8/15/2019 Epistemological Aspects of Methods http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/epistemological-aspects-of-methods 1/47 Republic of the Philippines Polytechnic University of the Philippines M. H. del Pilar Campus Valencia St. cor. R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta. Mesa, Manila EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF METHODS o pistemology o !no"ledge o mpiricism o Rationalism o Constructivism In Partial Flfill!ent of the "e#ire!ent in Philosophical an$ Psycho%Social Perspectives E$cation &DEM '()* Submitted to# $r. Beatri% &. 'orno Professor Submitted by# 'ee(ay $. Panganiban $M Student ) nd Semester, S* )+-)+/ March +', +)-' I. I/T"ODUCTIO/
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pistemology derives from the &ree0 "ord, episteme, "hich translates as
0no"ledge. 'hus epistemology is the systematic study of 0no"ledge. 1mong the central
2uestions that concern epistemologists are# 3hat are the necessary ingredients for
0no"ledge4 $oes 0no"ledge have a certain structure4 3hat are the various sources of
(ustified belief4 5uestions of this sort pic0 out an important feature of traditional
epistemology6 it is centrally concerned "ith analy%ing various features of (ustified belief.
7t does not consider ho" the character and cognitive traits of persons might influence
our understanding of 0no"ledge and its function in our lives. Rather it restricts its
analysis to beliefs6 it is beliefbased.
1 number of concepts of educational import are epistemic concepts. 'hese are
the concepts of learning 8 having to do "ith an individual9s moving from a state of less
to greater 0no"ledge 8 the concept of teaching 8 having to do "ith someone instructing
another in order to bring about learning, and education 8 roughly the concept of a
process of bringing about learning in another intentionally by teaching or other means.
'hese epistemic concepts in particular play a structuring role in the philosophy of
education and, in its earliest conceptual analysis phase :associated "ith the "or0 of, for
instance, Peters, Hirst and 7. Scheffler;, philosophy of education focussed mainly on the
analysis of these three concepts. Here, "e "rite, of course, of learning, teaching and
education as epistemic concepts and an important 2uestion is "hether learning,teaching and education are firstly, or only, epistemic concepts. Some point out that, in
addition to learning, teaching and educating :for; 0no"ledge, much educational effort is
also directed at learning, teaching and educating :for;, for instance, moral or political
values, aesthetic appreciation and so forth. 'he dispute may be over "hether the
concepts learning, teaching and education belong firstly to epistemology or to ethics,
political philosophy, aesthetics, etc. <ne may allo" that the concepts in 2uestion can be
usefully studied by multiple areas of philosophy. 'his is the approach of those "ho
distinguish education9s cognitive from its moral, aesthetic, economic, etc. aims.
1lternatively, one may "ish to insist that the concepts in 2uestion are at root epistemic
concepts in that, even "hen pertaining to morals, aesthetics or economics, they still
have to do "ith the increase of moral, aesthetic or economic 0no"ledge or
understanding on the part of the learner.
2 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
Probably the most general concept in the area is that of learning. 1 number of
sources :e.g. 7. Scheffler :=/-; and Hamlyn :=/>;; point out that one - ordinary sense
of the "ord ?learning9 is coming to 0no" truths. <ne fertile area of discussion concerns
"hether learning, properly spea0ing, re2uires more than 0no"ing truth6 Hamlyn, for
instance, is opposed to calling rote learning of facts ?learning9. 7mportant distinctions in
the area are bet"een :; learning that comes about as the conse2uence of teaching,
and learning that occurs independently and :); learning that something is the case and
learning ho" to do something.
pistemology is the study of the nature and scope of 0no"ledge and (ustified
belief. 7t analyses the nature of 0no"ledge and ho" it relates to similar notions such
as truth, belief and (ustification. 7t also deals "ith the means of production of 0no"ledge,as "ell as s0epticism about different 0no"ledge claims. 7t is essentially about issues
having to do "ith the creation and dissemination of 0no"ledge in particular areas of
in2uiry.
pistemology as0s 2uestions li0e# @3hat is 0no"ledge4@, @Ho" is 0no"ledge
ac2uired4@, @3hat do people 0no"4@, @3hat are the necessary and sufficient conditions
of 0no"ledge4@, @3hat is its structure, and "hat are its limits4@, @3hat ma0es (ustified
beliefs (ustified4@, @Ho" "e are to understand the concept of (ustification4@, @7s
(ustification internal or eAternal to ones o"n mind4@
'he 0ind of 0no"ledge usually discussed in pistemology is propositional
0no"ledge, @0no"ledgethat@ as opposed to @0no"ledgeho"@ :for eAample, the
0no"ledge that @) ) D E@, as opposed to the 0no"ledge of ho" to go about adding t"o
numbers;.
!no"ledge is the a"areness and understanding of particular aspects of reality. 7t
is the clear, lucid information gained through the process of reason applied to reality.
'he traditional approach is that 0no"ledge re2uires three necessary and sufficient
conditions, so that 0no"ledge can then be defined as @(ustified true belief@#
3 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
. 'he person is 4stifie$ in believing the statement to
be true
0elief
Ksually, a @belief@ is a state of mind of a certain sort. But the behaviourists denythat there are states of mind, or at least that they can be 0no"n6 they therefore avoid
the "ord @belief@, and, if they used it, "ould mean by it a characteristic of bodily
behaviour. 'here are cases in "hich this usage "ould be 2uite in accordance "ith
common sense. Suppose you set out to visit a friend "hom you have often visited
before, but on arriving at your destination you find that he has moved, you "ould say @7
thought he "as still living at his old house.@ *et it is highly probable that you did not thin0
about it at all, but merely pursued the usual route from habit. 1 @thought@ or @belief@ may,
therefore, in the vie" of common sense, be sho"n by behaviour, "ithout any
corresponding @mental@ occurrence. 1nd even if you use a form of "ords such as is
supposed to eApress belief, you are still engaged in bodily behaviour, provided you
pronounce the "ords out loud or to yourself. Shall "e say, in such cases, that you have
a belief4 <r is something further re2uired4
$% | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
correspondence theory "ould not permit us to say either that N7t is true that Bill
murdered CharlieO or N7t is true that &od eAists.O
1 second famous definition of truth is the coherence theory , "hich aims to
address the shortcomings of the correspondence theory. 1ccording to the coherence
theory, a statement is true if it coheres "ith a larger set of beliefs. Rather than
attempting to match up our statements "ith the actual "orld of facts, "e instead try to
see if our statements mesh "ith a larger "eb of beliefs that support them. Lor eAample,
the statement Nmy car is "hiteO is true if it coheres "ith a collection of other beliefs such
as Nmany cars are painted "hite,O N7 perceive that my car is "hite,O and Nother people
invariably report that my car is "hite.O 3ith the coherence theory, "e avoid s0eptical
obstacles such as the unreliability of our senses and the possibility that "e are
hallucinating. 3hat matters is our "eb of beliefs, "hich "e all have access to in
contrast "ith a hidden "orld of facts that is blurred by the limits of our sensory
perceptions. 3e also can even investigate statements such as N7t is true that Bill
murdered CharlieO or N7t is true that &od eAists.O 3hat matters here is "hether these
statements consistently fit "ith other beliefs that "e have beliefs about the pieces of
evidence against Bill and beliefs about the evidence regarding a divine being.
Knfortunately the coherence theory faces serious criticisms, the most important
of "hich is that it is relativistic. 'hat is, it grounds truth in the changeable beliefs of human beings, rather than in an unchanging eAternal reality. 1ccording to the coherence
theory, the standard for all truth is the larger "eb of beliefs that people hold 8 beliefs
about "hite cars, criminal evidence, evidence for &od9s eAistence, and countless other
issues. 'he problem is that belief systems come and go. 'a0e beliefs about criminal
evidence as (ust one eAample. Many cultures throughout history based criminal
convictions on the evidence of supernatural omens# prophetic visions, the flight path of
birds, patterns in the guts of sacrificed animals. 'hat "as their belief system "hich they
relied on. 7n other cultures the testimony of one eye "itness is sufficient to prove guilt. 7n
our culture today "e have fingerprints, $J1 samples and psychological profiles "hich
all contribute to our belief system about criminal guilt. 'he statement NBill murdered
CharlieO could cohere "ith some belief systems, but not "ith others. 3e typically thin0
$3 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
7f the seed of 0no"ledge is belief, "hat turns belief into 0no"ledge4 'his is
"here (ustification comes in . 1 person 0no"s something if they9re (ustified in believing it
to be true :and, of course, it actually is true;. 'here are do%ens of competing theories of (ustification and there is little consensus about "hich is the right one. 7t9s sometimes
easier to describe "hen a belief isnt (ustified than "hen it is. 7n general, philosophers
agree that a person isn9t (ustified if their belief is#
a product of "ishful thin0ing :e.g. 7 really "ish you "ould love me so 7 believe you
love me; a product of fear or guilt :e.g. you9re terrified of death and so form the belief in an
afterlife; a product of guess"or0
formed in the "rong "ay :e.g. you travel to an area you 0no" nothing about, see
a "hite spot -++ yards a"ay and conclude it9s a sheep; a product of dumb luc0 :e.g. you randomly form the belief that the neAt person
you meet "ill have ha%el eyes and it turns out that the neAt person you meet has
ha%el eyes;
ustification is hard to pin do"n because beliefs come in all shapes and si%es
and it9s hard to find a single theory that can account for everything "e "ould "ant toclaim to 0no". *ou might be (ustified in believing that the sun is roughly = million miles
from the earth much differently than you "ould be (ustified in believing &od eAists or
that you have a minor bac0 pain. ven so, (ustification is a critical element in any theory
of 0no"ledge and is the focus of many a philosophical thought.
Philosophy9s history of reflection upon 0no"ledge is a history of theses and
theories6 but no less of 2uestions, concepts, distinctions, syntheses, and taAonomies. 1ll
of these "ill appear in this article. 'hey generate, colour, and refine these philosophicaltheses and theories about 0no"ledge. 'he results are epistemological Q philosophical
attempts to understand "hatever is most fundamentally understandable about the
nature and availability of 0no"ledge. 3e "ill gain a sense of "hat philosophers have
thought 0no"ledge is and might be, along "ith "hy some philosophers have thought
0no"ledge both does not and could not eAist.
$5 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
property of redness, as "ell as "ith a specific patch of redness briefly in your visual
field.
!no"ledge by description "as the means by "hich, in Russell9s vie", a person
could proceed to 0no" about "hat he or she had not eAperienced directly. 3e formulate
definite descriptions :?the third man listed in the current Sydney residential phoneboo09;
and indefinite ones :?a man listed in the current Sydney residential phoneboo09;. 3ith
these, "e can designate individuals "ith "hom "e have not interacted. 'hen "e can
formulate claims using such descriptions. Some of these claims could be 0no"ledge.
'hus, "e may open up for ourselves a "orld of 0no"ledge beyond "hat is revealed by
our immediate eAperiences.
0no"ledge;, declarative 0no"ledge :the 0no"ledge9s ob(ect is represented by a
declarative sentence# ?Suchandsuch is so9;, or 0no"ledgethat :the 0no"ledge is
represented in the form ?that suchandsuch is so9;.
!no"ledge by description "ould be one form that could be ta0en by 0no"ledge
that# some 0no"n propositions include descriptions6 but not all do. 7n principle,0no"ledgethat is the 0ind of 0no"ledge present "henever there is 0no"ledge of a fact
or truth Q no matter "hat type of fact or truth is involved# 0no"ledge that ) ) D E6
0no"ledge that rape is cruel6 0no"ledge that there is gravity6 and so on. 3hen
philosophers use the term ?0no"9 un2ualifiedly, 0no"ledgethat is standardly "hat they
mean to be designating.
$9 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
Most philosophical discussion of 0no"ledge is
directed at 0no"ledgethat Q such as 0no"ledge that0angaroos hop, 0no"ledge that 0oala sleeps most of the
time, 0no"ledge that 0oo0aburras cac0le, and the li0e.
'his is generally called propositional 0no"ledge :a
proposition that such!and!such is so is the ob(ect of the
&a posteriori * Aperiential 0no"ledge is of many types, the most obvious of "hich
involves perception. ach of our five senses is li0e a door to the outside "orld6
"hen "e thro" them open, "e are flooded "ith an endless variety of sights,
sounds, teAtures, smells and tastes. 3hen 7 loo0 at a co" in front of me and say
@7 0no" that it is bro"n,@ the source of this 0no"ledge rests upon my visual
perception of the bro"n co". 3hile perception is perhaps the dominant source of
eAperiential 0no"ledge, it immediately raises a critical 2uestion# "hen 7 loo0 at a
co", do 7 perceive the actual co" itself, or (ust a mental copy of it that is
processed through my visual system4 1 theory called direct realism holds that "e
see that actual co" itself. 'his is "hat "e ordinarily assume "hen "e open our
eyes and perceive anything around us# 7 perceive the real table, chair, car, or
"hatever. 3e have a natural confidence in our senses, and "e simply assume
that "hat "e see is "hat is actually there. But, according to a rival theory
called indirect realism, this could not possibly be true, since there are countless
instances "here "e 0no" that the actual ob(ects do not match "hat "e perceive.
<b(ects appear to get larger as 7 move closer to the ob(ect, "hile the ob(ect itself
clearly remains the same si%e. 'here are optical illusions, such as a stic0 "hich
appears bent "hen in "ater6 there are mirages, such as the appearance of "ater
puddles on hot roads. 1ccording to indirect realism, then, 7 do not see the actual
co" itself "hen 7 loo0 at it, but only a copy or visual representation of it, almost
as if 7 am vie"ing the co" on a television screen. 'here is, then, a big gapbet"een "hat the co" itself and the image of it that appears to me, and for all 7
0no" the real co" may be vastly different than ho" it is represented. 'hus, as
much as "e rely on perception to gain 0no"ledge, uncertainty is built into the
very act of perception.
22 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
cheap, and "ere often sloppy in the accounts that "e convey to others.
'estimonies from "ritten sources are usually more reliable than oral sources, but
much depends on the integrity of the author, publisher, and the methods of fact
gathering. 3ith oral or "ritten sources, the longer the chain of testimony is, the
greater the chance is of error creeping in.o Religious Experiences. Consider neAt religious eAperiences. Believers
sometimes say that they receive prophecies from &od, or are guided by him, or
0no" something through faith. Christian theologian ohn Calvin even spo0e of a
sense of the divine that "e all have, "hich informs us that &od eAists. Might any
of this count as eAperiential 0no"ledge4 'he 2uestion is a compleA one
considering the "ide range of religious eAperiences that believers report. Gets
narro" the 2uestion to t"o representative types# 0no"ledge through faith andprophetic 0no"ledge. Regarding faith, as typically understood, faith involves
belief "ithout evidence, such as faith that &od eAists, or that the bodies of the
dead "ill be resurrected in the future, or that our souls "ill be reincarnated in
different bodies. 'hese faith beliefs may important for in our personal religious
lives, but there is a problem "hen "e to claim to know something through faith.
<ne of the chief re2uirements for something to count as N0no"ledgeO is that there
is evidence to support itQas "ell see more clearly in the neAt section. But since
faith is belief "ithout evidence then, technically spea0ing faith "ouldnt 2ualify as
0no"ledge. Prophetic 0no"ledge faces the same challenge as SP# are
prophecies any more successful than educated guesses4 7magine an eAperiment
that "e might conduct in "hich half of the sub(ects "ere prophets, and the other
half nonprophets. 3e then as0ed both groups to ma0e predictions about the
upcoming year6 at the end of the year "e then chec0ed the results. Ho" "ould
the prophets do4 'he odds are slim that "e could even conduct the eAperiment
since prophets "ould say that they cant prophesi%e on demand# its a uni2ue and
unpredictable revelatory eAperience. 'hey might also say that their revelations
from &od are not the sort of things that can be confirmed in the ne"spaper. 7f
prophetic eAperiences are genuine sources of 0no"ledge, the burden of proof
24 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
Rationalism is any vie" appealing to intellectual and deductive reason :as
opposed to sensory eAperience or any religious teachings; as the source
of 0no"ledge or (ustification. 'hus, it holds that some propositions are 0no"able by us
by intuition alone, "hile others are 0no"able by being deduced through valid arguments
from intuited propositions. $epending on the strength of the belief, this can result in a
range of positions from the moderate vie" that reason has precedence over other "ays
of ac2uiring 0no"ledge, to the radical position that reason is the only path to 0no"ledge.
Rationalism relies on the idea that reality has a rational structure in that all
aspects of it can be grasped through mathematical and logical principles, and not simply
through sensory eAperience. Rather than being a @tabula rasa@ to be imprinted "ith
sense data, the mind is structured by, and responds to, mathematical methods of reasoning.
Rationalists adopt at least one of three main claims#
• Intition=De$ction: Some propositions are 0no"able by us by intuition alone,
"hile others are 0no"able by being deduced from intuited propositions. Some
rationalists ta0e intuition to be infallible, claiming that "hatever "e intuit must be
true6 others allo" for the possibility of false intuited propositions. Some claim thatonly mathematics can be 0no"able by intuition and deduction6 some that ethical
truths can also be intuited6 some more radical rationalists maintain that a "hole
range of metaphysical claims :li0e the eAistence of &od, free "ill and the duality
of mind and body; are include "ithin the range of intuition and deduction.
• Innate 6no7le$2e: 3e have 0no"ledge of some truths as part of our innate
rational nature. Aperiences may trigger a process by "hich "e bring this
0no"ledge to consciousness, but the eAperiences do not provide us "ith
the 0no"ledge itself, "hich has in some "ay been "ith us all along. Some
rationalists claim that "e gained this innate 0no"ledge in an earlier eAistence,
some that &od provided us "ith it at creation, and others that it is part of our
nature through natural selection.
33 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
• Innate Concepts: Some of the concepts :as opposed to actual 0no"ledge; "e
employ are part of our innate rational nature. Some "ould argue, ho"ever, that
innate concepts are entailed by innate 0no"ledge, because a particular instance
of 0no"ledge can only be innate if the concepts that are contained in the
proposition are also innate.
Some rationalists also claim, in addition to the claims above, that the 0no"ledge
"e gain by intuition and deduction, as "ell as the ideas and instances of 0no"ledge that
are innate to us, are indispensible and could not have been gained through sense
eAperience, andor that reason is superior to eAperience as a source of 0no"ledge.
Rationalism is contrasted "ith mpiricism, the vie" that the origin of all
0no"ledge is sense eAperience and sensory perception. 7t is usually associated "ith the
introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy during the 1ge of Reason and
the nlightenment by the ma(or rationalist figures, $escartes, Geibni% and Spino%a. 7t is
commonly referred to as Continental Rationalism because it "as predominant in the
continental schools of urope, "hereas British mpiricism dominated in Britain.
'he distinction bet"een Rationalism and mpiricism, ho"ever, is perhaps not
as clearcut as is sometimes suggested, and "ould probably not have evenbeen recogni%ed by the nlightenment philosophers involved. Lor eAample, the three
main rationalists "ere all committed to the importance of empirical science, and in many
respects the empiricists "ere closer to $escartes in their methods and metaphysical
theories than "ere Geibni% and Spino%a. Both Geibni% and Spino%a asserted that, in
principle, all 0no"ledge, including scientific 0no"ledge, could be gained through the use
of reason alone, though they both observed that this "as not possible in practice for
human beings, eAcept in specific areas such as mathematics.
o HISTO";
34 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
RenW $escartes is one of the earliest and best
0no"n proponents of Rationalism. He believed that
0no"ledge of eternal truths:e.g. mathematics and the
epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the
sciences; could be attained by reason alone, "ithout the
need for any sensory eAperience. <ther 0no"ledge :e.g.
the 0no"ledge of physics;, re2uired eAperience of the
"orld, aided by the scientific method a moderate
rationalist position. Lor instance, his famous
dictum "ogito ergo sum" :"I think, therefore I am" ; is a
conclusion reached a priori and not through an inferencefrom eAperience.
$escartes held that some ideas :innate ideas; come from &od6 others ideas arederived from sensory eAperience6 and still others are fictitious :or created by
the imagination;. <f these, the only ideas "hich are certainly valid, according
to $escartes, are those "hich are innate.
Baruch Spino%a eApanded upon $escartes basic principles of Rationalism. His
philosophy centred on several principles, most of "hich relied on his notion that &od is
the only absolute substance :similar to $escartes conception of &od;, and that
substance is composed of t"o attributes, thought and eAtension. He believed that all
aspects of the natural "orld :including Man; "ere modes of the eternal substance of
&od, and can therefore only be 0no"n through pure thought or reason.
&ottfried Geibni% attempted to rectify "hat he sa" as some of the problems that
"ere not settled by $escartes by combining $escartes "or0 "ith 1ristotles notion
of form and his o"n conception of the universe as composed of monads. He believed
that ideas eAist in the intellect innately, but only in a virtual sense, and it is only "hen
the mind reflects on itself that those ideas are actuali%ed.
7mmanuel !ant started as a traditional rationalist, having
studied Geibni% and Christian 3olff :/>= >-E; but, after also studying
the empiricist $avid Humes "or0s, he developed a distinctive and
35 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
very influential Rationalism of his o"n, "hich attempted to synthesi%e the traditional
rationalist and empiricist traditions.
Rationalism and Empiricism. 1n important philosophical "ar too0 place in the
>th and Uth centuries bet"een t"o schools of thought. Most briefly, first there
"ere rationalists from continental urope "ho "ere critical of sense eAperience and felt
that genuine 0no"ledge "as ac2uired noneAperientially through reason. 'he leaders
on this side "ere RenW $escartes, Benedict Spino%a, and &ottfried Geibni%. Second
there "ere empiricists from the British 7sles "ho felt that noneAperiential reasoning
"ould give us nothing, and eAperience "as the only path to 0no"ledge. ohn Goc0e,
&eorge Ber0eley and $avid Hume "ere the leaders on this side. 'he "ar finally ended
"hen 7mmanuel !ant proposed a compromise# true 0no"ledge depends on a miAture of
eAperiential and noneAperiential 0no"ledge. 3e need both, !ant argued, other"ise our
"hole mental system "ill not operate properly.
Gets return to the rationalist position, particularly the version championed by
$escartes. Sense eAperience, he argued, is seriously fla"ed and cannot be the sourceof important ideas that "e have. 'a0e, for eAample, the idea of a triangle. Goo0 around
the "orld and youll never see a perfect triangle, "hether its a shape that "e dra" on a
piece of paper or the side of a pyramid in gypt. <n close inspection, theyll all have
irregular lines. 'he fact remains, though, that "e do have conceptions of perfectly
shaped triangles. Rationalism, according to $escartes, offers the best eAplanation of
ho" "e get those perfect ideas. 'here are t"o central components to the rationalist
position# innate ideas and deductive reasoning. Innate ideas, according to $escartes,
are concepts that "e have from birth that serve as a foundation for all of our other
ideas. 3hile they are inborn, "e only become a"are of them later in life 8 "hen "e
reach the @age of reason@ as one philosopher called it. 7nnate ideas are in a special
class of their o"n# "e 0no" them "ith absolute certainty, and its impossible for us to
ac2uire them through eAperience. 3hile rationalists "ere reluctant to offer a complete
36 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
list of innate ideas, the most important ones include the ideas of &od, infinity, substance
and causality. Regarding deductive reasoning , $escartes held that from our innate
ideas "e deduce other ideas. 7ts li0e in geometry "here "e begin "ith foundational
concepts of points and lines, and deduce elaborate propositions from these about all
0inds of geometrical shapes. $escartes "as in fact inspired by the deductive method of
geometry and maintained that "e deduce ideas in the same "ay. 'hrough deduction,
the certainty that "e have of innate ideas transfers to the other ideas that "e derive
from these. Mista0es creep in only "hen our deductions become so long that they rest
on memory. 1ll 0no"ledge, he argued, including scientific 0no"ledge, proceeds from
innate ideas and deductive demonstration.
'urn no" to empiricism, particularly Goc0es version. Goc0es first tas0 "as to
challenge the theory of innate ideas# none of our concepts, he argued, are inborn. <ur
mind is from birth li0e a blan0 sheet of paper, and it is only through eAperience that "e
"rite anything on it. <ne problem "ith innate ideas is that "e can eAplain the origin of
each one of them through eAperience. 'he idea of &od, for eAample, is not innate as
$escartes supposed, but comes from our perceptions of the "orld around us. 'heres
thus no reason to put for"ard the theory of innate ideas "hen eAperience eAplains
these notions (ust fine. Goc0e also found fault "ith the rationalist position that "e dont
become a"are of innate ideas until later in life. 7ts not clear ho" such ideas can linger in our minds for so many years before "e can be conscious of them. 1nd by that time
our minds have been flooded "ith eAperience, and a lateblooming innate idea "ouldnt
contribute anything to our 0no"ledge of the "orld. mpiricists also challenged the
rationalists emphasis on deductive demonstration. 3e dont eApand our 0no"ledge by
deducing ne" concepts from foundational ones, as mathematicians do. &eometry is the
"rong role model to follo". 7nstead, "e ac2uire ne" 0no"ledge through induction, such
as ma0ing generali%ations from our eAperiences. 7 hit ten light bulbs "ith a hammer and
each brea0s6 7 generali%e from this that all similar light bulbs that 7 hit "ith a hammer "ill
also brea0. 3e first perceive, then "e generali%e. 3e perceive some more, then
generali%e some more. 'hats ho" "e push 0no"ledge for"ard.
1nd then comes along !ant, the great mediator in the rationalismempiricism
debate. !ant "as sympathetic "ith empiricism but thought that it suffered from a serious
37 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
problem# it doesnt offer a good eAplanation for ho" "e ac2uire noneAperiential
0no"ledge, such as mathematics and logic. CompleA mathematical formulas in
particular could not come from sense perception. 'here is a 2uality of selfevidence and
certainty that they have, "hich fallible eAperience could never produce. !ants solution
"as not to resurrect the old theory of innate ideas. 7nstead, he argued that there are
innate organi%ing structures in our minds that automatically systemati%e our ra"
eAperiences 8 sort of li0e a s0eleton that gives shape to flesh. Lor eAample, as 7 "atch
someone hit a light bulb "ith a hammer, ra" sensory information rushes in through my
eyes. My mind immediately reconstructs this information into a threedimensional image
and puts it on a timeline. My mind then imposes other organi%ational schemes on the
sensory information. 7t ma0es me see the hammer and light bulb as separate things,
rather than (ust a single blob of stuff. 7t then ma0es me see the hammer as the cause of
the light bulb brea0ing. My eAperience of the "orld, then, is a fusion of innate structures
and ra" eAperience. 'he innate part is a concession to rationalism, and the eAperience
part a concession to empiricism.
Rationalism and empiricism in their original forms are outdated theories today, in
part because of !ant9s insights. Jevertheless, they still are useful for depicting t"o
fundamentally different "ays in "hich "e assess the sources of 0no"ledge. Rationalism
"ill continue to be attractive "henever "e have 0no"ledge that cannot be easilyeAplained by eAperience. mpiricism "ill be attractive "henever the claims of
innateness loo0 fishy.
Constructivism :also 0no"n as Constructionism; is a relatively recent perspective
in pistemology that vie"s all of our 0no"ledge as @constructed@ in that it is contingent
on convention, human perception and social eAperience. 'herefore, our 0no"ledge
does not necessarily reflect any eAternal or @transcendent@ realities.
7t is considered by its proponents to be an alternative to
classical Rationalism and mpiricism. 'he constructivist point of vie" is
both pragmatic and relativistic in nature. 7t opposes Positivism and Scientism in that it
38 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s
0no"ledge and information "ere not. ducation "as conceived as the transmission of
0no"ledge from those "ho 0ne" to those "ho did not, and 0no"ledge "as thought of
as fiAedQunambiguous, une2uivocal and unmysteriousQand nonoverlapping bet"een
disciplines. Students "ere supposed to ac2uire 0no"ledge by stoc0ing their minds "ith
information. 1s a result, genuine understanding, if it occurred at all, "as more often than
not an incidental outcome.
1lso the aims of education are often characterised in terms of certain 0inds of
epistemic goods. But "hat particular goods an education should aim to foster remains
an important area of debate in the epistemology of education, and one "hich has
attracted the interest of epistemologists "or0ing on the closely connected issue of "hat
epistemic states :and cognitive abilities or virtues; are the most epistemically valuableones to achieve, and "hy. Perhaps the most famous discussion of the epistemic aim of
education features in Plato9s classic discussion in the Republic of the 1llegory of the
Cave, an aimpursued by metaphorthat might be best understood as an epistemic
process. By contrast, &oldman :===; characterises the aim of education in terms of,
and by comparison "ith a traditional line of thin0ing in the philosophy of science, the
production of 0no"ledge. 7t follo"s, on &oldman9s approach, that the educational value
of the cultivation of certain dispositions or traits are al"ays only of instrumental
educational value, relative to the goal of 0no"ledgeproduction.. <n Siegel9s vie",
critical thin0ingQand, more generally, reasoningQis an ability an education should aim
to foster independently of any connection bet"een critical thin0ing and truth or
0no"ledge. <n Siegel9s vie", critical thin0ing can be vie"ed as supplanting 0no"ledge
as "hat is fundamental or basic visavis the aim of an education. Baehr :)+; departs
from the 0no"ledge account by, li0e Siegel, focusing on the value of cultivating
disposition as opposed to states. Lor Baehr :)+;, ho"ever, the aim of education
ought to be articulated, specifically, in terms of intellectual character virtues, virtues that
are individuated in part in terms of their characteristic motivations :e.g. open
mindedness, intellectual courage;.
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!no"ledge and information can become obsolete or irrelevant after a time, and it
"as becoming so faster "ith the increasingly rapid pace of technological development
to"ards the end of the t"entieth century. Conse2uently, many fresh school graduates
discovered that the 0no"ledge and information they had learnt in school "as not al"ays
applicable to the (obs they had been hired to do. 'o ma0e matters "orse, they had not
learnt ho" to deal "ith these rapid changes. 'his meant that the learning curve "as
usually very steep at the initial stages of their "or0ing life. Had they been eAplicitly
taught the s0ills and processes needed for ac2uiring 0no"ledge and information in
various disciplines "hen in school, they "ould have had a much easier time.
'here should be greater emphasis on the teaching and learning of process s0ills
:critical thin0ing, creative thin0ing, "riting, oral presentation, data analysis, data
collection, etc.; in the school curriculum. Schools and organisations that "ill specialise
in teaching critical and creative thin0ing s0ills, as "ell as in training teachers to teach
these s0ills, "ill also sprung up for the neAt school years.
pistemology is the clarification of ho" "e thin0. 7t is essential in order to be ableto determine the correct from the "rong, by determining a appropriate techni2ue of
evaluation. 7t is needed in order to use and obtain 0no"ledge of the "orld around us.
3ithout epistemology, "e could not thin0. More specifically, "e "ould have no reason to
believe our thin0ing "as productive or correct, as opposed to random images flashing
before our mind. 3ith an incorrect epistemology, "e "ould not be able to distinguish
truth from error. 'he conse2uences are obvious. 'he degree to "hich our epistemology
is correct is the degree to "hich "e could understand reality, and the degree to "hich
"e could use that 0no"ledge to promote our lives and goals. Lla"s in epistemology "ill
ma0e it harder to accomplish anything.
1 philosophy is a system of beliefs about reality. 7t is ones integrated vie" of the
"orld. 7t includes an understanding of the nature of eAistence, man, and his role in the
44 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s