battalions.

British military officials had an additionalreserve force to draw upon for theFrench-Indian War: the colonial provincials.These were units whom the Colonies wererequested to raise, to serve alongside theregular forces. Some military officialsconsidered them more of a burden than anasset, principally because, unlike regularsoldiers, provincial soldiers were only calledfor one campaign season at a time, and thenreturned to their homes. This created theimpression that because provincial soldierswere not professionals, they were notsubjected to the same harsh discipline andrules that the regulars endured, and thatthey were not, therefore, true soldiers. Theprovincials, on their side, considered regularsoldiers ignorant of how to operate in theforest and the conditions of the frontier.Such beliefs created a rivalry that persistedthroughout the war period, each sideregarding the other as unfit to fight invarious combat situations.

During the first years of the war, relationsbetween provincials and regulars were furtherstrained. The first article of the Rules andArticles of War of the British Army of thisperiod stated that 'a provincial soldier servingwith regulars ceased to be governed bycolonial disciplinary measures but becamesubject to the mutiny act' (Pargellis, p.84).This stipulation was created by British military

authorities who envisioned no more than afew provincial companies serving with theregulars. It meant, in theory, that provincialsoldiers serving alongside regulars were subjectto the same strict regulations and discipline. Inpractice, however, there were likely to bediscrepancies in treatment. Loudon reportedone instance where 'a private of the60th found guilty of mutiny received1,000 lashes whereas a private of aMassachusetts [provincial] regiment got 500for the same offence' (Loudon, 3 September1757). Braddock's defeat in 1755 changed thesituation considerably by demonstrating theimmediate need for a large number of soldiers.As a result, the number of provincial soldiersrequired also increased dramatically.

The increased need for provincial troopsbrought about one beneficial change in theirsituation. Previously, commissioned officersin the provincial forces, even as high as therank of General, were degraded to the levelof senior captain when serving alongsideregular forces in the field. This was a majorsource of resentment for the provincialforces. Loudon was uninterested in resolvingthis issue with the colonial governments,and no changes were made until after he wasremoved from command. William Pitt,Secretary of State (with control of the warand foreign affairs and later the leader of theBritish government), amended the ruling sothat provincial officers retained their rank,but were junior to regular officers ofequivalent and higher rank. Pitt consideredthis necessary to appease the colonialgovernments and convince them to recruitmore men for the campaigns. Even thoughthe British government ultimately fundedcolonial units, they had to rely on thecolonial governments' efforts to fill theranks. In the event, his tactic was successful;the colonial governments provided moresoldiers in 1758 and 1759, after the rulingwas changed, than they had previously.

Despite this initiative and the risingnumber of provincial troops, regular soldierscontinued to distrust their fighting abilities,and only grudgingly would they concede thatprovincials made a contribution. It was true

Warring sides 21

that provincials were unlikely to have thestamina to sustain the rigors of a linear-stylebattle, since they did not have the same levelof training or discipline as regular troops.There was the occasional compliment; asnoted by a regular officer in 1759 :

the provincial regiments, under arms today, tobe perfected in the manoeuvres contained in theregulations of the 20th of June ... [T]hey[provincials] made a good performance, performedwell, and gave great satisfaction (Knox, p. 486).

Major General Amherst gave areluctant-sounding compliment whenspeaking of the provincials in 1759 atFort Edward:

[they] began to grow sickly and lose somemen; they are growing homesick but much lessso than ever they have been on any othercampaigns (Amherst, 22 September 1759).

France

On the other side of the conflict, the Frenchwere spending comparable time arguing overstrategy and the abilities of their regulars towage war along the frontier. Major GeneralLouis-Joseph Montcalm, who commandedthe French regular forces from 1756 until hisdeath in 1759, disagreed firmly with thegovernor-general of New France, PierreFrancois de Rigaud Vaudreuil on issues ofstrategy. There was often considerableantagonism between colonial-born (such asVaudreuil) and French-born officials (such asMontcalm); the colonials perceived visitorsas high-handed interlopers who did notunderstand the issues particular to thecolonial setting. The French government hadclearly established the lines of command -Vaudreuil was unquestionably senior toMontcalm - but in practice this had no effecton mitigating tensions or resolving proposalsof conflicting strategies. Unlike Loudon inthe British Colonies, neither man wasremoved from service when tensions flared,and the situation escalated. Each man

accused the other of interfering in issues ofstrategy. Marquis de Vaudreuil favored aguerilla campaign along the frontier, anddismissed the ability of the French regulars toadapt to the necessities of waging war in theforest. Montcalm recognized the value ofmilitia and Indians in forest operations, butstill believed that the war would ultimatelybe decided by regular troops.

Montcalm did understand the issues ofsupply and scouting involved in fighting inthe woods. A master strategist, he recognizedearly that the British were going tooutnumber his forces, and decided upon adefensive strategy that would allow him tolaunch pre-emptive strikes wheneveropportunity permitted. Having decided onthis plan of action, he implemented it early inthe campaign with surprise attacks on theBritish forts at Oswego and Fort WilliamHenry in 1756 and 1757. He succeeded inoverwhelming the troops guarding all the forts,and forced them to surrender. He did not stayput, but destroyed the forts and moved. It was

Marquis de Vaudreuil. (Public Archives of Canada)


Louis-Joseph Montcalm. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

a bold strategy, and effectively knocked theBritish off balance for a time early on. In1758, however, the situation changeddramatically. The British had begun to learnthe art of war in the forest and had created asupply network that could carry their armiesover difficult terrain. On the other side, the

French forces received no reinforcements after1757, thanks to the Royal Navy blockade.Montcalm was forced to guard a vast frontierwith less than one-third of the regular troopsthat the British had at their disposal. Hecontinued to take gambles; some of them paiddividends, such as the decision to deploy mostof his regulars to Fort Carillon in 1758 asdescribed below. But from 1758, Montcalm

Warring sides 23

Fusilier, Compagnies Franches de la Marine byMichael Roffe. (Osprey Publishing)

was constantly on the defensive, attempting tostem the rising tide of British attacks.

The French and British forces wereorganized along similar lines - a mixture ofregulars, militia, and Indian allies. The firstgroup of regulars that served in New Francewas the troupes de la marine or marines. Whenwar broke out between France and Britain in1754, no French regular line infantry unitswere initially deployed to North America. Themarines had been serving under the commandof the French Navy in New France for many

Grenadier, Regiment de Languedoc by Michael Roffe(Osprey Publishing)

years before the outbreak of hostilities. Themen and officers were recruited in Francefor colonial service, and encouraged to remainin North America after their terms ofenlistment ended. The marines served alongthe frontiers of New France, as well as in thetrading centers, and were organized along


lines similar to those of the BritishIndependent Companies; their detachmentswere organized into company sized units.Numbers within companies fluctuated from50-75 men, and as of 1750, there were30 companies deployed in New France. By1757, 64 companies had been deployed inQuebec and Cape Breton, with another30 companies stationed in the Louisianaterritory. Companies from Louisiana wereinvolved in fighting in the Ohio River areaduring the course of the war. Marines, whilecommonly considered regular soldiers inthe colonial administration, also hadconsiderable experience of operating in thewoods based upon years of deployment onthe frontier.

By 1757, only 12 battalions of Frenchregulars, known as the troupes de terre andnumbering just over 6,000 men, had beenshipped to North America. Eight of thebattalions saw service with Montcalm in theCanada and Western theaters, and four weresent to Louisbourg to bolster its defenses.French regular soldiers were generally willingto learn some of the bush fighting tacticsused by the Canadian militia and Indiansand, like their British counterparts, oftenattached themselves to small raiding partiesto learn the tactics of the woods.

During the first years of the war, theFrench regulars performed very well inbattle. Discipline was very good; Montcalmcited only two courts martial during theperiod from 1756-58. Montcalm alsocommended the condition and performanceof his troops, describing the Royal-Roussillonregiment as 'well supplied and welldisciplined' (Sautai, p. 23). However, asFrench strategy changed in the wake of theeffective British naval blockade and troopswere increasingly left to fend for themselvesin New France, discipline and desertionbecame greater problems. The performanceof the French regulars at the Battle of thePlains of Abraham indicated that firediscipline had deteriorated noticeably fromprevious standards. To their credit, theFrench regulars continued to perform verywell, particularly considering that they were

vastly outnumbered by the British, sufferedfrom unreliable provision of supplies, andbecame increasingly aware that grandstrategy in the larger conflict had shiftedattention and resources away from them. Inlight of these obstacles, American historianFrancis Parkman commended the FrenchArmy in North America 'for enduringgallantry, officers and men alike deservenothing but praise' (Parkman, p. 215).

The Canadian militia was a major asset tothe French commanders. Unlike provincialtroops in the Thirteen Colonies, theCanadian militia was geared for war.Montcalm, apparently recognizing theirvalue, described Canadians as

born soldiers, from the age of 16 ... on therolls of militia. Boatmen and good shots, hunters... [T]hey excelled in forest war and ambushes(Sautai, p. 16).

This idea of a citizenry geared for war wasnot unique to New France and occurredoften in Europe; notably similar to theCanadians were the Croat populations alongthe Austrian/Turkish borderlands. Whilemilitiamen were not sufficiently trained torebuff a full-scale linear-style attack, theywere more than proficient in wildernessfighting and scouting. Militiamen in NewFrance were generally assigned to protectforts and remote outposts, a practice thatwas also common in the Thirteen Colonies.They were also assigned flank and scoutingactivities, either performed alone or as partof a larger regular column.

The number of militiamen raised in NewFrance throughout the war period neverexceeded 15,000 men per year. Similar toBritish provincials, they returned home aftereach campaigning season; many menreturned to the militia year after year, as thethreat to New France increased. The ThirteenColonies provided a larger number ofprovincial soldiers, but they were not of thesame quality as Canadian militiamen.Montcalm claimed that relations between hisregulars and the militia and Indians werevery cordial; in 1757 he declared that 'our

Warring sides 25

troops ... live in perfect union with theCanadians and savages' (Sautai, p. 26). Someof his junior officers disagreed with thisassessment; one officer noted in 1758 that:

when the French had won the battle,confidence returned ... [T]hey regained theirCanadian spirits and busied themselves only inways of taking away from the French [Regular]troops the glory of an action which it appeareddifficult to attribute to anyone else(Bougainville, p. 239).

There was tension between French andCanadian officers, principally on questionsof tactics. Some French officers preferred touse linear-style tactics, and believed that theCanadian soldiers and officers were no betterthan the Indians. The Canadian officers, fortheir part, felt on more than one occasionthat French troops were not suited forfrontier warfare. This caused friction, as itdid within the British forces.

Indians

Both Great Britain and France sought theallegiance of the numerous Indian tribesliving along the frontiers of the Europeancolonies in North America. Indian warriorswere expert forest fighters, unsurpassed intheir skill at both ambushing and scouting.Their reputation as warriors struck fear intothe hearts of civilians and soldiers alike. ABritish grenadier reported outside Quebec in1759 that 'all the grenadiers crossed over tothe island of Orleans ... [T]he Indiansattacked us very smartly' (Journal of theExpedition to the River St. Lawrence, 21 July1759). This was only intensified by theirwillingness to shift their alliances from oneside to the other as the fortunes of eachwaxed and waned. Many Indian warriorswould disappear from a campaign if they felttheir side was losing or there was a chance ofplunder in another part of the frontier. Theywere considered untrustworthy by Europeantroops, and criticized for their opportunisticdecisions to side with the strongest power.

Of course, both Britain and France also triedto use such opportunism to their ownadvantage, trying more than once toundermine existing treaties between theenemy side and its Indian allies. In battle,Indians excelled in gaining intelligence fortheir European commanders, as well assetting ambushes. However, when faced withcontinental-style fighting in the open theytended to break very easily. They also lackedthe stamina and planning skills to carry outa siege of a small post. The Indian Uprisingof 1763-64 is an example.

The French tended to be more successfulin winning the allegiance of Indians. This ispartly due to the fact that the French

Colonel William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian affairsfor the British Crown. (Albany Institute of History and Art)


Huron by Michael Roffe. (Osprey Publishing)

presence in North America was smaller thanthe British presence. Many Indians onlycame in contact with Canadian traders, whothey did not consider to be encroachingupon their territory. British colonists,however, were a larger population, seekingland as well as trading opportunities in the

Indian lands along the frontier. Tension wasthus correspondingly greater. The Frenchformed alliances with five major Indiantribes: the Hurons, Ottawas, Wyandots,Miamis, and Algonquins. The principalBritish-Indian alliance was with themembers of the Five (later Six) Nations ofthe Iroquois. The original five nations werethe Oneidas, Mohawks, Senecas,Onondagas, and Cayugas, and weresubsequently joined by the Tuscaroras. TheFrench repeatedly attempted to win overone of the Iroquois nations to their causethroughout the course of the war, but wereconsistently thwarted by the efforts ofLieutenant Colonel William Johnson, chiefIndian agent for the British Crown. TheSenecas did later become dissatisfied withthe British alliance, but this was later andfor other reasons; the dispute will becovered in the Indian Uprising section.

On the whole both sides tended toaccept their Indian allies as a necessity,and tried to regulate their behavior byimposing harsh penalties for failure tofollow orders. One characteristic situationhappened in 1757, when the French-alliedIndians killed a number of the Britishcivilians who had surrendered at FortWilliam Henry. French regulars had torestrain their allies with the threat ofviolence if they did not stop the killing.Some senior British commanders loathedusing Indian allies against European soldiersor civilians. In the end, warfare increasinglyutilized more conventional methods, andboth sides relied less upon the services ofIndians. Equally significant, following theFrench defeat at Quebec in 1759, manyIndians decided to leave French service,fearing British reprisals upon their villages.

Outbreak

Entry of the regular soldiers

Although formal declarations of war werenot exchanged between France and GreatBritain until 1756, the deployment of twoBritish Regular regiments toward FortDuquesne and the operations against FortBeausejour in Nova Scotia, Fort Niagara, andCrown Point marked the formal outbreak ofthe war in North America. The narrativedescribing the progress of the conflict will bedivided into years and subdivided intoregions. The fighting that took place in theOhio River region and Pennsylvania will bereferred to as the Western theater. Thefighting in the Lake George, LakeChamplain, and western New York regionswill be referred to as the New York theater.The Canadian theater will cover operationsin Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, and Quebec.

In October 1754, the British government,headed by Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke ofNewcastle, ordered the reinforcement of theThirteen Colonies with regular troops inresponse to increasing tension in the OhioRiver valley. The orders called for thetransportation of the 44th and 48thRegiments of Foot to Virginia, under thecommand of Major General EdwardBraddock, who was to be in overallcommand of all troops in North America.The two regiments were below strength andofficials decided to fill the companies with

locally recruited men upon reaching theAmerican colonies. Two additionalregiments, the 50th and 51st Foot, were tobe raised in their entirety in North America.

The dispatch of British regulars onlyalerted the French to follow suit. Beyond thecompanies of marines (regulars) alreadydeployed in New France, the Frenchdispatched 3,000 regulars from the lineregiments of La Reine, Artois, Guienne,Languedoc, and Beam. They were all underthe supreme command of Baron de Dieskau.These regulars were unable to reach FortDuquesne in time to support its defense, butwere deployed to protect other vulnerablepositions afterwards.

The British strategy for 1755 was thatGeneral Braddock and his two regiments,along with provincial units, would march onand seize Fort Duquesne from the French.Meanwhile, the second-in-command inNorth America, Governor Shirley ofMassachusetts, was to march with the50th and 51st regiments, as well as variousprovincial units, to seize the French fort atNiagara. Colonel Johnson was to march fromAlbany against the French Fort St. Frederic atCrown Point. Finally, Lieutenant ColonelRobert Monckton, a British Regular, was tolead a force of 2,000 militia and 200 regularsagainst Fort Beausejour in Nova Scotia.

The fighting

War of the forest and fortress

Western theater

Braddock, along with the 44th and 48th Foot,arrived in Virginia in March 1755. By May,the force, regulars, provincials, and RoyalArtillery, was assembling at Fort Cumberland,Wills Creek. They were delayed from leavingon schedule by the lack of suppliesforthcoming from the various colonialgovernments and the need for additionalrecruits for both regular and provincial units.The British expedition, finally fully assembledand provisioned, marched out from FortCumberland on 10 June.

The British government was confident thatthe infusion of regular troops would ensurevictory, but failed to recognize that a differenttype of war was in store. Braddock's onlyexperience of warfare was on the EuropeanContinent, and he was not fully aware of thepotential pitfalls involved in waging war overdifficult, hilly, and forested terrain. HisFrench adversaries had a better understandingof how to effectively mix the discipline andtraining of French regulars (marines) with themore unorthodox methods of the Canadianmilitia and allied Indians.

The British expedition averaged only 6 km(four miles) a day on the march, slowed downby the wagons and the condition of the road.On 18 June, the force reached Little Meadows,where Braddock decided to split his force. Hewould lead 1,200 picked men ahead of thebaggage and rest of the men, the vast majorityof whom were provincial troops. A specialistunit of rangers was put under the commandof Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage toadvance forward of the column and protect itfrom surprise attack. Braddock and Gage setoff, and were soon set upon by French scoutsand Indians. The rangers and other flanktroops successfully subdued repeated Frenchand Indian ambush attempts. Braddock, Gage,

and 1,200 men reached the remains of FortNecessity on 25 June.

The French garrison at Fort Duquesnenumbered more than 100 regulars,200 Canadian militia, and nearly 1,000 alliedIndians. The British column crossed theMonongahela River about 32 km (20 miles)

The fighting 29

east of the fort in early July, but shortly hadto cross back, frustrated by the terrain. In themeantime, Captain de Beaujeu assembled anattack force of most of the French regulars,plus 100 Canadians and a sizeable Indianforce, and led them out of Fort Duquesne.On 6 July forward elements of both armiesmet and skirmished. On 8 July, Braddock'scolumn crossed the river for the second timejust below Fort Duquesne. The crossing wentwithout difficulty, one British observerdescribing how the 'main body cross withcolours flying, drums beating and fifesplaying' (JSAHQR, 61, p. 202).

The French force came within sight of theadvance guards of the British column, andfighting broke out at midday. The British formeda skirmish line and opened fire on the French,killing Captain de Beaujeu in the openingvolley. A Captain Dumas assumed commandand decided to deploy the troops along thesides of the British column in the woods,trapping the advance guard of Gage's force in across-fire from the French and Indian troops.Gage, instead of pushing forward, decided to

Braddock's march to Fort Duquesne. (Ann RonanPicture Library)


Braddocks column under attack. The image is viewed fromthe positions of the French and allied Indians firing into theBritish positions, (State Historical Society ofWisconsin)

fall back. The French and Indians had seizedthe crucial high ground, and as the Britishtroops withdrew, the French and Indianscontinued to pour fire into their ranks. ARoyal Artillery officer described the scene:

the first fire the enemy gave was in front andthey likewise attacked the piquets in flank, sothat in a few minutes the grenadiers were nearly

cut to pieces and drove into great confusion ...[When t]he main body heard that the front wasattacked they instantly advanced ... [T]he enemyattacked the main body ... [The British] engagedthem but could not see whom they fired at [as]the trees were thick ... [S]oldiers [were]encouraged to take the hill but they had beenintimidated and many officers declared theynever saw above 5 of the enemy at one time ...[Braddock] divided the men into small partiesbut the main part of the officers were eitherkilled or wounded and in short the soldiers weretotally deaf to the command of the few officers

The fighting 31

that were left unhurt (JSAHQR, 61,pp. 202-203).

After three hours of fighting, theBritish column began to fall back to theriver. More than 800 of their men andofficers were killed or wounded, includingGeneral Braddock, who had been mortallywounded. The French lost three officerskilled and four wounded, plus 10 regularsand Canadians killed. It is estimatedthat the Indians lost between 20 and100 warriors. The remains of the British

column reached Fort Necessity on 17 July,and from there the army made a furtherwithdrawal to Fort Cumberland. Theimmediate threat to Fort Duquesne hadbeen nullified, at least for 1755.

It is true that Braddock lacked knowledgeof warfare in North America, but as heundertook very good flank protection on themarch, his inexperience was only part of thereason for the crushing British defeat. Thebattle was, effectively, a collision betweenthe two armies. The French and Indians hadthe advantage of the high ground, whichGage should have seized. Braddockattempted to seize the high ground by force,but the French and Indians were too wellestablished and the troops were beaten backmercilessly. Any British general of the periodwould have had a difficult time attemptingto rectify the situation, and there is nothingto indicate that a provincial commanderwould have fared any better. Captain Dumas,the French commander, deserves full creditfor sound and innovative action at the rightmoment.

New York theater

Following General Braddock's death,Governor (Major General) Shirley becamecommander-in-chief of the British forces inNorth America. Shirley was designated tolead the expedition against Fort Niagara,primarily using the two newly raised regularregiments filled with raw recruits andvarious provincial units. He assembled hisforce in late July. The plan called for thecolumn to travel overland and by river toOswego, a British-Indian trading centersituated on Lake Ontario. It was morethan 321 km (200 miles) from Albany toOswego, and a further 241 km (150 miles) toFort Niagara via Lake Ontario.

Shirley and the major part of hisexpedition arrived at Oswego on 17 August.They encountered no opposition, either enroute or when they arrived. The difficultpassage to Oswego, followed by numerousdelays in the arrival of supplies and troops


once there, prevented Shirley moving ontoward Fort Niagara as quickly as planned.The last troops arrived in Oswego on2 September, but supply problems continuedand desertions had begun. In the interim,the French, taking advantage of the delay,had moved troops to Fort Frontenac, on thenorth side of Lake Ontario, and to otherposts to protect Niagara. Shirley, aware ofthe growing threat from the north and thedecreasing time left to lay siege to the fort,decided to call off the attack until the nextcampaign season and build up defenses inthe Oswego area instead.

At around the same time, LieutenantColonel Johnson headed from Albanytowards Lake George with 2,000 provincialsoldiers, under orders to construct FortEdward on the Hudson River, south of LakeGeorge. Upon completion of this task, hewas to proceed to Lake George, sail north,and attack the French positions on thenorth side of the lake. From there, he wassupposed to continue to Fort St. Frederic(Crown Point) at the southern end of LakeChamplain, just north of Lake George.Johnson reached the southern end of LakeGeorge in late August, where he receivedreports from Indian scouts that the Frenchwere in position at Ticonderoga (later FortCarillon, also at the southern end of LakeChamplain) but they had not yetconstructed fortifications. Baron Dieskauhad heard reports that Johnson wasstationed at Fort Edward. He led3,500 French regulars, militia, and Indiansto Ticonderoga, and leaving the majority ofthese troops there to construct Fort Carillon,took 1,000 regulars, militia, and Indians toattack the British at Fort Edward. As theFrench forces moved down the lake inbateaux, they realized that Johnson was infact encamped at the southern end of LakeGeorge, several miles north of where theyexpected to find him.

The British camp was fortified againstpossible attack, and the two armies met on8 September. The French regulars marched inopen order towards the camp, but their fireonly pounded the felled trees surrounding

the British position. The provincialsretaliated with musket and artillery. TheFrench attempted to shift their fire, but wereunable to inflict heavy casualties. After a fewhours the Canadian and Indian troopsmelted away, but, as Johnson noted, the'[French regulars] kept their ground andorder for some time with great resolutionand good conduct' (Gipson, VI, p. 172).Eventually, however, the French began tolose ground, and the provincials seized theadvantage, launched a counter-attack, andcaptured the wounded Dieskau. The battleended when a relieving force arrived fromFort Edward, forcing a conclusive Frenchwithdrawal.

The British and French had each lostmore than 200 men in the battle at LakeGeorge. The British campaign towards FortSt. Frederick came to a halt when news wasreceived that the French had begun to fortifyTiconderoga and renamed it Fort Carillon.The British were content with their victoryand fortified the southern end of LakeGeorge with the construction of FortWilliam Henry.

Canadian theater

Ironically, the smallest British expedition wasalso the most successful of the 1755campaign season. Lieutenant ColonelMonckton led 2,000 provincials and280 regulars against the French FortBeausejour in Nova Scotia. The invasionforce sailed from Boston on 26 May for (Fort)Annapolis Royal in Nova Scotia. Artillery andsupplies were sent in from Halifax to FortLawrence, on the route to the expedition'sfinal destination, in time for the arrival ofthe Boston contingent on 2 June. The troopsstopped just long enough to re-supply,marching out on 4 June toward the fort.

British troops spent the next weekclearing the areas surrounding FortBeausejour of Acadians who were providingsupport to the French cause. The displacedAcadians flooded toward the fort forprotection. Beausejour was manned by a few

The fighting 33

companies of regulars, plus nearly1,000 Acadian militia. By 14 June, most ofthe area around the fort had been clearedand the British artillery was in position tobegin the bombardment of the fort. AFrench observer described how

on the morning of the 16 [June] an enemybomb exploded on one of the casements to theleft of the entrance ... [I]t was enough to bringabout the surrender of the fort because firecombined with inexperience made everyonein that place give up (Journals of Beausejour,p. 97).

The nearby French Fort Gapereau alsocapitulated, creating a significant breach inthe French strategy of a continuous line offorts from Louisbourg to New Orleans. Asidefrom the water route toward Quebec,Louisbourg had been utterly cut off by theBritish action. One lasting, and infamous,legacy of the fighting in Nova Scotia in 1755was the expulsion of the Acadian populationby British authorities. This will be discussedlater in the book.

The overall British strategy for 1755 hadnot been fully executed. The British hadbeen completely stymied in the Ohio Riverarea and had made limited gains in twoother campaigns. Only in Nova Scotia hadthe strategy borne fruit. The fighting in theNew York and Western theaters hadadditionally accelerated the deterioration ofrelations between regular and provincialtroops. Numerous provincial observers werecritical of the performance of the regularswith Braddock's expedition, especially aftersome regulars accidentally mistook Virginianprovincials for French troops and fired uponthem. Lieutenant Colonel Washington, whowas present at the battle on 9 July,commented that 'our poor Virginiansbehaved like men and died like soldiers'(18 July 1755, The Writings of GeorgeWashington). The victory at Lake George, alsowon by provincials, gave further credibilityto the colonial belief that British regularsmight not be suited to fighting conditions inNorth America.

1756

The major fighting of 1756 occurred aroundthe British post at Oswego on Lake Ontario.The British were very much on the defensiveduring 1756, mainly because of their focuson the build-up of provincial and regularunits to fight and on smoothing relationsbetween the two groups. The French, eventhough they were outnumbered in bothregular and militia establishments for theremainder of the war, nevertheless launchednumerous offensive operations in both 1756and 1757.

The French command in Canada waslargely divided between Marquis deVaudreuil, who in theory had influence inthe deployment of the colonial regulars andmilitia, and the new commander-in-chief ofthe French regular forces, Marquis deMontcalm-Gozon de Saint-Veran. The Frenchport of Louisbourg, however, was under thecommand of neither Montcalm norVaudreuil, but that of Chevalier de AugustinDrucour.

Montcalm sailed from France for Quebecon 3 April 1756, accompanied by areinforcement of two battalions of theRoyal-Roussillon and La Sarre regiments. Histwo senior commanders were Brigadier leChevalier de Levis and Colonel le Chevalierde Bourlamaque. As Montcalm sailed towardQuebec, war between Great Britain andFrance was formally declared on 17 May. Forthe French forces in North America, this didnot mean that France would focus hermilitary might on North America. On thecontrary, strategy in France was dividedbetween colonial and Continental ambitions,and there was strong sentiment at theFrench court for devoting the largest militaryeffort to the conflict in Continental Europe.By 1758, the French court had shifted almostcompletely to a strategy of invading andseizing Hannover, in the hope that it couldbe used as a bargaining chip for the return ofNew France, should the British succeed indefeating Montcalm. In any case, even hadstrategic plans been otherwise, the RoyalNavy undertook a very successful blockade,


The fighting 35

Battle of Lake George 1755. The image illustrates the Britishfortified camp on the right. Lake George is to the Britishrear. The French are attacking from the left side of theimage. (Anne SK Brown Collection)

bottling up the French fleet in Toulon andBrest and denying the French theopportunity to supply North America withreinforcements. For more informationregarding this strategy see Essential Histories,The Seven Years' War.

The British government took the oppositestrategic approach following the formaloutbreak of war, deciding that seizing NewFrance would be an important strategicadvantage in the larger world war that beganto develop in the spring of 1756. To this end,two more regiments were sent from GreatBritain in 1756, accompanied by seniorgenerals, such as Major General JamesAbercromby, Major General Daniel Webb, anda new commander-in-chief, John Campbell,Earl of Loudon, with orders to rectify thesituation that had developed in 1755. Britishregulars were still not equipped to fighteffectively in the forest, and Army leaders haddecided to create a new regiment of regulars.The 62nd (later 60th) Regiment of Foot was tobe raised in North America from the frontierpopulations, and its training was designed tocombine the discipline of the regulars withthe frontier fighting skills of a colonial

militiaman. Although not all of the recruitsfor this four-battalion regiment originatedfrom the frontier population, thisdevelopment marked a significant change inpolicy and an attempt by British regulars toget to grips with the sort of warfare particularto North America.

New York theaterLoudon, his staff, and the regularreinforcements arrived in Albany in lateJune, where he assumed overall command ofthe army in North America. As discussedearlier, he was faced immediately with theproblems resulting from a Royal Order whichdecreed all provincial officers (includingsenior officers such as generals and colonels)were to revert to the senior rank of seniorcaptain when serving alongside regulartroops. Loudon met with senior provincialofficers and was able to get them to agree tothe new edict, but it did nothing to improverelations between the two groups.

A senior British officer, LieutenantColonel Burton, was sent to report on thestate of the provincial forces stationed at FortWilliam Henry and Fort Edward. Hedescribed the camp at Fort William Henry as'nastier than anything I could conceive ... agreat waste of provisions, the men havingjust what they please, no great commandkept up' (Parkman, p. 233). The regular


View of Fort Beausejour. (Public Archives of Canada)

officer was not being prejudiced. AMassachusetts doctor, Dr. Thomas Williams,stationed at Fort William Henry reported:'we bury five or six a day. Not more thantwo thirds of our army fit for duty'(Parkman, p. 234). The plan for an attack onFort Carillon, just beyond the north side ofLake George, would have to be delayed.

The French feared that the main Britishattack would come against them at FortCarillon. Montcalm arrived at Fort Carillonin July, and decided to draw off Britishattention from the fort and apply pressureagainst Oswego instead. At first this planonly envisioned a feint attack but in the endit was to be the major campaign of theseason. A column of 1,000 French regulars,Canadians, and Indians, under the commandof Coulon de Villiers, was assembled to cutcommunications between Oswego andAlbany. They arrived in the area in early July,where they encountered a column ofprovincial troops. The unit numbered justover 500 men, and was under the commandof Captain John Bradstreet, a New Englanderwith a commission in the 62nd (60th) Foot.Bradstreet's men had arrived in Oswegowith supplies and were returning by boatto Albany.

On the 3 July, Bradstreet was ambushedby the French troops. The skirmish lasted for

most of the day, with both sides claimingvictory in the end. The encounter was mostlikely a draw, from which both sides wereable to extricate themselves with prisonerstaken but few casualties. The French ambushdid alert the British commanders to theprecarious position that Oswego was in, butthe confusion surrounding Loudon's arrivaland accompanying changes in bureaucracymeant that a major reinforcement for thearea was not prepared till 12 August. The44th Regiment of Foot and provincials wereassigned the task of reinforcing Oswego,where they were sorely needed. They werenot, however, to arrive in time.

Montcalm was already on the moveagainst Oswego. He had marched out fromFort Carillon in early July, leaving behind3,000 men to defend the north end of LakeGeorge. Montcalm reached Fort Frontenac, atthe northern end of Lake Ontario, on29 July, and from there he sent ahead a smalldetachment of regulars, militia, and Indiansto rendezvous with Villiers near Oswego.Montcalm, meanwhile, came behind withthe bulk of the force, which landed a milefrom Oswego on 10 August. The Frenchcolumns converged on Fort Ontario thenext day.

The garrison at the three forts at Oswego -Ontario, Pepperell (Oswego), and George -were commanded by Colonel Mercer. Shirleyhad left two locally raised regular regiments

The fighting 37

in the area for the winter of 1755-56, andthese were divided between forts Ontarioand Pepperell. New Jersey provincials werestationed at Fort George, with the totalgarrison numbering just over 1,500 men. Ariver separated Fort Ontario from the othertwo encampments, and it stood on a heightoverlooking Oswego and Fort George.

The French column was carrying a largecontingent of siege artillery for its assault onthe three forts. After two days and nights ofheavy bombardment, Fort Ontario wasshattered. Colonel Mercer ordered theevacuation of Fort Ontario to the westernside of the river on 13 August, and thesurvivors were able to get across to Oswego.Montcalm moved his artillery to thecaptured heights where Ontario had stood,and on the morning of 14 August, hiscannon opened up on the two remainingforts. A column of French and Indian troopscrossed the river unopposed under cover ofcannon fire. The effect of the artillery firewas described as leaving the British: 'somuch exposed that the Enemy could see thebuckles in our shoes' (Journal of the Siege ofOswego, Military History of Great Britain, for1756, 1757, p. 38).

After the heavy bombardment in whichColonel Mercer was killed, the remainingofficers held a council of war and decided tosurrender. In the end the British lost 50 menand the French forces about half that. Aswith other French victories, the French-alliedIndians wrought havoc among thesurrendered British soldiers and civilians.Montcalm had to intervene to stop thekilling and pillaging after the surrender. Theprisoners were transported to Montreal.Montcalm destroyed everything in the areaof any value, and then withdrew. His troopsredeployed to forts Niagara, Frontenac andCarillon, having decisively entered theconflict in 1756. The offensive defense hadpaid dividends, keeping the British offbalance for another year.

The rest of 1756 passed with small bandsof provincials, principally Rogers' Rangersand French Canadian and Indian troops,harassing posts along the frontier. This period

became known as the partisan war. The lossof the 50th and 51st Regiments of Foot atOswego prompted the renumbering of allBritish regiments listed above 51, and so the62nd Regiment of Foot became the 60th.

1757

Similar to 1756, 1757 would be marked byonly one major engagement between Franceand Britain, and again this was fought in theNew York theater of operations. The partisanwar continued along the frontier, spreadingfear among both French and British settlers.

Over the course of 1757, the Britishreinforced their war effort with more than11,000 regular troops shipped out from GreatBritain. By the end of 1757, 21 battalions ofBritish regulars and seven Independentcompanies were operating in North America.The British were also able to call upon thecolonies for further provincial forces, whichwere used in increasing numbers to protectlines of communications with forts along thefrontier. On the French side, Montcalmreceived his last major reinforcement in1757, with the arrival of two battalions ofthe Regiment de Berry. Montcalm had onlyeight battalions of regulars (there were 12 intotal, but four were stationed at Louisbourg)and 64 companies of colonial regulars,stationed from Louisbourg to New Orleans.He also, like his British counterparts, had alarge contingent of militia and a largernumber of Indian allies to draw upon for thecampaign.

A change of government in Britain in1757 caused the Newcastle ministry to bereplaced, first by William Pitt and WilliamCavendish, and then, after a short time by acoalition government, the Newcastle-Pittministry, in the winter of 1757. TheNewcastle-Pitt ministry changed strategy,shifting the British focus to attackingLouisbourg and Quebec, the heart of NewFrance. In response to the new strategic plan,Lord Loudon withdrew a large number ofregulars from New York in April and sailedfor Halifax. He was further reinforced with


Montcalm surrounded by his men.(Ann Ronan Picture Library)

newly arrived regular troops from GreatBritain, and was ordered to attack the Frenchfortress at Louisbourg, in an attempt to openup Quebec to attack.

Poor intelligence gathering and theFrench Navy's continued dominance of its

British naval opposition in the area nearLouisbourg meant that Loudon was unsureof the size of the French forces. He hesitatedto launch an attack, and by July, the planshad to be put aside when the Royal Navywas unable to gain the upper hand in theregion. Montcalm was aware of thesedevelopments, and his scouts reported thatthe frontier had been stripped of many

The fighting 39

British regulars. Montcalm decided to takeadvantage of the situation, and prepared tostrike at Fort William Henry, at the southernend of Lake George.

New York theaterBy July, Montcalm had amassed a large forcein and around Fort Carillon and wasplanning an attack on Fort William Henrybefore the end of the month. The Frenchattack column was to number 7,500 men,including six regular battalions, marines,militia, and Indians. Montcalm split his forcein two; one group of 2,600 men traveledoverland, while the other, some 5,000 mentraveled in bateaux over the lake. The twoforces met at the southern end of the lake on2 August.

The British force at Fort William Henrycomprised just over 2,000 men, half of whomwere regulars, under the command ofLieutenant Colonel George Munro. The fortwas a fairly strong structure, constructed oflogs and earth. General Webb was stationedwith 1,600 soldiers, mostly provincials, at FortEdward, 22 km (14 miles) to the south. Webbdispatched a reinforcement of 200 regulars on29 July to reinforce the garrison at FortWilliam Henry, and he also alerted the NewYork and New England colonies of the needfor more troops. The message was received,but the reinforcements would arrive too late.

On 3 August, the first clashes occurredbetween scouts of the British and Frencharmies. The road to Fort Edward was cut by adetachment of French and Indian troops,and British forces and civilians in the areabegan to withdraw to Fort William Henry,burning the houses and buildings thatremained outside the perimeter. The Britishalso held an entrenched camp outside thefort. British artillery fired upon the Frenchbuild-up outside the fort, but the first Frenchsiege trenches were dug under heavy fire onthe evening of 4 August and the siege beganin earnest.

Both sides exchanged fire as the Frenchtrenches crept closer and closer to the Britishramparts. A British artillery officer wrote on7 August:

Robert Rogers. (John Carter Brown Library atBrown University)

the enemy still continue working and carryingon their approaches. The garrison kept acontinual fire both of shells and cannon tillnight... [A]t night the garrison kept a continualwatch for fear of an assault (8311-85).

Webb was unable to send morereinforcements, fearing that his small forcewould be decimated trying to reach thebesieged British garrison. Such a loss wouldleave the road to Albany open andunprotected, since the provincialreinforcements had not yet arrived. To makematters worse, smallpox broke out insideFort William Henry.

A few days into the siege, the number ofkilled and wounded within the fort hadreached over 300. Many of the large Britishcannons and mortars had blown up or beendestroyed. The palisades had been breachedin a few locations, and the French continuedto pour artillery fire into the fort. Messagessent by Munro had been intercepted by theFrench and Indians. Munro was advised ofthis state of affairs by Louis Antoine deBougainville, a senior French officer, whowarned that the likelihood of reinforcements


from Webb was minimal. Munro still refusedto surrender, but morale within the fortwas sinking.

Following a full night of heavybombardment Munro at last began to feelthat resistance was futile. On the morning of9 August, Lieutenant Colonel Young,was sent to Montcalm's tent to discuss termsof a surrender. The British agreed to asurrender that allowed them to march to FortEdward with full military honors. They werealso required to promise not serve in theconflict for 18 months. The French prisonerscaptured since 1754 were to be returned toNew France within three months. The storesand artillery of the fort, or what was left ofthem, were retained as spoils of the French.Montcalm summoned a war council with hisIndian allies and called on them to respectthe conditions of the surrender. The Britishevacuated the fort and entrenched camp.

The French-allied Indians, disregardingMontcalm's demands, rushed to the fort asthe British evacuated, attacking and killingthe wounded left behind. The French guardsattempted to stop the killing, but there isdebate about how hard they tried.Montcalm was eventually able to restoresome level of order, but on the followingday, as the British column marched towardFort Edward, they were attacked again byIndians seeking revenge and prisoners. TheFrench guards again failed to stop theslaughter, and it is estimated that 50 men,women, and children were killed andanother 200 taken prisoner by the Indians.The French finally managed to restore orderand escort the remainder of the column toFort Edward. Some of the Indians sickenedand died of smallpox after their attacks onsick and wounded British.

By 11 August, the number of dead andwounded from the British side far exceededthe 300 who had been killed before thesurrender of the fort and was well over700 people killed, wounded, or missing. TheFrench forces had lost fewer than 100 menkilled and wounded. It is not known howmany French-allied Indians died. However,a British prisoner of the Indians reported

that 'the Indians that went from the town[to Fort William Henry] where I lived onequarter of the numbers were missing,seven killed and three died of their wounds'(King). This suggests that the toll on somesmall Indian villages could have beenquite high.

The partisan war on the frontiercontinued after the British defeat. Montcalmdestroyed Fort William Henry and returnedto Fort Carillon. He had been ordered toproceed to Fort Edward but had decided itwas not a good idea, as the Canadian militiawas nervous about getting back for theharvest. The year 1757 was the high watermark for the French effort in the French andIndian War; while the British were to suffer afew more defeats, the initiative began to shiftin their favor with the 1758 campaign.

1758

One of the first major changes of 1758 wasto the high command of British forces inNorth America, with the replacement ofLord Loudon by Major General JamesAbercromby. The Newcastle-Pitt Ministryalso made concessions to the colonialgovernments on disputes over command andpayment, in an effort to resolve past issues ofreinforcements and supplies and make theway smoother for Abercromby. Britain agreedto pay for a portion of the raising, clothing,and arming of provincial units recruited forfuture campaigns, and to discontinue thecustom of de-ranking provincial officers.

The British strategy for 1758 envisioned alarge-scale, three-pronged attack on NewFrance. Major General Abercromby was tolead an attack on Fort Carillon; MajorGeneral James Amherst was to lead anamphibious attack and siege of Louisbourg;and Brigadier John Forbes was to try onceagain to take Fort Duquesne, using adifferent route than Braddock had taken in1755. Some 24,000 British regulars and22,000 provincials were deployed for thesecampaigns, against a French force that wasspread thinly across New France.

The fighting 41

Western theaterBrigadier Forties's expedition towards FortDuquesne was different from Braddock's inseveral major ways. For a start the route wasshorter and originated in Pennsylvania.Forbes also had a highly motivated andtrained second-in-command, LieutenantColonel Henry Bouquet of the 60th Foot.Bouquet had been actively involved indrawing up battle plans and devising tacticsto fight in the woods of North America. In1757, he had drawn up a plan of marching inthe woods that highlighted the need for asecure line of communications. His order ofmarch focused on the need for constantscouting and destruction of any ambush,stating that

the vanguard must detach small parties amile forward, who shall march in great silence,and visit all suspected places, as copses, ditchesand hallows, where ambuscades may beconcealed ... [I]n case of attack, the men mustfall on their knees; that motion will prevent theirrunning away (Bouquet Papers I, pp. 52-53].

Forbes's march, though slow, was designed toensure that forts were constructed and asecure line of communication ensured.

Forbes's expedition began to gather inSandy Hook, Pennsylvania in April. The totalnumber of troops earmarked for the columnwas about 6,000. Nearly 1,800 of these wereregulars and the rest provincial soldiers. Theperiod between April and June was spentgathering the necessary supplies andprovincial troops for the operation. The issueof supplies was becoming acute; a presswarrant was issued for the authorization ofpressing wagons, carriages and horses if thesituation did not improve by late May. Thisaction was likely to be unpopular withcolonial settlers and was used as a last resort.

The forward elements of the column beganto move out in late June. On 24 June, Bouquetand forward elements reached Raystown,where they began to construct Fort Bedford.The troops would remain in the area for nearlya month, building the fort and securing thesurrounding area. Forbes's division followed

and met up with the forward units. Bouquetthen pushed out a further 64 km (40 miles) toLoyalhannon Creek and began to build up theroad and another fortified position, FortLigonier. By 6 September, Bouquet and hisforward elements were within 64 km (40miles) of Fort Duquesne at LoyalhannonCreek. Forbes and his large force remainedfurther back, hampered by discipline andsupply problems. The onset of autumn rainsdelayed progress still further.

As they progressed along the march route,the British were also in negotiation withlocal Indian tribes. They wished particularlyto win over the Delawares, who had sidedwith the French. After a series of meetingsmany of the Indian tribes agreed to side withthe British, including some that hadpreviously been allied with the French.

The French position at Fort Duquesne wasstill fairly formidable, even without a largecontingent of regulars. Contemporary reportsestimate that the fort was garrisoned by some1,200 militia and marines, supported by anadditional 1,000 Indian warriors, under thecommand of Marchand de Lignery.

It was at Loyalhannon Creek that Bouquetmade a major operational error. SeveralBritish provincial and regular soldiers hadbeen captured at Fort Ligonier by Indianraiding parties, and Bouquet was consideringsending out two parties of 100 men each tocut off the Indian withdrawal and rescue thetroops. Major Grant, a regular officer,suggested a different plan. He said that ifBouquet gave him 500-600 men, he wouldpush towards Fort Duquesne, make areconnaissance, attempt to cut off the roadsand generally to harass the fort. British scoutshad reported that the fort was garrisonedby only 600 men, so Bouquet agreed to theplan and Major Grant set out with a force of400 regulars and 350 provincials.

Grant's force was within five miles of FortDuquesne by 13 September, with a plan todestroy the Indian camp outside the fort.Major Lewis and a force of 400 men wentforward and destroyed some of theblockhouses outside the fort, while MajorGrant was stationed on a height overlooking


the fort. When Lewis returned, Grantremained on the height. The followingmorning, 14 September, Grant divided hisforce into three columns. He sent Major Lewisto set up an ambush position with100 regulars and 150 Virginian militia, whilea Captain MacDonald marched to the fortwith 100 regulars. Grant and the remainderof the force stayed on the heights.

As Grant reported to Bouquet, theexecution of the plan went badly.

For about half an hour after the enemy camefrom the fort, in different parties, without much

order and getting behind forces they advancedbriskly, and attacked our left where there were250 men. Captain MacDonald was soonkilled ... [O]ur people being overpowered, gaveway, where those officers had been killed ...[TJhe 100 Pennsylvanians who were posted uponthe right at the greatest distance from the enemy,went off without orders and without firing ashot. In short in less than half an hour all wasin confusion ... [W]e were fired upon from everyquarter. ... [O]rders were to no purpose, fear hadthen got the better of every other passion and Ihope I shall never see again such pannick amongtroops (Bouquet papers, II, p. 503).

The fighting 43

While the Pennsylvania provincialsperformed miserably, the Virginiansacquitted themselves well. Bouquet noted:'the Virginians who with 100 men sustainedthe battle with all their forces' (Bouquet, II,p. 519). In the end, Major Lewis and hisdetachment attempted to get back to MajorGrant, but the two officers were forced tosurrender to the French and Indians whohad completely cut them off. More than400 officers and men were able to escape,but some 200 had been killed or captured. Itis difficult to ascertain accurate numbers ofdead and wounded on the French side.

Following this victory, the Frenchattempted to build on the advantage gained.In early October, 400 militia and marinesand 100 Indians moved out to attack FortLigonier, arriving on the morning of12 October. Bouquet was not in commandat Fort Ligonier, having gone out on theroad to make inspections. The Frenchlaunched an attack at 11.00 am, pushingback two British forward reconnaissanceunits back toward the fort. The Britishcommander, Colonel James Burd, counter-attacked, and after two hours of brisk

fighting the French were forced to withdraw.Although this was a relatively minorskirmish for the French, morale at FortDuquesne began to sink in the aftermath,and the French militia from Illinois andLouisiana withdrew. Supplies due from FortFrontenac had been destroyed by Bradstreetin August, which was probably acontributing factor.

On 5 November, the main British forcewas finally established at Fort Ligonier.British scouts were reporting low morale atFort Duquesne, and on 18 November2,500 soldiers headed out from FortLigonier, hoping to exploit the situation.On the evening of 24 November, forwardelements reached the heights whereGrant had been stationed - just in time towitness the French blowing up their ownfort. The next morning, the British movedinto the remains of the fort and began torebuild it, renaming it Fort Pitt. Thecampaign was a success, and the regularswere sent back to Philadelphia for winterquarters, while provincial troops stationedalong the newly built road and itsprotecting forts.


New York theaterAfter spending the winter in Montreal,Montcalm decided to deploy most of hisregular troops to Fort Carillon, and by earlysummer eight regular battalions wereassembled there. They were largely withoutsupport from the Canadian militia, the vastmajority of which was held back inMontreal, Quebec, and other frontier areas.

General Abercromby, in preparation forthe attack on Fort Carillon, had assembled6,000 British regulars and 9,000 provincials.The British column assembled at the ruins ofFort William Henry to drill and buildbateaux for the lake crossing. On 4 July, theBritish force was completed and ready to sail.

Montcalm had realized that the Britishwere on the move, and in early July heordered his troops to build an outerdefensive work around Fort Carillon. A largeentrenchment was constructed, with felledtrees spread out in front of the dug trenches.One British observer described how the'[French] had large cut trees one laid aboveanother a man's height and in the outsidethere was brush and logs for about 15 pacesfrom it' (Black Watch, p. 24). The Britishwould have to overcome this obstacle beforethey could approach the fort itself.

The British force landed unopposed onthe north shore of Lake George on 6 July. Asthey moved to the north on 7 July, alarge-scale skirmish broke out on their leftflank. The French were easily pushed asideby British light infantry and rangers, but inthe fracas the innovative light infantryofficer, Brigadier George Augustus, LordHowe, was killed. A French senior officerBouganville recorded the event: '[Howe] hadshowed the greatest talents. ... [The skirmish]gave us twenty-four hours delay'(Bougainville, p. 229). A British captain,Charles Lee, offers another reason for thedelay of the British advance, claiming that'our troops [were] a good deal scattered anddivided through ignorance of the wood'(7803-18-1).

Colonel Bouquet meeting with Indians.(Rare Book Division, New York Public Library)

The fighting 45


After the skirmish, Montcalm gave ordersfor his troops to deploy to the entrenchment.Further work was done on the works inanticipation of the British attack, and sevenof the eight battalions were stationed in theentrenchment. Only one battalion remainedin Fort Carillon proper. Each battalion wasallotted 130 paces of frontage. Montcalm wasaware that there was not an endless supply ofammunition available to his army. Hespecifically ordered his officers to 'see to itthe soldier fires slowly and they must urgehim to take good aim' (Sautai, p. 72). On themorning of 8 July, the British were in sight ofthe entrenchment.

At this juncture, General Abercrombymade the worst command decision possible.After a forward engineer party reported thatthe works should be attacked immediately,Abercromby decided to make a frontal attackwithout artillery support. This plan made nosense, even to his own officers. One Britishofficer noted: '[entrenchment] made itimpossible to force their breastworks withoutcannon' (The Black Watch, p. 24). Captain Leewas even more scathing: 'a miscarriagemaybe brought about by the incapacity of asingle person I really did not think that sogreat a share of stupidity and absurdity couldbe in possession of any man' (7803-18-1). At10.00 am Bougainville commented: 'they[British] let off a great fusillade which did notinterrupt our work at all; we amusedourselves by not replying' (Bougainville,p. 232).

Sources differ on what time the mainBritish attack began, but it was most likelysometime around 12.00 pm. Bougainvilledescribed how four main British columnsattacked the entrenchment. Another Frenchofficer noted: 'our musketry fire was so wellaimed that the enemy was destroyed as soonas they appeared' (Sautai, p. 11). While theBritish attacks were not immediatelydestroyed, they suffered heavy casualties asrecorded by an officer of the 42nd Foot:'had as hot a fire for about three hours aspossibly could be, we all the time seeingbut their hats and end of their muskets'(Black Watch, p. 24).

There are estimated to have been sixmajor British attacks throughout the day,without a single successful breach of thebreastwork. Montcalm commented that'every part of the entrenchment wassuccessively attacked with the greatestvigour' (Sautai, p. 85), while Charles Leedescribed 'attacks made with most perfectregularity, coolness and resolution'(7803-18-1). French grenadier and lightcompanies were shifted to dangerous holesin the defense. Bougainville told of: 'their[British] light troops and better marksmen,who, protected by the trees, delivered a mostmurderous fire on us' (Bougainville, p. 232).

Captain Lee summarized the reasons forthe defeat with his account of how theunevenness and ruggedness of the groundand height of the breastwork

... rendered it an absolute impossibility ...[N]o order given to change attack ... but everyofficer led at the head of his division, companyor squadron to fall a sacrifice to his own goodbehaviour and stupidity of his commander[Abercromby] ... [T]he fire was prodigiously hotand the slaughter of the officers was great;almost all wounded, the men still furiouslyrushing forward almost without leaders, fivehours persisted in this diabolical attempt and atlength obliged to retire (7803-18-1).

At about 7.00 pm the British began towithdraw towards Lake George. Some of thetroops, after suffering such a setback, becamedemoralized, and Captain Bradstreet wasordered to march back to the landing placeand ensure that no one stole or seized theboats. The light infantry and rangersprotected the retreat as the boats wereloaded, and the remaining elements of theexpedition withdrew to the south end ofLake George. From there the retreatcontinued to Fort Edward.

The battle casualties for Britishwere more than 1,000 regulars and300 provincials killed. The French, by contrast,lost only 300 killed in the battle. GeneralAbercromby's demonstration ofpoor leadership and decision-making skills,

The fighting 47

contrasted against Major General JeffreyAmherst's success at Louisbourg (see below),led shortly to Abercromby's replacement ascommander-in-chief by Amherst in September.

There was one bright spot in the conductof the New York campaign. CaptainBradstreet, a regular officer, led a raid with asmall waterborne force against FortFrontenac in August. His force of 2,200 menwas made up mostly of provincial soldiers,with about 500 regulars among them.Bradstreet and his men traveled by bateauxup the Mohawk and Onandaga rivers pastOswego. On 22 August, the force left Oswegoand sailed due north for Fort Frontenac.

On 25 August, the flotilla arrived nearFrontenac. The French garrison had beendepleted in response to the need for regularsat Fort Carillon, and on 27 August, the fortand French shipping in the region wereunder bombardment by British artillery. Thefort surrendered later the same day. NineFrench ships, as well as the fort, weredestroyed in the attack, and the bootygained from seizing this important tradingpost and its supplies was estimated to havebeen close to 800,000 pounds sterling. Just asimportant, seizing the supplies and stores

from Fort Frontenac caused major problemsfor the French forts in the west.

Canadian theaterThe major engagement in the Canadiantheater took place on Cape Breton Island,home of the French fort at Louisbourg. Thisstructure was the strongest fortress in NorthAmerica, for either side, with defensesstretching for a mile and a half on itslandward perimeter. Some of the masonrywas in a poor condition owing to theweather conditions of the area, which wouldprove beneficial to the British artillery.Defensive lines had been dug along thebeaches to the south and west of thefortress, and four bastions stood within thefort itself. The governor of Cape BretonIsland, Chevalier de Drucour, was in overallcommand of the French forces atLouisbourg. There were four battalions ofregulars, 24 companies of marines, andsome militia. Contemporary accountsestimate that there were 3,500 menstationed in and around the fortress. There

Battle of Fort Carillon showing the entrenchment withno felled trees in front. (National Archives of Canada)


were 219 cannons on the fortress walls andother defensive positions, as well as19 mortars. The garrison was prepared for along siege. A French fleet had arrived overthe course of the spring to re-supply thefortress. Five ships of the line and sevenfrigates patrolled the harbor.

The British forces were gathered atHalifax, Nova Scotia. The Royal Navy hadprovided 23 ships of the line, 18 frigatesand a fleet of transports, under thecommand of Admiral Edward Boscawen.Major General Jeffrey Amherst, was to leadthe land effort. Once again, as in 1757, theexpedition was made up mostly of regulars.There were 14 regular battalions earmarkedfor the operation, comprising justover 12,000 men with an additional500 'Gorham's Rangers' from Halifax andRoyal Artillery attached. The fleet sailedon 28 May, and arrived off the Cape Bretoncoast on 2 June.

There were three possible landing sites.The first was Freshwater Cove, 6 km (fourmiles) from the fort. Flat Point and WhitePoint were to the east of Freshwater, closer tothe fort. Royal Navy and senior army officerssailed up and down the potential landingareas to assess the best approach, thendevised their plans. The army was to bedivided into three divisions: Brigadier JamesWolfe was to lead the main assault againstFreshwater Cove, with Brigadiers CharlesLawrence and Edward Whitmore advancingtowards Flat and White Points.

The fleet and army were delayed fromlanding for more than six days, as fog andsurf denied access to the beaches. The Frenchdefenses were strongest at Freshwater Cove,where their entrenchment was ready toreceive the enemy. Over 1,000 Frenchsoldiers had been deployed to throw theBritish back into the sea and were, as aBritish officer noted:

most advantageously posted behind goodentrenchment, the banks very high and almostperpendicular ... [W]herever there was the leastprobability of getting ashore it was well securedwith cannon and entrenchment (7204-6-2).

Finally, on 8 June, the troops received theorder to land. A British observer described'nothing seen or heard for one hour but thethundering of Cannon and flashes oflightening' (Add Mss 45662). Wolfe's divisionwas to see most of the heavy fighting for theday. The surf continued to be a problem -'the surge was extremely violent ... [Boats]crushed to pieces being carried away by thesurf (6807-131).

The first waves of British troopsapproached the beaches. An officer wholanded with Wolfe's division noted:

the boats proceeded to the cove, the enemy letthem come within half musket shot and gavethem a warm reception from their entrenchment,with great guns and small arms (MilitaryAffairs, p. 416).

As Wolfe's division made a foothold atFreshwater Cove, Lawrence's division alsolanded after making a diversion. The Frenchwere overwhelmed by the numbers of Britishtroops landing, and began to fear that theywere in danger of being cut off from the fort.A British officer recorded the attack:

the enemy's attention being quite engaged atthe other cove did not perceive our men climbingrocks till a few of them got to the top whobravely maintained their guard well supportedthough opposed by numbers they gained theenemy's flank who feared being cut off from thegarrison fled in great disorder (7204-6-2).

Each side lost about 100 men during thefight for the beaches.

Flat Point Cove became the landingplace for the British artillery and stores,once the area had been secured by thetroops moving from Freshwater, and acamp was built to receive troops andmateriel coming ashore. General Amherstdecided that the best way to deal with thefort was to surround it with batteries andslowly pummel it into submission. A formalEuropean-style siege was planned; unlikeAbercromby, Amherst decided against afrontal infantry attack.

The fighting 49

Montcalm cheered by his men after his victory at FortCarillon, 1758. (Fort Ticonderoga Museum)

On 12 June, Brigadier Wolfe and2,000 men set out to seize Lighthousebattery, to the north of the fort. The Britishhad received reports that the French haddestroyed Lighthouse and Great Battery, twoof the major batteries outside Louisbourg'swalls. A French officer stated the reason forabandoning the batteries: 'the impossibilityof maintaining this post obliged us toabandon it; for it was more than we coulddo to guard the batteries and ramparts ofthe city' (Knox, III, p. 104). Wolfe's forcesreached the abandoned lighthouse batteryon 20 June. They took possession andimmediately opened fire on Frenchshipping in the harbor and other Frenchpositions close by. The Island battery,opposite Louisbourg, was silenced on25 June when the combined artillery firefrom the Lighthouse and Royal Navy shipsfinally destroyed the will of the defenders.

On 29 June, the French sank six ships inthe entrance to the harbor to deny accessto the Royal Navy. Louisbourg was nowcompletely surrounded and closed off tothe outside world. The formal siege hadbegun. The British deployed infantry tovarious redoubts, set up siege batteries,and began to dig siege trenches towardsthe fortress.

The outcome of the siege was decided bythe ability of the engineers and artillery menon both sides. The French did not sit idly inthe fortress under the onslaught of Britishartillery. One French officer described atypical series of actions:

1st of July a detachment of our people salliedout of the wood ... [T]here was a very briskskirmish, but at length our men were forced toretire ... [W]e made a sally on the 8th ... [W]esurprised them ... but what could 900 men doagainst the vanguard of the enemy whoimmediately flew to assistance of the sappers(Knox, III, p. 110).


The siege was dangerous as well for theBritish soldiers out in the redoubts andtrenches. A British officer described whatbefell an overly curious fellow officer: ' [a]cannon ball which cut his head off as helooked over the breastwork out of curiositynot duty' (8001-30).

By late July, the French defenders werebeginning to suffer the effects of the siege inearnest. The British siege lines werecontinuing to close in, and a French 63-gunship of the line had been destroyed in theharbor. A French officer described theconditions of the French batteries:

as our batteries and ramparts had been verymuch damaged these three days, and as the fire ofthe enemy's small arms made it almostimpracticable for us to maintain ourselves on thoseramparts which we were endeavouring to repair ...a breach had been [made] in the Dauphin Bastionand West Gate (Knox, III, p. 112;.

He continued 'in so melancholy asituation, there was nothing left but tocapitulate; so that we suspended our fire, andsent to demand a truce, in order to regulatethe articles of surrender' (Knox, III, p. 113).The French garrison surrendered on 26 July.

The fighting 51

Lieutenant General Jeffrey Amherst. (Ann RonanPicture Library)

The British had lost 500 killed and 1,000wounded during the landings and the siege.The French losses are estimated at 1,000 killedand 2,000 wounded. More than 5,000 soldiers,sailors, and civilians surrendered to the Britishforces. The siege had taken most of the 1758campaign season, however, and the advancetowards Quebec City would have to wait untilthe following year. A large garrison was left atLouisbourg to rebuild the works and defendthe area against potential French counterattacks. The remainder of the troops weretransported to Halifax and New York forwinter quarters.

The campaigns of 1758 had definitivelyshifted the momentum of the war in Great

Britain's favor. New France was nowcompletely on the defensive. WhileAbercromby had been stopped at FortCarillon, it was only a matter of time beforethe British attacked it again with a differentoperational plan.

1759

Given their successes the previous year, theBritish decided once again to adopt amulti-pronged strategy for the 1759 campaign.The major thrust, against Quebec City, wouldbe commanded by Major General James Wolfe.Wolfe's force was almost completely composedof regular troops; he had 10 battalions, plus acomposite unit of grenadiers named the'Louisbourg Grenadiers'. A small force of300 provincial engineers and six companies ofRangers joined the force. The total number wasjust over 8,000 men. The force was smallerthan the one that had attacked Louisbourg,since a garrison was required to remain at theFort in case of French naval counterattacks.General Amherst was to lead a mixed force ofprovincials and regulars against Fort Carillonand Fort St. Frederic, with Montreal as his finalobjective. Amherst's force numbered just over5,800 regulars and 5,000 provincials. A thirdpincer, commanded by Brigadier JohnPrideaux, was to originate from the re-established Fort Oswego and strike towardsFort Niagara. Prideaux' force included threebattalions of regulars and two battalions ofprovincials. The last campaign was to becarried out by a very small force, ordered toreopen communications between Fort Pitt andFort Ligonier, and then to establish a force atFort Pitt to attack north against Forts PresqueIsle and Venango.

Western theaterThe regulars of l/60th Foot marched fromLancaster, Pennsylvania on 31 May. After amonth of undertaking repairs and ensuringsecurity along the road, the battalion arrivedat Fort Bedford. They spent June and earlyJuly carrying supplies and reinforcements toFort Pitt, amid much skirmishing.


The l/60th Foot received orders to marchfrom Fort Pitt toward Fort Venango on12 July. As the troops moved out, theyreceived news that the French hadabandoned both Venango and Presque Isle,as well as several other nearby posts, afterreceiving news of the fall of Fort Niagara toBritish troops. The l/60th marched out tosearch the forts, and confirmed that theyhad been abandoned. The regulars returnedto Fort Pitt, while provincial troops weredeployed north to occupy the forts for thewinter. Five companies of the l/60th Footremained at Fort Pitt for the winter, so that

they would be in a position to move quicklyif the frontier was threatened. The rest of thebattalion was sent along the road toLancaster to keep the lines ofcommunications open for the winter.

New York theaterIn March 1759, General Amherst ordered alarge-scale raid on Fort Carillon. A mixedforce of regulars, rangers, and Indians wasordered to observe the French and the areaaround Fort Carillon to assess its defenses.The raiding party destroyed French suppliesoutside the fort, captured five French

The fighting 53

soldiers, and drew accurate maps of thedefenses of the fort and the entrenchment,losing two men in the process.

General Amherst gathered his forces onthe southern end of Lake George over thecourse of June. While stationed there, theforces were drilled and trained for thecoming operation. A contemporary accountdescribed preparations:

the regular regiments of line will be readyformed at the head of their encampment,between four and five o'clock to-morrowmorning, if a fine day, the men to be in their

waistcoats with their arms and ammunition(Knox, II, p. 486).

Amherst built part of a fort at theentrenchment constructed in 1757 and namedit Fort George. He also ensured that forts wereconstructed between Fort Edward and FortGeorge to protect his rear in case a Frenchattack originated from behind. He waitedthroughout June and most of July forsufficient reinforcements to arrive for hisregulars and for the provincial forces to befully mustered. On 21 July the army enteredbateaux and began to sail north. They arrivedat the northern end of the lake on 22 July andbegan to advance towards Fort Carillon.

Chevalier de Bourlamaque had reinforcedFort Carillon with 3,000 regulars and1,000 militia troops in mid-May. However,he then received information that the Britishwere planning to land near Quebec, onlywith orders to withdraw his forces fromCarillon and attempt to hold the line at thenorth end of Lake Champlain. Nevertheless,he decided to hamper the approachingBritish before he withdrew.

A small but powerful French force of400 men was left at Fort Carillon to repel theBritish approach. Bourlamaque decided towithdraw north to Fort St. Frederic followingreports that Amherst's column was marchingon the fort. The French force at Fort Carillonheld up Amherst's force with artillery fire forfour days, until Amherst moved his heavyartillery into range and began to pound thefort. Amherst noted on 26 July that

the artillery will be up that we may openbatteries of six 24 pounders ... [A]t about 10 PMa deserter came in and said the garrison was toget off and blow up the fort... and soon we sawthe fort on fire and an explosion (JeffreyAmherst, 26/7/1759).

The French force withdrew from FortCarillon to meet up with Bourlamaque andhis forces. The French decided to blow up

British amphibious landings at Louisbourg.The landing hasa mix of British line and grenadier troops. (Aisa)


Halifax, Nova Scotia, the main staging area for theconquest of Louisbourg and Quebec.(National Archives of Canada)

Fort St. Frederic a few days later, fearing thatit could not withstand the powerful Britishartillery train which was fast approaching.Bourlamaque and his troops then withdrewto Isle-aux-Noix.

Amherst decided against continuing hisadvance on the French immediately. Hedecided to take some time to fortifyFort Carillon, renamed Fort Ticonderoga,and Fort St. Frederic, now Crown Point.Amherst also sent Robert Rogers and hisRangers on a long-distance raid to destroythe Indian village of St. Francis. His scoutsand rangers also sailed north from CrownPoint to the northern end of LakeChamplain to observe and assess Frenchpreparations for defense. Troops were furtherengaged in building more bateaux and othershipping, to contend with the small French

flotilla of armed whaleboats on the lake.Amherst did not attempt to resume thenorthward march until 11 October.

After an unsuccessful attempt to destroythe French shipping, on 19 October Amherstdecided to withdraw for the winter to CrownPoint and Fort Ticonderoga. The advancenorth on Lake Champlain, to the St. JeanRiver to deal with the forts outside Montreal,would have to wait until the next campaignseason, but the French presence on LakeGeorge and the southern areas of LakeChamplain had been destroyed.

The other major offensive in the NewYork theater was launched against FortNiagara. As mentioned previously, BrigadierPrideaux commanded three regular and twoprovincial battalions. By early spring, theforward elements of his column had reachedOswego, and began work to fortify the areafor future operations.

Captain M. Pouchot commanded theFrench garrison at Fort Niagara. His troops

The fighting 55


numbered 110 men from regular battalions,180 Marines, and 100 Canadian militia. Thefortifications at Niagara were quite good,however, and when Pouchot received wordof the British arrival at Oswego, he set aboutrepairing damage to the fort from weatherand made other improvements to prepare forthe inevitable British attack.

The British force was divided at Oswego.Eight regular companies of the 4/60th Footand one battalion of New York Provincialsremained to defend Oswego and completework on a new fort. Two companies of the4/60th Foot, along with the 44th and46th Foot and one battalion of New Yorkprovincials, sailed for Fort Niagara in earlyJuly. They arrived near the fort on 7 July,and immediately prepared to lay siege.Skirmishes with the French were frequentas the British advanced.

By 16 July, the British had closed offall routes into Fort Niagara except for thewater approaches. The formal siege began asboth sides opened fire with artillery. TheBritish, using trenches, moved steadilycloser to the walls. Prideaux was accidentallykilled by one of his own mortars during anartillery exchange, and Colonel WilliamJohnson assumed command. Heimmediately called for furtherreinforcements from Oswego, followingreports from scouts of a rumor that aFrench relieving force was on the marchfrom Presque Isle and Venango.

On 24 July, the French force appearedfrom the south and the two sides met atLa Belle Famille. There were 800 Frenchtroops present, and Johnson had deployedjust over 400 regulars. The British, however,managed to surprise the French as they camewithin firing range. As was often the case inbattles of the 18th century, the French lostany advantage their numerical superioritymight have given them, when the Britishwere able to fire into their column as theyattempted to deploy into linear formation.Jeffrey Amherst noted 'Johnson hadintelligence of their [French] approach anddispersed his people [so] that he beat androuted them, [and] took 160 prisoners'

(Jeffrey Amherst, p. 151). The commander ofthe British force, Lieutenant Colonel EyreMassy, commented: 'The men received theenemy with vast resolution, and never firedone shot, until we could almost reach themwith our bayonets' (Brumwell, p. 253).

On 25 July, Pouchot ordered a raidingparty of 150 men to attack the Britishtrenches. The attack failed, and on 26 July,the French surrendered the fort. Thesurvivors from the battle of La Belle Famillehad already withdrawn towards Fort Detroitin the west, and the surrender of FortNiagara effectively destroyed the Frenchpresence on the western frontier. Any threatto Fort Pitt had already been removed whenthe forts at Presque Isle and Venangowere abandoned.

Canadian theaterIn May 1759, Montcalm learned that asizeable British fleet was heading towardsQuebec City from Louisbourg. Until thisnews was received, many in the Frenchcommand had expected that the attackwould come from the Lake Champlainregion. The St. Lawrence River was widelyconsidered too difficult for a full fleet tonavigate. However, unknown to the French,a young Royal Navy officer, James Cook, hadsurveyed the St. Lawrence, giving the Britishthe information they needed to stage awaterborne assault. Units of militia andIndians were called to Quebec to bolster theFrench defense, and by late May 14,000 menhad been deployed to defend Quebec. Theseincluded five regular battalions, most of theMarines for New France, and militia units. AFrench observer described preparations:

all along the [St. Lawrence] coast as far asMontmorency Falls, redoubts, bastions andbatteries were placed at a distance of agunshot from one another, and here M. deMontcalm placed his whole army(Northcliffe Collection, p. 215).

The French regulars were stationed in thecenter with militia and a stiffening ofmarines to their left and right. The gates of

The fighting 57

Major General James Wolfe (Roger-Viollet)


Quebec City were heavily barricadedand more than 100 artillery pieces put inplace.

The British force, as mentionedpreviously, numbered just under 9,000 men.(French intelligence reports had consistentlyoverestimated the actual size of the fleet.) On21 June, the British fleet was first sightedfrom Quebec. After a series of reconnaissanceand surveying missions, the fleet landed theBritish force on Isle d'Orleans on 26 June.The British troops were able to landunopposed, opposite the French lines atBeauport. Montcalm ordered fire ships to bedeployed against the British anchorage, but,as an eyewitness noted, 'fire-ships were sentdown to burn enemy shipping, but, insteadof doing it, what was our surprise to see thefire ships ablaze two leagues away'(Northcliffe Collection, p. 216). On theevening of 29 June, a British brigade underthe command of Brigadier Robert Moncktonlanded at Point Levi, opposite Quebec City.The brigade had cleared the area and heightsby 30 June, and by 12 July had establishedbatteries to fire on Quebec City.

The two remaining brigades, under thecommand of Brigadiers James Murray andGeorge Townshend, landed opposite the leftflank of the French positions stationed atMontmorency Falls on 10 July. Wolfe haddecided to attempt to turn the French leftflank at some point. Montcalm did not moveacross the Montmorency to attack Wolfe'snew camp. Wolfe sent out skirmishingparties in an attempt to force Montcalm intoattacking him across the river, but Montcalmdid not move.

Wolfe decided to make a combinedamphibious attack from the St. Lawrenceand across the Montmorency River againstthe French left flank at Montmorency Falls.On the morning of 31 July, the Royal Navybegan to bombard the Montmorencypositions. This alerted the French to thepossibility of a major attack, and Montcalmreinforced this position with men from thecenter and right flank. The landing did nottake place until 5.00 pm on the 31st, whenthe British landed the 'Louisbourg

Grenadiers' and elements of the 60th Footfrom the St. Lawrence. These troops wereearmarked to seize two redoubts, the first ofwhich was speedily completed.Reinforcements from two other regimentswere then landed. What happened nextdestroyed any hope of a British victory.Accounts vary of exactly what happenedand who was responsible, but it appears thatthe grenadiers rushed forward and seized aredoubt at the base of the hill, withouthaving received orders to do so. This actionundermined the British commanders' planto launch a combined attack. Asergeant-major of the grenadiers recalled:

we fixed our bayonets and beat our grenadiersmarch and so advanced on, during all this timetheir cannon played very briskly on us, but theirsmall arms in their trenches lay cool till theywere sure of their mark then poured their smallshot like showers of hail, which caused ourbrave grenadiers to fall very fast(Journal of a Sergeant Major, p. 10).

Other observers were more critical of thegrenadiers' actions. A junior officer.Lieutenant Hamilton commented:

[t]he check the grenadiers met with yesterdaywill it is hoped be a diffusion to them for thefuture. They ought to know that such impetuous,irregular, un-soldierlike behaviour destroys allorder and makes it impossible for theircommanders to form any disposition for anattack and puts it out of the general's power toexecute his plans ... [T]he very first fire of theenemy was sufficient to repulse men who hadlost all sense of order and military discipline(6707-11).

James Wolfe recorded his thoughts: 'thegrenadiers landed ... their disorderly marchand strange behaviour necessity of callingthem off and desisting from the attack ...[M]any experienced officers hurt in thisfoolish business' (Wolfe, 31 July). A Frenchobserver noted that '[Montcalm] allowed theenemy to advance within easy musket range,when he ordered his army to fire'.

The fighting 59

(Northcliffe, p. 218). The outcome of theengagement was succinctly conveyed byMarquis de Bougainville: 'the enemy wasrepulsed with a loss of six or seven hundredmen, and in the retreating they burned twoof their anchored vessels' (Bougainville,p. 318). In the end the estimate of Britishcasualties was just over 400 killed andwounded.

The French did not follow up theBritish withdrawal, and the British wereable to leave unmolested. The main Frencharmy had not been destroyed, however,which enormously frustrated Wolfe. Hecontinued to send detachments of lightinfantry, Indians, and rangers out to destroyFrench villages in an attempt to drawMontcalm out of his entrenchment andinto open battle. As he stated on 7 August,Targe detachments sent to scour the woods

and to oblige the enemy to keep at adistance and to prepare the troops for adecisive action' (Wolfe, 7 August). He wasunsuccessful in provoking Montcalmthroughout the month of August. A Britishofficer noted: 'the next attempt[post-Montmorency] will, I hope, be morepracticable and more successful; if we can'tbeat them we shall ruin their country'(Pargellis, Military Affairs, p. 434). On 9 and10 August, a British attempt to draw battlewas sent against the French positions atPoint aux Trembles. As with Montmorency,these attacks failed. The French positionswere very strong, and an observer describedthe engagement thus: 'their loss was100 men killed and wounded the firsttime, and 250 the second. Our side losttwo men killed and 4 or 5 wounded'(Northcliffe, p. 219).


Quebec: Direct View. (Roger-Viollet)

By early September, Wolfe feltpressure to bring the campaign to adecisive end. Autumn was approachingand the harsh Canadian winter would puta stop to the campaign, but bring noresolution. If the British withdrew it wouldbe a major blow to morale and to thecampaign in North America. Wolfe decidedto take a gamble; on 6 September, heembarked five battalions on Royal Navytransports and ships and sailed up theSt. Lawrence to the bottom of the bluffsbelow Quebec City. Testing the resolve ofMontcalm to counter his aggression, hisships sailed up and down the river, makingsurveys of possible landing sites, until11 September. On 12 September, here-embarked a division of troops andsailed for the lower end of the river.Wolfe had decided on a specific pointbelow the cliffs which led to a largeplain, known as the Plains of Abraham,which stood to the west of the city. Thereis some controversy as to how Wolfegained the necessary information; somesources say that Wolfe had gathered theinformation himself, while others claimthat a French deserter pointed outthe potential weak spot in the fort'sdefenses.

Brigadier Townsend describes whathappened next in his report of the eveningand morning of 13 September:

light infantry scramble up a woodyprecipice in order to secure ye landing of thetroops by dislodging a Captains Guard,defending a small intrenched road ye troopswere to move up. After a little firing ye lightinfantry gained the top of the Precipice amidispersed the Captain's Guard ...by whichmeans the troops... soon got up and wereimmediately formed. The boats as theyemptied were sent back directly for thesecond disembarkation, which Iimmediately made ... General Wolfethereupon began to form his army(Northcliffe, p. 419;.

Montcalm thought that Wolfe'slanding was a trick. A British observerrecorded that 'the Marquis de Montcalmwhen he heard the British had ascended thehill still believed it to be a feint' (Add Mss45662). He realized his mistake when the

The fighting 61

British began to take to the field.Montcalm moved as many troops as hecould over to Quebec in an attempt todestroy the British landing and positionsthat were being drawn up. The armies werein sight of one another, and Wolfe at last

had the decisive battle that had eludedhim since June.

Although there were periods of NorthAmerican-style skirmishing throughout thebattle, it was mostly fought in conventionalstyle, with linear formations deciding the

62 Essential Histories • The French-Indian War 1754-1760

outcome. A British junior officer givesincredible detail of the developments of13 September, describing how the Britishformed lines

... about two miles from Quebec. Here we layon our arms and were very much annoyed by someCanadians who from behind the hills and from athicket on our left kept a most galling fire ... [A]tabout 9am the enemy [French] had drawn up ...[They] advanced towards us briskly and in goodorder. We stood to receive them. They began fire attoo great a distance ...as they came nearer firedon them by divisions ... [F]ire made them waiver abit... [H]owever they still advanced pretty quick.We increased our fire without altering our position.When they were 60 yards gave them a full fire,fixed bayonets and under cover of smoke pushed atthem. When they perceived us they immediatelyturned their backs and fled (7204-6-2).

A British Sergeant-Major recalled: 'in abouta quarter of an hour the enemy gave way onall sides, when a terrible slaughter ensued fromthe quick Fire of our field guns and musketry,

The fighting 63

Attack at Montmorency Falls. In the foreground, the RoyalNavy ships can clearly be seen giving fire support to thetroops on the beaches. In the distance are British artilleryfiring at Quebec from the south bank of the river (NationalArchives of Canada)

with which we pursued them to the walls ofthe town' (Sergent Major, p. 22). The Britishlost 50 men killed, including Wolfe, who diedof gunshot wounds, and 500 wounded. TheFrench lost more than 1,500 killed, wounded,and taken prisoner. Montcalm was mortallywounded, and died on 14 September in the city.

The battle for control of the city andfortress was far from over. The town andfortress had still not been taken, and theBritish began to build a camp to lay siege tothe town. Reinforcements and artillery werebrought over from Point Levis. Marquis deBougainville and a large part of the Frenchforce had not yet been engaged. He reported:

I was not informed of it [arrival of Britishtroops on the Plains of Abraham] until nine inthe morning. I marched at once, but when I

came within range of the battle, our army wasbeaten and in retreat. The entire English Armyadvanced to attack me. I retreated before themand posted myself so as to cover the retreat ofour army, or join with it, or to march againagainst the enemy if it was judged proper ... Onthe 18th I marched with six hundred men tothrow myself into Quebec ... I was only threequarters of a league from Quebec when I learnedthat the city had surrendered. It had beenbombarded for sixty-eight days ... [W]e spentthree months in bivouac. Just the same, theEnglish hold only the outer walls and theKing [Louis XV] still holds the colony(Bougainville, pp.320-1).

While the British had been verysuccessful in 1759, the French still had alarge force stationed outside Quebec and inMontreal. The momentum that had shiftedto the British in 1758 continued in 1759,but the French remained defiant in the faceof defeat. The British were surrounded atQuebec. Winter was coming and the


British volunteers scaling the cliffs below the Plains ofAbraham. (National Archives of Canada)

St. Lawrence would freeze, preventing theRoyal Navy from delivering supplies. Amajor reinforcement of troops and materielwas required to contend with theencroaching French forces, and then tomarch to Montreal to take on the Frenchunits remaining there. The Battle of thePlains of Abraham was a critical turningpoint in the campaign, but it did not endthe conflict. As a British observer,Lieutenant Williamson, noted: 'we aremasters of the capital its true but it does notfollow from thence that we have conqueredthe whole country, that entirely depends onour fleet' (7311-85). A second battle outsideQuebec and a campaign against Montrealwould need to be won before the Britishcould claim victory in North America.

1760

The fighting in 1760 was marked by twomajor engagements: the second Battle of thePlains of Abraham (also known asSainte-Foy) and the British offensive againstthe last remaining French post, Montreal.This section will look first at the Canadiantheater of operations as this was the first,and most significant, campaign of 1760.

Canadian theaterThe British garrison left in Quebec Cityspent the winter months in a virtual stateof siege. They were holed up in the city anda few surrounding positions in thecountryside, closed off from the outsideworld by the frozen St. Lawrence River.During the winter the British suffered dueto the lack of proper winter housing. As aBritish observer noted: 'during the wholesiege from first to last, 535 houses wereburnt down, among [them] the wholeeastern part of the lower town'(Sergeant-Major, p. 24). It was estimatedthat by March 1760, half of the garrisonforce was on the sick list due to scurvy

and illnesses aggravated by the weatherconditions. The British, under the commandof Major General Murray, were also forced tosend forage parties outside the city walls to

The fighting 65

supplement their supplies. These partieswere regularly attacked by rear guards of theFrench forces. During the winter of1759-60, the British constantly anticipated

the arrival of a large French force fromMontreal. Rumors circulated for monthsthat the French, under the command ofMarquis de Levis, were about to march on


Quebec, creating a sense of urgency toprepare for the worst.

The French, meanwhile, had quarteredsome of their regulars in Montreal, aswell as in outposts near Quebec. The militiahad been dismissed, ready to be calledup again for duty in the spring of 1760.The French decided to attack Quebec beforethe ice on the St. Lawrence had broken upand the British could get reinforcements.By mid-March, orders were received togather supplies and prepare for the march tothe north, and the militia was called outonce again. On 20 April, the French forcesbegan to march. The column numberedmore than 6,000 men, comprising eightregular battalions, 20 Marine companies,3,000 militia, and 400 Indians. As theforce marched north, various detachmentswere called in and the number rose toover 8,000 effectives.

The British received reports of a Frenchcolumn approaching from Montreal. OneBritish observer recalled that 'during yenight of the 26th and 27th [a soldier]brought certain intelligence that the Frenchwere in motion to come by ye way ofLorette and St. Foy to cut off our CampRouge posts' (Northcliffe, p. 427).Bougainville also commented that 'thespeed of [Levis'] march surprised the enemy'(Bougainville, p. 325). The French drove offany British light troops they encounteredand began to build a camp at Sainte-Foy, atthe western edge of the Plains of Abraham.General Murray made a critical mistake atthis point; instead of assessing the situationand numbers of French forces, he decided toadvance out of the city and prepare anentrenchment. He could have waitedbehind the walls of the city until the icebroke up and a reliving force had arrived.Instead, as one British officer, captain Knoxrecalled, 'about seven o'clock our armymarched out to the Heights of Abrahamwith a respectable artillery' (Knox Journal,p. 246). A French observer, J. Desbruyeres,described '[Murray's] garrison consisting of

Death of James Wolfe. (National Archives of Canada)

3,000 men ... the numbers of Frenchappearing but small their brigadesbeing then sheltered by the woods'(Northcliffe, p. 427).

The 10 British battalions were drawnup on the heights and as the French armywas in disorder they moved to attack.The French began to deploy from columninto line as the British approached. Thefirst volleys occurred on the British rightand French left flank between forwardunits. British light infantry engaged and

The fighting 67

defeated a large group of French grenadiers.British rangers engaged French advancedtroops on the French right and again theFrench were defeated. However, the mainFrench force arrived at this stage andoverwhelmed the British light infantry,forcing them to withdraw. They then turnedtheir attention to the British right wing,followed by an attack on the British leftflank. The French began to outflank theBritish line, in an attempt to get betweenthem and the city.

The British artillery was of little usebecause the main battle line had shiftedforward. A British officer lamented that'our cannon were of no service to us as we

could not draw them through the softground and gulleys of snow 3 feet deep'(7204-6-2). It was during this heavy fightingthat Murray realized at last how muchdanger his troops were in, and ordered awithdrawal to the city. The British,supported by heavy fire into the Frenchlines, were able to retreat in good order.


Death of Montcalm. (National Archives of Canada)

Knox reported that 'this discomfirt[withdrawal] was however so regularlyconducted that the enemy didnot pursue with the spirit which the vastimportance of their victory required'(Knox, Journal, p. 248).

The battle had lasted just over twohours. One-third of the British force hadbeen killed, wounded, or captured, whilethe French had lost 2,000 men. By 29 April,the French were within 600 yards of thecity and began to build trenches and siegebatteries to pound the city into submission.The British responded by further reinforcingtheir own batteries and positions. AsBougainville noted, the deciding factorduring the siege was not Levis' troopsand artillery; 'the arrival of an Englishsquadron decided the matter, it wasnecessary to raise the siege' (Bougainville,p. 325). On 15 May, the Royal Navy arrived

The fighting 69

to lift the siege of Quebec. The Frenchwithdrew, except for a small force ordered toshadow the British movements from Quebecto Montreal.

Advance on Montreal

General Amherst decided to attackMontreal with another multi-prongedmovement. After Murray and his troopshad been re-supplied and reformed inQuebec, he was ordered to advance downthe St. Lawrence from the northeast. On2 July, Murray and 2,400 regulars embarkedfor Montreal, followed by a reinforcement ofjust over 1,000 men from Louisbourg. Thesecond prong, under the command ofBrigadier William de Haviland, was to marchwith 3,400 regulars, provincials, and Indiansfrom Lake Champlain up the St. John Riverand then north-west towards Montreal. DeHaviland began his march in August. The

Ruins of Quebec after the siege of 1759.(National Archives of Canada)

third prong and largest force was to beunder the command of General Amhersthimself. Amherst, with a force of10,000 regulars and provincials, planned tolaunch an attack from Fort Oswego andthen Fort Frontenac up the St. Lawrenceto attack Montreal from the west. He beganhis advance on 10 August.

Murray's force should have had tocontend with French forces at TroisRivieres, but he decided to avoid the2,000 troops stationed there. He bypassedTrois Rivieres altogether and sailed forMontreal, landing just north at Sorel. TheFrench forces in the area were gathering todestroy his force, but Murray sent outrangers and other units with proclamationsfor the militia to lay down their arms, whichmany did, after hearing reports that thosewho refused to surrender were being burnedout of their houses. By the end of Augustmost of the French forces opposing Murrayhad gone home.

De Haviland successfully cut offBougainville's force of 1,000 from theirlines of communication with St. Jean and


Marquis de Levis is hailed by his men after the Battle ofSainte-Foy. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

The fighting 71

Fraser at Quebec. (Roger-Viollet)

Chambly, stranding them on theIsle-aux-Noix. His rangers and other forcesroamed the countryside, forcingBougainville to withdraw towards St. Jean,where he met up with additional Frenchforces and staged a further withdrawaltowards Montreal. The French forcesopposing de Haviland also began tosuffer from desertion losses. De Havilandcontinued moving towards theSt. Lawrence. Forward units of Murrayand de Haviland made contact in earlySeptember.

Amherst encountered and foughtseveral small French units on his march

up the St. Lawrence, but nature proved themost difficult obstacle, specifically therapids just outside Montreal. His forcewas somewhat battered by their crossing,but landed at La Chine, 14 km (nine miles)from Montreal, on 6 September. Montrealwas slowly being surrounded.

The Marquis de Levis recognized that hisforce was slowly disappearing as the Britishadvanced. Murray had crossed the"St. Lawrence and began to cut off the cityfrom the east, while Amherst set up camp tothe west. De Haviland's force wasapproaching the city from the south.Amherst's column was beginning to moveheavy artillery from La Chine. With theFrench forces melting away, Vaudreuil, the


French governor, and senior French militaryofficers held a council of war to decide thenext step. Negotiations with Amherst began,and on 8 September the capitulationwas signed.

One aspect of the negotiated peace wasthat the French soldiers were to lay downtheir arms and promise not to serve againduring the present war. Some French officersfelt that this was an intolerable condition,but the number of desertions from theirranks left them powerless to negotiate. Thebrother of Jeffrey Amherst, William, statedthe reasons for such harsh conditions onthe French:

the General's [Amherst] reason which he hasgiven for imposing such harsh terms on heregulars that they cannot return with honour is aseries of bad behaviour during this present war inthe country in letting ... the Indians commit theworst cruelties (William Amherst).

Some French officers considered thisreason particularly hypocritical, given theBritish Army's own record. The British hadwaged a devastating war on the civilianpopulation during 1759 in and aroundQuebec with not just the help of alliedIndians, but brutal force imposed by theirown regulars.

Portrait of a soldier

Joshua Goodenough, aRogers' Ranger

As noted in the section dealing with theBritish forces, the Ranger Corps thatdeveloped in New England and Nova Scotiawas considered to be an elite force. Therangers drew most of their men from thefrontier regions, selecting those consideredcapable of enduring the hardships of fightingin the forest. They were considerably fearedby their French and Indian enemies. Thefollowing is an excerpt from the journal of aranger from the Rogers' Ranger Corps, whichwas raised in New England.

Joshua Goodenough had lived near theAlbany, New York region before becoming aranger. His father had been killed in anIndian raid in 1753. He described theparticular attributes of the frontier people asfollows: 'on the frontiers ... few people hadmuch skill with the pen, nor was muchneeded. The axe and rifle, the paddle andpack being more to our hands in those roughdays' (p. 1). When war broke out on thefrontier, he decided to enlist, saying that 'theprovince was levying troops at Albany tofight the French, and I took my pay fromPeter Vrooman saying that I would go toAlbany to be a soldier' (p. 2). He hadpreviously worked as a trader in the area.

Goodenough enlisted in a local provincialunit named the York Levies. He described howthe men were given muskets, tents, bowls,and knives and were drilled in musketry by anofficer who had been a British regular. Hecommented on the extreme discipline withinthe units: 'one man was given 500 lashes forenlisting in some other troop and orders saidthat any man who should leave His Majesty'sService without discharge should suffer death'(p. 2). In the autumn of 1757, he and severalother men were transferred to Rogers' Rangersand ordered to march to Fort Edward.

His first observations of the rangers arequite illuminating. He comments that 'we

found the Rangers were rough borderers likeourselves, mostly Hampshire [NewHampshire] men well used to the woods andmuch accustomed to the enemy' (p. 2).Goodenough recorded the particular tacticsdevised by the corps in a conversation with aveteran and later friend, Shanks. Shankssuccinctly stated the 'ranger ways':

they always marched till it was quite darkbefore encamping ... returned by a different routefrom that on which they went out... not togather up close to other rangers in a fight but tokeep spread out, which gave the enemy less markto fire upon ... not to fire on the enemy when wewere ambush till they have approached quitenear, which will put them in greater surprise andgive your own people time to rush in on themwith hatchets (p. 3).

Goodenough and other rangers were sentout on numerous scouting missions in andaround Fort Edward. They were sent in smallparties that were ordered to disrupt orambush any French and Indian raidingparties. The French-allied Indians had beensent along the frontier to raid and interceptconvoys heading between Albany and theoutlying Fort Edward.

During the winter months, Goodenoughtook part in a major raid of the French fortat Carillon. More than 100 rangers weredispatched to seize prisoners for intelligenceand destroy any supplies outside the fort.This first raid was successful, capturing a fewprisoners and destroying some supplies.However, when Goodenough was strickenwith distemper, he was forced to remain atFort Edward, and missed accompanyingMajor Robert Rogers on a second major raid.This raid was not a success; Rogers and hisrangers were ambushed, in what came to beknown as the Battle of the Snowshoes.


Almost all of the rangers were killed orcaptured, although Rogers managed toescape. Goodenough highlighted the difficultconditions that men found themselves whenthey were forced to surrender to Indians:

some of the rangers had surrendered underpromise of quarter, but we afterwards heard thatthey were tied to trees and hacked to deathbecause the Indians had found a scalp in thebreast of a man's hunting frock (p. 9).

The rest of that winter and the spring of1758 were spent on smaller-scale scoutingmissions.

With summer approaching, a newcampaign to seize Fort Carillon(Abercromby's campaign) began in earnest.Goodenough described a large-scale skirmishat the northern end of Lake George whereLord Howe was killed. The Rangers respectedHowe as a good officer, and Goodenoughwrote that 'Lord Howe was shot through thebreast, for which we were all muchdepressed, because he was our real leaderand had raised great hopes of success for us'(p. 9). As described earlier, in the fightingsection, Goodenough also emphasized therole of the French defensive plan of usingfelled trees. He provided a vivid account ofthe battle at Fort Carillon.

We drove in the French pickets and came intothe open where the trees were felled tops towardsus in a mighty abbatis ... [I]t was all we couldundertake to make our way through the mass,and all the while the great breast works of theFrench belched cannon and musket balls whilethe limbs and splinters flew around us ... [T]heheavy red masses of the British troops advancingin battle array with purpose to storm with thebayonet... [T]he maze of fallen trees ... broketheir ranks, and the French entrenchmentsblazed fire and death (p. 9).

He also commented: T have since been inmany battles and skirmishes, but I neverhave witnessed such slaughter and suchwild fighting as the British storm ofTiconderoga' (p. 9).

Goodenough participated in one of theattack waves, but was forced back. It appearsthat he was not wounded during thefighting. He and other small groups ofrangers were used to skirmish with Frenchand Indians in the follow up to the Britishwithdrawal. He also confirmed that theBritish Army was almost completelydemoralized after the day's fighting. Afterthe withdrawal, Goodenough stated that hetook his discharge and returned to the areawest of Albany. He resumed working as atrader until the spring of 1759, when hedecided that his life was too boring and triedto join up with the rangers once again. Hereturned to Albany and met up with MajorRobert Rogers, to whom he mentioned thathe wished to re-join his unit.

It is at this point that the journal seems tocontain some inaccuracies. Goodenoughstated that he went off to meet with otherrangers at Crown Point. This would makesense if he were speaking of late July orAugust 1759, but he described a large partyof 250 light infantry and rangers setting offfor Isle-au-Noix in June. While this raid mayhave taken place in June, the British had notyet captured Carillon or Crown Point.

Upon his return to the ranger camp,Goodenough noticed that some of the oldsoldiers had left the corps. He commentedthat 'there was a great change in the privatemen of the rangers, so many old ones hadbeen frost bitten and gone home' (p. 11). Hisold friend, Shanks, was still with the corps.Old as he was compared to some others,Shanks had a desire to stay. Goodenoughsaid that

[Shanks] had such a hate of the Frenchersand particularly of the Canada Indians that hewould never cease to fight them, they havingkilled all his relatives in New Hampshire whichmade him bitter against them, he always sayingthat they might as well kill him and thus endhis family (p. 11).

As mentioned previously, in June a party of250 rangers and light infantry headed inwhaleboats to Isle-aux-Noix. They skirmished

Portrait of a soldier 75

with French soldiers on the island aftermaking camp. The large raiding party thenturned north and headed towards St. Jean.They decided not to attack but moved on toanother fort which Goodenough did notmention by name. Their raid surprised thegarrison, and Goodenough provided aninteresting description which might indicateabuse of the civilian population of the fort. Hestated: 'captured all the garrison, men, womenand children. After we had burned anddestroyed everything we turned the womenand children adrift, but drove the men alongas prisoners' (p.12). The women and childrenwere apparently turned out without supplies,since everything had been destroyed. Theraiding party withdrew south to Crown Point.

In the journal Goodenough did not makeit apparent, but when the raiding partyreturned they remained at the southern endof Lake Champlain, due to the fact thatGeneral Amherst did not move north untilthe campaign season of 1760. Goodenoughmentioned that the rangers carried outvarious raiding parties along the lake duringthe period which we are to presume was theautumn and winter of 1759 and spring of1760. He ended his journal by describingthat his unit advanced north with the armyall the way to Chambly, where the men weretold that the French had surrendered.Goodenough then took his discharge for asecond time and returned home to work as atrader west of Albany.

The world around war

The economic and civilian costs

In pure economic terms, the war in bothNorth America and the rest of the world costFrance and Great Britain considerably.Britain had to pay for the upkeep of majorarmies in North America and Germany. Theexpense of building naval vessels was alsosignificant. Even with tax levies throughoutthe war, the debt rose annually, and theBritish government was forced to borrow tomake good on the shortfall. Britain did haveone economic bonus during this period: theRoyal Navy was dominant on the seas by1759 and thus was able both to seize warbooty and to deny access to French ports. In1756, Great Britain's national debt was75 million pounds; by the end of the conflictit had climbed to 133 million pounds. Thecontinuing need to maintain garrison troopsafter 1763 were the principal reasons for thecontroversial demand that the wealthyThirteen Colonies to take on some of thecosts of their own protection in the 1760s.

France was in much the same financialposition as Great Britain. However, Francedecided to borrow more money rather thanlevy taxes on the population. Unlike Britain,her trade suffered heavily from the RoyalNavy blockade of the French ports, causing afurther loss of revenue during the conflict. In1753 the national debt was 1,360 millionlivres. By the end of the conflict the nationaldebt had nearly doubled, climbing to2,350 million livres. It cost 24.5 millionlivres a year just to keep the French armiesin the field; most of this was spent on theregular army in Germany.

The war also proved a major financialdrain on the Thirteen Colonies and NewFrance. Each of the Thirteen Coloniesprovided varying levels of support in theform of supplies, provincial troops, recruitsfor regular regiments, and billeting of troops.Some colonies, such as South Carolina, were

not particularly willing to support the wareffort; this was often linked to the level ofbelief in the cause of the war demonstratedby elected and appointed officials. As thefortunes of war began to turn in Britain'sfavor, some colonies grew less enthusiasticabout committing money and men to acampaign happening far away to the north ofthem. Others saw the threat diminish in theirown region and decided that the war was notas important as they had previously believed.

The British commander-in-chiefperiodically had to rely upon localmerchants for specie, or borrow money topay for supplies and provisions for thecoming year. Shipments of money fromGreat Britain often arrived later than officerswould have preferred. In 1759, GeneralAmherst called upon the New York Assemblyfor a loan to pay for his campaign. In bothNew France and the Thirteen Colonies,many merchants and business people cameto rely upon government and military clientsfor the main part of their business. One issuethat did not affect the Thirteen Colonies wasshortage of food, for either civilians orsoldiers. While the soldiers may have beenrestricted at times during the campaigns, thecivilian population did not have rationingimposed upon them, unlike New France.

The colonies were asked each year toprovide provincial soldiers for campaignduty. This entailed men serving outside theirrespective colonies. Each year a new forcewas raised, and then released from duty atthe end of the campaign season. The Britishgovernment provided subsidies for theraising of these forces. Regardless, by 1759assemblymen from several colonies assertedthat the colonies could no longer providethe numbers needed. Considerable numbersof provincial troops had been lost to battleor sickness; other men seeking adventure or

The world around war 77

pay had also left the colonies to enlist in theRoyal Navy or the British regulars. Colonialleaders feared that the constant drain wouldhave a negative effect on colonial farmingand trades. They were also angered by theBritish government's method of handling theissue: each year the British governmentprovided subsidies for the past campaignseason, reimbursing the Thirteen Coloniesfor about 40 percent of their total militaryexpenses. As the new campaign seasonapproached, officials would threaten not topay the subsidies owed unless each colonyprovided the desired number of soldiers.

The numbers of soldiers provided and themoney raised by each colony also became asore point between the colonies. Coloniessuch as Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, NewYork, New Jersey, New Hampshire, andRhode Island provided considerable supportto the war effort. They were resentful of thesmaller amounts of support provided byother colonies such as Georgia, South andNorth Carolina, and Maryland. Georgia wasa poor colony and was unable to raiseprovincial troops; the colony's security wasprovided for by British regulars. SouthCarolina only provided for three companiesof provincial infantry and two of horse.North Carolina and Maryland were criticizedfor not providing any major support to thewar effort; both of these colonies felt lessthreatened by the conflict than theirneighbors to the north. The border coloniesof Pennsylvania and Virginia providedsufficient men and support for the war effortas long as they felt directly threatened, butas the war in the west dwindled and thefocus shifted to the invasion of Canada, theirsupport began to dry up as well.

This constant need for soldiers andsupplies from the colonies was an ongoingsource of friction between British militaryofficials and colonial assemblymen. Eachside accused the other of not carrying itsshare of the load or of being autocratic. Thedebate became so acrimonious that even theend of the war did not resolve it andargument, continued through the financialcrises of the postwar period. It eventually led

to more drastic demands by the Britishgovernment and, eventually, war betweenBritain and the Thirteen Colonies.

The situation in New France was overallmore difficult. One of the major problemswas the food supply, which proved to beinsufficient on more than one occasion. Onepossible reason for this was the fact that onlya small portion of the province had beencultivated properly. This level of cultivationwas satisfactory during the peace years, butwhen war broke out demand increased. Thecrop yield, which had been sufficient for thepopulation as well as supplies to the Marines,militia, and allied Indians, could not stretchto accommodate the 6,000 regular soldierswho were shipped to New France during thewar. The plan was that soldiers would beshipped with their own provisions, and thateach year a large supply convoy would arrivefrom France to support the offensiveoperations of the campaign season.

The reality, however, was that due to thesuccessful Royal Navy blockade, the numberof ships that arrived each year dwindledsteadily. The situation reached crisis point in1757. A large flotilla arrived with stores, butit was still not enough to support both thesoldiers and citizens of New France.Montcalm recorded that 'provisions fail thepeople, reduced to a quarter pound of bread.Perhaps the rations of the soldiers must bereduced again' (Sautai, pp. 38-39). In June1757, all grain was centrally stored and madeinto bread by the colonial government. Dailyallowances were allocated to all the peoplewithin the colony. Nature also had a role toplay in the colony's plight; the harvests for1756 and 1757 were poor, followed by theunusually severe winter of 1757-58. Thepopulation was forced to consume the seedcrop of wheat for the following year. Franceresponded and three ships were sent withseed, which reached their destination.

The results of the harvest had anadditional effect on the army: thecomposition of the colonial militia. Themilitia, as described previously, was drawnfrom all sectors of the French community,including farmers. If the threat to New France


did not subside for a significant period oftime and the men could not be released, theyield of the harvest might be adverselyaffected. As a result, at times militiamen tookmatters into their own hands and returned totheir farms without having been discharged.Widespread desertion, in turn, put Frenchcommanders in a precarious position. Thetwo conflicting priorities created anapparently insoluble dilemma.

Corruption was another major issue forNew France. The colony's chief colonialadministrator, Francois Bigot, had created amonopoly on goods sold within the colonyto benefit himself and some of his friends.With the advent of war, the principalproducts sold in New France were no longerfurs, fish, or skins, but military provisionsand supplies. Bigot was in charge of thecontracts for military stores supplied to thetroops, and he and his cronies were liningtheir pockets. When food was rationed, thesale of bread also came under Bigot's control,when the French Crown bought the grainand made it into bread. The prices that theCrown paid for the flour were set andcontrolled by Bigot, as was the price of breadsold to colonists.

Paper currency in New France was steadilydevalued over the course of the war. Frenchattempts to send specie to the colony onlysped up the process. Farmers only sold tosoldiers who had been paid in specie, andboth civilians and soldiers hoarded the coins.New France was paying over 12 million livresa year by 1757 for the upkeep of New France.By 1758, the British blockade and the shiftwithin the French court to a Continentalstrategy had left New France almostabandoned. Ships with food, supplies, soldiers,or currency were diverted to other regions, andNew France was left to defend itself.

Portions of the civilian populations ofboth sides suffered directly as a result of thewar, and there were examples of outright'cruelty' by both sides. One of the mostfamous cases is the expulsion of the Acadian(French) population from Nova Scotia by theBritish. After the capture of Fort Beausejourin 1755, the question arose of what to do

with the Acadians. Many colonial governors,such as William Shirley of Massachusetts,considered them a nuisance and a risk to thesecurity of Nova Scotia. The situation cameto a head when the British produced an oathof allegiance to the British Crown, andrequired Acadians to adhere to it. Many ofthe Acadians, however, preferred to remainneutral. They had no desire to swearallegiance and wished to be exempt frommilitary duty. British commanders reportedthat their mood changed from neutral tohostile when rumors began to circulate of aFrench fleet arriving in the Bay of Fundy.

The British were in a difficult position.The Acadians lived on a particularly strategicpiece of land, and the war had just begun inearnest. There were also British landspeculators waiting to cash on the excellentlands occupied by the Acadian farms.

British military and colonial officials metin Halifax, and determined that the Acadiansshould be forcibly removed from their homesand transported to the Thirteen Colonies.They decided against sending them toQuebec or Louisbourg because in either placethey would provide valuable reinforcementsfor the militia. The Acadian villages wereemptied and the settlers marshaled towardsthe Bay of Fundy where, over the course ofautumn 1755, ships arrived from the ThirteenColonies to transport the people. The Britishauthorities did their best to keep villages andfamilies together, so as not to cause furtherpsychological damage to the uprootedAcadians.

In the end more than 6,000 men, womenand children were transported. SomeAcadians, upon receiving word of the Britishplan, escaped to Quebec. Other groups ofpeople withdrew into the woods of NovaScotia. Some of the men in these groupscarried out a guerrilla campaign over thecoming years. Many of the Acadian homesand farms were burned to prevent escapedrefugees returning to their homes. TheBritish government also hoped that peoplewould surrender to British authorities afterthey realized their position was hopeless.Many of the Acadians who were sent to the

The world around war 79

Exile of the Acadians. (National Archives of Canada)

Thirteen Colonies eventually made their wayto Louisiana. Some returned to Acadia afterthe Treaty of Paris and continue to live inthe same districts today. The story of theAcadians was later made famous inLongfellow's poem 'Evangeline'.

The British continued this policy for mostof the war. Following the seizure ofLouisbourg in 1758, General Amherst decidedto round up and transport the civilianpopulations in and around Louisbourg, aswell as the French colonists on St. Jean Island(Prince Edward Island). All colonists who tookup arms were considered prisoners of war andwere subsequently transported to GreatBritain along with the French soldiers.Colonists who did not take up arms weretransported to France. More than 8,000people were transported from Cape Bretonand St. Jean Island. Amherst decided on thispolicy after the killings at Fort William Henry.He felt that the French deserved suchtreatment after what he considered theirleniency in allowing the Indians to commitsuch crimes against civilians.

Warfare all along the frontier was brutal.Many white settlers on both sides were takenprisoner or killed by roaming bands of alliedIndians, French militia, and rangers. Thistype of random violence had occurred formany years since the mid-1600s, but theonset of the French-Indian War provided anew impetus to spread fear along thefrontier. The British forces, especially therangers, were able to launch waterborneattacks into the heartland of New Franceand against Indian settlements along theSt. Lawrence. Major General Amherst citedthe abuses of the French and their Indianallies when he drew up the conditions ofsurrender at Montreal in 1760.

French regular soldiers generally did notcome into immediate contact with thecivilian population of the Thirteen Colonies.Some were involved in small-scale raidsalong the frontier or in clearing lands ofBritish settlers. The major British towns didnot have to contend with foreignoccupation. The civilian population of NewFrance, on the other hand, had toaccommodate the presence not only ofBritish-allied Indians and rangers, but from


1758-60 had to contend with British Armyregular soldiers as well.

The major evidence of French civilianssuffering at the hands of British regularsoccurred during the Quebec Campaign in1759. Major General Wolfe apparently issuedorders for the destruction of the countryside.His reasoning for this was twofold: first, todeny supplies to the French garrison on thenorth bank of the St. Lawrence River; andsecond, to attempt to force Montcalm tobattle. Two journal entries by British soldiersgive insight into the actions of some of theBritish regulars at Quebec. A Sergeant-Majorfrom a grenadier company described theactions outside Quebec:

on the 20th [August] the LouisbourgGrenadiers began their march down the mainland of Quebec, in order to burn and destroy allthe houses on that side ... [On] the 25th beganto destroy the country, burning houses, cuttingdown corn and the like (Sergeant-Major, p. 16,).

An officer with the 15th Foot alsodescribed his experiences on a marchthrough the countryside outside Quebec. Hisaction, like the Sergeant-Major's, took placein August 1759. He recalled:

our light infantry and rangers marched off tothe Parish of St. Nicola but a little after wepassed the church of St. Antonia our advanced

guard was fired upon by a party of the enemythat lay in ambush in the wood ... [W]emarched to the far end of the parish when webegan to burn all before us (Add Mss 45662).

The British were not always given ordersto ravage the countryside; in fact it appearsthat sometimes the opposite happened.During the 1760 campaign, some units wereordered not to abuse the population as theymarched towards Montreal. A Massachusettsprovincial soldier named Sergeant DavidHolden noted that, when his regimentmarched from Chambly to Montreal, theFrench population was generally very civil.He commented that

the French treat us on our march with theutmost civility more over our army was verycautious in not abusing any of them or theirsubsistance ... General Amherst returns the troopsunder his command abundance of thanks for theirso strickly observing his orders (Holden, p. 21).

The severity of the fighting along thefrontier during the early years of the conflictcreated ugly situations. The attacks by theFrench and their allied Indians spread fearand hatred among the colonists. The killingof British civilians after the surrender of FortWilliam Henry provided the impetus forBritish reprisals when troops entered civilianareas of New France.

Portrait of a civilian

Jean Lowry and Titus King

Capture of colonists by Indian troops was acommon feature of the French-Indian War.Two contemporary accounts of Englishcitizens who were captives of theFrench-allied Indians describe very differenttypes of treatment. One of the accounts waswritten by a woman and the other by a man.The first described here is a harrowingaccount by a woman who was seized, alongwith her children.

Jean Lowry was living on the frontierregion of Pennsylvania when, in April 1755,a band of Indians arrived outside herhomestead. They immediately killed herhusband, and then, as she states: '[there]being no man in the house at that time thebarbarians rushed into the house, plunderedthe house and did what they pleased ...[T]hey set fire to the house' (1 April 1755).Mrs Lowry and her five children were seizedand forced to march overland.

After traveling for four days, a group of50 white settlers caught up with the Indianparty and fired upon them. The whitesettlers were able to release Mrs Lowry andher children, but their ordeal was not yetover. That evening, a larger Indian partyreturned and attacked the camp of the whitesettlers. Mrs Lowry recalled that

the savages returned and surrounded ourpeople this gave them great advantage ... [O]urpeople did the best they could for two hours. Agreat many of our people were killed andwounded ... [O]ne wounded man was torturedand the ladies had to watch (5 April 1755).

The whites from the party who were leftalive and could still march were takenas prisoners.

Mrs Lowry and her family were ordered tomarch on after the man being tortured hadfinally died. When the Indian party reached

a hunting camp, Mrs Lowry began a periodof intense hardship. She describedthe Indians

laying upon me with their [hot] rods I beingso weak and spent with fatigue could not run ...so they had their leisure to exercise theirbarbarous customs upon my feeble body, this leftmany wounds on me (8 April 1755).

It was also at this point that hereight-year-old son was taken away from her.

The Indian party marched the whiteprisoners into an Indian village a few dayslater. As they entered both Mrs Lowry andher eldest daughter were given 'an awfulbeating' (10 April 1755). Many of the otherwhite prisoners were 'adopted' by Indianhouseholds, and here Mrs Lowry lost hereldest daughter who was 10, and anotherdaughter who was six, to Indian families. Asshe continued marching up the AlleghenyRiver with the two children still with her,she came across the son that she had lost,but was not allowed to collect him. MrsLowry was a religious person, and believedthat her condition and losses over the pastweeks must be 'for our sins that god hasdelivered us into the hands of the Indians'(17 April 1755).

It appears that one important reason forthe treatment that Mrs Lowry particularlyreceived was her resolve not to be seen tocooperate with the Indians in any way -either by accepting adoption by Indians orby doing any work for them. On 23 April,the Indian party entered another village,where Mrs Lowry was beaten by severalIndian women for the loss of their husbands.In this village, her two remaining childrenwere also taken from her, although onewas returned to her later in the day(24 April 1755).


mage of a captured white woman and her Indiancaptors. (Amon Carter Museum, Fort Worth)

At this point, Mrs Lowry admitted thatshe began to moderate her behavior and totry to accept her predicament. One reasonfor this change of heart was that 'the Indianshad threatened to sell me to the French andwhat cruel usage I would meet with fromthem' (5 May 1755). She left the Indianvillage for Fort Venango under theownership of another Indian warrior. Whilein Fort Venango, she gave birth to anotherlittle girl, who died the same day (4 July1755). This event makes clear that MrsLowry was in fact pregnant throughout thetime she was marching overland. Thebeatings and generally poor treatment shereceived must have played a role in thedeath of the child.

The journal's pace quickens after MrsLowry arrived at Fort Venango, where sheremained as a servant of the Frenchcommanding officer from 15 May 1755 until27 July 1757. The French commander's wifetook Mrs Lowry when she traveled from Fort

Venango to Fort Niagara, and then toMontreal. In Montreal, she heard that whiteprisoners were being exchanged for Frenchprisoners, and she continued to serve as aservant in Montreal until she received wordof a possible exchange. In September 1758,she was allowed to proceed to Quebec City,where she was exchanged for Frenchcaptives. On 16 March 1759, she returned toNew York after being shipped to GreatBritain. The journal records no mention ofseeing any of her children ever again.

It is interesting to note how the journal ofa male captive named Titus King differs fromMrs Lowry; he appears to have avoided mostof the brutality that she suffered. King was aprovincial soldier in Colonel Israel Williams'Regiment, Massachusetts. He and a smallparty of soldiers were stationed atCharlemont, 40 km (25 miles) northwest ofNorthampton, Massachusetts, to protect thelocal farming community from Indian andFrench irregulars. On 11 June 1755 his smallband of men was attacked by a larger groupof Indian warriors, and King was capturedalong with a small boy soldier. He noted that

Portrait of a civilian 83

'we marched 20 or 25 miles on the first day'.It is interesting to note that King's Indiancaptors seemed to value their prisonersrather highly. He commented that when 'theboy was not able to go any more the Indianscarried him on their backs and put me tocarry a pack and a gun' (12 June 1755).

The food for the trip was meager forthe prisoners, and King commented on17 June that

since we have had nothing to eat except apigeon and an owl they killed on the way rootsgreen barks of the tree and the like ... we wasvery faint and hungry ... [T]he Indians filled alarge littal of this pounded corn and boiled it...eat very heartily but I could not eat so much as Ithought I should (17 June 1755;.

The Indian party was marching towardsCrown Point.

King and his Indian captors reached theirdestination in early July. King commentedon the good behavior of the French officersand men: 'the French treated me pretty wellwith the wine and brandy and goodmanners'. The next day, 18 July, King leftwith his Indian captors, traveling by canoeup Lake Champlain towards St. Jean. Oneevening the Indians got very drunk and thenext day, due to their hangovers, King wasforced to be one of the oarsmen on one ofthe canoes for some of the day. It was whilethe Indian party was traveling on LakeChamplain that King was told that he wasnot going to Montreal to be exchanged, butwas to become an Indian and go with thewarriors to their village. One of the warriorscommented, 'Frenchmen no good,Englishmen no good, Indian very good'(21 July 1755).

It appears that King accepted his new role.He was stripped of his shirt and had his haircut and his face painted. The party arrived at

St. Jean on 22 July, where once again King wastreated well. He noted, perhaps a bitregretfully, that 'the French treated me prettywell ... [but] I must live with them [Indians] intheir wigwams' instead of accepting theFrench offer to stay with them (22 July 1755).King, repainted, and the Indians moved outon 23 July for the Indian village. On 25 Julythey arrived at the Indian village, where theywere greeted by 200 Indians on the shore ofthe river. King described how the 'youngIndians had sticks to whip us' (25 June 1755).He was ordered to run about 30 rods up a hill,with a crowd on both sides. He expected to bebeaten, but the crowd dispersed as he ran upthe hill and he was not. He had apparentlybeen accepted as part of the village.

As he noted, however, he was still acaptive of one of the Indian warriors. Heremained part of the village for the rest of1755, all of 1756, and most of 1757. Asmany Indian warriors left the village to fight,King became an important male figure. Hewas adopted as a grandfather by one of thefamilies after their grandfather failed toreturn. It was expected that King would havean Indian woman and have children to helppopulate the village. He was formally put inIndian dress and accepted as an Indian.During the campaign season of 1757, he leftwith a band of warriors for Fort WilliamHenry. However, he was sold to the Frenchfor 120 livres and sent to Montreal. He wasthen exchanged by the French, and by thesummer of 1758, he had returned toNorthampton via Great Britain.

Titus King had not endured the incrediblesuffering that Mrs. Lowry had lived through.This may have been partly due to the valuethe Indians placed on a male captive over afemale captive. It may also have been due tothe fact that King seemed resigned to his fateand did what he was told, whereas Mrs.Lowry had put up considerable resistance.

How the war ended

Treaty of Paris and theIndian uprising

The capture of Montreal more or lessbrought the war in North America to an end,but the larger conflict, the Seven Years' War,dragged on outside North America foranother two years. Prussia, in alliance withGreat Britain, continued a defensive waragainst Russia and Austria, and war withFrance continued on the continent as well.The British also provided ongoing fundingand men to His Britannic Majesty's Armycampaign against the French in Hanover.France and Great Britain also continued towage war in the colonies of the Caribbeanand India. Spain entered the conflict onFrance's side in 1761. The British hadbecome very proficient in amphibiousoperations by 1760, and the Royal Navy wasdominant on the seas. Campaigns againstthe Spanish and French colonies in theCaribbean, India, and the Philippines wereall great successes for Britain. The war finallycame to an end more as a product ofexhaustion on the part of all parties involvedthan any definitive victory. For more detail,see Essential Histories The Seven Years' War.

Two peace treaties formally concluded theSeven Years' War. The first, signed by France,Great Britain, and Spain, was agreed on10 February 1763 and known as the Treaty ofParis. The second, known as the Treaty ofHubertusburg, was concluded betweenAustria and Prussia on 15 February 1763.Only the Treaty of Paris will be examinedhere, since it had ramifications for theconflict in North America.

Great Britain's portion of the treaty hasbeen characterized as swapping snow forsugar cane and sun. All of the French landseast of the Mississippi River were awarded toBritain, including the Ohio River valley,which had been one of the principal causesof the conflict. Quebec and Cape Breton werealso ceded to Great Britain. Of all her North

American possessions, France was allowed toretain control of only two small islands offthe coast of Newfoundland, St. Pierre andMiquelon. In exchange, France received theislands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, whichshe had lost during the conflict. Britain alsotook possession of Florida from Spain, inexchange for the Philippines and Cuba. GreatBritain was now the only major Europeanpower on the Atlantic Seaboard of NorthAmerica, controlling the entire coastline fromNewfoundland in the north to Florida inthe south.

Even with Great Britain in undisputedcontrol of the area, problems arose almostimmediately in the newly acquired territoriesof the Ohio River valley and the lands westof the Appalachians. The French hadmaintained forts and a small settler presencein the region, but had infringed little uponthe local Indian population. With the Britishin control, some of the British colonistswished to push west from the Atlanticseaboard and open up the interior forsettlement. Naturally, the Indians who werealready living in the area objected to thisplan, and the determination of the whitesettlers to carry on regardless led to alarge-scale Indian uprising, known asPontiac's Rebellion, in 1763-64.

When fighting ended in 1760 after theseizure of Montreal, Rogers' Rangers and the60th Regiment were sent to occupy theFrench forts in the west, at Detroit and alongthe Great Lakes. The troops were givenorders to accept the surrender of the Frenchforces in the region, meet with variousIndian chiefs, and explain that Great Britainhad taken control of the area. Soldiers andofficers were also instructed not to give theIndians gifts, ammunition, or guns, a policywhich offended the Indians in the regionwho had recently been waging war against

How the war ended 85

the British and expected to be rewarded forpromising loyalty to the new government.The soldiers were warned not to give offenseto any one group; peace was to bemaintained at all costs.

Not only did the British disappoint theIndians who had been allied with theFrench; they also alienated the Senecas, oneof the tribes of the Six Nations, whoconsidered that the British had failed to keeppromises made during the war. To persuadeIndian tribes to side with them, the Britishhad signed agreements promising that landswest of the Alleghenies would only be usedby Indians for hunting. Trading of Europeangoods in these areas would be cheaper andfur and skins would sell at higher prices.

As early as 1761, Indian representatives,including members of the Six Nations,demanded a meeting with the governor ofPennsylvania. The Indians contended thatthe British were not keeping to theirpromises. White settlers were moving intothe region west of the Alleghenies, goodswere still being sold at high prices, and fursand skins were not appreciating in value.The Indian representatives also stated afurther concern, that 'there are forts allround us and therefore we are apprehensivethat death is coming upon us' (Bouquet,Mss 21655). Indians who had sided with theBritish were also not allowed to move westinto territory formerly belonging to theFrench. This proscription irked manyIndians, who felt they had scores to settlewith the French-allied tribes, and whowanted access to the hunting grounds in theOhio River valley.

The white settlers, for their part, felt theyhad a perfect right to settle where they chose.Captain Bouquet of the 60th soon became anunpopular figure, since he did what he couldto arrest whites operating illegally in theregion. To make matters worse, a set of orderswas then handed down that Indians could begiven small gifts for capturing illegal whitesettlers and bringing them to outposts of the60th along the frontier (Bouquet, MSS21653).White settlers found in the area had todemonstrate their purpose for being there and

present proper paperwork. Failing to do someant that they would be arrested, and underthe circumstances they were subject to military,not civilian law. White settlers were furious atwhat they perceived as the army's favoring theIndians over them, and the soldiers'performance of their duty progressively souredrelations between settlers and regulars.

Given the size of the area that the soldiershad to patrol, white settlers were able toelude them without great difficulty, slip intothe prohibited areas, and carry outlarge-scale hunting west of the Appalachians.The Indians in the region grew increasinglyrestless about these incursions, and clashesbetween Indians and settlers began to occur.By 1761, the Senecas, a formerlyBritish-allied tribe, were holding meetingswith members of the Delawares and Miamisto discuss attacks on the frontier region forts.They did agree that they were not ready foran all-out rebellion. At the same time as thewar raged in Europe and the rest of theworld, French settlers in the area began tofan the flames by meeting with variousIndian chiefs and discussing a possible returnof the French to the region.

By 1762, the British troops on the frontierwere in a difficult position, caught betweenwhite settlers and Indian tribes. Bouquetrecognized the potential for even greatertrouble and attempted to reinforce thevarious forts, preparing them for a possibleoutbreak of violence. Bouquet also advisedGeneral Amherst, commander-in-chief NorthAmerica, of the rising tension on the frontierand asked for further reinforcements. Mostof the troops from North America wereinvolved in the amphibious campaign in theCaribbean, however, so sufficientreinforcement was not possible.

The Indian uprising began in late 1762when Seneca warriors killed two whitesettlers. War belts were sent by the Senecasto the western tribes as the signal to beginhostilities. While extremely dangerous tothose in the frontier region, the uprising wasnot a completely unanimous effort. Membersof the Senecas, Ottawas, Hurons, Delawares,and Miamis participated, but no tribe


involved all of its warriors. Additionally,none of the western tribes, such as the Sauks,Puans, and Foxes, raised the war belt.

The purpose of the Indian uprising is stillunclear. Its principal objective seems to havebeen the seizure of all British forts and posts,but then even this strategy was notimplemented with any consistency. Particularlyat first, the Indian effort was not a coordinatedonslaught, but seemingly unrelated attacks onvarious forts by groups of warriors.

One indication of the fact that the Indianuprising was not as widespread or organized asit could have been was the conduct of oneIndian chief, Pontiac. He was an Ottawa chiefwho only commanded a local village near FortDetroit. He agreed with other Indian chiefsabout the state of affairs under Britishgovernance, but instead of acting inconjunction with others, he set up a campaignagainst Fort Detroit by himself. Pontiac didnot participate in any other actions, but FortDetroit was such an important outpost thatthe British hailed him as the leading war chiefand the entire uprising became known asPontiac's Rebellion.

In early April 1763, Pontiac gatheredvarious Indian warriors near Fort Detroit andcalled for action against the British fort. On1 May Pontiac himself arrived at Fort Detroitwith a small reconnaissance party to assessthe British defenses and troops. He wasgreeted and entertained by the Britishcommander, Major Gladwin, after which theIndian party left, promising to return at alater date. The British, although they wereaware of the possibility of attack, still did notwant to aggravate the situation by not beingamicable. Pontiac met with another party ofIndian warriors on 5 May and called for theextermination of the British at Fort Detroit.Other Indian warriors decided to join asword reached Pontiac that other forts werealso going to be attacked. On 7 May, a selectgroup of warriors marched towards FortDetroit with weapons hidden and a plan tostorm the fort.

Gladwin had received information that anattack was imminent, and had 100 menunder his command. He decided to close the

gates and put white traders in the area underarms to boost defensive numbers. Pontiacacted surprised when he came upon the Fortand was not received with open gates. On8 May, other chiefs attempted to meet withGladwin to promise that the Indians had nointention of seizing the fort. Gladwindismissed these claims and prepared for anarmed encounter. On 9 May, an armedflotilla of Indian canoes arrived. Gladwincontinued to refuse to speak with theIndians, and on 10 May the siege of FortDetroit formally began. A relief force of95 soldiers marching toward the fort wassurrounded and overwhelmed on 29 May.

Other forts along the Great Lakes and inthe Ohio River valley were subsequentlyattacked by other Indian tribes. Some fortswere seized by a surprise attack; others wereable to repel the Indian attacks and then thegarrison slip away during the evening. TheSeneca attack at Fort Venango destroyedrelations between the British and their formerallies; a Seneca war party was received intothe fort as allies, only to turn and massacrethe garrison. By the end of June, all of theBritish forts along the frontier and in thenewly claimed territories had been seizedexcept for Forts Pitt, Detroit, and Niagara.Indian war parties also headed east towardFort Bedford but were unsuccessful incapturing it. Fort Pitt was surrounded in lateJune, but not attacked until late July. TheBritish managed to repulse the Indian attack,when it came, knowing that it was critical tohold Fort Pitt, as well as Niagara and Detroit,as jumping-off positions for the re-conquestof the Ohio River valley and Great LakesRegion. Colonel Bouquet and hisheadquarters received word of the attacks bylate May.

On 28 July a relief column arrived at FortDetroit. This force numbered 200 men drawnfrom regular and ranger units, but wascarrying few supplies or provisions for thefort. On 31 July, the column, commanded byCaptain James Dalyell, marched to destroythe Indian camp and lift the siege. They wereambushed and all but destroyed at a creeknamed Bloody Run, with more than 20 men

How the war ended 87

killed, 30 wounded, and 100 captured.Captain Dalyell was killed in the battle, andthe siege of Detroit continued.

All available troops were sent toPhiladelphia to stage an expedition to relieveFort Pitt. At this point, not only had severalregiments been transported to the Caribbeanto fight in the campaigns there, but the warin North America had also officially endedand many more men had been shippedhome or discharged from service. Bouquetgathered a force of men from the 42nd,77th, and 60th Regiments of Foot, as well asrangers, to open the road to Fort Pitt. He hadonly about 500 men with him.

Bouquet's force marched overland toCarlisle and moved out toward Fort Pitt on18 July. They had been delayed, aspreviously, while the local colonialgovernments took their time gatheringsupplies for the force. The Indians besieging

Fort Pitt received word of Bouquet'smovement and moved east to ambush hisforce. The two groups met at a place namedBushy Run, 40 km (25 miles) from Fort Pitt.On the morning of 5 August, Bouquet'sforward units skirmished with Indianwarriors. Bouquet, realizing that his forcewas in a potential ambush situation,deployed his troops in a circular defensiveposition and awaited the Indian attack. Itcame at 1.00 pm and lasted throughout theafternoon and into the evening. Bouquet'scircle held out, despite many casualties. Onthe morning of 6 August, the Indiansattacked again, undertaking coordinatedattacks immediately. When Bouquetrecognized that he was in danger of beingbreached, he decided to shorten his lines,and two light companies were ordered to fallback. The Indians saw this, mistook it for aretreat, and launched a disorganized attack.


Unbeknownst to the Indians, the British hadalready pulled back four other companies,and the right flank of the British circle beganto pour heavy fire into the attacking Indianmass, then rushed them with bayonets. TheBritish left flank attacked the Indian massnext; the Indians attempted to withdraw, butwere cut down. Bouquet related that 'twoother companies were so posted as to catchthem [Indians] in their retreat and entirelydispersed them, and the whole fled' (JeffreyAmherst, p. 318). The remainder of theIndian force managed to withdraw from thefield of battle. It is debatable whetherBouquet calculated the whole maneuver;what is certain, however, is that he wished toshorten his lines, recognized the tacticaladvantage given to him, and pushed homehis attack. The battle cost both sides some50 killed and 50 wounded.

Fort Pitt was relieved by 10 August, afterwhich Bouquet decided that his force neededrest and decided to postpone furtheradvances into the Ohio River valley. Smalldetachments were sent out to Forts Bedfordand Ligionier, and provincial troops arrivedat Fort Pitt in early September. Bouquet thenmarched towards Fort Detroit while a secondcolumn of regulars retook Presque Isle.Colonel Johnson had been meeting withmembers of the Six Nations concerning theSenecas who had turned on the British. TheSix Nations were still officially on the side ofthe British throughout the crisis, and vowedto deal with the traitors. Meanwhile, theSenecas kept fighting, ambushing a reliefcolumn heading out from Fort Niagara toFort Detroit. Another column of 90 Britishregulars sent out to attack the Indians wasalso ambushed and destroyed by the Senecas.The garrisons at Fort Pitt and Detroit readiedthemselves for the coming winter. FortDetroit's siege had been lifted on 15 October,but this had happened largely because theIndians had lost interest in continuing thesiege. Detroit was still in dire need ofsupplies.

The tension in the region which provokedthe Indian uprising eventually forced theBritish government to proclam a policy

concerning the newly conquered territories.The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was anattempt to resolve several outstanding issuesin the region conclusively, but it was stillsomewhat ambiguous. The principalconditions of the proclamation were: thatthe French settlements north of New Yorkand New England were to become known asthe new colony of Quebec; that Florida wasto be divided into two new colonies, Eastand West Florida; that all three new colonieswere to operate under English law; and thatall other land not encompassed by the threenew colonies was to belong to the Indians.Colonial governments that claimed land inthe region, such as Pennsylvania andVirginia, were no longer allowed to grantlands in the area. Only Crownrepresentatives could negotiate with Indiansover the sale of land. No whites were tosettle the region, and any whites alreadypresent in the region were ordered towithdraw to east of the Appalachianmountains. White traders were allowed tocross into Indian territory, but were requiredto carry a license from the commander-in-chief. The proclamation was vague aboutwhat French inhabitants of the Indianterritory should do. Were they required tomove to Quebec? The document was unclearon this issue.

The proclamation succeeded in achievingits objective, which was to end the Indianuprising. At the same time, it established awhole new set of problems with colonistsfrom the Thirteen Colonies who wished tosettle in the region, which would contributeto tension already developing.

General Amherst was replaced on17 November 1763 by Major GeneralThomas Gage. Amherst had developed thestrategy for 1764 before he left; provincialsand regulars would be raised in New York tolift the siege of Fort Niagara, and under thecommand of Colonel Bradstreet, would besent to subdue the Indians on the GreatLakes. Bouquet and his troops would marchinto the Ohio River valley and subdue theIndian tribes there. Colonel Johnson,assuming these campaigns were successful,

How the war ended

would negotiate a treaty with the Indiansand settle the uprising. Intelligence reportsindicated that the Indians were growingtired of the situation. The siege of Detroit,in particular, had carried on longer thanthey had expected, and the British success atthe battle of Bushy Run had broken theIndians' resolve. Johnson and Bradstreetarrived at Fort Niagara in early July to meetwith a number of tribal chiefs who wishedto discuss peace terms. Johnson managed toreach agreement with all but three of them.The terms of the treaty were not as harsh asmight have been expected under the

circumstances; the Indians were givenseveral concessions, including the right tolodge complaints at Fort Detroit and aschedule for setting values on goodsand skins.

Following the peace conference, Bradstreetleft with his force to subdue the three tribesstill in rebellion, and to spread the word thathostilities with the other tribes were at an end.Bouquet, as planned, moved into the OhioRiver valley to subdue any remaining Indianhostility and receive any white captives. Thecampaign was over by the end of the year, andthe frontier was peaceful once again.

Conclusions and consequences

Ramifications for the future

Since the French-Indian War was foughtchiefly between France and Great Britain andtheir Indian allies, the conclusions andramifications discussed are only relevant toNorth America. The principal outcome of theFrench-Indian War, from the British point ofview, was that France had been nullified asan adversary in North America. To the casualobserver of 1763, the situation at the end ofthe war presented Great Britain inundisputed control of North America east ofthe Mississippi River.

The situation quickly proved to be morecomplicated than first impressions indicated.Within a few months of the signing of theTreaty of Paris, a large-scale Indianinsurrection had broken out. The Britishsucceeded in quelling the revolt after a lengthycampaign, but the revolt raised several issues,relevant not only to relations with the Indiansbut also to ensure the security of new Britishterritories. Great Britain's methods for dealingwith both of these considerations only servedto further alienate her subjects in the originalThirteen Colonies. Already aggrieved bynumerous tensions that had arisen during theconduct of the war itself, the colonists wereincensed by the government's use of armedtroops to prevent their movements towardwestward expansion and settlement.

The Thirteen Colonies did not feel it wastheir responsibility to help pay the costs ofthe war, and they had no intention ofcontributing funds for the upkeep of securityalong the frontier, which was widelyconsidered to be there solely to obstruct thewestward movement of settlers. The Britishgovernment sought various ways ofcompelling the colonial governments to payto support the Army's presence in NorthAmerica, and debate on this and related issuesraged between London and North Americafrom 1764 until 1775. The colonists found

the Quebec Act of 1774 to be particularlygalling. In addition to making liberalprovisions accommodating the language,religion, and laws of the French Canadianpopulation, this act also gave the colony ofQuebec administrative rights over the newlyconquered territories of the Ohio River valleyand extensive areas east of the Mississippi.Settlers in the Pennsylvania and Virginiaregions were particularly incensed by thisdecision, as they had always claimed theseregions as their own. (For more backgroundon these issues, see Essential Histories, TheAmerican Revolution 1774-1783.)

The numerous grievances fermenting inthe populations of the Thirteen Colonieshad, by 1775, developed into open rebellionagainst the British Crown. The British Armyhad gained significant tactical expertise infighting in North America during the Frenchand Indian War, but by the time war brokeout in 1775, many of the reforms institutedhad been forgotten. The majority of seniorofficers in the British Army of this periodhad not waged war in North America; mostof them had fought in Germany in the SevenYears' War. Those who had fought in NorthAmerica were mostly contemptuous of theAmerican soldiers' fighting capabilities,citing their experiences with provincialsoldiers in the French-Indian War. In fact,the British officers disparaged the Americans'ability to wage a war as a unified entity,remembering, again, occasions during theFrench-War when colonial assembliesbickered and reneged on promises of suppliesand men. In underestimating their colonialopponents, British leaders made a seriousmistake, forgetting that the Americans had attheir disposal a large group of veterans whohad served in both the provincial andregular ranks. They were able to tap into afund of knowledge and experience when the

Conclusion and consequences 9

Fort Detroit (Detroit Public Library)

fledgling United States set out to create aprofessional army in 1775.

France, to its credit, did not ignore theissues that had been responsible for herdefeat in both the French-Indian and thelarger Seven Years' War. The armyimplemented numerous tactical reforms. Infact, the army in North America hadperformed remarkably well, given thecircumstances and constraints under whichit was forced to operate. Many of the reformswere instituted in response to the FrenchArmy's poor performance in Germany. Thesereforms became the cornerstone of amovement that would lead eventually tosuccesses for the French Army in theAmerican Revolution (1778-83) and duringthe revolutionary and Napoleonic period.France was only too happy in 1778 to jointhe Thirteen Colonies in an open treaty,hoping to gain back some of the territorieslost in the Seven Years' War. This strategypaid off to a certain extent; France did not

regain New France in 1783, but she didregain some of her lost colonies in theCaribbean, and helped to inflict a defeatupon the British. Both of these achievementshelped to restore morale within the Frenchmilitary establishment.

The expenses incurred in both the French-Indian War and the larger Seven Years' Warput France in a difficult financial position.Her attempts at financial reform were not asextensive as her military reforms had been,and the construction of a new fleet, alongwith other military needs, strained thebudget to breaking point in the 1760s.Successful involvement in the AmericanRevolution brought more financial burdensbut no new ways of releiving them. TheFrench crown's mounting debt and attemptsto get it under control are often cited asbeing among the principal causes of theFrench Revolution. In the end, a seeminglyinsignificant frontier campaign in a thinlysettled colonial outpost was to haveenormous long-term ramifications for two ofEurope's greatest powers.

Further reading

Primary Sources:

Manuscript Sources:British LibraryBouquet PapersHaldimand PapersHardwicke PapersNapier PapersNewcastle PapersTownshend PapersAdd 11813 Captain William Parry

(RN) LouisbourgAdd Mss 45662 Journal of Richard HumphrysAdd Mss 15535 Plans of Military Operations

in NA

Massachusetts Historical Society, BostonJournal of Benjamin DunningMajor John Hawks Orderly BooksJournal of David HoldenDiary of Timothy NicholsJournal of David SandersJames Wolfe's Journal (McGill University)

National Army Museum, London7204-6-2 'Journal of unknown individual'6707-1 Lt. T. Hamilton Journal6807-131 Journal of Augustus Gordon7803-18-1 Journal of Charles Lee8001-30 Captain Phillip Townsend6806-41 1st Marquis Townshend Papers7311-85 Williamson Papers6807-51 Orders given by Major General Wolfe

Public Records Office, LondonAmherst Papers

Printed Sources:'General Orders in Wolfe's Army' Manuscripts

Relating to the early History of Canada,Quebec, 1875.

'Journal of Braddock's Campaign'JSAHQR, LVII.

'Journal of Beausejour' Sackville, N.B., 1937.'Journal of the Expedition to the River St.

Lawrence', London, 1760 (Sergeant- Major).'Journal of the Siege of Oswego', Military

History of Great Britain, for 1756, 1757,London, 1757.

Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain1727-1783, London, 1790.

The Northcliffe Collection, Ottawa, 1926.'Reflections on the General Principles of War

and on the Compositions and Charactersof the Different Armies in Europe', AnnualRegister, 1766.

Amherst, J., Journal of Jeffrey Amherst,Toronto, 1931.

Amherst, W,. Journal of William Amherst,London, 1928.

Bradstreet, J., Impartial Account of Lt ColonelBradstreet's Expedition to Fort Frontenac,London, 1759.

Bougainville, L.A. de., Adventure in theWilderness, Norman, Oklahoma, 1964.

Dalrymple, C, Military Essay containingreflections of the raising, arming, clothingand Discipline of British Cavalry andInfantry, London, 1761.

Doughty, A.G., (ed.) The Siege of Quebec andthe Battle of the Plains of Abraham (6 Vols.),Quebec, 1901.

Dundas, Sir David, Principles of MilitaryMovement, London, 1788.

Goodenough, J., A Rogers' Ranger in the Frenchand Indian War, New York, 1897.

Hamilton, C, (ed.) Braddock's Defeat: Journalof Captain Robert Chomley's Batman;Journal of a British Officer; Halkett's OrderlyBook, Norman, Oklahoma, 1959.

King, T, Narrative of Titus King, Boston, 1938.Knox, H. Historical Journal of Campaigns in

North America, 1757-1760 (3 Vols.),Toronto, 1914.

Loudon, J., General Orders 1757, NewYork, 1899.

Further reading 93

Lowry, J., A Journal of Captivity, London,1760.

Pargellis, S., (ed.) Military Affairs in NorthAmerica, New York, 1936.

Pouchot, P., Memoir of the Late War in NorthAmerica between the French and the English,Roxbury, Mass., 1864.

Quaiffe, M., (ed.) The Siege of Detroit in 1763,Chicago, 1958.

Rogers, R., Journals of Major Robert Rogers,Albany, 1883.

Sautai, M., (ed.) Montcalm at the Battle of FortCarillon, Ticonderoga, N.Y., 1928.

Tomlinson, A., Military Journals of Two PrivateSoldiers, Poughkeepsie, New York, 1855.

Webb, T., Military Treatise on the Appointmentsof the Army, Philadelphia, 1759.

Wolfe, J., Instructions to Young Officers,London, 1768.

Yorke, P.C., (ed.) Life and Correspondence ofPhillip Yorke, Earl of Hardwick, Cambridge,1913.

Secondary Sources:

Anderson, R, A People's Army: MassachusettsSoldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War,Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1984.

Anderson, R, Crucible of War: The Seven Years'War and the Fate of Empire in British NorthAmerica, 1754-1766, New York, 2000.

Balisch, A., 'Infantry Battlefield Tactics in the18th Century,' Studies in History andPolitics 83-84.

Brumwell, S., Redcoats: The British Soldier andWar in the Americas, 1755-1763,Cambridge, 2002.

Duffy, C, The Military Experience in the Age ofReason, London, 1987.

Eccels, W.J., Essays on New France,Toronto, 1987.

Fortescue, Sir John, History of the BritishArmy, Vol. II, London, 1908.

Gipson, L.H., The British Empire Before theAmerican Revolution (V-VIII), New York,1936-1970.

Guy, A.J., Economy and Discipline: Officershipand Administration in the British Army,1714-63, Manchester, 1984.

Harper, J.R., 78th Fighting Fraser's in Canada,Montreal, 1966

Houlding, J.A., Fit for Service: Training of theBritish Army, Oxford, 1981.

Hughes, B.O., Open Fire: Artillery Tactics fromMarlborough to Wellington, Chichester,Sussex, 1983.

Kennett, L., French Armies in the Seven YearsWar, Durham, North Carolina, 1967.

Leach, D.E., Arms for Empire: A MilitaryHistory of the British Colonies in NorthAmerica, 1607-1763, New York, 1973.

Leach, D.E., Roots of Conflict: British ArmedForces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763,Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1986.

Middleton, R., Bells of Victory: Pitt-NewcastleMinistry and conduct of the Seven Years'War, Cambridge, 1985.

Nosworthy, B., Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics1689-1763, Hippocrene, N.Y., 1992.

Pargellis, S., Lord Loudon in North America,New Haven, 1933.

Parkman, R, Montcalm and Wolfe, NewYork, 1995.

Richards, R, The Black Watch at Ticonderogaand Major Duncan Campbell, Glen Falls,NY, 1930

Riley, J., The Seven Years War and the OldRegime in France: Economic and FinancialToll, Princeton, New Jersey, 1986.

Schweizer, K., England, Prussia and the SevenYears War: Studies in Alliance Policies andDiplomacy, Lewiston, N.Y., 1989.

Stacey, C.P., Quebec, 1759: The Siege andBattle, Toronto, 1959.

Ultee, M. (ed.), Adapting to Conditions: Warand Society in the Eighteenth Century,Alabama, 1986.

Unpublished Thesis:Marston, Daniel 'Swift and Bold: The 60th

Royal American Regiment and Warfare inNorth America, 1755-1765', M.A. Thesis,1997, McGill University.


Index

Figures in bold refer to illustrations

Abercromby, Maj. Gen. James 35, 40, 44, 46, 46-7Acadians 11, 32-3, 78-9, 79Algonquins 26American Revolution, causes of 88, 90-1Amherst, Lt. Gen. Jeffrey 47, 51

in the field 48, 51, 52-4, 69, 71-2, 79fund raising 76and Indian uprising (1763-64) 88quoted 21, 56

Amherst, William 19, 72artillery 16

bateaux men 16Beaujeu, Capt. de 29Bigot, Francois 78Bloody Run, Battle of (1763) 86-7Boscawen, Adm. Edward 48Bougainville, Louis Antoine de

at forts William Henry and Carillon 39-40, 44, 46on French provincial units 25at Quebec and Montreal 59, 63, 66, 68, 71

Bouquet, Lt. Col. Henry 41, 43, 44-5, 85, 86, 87, 88Bourlamaque, Col. le Chevalier de 33, 53Braddock, Maj. Gen. Edward 27, 28, 30, 31Braddock's Battle (1755) 28-31Bradstreet, Col. John 18, 36, 43, 46, 88, 89British Army

advantages 8British Establishment 12conduct to civilians 72, 80fighting style 14-17Independent Companies 12, 20, 37positions and numbers 19-20,37,40provincial units 20-1, 24, 35, 40, 73, 76-7provincials, relations with regulars 20, 35rangers 18-19, 37, 48, 51, 54, 71, 73-5, 84supplies 17-18, 22training 15-16, 18-19

British Army, regiments42nd Regiment of Foot 8744th Regiment of Foot 27, 28, 36, 5646th Regiment of Foot 5648th Regiment of Foot 27, 2850th Regiment of Foot 27, 3751st Regiment of Foot 27, 3755th Regiment of Foot 1962nd (later 60th) Regiment of Foot 18-19, 35, 36,

41, 51-2, 56, 84, 8777th Regiment of Foot 8780th Regiment of Foot 19New York Provincials 56

Burd, Col. James 43Burton, Lt. Col. 35Bushy Run, Battle of (1763) 87-8, 87

Canada 11, 32-3, 47-51, 56-72cavalry, use of 16civilians, effects of war on 72, 78-80, 81-2Cook, James 56Coulon de Jumonville, Ens. 12Coulon de Villiers, Capt. 12-13, 36Crown Point (formerly Fort St. Frederic) 54

Dalyell, Capt. James 86, 87Delawares 12, 41Desbruyeres, J. 66Dieskau, Baron de 27, 32Dinwiddie, Gov. Robert 11Drucour, Augustin, Chevalier de 33, 47Dumas, Capt, 29, 31

fighting styles 14-17Forbes, Brig. John 40, 41Fort Beausejour 11,32-3,36Fort Bedford 41, 51,86Fort Carillon (later Fort Ticonderoga) 32, 36, 73-4

battle at (1758) 44-7, 47, 49, 50, 74British attempt on (1759) 51,52-4

Fort Cumberland 12, 28, 31Fort Detroit 86-8, 91Fort Duquesne (later Fort Pitt) 12, 13

Braddock's march to (1755) 27-31, 28-9, 33, 34, 43Forbes's attempt on (1758) 41-3, 43

Fort Edward 18, 21, 32, 39, 40, 73Fort Frontenac 32, 36, 47Fort Gapereau 33Fort George (Lake George) 53Fort George (Oswego) 36-7Fort Ligonier 41, 43Fort Necessity 12-13,31Fort Niagara 31-2, 54-6, 59Fort Ontario 36-7Fort Pepperell 36-7Fort Pitt (formerly Fort Duquesne) 43, 51, 52, 86, 87-8Fort Presque Isle 51, 52, 88Fort St. Frederic (later Crown Point) 51, 53, 54Fort Ticonderoga (formerly Fort Carillon) 54Fort Venango 51, 52, 86Fort William Henry 32, 35-6

Battle of (1757) 21, 26, 39-40, 42France

allies 7, 25-6effects of the war 84, 91financing the war 76Royal Navy blockade 33-4strategy 33treaty with Thirteen Colonies (1778) 91

Fraser 71French Army

advantages 8Canadian militia 24-5, 77-8conduct to civilians 79discipline 24fighting style 14-17marines 23-4, 23postwar reforms 91regiments 24, 27, 33, 37regulars 23-4, 23strategy 21supplies 17training 15-16

French Navy 38Fundy, Bay of 11

Gage, Lt. Col. Thomas 28, 29-30, 31, 88George II, King of Great Britain 8Gladwin, Maj. 86

Index 95

Goodenough, John 19Goodenough, Joshua 73-5Gorham's Rangers 18, 48Grant, Maj. 41-2, 43Grant's Battle (1758) 41-3Great Britain

allies 7, 25-6consequences of the war 84, 90financing the war 76strategy 35

Great Meadows, skirmish at (1754) 12

Halifax, Nova Scotia 54Haviland, Brig. William de 69, 69-71Howe, Brig. George Augustus, Lord 44, 74Hurons 26, 26, 85

Indian uprising (1763-64) 84-9Indians 44-5, 82

alliances 25-6, 41British raid of St. Francis 54capture of colonists 81-3, 82conduct to prisoners 26, 37, 40, 74engagements 13, 29-31, 32, 37, 40, 43, 66skills 16, 25

Indians: tribesAlgonquins 26Delawares 12, 41, 85Hurons 26, 26, 85Miamis 85Ottawas 26, 85, 86Senecas 26, 85, 86, 88Shawnees 12Six Nations of the Iroquois 26, 85, 88Wyandots 26

lroquois, Six Nations of the 26, 85, 88Isle-aux-Nois 74-5

Johnson, Lt. Col. William 25, 26, 27, 32, 56, 88, 88-9

King, Titus 40, 82-3Knox, Capt. H. 21, 66, 68

La Belle Famille, Battle of (1759) 56Lake George, Battle of (1755) 32, 35Lawrence, Brig. Charles 48Lee, Capt. Charles 44, 46Levis, Brig. le Chevalier de 33, 65, 71Lewis, Maj. 41-2, 43Lignery, Marchand de 41Loudon, Lt. Gen. John Campbell, Earl 17-19, 20, 35,

37-8, 40Louis XV, King of France 9Louisbourg 33, 37-8

siege of (1758) 47-51, S2-3, 55, 79Lowry, Jean 81-2

MacDonald, Capt. 42MacKay, Capt. James 12Massy, Lt. Col. Eyre 56Mercer, Col. 36, 37Miamis 26, 85Monckton, Lt. Col. Robert 27Montcalm-Gozon de Saint-Veran, Louis-Joseph,

Marquis de la 22, 38, 49, 68(1756-58) 33, 36, 37, 38-9, 40, 44, 46(1759) 56, 58, 59, 60-1, 63on food supply 77on his men 24, 24-5strategy 21-3

Montmorency Falls, attack at (1759) 58-9, 62-3Montreal 66, 69-72Munro, Lt. Col. George 39-40Murray, Maj. Gen. James 58, 64, 66, 67, 69

New Francelife during war 77-80population 7

Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of 27, 37,40

North America 7Nova Scotia 11, 32-3, 78

Ohio River valley 11-13,84,88,90Oswego 31, 32, 36-7Ottawas 26, 85, 86

Paris, Treaty of (1763) 84Parkman, Francis 24Pitt, William 20, 37, 40Plains of Abraham, first Battle of the (1759) 24, 60-3,

64-5Plains of Abraham, second Battle of the (1760) 66-8,

70Pontiac 86Pontiac's Rebellion (1763-64) 84-9Pouchot, Capt. M. 54-6Prideaux, Brig. John 51,54,56Prince Edward Island 79

Quebec 60-1, 68-9Quebec Act (1774) 90Quebec Campaign (1759) 15, 51, 56-69, 62, 71, 80

rangers 18-19, 37, 48, 51, 54, 71, 73-5, 84Rogers, Robert 18, 39, 54, 73, 74Rogers' Rangers 18, 37, 54, 73-5, 84Royal Navy 33-4, 38, 48, 49, 58, 60, 68-9, 76, 77Royal Proclamation of 1763 88

St. Francis 54St. Jean Island 79Sainte-Foy, Battle of (1760) 66-8, 70Senecas 26, 85, 86, 88Shawnees 12Shirley, Gov. William 11, 27, 31-2, 78Six Nations of the lroquois 26, 85, 88smallpox 39, 40

tactics see fighting stylesThirteen Colonies

financing the war 76-7population 7postwar grievances against Great Britain 88, 90treaty with France (1778) 91

Townshend, Brig. George 58, 60training, military 15-16, 18-19transport and travel, in North America 17, 18

Vaudreuil, Pierre Francois de Rigaud, Marquis de la21, 21, 33, 70-1

warfareirregular warfare 14,16-17linear warfare 14-16

Washington, Lt. Col, George 11-12, 11, 33weapons

artillery 16flintlock muskets 14

Webb, Maj. Gen. Daniel 35, 39, 40Whitmore, Brig. Edward 48Williams, Dr. Thomas 36Williamson, Lt. 64Wolfe, Maj. Gen. James 57,66-7

at Louisbourg 48, 49at Quebec 51, 58, 59, 60, 63, 80

Wyandots 26

Young, Lt. Col. 40

Essential Histories - Higher Intellect northern Thirteen Colonies and in the ... 8 Essential Histories • The French-Indian War 1754 -1760 ... Great Britain was at war with the colonists

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