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Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February 2012 Richard Hill, ITU
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Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Mar 27, 2015

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Page 1: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T

RecommendationsAPT-ITU workshop on the International

Telecommunications RegulationsBangkok, 6-8 February 2012

Richard Hill, ITU

Page 2: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Background

• A treaty must be applied by the Member States that are party to it

• A treaty could create rights and obligations for individuals or entities that are under the jurisdiction of Member States that are parties to the treaty

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Page 3: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Implications for parties (1/5)

• Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties

• “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”.

• But a treaty may contain non-binding provisions, or, in some cases, provisions whose intent is uncertain and mostly left to the appreciation of the parties.

Page 4: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Implications for parties (2/5)

• “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”

• Unless the treaty specifically provides otherwise, or a reservation has been duly made, a party should adapt its national laws to be consistent with the treaty.

Page 5: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Implications for parties (3/5)

• The principle of good faith performance of treaty obligations imposes the transposition to the national legal system of the parties of those treaties that create rights and obligations for individuals or entities.

• Unjustified failure to implement a treaty shall entail the international responsibility of the concerned States.

Page 6: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Implications for parties (4/5)

• However, since States are sovereign, and not subject to any higher authority unless they have specifically agreed to the contrary, there are no generic mechanisms for enforcing treaties.

• If a State does not comply with the terms of a treaty to which it is a party, then, in general, there is no legal mechanism to oblige it to comply.

Page 7: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Implications for parties (5/5)

• There are, however, numerous specific enforcement mechanisms that form part of specific treaties. – bilateral investment treaties – WTO treaties– European Convention on Human Rights– International Court of Justice– ITU Constitution and Convention

Page 8: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Proposals made to CWG-WCIT

• To date, some Member States have suggested that consideration should be given to adding some sort of dispute resolution mechanism to the ITRs, but no specific, concrete proposal has yet been made.

Page 9: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Status of ITU-T Recommendations (1/5)• The immediate predecessor of the ITRs, the

1973 Telephone Regulations, included a provision regarding Recommendations – In implementing the principles of the Regulations,

Administrations* should comply with the relevant CCITT Recommendations, including any Instructions forming part of those Recommendations, on any matters not covered by the Regulations.

Page 10: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Status of ITU-T Recommendations (2/5)• That provision was widely considered to

require that telecommunications operators comply with Recommendations, in particular those dealing with tariff and accounting matters.

Page 11: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Status of ITU-T Recommendations (3/5)

Page 12: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Status of ITU-T Recommendations (4/5)• Further, the current ITRs contain an additional

provision related to CCITT Recommendations that was not found in the 1973 Telephone Regulations:– References to CCITT Recommendations and

Instructions in these Regulations are not to be taken as giving to those Recommendations and Instructions the same legal status as the Regulations.

Page 13: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Status of ITU-T Recommendations (5/5)• It is clear that that the language adopted in

1988 cannot be understood to imply that either Member States or operating agencies have an obligation to comply with CCITT Recommendations.

Page 14: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Proposals made to CWG-WCIT

• Some of the proposals presented to CWG-WCIT take the view that this situation should be changed, at least with respect to certain specific areas covered by ITU-T Recommendations, and that certain Recommendations should have binding force.

Page 15: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Additional background (1/2)• International organizations have the external

normative authority– Most common approach is treaties/conventions.– Certain international organizations are expressly

empowered to adopt regulatory texts having a general scope and that do not require ratification as treaties.

– This derives from a provision of the constitutive act expressly assigning such competence.

Page 16: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

Additional background (2/2)

• WHO can enact health-related regulations • ICAO is authorized to adopt international

norms and procedures that are binding on its Member States

• European Union regulations are directly binding on its Member States

• UN Security Council Resolutions are binding on all members of the UN, even if they are not members of the Security Council

Page 17: Enforcement issues, including status of ITU-T Recommendations APT-ITU workshop on the International Telecommunications Regulations Bangkok, 6-8 February.

ITU situation• There is a mechanism in the Radio Regulations

used to confer, under specific conditions, binding force to selected ITU-R Recommendations

• From the international legal point of view, it would be entirely possible to envisage a mechanism in the revised ITRs that would confer treaty value and, as appropriate, binding force to non-treaty instruments such as Recommendations

• Of course this says nothing about the advisability of such a provision, which is a matter to be decided by the Member States