Environmental Risks of Condensate Releases - Leviathan ... · Water Reinjection (PWRI) is widely recognized as BAT, but was declined for Leviathan due to cost. The Leviathan project

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EnvironmentalRisksofCondensateReleases-LeviathanOffshoreGasProject,IsraelIndependentExpertOpinion July15,2018 ProfessorRichardSteiner OasisEarth,Anchorage,AlaskaUSAwww.oasis-earth.com;[email protected]: Page 1. ExecutiveSummary–Findings 22. Introduction 103. LeviathanProjectSummary 124. Condensate–GeneralCharacteristics 135. LeviathanOilSpillModels 18 5.1 Drilling 19 5.2 Production/SeabedPipelines 21 5.3 LeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP) 21 5.4 EcologicalImpacts 226. RiskAssessment 24 7. Mitigation–SpillPrevention 25 7.1 Welldesignandcontrol 26 7.2 Redaction 29 7.3 2011Leviathan2Blowout 30 7.4 BlowoutPreventers 31 7.5 BlowoutResponsePlan 32 7.6 PipelineIntegrityManagement 33 7.7 PipelineLeakDetection 35 7.8 Additionalspillpreventionmeasures 378. SelectedProjectDesign-Platformvs.FPSOorFLNG 399. CondensateSpillResponse 44 9.1 OilSpillContingencyPlan(OSCP) 45 9.2 MechanicalRecovery 46 9.3 Dispersants 46 9.4 In-situburning 48 9.5 Additionalconsiderations 48 9.5 VaporEmissionsAboveCondensateReleases 49 9.6 Spilltrackingandmonitoring 51 10. MarineDischarge 51 11.1 ProducedWater 51 11.2 NorwayandU.S.MarineDischargeRegulations 53 11.3 EmissionsMonitoringandReporting 54 11. FinancialLiability 5412. CO2Emissions 55

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13. SecurityRisk 5614. StakeholderEngagement 60 14.1IsraelOffshoreCitizens’AdvisoryCouncil 61 15. GovernmentRevenue-IsraelPermanentFund 6216. Conclusion 6317. References 63 i. Appendix1AuthorBiography 66ii. Appendix2HydrocarbonInfluenceontheMarineEnvironment 681. ExecutiveSummary-Findings Background

1. ItisevidentthatLeviathanproponents(industryandgovernment)havededicatedanimpressiveamountoftime,effort,andfinancialresourcesinplanninganddevelopmentoftheprojecttodate.Therevieweddocumentspresentathoroughbackgroundofthebaselineregionalenvironment,abasicdescriptionoftheproject,andreasonableassessmentofsomeoftheexpectedconstructionandoperationalimpacts.

2. ItisnotedthattheLeviathandevelopmentisconsiderablyadvancedat

present,withseveralwellshavingbeendrilledandcompleted.ThusthecommentsbelowmayhavebeenmoreusefultoprojectplannersandtheGovernmentofIsraelifprovidedearlierintheprocess.Nevertheless,thecommentsandconcernsoutlinedinthisreportremainrelevantforallaspectsoftheproject.Evenatthisstageofprojectdevelopment,itishopedthatthisreportmayhelpimprovetheenvironmentalsafetyoftheproject.

3. Thedocumentsreviewedareinsufficientuponwhichtoconcludethatthe

Leviathanprojectmeetsitssafetydeclarationsandobjectivesandbestindustrypractice.Significantly,documentsunderstatetherisksandimpactsoftheLeviathanprojectfromapotentialcatastrophicfailureofanyoftheseveralsystems-criticalprojectcomponents,andoverstateresponsecapabilities.Thedocumentsfailtoaccountforthemanywaysinwhichacomplexsystemsuchasadeepwatergasprojectcanfail,causingalowprobability/highconsequenceeventsuchasamajorgas/condensatewellblowoutorpipelinerelease.Inthepost-DeepwaterHorizonunderstandingofdeepwaterdrillingrisks,thisisunacceptable.Whileimpactsfromconstructionandnormaloperationoftheprojectmaybemoderateaspredicted,impactsofmajorfailurescouldbecatastrophic.Thesecatastrophicriskshavenotbeenadequatelyassessed.

4. TheLeviathandocumentsreviewedarepoorlyintegrated,redundant,often

inconsistent,containsignificanterrors(e.g.unitsofmeasurement),containsignificantgapsinessentialinformation,andoftenmakevagueandgeneralassertionslackingdetail.Thispoororganizationofdocumentsmakesit

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difficultforthepublictoassimilateprojectinformationandreasonablyevaluateenvironmentalimpactsandrisksoftheproject.

5. ThecurrentstatusofLeviathandevelopmentandpermittingremainsunclear

totheauthor.Theprojectschedulereportedinthe2016DrillingEIAstatesthatoffshorewelldrillingandcompletionwouldbeunderwayatthistime.Yet,thereismuchdetailonthisandotheraspectsoftheprojectthatwereunavailabletotheauthor,includinganyApplicationsforPermitstoDrill(APD).Thispresentedasignificanthandicaptoacomprehensivereviewoftheproject.

SpillModeling

6. Condensateisalight,volatile,andacutelytoxicpetroleumhydrocarbonmixturethatbehavesverydifferentlythanheaviercrudeoilwhenreleasedintothemarineenvironment.Condensatereleasesgenerallydonotformdefinablesurfaceslicks(asdocrudeoils),andthuscondensatespillsarenotamenabletotraditionalspillresponsemethodologies.Whilenotaspersistentascrudeoilwhenreleasedintotheenvironment,condensatescanpersistforwellover6monthsoncereleased.Inaddition,weatheredcondensateisknowntobeevenmoreacutelytoxicthanfreshcondensate,downtoconcentrationsaslowas0.04ppm(40ppb).

7. ThecondensatespillmodelsconductedforLeviathan(OSCARandMEDSLIK)

arerobustanduseful,butfailtomodeltrueWorstCaseDischargesfromeachprojectcomponent,ignorewatercolumnentrainment,understatepotentialimpacts,andoverstateresponsecapabilitytomitigatesuchimpacts.

8. FortheDrillingphase,MEDSLIKmodeledawellheadcondensatereleaseof

857m3(5,827bbls)/dayx30days(thisdatawasredacted,butretrievable),foratotalreleaseof25,110m3,orabout175,000barrels(bbls).Giventhehistoryofdeepwaterpetroleumblowouts,thisisclearlynotaWorstCaseDischarge.Theprojectshouldmodelablowoutatthisratecontinuingforatleasttwicethislengthoftime(60days),foranapproximatecondensatereleasevolumeof350,000bbls.

9. Bycomparison,thefailedMacondooil/gaswelldrilledbytheDeepwater

Horizonin2010intheU.S.GulfofMexico,atcomparabledepthandpressuretoLeviathan,releasedanaverageof62,000bbls/dayofoilover87days,foratotaloilreleaseof4.9millionbbls(oilequivalent).Andthe2009Montaraoil/gasplatformblowoutoffnorthwestAustralia(inonly76mwaterdepth)continuedfor74days.Accordingly,the30-daywellblowoutperiodmodeledforLeviathanisinsufficient,andshouldbeincreasedtoatleast60days.

10. FortheProduction(seabedpipeline)phase,themodeledWorstCase

Dischargewasapprox.1,220bbls–1,320(194m3)bblscondensate,based

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onthereleaseoftotalpipelineinventory,plus5minutesresponsetimetoshut-inthepipeline.ThisrepresentsanunderestimateofpotentialWorstCaseDischargevolume,andshouldberevisedupward.Thisunderestimatederivesfromtheassumptionthatapipelinefailurewillbeimmediatelydetectedandshut-inwithproperfunctioningoftheSurfaceControlledSubSurfaceValve(SCSSV)systemfromtheLeviathanProductionPlatform.However,thereisnodiscussionofacontingencyforthefailureinthissurface-controlledsystem(e.g.severedumbilicalconnection,fire/explosionontheLPP,etc.),whichcouldleadtoamuchlargerreleaseofgasandcondensatefromseabedpipelines.

11. ForthenearshoreLeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP),theOSCARmodel

assumesareleaseofonly1,000bblscondensate,whileOSCARalsomodelsaverysmallcondensaterelease(fromadroppedobject),ofonly15.9bblsofcondensateand75tonsofgas.MEDSLIKalsomodeleda100,000bblscondensatereleasefromaFloatingStorageandOffloading(FSO)tanker/facility(NOP37/HGuidelines),whichwasnotselectedforthefinalLeviathandesign.Atminimum,areleaseoftheentirestoragecapacityofapprox.5,000bblsofcondensatefromtheLPPshouldbemodeled.Bothmodelsassumeapprox.40%-50%evaporationofcondensate,withtheremainingbalancedispersinginthemarineenvironmentand/orbeachingonshorelines.BothmodelspredictsubstantialshorelinecontaminationfromaWorstCaseDischargecondensatereleaseattheLPP.

12. Surprisingly,theLeviathandocumentsdonotdiscussindetailthepotential

large-scalereleaseofnaturalgasfromfailureofsubseainfrastructure,itspotentialfate,orecologicalimpacts.Inadditiontoreleasing350,000bblsofcondensate,aWorstCaseDischargefromafaileddeepwaterwellcouldalsoreleaseperhaps100,000tonsofnaturalgasintothedeepoceanecosystemoffIsrael.Naturalgas(99%methane)isknowntobetoxictomarineorganisms,particularlyatwarmerwatertemperatures(andhighermetabolicratesinorganisms)foundoffthecoastofIsrael.Thelackofdetailedevaluationofalargegasreleaseisasignificantgapintheenvironmentalassessmentoftheproject.

13. Regardingecologicalimpactsofcondensatereleases,thedocumentsassert

that:“NoHighriskimpactswereidentifiedintheevaluationfromroutineactivitiesoraccidentalevents.”Thisisnotsupportable.Ifasmodeled,175,000bblsofcondensateisreleasedfromaLeviathandeepwaterwellfailure,spreadsover395,000km2ofcoastalocean,resultsinwaterhydrocarbonconcentrationsinexcessof300ppm,persistsformonths,andcontaminates388kmofshorelinesfromEgypttoSyriawithover88,000barrelsoftoxicweatheredcondensate;thenclearlytheecologicalimpactswouldbe“high”,not“moderate”aspredictedbytheEIAs.IfaWorstCaseDischargeoftwicethismuchorlargeroccurs,thenimpactswouldbecorrespondinglygreater.

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14. TheEIAsdonotsufficientlydiscussthepotentialforlong-termecological

impactsfromamajoroffshoregas/condensaterelease. Mitigation/SpillPrevention

15. Mitigation/spillpreventionispoorlydevelopedinthedocuments.Asthisisthemostcriticalaspectofenvironmentalriskreduction,thisneedsconsiderablymoretechnicaldetail.Forinstance,thedocumentsdonotpresentaclearplanforpreventingwellblowoutsorseabedpipelinefailure,robustwelldesignandcontrol,pipelinedesign,pipelineIntegrityManagement(IM)program,pipelineLeakDetection,personneltraining,thirdpartyservices,managementofchange,near-casualtyreportingandinvestigation,riskassessment,subcontractormanagement,andequipmentmaintenanceandsurveillance.AlthoughseveraldeepwatergaswellshavebeensuccessfullydrilledoffIsraelinrecentyearswithnoreportedmajorhydrocarbonrelease,anyofthenextwellsdrilledcouldfailcatastrophically.Priortothe2010DeepwaterHorizonoil/gasblowoutintheU.S.GulfofMexico,hundredsofdeepwaterwellshadbeendrilled,mostwithnowell-controlincident.TheLeviathandocumentsprojectatroublingsenseofcomplacencyaboutthisveryrealrisk.

16. Riskisinherentinalloffshoreoilandgasprojects,andcannotbereducedto

zero.ButasevensimplefailuresincomplexindustrialsystemssuchasLeviathancanleadtocatastrophicconsequencesfortheenvironmentandpublicsafety,thegovernmentmustrequirethatthehighestriskreductionstandardsareemployedfortheproject.ButasLeviathancommitsonlytoariskreductionstandardofAsLowAsReasonablyPracticable(ALARP),thisisprimafacieevidencethattheprojectmaynotalwaysemployBestAvailableTechniquesandTechnology(BAT),suchasininstanceswhereBATisjudgedtoocostlyorotherwisenot“reasonablypracticable.”Asexample,ProducedWaterReinjection(PWRI)iswidelyrecognizedasBAT,butwasdeclinedforLeviathanduetocost.TheLeviathanprojectmustberequiredtocommittoBATatalltimes,regardlessofcost,andemployariskreductionstandardofAsFarAsPossible(AFAP),asisbestindustrypractice,andisrequiredintheE.U.offshoredrillingrule.

17. Aconsiderableamountofsystems-criticalinformation(asreferencedabove)

issimplyredactedfromdocuments.Thisishighlyunusual,andforaprojectwithsuchpotentialconsequenceandpublicinterest,isunacceptable.

18. The2011Leviathan2blowoutismentionedbrieflyintheDrillingEIA,but

insufficientdetailisprovided.Asaresultofthislossofwellcontrolincident,thedrillrigdisconnectedfromthewell,andformationwaters/brineflowedfromthefailedwellfromMay2011–Sept.2012(16months)beforebeingplugged.Thisisanunacceptableresponsetoawellcontrolincident,and

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callsintoquestiontheveracityofmanyofthewellcontrolassertionsmadeinthedocuments.Benthicimpactsfromthisincidentreportedlycontinuedforatleastfive(5)years.ItisnotknownwhetherthisfailurewaswidelyandaccuratelyreportedtotheIsraelipublic,government,orlenders,butclearlyitshouldhavebeeninvestigatedindetail,andtransparentlyreported.

19. TheprojectdoesnotpresentaCriticalOperationsandCurtailmentPlan

(COCP),BlowoutPreventionandResponsePlan,drillingmudandcementformulations,andsafetysystems(e.g.gasalarms)ondrillingrigstobeused(whichhadyettobeidentifiedinthedocumentsreviewed).

20. WhileNoblecommitstomeetU.S.andglobalbestpracticestandards,the

documentsdonotitemizetheinternationalstandardsandregulationsthecompanycommitstomeet,whichshouldincludespecificreferencetoallthoseoftheU.S.BureauofSafetyandEnvironmentalEnforcement(BSEE),AmericanPetroleumInstitute(API),AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(AMSE),AmericanNationalStandardsInstitute(ANSI),OfficeofPipelineSafety,TransportationSecurityAdministration,andtheEuropeanUnion’sDirective2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations.

21. Documentsdonotidentifywell-controlcontractorsthatwouldbecalled

upontointerveneinalossofwellcontrol.

22. Documentsdonotdetailareliefwellcontingencyplan,wherebyareliefwellwouldbedrilledfromanotherrigtointersectandbottom-killawellblowout.

23. DocumentsdonotprovideadequatedetailregardingtheSurfaceControlled

SubSurfaceValves(SCSSVs),andcontingenciesforfailureofconnectionwithsurfacecontrolsystems.

24. PipelineIntegrityManagementandLeakDetectionSystemsareinadequately

detailedinthedocuments.PetroleumcompaniesoperatinginIsraelmustberequiredtocomplywithinternationalbestpracticestandards,includingthoseoftheAmericanPetroleumInstitute(API),andtheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME).UnderU.S.regulation,aHighConsequenceArea(HCA)forpipelineoperationisdefinedasanyareawithsignificanthumanpopulation,navigablewaterways,oranenvironmentunusuallysensitivetospills.ItisrecommendedherethattheIsraeloffshoreandonshoreregionsbeconsideredaHighConsequenceArea(HCA),requiringthehighestBATstandardsforallpetroleuminfrastructure,includingwellandpipelinedesignfeatures,pipewallthickness,pipespacing,corrosionprotection,inspection,maintenance,etc.

25. TheGovernmentofIsraelshouldcommissionacomprehensivethird-party

IntegrityManagement(IM)assessmentofallexistingandplannedgasandcondensateinfrastructureinIsrael,offshoreandonshore;anditshould

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requirearigorous,continuousIMprogramforallpetroleuminfrastructure.ThisIMassessmentshouldbeconductedonallplannedoffshoregasdevelopment,includingLeviathan,AphroditeBlock12,Dalit,KarishandTanin,DanielEastandWest;andexistingdevelopmentsincludingTamar,Mari-BandNoa,HaderaDeepwaterLNGterminal,ShimshonGasField,andAphrodite/Ishai.Aswell,allonshorepetroleuminfrastructureshouldsubmittosuchacomprehensiveIMassessment.

26. ThefrequencyofunderwaterRemotelyOperatedVehicle(ROV)surveyson

seabedinfrastructureshouldbeincreasedfromannually,ascurrentlyplanned,toatleastmonthly.

27. ItisnotclearthatfireandexplosionriskontheLeviathanProduction

PlatformhasbeenadequatelyassessedandmitigatedviaFrontEndEngineeringDesign(FEED).Explosion/fireontheLPPisasignificantriskthatcouldresultincatastrophicconsequencesforhumansafetyandthenearshoreenvironment.Thismustbefurtherclarified.

Platformvs.FPSOorFLNG

28. TheoveralldesignselectedforLeviathaneliminatedoptionsforoffshoreFloatingProduction,Storage,andOffloading(FPSO),orFloatingLiquefiedNaturalGas(FLNG),inuseelsewhereintheworld,withoutadequateconsideration.AnFLNGfacility125kmoffshore,shippingLNGviashuttletankers,wouldeliminatemostnearshorerisksandimpactsinherentinthecurrentprojectdesign,whichincorporateshundredsofkmofseabedpipelinesandaplatform10kmoffshore.AndanFPSO,also125kmoffshore,evenwithseabedpipelinestransportinggastoshore,wouldalsoeliminatethesubstantialrisksposedbythenearshoreplatform.Inevaluatingalldesignoptionsfortheproject(includinganentirelyoffshoreoption),thedocumentsclaim:“Therewerenosignificantenvironmentaldifferentiatorsorshowstoppersidentifiedacrossalloftheviableoptions.”Thisiscategoricallyincorrect,astheoffshoreFPSOorFLNGoptionwouldsignificantlyreduceoreliminaterisksandimpactstothecontinentalshelfenvironmentandcoastalpublicsafety.Accordingly,thecurrentprojectshouldbesuspendedandtheFLNGorFPSOoptionreconsideredandadopted.

29. RegardingtherelativeenvironmentalbenefitofFLNGvs.onshore/near

shoreprocessing(ascurrentlyplannedinLeviathan),RoyalDutchShellstatedwithregardtoitsPreludeFLNGprojectoffthecoastofAustralia: “FLNGtechnologyofferscountriesamoreenvironmentally-sensitive waytodevelopnaturalgasresources.Preludewillhaveamuchsmaller environmentalfootprintthanland-basedLNGplants,whichrequire majorinfrastructureworks.Italsoeliminatestheneedforlongpipelines toland.”

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30. And,Energean’s2017KarishandTaninFieldDevelopmentPlanconcludesthatanFPSOoptionoffersseveraladvantagesovertheonshore/nearshoreprocessingoption,including:anFPSOminimizesworknecessaryinthefield,quickerdevelopmenttime,capitalexpenditureconsiderations,increasedopportunitiestoexport,tie-backofmultiple3rdpartyfields,reducedtechnicalrisk(e.g.hydrateformationinseabedpipelines),enhancedproductrecoveryfromfield,easeofabandonmentafterfieldisexhausted,andsignificantlyreducedenvironmentalfootprint.Evenwithseabedpipelinestransportingdrygastoshore,anFPSOisclearlyasaferoptionforthenearshoreandcoastalenvironment.NobleshouldexploreleasinganFPSOforinitialLeviathandevelopment,totie-intotheseabedpipelineinfrastructuretransportinggastoshoreandintotheINGLsystem.

31. Regardingrelativesecurityrisksofaplatformvs.FPSO/FLNGfacility,a

formerNobleEnergyofficialstatedasfollowstoa2011TelAvivconference: “Planningaterroristattackonanunprotectedoilplatformisassimple ascharteringboats,trainingdivers,andprovidingthemwiththe explosivesrequired.Optionstoreduceriskandmaximizeflexibility couldincludeusingafloatingplatformcapableofprocessinggasinto LNG.Allsecurityeffortswouldbeconcentratedatthedrilling platformandFLNGfacility,therebyreducingother,greaterrisksin naturalgasproductionandtransportation.”

SpillResponse

32. TheLeviathandocumentsoverstatethecapabilitytorespondto(contain/recover)anoffshorecondensaterelease.Itisgenerallyacceptedintheinternationalspillresponsecommunitythatthereexistsnocontainment/recoverymethodologythatwouldbeeffectiveforoffshorecondensate(ornaturalgas)releases.TheTechnicalLeadforOilSpillResponseLimited(OSRL)intheUK,whichisNoble’sTierIIIresponsecontractor,admittedthedifficultyinrespondingtocondensatespillsinareplytotheauthoronthissubject,stating:“Youarecorrectthatinthemajorityofcasesofgasorcondensatereleasesthenit’ssimplyamatterof‘Monitor&Evaluate’withnodirectintervention.”Theassumptionthatallgasandcondensatewillquicklyfloattotheseasurfaceisalsoincorrect,assomemayremainentrainedinmid-layerwatermasses(asinDeepwaterHorizon).

33. Chemicaldispersantsarenotknowntobeeffectiveinmostcondensate

releasescenarios,yettheLeviathanOilSpillContingencyPlan(OSCP)reliesondispersantapplicationasaprimaryresponsetool.Further,currentIsraelidispersantrestrictionsprohibitdispersantuseinwaterdepthslessthan20mdeep,orwithin1nauticalmileofsensitivecoastalhabitats.Thisrequirementneedstoberevisedtoprohibitdispersantuseinwaterslessthan200mdeep,orwithin10milesofshore.Theoperatorshouldberequiredtoconductlaboratorytestsoftheeffectivenessofdispersantson

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Leviathancondensate,anduntileffectivenesscanbedemonstrated,dispersantsshouldnotbeapprovedforuseonLeviathancondensatespills.

34. TheLeviathanOCSPhasinsufficientdiscussionoftransboundaryspill

responsearrangements(e.g.withLebanon,Egypt,Cyprus);in-situburningandignitionrisk;andwildliferesponseinaspill.

35. TheOCSPcontainsinadequatediscussionoftechnologiesavailableforspill

trackingandmonitoring,includingremotesensingtechnologiesandtrackingsubsurfacecontaminantplumes,anddoesnotadequatelyconsiderdispersionandsafetyissuesregardingvaporemissionsaboveacondensaterelease.

36. Thereisnodiscussionofpre-planningforconductinganenvironmental

damageassessment(NaturalResourceDamageAssessment,orNRDA)scienceprogramintheeventofamajorreleaseofgasorcondensate.

OtherSignificantIssues

37. Thereisnodiscussionofsecuringadequatefinancialliabilitycoveragefortheproject,includingenvironmentaldamageandunlimitedliabilityforgrossnegligence.Israelisapartytoseveraloftheinternationaloilpollutionliabilityregimes,butthesealoneareinsufficient.Israelshouldconsideradditionalliabilityrequirementstomotivateresponsiblecorporatebehavior.

38. IfthecurrentdesignmovesforwardwiththeLeviathanProductionPlatform

(LPP)10kmoffshore,theprojectshouldberequiredtouseeitherProducedWaterReinjection(PWRI)asBAT,ortobuildadischargepipelinefromtheLPPoffshoretoatleast500mdepth(about10kmfurtheroffshore),fromwhichtodischargeproducedwaterfurtherfromshoreandbeneaththephoticzone/thermocline,reducingimpacttothecontinentalshelfecosystem.

39. Theprojectestimateofabout19milliontonsCO2emissionsoverthe30+

yearlifetimeoftheprojectconstitutesadramaticunderestimate.Ifthetotaltheamountofnaturalgasprojectedtobeproduced(22Tcf)fromtheprojectisconsidered,totalCO2emissionsresultingfromtheprojectwouldexceed1.2billiontons.TheGovernmentofIsraelshouldestablishacarbontaxofatleast$60/tonCO2e(comparabletoNorway)onallcarbonemissions.

40. Securityriskoftheproject,particularlyfortheLPPandonshore

infrastructure,isnotsufficientlyconsidered.SecurityriskalonearguesagainsttheLPPoption,infavoroftheFLNGoption125kmoffshore.

41. TheStakeholderEngagementPlan(SEP)reliesonconventionalpassive

engagement,whichisineffective.AstheGovernmentofIsraelisbothfinancialbeneficiaryandregulatoroftheproject,ithasconflictofinterestin

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providingeffectiveoversightonitsown.Tocorrectthis,theprojectshouldberequiredtoestablishwell-funded,representativeIsraelOffshoreCitizens’AdvisoryCouncil,toauthenticallyempowerallstakeholdersinworkingwithindustryandgovernmenttoprovideoversightoftheproject.

42. TheIsraeligovernmentshouldestablishasufficienttaxandroyaltyregime

forrevenuefromitsfinitehydrocarbonresources,collectingatleast50%ofgrossrevenues,andestablishingapetroleumsavingsfundwithatleast50%ofannualgovernmentrevenuedepositedasanIsraelPermanentFund.SomegovernmenthydrocarbonrevenuesshouldbededicatedtosubsidizingarenewableenergytransitioninIsrael.

Giventheabovesubstantiveconcerns,itismyrespectfulrecommendationthattheGovernmentofIsraelsuspendpermittingfortheLeviathanproject,pendingsatisfactoryresolutionofallissuesraisedherein.Inparticular,theLeviathanprojectshouldberedesignedtoeliminatethenearshoreLeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP)andextensiveseabedpipelineinfrastructure,optinginsteadforeitheranFLNGfacilityoffshoreatthegas/condensatefield125kmoffshore,anduseofshuttletankerstodeliverLNGandcondensatetoIsraelandothermarkets;oralternatively,anFPSOattheoffshoregas/condensatefield,transportingcondensateviashuttletankersanddrygasviaseabedpipelinetoshore.WhileFPSOorFLNGoptionswouldposedifferentrisksthatmustbeaddressed,onbalanceeitherwoulddramaticallyreducenearshorerisksandimpactsoftheproject.

Clearly,themostenvironmentallyresponsibleoptionforLeviathandevelopmentisforNobletodesignandconstructanFLNGfacility.Alternatively,inordertoavoidconstructiondelays,thecompanyshouldconsiderleasinganFPSOforinitialdevelopment,andtie-intoitsseabedgaspipelinesystem(inconstruction)totransportgastoshoreandtheINGLsystem,andcondensateviatanker.NobleshouldofferitsnewlyconstructedLPPforsaletoanotheroffshoregasprojectelsewhere.

Inaddition,manysystems-criticaltechnicaldetailsarenotreported,redacted,ornotadequatelydetailedintheLeviathandocuments.Allofthismustberemediedbeforetheprojectproceeds.2. IntroductionThisIndependentExpertOpinionwascommissionedbyGuardiansoftheCoastalPlain,Citizen’sCoalitionAgainstCondensate;HomelandGuards;andZalulEnvironmentalAssociation;non-governmentalorganizationsinIsrael.ThegroupsrequestedindependenttechnicalreviewofseveralspecificaspectsoftheLeviathanOffshoreGasProjectnowindevelopmentofftheIsraelicoast,specificallyfocusingontheenvironmentalrisksofacondensatereleasefromtheproject.Theauthor

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confirmsthatneitherGuardiansoftheCoastalPlain,HomelandGuards,Zalul,oranyothergroup-government,industryorcivilsociety-assertedanyeditorialcontroloverthisindependentopinion.Thisreviewwaslimitedtothedocumentstranslatedandprovidedtotheauthor,andcompletedwithoutconductingasitevisittoIsrael.Documentsprovidedforreviewincludedthefollowing:

• SupplementalLenderInformationPackage(2016);• DrillingEIA:EnvironmentalImpactReportforProduction,Drilling,

ProductionTests,andCompletion–LeviathanField(2016);• DrillLeviathanEIAAmendment(2017);• ProductionEIA:EnvironmentalImpactAssessmentforInstallation,

OperationandMaintenanceofpipelinesandSubmarineSystemsforLeviathanFieldDevelopment;

• LeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP)EIA:TAMA37HNOP(NationalOutlinePlan),EIAOffshoreSection;

• OnshoreEIA:TAMA37HEIANOP,OnshoreSection;• RelevantAppendices6.1,6.4,6.9toaboveEIAs;• LPPEMMP:EnvironmentalManagementandMonitoringProgram

(EMMP)Civil2andMechanic1;• MarineEMMPNo.1,Appendix6.1• OPICInformationSummaryforthePublic;• LayoutandPlanningofNGInfrastructureinIsraelfromOffshoretoLand

(IsraelMOE);• RatioOilExplorationPartnershipPresentation(2014);• NobleEnergyMediterraneanLtd.(NEML)OilSpillContingencyPlan(Jan.

2018);• NOP37/HOffshoreProcessingScheme(PDI)FacilitiesDescription&

QuantificationofEmissionsandDischarges;• Leviathan4–EnvironmentalMonitoringProgramPost-DrillSurvey

(2013);• EnvironmentalImpactReportforProductionDrilling,ProductionTests,

andCompletion–LeviathanField(2016).Asofthiswriting,thecurrentstatusofprojectdevelopmentandpermittingremainsuncleartotheauthor.Theprojectschedulelistedinthe2016DrillingEIAstatesthatoffshorewelldrillingandcompletionwouldbeunderwayatthistime.TheauthorwasrecentlyinformedthatconstructionoftheLPPhasbeencompletedinHoustonTexas(USA),andtheplatformisnowawaitingtow-outtotheselectedsiteoffshoreIsrael.Aswell,apparentlyseveralofthewellshavebeendrilledandcompleted.Yet,thereismuchdetailonthisunavailabletotheauthor,suchasdetailedApplicationsforPermittoDrill(APDs).Thisinformationgappresentedasignificanthandicaptoacomprehensivereviewoftheproject.

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TheLeviathandocumentsreviewedarepoorlyintegrated,redundant,inconsistent,andcontainseveralerrors(e.g.units),makingitdifficultforthepublictoeasilyaccessthemostsignificantinformationabouttheproject.The2016SupplementalLenderInformationPackage,orothersummarydocument,shouldhavemethodicallysynthesizedandclarifiedallrisksandmitigationfortheproject,inparticularWorstCaseDischargecondensate/gasreleasesoffshore,butfailedtodoso.

Finally,whilethisreviewfocusesonthefailuresandinsufficienciesoftheLeviathandocuments,itisofferedrespectfully,andinthesincerehopethatitwillassistIsraelicivilsociety,theGovernmentofIsrael,thecompanies,andpotentiallendersbetterunderstandtherisksinvolvedintheproject,thepotentialeffectivenessofproposedriskmitigationmeasures,andcontributetoinformeddecisions.ThisreviewisofferedinrecognitionofIsrael’slaudablegoalofsecuringenergyindependence.Theauthor’sprofessionalexperienceinenvironmentalaspectsofoffshoreenergydevelopmentandoilspillsissummarizedinAppendixI.Theauthorlooksforwardtoworkingwiththepublic,government,andoperatorstomakeLeviathanassafeaspossible.3. LeviathanProjectSummaryTheLeviathanOffshoreGasprojectplanstodevelopadeepwaterhydrocarbonreservoirintheeasternMediterraneanSea125kmoffthenorthcoastofIsrael.OwnershipoftheLeviathangasfieldincludesNobleEnergyMediterraneanLimited(39.66%),RatioOilExploration(1992)LimitedPartnership(15%),DelekDrillingLimitedPartnership(22.67%),andAvnerOilExploration–LimitedPartnership(22.67%).NoblewillbetheoperatorofLeviathan.TheLeviathanprojectisoneofseveraloffshoregasprojectsoperatingorindevelopmentoffIsrael,includingTamar,Mari-BandNoa,HaderaDeepwaterLNGterminal,ShimshonGasField,Aphrodite/Ishai,AphroditeBlock12,Dalit,KarishandTanin,andDanielEastandWest.TheLeviathanprojectenvisionsproducinganestimated22trillioncubicfeet(Tcf)ofnaturalgas,39.4millionbarrels(bbls)ofcondensate,andpotentiallyseveralhundredmillionbblsofcrudeoil(beneaththegas/condensatereservoir).Thegas/condensatereservoirliesabout5,170mbeneaththeseabed,inwaterdepthsfrom1,540m–1,800m(totalmeasureddepthfromseasurfacetoreservoirofabout7,000m).Reservoirformationpressureisexpectedtobeapproximately590bar(8,557psi)withatemperatureof140°C,approachingconditionsofHighPressure/HighTemperature(HP/HT)reservoirs,thusrequiringstringentsafetymeasures.TheLeviathandevelopmentplancallsforeightinitialwells(6newand2sidetrackoffexistingtwowells,Leviathan3and4)andupto29totalwellsoverprojectlifeof30+years.TheinitialproductionwellswillbedrilledbytwoDynamically

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Positioned(DP)rigs,eithersemi-submersibleordrillship,andareexpectedtotakeatotalof556daystocomplete.Naturalgasandcondensateproductionwillflowtogetherfromtheeight(8)initialhigh-ratedeepwaterwellheads,through14”diameterinfieldflowlinestoaseabedInfieldGatheringManifoldin1,629mdepth,about10kminshorefromthewellheads.Thisseabedgatheringmanifoldwillbeconnectedbytwo(2)18”pipelines(totheDomesticSupplyModule),andone(1)20”pipeline(totheRegionalExportModule)transiting117kmtothenearshoreprocessingplatform,theLeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP)onthecontinentalshelfat87mwaterdepth,about10kmoffthecoastatDor.Two(2)6”MonoEthyleneGlycol(MEG)pipelineswillcarryMEGfromtheplatformtothedeepwaterwellheadsforcontinuoushydrate(ice-likemethanecrystals)inhibition(twoareusedforredundancyinthisproduction-criticalcomponent).ThesubseaproductionsystemwillbecontrolledfromtheLPP,viaanopenloop,multiplexedelectrohydraulicsystemconnectedthroughasingle4”umbilicallinerunningfromtheLPPtotheinfieldcontrolSubseaDistributionUnit(SDU),fromwherecontrolwillextendbyadditionalumbilicalstoremotelyoperatedvalvesatthewells.Leviathanproductionratesareexpectedtobeginat1.2billioncubicfeet(MMMscf)/dayofnaturalgas,andbetween2,500-7,630barrelsperday(bpd)ofcondensate,toexistingmarketsinIsrael,Jordan,andthePalestinianAuthority,andexpandto2.1MMMscf/dayofgaswhenadditionalmarketsmature.TheprojectalsoenvisionsthepossibilityofconnectingtheLeviathanwellstotheAphroditeBlock12gasfieldnowindevelopmentintheEEZofCyprus,about45kmtothewest,forexporttoCyprus.Afterdewatering,separation,andcondensatestabilizationattheLPP,recoverednaturalgaswillflowthrougha32”seabedpipeline,andcondensatethrougha6”seabedpipeline,toanonshorecoastalvalvestationatDor,fromwheregaswillentertheIsraelNaturalGasLine(INGL)pipelinesystem,andcondensatewillalsotransportviatheINGLandviapipelinethroughHagittorefineriesatHaifa.Alltogether,theprojectisexpectedtoinclude352.5kmofsubseaproductionpipelines,235kmofMEGsupplylines,and117.5kmofelectrohydraulicumbilicalsforsurfacecontrol(electricalandhydraulic)ofsubseaproductioninfrastructure.4. Condensate-GeneralCharacteristicsCondensates,alsocalledNaturalGasCondensates(NGCs),areacomplexmixtureofhydrocarbons(pentaneandhigherhomologues)associatedwithmanynaturalgasreservoirs.1Whileunderpressureinthegeologicreservoir,theyaregenerallyinagaseousstate.Ascondensatesareproducedalongwithnaturalgasfromthereservoirandpressuredrops,theycondenseintoaliquidphase.Thiscondensation

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generallyoccursduringproductionatthewellhead,gasprocessingplants,oringaspipelines.NGCsconsistofhydrocarbonssuchasalkanes,isoalkanes,cycloalkanes,andaromaticswithintherangeofC2–C30,mainlyfallingbetweenC5andC15(includinglowboilingpointnaphthas,suchasgasoline).Condensatesarealsoreferredtoasnaturalgasliquids(NGLs).Bycomparison,naturalgasiscomprisedlargely(99%)ofmethanegas,andcrudeoilmuchheavierfluidhydrocarbons,againdifferingbetweenreservoirsandevenatdifferentlocationswithinreservoirs.NGCsmaycontainover100differenthydrocarbons,includingbenzene,toluene,ethylene,xylene(BTEX),andpolycyclicaromatichydrocarbons(PAHs).Somearesimilartolightcrudeoilsabsentheavierasphaltenes.2Condensatesexhibithighvariabilitybetweendifferentreservoirs.APIGravityisaninversemeasureofpetroleumdensityrelativetowater--thegreatertheAPIGravity,thelessdensetheliquid.PetroleumliquidswithAPIGravitylessthan10areheavierthanseawaterandsink.PetroleumisgenerallyclassifiedastoAPIGravityasfollows:HeavyoilAPI0-20;MediumoilAPI20-40;LightoilAPI35-55;condensateAPI50-85;andLNG/CNGAPI80-90.APIGravitymeasuresforLeviathancondensatearereportedat43.2,althoughAPIGravityof34.2isusedforsomeLeviathanspillmodels.Thisisheavierthanmostcondensate.CondensatesdiscussedintheCanadaScreeningAssessmentrangedfromAPI39.9(SpecificGravity0.83)toAPI78.1(SpecificGravity0.67);viscosityrangedfrom0.41cP(centipoise–dynamicviscosity)to2.7cP;andwatersolubilityrangedfrominsolubleto74.7mg/L.3CondensateswithAPI39.9weighapproximately824kg/m3;whilethoseofAPI78.1weigh660kg/m3.Condensatescontainbetween0.15%-3.6%ofthecarcinogenbenzene,averagingabout1%,andexhibitvaryingdegreesofsolubilityandviscosity.4CompositionofLeviathancondensateisexpectedtobepredominantlyC13–C19(24.46%),Octanes(10.26%),C30+(10.07%),C11(9.93%),Heptanes(8.25%),n-Nonane(7.59%),andn-Decane(7.01%).5Condensatesaregenerallyhighlyvolatileandmoderately(andvariably)solubleinwater.TheBTEXcomponentcontributesmostofthesolubilityofcondensates,withbenzenebeinghighlysoluble(upto1,790mg/L).Solubilityofthecomplexcondensatemixtureisoftendifferentthanitisfortheindividualcomponentsalone,thusthereisasynergisticeffectonsolubility.6Condensatesareusedfordilutingheavycrudeoil,andrefineryfeedstockforgasoline,jetfuel,andotherindustrialuses.Worldproductionisnowapproximatelynine(9)millionbbls/day(bpd),andincreasingbyabout3%/yr.Whilemostcondensatespillsatseaaresmall,from1–70bbls,therehavebeenatleasttwoverylargecondensatespillsatsea:

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1.1980,JuanAntonioLavellejacollidedwithabreakwaterintheport ofArzew,Algeria,spillingareported28,000tonsofcondensate.

2.2018SanchicondensatetankerdisasterintheEastSeaoffChina (ship-to-shipcollisionandsinkingwithallhands),releasingitsentire cargoofapprox..113,000tonsofIraniancondensate–thelargestcondensate releaseinthehistoricrecord.

Unfortunately,neitheroftheselargemarinecondensatespillswassubjectedtocomprehensiveenvironmentaldamageassessment.Condensateislight,volatile,andacutelytoxic(inconcentrationslessthan1ppm).Condensatebehavesverydifferentlythancrudeoilwhenspilled,asitisnotknowntoformdistinctandvisiblesurfaceslicksaswithcrudeoilspills.Whiletheimpactontheseasurfacemaybeless,theimpactofthedissolvedorentrainedfractioninthesubsurfacewatercolumnecosystemmaybeacuteandserious.Thedissolvedanddispersedhydrocarbonplumewouldbesubmergedandnotvisibleattheseasurface.Ifthecondensateignites,muchofthehydrocarbonwilldisperseatmosphericallyasburnedparticulatesinthesmokeplume,butburnresiduemayalsosettleontheseasurfaceandpotentiallylenditselftocontainmentandrecovery.Thedissolvedorentrainedfractionofthecondensatereleasedwouldformanacutelytoxic,three-dimensionalplumethatdispersesanddiluteswithwatercurrents.Althoughtheyaregenerallylesspersistentthanheaviercrudeoilspills,condensatehydrocarbonscanpersistformonths(dependingonwater/airtemperature,dispersionrate,biodegradation,etc.).Whenreleasedattheseasurface,mostcondensatewillvolatilize(evaporateintoagaseousphasetotheatmosphere),andtheremainderwilldissolveinseawater,emulsify(generallyintounstableemulsions),adheretosuspendedparticulates,biodegrade,weather,anddispersewithwatercurrents.Thewater-solublefraction(WSF)ofcondensateissimilartolightcrudeoils,withlightpolycyclicaromatichydrocarbons(PAHs)dominant.7Mostscientificinformationonthefateandeffectsofcondensatespillsderivesfromsmallsurfacereleases.However,whencondensateisreleasedbeneaththeseasurface(suchasfromafailureintheLeviathandeepwateroffshoreproductioninfrastructure),ahigherpercentageofthecondensatewilldissolveasitdriftstowardtheseasurface.Thisisparticularlytrueifthereleaseoccursfromthedeepwaterwellheadsandpipelinesat1600-1800mdepth.SomecondensatereleasedatdepthsinvolvedintheLeviathanprojectmayevenentrainindeepwatermasses,suchasthehighersalinityLevantineIntermediateWaterbelow200m,orMediterraneanDeepWaterbelow800m,andremaininthesewatersforsometime.

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Indeepwaterreleases,whilelargedroplets(upto5mmdiameter)willrisewithinhourstotheseasurface,smalldroplets(to0.5mm)willrisemoreslowly,takinguptoadaytosurface.8AsreportedbySINTEFfordeepwater(below1000m)releases:

“Finedroplets(below100microns)maystayinthewaterforweeksoreven month(s)beforetheyeventuallyreachthesurface.However,factorslike verticalturbulencemixinginthewatercolumn,densitystratificationand crossflowswillcontributetokeepsuchfinesmalldropletssubmergedfor evenprolongedperiods(Johansenetal.,2003).”

Thisdynamicispreciselywhatoccurredwithmuchofthe400,000tonsofmethaneandsmalloildropletsreleasedalongwithoilfromthe2010DeepwaterHorizonblowoutintheU.S.GulfofMexico.9Mostofthishugevolumeofmethanedidnot,aspreviouslyexpected,reachtheseasurfaceandatmosphere,butinsteadremainedentrainedinlargesubsurfaceplumesdriftingwithmid-watercurrents.Thesesubsurfacemethaneplumesremainedintactinthewatercolumnformonths,leadingtosignificantenhancementinmethanotrophicbacterialproduction,oxygendepletion,andwasultimatelytakenupbyplanktoninmidwaterdepths.SuchaphysicaldynamicispossibleforadeepwaterLeviathanrelease,butwasnotconsideredintheEIAdocuments.Thereislittleavailableresearchregardingtheeffectofwaterpressureatthesedepthsoncondensatereleasebehavior,dissolution,orecologicaleffects.ThisrepresentsasignificantgapinpredictingecologicaleffectsofamajordeepwatercondensatereleasefromLeviathan.Regardless,itisevidentthatadeepwaterreleaseofcondensatefromtheLeviathanprojectwouldbeexpectedtocausefargreaterimpactonthepelagic(watercolumn)ecosystemthanwouldareleaseattheseasurface.Duetoitsvolatility,thepersistenceofsignificantcondensateontheseasurfaceisexpectedtobeshortterm,fromdaystoweeks.However,studieshaveshownthatspilledgasoline(acomponentof,andsurrogatefor,condensate)canhaveahalf-lifeofupto6monthsinwater.10Somecomponents,includingtheheavieraromatics,alkanes,andPAHs,haveshownhalf-livesexceeding6monthsinwaterandmorethanayearinsediments.Theseheavier,lipophiliccomponentsarealsopronetobioaccumulation.And,weatheredcondensateontheseasurfaceandshorelinewilldegrademoreslowly.Environmentalimpactsofcondensatespillscanincludelethalandsub-lethalinjuryacrossallcomponentsofamarineecosystem,includingplankton,fish,benthicinvertebrates,seabirds,andmarinemammals.Condensateisabsorbedintomarineorganismsthroughingestion,respiration,anddirectcontact(e.g.throughgilltissuesoffish).Acutetoxicityisreportedinsomemarinespeciesexposedtoconcentrationsofweatheredcondensateaslowas0.03mg/L(0.04ppm,or40ppb).11Thisisconsideredahightoxicity.Similartoxicityresultsarereportedforheavycondensatesaswell.Withsuchtoxicity,monitoringmustachievehigh

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sensitivityandanalyticprecision,yetnoanalyticdetailswereprovidedinLeviathandocuments.Water-solublefractionsofcondensatehavebeenshowntobetoxictocorallarvae,leadingtoincreasedmortality,reproductiveinjury,delayedmetamorphosis,andreducedgrowth.12Theseresultssuggestsignificantrisktoearlylifestagesoforganisms(e.g.fishlarvae,plankton,etc.)inthepelagicecosystem.Subsurfacecondensatereleases,wherevolatilizationisgreatlyreduced,wouldbeexpectedtoexertfargreatertoxicityonmarineorganismsthansurfacereleases.Ofparticularinteresthereisthatinmoststudies,weatheredcondensate(over48hours)exertedfargreatertoxicitythanfreshcondensate.13Inadditiontotheknowncarcinogenbenzeneincondensate,othercomponentsoftoxicologicalconcernincluden-hexane(neurotoxicity),toluene(ototoxicity),ethylbenzene(possiblycarcinogenic),xyleneandn-pentane.Epidemiologicalstudiesinpetroleumworkershavereportedincreasesinincidenceandmortalityfromleukemia,skincancer,kidneycancer,andlungcancerinpetroleumworkers.14Aone-dayexposuretocondensate-contaminatedsurfacewateronaranchinCalifornialedtothedeathsof30sheepovera21-dayperiod,duetoaspirationpneumonia,myocardialnecrosis,renaldamage,andmeningealedema.15Onecanbroadlyextrapolatesuchacutetoxicityifmarinemammalsandbirdsaredirectlyexposedtohighconcentrationsofcondensate.Beyondtheseacutelytoxiceffectstomarineorganisms,ecologicalimpactscanlastconsiderablylongerthantheenvironmentalpersistencetimeofcondensate.Thishasbeenproveninoilspills,suchasecologicalimpactsfromthe1989ExxonValdezoilspillpersistingtoday,almost30yearslater.16Ifamajorcondensatereleaseimpactsreproductioninlong-livedmarineanimals,forinstancemarinemammals,effectscanpersistforseveralgenerations.Itispossiblethatimpactstogeneticallydistinctpopulationsoflong-livedmarineanimals(e.g.whales),withlimitedsizeandrange,canbepermanent.ThishasbeenreportedinonekillerwhalepopulationinAlaska(AT1),thatwasheavilyimpactedbytheExxonValdezspill,andisnowexpectedtogoextinctduetothelossofallreproductivefemalesfromthesmallpopulationinthespill.17TheEnvironmentCanadasynthesissummarizescondensate(NaturalGasCondensate)ecotoxicityasfollows: “Basedontheavailableinformation,NGCscontaincomponentsthatmay persistinairandundergolong-rangeatmospherictransport.Theyalso containcomponentsthatmaypersistinsoil,waterand/orsedimentforlong periodsoftime,thusincreasingthedurationofexposuretoorganisms.NGCs arealsoexpectedtocontaincomponentsthatarehighlybioaccumulative. Studiessuggestthatmostcomponentswillnotlikelybiomagnifyinfood webs;however,thereissomeindicationthatalkylatedPAHsmight.”18

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Thus,condensatereleasesareconsideredasignificantenvironmentalrisk.5. LeviathanOilSpillModelsTwoindependentoilspillmodelingapproacheswereusedfortheLeviathanproject:1.OSCAR(OilSpillContingencyandResponse),developedbytheNorwegianNavalResearchInstitute(SINTEF),andconductedfortheLeviathanprojectbyGenesis.2.MEDSLIK,developedbytheOceanographicInstituteofCyprus,tailoredtoMediterraneanSeaconditions,conductedfortheLeviathanprojectbyDr.SteveBrennerofBarIlanUniversity.Bothmodelsappearrobustanduseful.However,theinputspillvolumesthatweremodeledshouldberevisedsignificantlyupwardforaWorstCaseDischarge(seebelow).Duetotheorganizationofthedocumentsandanalyses,itisdifficulttosummarizeandevaluatethevariousworstcasedischargeestimates.Aswell,severalunitsindocumentsareincorrect,confusingm3forbbls(e.g.condensatestorageontheLPP),oroiledshorelinemeasurementsofm3/kmform3.The2016SupplementalLenderInformationPackage(SLIP)shouldhavemethodicallysynthesized,corrected,andclarifiedallofthespillmodelingresultsfromallprojectdocuments,butfailedtodoso.Thismakesitextremelydifficultforthepublictounderstandthepotentialspillvolumesfromtheproject.Thefollowingstatement,fromtheLPPEMMP,isincorrectandmisleading(emphasisadded): “Itisimportanttoemphasizethatthedatainthetablesbelowrepresents themostextremescenarios,anddoesnottakeintoaccounttheexpected interventionoftheCompanyanditscontractorsinordertomitigatethe damage.Inpractice,theimplementationoftheCompany’semergencyplan willallowthetakingofavarietyofactionsinordertodealwiththespill, whichwillenableasignificantmitigationofitseffect.Inviewofthe platform'sproximitytothecoastline,thedepthofthewaterandtheexisting naturalreservesinthearea,mostofthespillagecollectionactivitieswill concernmechanicalmeasuresandpreparationsforthemitigationofthe damagetothecoastline,ShoreLineCleanupandAssessmentTechnique (SCAT),dependingonthecoasttype,sensitivelanduse,etc.” First,modeledspillvolumesdonotrepresent“mostextremescenarios”(seebelow).Next,theclaimthatspillresponse“willenableasignificantmitigationofitseffects,”isalsonotsupportable.Thementionof“mechanicalmeasures”forcondensateresponseisnotrealistic(seeOSCPsectionbelow).APIGravityforLeviathancondensateisreportedat43.2,althoughAPIGravityof34.2isusedforsomeLeviathanspillmodels.Thisissignificantlyheavierthancondensate,more

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appropriateformediumcrudeoils,andthususeofthisAPIgravitymayhaveskewedspilldispersionmodels.Thisshouldbeevaluated.Andthespillmodelsdonotadequatelyaccountformidwaterentrainmentofsmall(lessthan100micron)condensatedropletsfromdeepwaterinfrastructure,oradherenceofcondensatestosedimentinnearshoreandshorelineoilingsituations.5.1 DrillingTheMEDSLIKmodelassumesatotalcondensatereleaseof857m3x30days=25,110m3,with37%evaporatinginfirst2days,leaving15,819m3ontheseasurface.Thistotalreleasewouldbeapproximately170,748bbls(whichcanberoundedto170,000bbls).Themodelpredictsthatattheendof30days,44%ofthisoffshorecondensatespillwillhaveevaporated,leaving56%(95,619bbls)inthemarineenvironment.Itmustbenotedthat,whilethemodeleddieselspillvolumewasreported(8,415.3m3),themodeledvolumecondensatespillwasredactedfromtheDrillingEIA.However,thedatawasretrievable,andtheredactedcondensatereleasevolumewassetat857m3(5,827bbls)/dayx30days.Itishighlyunusualandunacceptabletoredactthismodeledreleasevolume,andraisesanumberofveryseriousconcernsregardingthetransparencyoftheproject(seeredactiondiscussionbelow).Assuminganaveragesurfaceslickthicknessof1micron–0.04micron,areaofsurfacecontaminationisestimatedfrom15,819km2to395,475km2.Ataconversionfactorof6.8bbls/m3,themodeled25,110m3releasewouldtotal170,748bbls.However,inAppendixNoftheDrillingEIA,themodeledcondensateblowoutrateisreportedtobe5,264bbls/dayx30days,totaling157,920bbls.Thereasonforthediscrepancyisunclear,butlikelyduetoaconversiondifference(fromm3tobbl).Regardless,thesetotalreleasevolumesarerelativelyclosetooneanother.ItissimilarlyunclearwhyslightlydifferentAPIgravitymeasureswereusedinvariousmodels.TheMEDSLIKmodelisrigorousandusefulinprovidingageneralunderstandingofexpectedfateforalargecondensaterelease.However,twosignificantissueswiththemodelare:

1.Themodeledvolumedischarge(857m3x30days=25,710m3)isclearly notaWorstCaseDischarge(WCD)scenario;and

2.Theassumptionthat:“Theslickisassumedtobepositivelybuoyantand risesinstantaneouslytothesurfacewhereitfloatsandisdispersedbythe currentsandthewinds,”isnotnecessarilyavalidassumption.

Itisunclearhowthe857m3/day(5,827bbls)andthe30-daytotalreleaseperiodwereselectedforthemodelingexercise.Bycomparison,theflowratefromthe

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DeepwaterHorizonblowoutintheUSGulfofMexico(fromtheMacondoreservoiratcomparabledepthandpressureasLeviathan)averaged62,000barrelsperday(bpd)over87days,foratotalreleaseofestimatedat4.9millionbbls,withsurfacecontaminationultimatelycovering180,000km2.The2009MontaraoilandgasplatformblowoutinnorthwestAustraliacontinuedfromAug.21–Nov.3,atotalof74days,atanestimatedrateof2,000bpd,foratotalreleaseof4,500m3–34,000m3(30,600bbls–231,200bbls).AndthePointThomsongas/condensatefieldonAlaska’sNorthSlopemodeleda27,000bpdx15dayscondensatespill,foratotalreleaseof405,000bbls.19Total’sElgingasandcondensateblowoutintheScottishNorthSeaisanotherexampleofahightemperature/highpressuregasblowoutthatcontinuedlongerthan30days.TheElginwellblewoutduringplugandabandonmentproceduresonMar.25,2012,releasing7millioncf/dayofmethaneintotheNorthSeaforover7weeks,untilmudandcementpumpingintoareliefwellwascompletedMay16,2012.20Theblowoutwasattributedtocorrosionofthewellcasing.Giventherelativesimilaritiesinreservoirdepthandpressure,Leviathanmodelsshouldassumethataworsecasedischarge(WCD)condensatereleasefromoneofLeviathan’sdeepwaterwellscouldcontinueforaslongas,andbeaslargeas,anyoftheseblowouts.Infact,giventhereported2011blowoutoftheexploratoryLeviathan2wellwhiledrilling,whichcontinuedfor16monthsuntilplugged,acorrespondinglylongertimeperiodforawellheadblowoutshouldbemodeled.Ataminimum,atleasttwicethereleaseperiod(60days)shouldbemodeledforaLeviathanblowout.Aswell,itmustbenotedthat16monthstoregaincontrolofafailedwellisanunacceptablelengthoftime,andthiscallsintoquestiontheeffectivenessofNobleandDelek’swellcontrolcapabilities.

Astothefateofcondensatereleasedfromadeepwaterwell,somecouldbecomeentrainedindeepormid-levelwatermasses(e.g.underthethermoclineorbelow200m)forsometimepost-release.Indeed,elsewhereinthediscussionitispredictedthatasubstantialamount-e.g.14%-wouldremaindispersed(verticallymixed)inthewatercolumn.Onthemodeledreleaseof170,000bbls,thatwouldbe23,800bbls.OnalargerWCDreleaseof350,000bbls,thiswouldbe47,600bblsofcondensateremaininginthewatercolumn.

Andthestatement:“Ingeneralthemainconcernistheamountandlocationoftheoilthatwillpotentiallyreachthecoast,”betraysanunreasonable(yetconventional)shorelineoilingbiasinsuchoilspillimpactassessments.Infact,fromanecologicalstandpoint,thegreatestconcernfromalargeoffshorecondensatereleaseisfortheoffshorepelagicecosystem,nottheshoreline.TheEasternMediterraneancontinentalshelfecosystemisauniqueandfragilebiologicalsystemthatcouldbeseriouslyimpactedbysuchamajorpollutionevent.

TheMEDSLIKmodelprojectsthat15.8%oftheoffshoresurfacecontaminationfromtheDrillingcondensatespillwillreachshore,contaminating388kmofshoreline,

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withupto941bbls/kmofshoreline,fromtheshoresofEgypttoSyria.Butagainadiscrepancyisthatinoneplacethemodelprojects2,000m3onshore,yetTable4-8intheDrillingEIAprojects13,000m3onshore.[Note:Table4-8actuallystates13,000m3/kmtoreachshore,whichseemstobeanerrorinunits].Importantly,theMEDSLIKmodelforthedrillingcondensatereleaseprojectsonly44%ofthecondensatebeingevaporatedattheendof30days.Thus,56%wouldremaininthemarineenvironmentforaconsiderablylongerperiod.Andgiventhediscussionaboveregardingreportsthatweatheredcondensateisfarmoretoxicthanfreshcondensate,thisrepresentsasignificantgapintheeffectsanalysis.Givenalloftheabovepoints,itisrecommendedherethattheprojectmodela350,000bblcondensatereleaseduringLeviathanoffshoredrilling,twicethatincurrentmodels.

5.2 Production(subseapipeline,wellheadstoLPP)FortheProduction(seabedpipeline)phase,themodeledWorstCaseDischargewasapproximately1,220bbls–1,320(194m3)bbls,basedontotalpipelineinventory+5minutestoshut-inthepipeline.ThisrepresentsasignificantunderestimateofpotentialWorstCaseDischargevolume,andshouldberevisedupward.Thisunderestimatederivesfromtheassumptionthatafailedpipelinewillbedetectedandpromptlyshut-inwithproperfunctioningoftheSurfaceControlledSubSurfaceValve(SCSSV)systemfromtheLeviathanProductionPlatform.Upondetection,operatorswouldclosetheInfieldGatheringManifold(IGM),relevantsubsurfaceisolationvalves(SSIV),andthetopsidesafetyvalvesattherisertie-inpoint.Thescenarioassumescompletepipelineisolationin2minutesor5minutes.Thisignoresotherpipelinefailurescenarios,includingafailureindetectionsensorsystemsorlostconnectivitywithinthesystem.Allofsuchisarealpossibilitythatmustbeevaluatedandmitigated.Again,themodeledscenarioassumesthegaswillallrisetothesurfaceandevaporatetotheatmosphere.“…thegaswilleventuallyleavethewatercolumnandentertheatmosphere”(p.16D).ButasintheDeepwaterHorizonrelease,thismaynotbethecase.Smalldropletsofcondensate/gasmixture(lessthan100microns)canremaininthewatercolumnforweeksormonths.ThespillscenariomodeledfortheProductionphasedramaticallyunderstatesthepotentialreleaseofgasand/orcondensatefromacatastrophicseabedpipelinefailure.

5.3 LeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP)DifferentdischargescenariosareusedbythetwomodelsforcondensatespillsfromtheLPP.TheOSCARmodelusesa1,000bblspill,andMEDSLIKusesa100,000bblspillfromapotentialFSO(FloatingStorageandOffloading)tanker/facilityassociatedwithaplatform(NOP37/H–Guidelines).However,theWorstCase

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DischargefromacondensatetankfailureontheLPPwouldbefivetimeslargerthanthe1,000bblsmodeled.InaMay5,2018letter,MoEPstatedasfollows: “Thetotalamountofcondensateexpectedtobestoredintheplatformand pipelinestotheshorewillnotexceed5300barrels(850m3).”21Thus,althoughtheFSOcondensatestorageoptionwasnotselectedinthefinalLPPdesign,thelossof5300bblsofcondensatefromatankfailureontheLPPrepresentsaWorstCaseDischargeandshouldbemodeled.Elsewhere,OSCARmodelsaverysmallcondensaterelease,only15.9bblsand75tonsofgas(ChapterD,p14).Thisisbasedonatotalreleasetimeofonly3minutes,includingonly2minutestoactivatethesubsurfaceisolationvalve(SSIV)closingthesystem.ThesolescenarioconsideredwasadroppedobjectfromtheLPPrupturingasegmentdownstreamoftheSSIVs(subsurfaceisolationvalves),whichwouldclose“uponpositivedetectionofalossofcontainment,”andisolatethepipeline.Bothmodelsassumesignificant(50%)evaporationwithin24hours,andbothestimatesignificantshorelinecontaminationbetweenAtlitandHaifa.Inthevariousscenarios,condensatecontaminationisprojectedtoreachshorefrom18hourstoseveraldaysafterrelease.ShorelinecondensateinOSCARmodelfromLPPmaximumis32tons,whichisreportedtobe24%ofthespill.OSCARprojectswatercolumnhydrocarbonconcentrationsbetween300ppm-400ppm,whichgiventoxicityreportscitedinabovesections,isconsideredacutelytoxictomarineorganisms.5.4 EcologicalImpacts

Regardingecologicalimpactsexpectedfromcondensatespills,agoodsummary(althoughgeneral)isfoundinSection4.8.6intheTAMAoffshoreEIA.ThissummaryisattachedinApp.1(verbatim,withoutcitations),inordertomaketheinformationmoreeasilyaccessibletothegeneralpublic.

However,itisclearthatthestatementinthedocumentsthat:“NoHighriskimpactswereidentifiedintheevaluationfromroutineactivitiesoraccidentalevents,”isnotsupportable.

Forinstance,theDrillingEIAstates(p.13,emphasisadded):

“Bothoftheaccidentalspillscenarios(afuelspillandacondensatespillfrom ablowout)wereevaluatedashavingseveralModerateimpacts.Forthefuel spill,potentialimpactsonseabirdsandmigratorybirdsaswellascoastal habitatsandinfrastructurewereratedasModerate.Forthecondensatespill, potentialimpactsonmarinemammals,seaturtles,fishes,seabirdsand migratorybirds,fishingactivitiesandmarinefarming,andcoastalhabitats

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andinfrastructurewereratedasModerate.Thecondensatespillhasthe potentialforgreaterconsequencesbecauseoftheextendedtimeperiod(30 days)forthespilleventandthegreatervolumesofoilpotentiallyreaching theshoreline.”

However,if170,000bblsofcondensatearereleasedfromaLeviathandeepwaterwellorpipelinefailure,spreadsover395,000km2ofcoastalocean,resultsinwaterhydrocarbonconcentrationsinexcessof300ppm,persistsformonths,andcontaminates388kmofshorelinesfromEgypttoSyriawithover88,000barrelsoftoxicweatheredcondensate,thenclearlyecologicalimpactswouldbehigh.Inparticularifalargerworst-casereleaseisconsidered,ecologicalimpactsshouldbeconsidered“high.”UnderstatementofpotentialspillimpactsforLeviathanderivesfromtheconventionalindustrytendencytofocusalmostexclusivelyonshorelineimpacts,whileinmanyoftheLeviathanspillscenarios,mostoftheimpactwillbetooffshorepelagicecosystems.Risktable4.9intheDrillingEIA(p.210-211)shouldbeadjustedaccordingly.TheLeviathanenvironmentalimpactassessmentsdonotadequatelydetailthebiologicaluniquenessofthedeep-seaecosystemsoftheLevantSea,whichisdescribedasfollows: “…auniqueanddelicatemarineecosystem,whoserichbiological communitieshostrarespeciesofdeep-seasponges,worms,molluscsand coldwatercorals–someofwhicharethousandsofyearsold.”22

AlthoughtheconventionalviewofthedeepsearegionoftheLevantSeaisofarelativelynon-diverse,simplebioticassemblage,morerecentstudiesreportarichanddiversedeepseafauna,with60speciesoffish,crustaceans,andmollusksnewlyrecordedintheregion,andseveralspeciesnewtoscience.23TheLeviathandocumentsdonotprovidesufficientdetailregardingthisuniquedeepseaecosystem,andinparticularpotentialimpactsoftheproject.Inaddition,thereislittlediscussionoftheimpactsofamajornaturalgas(largelymethane)releaseinthedocuments.Thisisasignificantgapintheassessmentofenvironmentalimpacts.Asreportedinthe2010DeepwaterHorizonwellheadblowout,up40%ofthereleasevolumewasmethane.Thisreleasebehavedinunexpectedways,remainingentrainedinmidwaterpelagicecosystemformonths,leadingtoenhancedmicrobialpopulationsandextensiveanoxicconditionsintheGulf.Thepotentialenvironmentalimpactsofalarge-scalegasreleasefromLeviathanneedtobemoreextensivelyassessedandreportedtothepublic.Naturalgas(methane)isknowntobetoxictomarineorganisms,particularlysoathigherwatertemperaturesoffthecoastofIsrael.Finally,ifextensiveshorelinecontaminationoccursasaresultofalargecondensaterelease,someofthetoxicweatheredcondensatewilladheretobeachsediment(sand,silt,etc.),andsomewillthentransportbackoffshorewithtidalmixingand

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nearshorecurrents.Thiswillcontaminatenearshorebenthiccommunities.Thispotentialimpactwasnotdiscussed,andshouldbe.

6. RiskAssessmentSomequantitativeriskassessmentforvariousprojectcomponentsisreportedinthedocuments,butitisunclearthatarigorous,independent,integratedriskassessmenthasbeenconducted.Theindependentriskassessmentshouldmethodicallyandquantitativelyevaluateallrisksandpotentialconsequencesderivingfromtheproject,includingcommon-causefailuresandextraordinary,catastrophiccasualties.Generally,probabilisticriskassessmentsunderstatetheriskofcatastrophicfailure,leadtolessthanBestAvailableTechniques/Technology(BAT)systemsdesign,andpromotedangerouscomplacencyingovernmentandindustry.Inarealsense,iftheriskofacatastrophiceventisnotzero,itshouldbeconsideredtobe100%--thattheeventwillhappen,soonerorlater.AsLeviathanproductionisexpectedtocontinuefor30+years,thechanceforamajorpollutiondisasterissignificant.Thisisthebestframeworkwithwhichtoevaluateandreduceallpossiblerisk.

Evencompetentriskmanagersgenerallydoapoorjobatassessingandmanagingriskincomplexsystems.AnexampleistheNASASpaceShuttleprogramintheU.S.Afterthe1986Challengerdisaster(causedbyaverysimplemalfunctionofthefueltankgasket“O”ring),manytechnicalinquirieswereconducted,andNASAconcludedthatallriskshadbeenidentifiedandremedied,andthenrestartedtheprogram.Then,the2003Columbiadisasteroccurred,causedbyanotherverysimpleproblemthatwasnotanticipatedbytheengineeringanalysesonChallengerandriskassessments(asmallpieceofthegantrybrokeoffduringliftoff,piercedtheforwardedgeofawing,exposingtheareatoexcessiveheatonreentry,andtheshuttleexploded).Thepointhereisthateveninthemosthighlyengineered,sophisticated,complexsystems,wemakelowprobability/highconsequencemistakes.ThepeopleofIsraelshouldexpectandplanforsuchwiththeLeviathandevelopment,andrigorouslyanalyzeandmitigateallsuchrisks.

Leviathanplanningdocumentsdonotsufficientlyenvisionandplanforcatastrophicfailure,whichtheydoonlysuperficially.Tothecontrary,theLeviathandocumentsassumesuccess.Thisattitudeleadstodangerouscomplacencyandlackofvigilance.

Historyisfullofthetragicconsequencesofsuchcomplacencyandarrogance.Forinstance,seekingapprovaltobuildthe800-mileTransAlaska(oil)pipelineandmarineterminalintheearly1970s,politiciansassuredtheAmericanpublicthat“notonedrop”ofoilwouldeverbespilledintocoastalwatersofAlaska,asbestavailabletechnologywouldbeusedtopreventsuch.Butaftersecuringtheright-of-waytobuildthepipeline,thepromiseofbestavailabletechnologywasabandoned.TwelveyearsaftertheopeningoftheAlaskapipelineandterminal,thefullyloadedExxonValdezgroundedonawell-markedreef,spillinghundredsofthousandsof

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barrelsoftoxicoilintothepristinecoastalecosystemofPrinceWilliamSound.Theenvironmentalinjurycontinuestothisday.

Just5monthspriortotheDeepwaterHorizondisasterintheU.S.GulfofMexico,representativesoftheU.S.oilindustryandgovernmentregulators,intestimonytoaU.S.SenatehearingregardingtheAugust2009MontaraoffshoreplatformblowoutintheWestTimorSea(NWAustralia),assuredtheU.S.CongressthatoffshoredrillingintheGulfofMexicowasperfectlysafe,andtheregulatoryprocesswassufficienttopreventsuchdisastersintheU.S.

Andjustthreeweeksbeforethe2010DeepwaterHorizondisaster,thenU.S.PresidentBarackObamaopenedlargeareasoftheU.S.OuterContinentalShelf(OCS)tooilandgasdrilling,assuringtheAmericanpublicthat:“Oilrigstodaygenerallydonotcausespills.Theyaretechnologicallyveryadvanced.”

Thisverysamedangerouscomplacency,hubris,andrisktoleranceisevidenttodayinLeviathanplanning.

7. Mitigation-SpillPrevention

Asdiscussedbelow,itmustbehonestlyadmittedbyprojectproponentsandtheGovernmentofIsraelthatthereisnorealisticpossibilityofeffectivelycontainingorrecoveringacondensateornaturalgasreleaseatsea.Oncereleased,theenvironmentaldamagefromnaturalgasand/orcondensatewilloccur,irrespectiveofanyresponseeffort.Thus,mitigationoftheseimpactsmustfocusonpreventionofreleases.

Regardingriskofcatastrophicfailureofprojectcomponentsand/oracatastrophicenvironmentalreleaseofhydrocarbons,riskneedstobemethodicallyassessed.Onthis,thedocumentsreviewedsimplydonotprovideenoughdetailtoconfirmthecompany’ssafetyassurances.Ingeneral,thedocumentsoverstatethepotentialeffectivenessoftheproject’sriskmitigationandresponseplans,anditsclaimsregardingriskmitigationarequalitative,vague,andunsubstantiated.

Forinstance,thedocumentsdonotpresentaclearwellblowoutorpipelinespillpreventionplan-justgeneralassurances-includingleakdetection,welldesignandcontrol,pipelinedesign,personneltraining,thirdpartyservices,managementofchange,near-casualtyreportingandinvestigation,riskassessment,andequipmentmaintenanceandsurveillance.ThereisnodiscussionofanOperationsIntegrityManagementSystem(OIMS).

AlthoughseveraldeepwatergaswellshavebeendrilledsuccessfullyinrecentyearsofftheIsraelcoastwithnomajorreportedhydrocarbonrelease,suchacatastrophicfailurecouldoccuronanyofthewellstobedrilledinthefuture.Itshouldbenotedthatpriortothe2010DeepwaterHorizonblowoutintheU.S.GulfofMexico,hundredsofsuchwellshadbeendrilled,mostwithfewlossofwell-controlincidents.Thelessonhereisthatthepastdoesnotalwaysaccuratelypredictthefutureinthis

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regard.TheLeviathandocumentsprojectasenseofcomplacencyabouttheveryrealriskofacatastrophichydrocarbonrelease.

TheDrillingEIAsimplystates:

“Bestindustrypracticewillbeusedduringalldrillingphases.Aftereach newwellisdrilled,itwillbetemporarilyabandonedandsecuredwith multiplebarrierspendingcompletionoperationsbytheseconddrillingrig. TemporaryabandonmentwillbeconductedinaccordancewithMNIEWR guidelines.“

Obviously,thisisinsufficientwithwhichtojudgetherigoroftheproject’ssafetyandspillpreventionsystems(Seebelow).

7.1 Welldesignandcontrol

Theprojectdocumentationneedstorecognize,detail,andconfirmtheprojectwillmeettheincreasedsafetystandardsimposedintheU.S.afterthe2010DeepwaterHorizondisaster.24Inparticular,theprojectdocumentsmustdiscusstheU.S.BureauofSafetyandEnvironmentalEnforcement(BSEE)FinalRule(30CFRPart250)publishedonAugust10,2012:OilandGasandSulphurOperationsontheOuterContinentalShelf–IncreasedSafetyMeasuresforEnergyDevelopmentontheOuterContinentalShelf.ThisoffshoreDrillingSafetyRuleintheU.S.,establishednewcasinginstallationrequirements,newcementingrequirements,requiresindependentthird-partyverificationofblindshearram(BSR)capabilityandsubseaBOPstackcompatibility,requiresnewcasingandcementingintegritytests,establishesnewrequirementsforsubseasecondaryBOPintervention,requiresfunctiontestingforsubseasecondaryBOPintervention,requiresdocumentationforBOPinspectionsandmaintenance,requiresaRegisteredProfessionalEngineertocertifycasingandcementingrequirements,andestablishesnewrequirementsforspecificwellcontroltrainingtoincludedeepwateroperations.

ThedocumentsdonotpresentaCriticalOperationsandCurtailmentPlan(COCP),formovingarigofflocationduringanemergencysituation,asisrequiredintheU.S.TheCOCPneedstodetailspecificproceduresforrespondingtosuchthingsasadverseweather;unavailabilityofequipment,materials,orpersonnel;orwellcontrolissues.TheCOCPneedstoidentifyplannedandunplannedcriticaloperations,suchasdrillingintoazonecapableofflowingoilorgas,coring,pullingoutofthehole,wirelogging,runningcasing,circulating,cementing,attemptingtoretrievelostitemsinthewell,open-holesidetracking,drillingintoalostcirculationzone,remedialwellwork,anchorlinetensioning,refueling,oraccidentalriserdisconnect.TheCOCPmustidentifytheamountoftimeexpectedtosecurethedrillingoperation,includingtime(inhours)necessarytodisconnecttheLowerMarineRiserPackage(LMRP)fromtheBOPandtemporarilyabandonthewell,andtomoveoffthesite.AndtheCOCPmustclearlyestablishadrillingcurtailmentdecisionprocess,aswellastrainingofkeypersonnelinthisprocess.

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Again,asnotedabove,theLeviathanplanningdocumentsdonotsufficientlyenvisionandplanforcatastrophicfailure,whichtheydoonlysuperficially.Tothecontrary,thedocumentsassumesuccess.Thisattitudeleadstodangerouscomplacencyandlackofvigilance.

Infact,projectdocumentsconfirmthataninadequateriskreductionstandardwouldbeusedfortheproject.WhiledocumentsrecitetheintentiontoemployBestAvailableTechniquesandTechnology(BAT),alsocalledBestAvailable&SafestTechnology(asrequiredinU.S.regulation),itiscleartheLeviathanprojectdoesnotintendtomeetaBATstandard.Tothecontrary,thedocumentsstatethattheoperatorwillemployariskreductionstandardofAsLowAsReasonablyPracticable(ALARP).AnALARPstandardimpliesthatnotallBestAvailableTechniquesandTechnologyriskreductionmeasureswillbeincorporatedintotheproject,particularlyif,atthediscretionofthecompany,theyaredeemedtoocostly,toodifficult,tootime-consuming,orotherwise“notreasonablypracticable.”Inessence,ALARPisnotBAT/BEP.IfBATisrequired,thenALARPisinsufficient.ThisisaveryimportantpointthattheGovernmentofIsraelneedstoclarify.

GiventhesensitivityofenvironmentalandsocialresourcesinIsrael,theregionshouldclearlybeconsideredaHighConsequenceArea(HCA)forpetroleumdevelopment(asdefinedinAPIstandards),therebyrequiringenhanceddesignandoperationalstandardstoreduceriskwithBATtoAsLowAsPossible(“ALAP”).AHighConsequenceAreaisgenerallyconsideredtoincludeinfrastructurethroughpopulationareas,drinkingwatersources,andhighlysensitiveenvironments.Theseareasofinfrastructurethenreceivegreatersafetydesignstandards.ItisclearthattheseenhanceddesignstandardsareindeedbestAvailableTechnology(BAT),anditisrecommendedherethatsuchBATbeemployedonallcomponentsofLeviathan.Additionally,Directive2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperationssimilarlyrequiresrisktobereducedtoAsFarAsPossible.25TheLeviathanprojectshouldbeheldtothisstandard.

Thedocumentsomitreferenceto,orcommitmenttocomplywith,importantAmericanPetroleumInstitute(API)Standards,including,butnotlimitedto,thefollowing:APIStandard53:BlowoutPreventionEquipmentSystemsforDrillingWells;APIRecommendedPractice(RP)65Part2:IsolatingPotentialFlowZonesDuringWellConstruction,addressingbestpracticesforcementing;APISpec16A:SpecificationforDrill-ThroughEquipment;APISpec16D:SpecificationforControlSystemsforDrillingWellControlEquipmentandControlSystemsforDiverterEquipment;APISpec17D:SpecificationforSubseaWellheadandChristmasTreeEquipment;APIRP17H;ISO13628-8:RemotelyOperatedVehicle(ROV)InterfacesonSubseaProductionSystems;andAPIRP75:DevelopmentofaSafetyandEnvironmentalManagementProgramforOffshoreOperationsandFacilities.ManyoftheseareincorporatedbyreferenceintotheU.S.offshoreDrillingSafetyRule(BSEE,2012),withwhichNoblecommitstomeet.

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AlthoughtheEIAsasserttheprojectwillmeetU.S.BSEEstandards,theydonotcitetheDirective2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations.26IftheLeviathanprojectistomeetglobalindustrybestpracticeandBATstandards(whichitshould),itshouldciteandcommittomeettherelevant2013EUOffshoreDrillingDirectiveaswellasallrequirementsoftheU.S.BureauofSafetyandEnvironmentalEnforcement(BSEE),AmericanPetroleumInstitute(API),AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(AMSE),AmericanNationalStandardsInstitute(ANSI),andotherbestglobalbestpracticestandardsasappropriate. ThedocumentsdonotpresentevidencethatarobustwellintegrityRiskAssessmentforspecificwelldesignshasbeenconducted,orthatsuchwillbeconductedpriortodrilling,asrequiredbyDirective2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations.ThewellintegrityRiskAssessmentsshouldfocusparticularattentionontheexpecteddifferencebetweenporepressureandfracturegradientofsurroundingrockstrata.

Thedocumentsdonotprovidesufficientdetailregardingexpectedreservoircharacteristics.Thegeologyoftheproposedwellsitesislargelyredacted.Computersimulationsandhydraulicmodelingcanaccuratelypredictthedownholepressuresthatmaybeencountered.ThedocumentsneedtopresentthepredictedMaximumAnticipatedSurfacePressure(MASP)forthewells,andMaximumAnticipatedWellheadPressures(MAWHP).

Drillingmudengineeringisacriticalelementofasafedrillingprogram,particularlyfordeepwaterwells.Precisecalibrationofmud(weight,viscosity,etc.)mustbeidentifiedthatwillmaintainwellcontrol.Ifthemudweightistoohigh,thesurroundingformationmayfracture,leadingtoalossreturneventandpotentiallyaninfluxofhydrocarbonsintothewell.Ifthemudweightistoolow,thenthewellisinanunderbalancedcondition,alsoconducivetoflowintothewellandawellheadblowout. DrillingmudpropertiesthatarenotreportedfortheproposeddeepwaterLeviathanwellsincludeviscosity,yieldstressandgels,compressibility,gassolubility,stabilitytocontaminantsandaging,weighting,mudformulation,applicationandcontrol,mudadditives(e.g.particlesizeofbaritetobeused),compressibility,andpressure-volume-temperature(PVT)analysis.Thisshouldincludeadiscussionofcontrolofimpurities,suchasclay,carbonate,iron,etc.,thatmaycompromisemudintegrityorfunction.

Thedocumentsomitdetailsforthecementandcementingprocedurestobeused.Thisisasafety-criticalelementthatmustbediscussedindetail.Itiswellknownthatcementingproblems,includingtheannulusbetweencasingsandthesurroundingrockformationandthecementplugsinthewellbore,constituteoneofmostsignificantriskfactorsforblowouts.Particularlyindeepwaterwells,cementformulationandapplicationisanextremelyimportant,safety-criticalaspect.Theprojectmustcite,andcommittocomplywith,enhancedcementingrequirementsinthenewoffshoredrillingsafetyruleintheU.S.

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Thedocumentsdonotidentifyarigorousprocessfordecidingandconfirmingcementspecifications,andthetestingprocedureforcementslurryformulation,includingtestingprocedurespriortoapplication.

AnimportantconclusionreachedregardingtheDeepwaterHorizonblowoutwasthat:“Thefailuretoproperlyconductandinterpretthenegative-pressuretestwasamajorcontributingfactortotheblowout.”27Onthis,theLeviathandocumentsdonotdetailthepressureteststhatwillbeperformedpriortomuddisplacementandabandonment.Inparticular,thenegativepressuretestisacriticalproceduretotestintegrityofcementedfinalcasingstringorliner,wheremudisremovedfromthewellbore,replacedwithlessdenseseawater,todetermineifpressureincreasesinwellborethatmightindicateadangerousflowofhydrocarbonsintothewell.Thisprocedureneedstobediscussedindetail.

Thedocumentsdonotdiscussthespecificprocedureandguidelinesthatwillbeusedtomonitorkicks(short-termpressuredhydrocarbonreleases)fromwells.Theyneedtodetailakickmonitoringsystem(e.g.KickAlertStatus),withsuccessivelevelsofalert,andproceduresforrespondingtosuchalerts.Earlydetectionofflowiscritical.ItshouldbenotedthattheinfluxofhydrocarbonsintotheMacondowellontheDeepwaterHorizonwasnotdetecteduntil50minutesafterflowhadstarted,renderingwellcontrolmoredifficult.

Inaddition,bothMeasurementWhileDrilling(MWD)andLoggingWhileDrilling(LWD)toolsintheBottomHoleAssembly(BHA)arediscussed,butnofinaldeterminationhadbeenmadeatthetimeofEIApublication.Itisimportanttodetailhowoperatorswillcollectandanalyzerealtimedrilldata,andthecontingencyplanifwelldatatransmissionislost.

7.2 Redaction

AseriousconcernintheLeviathandocumentsisthatmostofthesystems-criticaldetails,includingthoseforwelldesignandcontrol,aresimplyredacted/withheld.Thisextensiveredactioninsystems-criticalinformationisclearlyunacceptable.

Section4.3.5oftheDrillingEIAgenerallystates:

“Mitigationforaccidentalspillsincludesbothspillpreventionandresponse measures.NobleEnergywillusesafedrillingpracticesduringitsactivitiesin theLeviathanFieldtoreducethelikelihoodofanaccidentalspill.Best industrypracticewillbeusedduringalldrillingphases(e.g.,settingofBOP; cementingofconcretebetweenboreandprotectivepipe).DetailedBOP specificationsareprovidedinSection3.2.5.Thedetailedcasingdesignand testingaredescribedinSection3.2.6.Inaddition,oncethedrillingrigtobe usedhasbeenidentified,NobleEnergyandthedrillingrig’sownerwill engageinacomprehensiveinspectionandtestingoftherig’ssubseaBOP systemtoensurecompliancewiththeU.S.BSEEregulations.Theinspection andtestingwillbewitnessedandcertifiedbyathird-partysurveyor.Noble

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EnergyhascommittedtooperatinginIsraelperBSEEregulations,unless supersededbyMNIEWRregulations.”

However,muchofthisinformationiseithernotprovidedorredacted.

RedactedpartsofDrillingEIA,and2017Amendmentincludethefollowing:detailsondrillingmuds;condensatespillmodeltotalreleasevolume;seafloorbathymetryatdrillsites;geologicsetting;seafloormorphology;wellboreschematics;shallowstratigraphyoftheLeviathanfield;geohazards;seismicity;reservoircharacteristics;reservoirgascomposition;CyprusA-2awelldetails;drillingplansandcompletionactivities;casingdesign;wellboreconfigurationandschematics;toxicologicaldata;wellbarrierschematics;wellproductionparameters;dischargechemicals;vesselinformation;BOPcontrol;bariteanalysis;TCCreport;bridgingdocuments;shallowwaterflowcontingency;wellcontrolhandbook;expertopiniononincreasedWBMdischarge;bathymetricmapsatwellsites;etc.Muchofthe2017DrillingEIAAmendmentisredacted.Thisishighlyirregularand,foraprojectwithsuchpotentialconsequenceandpublicinterest,simplyunacceptable.Itisunclearatwhatpoint,oronwhosebehalf,theredactionsoccurred-thecompany,thegovernment,orinsurers(OPIC).Ifthecompanyisresponsible,thentheGovernmentofIsraelhasnowaytodeterminetheveracityofthecompany’ssafetyassertions.Ifthecompanysubmitstheinformationandthegovernmentthenredactsit,thenthepublichasnowaytojudgethesafetyassurances.Regardless,duetosuchextensiveredaction,safetyassurancesbyproponentscannotbeindependentlyconfirmed.Thismustberemedied.Accordingly,Irecommendtheprojectapprovalbesuspendeduntilthisinformationismadepublic,independentlyreviewedbyrelevanttechnicalexperts,andjudgedtobeBestAvailableTechniquesandTechnology(BAT).

7.3 2011Leviathan2Blowout

Regardingdrillingrisk,the2011-2012Leviathan2wellcontroleventisinstructive,butnotadequatelydiscussed.Section1.13(p.114)oftheDrillingEIAreportsasfollows:

“DuringdrillingoftheLeviathan-2wellinMay2011,wellboreintegrity issuesoccurredpriortodrillingofthewell’sreservoirsection.Duetothese issues,thedrillingrigwasremovedfromthewell.Followingcessationof drillingoperations(May2011)andpriortothesuccessfulplugging(plug- and-abandonment)ofthewellinSeptember2012,therewasaflowof formationwaterandsubsurfacesedimentsfromthewell….Findingsfromall post-pluggingsurveysconductedtodate(November2012toJanuary2015) suggestthatthepluggingwaseffective(i.e.,noevidenceofaleak),andthat conditionsaregraduallyapproachingnormalconditions(i.e.,decreaseinsize andsalinityofcalderabrinepool).Ithasbeenrepeatedlyshowninprevious reportsthatallenvironmentalimpactsareminimalandhighlylocalized

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within200mofthewellhead,andtheareaisshowingsignsofrecovery.The effectsofwaterandsanddischargesappeartobeminimal,havingno indicatorsoftoxiclevelsofcontaminationfromcompoundsofconcern.”

Althoughthereislittledetailinthisstatement,andnofurtherdetailprovidedonthissignificantfailure,itisevidentthatthewellcontrolandblowoutresponsecontingenciesfailed,andflowfromthefailedwellcontinuedfor16months.Thisisanexceptionallylongtimetocontrolafailedwell,andindicatesafailureinbothwellcontrolandblowoutresponsecapabilityofthecompaniesinvolved.Additionally,asthe2016EIA(5yearslater)reportedthat:“conditionsaregraduallyapproachingnormalconditions,”indicatesthelong-termnatureofenvironmentalimpactfromthiswellblowout.Further,thiswasnotreportedintheSLIP.

7.4 BlowoutPreventers(BOPs)

RegardingtheBlowoutPreventer(BOP)tobeusedindrillingthehighpressure,deepwaterwells,thedocumentsgenerallystate:

“NobleEnergyandtherig’sownerwillengageinacomprehensiveinspection andtestingoftherig’ssubseaBOPsystemtoensurecompliancewiththeU.S. BureauofSafetyandEnvironmentalEnforcement(BSEE)regulations.The inspectionandtestingwillbewitnessedandcertifiedbyathird-party surveyor.”

Giventhe2011failureoftheLeviathan2well,theaboveassertionisquestionable.Andalthoughthestatementisencouraging,itneedsfarmoredetaileddiscussion,includingindependentverification,monitoring,andconfirmation.Forinstance,documentsshoulddiscusstheIndependentVerificationOrganizationthatwillbeusedforallaspectsoftheproject,andtheirtechnicalqualifications.ThedocumentsdonotrecognizetheinherentlimitationsofBlowoutPreventers.ABlowoutPreventer(BOP)isacriticalsafetysystemforsubseawellheadblowoutcontrol,butthedocumentsshouldclearlyrecognizethataBOPisnotafailsafemechanismforsealingawellblowout.NumerousstudieshavedocumentedthelimitedeffectivenessofBOPsinsealingsubseawellblowouts,butnoneofthesearereferenced.28SomeofthesestudiesreportaBOPfailurerateupto45%.Theresidualriskimposedbythisinherentfailurerateshouldbehonestlydiscussed,sothatthepublicandgovernmentdonotdevelopafalsesenseofsecuritybytheinstallationofaBOPontheseabedwellheads.

Further,thedocumentsshouldciteandcommittocomplywithAPIStandard53:BlowoutPreventionEquipmentSystemsforDrillingWells,whichincludesarigoroustestingandmaintenancescheduleforBOPstobeused.29FurtheronBOPs,theyneedtodiscusstheneedforBOPandwellfunctionalarmstoautomaticallydefaulttoclosethewell(activationofBSRs,EDS,generalalarm,etc.),ifspecificalarmstriggerbutarenotaddressedintimelymanner.

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BOPactivationmethodsincludeelectricaltransmissioncable,acousticsignal,RemotelyOperatedVehicle(ROV)intervention,a“deadmanswitch”/autoshearfunction,andanEmergencyDisconnectSystem(EDS)onthedrillingrig.YetnoneofthesecriticalBOPactivationsystemsarediscussedindetail.AlloftheseBOPactivationsystemsneedtobeindependentlyinspectedandtestedregularly.

7.5 BlowoutResponsePlan

Thedocumentsdonotpresentarigorouswellcontrolplan,BlowoutContingencyPlan(BOCP),areliefwellplan,andsecuredcontractstoprovidetheseservices.TheBOCPmustdetailalltechnologiestobeused,andverifythattestsinexpectedconditions(atdepth,temperature,andpressuresexpectedattheseabed)havedemonstratedtheeffectivenessofthewellcontrolresponsetechnologies.Theseshouldincludeacontainmentdomeortophatforinitialresponse,adiscussionoftheprosandconsandmethodologiesforattemptingatopkillofablowout,acappingstackspecificallyfittedtotheBOPtobeused,andanadequaterisersystemandsurfacesupportvesselstocollecthydrocarbonsfromablowout.TheBOCPneedstoidentifycommunicationsandlogisticsfordeployingallequipmentandsupportvesselsnecessaryinablowoutresponse.Thisshouldincludewheretheequipmentwillbephysicallylocatedonstandby,andhowquicklyitcouldbedeployedtotheLeviathandrillingsites.

ThemostreliableblowoutcontroloptionisdrillingareliefwellfromanotherDynamicallyPositioned(DP)drillrig/ship,butsuchreliefwellstaketimetocomplete.Areliefwellconsistofdrillingasecondaryboreholenear,ortointersectthefailedwell,pumpingheavymuddowntooverbalancethereservoirpressure,and/orperformabottom-killonthefailedwell.Sixty(60)daysisareasonableminimumestimateofthetimeitwouldtaketocompleteareliefwellattheLeviathanfield.ItshouldbenotedthatittookBPtwelve(12)daysaftertheDeepwaterHorizonexplosionjusttobegindrillingareliefwell,andthereliefwell(atsimilardepthstoLeviathan),wasnotcompleteduntilmorethan4.5months(137days)later.However,over95%ofoffshorewellblowoutsontheUSOCSarestoppedbysurface(wellhead)intervention–muds,capping,BOPs,cement,etc.Butareliefwellshouldbedrilledatthesametimeassurfaceinterventionisattempted,particularlywhenthefailedwellboreisdamaged,blocked,orcannotbeaccessed.

Thedocumentsdonotprovideaspecificplan,ordiscussacontract,forarigtodrillareliefwelltoperformapermanentbottom-killofablowout.Thisneedstoidentifywhatrigwouldbeusedtodrillareliefwell(e.g.,theotherrigengagedinsimultaneousdrillingtheLeviathanfield),itsdisconnectsequenceandresponsetime,andthetimeitmayrequiretodrillthereliefwell.AstherewillbetwoDPrigsonlocationdrillingonanoverlappingscheduleforsomeofthedrillingperiod,onedrillingthewellandonedoingwellcompletions,itisassumedthatinablowoutemergency,thenon-emergencyrigwouldsafelydisconnectfromitswellandbegindrillingthereliefwelladjacenttothefailedwell.Thisneedstobediscussedindetail.Aswell,asdrillingtakesplacefromonevesselwithouttheotheron-siteat

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thebeginningofthedrillingschedule,areliefwellcontingencymustbeidentified.

ThedocumentsshouldlistcontractsNoblehasinplacewithwellcontrolfirmstoassistintheinterventionandresolutionofwellcontrolemergencies.Suchservicesinclude,butarenotlimitedto,firefightingequipmentandservices,specialtyblowoutcontrolequipmentandservices,directionaldrillingservices,high-pressurepumpingservices,etc.ProvidersofsuchservicesincludeBoots&CootsInternationalWellControl,CuddWellControl,WildWellControl,SafetyBoss,HalliburtonEnergyServices,AnadrillSchlumberger,BakerHughesINTEQ,DowellSchlumberger,Baroid,andMIDrillingFluids.

7.6 PipelineIntegrityManagement

ThedocumentsfailtoadequatelydetailarigorouspipelineIntegrityManagementprogramforalloffshoreandonshorepipelineinfrastructure.

GaspipelineoperatorsinIsraelmustberequiredtocomplywithinternationalbestpracticestandards,includingthoseoftheAmericanPetroleumInstitute(API),AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME),BritishStandardCodeofPracticeforPipelines:BSPD8010Part2:SubseaPipelines,andNorwegianOffshoreStandard:DNV-OS-F101:SubmarinePipelineSystems.

UnderU.S.regulation,aHighConsequenceArea(HCA)forpipelineoperationisdefinedasanyareawithhighhumanpopulation,navigablewaterways,oranenvironmentunusuallysensitivetooilspills.ItisrecommendedherethattheIsraeloffshoreandonshoreregionsbeconsideredaHighConsequenceArea(HCA),requiringthehighestpipelinestandardspossible.

Theregulatoryrequirementsforgaspipelinedesign,operation,andmaintenanceintheU.S.(Dec.2003U.S.IntegrityManagementinHighConsequenceAreas-GasTransmissionPipelines),shouldstrictlyapplytoallgasandcondensatepipelinesinIsrael.30TheU.S.pipelineIntegrityManagement(IM)programrequiresthefollowingofpipelineoperators:

• IdentificationofallpipelinesegmentsthatcouldaffectHCAsintheeventofafailure;

• DevelopmentofaBaselineAssessmentPlan;• RiskAssessment,toidentifyallthreatstoeachpipelinesegment;• Remedialactionstoaddressintegrityissuesraisedbytheassessment;• Acontinualprocessofmonitoring,assessmentandevaluationtomaintain

pipelineintegrity;• IdentificationofpreventiveandmitigativemeasurestoprotectHCAs;• Methodstomeasuretheprogram’seffectiveness;• Amanagement-of-changeprocess;

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• Aprocessforreviewofintegrityassessmentresultsandinformationanalysisbyapersonqualifiedtoevaluatetheresults.

• AcommunicationplanTheAPI1160standard,publishedinNovember2001,providesguidancetoallAPImembers(includingNobleEnergy)toimplementtheIMprogram,recommendingthatallpipelinesegmentsareevaluatedwithacompany’sIMprogram.Clearly,allofthisshouldapplytogasandcondensatepipelinemanagementinIsrael.ThisstandardrequiresalloperatorstocompleteaBaselineAssessmentPlan,includingthefollowingissues:

• Resultsofthepreviousintegrityassessment,defecttypeandsizethattheassessmentmethodcandetect,anddefectgrowthrate;

• Pipesize,material,manufacturinginformation,coatingtypeandcondition,andseamtype;

• Leakhistory,repairhistory,andcathodicprotectionhistory;• Producttransported;• Operatingstresslevel;• Existingorprojectedactivitiesinthearea;• Localenvironmentalfactorsthatcouldaffectthepipeline(e.g.corrosivityof

soil,subsidence,climatic);• Geo-technicalhazards;and• Physicalsupportofthesegment,suchasbycablesuspensionbridge,etc.

UndertheU.S.IntegrityManagementregime,anoperatormustregularlyassesstheintegrityoftheirpipelinesbyseveralmethods:

• Internalpipeinspectiontoolscapableofdetectingcorrosionanddeformationanomaliesincludingdents,gougesandgrooves(smart‘PipelineInspectionGauges’,or`PIGs');

• Pressuretesting;• Assessingweldseamintegrity,especiallyforElectricResistanceWelded

(ERW)pipelines;• Directassessmentofexternalandinternalcorrosion--ExternalCorrosion

DirectAssessment(ECDA),andInternalCorrosionDirectAssessment(ICDA);• Monitoringofcathodicprotection;• Othertechnologiesthattheoperatordemonstratescanprovideanequivalent

understandingofconditionofthepipeline.Further,U.S.IntegrityManagementlawrequiresthatpipelineoperatorsmust: “…continuallychangetheprogramtoreflectoperatingexperience, conclusionsdrawnfromresultsoftheintegrityassessments,andother

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maintenanceandsurveillancedata,andevaluationofconsequencesofa failureonthehighconsequencearea.”Apipelineoperator’sIntegrityManagementevaluationandremediationschedulemustprovideforimmediaterepairconditions.Underthisregime,apipelineoperatormust: “…takepromptactiontoaddressallanomalousconditionsthattheoperator discoversthroughtheintegrityassessmentorinformationanalysis.In addressingallconditions,anoperatormustevaluateallanomalous conditionsandremediatethosethatcouldreduceapipeline’sintegrity.An operatormustbeabletodemonstratetheconditionwillensurethatthe conditionisunlikelytoposeathreattothelong-termintegrityofthe pipeline.”ApipelineoperatormusttakemeasurestopreventandmitigatetheconsequencesofapipelinefailurethatcouldaffectaHighConsequenceArea.Thesemeasuresincludeconductingariskanalysisofthepipelinesegmenttoidentifyadditionalactionstoenhancepublicsafetyorenvironmentalprotection.Suchactionsmayinclude,butarenotlimitedto:

• Implementingdamagepreventionbestpractices,• Bettermonitoringofcathodicprotectionwherecorrosionisaconcern,• Establishingshorterinspectionintervals,and• Providingadditionaltrainingtopersonnelonresponseprocedures,

conductingdrillswithlocalemergencyrespondersandadoptingothermanagementcontrols,etc.

Giventheabove,itisrecommendedthattheGovernmentofIsraelimmediatelycommissionacomprehensivethird-partyIntegrityManagement(IM)assessmentofallpetroleuminfrastructureinIsrael,offshoreandonshore,andrequirearigorousIntegrityManagementprogramonallgasandcondensatepipelines,existingandplanned.ThisIMassessmentshouldbeconductedonallplannedoffshoregasdevelopment,includingLeviathan,AphroditeBlock12,Dalit,KarishandTanin,DanielEastandWest;andexistingdevelopmentsincludingTamar,Mari-BandNoa,HaderaDeepwaterLNGterminal,ShimshonGasField,andAphrodite/Ishai.Aswell,allonshorepetroleuminfrastructureshouldsubmittosuchanIMassessment. 7.7 PipelineLeakDetectionAcriticalcomponentinreducingpipelinerupturesandspillriskisabestavailabletechnology(BAT)leakdetectionsystem.Theleakdetectionsystemshouldincorporatecontinuousmonitoringusingsuchtechnologiesasline-volumeaccounting,flowmeters,pressuretransducers,rarefactionwavemonitoring,real-

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timetransientmonitoring,acousticemissions,fiberopticsensing,vaporsensing,andaerialsurveillanceofremotepipelines.Externallybasedmethodstodetectleakingproductoutsidethepipelineandincluderight-of-wayinspectionbypipelinepatrols,ROVsurveysonseabedpipelines,hydrocarbonsensingviafiberopticordielectriccables.Internallybasedmethods,alsoknownasComputationalPipelineMonitoring(CPM),useinstrumentstomonitorinternalpipelineparameters(i.e.,pressure,flow,temperature,etc.),whichareinputsforinferringaproductreleasebymanualorelectroniccomputation.Internationalbestpracticerequireseffectivealarmsystems,andthattheleakdetectionsystemmustbesensitive,accurate,reliable,androbust.ItwasnotpossibletodeterminewhatleakdetectiontechnologiesNobleintendstoemployinitsextensivepipelinesystem.Arobustpipelineleakdetectionsystemshouldincludeasmanyofthefollowingcharacteristics(fromAPICPM1995)aspossible:

• Accurateproductreleasealarming;• Highsensitivitytoproductrelease;• Timelydetectionofproductrelease;• Efficientfieldandcontrolcentersupport;• Minimumsoftwareconfigurationandtuning;• Minimumimpactfromcommunicationoutages;• Accommodatescomplexoperatingconditions;• Configurabletoacomplexpipelinenetwork;• Performsaccurateimbalancecalculationsonflowmeters;• Isredundant;• Possessesdynamicalarmthresholds;• Accommodatesproductblending;• Accountsforheattransfer;• Providesthepipelinesystem’srealtimepressureprofile;• Accommodatesslack-lineandmultiphaseflowconditions;• Accommodatesalltypesofliquids;• Identifiesleaklocation;• Identifiesleakrate;• Accommodatesproductmeasurementandinventorycompensationfor

variouscorrections(i.e.,temperature,pressure,anddensity);and• Accountsforeffectsofdragreducingagent.

FortheLeviathanproject,pipelineleakdetectionistobeachievedbycontinuousmonitoringofarrivalpressuresandflowrates,aProductionManagementSystemtoreceiveandmonitorsubseasensorreadings(continuousmassbalanceonentireproductionsystem),annualROVsurvey,andapipelineintegrityassuranceprogram.Nofurtherdetailsofthissystems-criticalcomponentwereprovided,andthisneeds

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considerablymoredetail.Ataminimum,thefrequencyofROVsurveysofseabedinfrastructureshouldbeincreasedtoatleastmonthly,notannuallyasproposed.TheLeviathanDrillingEIAstates(emphasisadded): “Theriskofdamagetothepipelinesduetofactorssuchaslandslides, anchorsinshippinglanesandtrawlerfishingwillbeassessedatall relevantlocationsalongtheroutewillalsobeconsideredinthesafetyrisk assessment.Wheresignificantriskisidentified,preventativemeasureswill betakensuchasburyingthepipelineorprovidingexternalshieldingsuch asconcretecoating,Uraduct®coatingorconcretemattresses.”

Thisassessmentshouldhavebeencompletedandreportedinthesedocuments.Aswell,otherpipelinesafetydesignfactorsshouldbediscussed,includingpipelinewallthicknessandspacing.Asdesigned,seabedpipelinewallthicknesswillbeslightlygreateratfree-spansubseachannelcrossings,butthereisnodetaileddiscussionofadditionalseabedpipelinedesignfeaturestoreducerisksofpipelinefailure.7.8 Additionalspillpreventionmeasures

RegardingtheDynamicallyPositioned(DP)drillingrigstobeused,whichhadnotbeenselectedatthetimeofpublicationofthesedocuments(2016),therearemanysystem-criticaldetailsthatneedtobereportedandconfirmed,includingdetailontheIntegratedAlarmandControlSystem(IACS)onthedrillingrigs,CombustibleGasDetectors(CGDs),electricalgeneratorsafetysystems,firesuppression,andcommandstructureontherig,e.g.,responsibilitiesandrelationshipsbetweenallprojectparticipants,includingtherigowner,thecaptainofthevessels,OffshoreInstallationManager(OIM),andallsubcontractors.

Thedocumentsdonotprovideadiscussionofthecausesorspecificresponsestohistoricworst-caseoffshoreblowouts,whichindicatesalackofconsiderationforhistoriclessonslearned.Thisisalsorequiredinthe2013EUDrillingDirective,andshouldberequiredforLeviathan.

ItisunclearwhetherfireandexplosionriskontheLeviathanProductionPlatformhasbeenadequatelyassessedandmitigatedviaFrontEndEngineeringDesign(FEED).Explosion/fireontheLPPisasignificantriskthatcouldresultincatastrophicconsequencesforhumansafetyandthenearshoreenvironment.Thismustbeclarified.Thedocumentsdonotpresentsufficientdiscussionofallinspectionregimes,andtrainingandqualificationsofpersonnel,orthirdpartyexpertreviewofthedrillingplan.

Thedocumentsdonotidentifyorcommitto,asariskmitigationmeasure,

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establishingananonymoussafetyreportingcapability(“whistleblower”provision),incentivesandprotectionsforpersonnelusingsuchasystem,andhoweachsuchreportwillbeinvestigated.ThisisrequiredbyDirective2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations.

ThedocumentsdonotpresentacompletecasualtyhistoryforNobleorRatioOil’soffshoredrillingprojects,aswellasforthespecificrigstobeused(whichhaveyettobeidentified).Thisinformationisnecessarytoevaluatethecompany’sassertionsregardingitssafetymanagementsystems. ThedocumentsdonotadequatelydiscussNoble’sSafetyandEnvironmentalManagementSystem(SEMS),asisrequiredinU.S.regulation(30CFR250FederalRegister,Vol.75,No.199,Oct.15,2010).ThisisalsorequiredinDirective2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations(EU,2013).Inthisregard,thedocumentsshoulddetailthecompany’ssafetymanagementstructure,technicalexpertise,deepwaterexperience,analyticalmethodologytoassesstheperformanceofallsafetysystemineventofmultiplefailures,anditsoverallsafetyculture.SEMSisagoal-oriented,performancebasedSafetyCaseapproach,ratherthanthetraditionalprescriptiveapproach.Itrequiresoperators,contractors,andservicecompaniestodocumenttheirsafetyapproach;worktogethertoachievesafedrillingoutcomes;formalizeriskmanagementproceduresandresponsibilitiesofallparties;establishclearcommunicationprocedures;establishaManagementofChange(MOC)process;provideanindependentassessmentofwelldesign,drilling,andcompletion;andaproceduretomanageandincorporateevolvingtechnologies.TheU.S.NationalAcademyofEngineeringrecommendsahybridofprescriptiveandperformancebasedmanagementregimes,andthisshouldbediscussed.

Thedocumentsfailtodetailarigoroussubstanceabusepreventionprograminallphasesoftheproject,includingforallsubcontractors.

Regardingwellcompletionandwell-controlmonitoring,theDrillingEIAstates(3.2.7):

“EachwellwillbeequippedwithanSCSSVbelowmudlinetopreventan uncontrolledreleaseofhydrocarbons.Inaddition,eachwellwillbeequipped withadualdownholepressureandtemperaturegaugeforreal-time downholesurveillance,includedwithchemicalinjectionmandrels(CIMs)for mitigationagainstthepotentialriskofscaleorhydrates.”

Yetthereisnomoredetailavailablere:theSCSSVs(Surface-ControlledSubsurfaceSafetyValves)orotherdownholeequipmenttomaintainwellcontrolduringtheoperational/productionphase.ThereisnodiscussionofthepotentialforSCSSVfailureandlossofwellcontrol,orarobustcontingencyplanforsuch.Thisisasystems-criticalissue,andmustbedetailedinthedocuments.Pressuretransmittersindownholeequipment,includingSCSSVsystems,areknowntofailfromavarietyofissuesincludingplugging,leaks,trappedbubbles/gaspocketsin

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liquid-filledimpulselines,trappedliquidsingas-filledimpulselines,electrostaticdischarges,temperature-inducedmeasurementerrors,corrosion,andoverpressuresorvacuums.31Allofthesepotentialfailuresmustbeaddressedindetail,yethavenotbeeninthedocumentsreviewed.Ifsubseacontrolsystemslosesurfacecontrolconnectivity(suchasafteranexplosiononLPP,orabreakinthesubseaumbilicalconnection),backupprocedureswouldneedtobeemployedquicklytoceasegasandcondensateproductionandrelease.Thedocumentsdonotidentifyallsubcontractorstobeused,andhowtheywillbemanaged.InadrillingacomplexdeepwaterprospectsuchasLeviathan,itisnecessarytoeffectivelymanageseveraldrillingsubcontractors,servicecompanies,andconsultants,andstaffsimultaneously.Forinstance,indrillingtheMacondowellintheGulfofMexico,BPemployedatleasteight(8)subcontractingcompaniesforvariouscomponentsoftheproject.Therelationshipandcommunicationbetweenallcorporateentitiesinvolvedinacomplexdeepwaterdrillingoperationisasafety-criticalissue.Thedocumentsshouldclarifythisrelationship,whichpersonnelhavestop-workauthority,andhowandwhenthismaybeimposed.

ThedocumentsdonotstipulatethatanIndependentWellControlExpert(IWCE),willbeavailableandreviewthedrillingproceduresatalltimesduringdrilling,aswellasaprocedureforobtainingpeerreviewandsecondopinionsonvarioussafety-criticaldecisionsmadebeforeandduringdrilling.SuchasystemexistsintheU.K.,isrequiredintheU.S.offshoreDrillingSafetyRules(BSEE,2012),andimpliedbythe2013EUDrillingDirective(EU,2013).TheindependentthirdpartyexpertshouldbeaRegisteredProfessionalEngineer,whosequalificationsarepresentedtoandapprovedbygovernment.

8. SelectedProjectDesign–Platformvs.FPSOorFLNGNineconceptualdesignoptionsweregenerallydiscussedintheOffshoreProcessingScheme,Table2.1,NOP37H,asfollow: 1.DirectSubseaTieback–FullProcessingOnshore 2.DirectSubseaTieback-FullProcessingOnshorewithsubseapressure reduction 3.DirectSubseaTieback–FullProcessingOnshorewithsubseapressure reductionoronariserplatforminterritorialwaters 4.ShelfPlatformSubseaTieback–MinimumProcessingOnshore 5.SubseaSeparationandProcessingOnshore 6.ProductiontoMari-BExisting/FuturePlatformsandPartialProcessingin Ashod 7.ShelfPlatformSubseaTieback–MaximumProcessingOffshore 8.ShelfPlatformSubseaTieback–FullProcessingOffshore,connectionto NGTSpipelineoffshoreHadera

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9.DeepwaterDevelopment–ProcessingOffshore“ThesenineconceptswerethenevaluatedagainstaseriesofselectioncriteriaandthreewereshortlistedforfurtherevaluationinStage2ofthePlanningProcess”:Cases3,4,and7.Anotheroptionwithminimalonshorefacilitieswasalsoconsidered.

ThedocumentpresentsaninadequateexplanationforwhyCase9“DeepwaterDevelopment–ProcessingOffshore”wasdeclinedasanoption.InitsSept.2014document“RatioOilExploration[1992]”document32,Noble’spartnerRatioOildiscussestheoverallprojectconceptforuseofaFloatingProduction,Storage,andOffloading(FPSO)ship,andaFloatingLiquefiedNaturalGas(FLNG)optionfortheLeviathanproject.

TheNOP37/H–Guidelines(1.6,ChaptersAandB)providesageneraldiscussionofsomeoftheadvantagesanddisadvantagesoftheFPSO/FLNGoption.ThedocumentevaluatesfourdifferentoptionsinCase9:Semi-SubmersibleProductionPlatform,Tension-LegPlatform,FPSO,andFLNG.However,thesealternativesconsideronlyseabedpipelinetransmissionofgas/condensatetoshore,afterinitialstorageandprocessingoffshore--thedocumentdoesnotconsideruseofshuttleLNGtankersorbargestotransportLNGtoshorefacilitiesorexport.

SeveralconstraintstotheoffshoreFPSO/FLNGoptionareraisedinthedocument,sometechnicalandsomefinancial.Technicalissuesincludepotentialcondensation(hydrates)inseabedpipelines,engineeringanddurabilityofflexiblerisersbetweenseabedwellheadsandtheFPSO/FLNG,etc.Forallfouralternatives,cost,timetobuild,andinabilitytosupplygastothelocalsystemarecitedasimpedimentstotheoffshorealternative.Infact,theFLNGoptioncaneasilyprovidegastothelocalgassystemviashuttleLNGtankerorbarge,orFPSOthroughseabedpipelinestransportingdrygastoshore(aswiththeKarishandTaninproject),butthiswasnotthoroughlyevaluated.

TheNOP37/HdocumentincorrectlystatesthatFLNGisan“unproventechnology.”WhilesuchFLNGfacilitiesareindeednewdevelopmentsfordeepwater,offshoregasfields,atleasttwoarenowoperational-oneinMalaysia,PetronasPFLNG133,currentlyoperatingattheKanowitgasfieldoffSarawak,Malaysia;andGolar’sFLNGoffCameroon.34

AdditionalFLNGprojectsarenowindevelopmentoffChina,EquatorialGuinea,andAustralia,andothersarepresentlyinconsideration.Shell’s“PreludeFLNG”facilityforthePreludeandBrowsegasfields200kmoffSouthAustralia(whichisnowonsite)islargestfloatingstructureeverbuilt(488mx74m,displacing600,000tons).35TheseFLNGfacilitiesloadandprocessallproducedgasandcondensateontofloatingfacilitiesoveradeepwateroffshoregasfield,eliminatingtheneedforhundredsofkmofseabedpipelinestoshore,nearshoreplatforms,andotheronshoreinfrastructure.TheFLNGfacilityliquefiesthegas,andthenloadsLNGonto

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shuttletankers/bargesfortransporttomarketsonshoreorexport.Assuch,FLNGdrasticallyreducesriskandimpacttocoastalresources.

AsShellstatesregardingitsPreludeFLNGprojectoffAustralia:

“FLNGtechnologyofferscountriesamoreenvironmentally-sensitivewayto developnaturalgasresources.Preludewillhaveamuchsmaller environmentalfootprintthanland-basedLNGplants,whichrequiremajor infrastructureworks.Italsoeliminatestheneedforlongpipelinestoland.”36 AndFPSOs(withgas/oilseparation)havebeenusedsuccessfullyforover25yearsfordeepwateroilandgasfields,andtherearepresentlyover200inuseglobally.SomeFPSOsarenowinuseatwaterdepthsfargreaterthanLeviathan,includingtheBWPioneermoored(viaadisconnectableturret)in2,600mdepthintheU.S.GulfofMexico.37

Further,the2017EnergeanKarishandTaninFieldDevelopmentPlandescribestherelativeadvantageofanFPSOvs.seabedpipeline/onshoredevelopmentoptionasfollows:minimizesworktobeconductedinthefield,quickerdevelopmenttime,capitalexpendituretofirst-gas,increasedopportunitiestoexport,tie-backofmultiple3rdpartyfields,reducedtechnicalrisk(e.g.hydrateformationinextensiveseabedpipelines),additionalproductrecoveryfromfield,significantlyreducedenvironmentalfootprint,andeaseofabandonmentafterfieldisexhausted.38RegardingexperiencewithFPSOtechnology,Energean’s2017assessmentstates:

“Useofafloatingstructureinthevicinityofthefieldisamuchmorecommon approach,onethathasbeenmasteredoverthelast25years.Therearemore than20floatingunitsworldwideinwaterdepthsgreaterthantheKarish field.”39

RegardingenvironmentalfootprintoftheFPSOvs.seabed/onshoreoption,Energean’s2017analysisstatesasfollows(emphasisadded):

“Environmentalfootprint:UsinganFPSOlocated75kmfromtheIsraelcoast shouldresultinthedevelopmenthavingverylowenvironmentalimpacts, substantiallylessthantheotherschemesconsidered.Environmentalimpacts shouldbelowerduringallprojectphases:construction,operationand abandonment.Asnofixedplatformisrequiredandsuctionpileswillbe employedfortheFPSOmooringsystemasmallfleetofmarinevesselswillbe requiredduringconstruction/installation.Thiswillresultinlownoiseand pollutionlevels.TheFPSOschemealsolimitsthepotentialforoilpollution resultingfrompipelineleaks.Hydrocarbonliquidsarenottransportedto shoreandhencetheconsequenceofanyspillageissignificantlyreduced.The FPSOschemealsoallowsreservoirpressureenergytobeemployedmore effectivelyreducingoverallpowerrequirementsandhenceemissionlevels. Importantly,theonshoreandcoastalprojectscopeandhenceenvironmental

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impactwillbesmall.Thisiscriticalasnotonlywillitensurethat environmentalimpactsareminimizedbutshouldaidintheobtainmentof permitsandhencesupportafast-trackproject.ThelowestCAPEX(capital expenditure)approachwouldhavebeentotreatallfluidsonshorebutclearly thiswouldhavehadthemostsignificantenvironmentalimpactandhence wasexcluded.”

ToavoidconstructiondelaysforLeviathan,NoblecouldleaseanFPSO,andtie-intoitsseabedpipelinesystemnowinconstructiontotransportgastoshore,andshipcondensateviashuttletankers.Asfarascouldbedetermined,anFPSO/FLNGalternativeforLeviathanwasnotfurtherevaluated.Itisimperativethatbothoftheseoptionsarereconsidered. TheSLIP(p.57)states(emphasisadded):

“NobleEnergyassessedavarietyofdevelopmentandtreatmentoptions(i.e., onshore,offshore,sub-sea),includingaFloatingProductionStorageandOff- Loadingvessel(FPSO)withaPressureReductionMeteringPlatform,which wasoriginallypreferred,andaFixedPlatform...Therewerenosignificant environmentaldifferentiatorsorshowstoppersidentifiedacrossallofthe viableoptions.Afixedproductionplatformwaschosen,primarilyinorderto accelerategassupplytothedomesticmarketthusbringingredundancyto Israel’sgassupplyearlier.”

Thisconclusionisclearlynotsupportable,asthereareindeeddramaticenvironmentaldifferentiatorsbetweenthenearshoreplatformandtheFPSO/FLNGoption.

Itisinarguablethatnearshorerisksandimpactsfromconstructionandoperationoftheproject(noise,light,atmosphericemissions,marinedischarge,visual/aestheticimpacts,socioeconomicimpacts,etc.);risksofnaturalgas,condensate,diesel,MEG,methanolorotherspillstocoastalinhabitantsandecosystems;riskfromfire/explosionontheLPP;andsecurity/terrorismriskpresentedbytheLPPandnearshoreinfrastructure,etc.;wouldallbesignificantlyreducedif,insteadoftheproposedLPP10kmoffshore,theprojectoptedforanFPSO/FLNGfacility125kmoffshoreatthedeepwatergasfield.Accordingly,theselectedLPPoptionshouldbereconsidered,infavorofCase9:“DeepwaterDevelopment–OffshoreProcessing.”

FPSOandFLNG,andLNGtankerswillposedifferentrisks,andtheseshouldbeevaluatedandmitigatedasfaraspossible.Butoverall,theriskfromanFPSOorLNGtankerscarryingLNGfromanoffshoreFLNGfacilitywouldbeconsiderablylowerthanthenearshoreplatformoption.

Fromasecuritystandpointalone,thenearshoreplatformoptionclearlyposesfarmoreriskthananFPSO/FLNGfacility125kmoffshore(seediscussionofthisissue

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inSecurityRisk,Section13,below).TheLPPwouldlikelybeconsideredahigh-valuetargetforterroristattack.Additionally,ifhostilitiesweretoeruptonceagainbetween,forinstance,HezbollahinsouthernLebanonandIsrael(asin2006),anearshoregasprocessingplatformclosetotheborder(e.g.,LPP)wouldlikelybehighonanadversary’stargetlist.

AstheGovernmentofIsraelisacutelyaware,Hezbollahnowpossesses130,000–150,000rockets,includingshort,medium,long-rangeandM-600ballisticmissiles(witharangeof300miles),mostlypositionedalongthesouthernLebaneseborder.40WhileanFPSO/FLNGfacility125kmoffshorewouldstillbeinrangeoflong-rangemissiles,itwouldclearlybeatlessriskofthis,andotherthreats,thanwouldtheplatformonly10kmoffshore.Additionally,anFPSO/FLNGfacilityshoulddevelopacontingencyplanintheeventofhostilities,inwhichitwouldclosedownallproductionandmoveoff-site,outofrangeofhostileaction.SucharesponsewouldbeunavailabletothestationaryLPP.

Further,thedocumentsstatethattheactualrationalefordecliningtheoffshoreFLNGalternativeforLeviathaninfavorofmoretraditionaldesign(subseapipelinestoanearshoreprocessingplatform)wasasfollows:

“…inordertoaccelerategassupplytothedomesticmarketthusbringing redundancytoIsrael’sgassupplyearlier.”

Thisstatementconfirmsthatcommercialimperativetoexpeditegasdeliverieswasthemainreasonforselectingtheplatformoption--notminimizingenvironmentalriskorimpact.CostwasraisedasanissueinallfouralternativesoffshorediscussedinNOP37/H.

SourcessuggestthatthetotalcostfortheShell’sPreludefacilitymaybefrom$11billion-$13billion.41However,amortizingthiscostovertheexpected30+yearlifetimeofLeviathan(whichcouldgrossover$100billion),andotherdeepwatergasdevelopmentsintheEasternMediterranean,FLNGbecomescost-effective.

EventhoughtheLeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP)andseabedpipelineoptionhasalreadybeenselectedandareindevelopmentatpresent,astheprojectlifetimeisexpectedtoexceed30years,itisinthelong-terminterestofIsraeltosuspendthecurrentplatformdevelopment,andredesigntheprojectasanoffshoreFPSO/FLNGfacility.Thiswouldeasilystillprovidedomesticenergyneeds,asLNGshuttletankerswouldtransportgasandcondensatetotheHaderadeepwaterLNGbuoy,additionalLNGbuoys,otherportsinIsrael,ordrygasviaseabedpipelinetoshore.Infact,theFPSO/FLNGoptionwouldprovidegreaterlong-termflexibilityfortheprojectinmeetingshiftingmarketsandexportopportunities.

NobleshouldexploreoptionstosellthenewlyconstructedLPPtoanotheroffshoregasprojectelsewhere.

RegardingtheselectedLPPlocation,threesiteswereevaluated,(TAMAoffshoreEIA

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p.193),Hadera,HavatzeletHaSharon,andNetanya,allalongthesamegeneraldepthcontour(80m-90m),about10kmoffshore.TheEIAstates:that“thereisnosignificantdifferencebetweenthethreesites,”andselectedHavatzeletHaSharon,withthecaveatthattheystillneededa“detailedsurveyoftheseabed.”However,itisnotedthatoffshoreplatformsgloballycanbelocatedinwaterdepthsto500m,yettheLeviathandocumentsdonotdiscusspotentialforlocatingtheLPPfurtheroffshore,indeeperwater.Thisshouldhavebeenexplored.Essentially,thefurtherfromshoreahydrocarbonplatformorprocessingfacilityis,thebetter.

9. CondensateSpillResponseAsitislight,volatile,andlowviscosity,spilledcondensatewouldbevirtuallyimpossibletocontainandrecoverfromtheseasurfacewithconventionaloilspillmethodologiessuchasboomsandskimmers.Infact,itisgenerallyacceptedintheinternationalspillresponsecommunitythatthereexistsnocontainment/recoverymethodologythatwouldeffectiveforcondensate(ornaturalgas)spillsatsea.InaMay17,2018emailreplytotheauthoronthesubjectofresponsetocondensatereleases,Dr.RobHolland,TechnicalLeadforOilSpillResponseLimited(OSRL)intheUK(theprimaryTierIIIresponsecontractorformostoilandgasoperationsglobally,includingNoble)statedasfollows:

“Youarecorrectthatinthemajorityofcasesofgasorcondensatereleases thenit’ssimplyamatterof‘Monitor&Evaluate’withnodirectintervention. Somecondensateshavehigherwaxcontentthanotherswhichcanposeits ownsetofchallengesoncethefreshcondensatehasweatheredatsea.”42Itisimportanttonotethattherehasneverbeenasuccessfulmechanicalcontainmentandrecoveryoperationinresponsetoalargecondensate(ornaturalgas)releaseinthemarineenvironment.Asfarasisknown,nonehasevenbeenattempted.Theremaybeapossibilityofusingsorbentmaterialsdeployedtoabsorbsmallamountsofspilledcondensatefromsurfaceandsubsurfacewaters(e.g.newlydevelopedpolyurethaneOleoSponge,sorbentboomsandpads,etc.),andperhapsweatheredcondensatemaylenditselftocontainmentandrecovery,buteventhesewouldhaveminimaleffectonlargeoffshorecondensatereleases.Thusforplanningpurposes,itshouldbeassumedthatnoneofanoffshorecondensate(ornaturalgas)releasefromLeviathaninfrastructurewouldberecoveredfromtheenvironment.TheassumptionfoundthroughouttheLeviathandocumentsthatcondensatespillswillbehavesimilarlytooilspillsisunfounded.Further,theassumptionthatchemicaldispersantswouldbeeffectiveonamarinecondensatespillissimilarlyunfounded.Thereisonlyminimalresearchintotheeffectofdispersantsoncondensatespills,withequivocalresults.

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Itmayindeedbepossibletocollectweathered,emulsifiedaccretionsonshore,andthatshouldbeexplored.ShorelinecontaminationfromaWorstCaseDischargeofcondensatecouldpersistformonths,ifnotyears.AnOilWeatheringModel(OWM)shouldbeconductedonLeviathan/Tamarcondensateandnaturalgas.InputintothecondensateOWMshouldincludeoil/emulsionfilmthickness,seastate,andseatemperature.9.1 OilSpillContingencyPlan(OSCP)Thedocumentsassertthat:“Inthecaseofaspill,anemergencyplanforthepreventionofseapollutionwillbeexecuted.Theprogramwillinclude,interalia:

• Useofdedicatedequipmenttodealwiththespillevent,atTIER1level;• PeriodicemergencydrillsaccordingtotherequirementsoftheMinistry

ofEnvironmentalProtection;• Operationofalocalcontractortoprovideimmediateresponsetoalocal

spill;• Operationofinternationalcontractorstorespondtoaregionalevent.• TheprogramwillbebasedonthescenariosexaminedinboththeOSCAR

modelandtheMEDSLIKmodel,withrespecttoresponsetimesrequiredtoreducethespreadofthespill,andpreventingitsarrivalatthecoastline.

• TheuseofdispersantswillbecarriedoutinaccordancewiththeMinistry’sinstructions,andsubjecttorestrictionsresultingfromproximitytothecoastlineandmarinereserves(waterdepthgreaterthan20meters,distancefromareservationgreaterthan1mile).”

TheonlyOCSPavailableforreview–Jan.2018“NEMLLeviathanFieldInstallationandConstructionOSCP–Tier4”–doesnotconstituteasufficientoperationalspillresponseplanforallphasesoftheproject,includingdrilling,production,andtheLPP.Theplanappearstofocusmostlyoninshoreresponsescenarios,andeventhatisinadequate.NoShipboardOilPollutionEmergencyPlans(SOPEPs)orEmergencyResponsePlanswereavailableforreview,andthereisnodiscussionofresponseequipmentorcapabilityattheoffshoredrillrigsortheLPP.

CondensatespillresponseassumptionsintheOSCP(5.2)arelistedasfollows:“ThegeneralcharacteristicsoftheproductassociatedwithNEMLoperationsfavorsdispersantoverrecovery.NEML’sstrategywilldependonmanyfactorsthatwillbesituationdependent.Ingeneral,hydrocarbonreleasestrategiesmayincludethefollowing:

• DispersantApplication• MechanicalAgitation

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• MechanicalRecovery• ShorelineProtection• ShorelineCleanup/Recover• Rehabilitation

Thegovernmentand/orNobleshouldprovideaMaterialSafetyDataSheet(MSDS)forLeviathancondensate,buttheauthorhasnotbeenprovidedsuch.ThisisastandardrequirementintheU.S.andEuropeforallpotentiallyhazardouschemicalsproduced,transported,orstoredbyindustrialprojects,andisalsorequiredinIsrael.AnMSDSshouldbeprovidedforallhazardoussubstancesinvolvedinLeviathan.

9.2 Mechanicalrecovery

Mechanicalrecoveryofseasurfaceoilspillsconsistsofcontainmentwithboomsandcollectionwithvariouskindsofskimmersorsorbents.

Butagain,itisimportanttounderscorethefactthatspillresponseprofessionalsdonotgenerallyconsidercondensate(ornaturalgas)releasesatseatoberecoverable.Infact,evencontainmentandresponsetolargeoffshorecrudeoilspillsisknowntobegenerallyineffective,withusuallylessthan10%recovered.Asexample,recoveryofDeepwaterHorizoncrudeoilwasonly3%ofthetotalreleasevolume,despitethelargestoilspillresponseeffortinhistory(with47,000responsepersonnel,7,000vessels,costingover$14billion).AndrecoveryrateintheExxonValdezcrudeoilspillwasabout7%.

AsreportedbySINTEF,condensatesreleasedonacalmseasurfacemayspreadandformathinfilm(lessthan0.1mm)ofverylowviscosity,and“theuseoftraditionalmechanicalrecoverysystemsisassumedtohavelowefficiencyonthinoilfilms.”43However,afterweatheringforseveraldays,theremaybesomesolidificationofcondensateallowingcontainmentwithboomsandcollectionwithskimmers.ButthissolidificationmaybeunlikelyathightemperaturesfoundoffIsrael.

Forplanningpurposes,itshouldbeassumedthatacondensateornaturalgasreleaseatseawouldbenon-recoverable.

9.3 DispersantsRegardinguseofchemicaldispersants,thereislittleevidencethatdispersantswouldbeeffectiveonlargeoffshorecondensateornaturalgasreleases.Dispersantsareacombinationofasurfactantandorganicsolventthatlowerstheinterfacialtensionbetweenoilandwater,resultinginemulsificationanddispersionofsurfaceoilintosmallerdroplets,increasingdispersionandbioavailabilitytonaturalhydrocarbondegraders.44Theyareusuallyappliedviaairplane,equippedwithanAerialDispersantDeliverySystempackage(ADDS-pack).Inthe2010MacondoblowoutintheU.S.GulfofMexico,dispersantswerealsoaddedatthedeepwater

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wellhead.AcontingencyforwellheaddispersantapplicationshouldalsobedevelopedforLeviathan.Evenwithcrudeoilspills,chemicaldispersantsareknowntobeoflimitedeffectiveness,exertasynergistictoxicity,andtransferofpollutantimpactfromtheseasurfacedownintothewatercolumn.Dispersantsaregenerallyusedonsurfacefilmsgreaterthan0.05mm–0.1mmthick,andtheylosetheireffectivenessasoilsweather.TheyaregenerallymosteffectivewhenappliedataDispersanttoOil(DOR)ratioof1:25.SINTEFreportslaboratoryteststhatdemonstratesomeefficacyinuseofdispersantsonSigyn(fromanoffshorefieldoffsouthernNorway)condensateincalm(summer)conditions.45However,thewindowoftimeandsea/windstatewithinwhichdispersantsmaybeeffectiveisextremelynarrow,thefirstfewdaysatmost.TheSINTEFstudythatreportedeffectivenessofDasicNSandCorexit9500onSigyncondensatefrom67%-100%didnotestablishacontrol,withnodispersantadded,thusthedispersibilityresultsarequestionable.46Muchofthereporteddispersibilitymaysimplyhavederivedfrommechanicalwaveaction,notchemicaldispersion.Fromapracticalresponsestandpoint,itisextremelyunlikelythatlarge-scaledispersantapplicationcouldbemobilizedquicklyenoughtobeeffectiveonamajoroffshorecondensaterelease.Afteronlyaoneortwodays,residualcondensateontheseasurfacewouldlikelybetooweatheredtobedispersible.Andassurfaceapplicationofdispersantstransferstoxichydrocarboncontaminationfromtheseasurfacedownintothewatercolumn,theiruseshouldbeavoidedovershallowwaters.Israelidispersantuserestrictionscurrentlypermitdispersantuseinwaterdepthsgreaterthan20moroutside1nauticalmileofsensitivecoastalhabitats,andtheserulesneedtoberevised.Itisrecommendedherethatdispersantusebeprohibitedinwaterdepthslessthan200m,and/orwithin10milesofshore.Ifusedonacondensaterelease,dispersantswouldincreasetheexposureofpelagicorganismstothewater-solubleanddispersedfractionofcondensate,therebyincreasingimpactinthiscomponentofthemarineecosystem.Thiswasnotaddressedinthedocuments,butmustbeconsidered.TheLeviathandocumentsrepeattheclaimthat:“Expeditedresponsefromouroilspillresponsecontractorandapprovalfortheuseofdispersantuseisvitaltosuccessfullymitigatingthisevent.”Asdiscussedabove,theuseofchemicaldispersantsinresponsetoanoffshorecondensate(ornaturalgas)releasehasnotbeendemonstratedtobegenerallyeffective.Indeed,eveninresponsetocrudeoilspillsthewindowforpotentialeffectiveuseofdispersantsisverynarrow,andgenerallyonlyeffectiveonfresh(un-weathered)oil(1-2daysout),andonlywithmoderatewave/windmixing,withwindsbetween10-20knots.

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Testsshouldbeconductedtodeterminethepotentialefficacyoftheplanneddispersants(DASICSlickgoneNSandSea-Brat4)oncondensate,bothfreshandweathered.Otherwise,itshouldbeassumedthatchemicaldispersantswouldnotbeeffectiveoncondensatesthatreachtheseasurface,particularlyastheyweather.Furthermore,nochemicaldispersantsshouldbepermittedtobeusedinwaterslessthan100mdepth,andcloserthan10milesfromshore,orwheresurfacecurrentsmaycarrydispersantsintowatersshallowerthan100morwithin10kmofshore.

Andeveniflaboratorytestsdemonstratedispersanteffectiveness,adispersibilitytestkitshouldbeusedinanyreal-timecondensatetoconfirmeffectivenessonprecisecondensatesurfacefilmsencountered.Again,itisunlikelythatdispersantswouldbeeffectiveonamajoroffshorecondensaterelease.

Theoperatorshouldalsoexaminethepotentialtoinjectdispersantintoawellheadblowout,aswasdoneinthe2010DeepwaterHorizonblowout.Thiswouldincludemethodologiesthatmightbeemployed,andthepotentialenvironmentaleffectsofsuchdeepwaterdispersantapplication.9.4 In-situburning

TheOSCPdoesnotdiscussin-situburning(ISB)-acontrolledignitionofsurfacehydrocarbonslicks-asapotentialcondensatespillresponsetool.Itisnotclearfromtheequipmentlist,referredtointheOSCP,whatspillignitionorISBequipmentisonhand.AnISBplanmustidentifyspecificignitionstrategies(Heli-torches,gels,etc.),herdingagents,fireboomdeploymentstrategies,andspecificapproachestobeused.Itisthusindeterminatehowin-situburningwouldbeconsideredormanaged,particularlyforaTierIIIresponse.Inamajorblowoutscenario,ISBwillalmostcertainlybeconsideredasanoptionforfar-offshoreresponse,andshouldbediscussedintheplan.ItmustalsobeacknowledgedthatinmanycondensatespillscenariosISBwillremainineffective.

Inaddition,theriskoffire/explosionwithasurfacecondensatereleasemustbecarefullyconsidered.SINTEFreportsthatSigyncondensateposesafirehazardduringthefirst2hoursafterrelease,undercalm(lessthan2m/sec.)windconditions,withaflashpointbelowambientseatemperature.47AsimilarriskmayexistwithanoffshorereleaseofLeviathancondensate.Inparticular,ignitionmaypresentsignificantriskifcondensateisspilledontotheseasurfaceattheLeviathanProductionPlatform,thusjeopardizingthesafetyoftheentireplatformandseabedinfrastructurecontrolsystems.Thismustbemethodicallyconsideredinanyspillrisk/responsescenario.

9.5 AdditionalOSCPConsiderations

InOSCPsection5.3ReleaseScenarios,thepossibilityofawellblowoutiscited,buttheonlyreleasescenariosdiscussed–operationalfailure,equipmentfailure,shipallision/collision–arediscussedonlyintermsoftheLPP.Thepossibilityofa

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catastrophicwellblowoutoffshoreisnotdiscussedintheresponsescenarios.Thisshouldberemedied.

Appendix5oftheOSCPlackssufficienttransboundarycontingenciesandarrangementsforspillsthatmaydrifttoterritorialwatersandcoastsofLebanon,EgyptorCyprus.Aswell,insection8.1,thereisnoprovisionforstakeholderengagementinspillresponseexercises,orinactualresponse.Noristhereprovisionforsurprisedrillscalledbythegovernment.Theseomissionsmustberemedied.

NEML’smainresponsefleetandbaseisinAshod,withadditionalrapidresponsefacilitiesinHaifaandHadera,yetthevesselparticularsandequipmentonhandarenotitemized.Appendix6liststheinstallationvessels,yetfewvesselparticulars.Appendix7listsvesselcontactsandeightresponsevessels,butnofurtherinformationontheirresponsecapabilities.Appendix8liststhespillresponseequipmentonhand.Itisimportantthatgovernmentauthoritiesconfirmthemaintenanceandoperabilityofallresponseequipmentwithinspectionsanddrills.

ThereisnowildliferesponseplanintheOSCP,whichneedstoberemedied.TheWildlifeResponseplanshouldincludeplansforhazingwildlife(seabirds,marinemammals,etc.)awayfromthefrontofaspreadingplumeofcondensateornaturalgas(surfaceorsubsurface),andcontainplanstocaptureandtreatoiledwildlife.

Finally,theOCSPshoulddiscusspotentialforamajorcondensateorgasreleasetocontaminateseawaterintakeatdesalinationplantsonshore(oneisonly20kmfromtheLPP),andthepotentialforaffectingdrinkingwaterquality.Studieshaveraisedvarioustechnicalconcernsregardingremovalofoilpollutionfromseawaterpriortodesalination.48Inparticular,thesestudiesfoundthatwater-solublecomponentswithsmallmolecularsizearedifficulttoremove.ThisriskshouldbeexaminedbytheLeviathanOSCP,andacontingencyshouldbedevelopedformonitoringandclosingtheintaketodesalinationplantsifthepotentialforgas/condensateexposurepresentsitselfinaspill.

NoteagainthattheprimaryTierIIandIIIresponsecontractorforLeviathan–OSRLintheUK–agreeswiththeauthorthatthereexistsnoeffectiveresponsemethodologyformarinecondensatespills.TheOSCPshouldhonestlyadmitsuch.

9.6 Vaporemissionsabovecondensatespills

Dependingonthepreciseconditionsofrelease,condensatesreachingtheseasurfacewillundergovolatilization/evaporationintotheoverlyingatmosphere,anddispersedownwind.Itisassumedthatroughly50%ofacondensatespillwillevaporateintooverlyingairasVolatileOrganicCompounds(VOCs),whichareacutelytoxic.Ifthereleaseisdirectlyontheseasurfaceorfromashallowsubsurfacepipeline,alargeramountwillevaporate.However,ifthereleaseisfromadeepwaterwellhead(1,600–1,700mwaterdepth)orpipeline,theevaporationpercentagewillbereduced,andamountremaininginthewatercolumnincreased.Regardless,fromthemodeledreleaseofapproximately175,000bbls,itcanbe

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assumedthatperhaps85,000bbls(12,500tons)ofcondensateevaporationcomponents(VOCs)willtransferintooverlyingairmasses.

However,noneofthedocumentsreviewedcontainadiscussionofthisatmosphericVOCplumethatwilldevelopoveracondensatespill.Detailmustbeprovidedonthis,includingmodelingthedispersionoftheVOCplumeasthecondensatereleasespreadsandweathers.

Someheavierresidualcomponentsofacondensaterelease(e.g.decane,C10H22)canpersistonthewatersurface,providingacontinuoussourceofVOCemissionsintooverlyingair.TheU.S.CAMEO(Computer-AidedManagementofEmergencyOperations)chemicaldatabasereportsthattheProtectiveActionCriteria(PAC),PAC3acutetoxicityindexfordecane(e.g.alife-threateningatmosphericconcentration)is440ppm,andaPAC2(causingdebilitatingeffects)isaslowas73ppm.49EPAreportsthatheaviercomponentsofcondensates(suchasdecane)generallyexertgreatertoxicity.Decaneexposurecancausethefollowingsymptomsinhumans: “Contactwitheyesmayproducemildirritation.Contactwithskinmaycause defatting,redness,scaling,andhairloss.Ingestionmaycausediarrhea,slight centralnervoussystemdepression,difficultyinbreathingandfatigue. Inhalationofhighconcentrationsmaycauserapidbreathing,fatigue, headache,dizziness,andotherCNSeffects.”50 Regardingatmosphericemissionsovercondensatereleases,IsraeliscientistshaveconductedpreliminaryanalysesusingtheUSEPAALOHA(AerialLocationsofHazardousAtmospheres)computersimulationtool,predictingthatinsomespillscenariosfromtheLeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP):

“Coastalinhabitantsmaybeexposedtoatoxiccondensatecloudabovethe PAC2AcuteExposureGuidelineLevelsforAirborneChemicalsaspublished bytheEPA.”51

Giventheknownacutetoxicityofcondensatecomponents,thisatmosphericplumethatformsoveracondensatereleasewillposerisktoair-breathingorganismsexposed,includingseabirds,marinemammals,andhumans.AlthoughseveralLeviathandocumentsrepeattheclaimthatthisatmosphericplumewouldnotpresenttoxicologicalriskfurtherthan200mfromthereleasepoint,theEnvironmentCanadasynthesisonNaturalGasCondensates(NGCs)concludesthat:

“Basedontheavailableinformation,NGCscontaincomponentsthatmay persistinairandundergolong-rangeatmospherictransport.”52

Regardless,anycondensatespillresponseplanmustincludeprovisionstoprotectresponsepersonnel,thepublic,andair-breathinganimalsfromthetoxicatmosphericplumeabovethespill.

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9.7 Spilltrackingandmonitoring

TheJan.2018NobleOSCPdoesnotpresentplansormethodologiestotrackandmonitoranoffshorecondensatespill,andthisisasignificantgapthatmustberemedied.Therearemanyproceduresandtechnologiesavailableforspilltrackingthatshouldbeitemizedandpreparedinadvanceofprojectpermitting.53Theseincludeaerialsurveillancewithdigitalcameras;aircraft-mountedinfraredandultravioletsensors;multispectralsatelliteremotesensing;veryhighresolutionradiometrysatellitesensors;aircraft-mountedSyntheticApertureRadar(SAR)andSide-LookingAirborneRadar(SLAR);shipboardobservation;driftbuoys;HighFrequency(HF)andmicrowaveDopplerRadartomapsurfacecurrents;waterhydrocarbonsampling;hydrocarbonsamplingbuoyarrays;etc.Forsubsurfacespillcomponents,additionaltechnologiesshouldbediscussed,includingsonar,watercolumnsampling,laserfluorosensors,geophysical/acoustictechniques,insitufluorometricdetectors,RemotelyOperatedVehicles(ROVs),AutonomousUnderwaterVehicles(AUVs),etc.54Thedocumentsdonotdiscusstheneedtopre-planacomprehensiveNaturalResourceDamageAssessment(NRDA,asitisknownintheU.S.)withwhichtomethodicallydocumentenvironmentaldamagefromalargecondensateornaturalgasreleasefromtheproject.55Suchacomprehensivescientificdamageassessmentisnecessarytodeterminetheextentofecologicalinjury,informthepublicandallstakeholdersoftheextentofinjury,providedetailedinformationuponwhichtobaseclaimstoResponsibleParty,andtoformulateanenvironmentalrestorationplan.Thedocumentsshoulddevelopanddiscussapre-spillNRDAplan;aRapidAssessment,MidtermAssessment;andLong-termAssessmentplan;andNRDAorganizationalandmanagement.Aswell,theenvironmentalmonitoringplansproposedinthedocumentslackdetail,andremaininsufficient.ItissuggestedthatenvironmentalmonitoringforallaspectsoftheprojectbefundedbyNobleandpartners,butbeconductedindependentlythroughIOLR(IsraelOceanographicandLimnologicalResearchInstitute),incooperationwithanIsraelOffshoreCitizens’AdvisoryCouncil(IOCAC,describedinStakeholderEngagementPlansectionbelow). 10. MarineDischarge

10.1 ProducedWaterDischargeProducedwater(condensedwater,formationwater,and‘breakthrough’water)fromthereservoirwillflowinsubseapipelinesalongwithproducedgasandcondensatetotheLPP.ProducedwaterwillbeseparatedanddischargedattheLPP.Israel’sMoEPreports(5/5/2018letterfromMoEPtoGuardians)thattheLPPproducedwatercapacitywillbeonly800m3(8,700bbl)/day,andisexpectedto

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dischargeapproximately550m3(3,850bbl)/dayofproducedwater.TheLPPwillbefittedwithaproducedwatertreatmentunit,consistingoftwosorbenttanksandonebackuptank.Thisunitisexpectedtobringdischargedpollutantconcentrationsdowntorequiredlimits:under5mg/LBTEX,andunder15mg/Ltotalhydrocarbons.

Still,producedwaterdischargeshouldbeconductedfurtheroffshore.

TheTAMAOffshoreEIAstates(4.8.3):

“…producedwaterisacomplexmixtureoforganicandinorganicsubstances inasolutionandinparticulateform,withawatersalinityrangingfrom almostsweetwatertohighlyconcentratedbrines.Treatedproducedwater containsdispersedoil,awiderangeofnaturalsubstancesinsolution,and lowresidualconcentrationsofgastreatmentadditivessuchascorrosionand sedimentationinhibitors,MEG,andbiocides.Thenaturalsubstancesin typicalproducedwateralsoincludesmallamountsoftoxicsubstancessuch asheavymetals,aromatichydrocarbons,alkyl-phenols,andradioactive substances(OGP2002;OGP2005;Neffetal.2011).”

“Ofmostconcernarethethreegroupsofmicro-components:heavymetals (inorganic),andpolycyclicaromatichydrocarbons(organic),duetotheir toxicityandenduranceinthemarineenvironment,andalkylphenolswhich areknowntodisruptendocrineactivity(Neffetal2011;OGP2005).”

Producedwatertoxicityderiveslargelyfromacombinationofresidualcondensate,iron,ammonia,andhypoxia.Heavymetalsinproducedwatersincludemercury,cadmium,iron,copper,lead,nickel,andchromium,generallyinconcentrationsbetween1mg/Land4mg/L.

Evenwithapredicteddilutionfactorof10,000:1at100mfromthedischargepoint,itisadvisablethatproducedwaterbedischargedfurtheroffshore,offthecontinentalshelf.Adischargepipelineshouldbeextendedatleast10kmoffshore(totalof20kmoffshore),ataminimumof500mdepth,inordertodischargeallproducedwatersfurtherfromproductiveshallowcontinentalshelfwaters.ThephysicaloceanographyintheDrillingEIAreportswatersintheregionarerelativelyisothermalandisohalinebelow500m.Aswell,fluorescencemeasurementsreportpeakphytoplanktonbiomassfrom50m–200mdepth.Thus,dischargeat500mdepth,belowthethermoclineandproductivephoticzone,wouldlimitexposureoftheshallowwatershelfecosystemtotoxicdischargecomponents.

ProducedWaterReinjection(PWRI),inwhichproducedwaterwouldbeseparatedfromthegasstream,pipedbacktotheoffshorefieldandreinjectedintospecificreinjectionwells,wasconsideredanddeclinedintheNOP37/H.WhileadmittingthatPWRIistechnicallyfeasibleandwouldreduceimpacttothemarineenvironment,theoptionisdeclinedastoocostly(100millionEuros)andoflittlenetenvironmentalbenefit.ThedocumentconcludesthatPWRIcannotbeconsidered

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BestAvailableTechnology(BAT)duetotheircontentionthatthetechnicalfeasibilityofdeepwaterPWRIforgasfields“cannotbeconsideredasproven”;wouldcost100millionEuros;andtheimpactofsuchdischargeis“lowandlimitedtothedirectvicinityofthedischargepoint.”Thisshouldbereconsideredforalloffshoregasprojects,includingLeviathan.BATshouldnotbejudgedbycost,butratherwhetheritindeedisBAT.Clearly,PWRIisBAT.Andregardingtheassertionthatimpactswouldbelowandlimitedtothedirectvicinity,themultiyearimpactofformationwaterreleasedfromthefailedLeviathan2wellshouldbeconsidered.AsdiscussedintheEIA,impactsfromthis2011release(offormationwater,notpetroleum)continuedatleastfor5years.However,evenifPWRIisnotadopted,theprojectshouldatleast,asmentionedabove,berequiredtoconstructadischargepipelinefromtheLPPoffshoreatleast10km(totalof20kmfromshore),inordertodischargeproducedwateroffthecontinentalshelf,inwatersatleast500mdeep.Thisiseasytodesignandaccomplish,andmanycoastalminingcompaniespracticeDeepSeaTailingsDisposal(DSTD)inthismanner,dischargingalltailingsfromcoastalminesoffthecontinentalshelfindeepoceanwaters.Thisisverycost-effective,andwillminimizeimpactstoecologicallyproductivewatersonthecontinentalshelf.10.2 NorwayandU.S.OffshoreDischargeRegulationsTheU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgencysummarizesoffshoreoilandgasdischargeregulationsinboththeUnitedStatesandNorway(2011).56Section402oftheU.S.CleanWaterActauthorizestheU.S.EPAtoregulatemarinedischargesthroughtheNationalPollutantDischargeEliminationSystem(NPDES),requiringcompliancewithOceanDischargeCriteriaguidelines.Norway’sPollutionControlActauthorizestheNorwayClimateandPollutionAgencytoregulateoffshoredischarges,includingdrillingfluidsandmuds,producedwater,andotherchemicals.Norwayrequireszerodischargeof“environmentallyhazardoussubstances,”usingBestAvailableTechniques,yetimposesastrictzerodischargerequirementinmoreecologicallysensitiveArcticwatersabove68°N.Forcoastalfacilities(within3milesofshore),U.S.regulationprohibitsdischargeofalldrillingfluids,cuttings,anddewateringeffluent(exceptCookInletAlaska,wherespecificacutetoxicityrequirementsmustbemet).Foroffshorefacilities(outsideof3miles),waterbaseddrillingfluidsandcuttings,andoil-basedcuttingsarerequiredtomeettheacutetoxicitystandard,anddischargeofoil-baseddrillingfluidsisprohibited.Forproducedwaters,theU.S.prohibitsdischargenearshore(exceptCookInletAlaska,whereoillimitsare42mg/L(ppm)daily,and29mg/Laverageoveramonth),asisrequiredoffshore.Israelilawsimilarlylimitshydrocarbondischargeconcentrationto29mg/Laverageoveronemonth.Southof68°N,Norwaypermitsproducedwaterdischargewithcomponentsthat“PoseLittleorNoRisk”(PLONOR),

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andlessthan30mg/Lofoilmonthlyaverage.Northof68°N,producedwaterdischargeisnotpermitted(exceptfor“operationaldeviations,”andthenamaximumof5%ofproducedwatersmaybedischarged).WhileIsraelirequirementsfortotalhydrocarbonconcentrationinproducedwaterdischargearesimilartothoseofcoastalU.S.andNorwaybelow68°N,Israeldoesnotregulateheavymetalconcentrationindischarge.Clearly,thehigheststandardiszerodischarge,suchasinNorwegianArcticwaters.ItisrecommendedthattheGovernmentofIsraelconsiderincorporatingtheNorwayArcticstandardintoIsraeliregulation,prohibitingmarinedischargeofalldrillingfluids,cuttings,andproducedwaters.10.3 EmissionsMonitoringandReportingItisunclearwhetherIsraelregulationrequiresreal-timeemissionsmonitoringandreportingbyoffshoregasfacilities,bothatmosphericandmarine.Thismustbeclearlyprovidedinregulation,asitconstitutesbestgovernment/industrypractice.IntheU.S.GulfofMexico(wheremostU.S.offshoreproductionoccurs),theU.S.BureauofOceanEnergyManagement(BOEM)requiresevent-basedreportingofairemissionsfromalloffshoreoilandgasfacilitiesthroughitsGulfwideOffshoreActivityDataSystem(GOADS).57Thissystemrequiresoperatorstoreportairemissionsthroughstandardizedcomputersoftwaresystem.AsimilarmonitoringandreportingsystemshouldberequiredbylawinIsraelforalloffshoreoperators,forbothatmosphericemissionsandmarinedischarges.11. FinancialLiability

Animportantcomponentofoffshoredrillingsafetyisanadequateliabilityregimethatimposessufficientfinancialliabilityforcorporatenegligence,inordertomotivateeffectivesafetymanagementbythecompany.Whilethereareinternationalliabilityregimescoveringoiltankerspills,bunkerspills,andhazardousandnoxiouschemicalspills,thereispresentlynointernationalliabilityregimecoveringoffshoreoilandgasdevelopment.Fornow,thisislefttocoastalstatejurisdiction.

WhileIsraelisapartytothe1992IOPCFundConventionandthe1992CLC,itisnotpartytotheSupplementaryFundProtocolprovidinggreatercoverageforcrudeoiltankerspills;the2001BunkerSpillConvention(coveringheavybunkerfuelspills);orthe2010HazardousandNoxiousSubstances(HNS)Convention(coveringnaturalgasandcondensatereleases.)

Directive2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations(EU,2013)requiresallmemberstatestoensurethatanoffshoreoilandgasoperator:

“…isfinanciallyliableforthepreventionandmediationofenvironmental damage...fromoffshoreoilandgasoperations.”

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ThisshouldbethecaseinIsraelaswell.Inthisregard,Israel’snationalliabilityprovisionsforoffshoregasdevelopmentandtransportationshouldbethoroughlyreviewedandupdatedtoensuresufficientcoverageofaWorstCaseDischargefromanyoftheoffshoregasprojects.Thiscanbedoneeitherthroughtheinternationalregimes,ormoreappropriately,throughnationallegislation.GiventhattheBPspillintheGulfofMexicohascostBPover$61billionUSD58,theGovernmentofIsraelshouldestablishunlimitedliabilityforoffshoredrillingprojects(atleastincasesofgrossnegligence).ThegovernmentshouldalsoensurethatNoble,itspartners,rigowners,andsubcontractorsarejointlyliable,andhavesufficientinsurancecoverageand/orbondingtocoverallcosts(includingenvironmentaldamage)foraWorstCaseDischarge.Aswell,Israel’scriminalliabilityforgrossnegligenceinindustrialoperationsshouldbereviewedandenhancedasappropriate.Thisshouldbediscussedinthedocuments.

TheGovernmentofIsraelshouldestablishanationalOilSpillPreventionandResponseFund,derivedfromanominal(e.g.,0.10Euro/bbl)assessmentonalloilandgasproducedorimportedintothecountry,asmanyothergovernmentshavedone.ThisFundshouldbeusedbythegovernmenttoenhanceitsoversightofoilandgasspillpreventionandresponsepreparedness,inparticularitsoversightcapabilitiesregardingoffshoregasexplorationandproduction.ThecomparablefundintheU.S.istheOilSpillLiabilityTrustFund,derivedfroma$0.09/bblfee,currentlywitha$5billioncurrentbalance.59

12. CO2EmissionsThedocumentspredictthetotalCO2(equivalent)emissionfromconstructionphaseoftheprojectwillbe911,397tons;fromoperationspre-2024atotalof2,416,105tons;andfrom2025–2050(projectdesignlife)atotalof15,416,825tons.Thus,totalCO2eemissionspredictedfromtheprojectperseareestimatedat18,744,327tons.However,thisestimatedoesnotincludeemissionsfromthe22TcfofnaturalgasthatwillbeproducedbytheLeviathanproject.UsingtheUSEPAconversionof0.0550tonCO2/Mcfgas,combustionof22Tcfofgaswillemitapproximately1.2billiontonsCO2e.Inaddition,theprojectestimatelikelydoesnotincludemethaneleakagefrompipelinesoverthe30+yearlifetimefortheproject.Thesesourcesshouldbeaccuratelyandhonestlyreflectedinprojectdocuments.Thepotentialfinancialimplicationoffuturecarbonpricingforthisamountofemissionsshouldbeconsidered,andfactoredintotheproject’sfinancialfeasibilityanalysis.TheGovernmentofIsraelshouldestablishacarbontaxofatleast$60/tonCO2e(comparabletoNorway)onallcarbonemissions.

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13. SecurityRiskIngeneral,thesignificantsecurityandterrorismriskposedbytheproject,inparticularattheLPP,hasnotbeenadequatelyaddressedinprojectdocuments.Giventhewell-knownsecuritythreatsintheregion,thisisasignificantgapinprojectriskassessmentandmustberemedied.Infact,theentireIsraelNaturalGasLine(INGL)systemshouldbesubjectedtorigorousandcomprehensivesecurityassessmentandplan(ifithasn'talready).Ascurrentlydesigned,theLeviathanprojectpresentssignificantsecurityrisktothepublicandenvironmentofIsrael,includingthepotentialforprojectinfrastructuretobeintentionallydamagedordestroyed,leadingtodisruptionofenergyservicesonshore;masscasualtiesand/orhealthimpacts;anddisruptionofcommerceandpublicservices.Securitymeasuresshouldbeintegratedintoprojectdesignandconstruction.Thisissuedeservesconsiderablymoredetailinprojectdocuments.Asdiscussedabove(inProjectDesign,Platformvs.FLNG),acentralissueinriskevaluationoftheLeviathanProductionPlatformisthepotentialforhostilitiesbetweenHezbollahandIsraelalongtheborderwithLebanon(asin2006).Insuchasituation,anFPSO/FLNGfacility125kmoffshoreissignificantlylessatriskthanaprocessingplatformonly10kmoffshore.Ifhostilitiesweretoensueagain,anearshoregasprocessingplatformclosetotheborder(e.g.,LPP)wouldlikelybehighonanadversary’stargetlist.Asdiscussedabove,thisriskwouldbesignificantlyreducedbyselectinganFPSO/FLNGfacility125kmoffshoreforLeviathan.

Israel(andNobleEnergyanditspartners)nowfacesignificantsecuritychallenges,whichwillincreasesubstantiallyasthenewdiscoveriesaredeveloped.

ThesecurityriskposedbyLeviathan(andotheroffshoregasfieldsofIsrael)wasdiscussedin2011byformerNobleEnergyofficialAbrahamD.Sofaer,asfollows60:

• Israelisalreadyavictimofterroristattacksinavolatilelocation.ThedevelopmentofnaturalgasaddsanothertargetforterroristsseekingtodamageIsrael’seconomyandinfrastructure.

• Thelogisticsofoffshoreexplorationanddevelopmentaswellastherelativelylimitedrequirementsforterroristattacksaddsanotherlayerofdifficultyinmaintainingsecurity.

• Althoughtheterroristattacksontheoilandgassectorarearelativelysmallproportionofterroristattacksoverall,thedatashowthatasignificantnumberofattackshaveoccurredovertheperiod1990-2005.Thenumberofattacksonthesectorappearstobeincreasinginsomecountries.(InstituteforInformationInfrastructureProtection,“TrendsinOilandGas:TerroristAttacks”)

• Platformsfromwhichdrillingandrecoveryoperationstakeplaceneedtobeprotected,alongwithtransmissionlinesandinstallationsinIsraelorelsewheretotransport,liquefyandshipgastopurchasers.Astablegas

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supplynetworkisnecessaryforefficientmarkets,agrowingeconomyandenergysecurity.

• Typesofpossibleattacksincludethefullrangeofthreatsposedbywarandterroristactivities:rockets,explosives,torpedoes,bombings,suicideattacksfromtheairorsea,communicationshacking,kidnappingofpersonnel,andhostagetaking.

• Planningaterroristattackonanunprotectedoilplatformisassimpleascharteringboats,trainingdivers,andprovidingthemwiththeexplosivesrequired.

• Sabotagingtransmissionlinesisevensimplerthanattackingplatforms,withlogisticalrequirementsaslowasobtainingshapedchargesandthemeansfortheirdeliveryatanyvulnerablepoint.

Sofaernotedthatoffshoreplatformsandrelatedfacilitieshaveoftenbeenattackedbystateandnon-stateforces.Hewentontonotethat:

“Optionstoreduceriskandmaximizeflexibilitycouldincludeusingafloating platformcapableofprocessinggasintoLNG.Allsecurityeffortswouldbe concentratedatthedrillingplatformandFLNGfacility,therebyreducing other,greaterrisksinnaturalgasproductionandtransportation(Potenand Partners).ExpertsregardtherisksofprotectingvesselstransportingLNG significantlylowerthanthoseofprotectingpipelinesandotherstationary facilities.AnFLNGfacilityiscurrentlybeingconstructedbyShelloffthe coastofAustralia(tobecompleteby2017),andcontractsareinplaceforup to10moreFLNGfacilitiesthroughouttheworld.”61

Asdiscussedabove,anFLNGfacilityshoulddevelopacontingencyplanintheeventofhostilities,inwhichitwouldclosedownallproductionandmoveoffsiteandoutofrangeofpotentialhostileaction.SucharesponsewouldbeunavailabletothestationaryLPP.Atveryleast,NobleshoulddevelopacontingencyplanforshuttinginandevacuatingtheLPPintheeventofseriousthreatduringarmedconflict.

UseofLNGshuttletankerstotransportLNGfromanoffshoreFLNGfacilitytoportsandoffshorebuoysintroducesdifferentrisksintotheproject.Theseriskscanbereducedandmitigatedwithstandardmaritimesecuritytechniques,includingexclusionzones,varied(unpredictable)transitschedules,noticesofsailing/arrival,intelligence,tugescorts,armedsecurity,sweeps(divers,sonar,boarding),surveillance,crewbackgroundchecks,shipsecurityplansandofficers,etc.62

Onbalance,fromasecurityriskstandpoint,risksposedbyFLNGandLNGtankerswouldbesignificantlylessthanrisksfromanearshoreplatform.

Alsointhisregard,itishighlyadvisableforIsraelandLebanontoresolvethedisputedmaritimeboundaryregion(330mi2)betweenthetwocountries,alongwhichLebanonhasrecentlyofferedoffshoregasdevelopmenttenders.63

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Apost-911(2004)studybySandiaNationalLaboratory(U.S.DepartmentofEnergy)reportsthatrisksfromintentionaldamagefromterroristattackstoLNGinfrastructurecanbemoreseverethanthosefromaccidents.64AlthoughtheanalysisfocusedonLNGrisks,itcanapplyaswelltoallnaturalgasinfrastructure,suchasLeviathan.TheSandiastudyitemizedintentionalattackrisksfromvesselramming,triggeredexplosion,insidertakeoverorhijacking,andexternalterroristattackwithexplosivevessels(e.g.USSCole),rocket-propelledgrenades,missiles,orattacksbyplanes.Itrecommendedseveralriskreductionandmitigationmethodsforeach,includinginspections,crewvetting,searchandsurveillance,improvedintelligence,etc.AlloftheserisksexistforelementsofLeviathan,particularlytheLPP.TheU.S.TransportationSecurityAdministration(TSA)issuedin2018itssecurityguidelinesforoilandgaspipelines,whichprovidesacomprehensiveguideforsecurityonallcomponentsoftheLeviathanproject.65TheU.S.securityguidelinesrecommendadoptionofanoverallCorporateSecurityProgram,includingthefollowingelements:

1. Developacorporatesecurityplan;2. Ensuresufficientresources,toincludetrainedstaffandequipment,are

providedtoeffectivelyexecutethecorporatesecurityprogram;3. Ensureidentifiedsecuritydeficiencieshaveappropriatefinancialresources

allocatedinthecorporatebudgetingandpurchasingprocesses;4. Assignaqualifiedprimaryandalternatestaffmembertomanagethe

corporatesecurityprogram;5. Developandmaintainacyber/SupervisoryControlandDataAcquisition

(SCADA)securityplan,orincorporatecyber/SCADAsecuritymeasuresinthecorporatesecurityplan;

6. Developandmaintainsecurityelementswithinthecorporateincidentresponseandrecoveryplan;

7. ImplementappropriatethreatlevelprotectivemeasuresuponreceiptofapertinentNationalTerrorismAdvisorySystem(NTAS)BulletinorAlert;and

8. NotifyTSAofsecurityincidentsmeetingthecriteriaprovidedinAppendixBbyphoneoremailassoonaspossible.

TheLeviathanprojectSecurityPlanshouldincludeadetailedsystemforsecuritymanagementandadministration;securityriskanalysisandcriticalityassessments;accesscontrolmeasures;equipmentmaintenanceandtesting;personnelscreening;drillsandexercises;securityincidentprocedures;responseproceduresintimesofheightenedthreatlevels;cyber/SCADAsystemsecuritymeasures;testingandaudits;andoutreach.Asecurityriskassessmentshoulddetailfacilitycriticality(primarilyfornearshoreinfrastructuresuchastheLPPandpipelines),nottoexceedevery18months;threatassessmentsidentifyingknownandunknownadversaries;asecurityvulnerability

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assessments(SVA)identifyingallpotentialsecurityweaknesses;riskassessmentsbasedonthreat,vulnerability,consequence;riskmitigationcountermeasures;andongoingadaptiveriskmanagement.Securitymeasuresforprojectoffshoreandonshorefacilitiesincludeadoptionofenhanced,site-specificsecuritymeasures(bulletinsandalerts,etc.);measurestoimpedeunauthorizedaccess;24/7intrusiondetectionandmonitoring;personnelidentification;personnelbackgroundscreening;equipmentmaintenanceandtesting;personneltraining.Cybersecurityisaparticularconcern,andmustbeaddressed.TheU.S.,theNationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)hasdevelopeda“FrameworkforImprovingCriticalInfrastructureCybersecurity,”whichprovidesgeneralguidancerelevanttoLeviathan(andtheentireINGLsystem).Inaddition,severalothersecurityguidancedocumentsfromtheU.S.shouldbeconsideredfortheLeviathanproject,includingthefollowing:

• AmericanChemistryCouncil,GuidanceforAddressingCyberSecurityintheChemicalIndustry

• AmericanGasAssociation(AGA)ReportNumber12,CryptographicProtectionofSCADACommunications,Part1:Background,PoliciesandTestPlan

• AmericanNationalStandardsInstitute(ANSI)/InternationalSocietyofAutomation(ISA)–99.00.01–2007,SecurityforIndustrialAutomationandControlSystems:Terminology,Concepts,andModels

• ANSI/ISA–99.02.01–2009,SecurityforIndustrialAutomationandControlSystems:EstablishinganIndustrialAutomationandControlSystemSecurityProgram

• AmericanPetroleumInstitute(API)Standard1164PipelineSCADASecurityANSI/APIStandard780,SecurityRiskAssessmentMethodologyforthePetroleumandPetrochemicalIndustries

• U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST),FrameworkforImprovingCriticalInfrastructureCybersecurity

• U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,NIST,SpecialPublication800-82,GuidetoIndustrialControlSystems(ICS)Security

• U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,OfficeofInfrastructureProtection,Risk-BasedPerformanceStandardsGuidance:ChemicalFacilityAnti-TerrorismStandards,May2009

• U.SDepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability,EnergySectorCybersecurityFrameworkImplementationGuidance,January2015

• U.SDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,TransportationSystemsSectorCybersecurityFrameworkImplementationGuidance,June2015

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14. StakeholderEngagementTheStakeholderEngagementPlan(SEP)outlinedinprojectdocuments(inparticularAppendix2oftheSLIP),isclearlyinsufficient.Noblestates: “NobleEnergyiscommittedtoestablishingandmaintainingtransparent, respectfulandregularengagementpracticestounderstandandmanage stakeholderconcernsandinterests.Thesepracticesareaboveandbeyond theengagementactivitiesmanagedbyIsraeligovernmentagenciesasapart ofthepermittingprocesses.”

First,giventheextensiveamountofredactionofsystems-criticalinformationinprojectdocuments,aswellasthefailuretopubliclyreportthe2011Leviathan2explorationwellfailure,theaboveassertionisquestionable.Moreimportantly,theStakeholderEngagementPlanreliesontraditionalpassiveengagement,whichforaprojectofsuchcomplexityandpotentialconsequenceisinsufficient.Passiveengagementconductedbytheproponentstodate(citedinthe2016SLIP)providessimplythat: “…thirdpartiespotentiallyaffectedbyprojectdevelopmentareprovided withopportunitiestoreviewprojectinformationandprovidecomment.”

Theoilandgasindustry’sconventionalpassivestakeholderengagementprocessprovidesthousandsofpagesofdetailed,technicaldocumentsforpublicreviewandcomment,publichearings,publicrelationscampaigns,etc.,butthisisknowntobeaninsufficientmethodforobtainingauthentic,informedpublicengagement.Foraprojectwiththetechnicalcomplexity,risk,andpotentialconsequencetothepublicinterestofIsrael,amoredeliberateSEPprocessmustbeestablished.Forthat,IrecommendestablishmentoftheIsraelOffshoreCitizens’AdvisoryCouncil.66Large-scaleresourcedevelopmentprojectssuchasLeviathan(Tamar,andotheroffshoregasdevelopments)generallyreceiveinsufficientoversightby,andengagementwith,civilsociety.Whileindustryandgovernmentmayprovidetransparency,thisinitselfdoesnotconstituteeffectivecivilsocietyengagement.Membersofthepublicoftenhaveinsufficienttime,financialability,andtechnicalexpertisetoengageeffectivelyincomplexresourcedevelopmentandpolicyissuessuchasLeviathan.

TherecanbeanoverwhelmingamountofinformationavailableregardingprojectssuchasLeviathan,muchofittechnicalandunfamiliar,andevenmultipleprojectsandpolicyissuesintersectingsimultaneously,makingitdifficultforcitizenstoassimilatepertinentinformationandprovideinformedcomment.Whileoutside

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technicalexpertscanconductsite-visitsandconsultanciestoprovidetheirtechnicalreviewandrecommendations,ifthereisnostandingcitizencapacitytofollowthroughontherecommendations,suchprocessesmayhavelimitedimpact.

Andintheabsenceofeffectivepublicengagement,corporateandgovernmentvigilancecanweaken,complacencyincreases,environmentalandsocialstandardsdecline,andrisksincrease.Suchinsufficientoversight,lowerstandards,andcomplacencycanresultinacuteandcatastrophicresults;suchasoilspills;long-term,chronicenvironmentaldegradation;andsocialtension,mistrust,litigation,andevenviolencebetweenlocalpeopleandindustry.

Tocorrectthisproblem,localcivilsocietystakeholdersneedtobedirectlyinvolvedinthereviewandoversightofresourceindustryoperationsthatpotentiallyaffecttheirlives,inparticularextractiveindustriessuchasoil,gasandmining.Andtoeffectivelyengage,citizenstakeholdersneedtheirownorganizationwithsufficientfunding,staff,authority,broadrepresentation,andindependence.

Additionally,astheGovernmentofIsraelisbothfinancialbeneficiaryandregulatoroftheproject,ithasaninternalconflictofinterestinprovidingeffectiveoversight.

14.1 IsraelOffshoreCitizens’AdvisoryCouncil

Thus,itisproposedherethattheGovernmentofIsraelrequiretheestablishmentofanIsraelOffshoreCitizens'AdvisoryCouncil(IOCAC)asapre-conditionforfinalgovernmentapprovaloftheLeviathanproject.Modeledlooselyonthetwooiloversightcitizens’councilsinAlaska(www.pwsrcac;www.circac.org),aswelltheShetlandOilTerminalEnvironmentalAdvisoryGroup,or“SOTEAG”,inScotland(www.soteag.org.uk/),theIOCACwouldprovidestructured,non-binding,informedpublicadvice,oversight,andengagementwithalloffshorepetroleumdevelopmentinIsrael’sEEZ.

ItisproposedthattheIsraelCouncilbeguaranteedabudgetofapprox.$5millionUSD/year,eitherfromgovernmentresourcerevenuesfromtheprojects,ordirectlyfromtheoffshorepetroleumindustry(e.g.,Nobleanditspartners).Bycomparison,ourPWSRCACreceivesapproximately$4million/yearfromtheownersandoperatorsoftheTransAlaskaPipelineSystemMarineTerminalinValdezAlaska.Asproposed,theIsraelCouncilwouldhaveabroadermandate,andcovertheentireoffshoreEEZofIsrael.Thus,abudgetof$5million/yearseemsappropriate.

TheIsraelCouncilshouldbecomprisedofallmajorstakeholderconstituenciespotentiallyaffectedbyoffshoreindustry–e.g.,fishing,aquaculture,conservation,tourism,women,youth,science,andlocalcommunities.Properlystructured,theIOCACwillbecometheeyes,ears,andthevoiceforlocalcitizensregardinglarge-scalepetroleumdevelopmentinIsrael’sEEZ,andaugmentgovernmentandindustryoversightoftheoffshoreprojects.

TheCouncilshouldhaveaBoardofDirectorsrepresentingallmajorstakeholders,

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paidstaffforday-to-dayoperation,andsub-committeesasappropriatetoitsmission.ThebroadmissionoftheIOCACwouldbetoenablecitizenstakeholderstoensurethehigheststandardsofenvironmentalandsocialresponsibilityofalloffshoreindustrialprojectsand/orallindustrialactivityinIsrael’sEEZ.Itsgoalistoreducethedeleteriousenvironmentalandsocialimpactandriskofresourcedevelopment,andenhancecommunicationandengagementbetweencivilsociety,industry,andgovernment.

Specifically,theCouncilshouldprovideoversight,advice,andadvocacyonissuessuchaswheretopermitadditionaldevelopment,BestAvailableandSafestTechnology(BAST)standards,biodiversityconservation,riskassessmentandaccidentprevention,responsepreparedness,liabilitystandards,environmentalmonitoring,biodiversityoffsets,invasivespeciescontrol,socialimpactmitigationprograms,transportroutesandmethodologies,regulatoryreform,governmentrevenuesandtaxes,wastemanagement,remediationandrestoration,laborpractices,humanrights,humanhealth,andsoon.TheCouncilshouldreviewandsubmitwrittencommentsonallexistingandproposedprojectoperations.Thiscanincludelegislation,regulationsandpermits,andindustrypolicy,procedures,andfinancialmatters.

AttherequestofitsBoardorcommittees,theIOCACshouldcommissionindependentscientificstudies,consultancies,andreportsonissuesofinterestorconcerntoitsstakeholders.Thisresearchshouldcontributetothefactualbasisofthecouncil’spolicyrecommendationstoindustryandgovernment.

TheCouncilwillprovideanon-going,structuredmechanismforgreatercommunication,collaboration,andtrustbetweencitizens,government,andoffshoreindustry,andshouldreduceindustry’senvironmentalimpact,risk,andfootprint.Thecitizens’councilwillnotsubstituteforeffectivegovernmentaloversight,butwillcomplementandenhancesuch.TheestablishmentofthisproposedCouncilisfundamentaltoindustry’s“sociallicensetooperate,”genuinecorporatesocialresponsibility,citizenempowerment,environmentaljustice,governmentlegitimacy,andsustainabledevelopment.Assuch,thecitizencouncilwillprovidelong-termbenefittothepublic,government,andindustry.

15. GovernmentRevenue-IsraelPermanentFundWhileoutsidethescopeofworkforthisreview,anotherimportantconsiderationthatmustbeaddressedisasufficientgovernmentroyalty/taxationregimeforhydrocarbondevelopment,andtheneedtosaveaportionofthesenon-renewablerevenuesinanationalhydrocarbonrevenuesavingsfund.Thisisdonebyseveralothergovernmentsaroundtheworld,includingAlaska,Alberta(Canada),andNorway.67Ashydrocarbonreservesarefinite,soistherevenuetheyprovide.Thus,intheinterestofitscitizenry(presentandfuture),theGovernmentofIsraelshouldestablishasufficienttaxationregimeforoffshoregasdevelopment,

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collectingatleast50%ofgrossrevenuefromtheprojects;andsettingasideatleast50%ofthesegovernmenthydrocarbonrevenuesinanIsraelPermanentFund,perhapsmodeledaftertheAlaskaPermanentFund(nowworthover$65billionUSD).AportionofthegovernmentrevenuesfromgasdevelopmentshouldbecommittedtosubsidiesforrenewableenergyinIsrael.16. ConclusionGiventheabovesubstantiveconcerns,itistheauthor’srespectfulrecommendationthattheGovernmentofIsraelimmediatelysuspendpermittingfortheLeviathanproject,pendingsatisfactoryresolutionofallissuesdiscussedherein.Inparticular,theprojectshouldberedesignedtoeliminatethenearshoreLeviathanProductionPlatform(LPP)andextensiveseabedpipelineinfrastructure,optinginsteadforanFLNGfacilityoffshoreatthegasfieldanduseofshuttletankerstodeliverLNGandcondensatetoIsraelandothermarkets;oranFPSO.AnoffshoreFPSO/FLNGoptionwoulddramaticallyreducenearshorerisksandimpactsoftheproject.ThemostenvironmentallyresponsibleoptionforLeviathandevelopmentisforNobletodesignandconstructanFLNGfacility,usingLNGandcondensateshuttletankers.Alternatively,inordertoavoidconstructiondelays,thecompanyshouldconsiderleasinganFPSOforinitialLeviathandevelopment(asitdoesatitsAsengoilandgasfieldoffEquatorialGuinea),andtie-intoitsseabedgaspipelinesystem(nowinconstruction)totransportgastoshoreandtheINGLsystem.NobleshouldsellthenewlyconstructedLPPtoanotheroffshoregasprojectelsewhere.

Aswell,manysystems-criticaltechnicaldetailsareeithernotreported,orredactedfromtheprojectdocuments.Thismustberemediedbeforepermitting.Again,whiletheabovereviewfocusesontheinsufficienciesoftheLeviathandocuments,itisofferedrespectfully,andinthesincerehopethatitwillassistIsraelicivilsociety,theGovernmentofIsrael,thecompanies,andpotentiallendersbetterunderstandtherisksinvolvedintheproject,thepotentialeffectivenessofproposedriskmitigationmeasures,andcontributetoinformeddecisions.ThisreviewisofferedinrecognitionofIsrael’slaudablegoalofsecuringenergyindependence.17. References1EnvironmentCanada,2016.NaturalGasCondensates:ScreeningAssessment PetroleumSectorStreamApproach.Dec.140pp.2EnvironmentCanada,2016.Ibid3EnvironmentCanada,2016.Ibid.4EnvironmentCanada,2016.Ibid.5Moshel,Ariel,GiladKozokaro.2018.LeviathanPlatform–CheckofMaximum BenzeneConcentrationsintheEnvironment.NobleEnergy,March.

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6Banerjee,S.1984.Solubilityoforganicmixturesinwater.EnvironmentalScience andTechnology18:587-5917S.L.RossEnv.Research,1982.Thebehaviorandfateofgascondensatespills,for MobilOilCanadaVenturegasfielddevelopmentontheScotianShelf,85pp.8SINTEF,2017.SigynCondensate–propertiesandbehavioratsea.SINTEFReport, OC2017A-137.EnvironmentalTechnology.9Joye,SamanthaB.,I.MacDonald,I.Leifer,V.Asper,2011.Methaneoxidation potentialofhydrocarbongasesreleasedfromtheBPoilwellblowout. NatureGeoscience,Vol.4,pp.160-16410EnvironmentCanada,2016.NaturalGasCondensates:ScreeningAssessment.11EnvironmentCanada,2016.Ibid.12Villanueva,RD,M.N.E.Montano,H.T.Yap,2008.Effectsofnaturalgascondensate– wateraccommodatedfractiononcorallarvae.MarinePollutionBulletin(56) 20081422-142813Bobra,A.M.,ShiuWY,MackayD.1983.Acutetoxicityoffreshandweatheredcrudeoils.Chemosphere.12(9),pp.1137-114914Lewis,et.al.2000(a)(b).Mortalityamongthreerefinery/petrochemicalplant cohorts.1970-1982,Active/terminatedworkers.J.Occupationaland EnvironmentalMedicine,42(7),pp.721-72915Adler,R.,BoermansHJ,MoultonJE,MooreDA,1992.Toxicosisinsheepfollowing ingestionofnaturalgascondensate.Vet.Pathology,29:11-20/16EVOSTC,2014.ExxonValdezOilSpillUpdateonInjuredResourcesandServices, ExxonValdezOilSpillTrusteeCouncil,www.evostc.gov17Matkin,C.O.,2013.Monitoring,Tagging,FeedingHabitats,andRestorationof KillerWhalesinPrinceWilliamSound/KenaiFjords2010-2012.Exxon ValdezOilSpillTrusteeCouncilRestorationProject,FinalReport(Project 10100742),NorthGulfOceanicSociety,HomerAlaska18EnvironmentCanada,2016.NaturalGasCondensates:ScreeningAssessment.19ExxonMobil,2008.PointThomsonOilSpillContingencyPlanandEIS,Alaska.20Schaps,Karolin,2012.TotalshutsElgingas,oiloutputafterleak.Reuters.Mar.26.21MoEP,2018.LettertoGuardiansoftheCoastalPlain,May5.IsraelMinistryof EnvironmentalProtection.22WWF,2011.DrillingforgasinMediterraneanSeawillthreatenvaluablemarine life,saysWWF.MediaStatement,9Feb.23Galil,B.andHerutB.,2011.Marineenvironmentalissuesofdeepseaexploration andexploitationactivities(oilandgas)offthecoastofIsrael.IOLRReport H15/201124BSEE,2012.OilandGasandSulphurOperationsontheOuterContinentalShelf- IncreasedSafetyMeasuresforEnergyDevelopmentontheOuterContinental Shelf.U.S.Dept.ofInterior,BureauofSafetyandEnvironmentalEnforcement (BSEE),30CFRPart2,Aug.25EU,2013.Directive2013/30/EUonSafetyofOffshoreOilandGasOperations, EuropeanUnion.26EU,2013.Ibid.

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27OSC,2011.Deepwater:theGulfOilDisasterandtheFutureofOffshoreDrilling. NationalCommissionontheBPDeepwaterHorizonOilSpillandOffshore Drilling.Deepwater,January.28NAE,2011.MacondoWellDeepwaterHorizonBlowout,NationalAcademyof EngineeringandNationalResearchCouncil.29API,Standard53.AmericanPetroleumInstitute30USDOT,2003.PipelineSafety:PipelineIntegritymanagementinHigh ConsequenceAreas(GasTransmissionPipelines);FinalRule.Dec.15.U.S. DepartmentofTransportation,OfficeofPipelineSafety.31Alloui,TaharEng.,2015.10worstissuesaffectingfieldinstruments:pressure transmitters.MIET,Nov.28.32RatioOil,2014.RatioOilExplorationLP(1992)PartnershipPresentation.33Petronas,2018.PetronasFloatingLiquefiedNaturalGas(FLNG). www.petronasofficial.com34Reuters,2018.StartofGolar’sfloatingLNGinCameroonmaydrawmoreAfrican clients.March12.35Shell,2018.ShellPreludeFLNG,www.shell.com36Shell,2018.Ibid.37BWOffshore,2017.www.bwoffshore.com38Energean,2017.KarishandTaninFieldDevelopmentPlan.Doc.No.ISR-GEN-RP- PJM-0025.15June.www.energean.com39Energean,2017.Ibid.40Huddy,JohnT.,2018.Rockets,Missiles,andMore:PredictingtheThirdLebanon War.TheJerusalemPost,Feb.9.41Reuters,2017.Shell’sPreludeFLNGfacilitysetssailfromSouthKoreatoAustralia. epmag.comJune29.42Holland,R.2018.OSRL,Personalcommunicationviaemail,May17.43SINTEF,2017.SigynCondensate–propertiesandbehavioratsea.SINTEFReport, OC2017A-137.EnvironmentalTechnology.44Tremblay,J.et.al.,2017.Chemicaldispersantsenhancetheactivityofoil-andgas condensate-degradingbacteria.ISMEJournal(2017)11,2793-2808, InternationalJournalforMicrobialEcology.45SINTEF,2017.SigynCondensate–propertiesandbehavioratsea.SINTEFReport, OC2017A-137.EnvironmentalTechnology.46SINTEF,2017.Ibid.47SINTEF,2017.Ibid.48Wen,Jianet.al.1999.Removalofpollutantsinseawateraspretreatmentof reverseosmosisdesalinationprocess.WaterResearch,Vol.33,Issue8,June49USNOAA,2018.CAMEOChemicals.U.S.NationalOceanicandAtmospheric Administration(NOAA).50USNOAA,2018.Ibid.51Adel,Mike.2017.CondensateFog.ABriefbyDr.MikeAdel.Nov.15.52EnvironmentCanada,2016.NaturalGasCondensates:ScreeningAssessment.

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53Klemis,Victor.2010.Trackingoilslicksandpredictingtheirbehaviorusing remotesensorsandmodels:CasestudiesoftheSeaEmpressandDeepwater HorizonOilSpills.JournalofCoastalResearch,Vol.26,Issue5.pp.789-797.54NAP,1999.SpillsofNon-FloatingOils,RiskandResponse.NationalAcademies Press.55Steiner,2004.UNguidancemanualontheassessmentandrestorationof environmentaldamagefollowingmarineoilspills.DRAFTforUNEP/UNIMO, Sept.;publishedbyUNEP/IMO2009.56USEPA,2011.RegulatingPetroleumIndustryWastewaterDischargesinthe UnitedStatesandNorway.EnvironmentalProtectionAgencyInformation Sheet,Jan.57BOEM,2016.GulfwideOffshoreActivityDataSystem(GOADS),U.S.Bureauof OffshoreEnergyManagement(BOEM),NTL2016-No358Mufson,Steve,2016.BP’sbigbillfortheworld’slargestoilspillreaches$61.6 billion.WashingtonPost,July14.59OSLTF,2018.OilSpillLiabilityTrustFund,U.S.NationalPollutionFundsCenter.60Sofaer,AbrahamD.2011.SecuringIsrael’sOffshoreGasResources.Presentation toLloyd’sConference:“SpecialistSolutionsintheFaceofChangingRisks.” TelAviv,June23.61Sofaer,AbrahamD.2011.Ibid.62SandiaReport,2004.GuidanceonRiskAnalysisandSafetyImplicationsofaLarge LiquefiedNaturalGas(LNG)SpillOverWater.SAND2004-6258,December63Reuters,2018.Lebanonvowstoblockborderwall,Israeleyesdiplomacyongas field.Feb7.64SandiaReport,2004.GuidanceonRiskAnalysisandSafetyImplicationsofaLarge LiquefiedNaturalGas(LNG)SpillOverWater.SAND2004-6258,December65USTSA,2018.PipelineSecurityGuidelines.U.S.TransportationSecurity Administration,Mar.,p30.66Steiner,R.2013.Citizens’AdvisoryCouncilstoenhancecivilsocietyoversightof resourceindustries.UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgram(UNEP) Perspectives,IssueNo.10.67IMF,2001.StabilizationandSavingsFundsforNonrenewableResources: ExperienceandFiscalPolicyImplications.InternationalMonetaryFund, April13.AppendixI–AuthorBiographySummaryofrelevantprofessionalexperienceofauthor,ProfessorRichardSteiner,AnchorageAlaska(www.oasis-earth.com):Theauthorhasworkedextensivelyinthefieldofmarineoilspillprevention,response,damageassessment,restoration,andpolicyaroundtheworld,advisinggovernments,industry,theU.N.,NGOs,andthepubliconenvironmentalissuesofoffshoreoilandoilspills,assummarizedbelow:

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• Alaska–ProfessorandmarineconservationbiologistatUniversityofAlaska

from1980–2010,stationedintheArctic;PrinceWilliamSound;andAnchorage.Inearly1980sconductedworkshopsinArcticcommunitiesre:risksofoffshoreoildevelopment;participatedin1989ExxonValdezoilspill--advisedemergencyresponse,helpeddeveloptheU.S.OilPollutionActof1990,co-foundedthePrinceWilliamSoundScienceCenter,initiatedestablishmentoftheRegionalCitizensAdvisoryCouncils(RCACs),andproposedsettlementofgovernment/Exxonlegalcaseanduseoffundsforhabitatprotection;continuedpublicoutreachonoffshoreoil/environmentissues.HelpedfoundandservedasFacilitatorofShippingSafetyPartnershiptoreduceriskofshipcasualtiesinAleutiansandArctic.

• Russia–Co-PrincipalInvestigatorforprojectonoilspillpreventionandresponseonSakhalinIsland;servedasforeigntechnicalexpertonpublicreviewcommissionfortheSiberiaPacificPipelineproject;taughtoilspillworkshopsinRussiaFarEast,Siberia,andWesternRussia;advisedRussiangovernmentandDumaonoilroyaltyandtaxationissues;andservedasoilspillexpertonIUCN/ShellIndependentScientificReviewPaneltoreviewtheSakhalinIIprojectanditsthreattothecriticallyendangeredWesternPacificGrayWhale.

• KazakhstanandAzerbaijan-Workedwithcivilsocietygroupstoenhanceoilsectorandgovernmenttransparency,andenhancegovernmenttakeofoilrevenues.

• Africa–Nigeria,workedwithNigeriaMinistryofEnvironment,NGOs,andstategovernmentsinassessingandmitigatingdamagefromoildevelopmentinNigerDelta;advisedDeltaStategovernor;andservedasexpertwitnessinlawsuitsre:environmentaldamagefromoil;organizedanddirectedNaturalResourceDamageAssessmentofoilspillsinNigerDelta.InMauritania,workedtoenhancecitizeninvolvementinoffshoreoilsectoroversight.

• Pakistan-DevelopedandservedforPakistanEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyandUNDPasChiefTechnicalAdvisorforfirstcomprehensiveoilspillNaturalResourceDamageAssessmentinadevelopingnationin2003–2004,forTasmanSpiritoilspillinArabianSea.

• Lebanon-DuringIsrael/Hezbollahwarof2006,advisedthegovernmentofLebanononissuesregardingtheJiyehoilspill,includingresponseanddamageassessment;briefedtheIsraeligovernmentandU.S.EmbassyinTelAvivonthespill.

• China–ConductedrapidresponsemissiontoDalianoilspill,advisedChineseNGOsandmediaonspill,2010.AdvisedNGOs,media,andgovernmentsre:SanchicondensatetankerdisasterinEastSea,2018.

• GulfofFinland–Conductedworkshopsin2005onbehalfofU.S.StateDepartmentonoilspillprevention,response,damageassessment,andrestorationinFinland,Russia,Estonia.

• Canada–AdvisedIndigenoustribesinB.C.re:risksofoiltransportandpipelinesproposedtonorthcoast.

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• U.K.–AdvisedShetlandIslandgovernment,mediaonBraerOilSpill,1993.• U.S.–ConductedseveralprojectsinU.S.re:oilspillpreventionandresponse,

includingforStateofHawaii,advisedgroupsinGulfofMexicoBPspillin2010,manyspeakingengagementsre:environmentalrisksofoil,etc.

• Belize–ConductedrapidassessmentofenvironmentalaspectsofoildevelopmentinBelizeforcitizen’scoalition(2011).

• Japan–Conductedoilspillprevention,response,andimpactworkshopsaroundHokkaidoIsland(2004).

• Spain/CanaryIslands–ServedastechnicalexpertforFuerteventuraCouncil,CanaryIslands,inreviewofdeepwaterdrillingproposalinCanaryIslands2013.

• NewZealand–Providedexpertwitnessaffidavitsforoffshoreoilexploratorydrillinglegalcases,2012and2015.

• Norway/Svalbard–Co-principalscientistonresearchcruisere:offshoreoildrillingoffSvalbardNorway,BarentsSeain2014.

• Other-Authoreddozensoftechnicalandpopularpublicationsonenvironmentalrisksofoil,includinginternationalmanualonenvironmentaldamageassessmentandrestorationafterlargemarineoilspillsforUNEPandIMO,commentedregularlytomediaonoilrisks,etc.

AppendixII–HydrocarbonInfluenceontheMarineEnvironment(citedhereverbatimfromTAMAOffshoreEIA,pp.250-255)Theimpactofpresenceofhydrocarbonsinamarineenvironmentmaybeacuteorchronic.

Acutetoxicity–immediateshort-termimpactofasingleexposuretoatoxinChronictoxicity-ongoingexposuretoatoxin

Hydrocarbons’acuteandchronictoxicitytomarineorganismsdependsonseveralfactors:

1. Hydrocarbonconcentrationandlengthofexposure2. Bioavailabilityandpersistenceofthespecifichydrocarbon3. Abilityoftheorganismtoaccumulateandmetabolizethehydrocarbons4. Abilityofthehydrocarbonmetabolitestointerferewithvitalphysiological

processes(growth,reproduction,survivability)5. Narcoticeffectonneuralconductance

AstudyconductedinAustraliaundercontrolledlaboratoryconditions(Neffetal.,2000)testedchemicalandphysicalchangesinvariousoilsasaresultofevaporationandtheimpactofthesechangesontheirchemicalcompositionandtoxicitytomarineorganisms.Condensatewasoneofthetestedsubstances.Studyresultsshowthatinafreshcontamination,MAH(monocyclicaromatichydrocarbons)arethemostsubstantialcontributorstoacutetoxicity,andwhenweatheringprocesses

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havehadsometimePAH(polycyclicaromatichydrocarbons)becomemoreprominentcontributors.

PAHtoxicitydependsamongotherfactorsonmolecularstructure.Ingeneral,thelightaromatichydrocarbons(includingMAH)areconsideredacutelytoxicbutnotcarcinogenictomarineorganisms.Heavyaromatichydrocarbons,ontheotherhand,arenotacutelytoxicbutseveralofthemareknowncarcinogens(seeCanadianCouncilofMinistersoftheEnvironment,1999).Thehighacutetoxicityoflightaromatichydrocarbonsismainlyascribedtotheirbeinghighlywater-soluble.Inahydrocarbonmixture(suchasthatincondensate)overallacutetoxicityisthecumulativeproductoftheindividualcomponents'toxicity.Narcoticeffectsofhydrocarbonsaremainlyascribedtolightvolatilehydrocarbons.

Consideringthatthetestedscenariointhepresentsurveyoutlinesanextremeincidentwithdamagetoacondensatestoragetankandaone-timedumpingofliquidintothesea,andbasedontheinformationregardingthechemicalpropertiesoftheliquid(highcontentoflighthydrocarbons)weestimatethattheexpectedimpactonorganismsintheshoreareawillbeclassifiedasacute.

Environmentalimpact

Theimpactofhydrocarbonpollution,includingthatofcondensate,onthemarineenvironmentvariesdependingonalargerangeoffactors,themainonesbeing:theexactchemicalcompositionofthespilledliquid,weatherconditionsatthetimeofcontaminationandafterward,propertiesofthereceivingmedium(water,sand,rock),andthecompositionoftheexposedpopulation.Topredictthenatureoftheexpectedtraumatosomehabitatasaresultofhydrocarboncontaminationitisadvisabletoreviewstudiesconductedinthefieldinthewakeofsimilarcontaminationincidents,andfindrelevantinformationfromlabexperiments.Pertinentdatamustbecross-referencedregardingimpactonsimilartaxa,evenifthegeographicalregionsaredifferent.

Openseaenvironment

Condensatecontaminationoriginatesintheopenseaenvironmentsothecontaminationisexpectedtotravelonthewatersurface.Atthispointweatheringprocesseswillbeintheirearlystagesandthemostimpactedwillbeorganismsthatinhabittheopenwatersandtheupperportionofthewatercolumn.Mostimpactedorganismsatthisstagearepopulationsofplankton,fish,andbirdsthatcomeintocontactwiththewater,butalsomarinemammalsandseaturtlesareatriskofexposure.

Plankton

Phytoplanktonandzooplankton,includinglarvalformsofmanyinvertebratesaswellasfisheggsandlarvaehaveacentralroleinprimaryproductioninthemarine

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environment.AstudyconductedinAustraliaundercontrolledlaboratoryconditions(Neffetal.,2000)thattestedtoxicityofcondensateandthreeotheroilshasshownthatacutetoxicityofthetwolightoilswashigherthanthatoftheheavyoilsinallsixspeciesoforganismsthatweretested(2speciesoffish,anelongated-abdomendecapod,amysid,aseaurchin,andseaurchinlarvae).Trackingtheimpactofpollutiononplanktonpopulationsintheopenseaisdifficulttounachievable,soitisimpossibletoruleoutlong-termeffectsofsuchpollutionwhichmaymanifestinharmtotheadultpopulationofcertainspecies(asaresultofinjurytothelarvalstages).

Birds

Seabirdsareconsideredtobehighlyvulnerabletohydrocarbonpollutionbecausetheycomeindirectcontactwiththesubstancesfloatingonthewatersurface.Speciesthatconcentrateatthewatersurfaceand/ordiveinsearchoffoodareathighriskofinjury.Maincausesofdeathonexposuretopollutionare:drowning,starvation,poisoning,andlossofbodyheatcausedbyfeathersbeingcoveredintar.Althoughtherehavebeenattemptstocleanbirdswhowereaffectedfewsurvivetheprocess,andittranspiresthattheirchancesofreproducingsuccessfullyaresmall.DetailedinformationregardingthebirdpopulationoftheCarmelbeachareaisavailableinAppendixN,attachedbelow.

Marinemammalsandseaturtles

Marinemammalsandseaturtlesbreatheairandmustcomeuptothesurfacetodoso.Incaseofalargeoilslick,thesecreatureswillbeexposedtochemicals'toxicfumesparticularlyiftheyareexposedduringthespill'sfirsthours.Inhalingtoxicfumesmayinjuretherespiratorysystemandcauseirritationtoavaryingdegree.Organismsmayalsobeexposedtooilpollutionthroughfeedingandskincontact.Digestingchemicalsafterconsumingcontaminatedorganismsoraccidentalingestionofoilmayinjuretheliverandkidneys,causeanemia,immunedepression,reproductivedysfunction,andevendeath.

Terrestrialenvironmentontheshore

Theslick'sfinaldestinationisthebeach,whereitwilllandonasandyorarockybed(seebelow).Thesandyenvironmentintheshallowsandinthesurfzoneisahomogenoushabitat(withrelativelyfewecologicalniches)andithasalowstabilitywhichdictatesarelativelysmallvarietyofspeciescomparedtorockyhabitatsandsandyhabitatsindeeperwater.Nevertheless,pollutionreachingthesandybeachwilllargelycontainamixtureofhydrocarbonsatadvancedweatheringstages.Asnotedearlier,atthispointweknowthatthemixture'sacutetoxicitycanbeascribedtoPAHs.WefurtherknowfromastudyconductedfollowingtheExxonValdezdisasterthatexposingfisheggstodegradationproductsofthespilledoilcauseddevelopmentalandgeneticdamageaswellasdeath(atexposurelevelsof0.4-

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0.7ppbPAH).Otherstudieshavedemonstrateddevelopmentaldamagealsoininvertebrateswhenexposedtolowerconcentrationsofhydrocarbons.

Organismsthatinhabitthebeachsuchasthetuftedghostcrab(Ocypodecursor)andcrabsthatliveonthewave-washedswashzonesuchasGastrosaccussanctus)canbeexpectedtosufferharmfromexposuretopollution,asarebirdsthatfeedinthisareabyfeedingoncontaminatedorganisms.Seaturtlesmayalsobeexposedtopollutionimpactintheirlayingareas;thisposesahazardtoadultturtles,eggdevelopment,aswellassurvivaloftheyoungturtles.

Ifhydrocarbonsarealsopresentonthesandybed,thenthebenthicpopulationofthesoftbed,meiofaunainparticular,willbeadverselyaffectedbythepresenceofPAHs.ExperimentsconductedinclosedsystemshavefoundthatPAHshaveaninhibitoryeffectonphysiologicalprocessesalsoinmicroalgae.Whenpresentinsediment,PAHsmayalsoaffectthecompositionofspeciesinthebenthiccommunitybyboostingthenumbersofresistantspeciessuchasnematodes,aneffectthatcouldcascadeupthefoodchain.

Intertidalzone

Therockyintertidalzone'svulnerabilitytohydrocarboncontaminationanditsabilitytorecoverisdirectlyrelatedregionalgeomorphology.Shorestructureanddegreeofexposuretowaveenergyinadditiontothefactorsnotedabovearealsosignificant(seealsothetableofoilspillsensitivities,below).Onarockybeachthatisexposedtowaveenergytheslick'sretentiontimewillbelimitedandrecoveryisexpectedtoberapid.Ifarockybeachhasanirregularfront,withmanysmallbaysandareasthatareprotectedfromwaveaction,theslickcanbeexpectedtogettrappedintheprotectedareascausingongoingdamageandslowedrecovery.Underthecondensatepollutionscenario,physicalcoatingandasphyxiationoforganismsbyheavyhydrocarbonsisnotexpected,buttoxiceffectsfromwater-solublecomponentsareapossibility.Theseeffectsmaybeshort-lived(afewhours)butinprotectedareaslikesmallbaysandtidalpoolssuchasthosefoundintheabrasionplatformareamayincreasethewater'sretentiontime(withtoxinspresent)andthereforealsoorganisms'exposuretimetotoxins.Organismsfromawidevarietyofgroupsarevulnerable,algae,clams,crabs,worms,sponges,bryozoa,cnidaria,fish,andothers(seeAppendixN).Notethatsedentaryorganismsthatareincapableofmovementwillbeharderhitthanmotileorganismsthatcanmoveawayfromthecontamination.DatagatheredinstudiesofintertidalzonesinNorthAmericawithsimilarbiologicalland-coverseemtoindicatethatdespitetheseorganisms'sensitivitytohydrocarboncontamination,almostcompleterecoverywasobservedwithinapproximatelytwoyears.Atthesametime,thereisariskofharmtokeyspecies,andharmingthesecouldsetinmotionlongertermchanges.

Itisworthnotingthatweatherconditionsatthetimethecontaminationreachestheshoreandafterwardhassignificantbearingonitsimpactonbiota.Aviolentstorm

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accompaniedbyastormyseawillmixanddispersethecontaminationandwillprobablylessenorganismexposure(mostlysedentaryones)totoxins.Acalmseaandadryheatwavecancauseextendedexposuretotoxins;ifthisisaccompaniedbyanextremelowtide,damagetotherockyintertidalzoneorganismswillbelethal.

ImpactofpollutionontheCarmelbeacharea

TheshorebetweenMaaganMichaelandGevaCarmelbeachiscomposedofKurkarislandsofftheshore,sandybeachareas,rockybeaches,andabrasionplatformsofthemostcomplexandvaluablealongtheIsraelicoast.Theseareas,someofwhichhavebeendeclarednaturereserves(DorislandandMaaganMichaelnaturereserve,Habonimbeachreserve)andsomeareslatedtobecomenaturereservesinthefuture(DaliaRiverestuary,andtheareafromGivatMichalatDortoTaninimRiver,alonga7kmsectionofshore)includeagreatvarietyoranimalsandplantsinmanydifferenthabitats(seeindetailAppendicesMandNofthisdocument).Incaseofacondensateleakfromastoragetankinthesoutherncompound(Compound2)wherethegastreatmentplatformisplanned,contaminationwillmakelandfallbetweenMaaganMichaelandGevaCarmelwithin12to24hours(seemodelresultsabove).Ifthereisaleakincidentinthenortherncompound(Compound1)thecontaminationisexpectedtomakelandfallbetweenNeveYamandDadobeach(onthesouthernoutskirtsofHaifa).Alsoalongthisshoresegmentarerockyandsandyhabitatsaswellasseaturtlelayinggrounds,aslistedinAppendixM.Marineorganismsareexpectedtosufferharmfromthetimethesubstanceisdischargedtoseaanduptoanunknowntimepost-discharge.Initially,thedominantsourceofacutetoxicitywillbeMAH,andasthecontaminationadvancesandweatheringprogresses,PAHconcentrationwillincreaseandtheywillbecomethechiefcontributorstotoxicity.Organismsfirstinlinetobehurtarethoseinhabitingthetopwatercolumn(plankton,fish,marinemammals,andseaturtles)andthesurface(birds).Next,asthecontaminationnearstheshore,DorandMaaganMichaelbeachislandswillbeimpacted(rockybedhabitatandbirdpopulation)aswellastherockyareaoppositeNeveYam(leakscenarioinCompound1)andimmediatelyafterwardthesandyshorebetweenMaaganMichaelandDor,andtheareanorthoftheAtlitfortressontoDadobeachinHaifa,andtherockyarea/abrasionplatformsofDor/Habonimnaturereserveandalittlefurthernorthofthere,andtheareaadjacenttoAtlit(leakscenarioinCompound1).

ItisimportanttonotethatduetotheabsenceofclosedbaysthatareprotectedfromwaveenergyonthesandyshorelinebetweenMaaganMichaelandDorbeach,hydrocarboncompoundsareunlikelytobefoundaccumulatinginthesediment.However,evenifsedimentationoccursfollowingdecompositionandadhesiontoparticulatematter,thesedimentarymaterialisexpectedtocontinuemixingintothebodyofwaterandbecarriedawaywiththecurrents.

Itisdifficulttoestimatethedegreeofinjury,capacityforrecovery,andduration.Allthesevarywiththespecies,weatherconditions,andbiologicalprocesses

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(reproduction,recruiting,nutrition).Wemustalsoemphasizethatuntilactualproductionfromthesubmarinereservoirsbeginsandtheexactcompositionofthecondensatebecomesknown,treatmentmethodsremainunknown.Condensatecontaminationisexpectedtoharmvariousorganisms(aslistedabove)asitprogressestowardtheshore.Amongtheseareinvertebratesaswellasvertebratesfromawiderangeofsystemsandhabitatsintheopensea,ontheislandsneartheshore,andontheshoreinhighlyvaluablesandyandrockyareas.NotethatsignificantportionsoftheshorebetweenMaaganMichaeltothesouthandDadobeachtothenortharenaturereserves,andadditionalsectionsareslatedtobeincludedinfuturenaturereserves.