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Memorates and memory: A re-evaluation of Lauri Honkos
theory1
VLADIMR BAHNAMasaryk University / Slovak Academy of Sciences
AbstractThis paper deals with the phenomena where culture and
society influ-ence the content of personal experiences. It
confronts psychological knowledge about autobiographical memory and
folkloristic theories associated with the concept of memorate a
personal experience nar-rative which is built upon a supernatural
belief. Autobiographical memory is not a vessel in which static
information is deposited and later recalled; rather, it is a
dynamic process of repeated construction and reconstruction of
memories, which is subject to many internal and external
influences. Ideas and concepts, widespread in society, dreams and
beliefs, stories and experiences of others, can be, and often are
incorporated into autobiographical memories. Similarly folklorists
have shown that memorates (personal experience narratives) often
consist of traditional elements. This paper argues that the theory
formulated by Lauri Honko (1962, 1964) regarding the formation and
transmission of memorates is largely coherent with psychologi-cal
understanding of autobiographical memory. This kind of social
contagion of memory suggests the possibility of a specific form of
experientally-based cultural transmission of beliefs and
concepts.
Keywords: Lauri Honko, memorates, autobiographical memory,
cognitive science of religion
A memorate is a term used mainly in folkloristics for a type of
narrative based on the speakers personal experience. Memorates are
often studied together or as a subgroup of legends. Both memorates
and legends are character-istically mono-episodic stories, the
content of which is built upon a belief, and which is presented as
a real happening. The difference between these two narrative types
is that whereas legends are shared by a wider group of people in a
relatively typified and fixed form, memorates take the form of
1 This article is a part of the project Laboratory for the
Experimental Research of Religion (LEVYNA, CZ.1.07/2.3.00/20.048)
co-financed by the European Social Fund and the state budget of the
Czech Republic. This work was also in part supported by the Faculty
of Arts, Masaryk University.
Temenos Vol. 51 No. 1 (2015), 723 The Finnish Society for the
Study of Religion
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VLADIMR BAHNA8
personal experience stories. This specific feature was first
addressed by Carl Wilhelm von Sydow, who also introduced the term
memorate (Sydow 1934). The crucial distinction between memorates
and legends or other narrative types is the personal experience at
their core.
Experience vs. culture
Carl von Sydow posited that memorates were unique, strictly
individual stories (Sydow 1934). That is what we normally expect of
personal experi-ences in general, but can we in such a case speak
about folklore or even culture? Personal experiences appear to be
the very opposite of the collec-tive phenomena that we understand
under tradition and transmission - the two crucial terms regarding
folklore. Von Sydow himself did not assign much importance to
memorates for the study of folklore, but later many folklorists
have noticed that the ethnographic material itself shows the
op-posite. Although the actual texts, the formulations and many of
the details of memorates were idiosyncratic, the narrative
structures often contained many or even exclusively traditional,
culturally shared motifs (Bennett 1999; Honko 1964).
The focus of attention in the discussion therefore turned to the
relation-ship between experience and tradition, the processes by
which individual experiences become part of a narrative repertoire
shared by the wider so-ciety. Memorates thus emerge as a possible
precursor of legend. By defini-tion, every legend is presented as a
real happening, and therefore implicitly assumes a first-hand
testimony at its inception (Dgh & Vszonyi 1974). Moreover, the
relationship between story and event is seen as reciprocal, and as
working in both directions (Bauman 1986; Bennett 1999). To quote
Gillian Bennett:
By listening to, collecting and studying memorates, one can
study tradi-tion at work shaping discrepant experiences and giving
meaning to mean-ingless perceptions. It is sensible then in a study
such as this to make no distinction between the experience of the
supernatural and the tradition of the supernatural. Memorates will
have to be considered on a par with legends - just as traditional
but exhibiting tradition in an alternative way. (Bennett 1985,
256.)
Story tellers and audiences knowledge of what constitutes a
proper super-natural event, helps to create the final shape of the
stories that are told on the
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 9
subject; conversely, knowledge of stories is part of the shape
we give to our supernatural experiences. They give meaning to
meaningless perceptions, shape private experiences into cultural
forms. (Bennett 1999, 5.)
The idea that cultural context can shape individuals personal
experiences is the main claim of this article. But it is a
nontrivial claim, which requires more theoretical and empirical
support than merely the recurrence of traditional elements in
personal testimonies. Lauri Honko, in his book Geisterglaube in
Ingermanland (1962), and the article Memorates and the study of
folk beliefs (1964), formulated a theory which involved a process
of how traditional themes can penetrate personal experiences,2 in
which he was far more specific than most other authors. The schema
[figure 1] represents his theoretical model of how a memorate about
a barn spirit could come into existence. To simplify the
explanation I have divided the schema into three parts. The section
on the right (C) refers to a possible further transmis-sion and
standardization of the narrative in a society - i.e. to the
possible formation of a legend. I will not deal with that here, as
I want to focus on the opposite processes, where culture and
society influence experiences. These are covered by the rest of the
schema. The far left section (A) refers to the initial experienced
event and the creation of a memory, and the mid-dle section (B) is
about its subsequent verbal formulations and the social negotiation
about its content.
According to Lauri Honkos theory, a vision (e.g. when a spirit
is seen) emerges (section A) when several conditions are met. First
there has to be some perceptual input: a trigger stimulus (e.g. a
strange or unexpected sound), possibly combined with some
perceptual constraints (e.g. dark-ness). Second, the person has to
be in a specific psychological condition (e.g. tiredness, fear);
and third, he or she draws on some tradition that they have adopted
(e.g. legends, other peoples memorates, previous personal
experience) as experiential models for the event. Honko also
mentions social values and norms, which may cause internal conflict
and stress. Social norms and values are also part of the learned
tradition, although of a different kind than stories. However,
although the schema sets out to describe some general mechanisms,
it was designed for a specific category of memorate, arising from
experiences relating to norm violations. In other cases (e.g.
ritual-based experiences), social norms and values might not play
any role, whereas other cultural aspects may have an impact (Honko
1964).
2 In several later publications focused on the folklore process,
Honko refined his model and located memorates within a broader
context of narrative genres (e.g. Honko 1979, 1989)
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Although Honko does not make such a distinction, there are
clearly three interconnected but separate domains which influence
the emergence of such an experience (1) the perceptual input, (2)
the individuals psychological conditions, and (3) the cultural
input.
The second section (B) of the schema refers to a further
influence of the learned tradition and the society. Honko suggests
that a memorate can emerge immediately after the event, but the
initial unspecified supernatural experience3 often acquires its
specific cultural label only after some time has passed. In many
cases interpretation follows only as the result of later
deliberation, and the supernatural meaning becomes evident only
after weeks or even months (Honko 1964, 17) which opens it to the
impact of social influences.
A person who has experienced a supernatural event by no means
always makes the interpretation himself; the social group that
surrounds him may also participate in the interpretation. In their
midst may be spirit belief specialists, influential authorities,
whose opinion, by virtue of their social prestige, becomes
decisive. [] The group controls the experiences of its members, and
if the most authoritative and influential person happens to be a
skeptic, the supernormal character of the experience can afterwards
be refuted. (Honko 1964, 18.)
Honko formulated the problem in a way that can be investigated
from the cognitive point of view. Most of the schema can be
addressed in cognitive terms: perception (the stimulus), learning
(the tradition), emotions (fear, stress), reasoning (later
interpretations), and social cognition and commu-nication, but at
the very center is memory. In its general features, this model is
similar to memory phenomena which psychologists more than a decade
after Honkos article started to call false memories. I will return
to this later, but at this point this is the reason why I see the
recent psychological understanding of human memory, especially
autobiographical memory, as important for the study of folklore,
religious narratives and religious transmission in general.4
3 Honko uses for this the term numen, which he borrowed from von
Otto, but in the more recent context, this (together with the
releasing stimuli) could be interpreted within the framework of a
Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device (see Barrett 2004; Guthrie
1993).4 Lauri Honkos work has already previously been linked to the
cognitive paradigm (see Pyysiinen 2000; Kamppinen & Hakamies
2013).
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 11
Memory and narratives
In contemporary cognitive psychology, there is general agreement
that hu-man memory consists of several interconnected but
independent memory systems. Cognitive psychologists have identified
five main systems of human memory: procedural, perceptual, primary
(working), semantic and episodic, which are divided into two main
types: explicit, which consists of semantic and episodic memory,
and implicit memory, which consists of procedural, perceptual and
primary memory (Schacter & Tulving 1994). The difference in
content and mechanisms between these memory systems has become a
crucial theoretical point in a number of cognitive approaches to
culture and religion, and has been used to explain differences in
ritual forms and their transmission and social dynamics (Whitehouse
2004; McCauley & Lawson 2002).
A similar memory-based approach could also be relevant for
narratives. While story reproduction is a matter of explicit
information, the recall of stories is related mainly to semantic
and episodic memory. Semantic memory makes possible the acquisition
and retention of factual information about the world in the
broadest sense: it involves encyclopedic information which
represents the world as it is or as it could be. On the other hand,
the episodic memory system enables individuals to remember
happenings (events) they have witnessed in their own personal past
(Schacter & Tulving 1994; Tulving 1999; 2004).
The recall of a story employs both systems, but the core memory
system deployed in recalling diverse categories of stories might
vary. When recall of a story is connected with a learned sequence
of happenings, or even with a concrete text, semantic memory
dominates. On the other hand, when the recall of a story is
connected with personal experience, and depends on the recall of an
audiovisual representation of an experienced event, the domi-nant
system is the episodic memory. This difference could well also
apply to the recall of memorates and legends as defined and used by
folklorists.
When the story of a personal experience of the narrator is told,
it changes from a story stored in episodic memory to a story stored
in semantic memo-ry. The very first transmission, when a personal
experience is presented to an audience, changes the memorizing and
recall mechanisms of the story. This is what happens when a
personal experience enters the process of cultural transmission. It
is not surprising that we are able to formulate our memories
verbally, and to understand such utterances of others, and remember
their content; what is, however, surprising, and somewhat
controversial, is the possibility of the opposite process, when
stories about experiences of oth-
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VLADIMR BAHNA12
ers or learned information influences the emergence or triggers
changes in individuals own memories.
Social contagion of memories
Autobiographical and episodic memory are sometimes used as
equivalent terms, but autobiographical memory does not designate a
separate memory system in the way that semantic and episodic memory
do. It is constituted by those memories which form a personal
representation of our life story. Autobiographical memory is
closely related to episodic memory, but by no means all episodic
memories are autobiographical; and it is characterized by our
ability to link information to clusters relating to significant
aspects in our personal past (Nelson 1993).
Even very young children have episodic memories, but they do not
yet have autobiographical memory. This is developed gradually, and
does not depend solely on the ability to remember personally
experienced events. Children have to learn the appropriate way of
recounting those events, which is to a large extent a social
process. They need to learn to describe experienced events in the
form of stories. The formation of autobiographical memory depends
on our ability to think in stories, and this ability is formed only
gradually, and through social interaction (Fivush et al. 1995;
Nelson 1993).
The influence of the social environment on human
autobiographical memory can be seen not only on the level of the
general character of our au-tobiography and its development, but
also on the content level of particular memories. Using library,
hard-drive or any other container-like metaphor for human memory is
rather misleading: human memory is not a simple and passive
information storage and recall device, but an active process of
re-peated construction, including the construction of memories of
our personal past. Human memory is prone to many internal and
external influences. Ideas, concepts and beliefs, widespread in
society, stories and experiences of others, can be, and often are
incorporated into an individuals autobio-graphical memories,
without being aware of it. Psychologists speak about false
memories, a term which refers to cases in which people remember
events differently from the way they historically happened, or
remember events that never happened at all. False memories can be
very vivid, and held with high confidence (Loftus et al. 1996;
Loftus 1997; Loftus & Pickrell 1995, Loftus et al. 1978). It is
necessary to keep in mind that vividness and confidence neither
supply nor guarantee the accuracy of memories (Mc-Cauley 1999;
Schmidt 2012, 602).
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 13
In general, false memories arise from two categories of causes:
internal causes, like fantasies or dreams, and external causes,
when the core of the memory is taken from others from an
individual, or from literature, media etc. Psychological
experiments and real-life studies (such as eyewitnesses reports in
criminal investigations) have demonstrated both the integration of
information from one or more external sources into memory, and the
use of that information to reconstruct a memory that was never
actually experienced (Loftus 2001, 1997).
False memories are not pathogenic memory malfunctions. In a mild
form, they are a usual side-effect of normal memory reconstruction,
and everyone produces dozens of them. Bold changes of memories
require specific social and psychological conditions to occur, but
are still produced as a byproduct of normal memory recollection.
The extensive research on false memories shows that false memories
are the result not only of inap-propriate, suggestive or
manipulative methods sometimes used by therapists or criminal
investigators, but also of normal everyday life situations and
social interactions. It is actually a frequent phenomenon, so it is
reason-able to think that it enables a specific form of cultural
transmission. At this point, to avoid misunderstandings, I need to
emphasize one thing. People sometimes struggle with the term false
memories as if it refers to lying. I agree that falseness sounds
rather strong, but we have to keep in mind that the term first
appeared in forensic psychology and within a legal context. Later
research, however, has revealed it as a much broader and everyday
memory phenomenon, which is in some sense actually the opposite of
ly-ing. To take false memories research into account in the study
of folklore and other sociocultural phenomena does not mean that we
are judging our informants, as to whether this or that really
happened, but exploring how tradition and society influence our
memories about particular events.
The social context of false memories
People do not adopt all the information with which they are
confronted, and obviously not all adopted information is used to
build false memories. Which beliefs and ideas participate in false
memory formation depends heavily, due to deeply embedded cognitive
biases, on the social context in which they occur. By social
context I mean the individual or the group of people who are the
source of the incorporated information. The relevance of
information depends on its content, its form and its social
context. Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson argue that cultural
transmission is determined
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VLADIMR BAHNA14
by our predispositions to prefer (within the process of social
learning) ideas with certain social contexts. They speak about
biases based on frequency (e.g. conformism), and model-based
biases, which depend on the characteristics of those who are the
potential models for adoption of ideas or behaviors (e.g. success,
prestige, similarity) (Richerson & Boyd 2005).
The impact of these predispositions is not limited to the level
of general cultural transmission. The social context of the source
of information is one of the most important aspects which have
impact on the emergence of false memories. Authority, positive
relationships, and trust were all found to increase the rate of
success in experimental implanting of false memo-ries, or were
identified as a key factor in real-life cases (Loftus & Ketcham
1994; DeGloma 2007; Roediger et al. 2001). Similarly, collective
agreement (consensus) increases the probability that information
will be incorporated into individual memory. Meade and Roediger
claim that this happens not as a result of a reflected and public
conformism, but because the untrue information becomes
spontaneously, through implicit memory processes, a part of
individuals beliefs (Meade & Roediger 2002). Another very
impor-tant aspect is whether the person who was the source of
information was presenting it as a personal testimony. People are
not only biased to have a positive stance toward information
presented as a testimony, but are more likely to insert information
presented in this way into their own memories (Basden et al. 2002;
Reysen 2007).
As noted earlier, Lauri Honko posited that an unspecified
supernatural experience becomes clearer in profile and related to
specific beliefs once the society participates in its
interpretation, and cultural explanatory models are introduced. The
influence of social authorities and experts may cause either the
rejection or the further elaboration of the experience (Honko
1964). Honkos assumption about the role of society in the formation
of personal-experience memories is in broad outline in agreement
with current psycho-logical knowledge. Honko speaks about the
individuals interpretations, which might suggest that memorate
formation is a conscious and explicit process, but false memories
research shows that even when the incorporated information is
verbal and further social negotiation about the content of the
experience is explicit, the incorporation itself is
characteristically not reflected and recognized by the individual
concerned.
The role of social context in memorate formation is supported by
ethno-graphic data from my own fieldwork in a rural region of
northern Slovakia. The research was focused specifically on
memorates and experiences of traditional supernatural agents, and
was based on detailed autobiographical
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 15
interviews, collections of narrative repertoires, and on
identifying the social networks and relationships of individuals
involved in the transmission of these narratives. I found that in
the surroundings of those individuals who reported an experience
with an supernatural agent, other similar stories were in
circulation, telling of similar experiences by a person socially
relevant to these individuals: close relatives, best friends,
important family friends, and persons seen as authoritative on the
basis of institutionalized office or pro-fessional expertise.
Moreover these memorates were supported within the immediate
community by a positive stance toward the experience, frequent
occasions of collective remembering, or by mutually supporting
testimonies of individuals with similar experiences. On the other
hand, in those parts of the local society where personal
experiences of this kind did not occur, the knowledge of
traditional narratives and beliefs was fragmentary, and on the edge
of social interest, mostly triggering a negative attitude among the
local majority and influential individuals. These findings support
the hypothesis that memorates are more frequent where the source of
the tra-dition is associated with the kind of social contexts which
have been seen in experimental research as increasing the
probability of false memories formation (Bahna 2012).
The emotional content of false memories
Emotions are another important domain related to false memories.
Negative emotions seem to be positively related to false memories
formation (Brainerd et al. 2008). Most of the real-life false
memory cases that have been studied were related to traumatic or
distressing experiences (Loftus & Ketcham 1994; Loftus 1979).
False memories are significantly more frequent under conditions of
high arousal than under conditions of low arousal (Corson, Verrier
2007). Memories of high arousal events are more vivid and detailed,
which can generate a feeling of their reliability, but at the same
time these memories are more liable to misinformation (Porter et
al. 2003).
This fits well with Lauri Honkos theory. As mentioned above,
Honko assumed that fear and stress caused by violating the social
norms is one of the key factors within the process of memorate
formation. In other catego-ries of experiences, e.g. ritual-based
ones, this role might be influenced by other cultural aspects
(Honko 1964, 1962). This could be supported by recent findings on a
high-arousal fire-walking ritual from San Pedro Manrique, Spain.
Dimitris Xygalatas and his colleagues found that immediately after
the ritual, participants reports had limited recall, low confidence
and high
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VLADIMR BAHNA16
accuracy, but two months later the same ritual participants
reported more inaccurate memories but higher confidence (Xygalatas
et al. 2013).
My own ethnographic research on experiences with supernatural
agents, mentioned above, supports this assumption as well. In this
case all recorded memorates which involved elaborated audiovisual
representations of the supernatural agent referred to emotionally
arousing experiences, and in a the majority of cases, to traumatic
experiences and intense fear, which was associated with
characteristic physiological symptoms (strong sweating, paralysis,
inability to breathe or speak, etc.) and behaviors (avoidance of
related places and situations). In contrast, stories which involved
no direct audiovisual representations of a supernatural agent, and
did not incorporate traditional motifs, or were only
interpretations of sudden events as caused by supernatural entities
(e.g. sounds, doors opening/closing, breaking of things or other
coincidences), mostly did not report any emotional arousal (Bahna
2012).
Conclusion
As an explanation for the observed recurrence of traditional
motifs in per-sonal testimonies, Lauri Honko formulated a
theoretical model in which culturally shared narratives about
supernatural elements affect personal experiences. A decade later,
Elizabeth Loftus started an influential research program on
misinformation and false memories, which brought empirical evidence
for what Honko had posited when studying narrative folklore. Honkos
model has many aspects (social context, emotions) which fit
per-fectly with subsequent psychological findings.
After nearly forty years of research on misinformation,
suggestibility and implanting of memories, the field is too
extensive to be covered by this article. Honkos theory covers only
a part of it, but recent psychological findings suggest that his
approach could be extended and applied more widely. For example,
Honko assumed that there is a real event (section A of the schema
in figure 1), the experience and memory of which is influenced and
extended by the learned tradition and society. But this is only one
small aspect of pos-sible false memory emergence (the
misinformation effect). Completely new memories, with no real event
in the background, can also be implanted. A big subfield within
false memories research called the Source Monitoring Framework
refers to a category of memory errors where thoughts, images and
feelings from one source are attributed to another, e.g. when the
content of a dream or a learned story is mistaken as a memory of a
perceptual event (Lindsay & Johnson 2000; Brainerd & Reyna
2005). This goes as well for the
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 17
emotional content of the experience, where emotional elaboration
plays a significant role in false memory creation (Drivdahl et al.
2009).
I think that it is the plasticity of human autobiographical
memory dis-cussed in this article which enables a specific form of
cultural transmission and personal experience narratives like
memorates. I would argue that false memories create a kind of
socio-cognitive niche for specific experience-related beliefs and
concepts.
The connection between psychology and narrative folklore which I
have tried to address, opens up a big field of potential
methodological questions. One possible way forward could of course
be an adaptation of experimen-tal false memory research towards
themes known from real cultural and religious transmission. It
seems to me more problematic, however, to apply it to field
research and ethnographic data. Even when the psychological
ex-planations seem promising, there would be always the question:
how could we know if the particular memorate, or which part of it,
is a false memory, when we probably in the majority of cases have
no accesses to the actual trigger event? We cannot know (unless,
contingently, the event itself or the relevant life period of the
informant had been followed by researchers). There are three
possible ways to cope with this issue:
1. Interpreting the supernatural elements in memorates as
inserted items. This is a very naturalistic claim, which assumes
that the supernatural or bizarre elements of the narrative are not
possible; there must therefore be an alternative, naturalistic
explanation of their origin rather than perception. False memories
are of course not tied exclusively to supernatural beliefs and
ideas, and in cases where false memories involve a supernatural
element, other parts too could be the result of misinformation or
implantation. Carl von Sydow, who invented the term memorate, never
made such a specific claim (1934). It was mainly Lauri Honko who
made the supernatural an integral part of the definition of
memorates. The Russian folklorist Kirill V. Chistov suggested that
a memorate designates a phenomenon which under certain conditions
may appear in any thematic group of narratives, and should not be
seen as a distinctive narrative genre, but as a communicative
variant (Chistov 1967); memorates should therefore be seen as
independent of supernatural beliefs. But even when we get rid of
the supernatural from the memorate definition, it is still helpful
to focus on this special thematic group of narratives incorporating
a perceived supernatural element. Let me illustrate it with an
issue from false memories research. When the early experiments
managed to implant new memories, critics argued that the im-
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VLADIMR BAHNA18
planted memories were trivial, events which in any case occur
frequently or are even highly probable (e.g. a child getting lost
in a shopping mall), so the experiment could not guarantee whether
this was a successfully implanted or in fact a genuine recovered
memory. Researchers then started to implant impossible and
implausible memories involving themes such as demonic possessions
(Mazzoni et al. 2001).
2. Recognition of the tradition present in experiences. As
mentioned above, memorates were in the beginning disqualified as
not belonging to folklore, since they are idiosyncratic memories.
But memorates are not as idiosyn-cratic as one would expect of
personal memories. The very fact that memo-rates include specific
motifs, audiovisual images, or even whole episodes known from other
stories current in the society suggests that these are more
probably adopted from the society rather than repeatedly
re-experienced by multiple individuals. To be able to identify and
track recurrences and potential transmission channels, an
ethnography focused on memorates therefore needs not to be
satisfied merely with memorates in isolation, but is also heavily
dependent on a detailed record of local narrative repertoires,
especially in the immediate social environment of the individual
reporting his or her own memorate. Even if no similarities are
found to other stories in the wider population, we might still find
specific micro-traditions spread-ing over several generations
within families or other small social groups.
3. Exploring congruencies with experimental findings. This is
actually the kind of research program I would like to promote.
Experimental research on false memories has managed to identify
many aspects and conditions of the false memory formation process,
which can be traced to real-life settings. Psychologists, including
forensic psychologists, have been able to identify them in methods
used by criminal investigators, as well as thera-pists, which has
led to false memories in witnesses and patients. Similar phenomena
should also be traceable in normal social interactions involving
narrative transmission. What is the relationship between the
individual with a memorate and the one who was the source or/and
the object of a similar story? What is his or her prestige or
authority? What are the opinions of the immediately socially
relevant people and authorities? Are there any specific
transmission occasions, such as collective remembering, or
performative narrative meetings? What emotions are associated with
the remembered event? All this can be investigated in real-life
settings and compared to experimental findings.
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 19
Personal experiences are not as idiosyncratic as people usually
assume. To use the words of Steven Schmidt, [] we are all
susceptible to false memories. The recall of culturally significant
events often occurs in context of cues likely to support the
creation of false memories (Schmidt 2012, 62). This fact opens up
our autobiographies as a field for cultural transmission. and
personal-experience narratives like memorates are one possible form
of this. The point of this approach is not to judge informants
experiences, but to identify possible influences of narrative
tradition on individuals memories, and the social, cultural and
psychological conditions of this phenomenon. Lauri Honkos ideas
about memorates from the 60s, despite not having had access to more
recent research findings in memory studies, nevertheless provide a
basis both for appreciating earlier work and for drafting ways to
amend it in terms of the knowledge of cognitive processes we now
have.
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MEMORATES AND MEMORY 23
Fi
gure
1
Lau
ri H
onko
s s
chem
e il
lust
rati
ng th
e em
erge
nce
of a
mem
orat
e (H
onko
1964
, 16-
17)
(Div
isio
n in
to se
ctio
ns A
, B, C
and
ver
tical
das
hed
lines
are
add
ed).
Ap
pen
dix
. Fig
ure
1.
Lau
ri H
onko
s s
chem
e ill
ust
rati
ng th
e em
erge
nce
of a
mem
orat
e (H
onko
196
4, 1
617
). D
ivis
ion
into
sec
tion
s A
, B, C
and
ver
tica
l das
hed
line
s ar
e ad
ded
.