ENGINEERING ETHICS Prof.V.Anantha Subramanian Department Of Ocean Engineering, IIT Madras 7 th April 2015.

ENGINEERING ETHICS

Prof.V.Anantha SubramanianDepartment Of Ocean Engineering, IIT Madras7th April 2015

ETHICSStudy of the characteristics of moralsInvolves moral choices made by

individuals as they interact with others

ENGINEERING ETHICS“Rules and standards governing the conduct of engineers in their roles as professionals”

ENGINEERING ETHICS

Body of philosophyWays the engineers should conduct, in their

professional capacityMany case studies do not have a clear cut

correct answerStrike the balance between safety and

affordability?

CODE OF ETHICS:• Professional societies such as NSPE, ASME establish code of

ethics which provide a framework for ethical judgment• However the code of ethics is not a legal document, so you are

not arrested for violation, but may be expelled from the Society

• The codes do not invent new principles, only refer to centuries old principles based on societal and human interactions.

• Engineers’ ethics codes today give weightage to public safety, public service and environment protection also

Helps to apply moral principles to the unique situations.

Creates an environment within a profession where ethical behavior is the norm

Guide or reminder to act in specific situations.Backup for an individual who is pressured by a

superior to behave unethically.Collective sense of correct behavior.It indicates that the profession is seriously concerned

about responsible, professional conduct.It should not be used as “Window dressing” i.e. an

attempt by an organisation to appear to be committed to ethical behavior when it really is not.

ETHICAL ISSUESLack of knowledge

Lack of Information

To manage the unknown For eg: An engineer can never be absolutely certain that his design will never harm anyone or cause detrimental changes to society. He must ensure that it operates safely and as planned. He must use his creativity to foresee the possible consequences of his work

Design problem Design criteria- Performance, Aesthetics, Price. In engineering design there is no unique correct answer.

PERSONAL VS PROFESSIONAL ETHICSPERSONAL ETHICS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Deals with how we treat others in our day to day lives

Involves choices on an organizational level rather than a personal level

ETHICS VS LAWLAW ETHICS

Actions are legal but not ethical.

For eg: Designing a process that releases a known toxic,but unregulated, substance into the environment is probably unethical although it is legal.

Actions are ethical, but not moral or legal.

For eg: Gambling

FUNDAMENTAL CANONS

Engineers in the fulfilment of their professional duties shallHold paramount- Safety, Health, Welfare of public.Perform services only in areas of their competence Issue public statements- objective & truthful manner.Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or

trustees.Avoid deceptive actsConduct – honorably, responsibility, ethically and

lawfully to enhance the honor, reputation and usefulness of the profession.

PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Highest standards of honesty and integrityShould acknowledge their errors and should not

distort or alter the facts.Should not promote their own interest at the

expense of the dignity and integrity of the profession

Strive to serve the public interestAvoid all conduct or practice that deceives the

public.

Should not complete, sign or seal plans, specifications that are not in conformity with applicable engineering standards.

If there is a pressure ,to notify the proper authorities and withdraw from further service on the project.

Should not request ,propose, accept a commission on contingent basis where their judgement may be compromised.

Should not attempt to injure, maliciously, falsely, directly, indirectly the professional reputation, prospects, practice or employment of other engineers.

CASE STUDIESSPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER

KEY DATES

• 1974 - Morton-Thiokol awarded contract to build solid rocket boosters.• 1976 - NASA accepts Morton-Thiokol's booster design.• 1977 - Morton-Thiokol discovers joint rotation problem. November 1981

- O-ring erosion• discovered after second shuttle flight.• January 24, 1985 - shuttle flight that exhibited the worst O-ring blow-by.• July 1985 - Thiokol orders new steel billets for new field joint design.• August 19, 1985 - NASA Level I management briefed on booster problem.• January 27, 1986 - night teleconference to discuss effects of cold

temperature on booster• performance.• January 28, 1986 - Challenger explodes 72 seconds after liftoff.

• On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger,exploded just over a minute into flight.

• The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank.

• The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters,

• insufficient low temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and

• lack of communication between different levels of NASA management.

EVENT AND REASONS LEADING TO IT

SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER

Space shuttles Challenger and Columbia illustrate many issues related to Engineering ethics .

The vehicle consists of• Orbiter• Two solid- propellant boosters• Single liquid –propellant boosters

Some circumstantial facts relating to the CHALLENGER

Failure of Solid rocket boosters

Built by Morton Thiokol

Design was a scaled up version of the Titan missile which was successfully used for many years to launch satellite.

The assembly of the propellant- filled cylinders was performed at Thiokol plant in Utah.

Key aspects of booster design are the joints where the individual cylinders , known as field joints, tang and clevis joints, fastened with 177 clevis pins.

The joints are sealed by two O-rings, primary and secondary.

The Titan booster had only one O-ringIn the filed joint.

• The boosters had experienced O-ring erosion at this temperature. Since the engineers had no low temperature data below 53°F,they could not prove that it was unsafe to launch at lower temperatures.

• He read his recommendations and commented that the predicted temperatures for the morning's launch was outside the data base and NASA should delay the launch, so the ambient temperature could rise until the O-ring temperature was at least 53°F (11.6 °C) should delay the launch, so the ambient temperature could rise until the O-ring temperature was at least 53°F.

• This confused NASA managers because the booster design specifications called for booster operation as low as 31°F (below 0°C) (It later came out in the investigation that Thiokol understood that the 31°F limit temperature was for storage of the booster, and that the launch temperature limit was 40°F (4°C). Because of this, dynamic tests of the boosters had never been performed below 40°F.)

THE LAUNCH

• During the night, temperatures dropped to as low as 8°F (minus12.5°C), much lower than had been anticipated.In order to keep the water pipes in the launch platform from freezing, safety showers and fire hoses had been turned on.

• Puffs of smoke coming out from the aft field joint immediately after the boosters were ignited caused the field joint to rotate. With extreme cold temperature ,the O-ring didn’t seat properly.

• The heat resistant putty was also so cold that it didn’t protect the O-rings and hot gases burned past both O-rings.

• Due to wind shear, the joints earlier temporarily sealed by the glassy oxide formation was opened again and hot gases escaped from the solid booster.

• Flames from the solid-fuel booster blow by quickly burned through the external tank.

• The liquid propellant was ignited and shuttle exploded.• The types of problem that we will encounter in studying

engineering ethics are very similar to the design problems that engineers work on every day.

°.

• The picture shows a ship model for which KORT NOZZLES areprovided around the propellers. They have a proper positioningand direction in which they are to be fitted.• Tests were conducted and the drag of the ship reported to the clients• As is customary, the nozzles were dismantled from the model.• The client requested for some repeat as well as extended tests a few months later. The tests were entrusted to the skilled team leader to prepare the model again with the NOZZLES and repeat the tests.• When repeated, the test results consistently showed higher drag values for no apparent reason.• Therefore the anomalous increased values were reported to clientwho was also confused.

(contd)• The project was closed• Days later, the Professor in consultancy contract with the

client discovered that the KORT nozzles were fitted in the wrong direction and this was the cause for the wrongly reported higher values of drag for the ship

• The reason was that the skilled team leader had not correctly chosen the nozzle direction while fitting it on the model