-
ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1
Facility: 2009 Seguoxah Written Retake Date of Examination:
9/9/2009
~ NRC Examinations Developed by: Gritt;:>/ Operating Test
Written / Operating Test Target
Chief
Date • Task Description (Reference) Examiner's Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a
and b) ~J}c -120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned
(C.1.d; C.2.e) t~ -120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and
other requirements (C.2.c) ~ -120 4. Corporate notification letter
sent (C.2.d) ~.k [-90] [5. Reference material due (C. I.e; C.3.c;
Attachment 2)] tje
{ -75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms
ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES- tJ1,c 301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's,
ES-401-1I2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C. I.e and f;
C.3.d)
{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback
provided to facility 4>~L licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through
JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation
(including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ~jA-ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and
ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C. I.e, f, g and h;
C.3.d)
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due
(C.l.l; C.2.g; ES-202) i>J)L
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-20 1-4
prepared (C.1.l; C.2.i; ES-202) ~ -14 11. Examination approved by
NRC supervisor for facility licensee review ~JK (C.2.h; C.3.f) -14
12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and
h; C.3.g) ~.!J- 1 0) applications audited to confirm
fY-qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and
waiver letters sent
(C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)
-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines
reviewed with facility licensee 1Jk-(C.3.k) -7 16. Approved
scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to
~)}L
NRC examiners (C.3.i)
* Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared
examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in
the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes
and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with
the facility licensee. [Applies only] {Does not apply} to
examinations prepared by the NRC.
ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1
Facility: 2009 Seguo:yah Written Retake Date of Examination:
9/9/2009
~ NRC Examinations Developed by: Gritt;:>/ Operating Test
Written / Operating Test
Target Chief
Date * Task Description (Reference) Examiner's
Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a
and b) fJ}c -120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned
(C.1.d; C.2.e) +~ -120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and
other requirements (C.2.c) ~ -120 4. Corporate notification letter
sent (C.2.d) f-k [-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c;
Attachment 2)] tjL-
{ -75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms
ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-f$L 301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-l's,
ES-401-1I2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as
applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)
{ -70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback
provided to facility iJJtL licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
{ -45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through
JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation
(including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ~~ ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and
ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h;
C.3.d)
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due
(C.Ll; C.2.g; ES-202) ~JY--
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4
prepared (C.Ll; C.2.i; ES-202) ~ -14 11. Examination approved by
NRC supervisor for facility licensee review +¥ (C.2.h; C.3.f) -14
12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and
h; C.3.g) ~)J,c
-7 13. Written examinations and j~ratiag tests approved by NRC
supervisor 4lc (C.2.i; C.3.h) -7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1
or 2 (if> 1 0) applications audited to confirm fY-qualifications
/ eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent
(C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)
-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines
reviewed with facility licensee 1.¥--(C.3.k) -7 16. Approved
scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to
~~
NRC examiners (C.3.i)
* Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared
examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in
the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes
and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with
the facility licensee. [Applies only] {Does not apply} to
examinations prepared by the NRC.
-
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2
Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 9/2009
Initials Item Task Description
a b* C#
1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model,
in accordance with ES-401. I~ Pit- ~~ w R b. Assess whether the
outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance
with
~ ~Jk I Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are
appropriately sampled. Z1+ T
()Iv ~JU T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any
systems, evolutions, or generic topics. 11+-E N d. Assess whether
the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are
appropriate. ~ 114- IJJ'L 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that
the proposed scenario sets cover the required number nla nla
~A-
of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures,
technical specifications, S and major transients. I M b. Assess
whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the
projected number nla nla ,J~ U and mix of applicants in accordance
with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule
L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each
applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly
modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated
T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will
not be repeated on subsequent days.
0 To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s)
conform(s) with the qualitative nla nla tJi'I R c. and quantitative
criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix
D.
3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the
criteria specified on Form ES-301-2: nla nla rJl\ (1 ) the
outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and
in-plant tasks
W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the
form / (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is
within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are
duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the
minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path,
low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria
on the form.
b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria
specified on Form ES-301-1: nla nla NA (1 ) the tasks are
distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least
one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task
is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the
projected number and mix nla nla rJp, of applicants and ensure that
no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA
and IPE insights) are covered ~lJ;o 7ff ~ in the appropriate exam
sections. G
I~ 141- ~L E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45
sampling is appropriate. N Ensure that KIA importance ratings
(except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~ -Vlr-
tM-E c. R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
f}(J/t 14:)- ~Y!A-A
If#' ~.D
-
£6QUOYAH 10a q R6r fll( 6 PA~§ I ~2 ES-201 Examination Security
Agreement Form ES-201-3
1. Pre-Examination
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about
the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 9) 91
(J q as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not
knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any
persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I
understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide
performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be
administered these licensing examinations from this date until
completion of examination administration, except as specifically
noted below and authOrized by the NRC (e.g" acting as a simulator
booth operator or communicatOr is acceptable if the individual does
not select the training content or provide direct or indirect
feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security
measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's
procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this
agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/oran
enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will
immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner
any indications or suggestions that examination security may have
been compromised.
2. Post-Examination
To the best of my knOWlrgl' I did not divulge to any
unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing
examinations administered during the week(s) of q 9 «01. From the
date that I entered into this security agreement until the
completion of examination administration, I did not instruct,
evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who
were administered these licensing examinations, except as
specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE iRESPONSIBILITY DATE NOTE
1. -:fuHN B. R\)~bI 2. S'Tt£VCIJ V. SM'IE}! R'HUV. "" .. " .....
, "" J ". " .... ·""· ... 0 /: --v ~ _~V. - :za . '~ ~.-__ 3.
~A\l7.b A PDRn'F US/.srd r ~~ 5.~'1.0' ~~ \~ 4. a~/s' r ;;> - •
I - '1-:-:;:;;--
5. C4lltS-e."
6·1if~cr S~ ~ ./~'~ 1-7. E. '" seQ ~. ~.. ~ 8. VQ.lr\ L. i=Of'"
SN\. ~Y;O ~ / 'i ~I 9. ·'i,." ... "' A ~t" kD ==,~ t.1.~\"~==U ~
10.W i LL: 0..,,", L Ch,,/J S R () , . . -- _ ... - " 11. (.p
(1l1·.41Nt D t..,. IV I L l)~ 12(:;) 12. f'B.¥t< 2t2/:N$ S.to
13. ~~K7
-
S~Lby4U 2009 7Z~K-C ;2.., I 'J....
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
1. Pre-Examination
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about
the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of
the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge
any information about these examinations to any persons who have
not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I
am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to
those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing
examinations from this date until completion of examination
administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized
by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or
communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the
training content or provide direct or indirect feedback).
Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and
requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures)
and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement
may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an
enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will
immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner
any indications or suggestions that examination security may have
been compromised. '
2. Post-Examination
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any
unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing
examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date
that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of
examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or
provide performance feedback to those applicants who were
administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically
noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE NOTE
~:='fi~ ~~~~"brr.lt"J=, ~ 3. If/UJenr'~ .zo~ Y 'r( sl ,.,.e.o
G!f.-4. ~"c.... StV\l\~,.r ap> M(;.Cl- ~~ 5.~'t &-fCY ~L$A.D
~~ 6. ""VI (J:M/1f£ (~ $A.~ .J.U3....a.:L 7. ___ _ 8. ___ _ 9. ___
_ 10. ___ _ 11. ___ _ 12. ___ _ 13 ..
__________________________________ _ 14. ___ _ 15. ___ _ NOTES:
ES-201, Page 27 of 28
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
1. Pre-Examination
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about
the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of
the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge
any information about these examinations to any persons who have
not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I
am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to
those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing
examinations from this date until completion of examination
administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized
by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or
communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the
training content or provide direct or indirect feedback).
Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and
requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures)
and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement
may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an
enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will
immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner
any indications or suggestions that examination security may have
been compromised.
2. Post-Examination
To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any
unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing
examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date
that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of
examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or
provide performance feedback to those applicants who were
administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically
noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME
I 7. ________________________ -'-____________________________ _
8. __________________________________________________ _ 9.
_____________________________________________________ _ 10 ..
__________________________________________________ _ 11 ..
__________________________________________________ _ 12 ..
_____________________________________________________ _ 13.,
____________________________________________________ _ 14.,
____________________________________________________ _ 15.
____________________________ ~---------'----------- _____ _
NOTES:
ES-201, Page 27 of 28
-
Sequoyah 2009 Initial Retake Exam Final Outline
ES-401! Rev. 9 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2! I
; Facility: Sequoyah Date of Exam: 2009 Retake Exam
RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points
Tier Group
K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 * Total
1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6
Emergency & 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 9 2 2 4
Abnormal Plant N/A N/A Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 5 5 4 4 27 5 5
10
1 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 28 3 2 5
2. Plant
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3
Systems Tier Totals 2 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 38 5 3 8
3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7
Categories
2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA
category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only
outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only
outline, the "Tier Totals'
in each KIA category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed
outline must match that specified in the table. The final point
total for each group and tier may deviate by ± 1 from that
specified in the table
based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points
and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the
associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the
facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important,
site-specific systems that are
not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401,
Attachment 2, for guidance regarding
the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as
possible; sample every system or evolution
in the group before selecting a second topiC for any system or
evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KIAs having an
importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be
selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only
portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for TIers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems
and KIA categories.
7. *The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from
Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics
must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.
S. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief
description of each topic, the topics' importance
ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point
toulls (#) for each system and category. Enter
the group and tier totals for each category in the table above;
if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other
than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the
Ileft. side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note
# 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only
exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog,
anoi enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#)
on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections till KIAs that are linked to
10 CFR 55.43.
I
Sequoyah 2009 Initial Retake Exam Final Outline
ES-401, Rev. 9 PWR examination Outline Form ES-401-2!
; Facility: Sequoyah Date of Exam: 2009 Retake Exam
RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points
Tier Group
K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 * Total
1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6
Emergency & 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 9 2 2 4
Abnormal Plant N/A N/A
Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 5 5 4 4 27 5 5 10
1 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 28 3 2 5
2. Plant
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3
Systems Tier Totals 2 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 38 5 3 8
3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7
Categories
2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA
category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only
outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only
outline, the "Tier Totals' in each KIA category shall not be less
than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed
outline must match that specified in the table. The final point
total for each group and tier may deviate by ± 1 from that
specified in the table
based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points
and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systemslevolutions within each group are Identified on the
associated outline; systems or evolutions that do
not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified;
operationally important, site-specific systems that are
not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401,
Attachment 2, for guidance regarding
the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.
4. Select topiCS from as many systems and evolutions as
possible; sample every system or evolution
in the group before selecting a second topiC for any system or
evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KIAs having an
importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be
selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only
portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems
and KIA categories.
7. *The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from
Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics
must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.
S. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief
description of each topic, the topics' importance
ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point
tobills (#) for each system and category. Enter
the group and tier totals for each category in the table above;
if fuel handling equipment Is sampled in other
than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the
lIeft side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note
# 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only
exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog,
anCiI enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals
(#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections tCiI K/As that are
linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
i
-
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
007EK2.03 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 3.5 3.6 0 ~ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
009EK1.02 Small Break LOCA 13 3.5 4.2 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
011EK2.02 Large Break LOCA/3 2.6 2.7 0 ~ 0 0 000 0 0 0 0
015AK2.10 RCP Malfunctions I 4 2.8 2.8 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
022AG2.1.31 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup I 2 4.6 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ~
026AA2.02 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 2.9 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~ 0 0 0
029EG2.2.22 ATWS 11 4.0 4.7 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 ~
038EA1.13 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture/3 3.7 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
0
040AA 1.09 Steam Une Rupture - Excessive Heat 3.4 3.4 ODD 0 0 0
~ 0 0 0 0 Transfer 14
054AK1.02 Loss of Main Feedwater 14 3.6 4.2 ~ ODD 0 DODO 0 0
055EK3.02 Station Blackout 16 4.3 4.6 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Page 1 of 2
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Reactor trip status panel
Use of steam tables
Pumps
RCP indicators and controls
Ability to locate control room switches, controls and
indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the
desired plant lineup.
The cause of possible CCW loss
Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety
limits.
Steam flow indicators
Setpoints of main steam safety and PORVs
Effects of feedwater introduction on dry SIG
Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite
power
211112009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
007EK2.03 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 3.5 3.6 D ~ D
D D D D D D D D I 1
009EK1.02 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.5 4.2 ~ D D D D D D D D D D
011EK2.02 Large Break LOCA/3 2.6 2.7 D ~ D D D D D D D D D
015AK2.10 RCP Malfunctions I 4 2.8 2.8 0 ~ D D D D D D DOD
022AG2.1.31 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 12 4.6 4.3 D D D D D D D D
D D ~
026AA2.02 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 2.9 3.6 D D DOD D
D ~ D D D
029EG2.2.22 A TWS I 1 4.0 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
038EA1.13 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 3.7 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
0 0
040AA1.09 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 3.4 3.4
DDDDDD~DDDD Transfer I 4
054AK1.02 Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 3.6 4.2 ~DDDDDDDDDD
055EK3.02 Station Blackout I 6 4.3 4.6 DD~DDDDDDDD
Page 1 of 2
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Reactor trip status panel
Use of steam tables
Pumps
RCP indicators and controls
Ability to locate control room switches, controls and
indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the
desired plant lineup.
The cause of possible CCW loss
Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety
limits.
Steam flow indicators
Setpoints of main steam safety and PORVs
Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G
Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite
power
2111/2009 12:16 PM
-
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION:
056AA1.11 Loss of Off-site Power / 6
057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6
058AK1.01 Loss of DC Power /6
062AK3.01 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4
065AA2.05 Loss of Instrument Air / 8
077AG2.2.39 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances /
6
T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
AO SAO
3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0
4.1 4.4 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.8 3.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.2 3.5 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.4 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
3.9 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
WE11 EA2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Aecirc. / 4 3.4 4.2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
Page 2 of 2
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
HPI system
Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical
instrument bus
Battery charger equipment and instrumentation
The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and
closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water
coolers
When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is
decreasing
Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action
statements for systems.
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures
during abnormal and emergency operations.
2I11/200912:16PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
056AA1.ll Loss of Off-site Power / 6
057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Ins!. Bus / 6
058AK1.0l Loss of DC Power / 6
062AK3.01 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4
065AA2.05 Loss of Instrument Air / 8
077AG2.2.39 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances /
6
T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
3.7 3.7 DDDDDD~DDDD
4.1 4.4 DD~DDDDDDDD
2.8 3.1 ~DDDDDDDDDD
3.2 3.5 D D ~ D D D D D D D D
3.4 4.1 D D D D D D D ~ D D D
3.9 4.5 D D D D D D D D D D ~
WEll EA2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.4 4.2 D D D D
D D D ~ D D D
Page 2 of 2
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
HPI system
Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical
instrument bus
Battery charger equipment and instrumentation
The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and
closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water
coolers
When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is
decreasing
Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action
statements for systems.
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures
during abnormal and emergency operations.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
-
ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
003AK3.06 Dropped Control Rod 11 2.7 3 D D ~ D D D D D D D D
032AK1.01 Loss of Source Range NI/7 2.S 3.1 ~ D D D D D D D
DOD
058AI~.02 Accidelital Liquid Rad ..... aste ReI. I' 8 2.7 2.7
059AK2.01 Accidental Gaseous RadWaste ReI. 2.6 2.9 D ~ D D D D D D
D D D
068AG2.1.27 Control Room Evac. I 8 3.9 4 DDDDDDDDDD~
076AA 1.04 High Reactor Coolant Activity 19 3.2 3.4 D D D D D D
~ D D D D
WE03EK3.4 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. 14 3.5 3.9 D D ~ D D D D D D
D D
WE07EA2.1 Saturated Core Cooling Core Cooling 3.2 4.0 D D D D D
D 0 ~ D D D 14
WE10EK2.1 Natural Circ. With Seam Void! 4 3.3 3.5 D ~ D D D D D
D D D D
WE16EA 1.3 High Containment Radiation I 9 2.9 3.3 D D D D D D ~
D D D D
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Reset of demand position counter to zero
Effects of voltage changes on performance
Radioaeti.e gas monitors ARM system, including the nonnal
rad-Ievel indications and the op status.
Knowledge of system purpose and or function.
Failed fuel-monitoring equipment
RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate
to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered
to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are
not violated.
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures
during abnormal and emergency operations.
Components and functions of control and safety systems,
including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and
automatic and manual features.
Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency
situations.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
003AK3.06 Dropped Control Rod / 1
032AK1.01 Loss of Source Range NI / 7
059AI
-
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
003A3.03 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.2 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
004A1.12 Chemical and Volume Control 2.S 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
0
004A2.2S Chemical and Volume Control 3.S 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0
0
00SK1.13 Residual Heat Removal 3.3 3.S ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
006KS.06 Emergency Core Cooling 3.S 3.9 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0
0
007A2.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.9 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
0 0 0
007A4.09 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.S 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~ 0
00SK3.01 Component Cooling Water 3.4 3.S 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
010G2.4.30 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ~
0121t6.6S Reactor Protection 3:6-&.'7 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0
012K6.03 3.3 3.5
013KS.02 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 2.9 3.3 0 0 0 0 ~
0 0 0 0 0 0
Page 1 of3
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Seal D/P
Rate of boron concentration reduction in RCS as a function of
letdown flow while deborating demineralizer is in service
Uncontrolled boration or dilution
SIS
Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure
Stuck-open PORV or code safety
Relationships between PZR level and changing levels of the PRT
and bleed holdup tank
Loads cooled by CCWS
Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that
must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.
~ Trip logic circuits
Safety system logic and reliability
2/1112009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
TOPIC:
RO SRO
003A3.03 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.2 3.1 DDDDDDDD~DD Seal D/P
004A1.12 Chemical and Volume Control 2.8 3.2 DDDDDD~DDDD Rate of
boron concentration reduction in RCS as a function of letdown flow
while deborating demineralizer is in service
004A2.25 Chemical and Volume Control 3.8 4.3 DDDDDDD~DDD
Uncontrolled boration or dilution
005K1.13 Residual Heat Removal 3.3 3.5 Iii'lDDDDDDDDDD SIS
006K5.06 Emergency Core Cooling 3.5 3.9 DDDD~DDDDDD Relationship
between ECCS flow and RCS pressure
007A2.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.9 4.2 DDDDDDD~DDD
Stuck-open PORV or code safety
007A4.09 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.5 2.7 DDDDDDDDD~D
Relationships between PZR level and changing levels of the PRT and
bleed holdup tank
008K3.01 Component Cooling Water 3.4 3.5 DD~DDDDDDDD Loads
cooled by CCWS
010G2.4.30 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.7 4.1 DDDDDDDDDD~
Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that must
be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.
0121
-
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
022K3.02 Containment Cooling 3.0 3.3 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
025A4.02 Ice Condenser 2.7 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0
025G2.2.42 Ice Condenser 3.9 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
026K2.01 Containment Spray 3.4 3.6 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~~:~~~ OOlitaililiieli1 Splay ~:~ ::~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
039A1.03 Main and Reheat Steam 2.6 2.7 00 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0
059K4.02 Main Feedwater 3.3 3.5 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 00
061A3.03 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 3.9 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
0 0
061K6.02 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 2.6 2.7 00 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
0 0
062K2.01 AC Electrical Distribution 3.3 3.4 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
063A4.02 DC Electrical Distribution 2.8 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
0
Page 2 of3
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Containment instrumentation readings
Containment vent fans
Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level
conditions for Technical Specifications
Containment spray pumps
GG& Recirc Spray System
Primary system temperature indications and required values,
during main steam system warm-up
Automatic turbine/reactor trip runback
AFW S/G level control on automatic start
Pumps
Major system loads
Battery voltage indicator
2I11/200912:16PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
022K3.02 Containment Cooling
025A4.02 Ice Condenser
025G2.2.42 Ice Condenser
026K2.01 Containment Spray
0261
-
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
064K4.03 Emergency Diesel Generator
073A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring
076K3.02 Service Water
076K4.03 Service Water
078G2.2.38 Instrument Air
103K1.03 Containment
T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
2.5 3.0 D D D ~ D D D D D D D
2.5 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 D D
2.5 2.8 D D ~ D D D D D D D D
2.9 3.4 D D D ~ D DODD 0 0
3.6 4.5 0 DOD DOD DOD ~
3.1 3.5 ~ D D D D D D D D D D
Page 3 of 3
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Governor valve operation
Erratic or failed power supply
Secondary closed cooling water
Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves
to CCW heat exchanges
Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility
license.
Shield building vent system
2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
064K4.03 Emergency Diesel Generator
073A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring
076K3.02 Service Water
076K4.03 Service Water
~~~ ____ ~ ______ ~ ___ - ________ 0 ____ _
078G2.2.38 Instrurnent Air
103K1.03 Containment
T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
2.5 3.0 D D D Ii'] D D D D D D D
2.5 2.9 D D D D D D D Ii'] D D D
2.5 2.8 D D Ii'] D D D D D D D D
2.9 3.4 D D D Ii'] D D D D D D D
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Governor valve operation
Erratic or failed power supply
Secondary closed cooling water
Autornatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves
to CCW heat exchanges
-~---~---------~-- ____ -----,,---____ --c-------,-____
----::------::-____ --[J D DOD D D D D D Ii'] Knowledge of
conditions and lirnitations in the facility
license. 3.6 4.5
3.1 3.5 Ii'] D D D D D D D D D D Shield building vent system
Page 3 of 3 2I11/200912:16PM
-
ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
TOPIC:
RO SRO
011A1.03 Pressurizer Level Control 2.8 3.2 DDDDDD~DDDD
VCTlevel
015K2.01 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.3 3.7 D~DDDDDDDDD NIS
channels, components and interconnections
028K3.01 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.3 Control
4.0 DD~DDDDDDDD Hydrogen concentration in containment
029G2.1.31 Containment Purge 4.6 4.3 DDDDDDDDDD~ Ability to
locate control room switches, controls and indications and to
determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant
lineup.
033K4.01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2.9 3.2 DDD~DDDDDDD Maintenance
of spent fuel level
034K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.6 3.3 DDDDD~DDDDD Radiation
monitoring systems
041K5.05 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control 2.6 3.2 DDDD~DDDDDD
Basis for RCS design pressure limits
071A2.02 Waste Gas Disposal 3.3 3.6 DDDDDDD~DDD Use of waste gas
release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate and totalizer
079A4.01 Station Air 2.7 2.7 DDDDDDDDD~D Cross-tie valves with
lAS
. 086A3.03 Fire Protection 2.9 3.3 DDDDDDDD~DD Actuation of fire
detectors
Page 1 of 1 2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
TOPIC:
RO SRO
011A1.03 Pressurizer Level Control 2.8 3.2 DDDDDD~DDDD VCT
level
015K2.01 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.3 3.7 D~DDDDDDDDD NIS
channels, components and interconnections
028K3.01 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.3 4.0 DD~DDDDDDDD
Hydrogen concentration in containment Control
029G2.1.31 Containment Purge 4.6 4.3 DDDDDDDDDD~ Ability to
locate control room switches, controls and indications and to
determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant
lineup.
033K4.01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2.9 3.2 DDD~DDDDDDD Maintenance
of spent fuel level
034K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.6 3.3 DDDDD~DDDDD Radiation
monitoring systems
041K5.05 Steam Dumprrurbine Bypass Control 2.6 3.2 DDDD~DDDDDD
Basis for RCS design pressure limits
071A2.02 Waste Gas Disposal 3.3 3.6 DDDDDDD~DDD Use of waste gas
release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate and totalizer
079A4.01 Station Air 2.7 2.7 DDDDDDDDD~D Cross-tie valves with
lAS
086A3.03 Fire Protection 2.9 3.3 DDDDDDDD~DD Actuation of fire
detectors
Page 1 of 1 2111/2009 12:16 PM
-
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
G2.1.41 Conduct of operations
G2.1.42 Conduct of operations
G2.2.23 Equipment Control
G2.2.44 Equipment Control
G2.3.11 Radiation Control
G2.3.5 Radiation Control
T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
2.8 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
2.5 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.1 4.6 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 0 0 ~
4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
FORM ES-401-* 3
TOPIC:
Knowledge of the refueling processes
Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures
Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for
operations.
Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the
status and operation of a system. and understand how operator
actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
Ability to control radiation
Ability to use radiation monitoring systems
-=-=--=-=:------c=--::--:--=-----c---------------------------------~--.,.._-_:___-.---------
G2.3.7 Radiation Control 3.5 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability
to comply with radiation work permit requirements
~------c=---------=--__,__-=_:_----~-____=____==___==___::=___=::_::=___==__=___=::_:::=___
---G2.4.11 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.0 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~
G2.4.16 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.5 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~
G2.4.37 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.0 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~
Page 1 of 1
during normal or abnormal conditions
Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with
other support procedures or guidelines.
Knowledge of the lines of authority during implamentation of an
emergency plan.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
G2.1.41 Conduct of operations
G2.1.42 Conduct of operations
G2.2.23 Equipment Control
G2.2.44 Equipment Control
G2.3.11 Radiation Control
G2.3.5 Radiation Control
G2.3.7 Radiation Control
G2.4.11 Emergency Procedures/Plans
G2.4.16 Emergency Procedures/Plans
G2.4.37 Emergency Procedures/Plans
T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
2.8 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
2.5 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
3.1 4.6 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 DOli']
4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.5 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
4.0 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
3.5 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
3.0 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-* 3
TOPIC:
Knowledge of the refueling processes
Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures
Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for
operations.
Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the
status and operation of a system, and understand how operator
actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
Ability to control radiation releases.
Ability to use radiation monitoring systems
Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during
normal or abnormal conditions
Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with
other support procedures or guidelines.
Knowledge of the lines of authority during implamentation of an
emergency plan.
2I11/200912:16PM
-
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
TOPIC:
RO SRO
009EA2.11 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.8 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity
015AA2.11 RCP Malfunctions I 4 3.4 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
When to jog RCPs during ICC
038EG2.4.20 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture 13 3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~ Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions
and notes.
040AA2.02 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 4.6 4.7 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Transfer 14
057 AG2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Ins1. Bus I 6 4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ~
062AG2.1.7 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 4.4 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ~
Page 1 of 1
Conditions requiring a reactor trip
Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the
status and operation of a system, and understand how operator
actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational
judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and
instrument interpretation.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
009EA2.11 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.8 4.1 D D D D D D D ~ D D D
015AA2.11 RCP Mal/unctions I 4 3.4 3.8 D D D D D D D ~ D D D
038EG2.4.20 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 3.8 4.3 D D D D D D D D
D D ~
040AA2.02 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 4.6 4.7 D D D D D
D D ~ D D D Transfer 14
057AG2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Ins!. Bus 16 4.2 4.4 D D D D D D D
D D D ~
062AG2.1.7 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 4.4 4.7 D D D D D D D D
D D ~
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity
When to jog RCPs during ICC
Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions
and notes.
Conditions requiring a reactor trip
Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the
status and operation of a system, and understand how operator
actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational
judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and
instrument interpretation.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
-
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
060AA2.05 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. / 9 3.7 4.2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ~ 0 0 0
061AG2.4.46 ARM System Alarms / 7 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~
WE13EA2.1 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 2.9 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~ 0 0 0
we15EG2.4.30 Containment Flooding / 5 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
That the automatic safety actions have occurred as a result of a
high ARM system signal
Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant
conditions.
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures
during abnormal and emergency operations.
Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that
must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1 G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4
G
RO SRO
060AA2.05 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. / 9 3.7 4.2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ~ 0 0 0
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
That the automatic safety actions have occurred as a result of a
high ARM system signal
-----------------------
~~---~--------------------___,____----___,____---,__-__:_c____:_---061AG2.4.46
ARM System Alarms / 7 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to
verify that the alarnis are consistent with the
WE13EA2.1 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 2.9 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~ 0 0 0
we15EG2.4.30 Containment Flooding / 5 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ~
Page 1 of 1
plant conditions.
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures
during abnormal and emergency operations.
Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that
must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.
2I11/200912:16PM
-
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
004G2.2.44 Chemical and Volume Control
005A2.04 Residual Heat Removal
012A2.05 Reactor Protection
059A2.06 Main Feedwater
064G2.4.8 Emergency Diesel Generator
SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
4.2 4.4 OOOOOOOOOO~
2.9 2.9 OOOOOOO~OOO
3.1 3.2 OOOOOOO~DOO
2.7 2.9 OOOOOOO~OOO
3.8 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the
status and operation of a system, and understand how operator
actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
RHR valve malfunction
Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function
generators
Loss of steam flow to MFW system
Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in
conjunction with EOPs.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION:
004G2.2.44 Chemical and Volume Control
005A2.04 Residual Heat Removal
012A2.05 Reactor Protection
059A2.06 Main Feedwater
064G2.4.8 Emergency Diesel Generator
SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
3.1 3.2 DODD 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
2.7 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
3.8 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the
status and operation of a system, and understand how operator
actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
RHR valve malfunction
Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function
generators
Loss of steam flow to MFW system
Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in
conjunction with EOPs.
2I11/200912:16PM
-
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION:
028G2.1.23 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control
068A2.04 Liquid Radwaste
SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
4.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
~~1:·.: ~~~te eas Disposal !:; ! .. ! 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant
procedures during all modes of plant operation.
Failure of automatic isolation
RuptUie disk failures Loss of coolant pressure
2/11/2009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
028G2.1.23 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control
068A2.04 Liquid Radwaste
071A2.0S Vvaste 6as Disposal 002A2.02 RCS
SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
4.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0
2.7 S.S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 4.2 4.4
Page 1 of 1
FORM ES-401-2
TOPIC:
Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant
procedures during all modes of plant operation.
Failure of automatic isolation
AtiptUi e disk !ai/tires Loss of coolant pressure
2/11/2009 12:16 PM
-
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
G2.1.9 Conduct of operations
G2.2.12 Equipment Control
G2.2.17 Equipment Control
SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
2.9 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
2.6 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
FORM ES-401-t 3
TOPIC:
Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control
room.
Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities
during power operations.
G2.3.11 Radiation Control 3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability
to control radiation releases
G2.3.14 Radiation Control
G2.4.16 Emergency Procedures/Plans
G2.4.38 Emergency Procedures/Plans
3.4 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
3.5 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
2.4 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOD 0 ~
Page 1 of 1
Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise
during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities
Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with
other support procedures or guidelines.
Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency
plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator.
211112009 12:16 PM
ES-401, REV 9
KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:
G2.1.9 Conduct of operations
G2.2.12 Equipment Control
G2.2.17 Equipment Control
G2.3.11 Radiation Control
G2.3.14 Radiation Control
G2.4.16 Emergency Procedures/Plans
SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE
IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G
RO SRO
2.9 4.5 D D D D D D D D D D ~
3.7 4.1 D D D D D D D D D D ~
o.
2.6 3.8 D D D D D D D D D D ~
3.8 4.3 D D D D D D D D D D ~
3.4 3.8 D D D D D D D D D D ~
3.5 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~
FORM ES-401-~ 3
TOPIC:
Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control
room.
Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities
during power operations.
Ability to control radiation releases
Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise
during normal. abnormal. or emergency conditions or activities
Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with
other support procedures or guidelines.
G2.4.38 o ___
~~~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~
Page 1 of 1
Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency
plan. including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator.
2111/2009 12:16 PM
-
ES-401 Record of Rejected KI As Form E S-40 1-4
Sequoyah 2009 RO Retake Exam
Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA -
1/2 059 AK2.02 Unable to write question relating the
interrelations between an accidental liquid Radwaste Release and a
radioactive-gas monitor.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 059 AK2.01
2/1 012 K6.09 Question on Reactor Protection system related to
CEAC which is a Combustion Engineering vendor application.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 012 K6.03
2/1 026 K3.01
Anything that initiates Containment Spray System also trips and
isolates the Containment Cooling System components. Therefore have
been unable to write a question that meets the KIA addressing the
effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Spray System
would have on the containment cooling system.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 026 K3.02
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4
Sequoyah 2009 RO Retake Exam
Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA -
1/2 059 AK2.02 Unable to write question relating the
interrelations between an accidental liquid Radwaste Release and a
radioactive-gas monitor.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 059 AK2.01
2/1 012 K6.09 Question on Reactor Protection system related to
CEAC which is a Combustion Engineering vendor application.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 012 K6.03
2/1 026 K3.01
Anything that initiates Containment Spray System also trips and
isolates the Containment Cooling System components. Therefore have
been unable to write a question that meets the KIA addressing the
effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Spray System
would have on the containment cooling system.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 026 K3.02
-
ES-401 Record of Rejected KI As Form ES-401-4
Sequoyah 2009 SRO Retake Exam
Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA
2/2 071 A2.03 There is no rupture disc in the Waste Gas System
and the KIA addresses predicting the impacts of and using
procedures to address the failure of the rupture disc. There is a
separate KIA on stuck open relief valves.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 04/06/09 with KA 002 A2.02
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4
Sequoyah 2009 SRO Retake Exam
Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA
2/2 071 A2.03 There is no rupture disc in the Waste Gas System
and the KIA addresses predicting the impacts of and using
procedures to address the failure of the rupture disc. There is a
separate KIA on stuck open relief valves.
Replaced by Edwin Lea on 04/06/09 with KA 002 A2.02
-
ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6
Date of Exam: 9/2009 Exam Level: RO ~ SRO ~
1.
2.
3.
a. b.
SRO
NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions. "h"",..ti",,,: are
referenced as available.
nnr'f'lnri;::,t,,, in accordance with Section D.2.d of
ES-401
4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than
4 RO or 2 SRO questions were from the last 2 NRC consult the NRR
OL
5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam
was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and
appears appropriate:
_ the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or _
the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started;
or 2L the examinations were developed independently; or
6.
7.
_ the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or _
other (explain)
Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at
least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the
actual RO / SRO-only
Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are
written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may
exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected KlAs support the higher
cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO
8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid
in the elimination of distractors.
Bank Modified
23/24 37/32
Memory
40 /32
9. Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the
previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the
tier to which they are assigned; deviations are . ed.
10. Question nC:'/I"h,Nr,oh·i,. . and format meet the nes in ES
AnI'On,n,v B.
11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple
choice items; the total is correct and with the value on the cover
sheet.
a. Author b. Facility Reviewer (*) c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
d. NRC Regional Supervisor
New
40/44
CIA
60 / 68
Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not
applicable for NRC-developed examinations. # I ent NRC reviewer
initial items in Column "c'" chief examiner concurrence
Initial
a
ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6
Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 9/2009 Exam Level: RO
1&1 SRO~ Initial
Item Description a b* c#
1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable
to the facility. frl.- O ~ 2. a. NRC KlAs are referenced for all
questions.
~ J fJjL b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as
available. 3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with
Section D.2.d of ES-401 l~ Dt. ~/'-4. The sampling process was
random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions
Ij~~:.;;· .•.•. if· :,:", ~jL were repeated from the last 2 NRC
licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office). .~. ~ 5.
Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was
controlled
as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears
appropriate: _ the audit exam was systematically and randomly
developed; or
{ilL I~}L _ the audit exam was completed before the license exam
was started; or IJ! ~ the examinations were developed
independently; or _ the licensee certifies that there is no
duplication; or _ other (explain)
6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified
New
~ I~JL from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest j/tl
new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only 23/24 37/32 40/44
question distribution(s) at right. 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of
the questions on the RO Memory CIA
exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level;
/It ~ fJJ"-the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly 40
/32 60 / 68 selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels;
enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.
8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers ~ (j ~
or aid in the elimination of distractors. 9. Question content
conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved pt
9J f#-examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which
they are assigned; deviations are justified. 10. Question
psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix
B. /1& ,f;jJ !~)L
< \
11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple
choice items; Wt I!I I~r-the total is correct and agrees with the
value on the cover sheet. \
Printed NAnature Date
a. Author John B. Roden / a~'hv ¥Ii b. Facility Reviewer (*)
B",dlev D. P;"";OIl';O I m -:--c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
i>\-,;.'\-,~ 6- . C"'-bek-A I I, . Q.... k '1 . l- " d. NRC
Regional Supervisor ~!J).. ". VlI~JJIJ,I\V dft~th
f ,ru.uy~
Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not
applicable for NRC-developed examinations. # Independent NRC
reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence
required.
-
ES-401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form
ES-401-9
SEQUOYAH INITIAL REVIEW
Instructions [Refer to Section 0 of ES-401 and Appendix B for
additional information regarding each of the following
concepts.]
1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either
(F}undamental or (H}igher cognitive level.
Enter the level of difficulty (LOO) of each question using a 1 -
5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are
acceptable).
3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is
identified:
• The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer
(e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too milch
needless information). • The stem or distractors contain cues
(i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false
statements. • The distractors are not credible; single implausible
distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. •
One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the
applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted
by stem).
14. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is
identified: • The question is not linked to the job requirements
(i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not
operational in content). • The question requires the recall of
knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode
(i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). • The question
contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent
units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). •
The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the
job requirements.
5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the
approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and
license level mismatches are unacceptable).
6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written
(U}nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of
(E}ditorial enhancement, or (S}atisfactory?
7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix
B psychometric attributes are not being met).
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOO
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q=
SRO UlE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only
Reexamine use of 15{ part of each distractor to see if
necessary. Change e E-O in distractor A to E-O.
76 H 2 Correct typo in distractor A. Added bullet to the stem to
define RWST level S and trend make 0 distractor more plausible.
Oistractor B & 0 imply that there is train relationship for
CETs. If there is
e not, then B & 0 are not valid distractors. CETs are train
related. Change 77 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices to 0 and 4 for
incorrect answer. S
Changed distractor B & 0 to "2 thermocouples in each train"
Oistractor B & 0 imply that an entry into a FRP is lJlausible
even if there is
e no condition to do so. B & 0 do not appear to be valid
distractors. Change 78 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices B & 0
more plausible. S
Reworded the question to eliminate concern with 2
distractors.
A is not plausible. The only uncontrolled Boron change that
would increase Rx power would be caused by a significant dilution
event and
e there is no correspondingMWe increase. This is generic
fundamental 79 H 2 X knowledge and is not SRO only. AOP entry
conditions are RO knowledge
S level. SRO level criteria is based on knowing the specific
guidance from the AOP. Reviewed wI license. OK. Make editorial
corrections. Replaced 2nd layer dashes in the stem w/bullets to
improve appearance.
U What makes this SRO? Appears that both parts of the answer can
be 80 H 2 X X deduced using system knowledge. In the stem, "SI not
actuated". This
S appears to be leading the candidate to part of the answer. Why
not
ES-401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form
ES-401-9
SEQUOYAH INITIAL REVIEW
Instructions [Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for
additional information regarding each of the following
concepts.]
1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either
(F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a
1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range
are acceptable).
3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is
identified:
The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer
(e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much
needless information). • The stem or distractors contain cues
(i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
The answer choices are a collection of unrelated truelfalse
statements. The distractors are not credible; single implausible
distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. One
or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the
applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted
by stem).
4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is
identified: The question is not linked to the job requirements
(Le., the question has a valid KiA but, as written, is not
operational in content). The question requires the recall of
knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode
(Le., it is not required to be known from memory). The question
contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent
units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). The
question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job
requirements.
5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the
approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KiA and
license level mismatches are unacceptable).
6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written
(U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of
(E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix
B psychometric attributes are not being met).
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q=
SRO U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KiA Only
Reexamine use of 1st part of each distractor to see if
necessary. Change € E-O in distractor A to E-O.
76 H 2 Correct typo in distractor A. Added bullet to the stem to
define RWST level S and trend make D distractor more plausible.
Distractor B & D imply that there is train relationship for
CETs. If there is
€ not, then B & D are not valid distractors. CETs are train
related. Change 77 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices to 0 and 4 for
incorrect answer. S
Changed distractor B & D to "2 thermocouples in each train"
Distractor B & D imply that an entry into a FRP is plausible
even if there is
€ no condition to do so. B & D do not appear to be valid
distractors. Change 78 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices B & D
more plausible. S
Reworded the question to eliminate concem with 2
distractors.
A is not plausible. The only uncontrolled Boron change that
would increase Rx power would be caused by a significant dilution
event and
€ there is no corresponding MWe increase. This is generic
fundamental 79 H 2 X knowledge and is not SRO only. AOP entry
conditions are RO knowledge
S level. SRO level criteria is based on knowing the specific
guidance from the AOP. Reviewed wi license. OK. Make editorial
corrections. Replaced 2nd layer dashes in the stem w/bullets to
improve appearance.
y What makes this SRO? Appears that both parts of the answer can
be 80 H 2 X X deduced using system knowledge. In the stem, "SI not
actuated". This
S appears to be leading the candidate to part of the answer. Why
not
-
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q=
SRO U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only
instead say that "SI is not injecting". SI not actuated implies
that no signal has been received therefore, it is NOT required to
be initiated and this is one part of the answer. Eliminated the "SI
not actuated" information and changed 2nd part of the question to
address T.S. entry to meet the SRO Only portion. Changed stem
conditions to support the T.S. entry criteria.
1Nhat makes this SRO? The NOTE for non EOP entry is in the body
of the ~OP. Does this make it RO criteria? If so, A& C are not
plausible. B & D
€ are not symmetrical. Reword B to match D. "Acknowledge the
Orange 81 H 3 X X path and continue... Is the first part of D
plausible? Why not change to
S say Orange path also? The last part is incorrect anyway.
Reviewed wI license. Made editorial corrections so that B & D
are symmetrical and simplified wording in the distractors.
1J What make this SRO? Appears question is derived based only on
system 82 H 3 X knowledge. Changed 2nd part of question to be SRO
Only.
S
The stem contains a cue: "The CRO reports that the fuel pool rad
monitors
1J are blocked". If they're blocked then only the Aux Bldg alarm
is
83 F 3 X X meaningful. It also implies that there is no concern
with ABGTS being
S INOP. This makes B & D not plausible. Rewrite to remove
cue and ask about ABGTS operability. Will revise to remove cue.
Reworded stem to remove cue.
A & C do not appear to be plausible. No procedure direction
to fill S/G to 100% anywhere. FR-H.3 is not a RED or ORANGE path
EOP. Is this an
1J entry level knowledge criteria for a RO. If so C & D are
also UNSAT for
84 H 2 X this condition. Revise C & D to change 100% to a
procedure related
S number or guidance. Removed SG level in distractors C & D
and changed SG #2 level in stem of question from 86% to 79%. This
changed the correct answer from the original question and made the
other distractors more plausible.
€ Are FR entry conditions required RO knowledge? Is 1 hr NRC
notification 85 H 2 X X required RO knowledge? Is not just RO
knowledge.
S
1J Incorrect KA. Not lAW sample plan. 2.4.44 vs. 2.2.44. New
question 86 H X written to match KA.
S
1 st half of answer "event in progress is RO knowledge". 2nd
part of "B" & "D" distractors is not plausible. Water level is
stated as increasing in stem
€ of question. Therefore, can deduce answer with RO knowledge
alone. 87 H 2 X X Reviewed wI license. Question is detailed
procedure knowledge and is
S therefore at SRO Only level. Procedure title corrected in stem
of question.
€ Does not appear that the "lAW" statements are needed in 2nd
part of 88 F 2 X distractors. Licensee put hard return in stem,
eliminated wording "in
S --
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOO
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q=
SRO U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only
instead say that "SI is not injecting". SI not actuated implies
that no signal has been received therefore, it is NOT required to
be initiated and this is one part of the answer. Eliminated the "SI
not actuated" information and changed 2nd part of the question to
address T.S. entry to meet the SRO Only portion. Changed stem
conditions to support the T.S. entry criteria.
What makes this SRO? The NOTE for non EOP entry is in the body
of the AOP. Does this make it RO criteria? If so, A& C are not
plausible. B & 0
e are not symmetrical. Reword B to match O. "Acknowledge the
Orange 81 H 3 X X path and continue... Is the first part of 0
plausible? Why not change to
S say Orange path also? The last part is incorrect anyway.
Reviewed wi license. Made editorial corrections so that B & 0
are symmetrical and simplified wording in the distractors.
y What make this SRO? Appears question is derived based only on
system 82 H 3 X
S knowledge. Changed 2nd part of question to be SRO Only.
The stem contains a cue: "The CRO reports that the fuel pool rad
monitors
y are blocked". If they're blocked then only the Aux Bldg alarm
is
83 F 3 X X meaningful. It also implies that there is no concern
with ABGTS being
S INOP. This makes B & 0 not plausible. Rewrite to remove
cue and ask about ABGTS operability. Will revise to remove cue.
Reworded stem to remove cue.
A & C do not appear to be plausible. No procedure direction
to fill S/G to 100% anywhere. FR-H.3 is not a RED or ORANGE path
EOP. Is this an
y entry level knowledge criteria for a RO. If so C & 0 are
also UNSAT for
84 H 2 X this condition. Revise C & 0 to change 100% to a
procedure related
S number or guidance. Removed SG level in distractors C & 0
and changed SG #2 level in stem of question from 86% to 79%. This
changed the correct answer from the original question and made the
other distractors more plausible.
e Are FR entry conditions required RO knowledge? Is 1 hr NRC
notification 85 H 2 X X required RO knowledge? Is not just RO
knowledge.
S
y Incorrect KA Not lAW sample plan. 2.4.44 vS. 2.2.44. New
question 86 H X written to match KA
S
1st half of answer "event in progress is RO knowledge". 2nd part
of "B" & "0" distractors is not plausible. Water level is
stated as increasing in stem
e of question. Therefore, can deduce answer with RO knowledge
alone. 87 H 2 X X Reviewed wi license. Question is detailed
procedure knowledge and is
S therefore at SRO Only level. Procedure title corrected in stem
of question.
e Does not appear that the "lAW" statements are needed in 2nd
part of 88 F 2 X distractors. Licensee put hard return in stem,
eliminated wording "in
S
-
ES-401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form
ES-401-9
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6.
7.
I 0# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job-
Minutia #/ Back- 0= SRO U/E/S Explanation
Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only
accordance with" in all choices.
89 H 3 X S Can deduce answers from RO knowledge only. Reviewed
w/ license. Licensee verified this is SRO level knowledge.
€ B & D do not appear plausible. When would the procedure
reader perform 90 H 2 X an AOP and handoff an EOP? Reviewed wi
license. OK This is a past
S event. Simplified distractor wording
€ Distractor B & D not plausible. Vessel venting is not part
of C/D & 91 F 2 X Depress strategy. Why would you vent the
vessel in ES-1.2? Modified
S stem wording to improve clarity of question.
92 H 2 S Reformatted to be consistent with other 2 part
questions.
y 1st half of distractors is AOP entry (RO Knowledge). Appears
2nd half may 93 H 2 X also be RO Knowledge. Licensee wrote a new 2"
part to be SRO Only
S (T.S. operability).
94 F 3 S
95 F 3 S
96 F 3 S
Can deduce answer from system knowledge only. Backfill goes back
to RX, blowdown goes to environment. 2nd part is EOP entry (RO
y Knowledge) Also this question is a potential repeat of
question 76. 97 H 2 X Completely re-wrote question to remove
reference to ECA·3.1 to avoid
S conflict with 076. The revised question centers around the
selection of recovery actions in the preferred procedure that will
be used as the mitigating strategy and the basis of why the action
was chosen.
98 F 2 S
99 H 3 S
100 F 2 S ---_ ... _----- -_ .. _-- ---_._-- -- -
ES-401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form
ES-401-9
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q=
SRO u/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only
accordance with" in all choices.
89 H 3 X S Can deduce answers from RO knowledge only. Reviewed
wi license. Licensee verified this is SRO level knowledge.
E B & 0 do not appear plausible. When would the procedure
reader perform 90 H 2 X an AOP and handoff an EOP? Reviewed wi
license. OK This is a past
S event. Simplified distractor wording
E Distractor B & 0 not plausible. Vessel venting is not part
of C/O & 91 F 2 X Depress strategy. Why would you vent the
vessel in ES-1.2? Modified
S stem wording to improve clarity of question.
92 H 2 S Reformatted to be consistent with other 2 part
questions.
1J 1st half of distractors is AOP entry (RO Knowledge). Appears
2nd half may
93 H 2 X also be RO Knowledge. Licensee wrote a new 2" part to
be SRO Only S (T.S. operability).
94 F 3 S
95 F 3 S
96 F 3 S
Can deduce answer from system knowledge only. Backfill goes back
to RX, blowdown goes to environment. 2nd part is EOP entry (RO
1J Knowledge) Also this question is a potential repeat of
question 76. 97 H 2 X Completely re-wrote question to remove
reference to ECA-3.1 to avoid
S conflict with Q76. The revised question centers around the
selection of recovery actions in the preferred procedure that will
be used as the mitigating strategy and the basis of why the action
was chosen.
98 F 2 S
99 H 3 S
100 F 2 S
-
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOO
(F/H) (1-5) utE/S Explanation
~ Enhance the question by rewording distractors to start with
"The Reactor 1 H 3 will remain at ... " or "The Reactor will trip
due to a ... " ~
S dlstractors.
~ Could you change to have Th included as in the bank question
to 2 H 3 X eliminate the use of 2 part answers? Also, why is
(Subcoollng margin = 0)
S given In the stem? Is this cueing? Removed ~ fir
-
ES·401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form
ES·401·9
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
0# LOK LOD
(F/H) (1-5) utE/S Explanation
€ Remove "and dropping" from stem. This appears to be
unnecessary
14 H 2 X cueing. The applicant should know this. Add the word
"current" prior to
S status, i.e. "current status" of 125V DC Battery. Removed "and
dropping" from the stem, reformatted the question to simplify.
€ Distractor A does not appear plausible. How much ERCW would it
take to 15 H 2 X cause a rise in containment pressure? A & C
distractors changed to ask
S about flooding vs. increasing containment pressure.
€ How did you acquire 44% and 54% for distractor choices B &
C? If
16 H 3 program level is 69% should choice B & C be 64% &
74% for < 5% or >
S 5% of program level? PZR program level at 69% power is 49%.
Reworded question to simplify.
17 H 3 S
€ Is this level of knowledge above RO knowledge? Do you need to
tell them 18 H 4 X they're in an orange path? Removed "orange path"
from question stem.
S
19 F 3 S
lj This is a plant specific exam. This question reflects generic
fundamentals 20 H 3 and as is has a LOD of 1. Moved 0#57 to 0#20.
Wrote a new question
S for 0#57.
lj 1st bullet appears to be a cue and is not needed to arrive at
the proper
21 H 3 X X answer. It also contains a portion of the answer. A
& B do not appear
S plausible. How could a high rad alarm setpoint be the cause of
an excessive release (it would prevent it). New question
written.
22 F 2 S Verify this is RO knowledge with licensee. SO confirms
that this meets their criteria for RO knowledge.
Not sure if LOK is an F, looks more like an H. Change B to
be
€ symmetrical with A, i.e. "The development of an RCS leak
inside
23 H 3 containment". Make D start with "An", i.e. "An
oscillating ... " Also, do we
S need to say lAW SGTR in stem? If we omit, SGTR could be added
as a distractor if needed. NOTE: Reference not provided for
distractor D (AOP R.02). Changed LOD to H. Other changes from above
incorporated.
€ Add qualifier to 3rd bullet in stem to specify what press
1125# correlates to: -24 H 2 i.e. RCS press or PZR press. Confirm A
& B plausible. Pressure bullet S now states RCS press.
Confirmed A & B plausibility with licensee.
€ 4th bullet, change "in" to "is". Is RCS subcooling = 0
unnecessary cueing? 25 H 3· Changes made as noted above.
S
€ Verify this meets the KA. Change D to match wording in
procedure. Also
26 F 3 X verify that D can NOT be considered as also correct or
partially correct. D
S fNording changed as noted above. D distractor verified to be
incorrect wI licensee.
ES-401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form
ES-401-9
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
0# LOK LOD
(F/H) (1-5) U/E/S Explanation
E Remove "and dropping" from stem. This appears to be
unnecessary
14 H 2 X cueing. The applicant should know this. Add the word
"current" prior to
S status, i.e. "current status" of 125V DC Battery. Removed "and
dropping" from the stem, reformatted the question to simplify.
E Distractor A does not appear plausible. How much ERCW would it
take to 15 H 2 X cause a rise in containment pressure? A & C
distractors changed to ask
S about flooding vs. increasing containment pressure.
E How did you acquire 44% and 54% for distractor choices B &
C? If
16 H 3 program level is 69% should choice B & C be 64% &
74% for < 5% or>
S 5% of program level? PZR program level at 69% power is 49%.
Reworded question to simplify.
17 H 3 S
E Is this level of knowledge above RO knowledge? Do you need to
tell them 18 H 4 X they're in an orange path? Removed "orange path"
from question stem.
S
19 F 3 S
Y This is a plant specific exam. This question reflects generic
fundamentals 20 H 3 and as is has a LOD of 1. Moved 0#57 to 0#20.
Wrote a new question
S for 0#57.
y 1st bullet appears to be a cue and is not needed to arrive at
the proper
21 H 3 X X answer. It also contains a portion of the answer. A
& B do not appear
S plausible. How could a high rad alarm setpoint be the cause of
an excessive release (it would prevent it). New question
written.
22 F 2 S Verify this is RO knowledge with licensee. SO confirms
that this meets their criteria for RO knowledge.
Not sure if LOK is an F, looks more like an H. Change B to
be
E symmetrical with A. i.e. "The development of an RCS leak
inside
23 H 3 containment". Make D start with "An", i.e. "An
oscillating ..... Also, do we
S need to say lAW SGTR in stem? If we omit, SGTR could be added
as a distractor if needed. NOTE: Reference not provided for
distractor D (AOP R.02). Changed LOD to H. Other changes from above
incorporated.
E Add qualifier to 3rd bullet in stem to specify what press
1125# correlates to:
-24 H 2 i.e. RCS press or PZR press. Confirm A & B
plausible. Pressure bullet S now states RCS press. Confirmed A
& B plausibility with licensee.
E 4th bullet, change "in" to "is". Is RCS subcooling = 0
unnecessary cueing? 25 H 3 Changes made as noted above.
S
E Verify this meets the KA. Change D to match wording in
procedure. Also
26 F 3 X verify that D can NOT be considered as also correct or
partially correct. D
S wording changed as noted above. D distractor verified to be
incorrect wi licensee.
-
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD
(F/H) (1-5) U/E/S Explanation
This appears to be a memory question, F. This seems very
difficult if it is a memory question. Also, the 1st half is in the
SO procedure. Is the 2nd
half also there? If so, the 1st 3 bullets are not needed to
answer the 27 F 4 E question. Also, the EA procedure only states
that the annulus dp must be
more negative than -0.5" H20. This is the procedure in effect,
not the SO ~hich states -.02" to -1.2" H20, i.e. C could also be
construed as correct. Changed LOD as noted.
~ picture of RCP Seal dp is needed to verify max range is 500
psid. Why ~oes RCP Op Parameters Table (SO-68-2 Table 1) give a max
value of
28 F 3 S 2300 psid & a normal of 2250psid if this value can
not be read? Does the question need to specify where the indication
is? Verified during in office visit that question is SAT as is.
~ppears to be cueing in stem. Why do we say CVCS mix bed "being
used or deborating"? Is this necessary? Is C & D 1st half
plausible? How
€ would lowering letdown flow increase IB] removal? Also, do we
need to
29 F 2 X X add the word BOTH to the question prior to "Letdown
Flow & Temp."?
S Agreed wI licensee's logic for C & D plausibility. If flow
is lowered through IX, applicant could misconstrue this to mean a
better IX process would occur. Question was also reworded to
simplify choices to a "combination of letdown flow & temp."
Distractor A & C implies an outward inadvertent control rod
motion due to
y an inadvertent boration from CCS. Is this plausible? How would
a leak in the CCS HX cause boron level to increase in the RCS?
Question was
30 H 2 X reworded with distractors modified to improve
plausibility. Question now S asks for when the 1st operator action
is required vs. procedure section entry.
Not sure of LOD. I'think this is a H. B is missing "in" after
the word
€ available. Reword as a fill in the blank statement to
simplify. With U1 @ 31 F 4 100%, the RHR Xtie Isolation Valves ...
are required to be maintained in
S the open position to ensure in the event an RHR pump fails
during response to a LOCA. LOD is OK. Reworded question to
simplify.
U A & D not plausible if the Rx is in SDC mode. THE CLA
would be valved out of service. You only need to know the highest
and lowest press
32 F 2 X € component to answer the question. Question modified
to add 100%
S power level to stem of question so that all modes would apply.
Rearranged component selection.
€ Is 360 degrees F the right distractor? Changed the distractors
to a 33 H 3 correlating temp. band vs. < or > 360
degrees.
S
€ Does the PRT have an auto pump down feature? No auto pump down
34 H 2 feature. Clarified the stem question to say "Iong term
effects".
S ---
1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOO
(F/H) (1-5) U/E/S Explanation
This appears to be a memory question, F. This seems very
difficult if it is a memory question. Also, the 1st half is in the
SO procedure. Is the 2nd
half also there? If so, the 1st 3 bullets are not needed to
answer the 27 F 4 E question. Also, the EA procedure only states
that the annulus dp must be
more negative than -0.5" H20. This is the procedure in effect,
not the SO which states -.02" to -1.2" H20, i.e. C could also be
construed as correct. Changed LOO as noted.
A picture of RCP Seal dp is needed to verify max range is 500
psid. Why does RCP Op Parameters Table (SO-68-2 Table 1) give a max
value of
28 F 3 S 2300 psid & a normal of 2250psid if this value can
not be read? Does the question need to specify where the indication
is? Verified during in office visit that question is SAT as is.
Appears to be cueing in stem. Why do we say CVCS mix bed "being
used for deborating"? Is this necessary? Is C & 0 1st half
plausible? How
E /Nould lowering letdown flow increase [B] removal? Also, do we
need to
29 F 2 X X add the word BOTH to the question prior to "Letdown
Flow & Temp."?
S Agreed wI licensee's logic for C & 0 plausibility. If flow
is lowered through IX, applicant could misconstrue this to mean a
better IX process would occur. Question was also reworded to
simplify choices to a "combination of letdown flow & temp."
Oistractor A & C implies an outward inadvertent control rod
motion due to
lj an inadvertent boration from CCS. I