Environmental policy POLI 352A. Trading places? Strictness 1970s1980s1990s U.S. Europe.

Environmental policy

POLI 352A

Trading places?S

tric

tnes

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1970s 1980s 1990s

U.S.

Europe

Diffuse v. concentrated effects

Diffuse costs Concentrated costs

Diffuse benefits GST tax cut Free tradeEnvironmental regulation

Concentrated benefits

Liberal immigration policy

Cap on civil liability awards

Costs

Ben

efits

Organization of interests

Why environmental interests have it tough:

• Far more diffuse than those who pay the costs of regulation– Diffuse groups less likely to vote on this issue

• Less likely to notice effects, prioritize the issue– Diffuse groups face greater collective action problems

• Greater incentives to free ride• Harder to coordinate• Less likely to identify common interests

• Business’s structural power

Organization of interests

Paradox: U.S. in the 1970s• Massive growth in environmental groups

– None of Olson’s advantages

• Was Olson wrong?– Yes: More “green” mobilization than Olson would

predict• May reveal limits to his model and its assumptions

– E.g., altruistic motives?– No: Can explain why most people did NOT join– No: Pro-environment groups far LESS organized then

“anti-green” interests– No: Some green mobilzation may be explainable in

Olsonian terms

• .

Organization of interests

• Mobilization of diffuse interests helped counter business power– Europe later than U.S.

Public opinion

Willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent pollution (1995):

Sweden 77%

Norway 73%

Netherlands 69%

U.S. 64%

Canada 64%

France 54%

W. Germany 49%

Public opinion

The problem isn’t opinions…

• It’s attention– Environment as “valence” issue

• Environmental policy tracks public’s wandering attention– Media and events key– Europe’s focusing events in 1980s and 1990s

regulatory catchup and overtake

• Economic conditions important

Institutions: Presidential vs. parliamentary

Which institutions respond best to diffuse interests?

• Parliamentary?– Few veto points less access for narrow lobbies– Clear accountability incentive to please voters

• Presidential?– Access points for placing new issues on agenda– More veto points to block rollbacks

Institutions: Presidential vs. parliamentary

• Parliamentarism “green” when executive wants to regulate– But risk of rollback (Thatcher)

• Presidentialism can be “green” when public’s attentive – When public cares, cross-party incentives to act– Helps environmental groups when party in power is

pro-business (Reagan)– Access points for putting green issues on agenda

• Separation of powers detailed legislation judicial enforcement

Institutions:Electoral system

• PR helps single-issue parties win seats– Green Parties in Europe

• Why does this matter?– Don’t big parties in FPTP still have to act “green”?

• Biggest effect is on agenda– Critical for valence issues

Institutions:European Union

• PR Elections to European ParliamentGreen Party representation

• Green leaders drag laggards forward

• Helps solve cross-national collective-action problems

Ideas

Can look at on different levels:

• Scientific ideas– About dangers to ecosystems or human health

• Policy ideas– E.g., Pollution-credit trading

Policy feedback

Possible policy feedback effects in environmental policy?

Where involves:• Physical irreversibility

– e.g., Land use

• Policy encourages investments new preferences?

• BUT much envir. policy may be quite reversible– Producers and beneficiaries weakly organized– Disappointed expectations invisible

Conclusion

• How full is Olson’s glass?

• Politics of a valence issue– Attention is key– Voter attention can overwhelm veto points

• Effect of veto points depends on status quo

• Institutions shape agendas and attention