Energy and Equity in Kansas City - The Green Impact Zone (GIZ) Case Text

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ENERGY AND

EQUITY IN

KANSAS CITY

ABSTRACT Looking at the racialization of space and the

Green Impact Zone (GIZ) through the lens of

political ecology, this case study provides

context to the racially charged real estate and

land use practices that have spurred energy

poverty issues in Kansas City. In highlighting

the GIZ’s numerous successes as well as the

structural obstacles it faced, this text hopes to

inform future energy efficiency policy

targeting low-income households who are

most in need of equitable solutions.

Prathmesh Jaiprakash Gupta, Ryan Moya, Calli VanderWilde

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Historical Context: Racialization of Space i. 1920 -1950: Legal & political infrastructure established

ii. 1950’s: Troost Avenue divides the city

III. History of the Green Impact Zone (GIZ) i. Coalition Building Components

ii. Calm Before the Storm: A flood of initial praise prior to political ecology barriers

IV. The Political Ecology Barriers That Surrounded The GIZ

i. Power Relations o Politics as Usual: Delays in spending opens door to reallocate

funds o Landlord holds cards in ‘Split Incentive’ Scenario

ii. Structural Barriers to Entry

o Time Required to Train & Mobilize a New Workforce o Up Front Costs Needed Prior to Weatherization o Regulatory Requirements

iii. Winners and Losers of Allocated Funds

o Bureaucratic Priorities Behind Allocated Funds o Public Priorities Behind Allocated Funds

V. GIZ’s Achievements

VI. Conclusion & Lessons for Future Policy

VII. References

VIII. Exhibit

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I. Introduction A society guided by the principles of distributive (in)justice exhibits the socially

(in)equitable allocation of goods, resources and services. The idea of distributive justice is utopian, and marks an important target for urban sustainability. However, for many urban areas such a goal is far from within reach – in the United States’ struggle for distributive justice, Kansas City provides the perfect paradigm.

Though distributive justice can be analyzed in the context of any

good/resource/service, Kansas City lends itself well to the study of distributive energy justice. Historical urban planning and land use strategies have heavily segregated the area and resulted in especially salient energy access disparities. Households that can be classified as lower-income, below poverty level, of racial/ethnic minority, and/or with heads-of-house lacking high school education disproportionately feel the burden of expensive and unreliable, energy.

Kansas City’s attempts to address such issues with the Green Impact Zone (GIZ)

initiative, which simultaneously received nationwide praise and faced various barriers that diminished the total dollars the city could allocate to weatherization projects in order to alleviate its energy poverty issues. The barriers the GIZ faced in political ecology provide valuable lessons regarding the challenges a community faces while simultaneously addressing energy and equity. It’s successes and failures can be used as a model to inform future projects in similarly burdened societies.

II. Historical Context: Racialization of Space & Brewed Energy Poverty Issues.

In his book Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City

Experience, 1900-2010, author Kevin Gotham argues that the issues (including energy poverty) that led to the establishment of the GIZ (five disenfranchised Kansas City neighborhoods) ultimately stem from segregationist ideology associated with “a racialization of space that linked race and culturally-specific behavior to place of residence in the city” (2014, p. 22).

i. 1920 -1950: Legal & political infrastructure established

Beginning in the 1920s, “real estate elites, community builders and homeowner associations” established racially restrictive covenants, agreements between property owners that impeded minorities from holding real estate in particular areas (Gotham, 2014, p. 21). The logic behind such covenants was a racist ideology, which correlated black populations to increased crime and/or neighborhood deterioration. Thus, racial exclusion was necessary to maintain property values and stability in primarily white neighborhoods. Kansas City did not begin racially divided (Exhibit 1) but covenants effectively began the systemic process of embedded racial prejudices and stereotypes into its urban space (Exhibit 2).

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The 1934 Federal Housing Act (FHA) was established to provide lenders with more accessible credit for home repairs and construction, and to assist low- and moderate-income families in obtaining better housing. However, the same parties who championed racially restrictive covenants were able to manipulate the FHA to defend discrimination for the sake of maintaining neighborhood “cultural homogeneity,” “security”, “stability,” and “integrity” of space (Gotham, 2014, p.23).

Housing Acts in 1949 and 1954 continued racist policies that “established the legal and political infrastructure for local real estate interests to designate and clear urban neighborhoods… dislocating and segregating impact of urban renewal and public housing on central city neighborhoods and the role these private-public initiatives played in shaping racial population patterns in the postwar area” (Gotham, 2014, p.23)

ii. 1950’s: Troost Avenue divides the city leading to decades of GIZ

disinvestment

With the legal and political infrastructure set, Gotham argues the Post World War II 1950s marked a new era in the history of the real estate industry and Kansas City largely originated a land use practice that was duplicated afterwards by successfully leveraging Troost Avenue to divide whites and blacks from the eastern part of the city. (p.95). Starting in 1955, the local Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD) as well as the Missouri based and newly revamped National Association Real Estate Board (NAREB) preserved segregated schools using Troost Avenue – a major north/south boulevard – as a racially identifiable school attendance boundary (Exhibits 3 & 4).

Appealing to white soldiers who had recently returned from WWII and feared

putting their children in segregated schools, marketing campaigns ran advertisements with messaging similar to that of Figure 1 shown above. The historical significance of these campaigns cannot be underestimated – the ads directly shaped exclusionary real estate practices and reinforced the beliefs of local housing reformers who “equated

Figure 1: 1957 NAREB advertisement discouraging

whites from living on the eastern side Troost Ave. (i.e.

present day GIZ neighborhoods). From Gotham

(2014).

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black neighborhoods with violent crime, disease and other negative vices” (Gotham, 2014, p. 22).

Troost Avenue “built the wall” (Gotham, 2014, p. 95) and drew a sharp dividing

line between whites and minorities, and a number of policies thereafter continued to reinforce the social inequities and conditions that ultimately led to Kansas City’s energy poverty issues. Unfortunately, Troost Avenue also served as a model for other cities throughout the U.S. and members of the NAREB chapter consulted cities such as Oakland, Los Angeles and others to duplicate similar land use mechanisms (p. 87).

Gotham (2014) equates this racialization of space with “uneven development”

which he defines as “a basic geographical medium through which inter-city competition, environmental degradation, and class struggle unfold” as a result of “profit-oriented growth” (p. 1). Not only in Kansas City, but in metropolitan areas across the United States, energy poverty too often was the product of decades of both housing policies and real estate/land development projects “that have overwhelming benefited entrepreneurs, private real estate interests, community builders, and the like, at the expense of poor residents and racial minorities” (p. 10). Continued patterns of disinvestment and neglect have left disenfranchised communities in their wakes.

III. History of Green Impact Zone (GIZ)

By 2009, neighborhoods east of Troost Avenue held unemployment rates as high as 53 percent in some census tracts, and families with “Increased heating costs during extreme winter months were placed with severe strains on household budgets and led families to make tradeoffs between energy, food or medicine” (Wise, 2015). In an effort to address these issues, Congressman Emanuel Cleaver launched the Green Impact Zone (GIZ) initiative in 2009 to focus federal stimulus funds on eight capacity-building priorities: housing, weatherization, employment and training, infrastructure, energy efficiency, urban agriculture, public safety and community services, and youth in a 150-square-block area of the city’s urban center suffering from years of disinvestment and neglect (“Strategies,” 2016).

The federal stimulus funds for the GIZ trickled from over $128 million worth of

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funding specifically bookmarked for Weatherization Assistance Programs (WAP) in the State of Missouri (Reames, 2016). Of the $128 million, $25.6 million were given to the Energize Missouri Housing Initiative, a competitive state-wide grant meant to encourage large-scale weatherization initiatives such as the GIZ. The MARC secured $4.5 million from the Energize Missouri Housing Initiative with the goal to improve the energy efficiency of all 659 GIZ households.

Responsibility for the management of the GIZ was given to the Mid-America

Regional Council (MARC), who appointed eight staff members – a GIZ Director and Assistant Director, five community ombudsmen, and an administrative assistant.

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i. Coalition Building Components

The Green Impact Zone was by design a hugely collaborative, cross-institutional

undertaking. Its multi-dimensional vision demands the engagement of various government agencies, community nonprofits, private-sector contractors and utilities, as well as other institutions. After leveraging stimulus money and gaining unanimous approval from fellow Kansas City council members, congressman Cleary’s first partnership was with the MARC. The MARC held “weekly meetings with six neighborhood groups from the zone, four community development organizations, Kansas City employment and energy nonprofits, and other organizations impacting the area” (Brookings Institute, 2009). These meetings piggybacked on the collaborative work done with elected neighborhood leaders and residents to shape the GIZ’s vision, guiding principles and future funding opportunities.

Recognizing that the initiative’s success was as much about people as it was

about energy savings, the GIZ aimed for community transformation. The need to weatherize and revamp all the GIZ homes lacking storm windows, sufficient insulation, and modern heaters created a number of green jobs. To ensure green jobs benefited those in the neighborhood, the GIZ established partnerships with the Metropolitan Energy Center, Full Employment Council of Kansas City and University of Central Missouri to train GIZ residents as certified energy auditors. In the words of Bob Housh, executive director of the Metropolitan Energy Center, “It was decided early on that rather than just do the usual thing with the usual organizations and agencies that they would try to do this from the community up” (Buffa, 2009).

According to Blue Hills Community Services, one of the members of the weekly

meetings, this community focus largely drove the success of GIZ initiative from day

Historical urban planning and land use strategies have led to uneven development and heavy segregation that continues to contribute complex undertones to Kansas City’s present.

Table from “Lessons Learned from Outreach and Engagement Practices from the Green Impact Zone

Initiative”, Green Impact Zone, 2013.

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one: “what the Green Impact Zone did was bring attention and some excitement to this area. It created new partnerships and brought new relationships to the table” (Montgomery,2014).

New Initiatives within the GIZ like the NEXUS of Excellence, garnered

neighborhood support by emphasizing the possibility of local green jobs and by launching educational enrichment programs for neighborhood youth. In the NEXUS of Excellence participating youth attended classroom training at nearby schools and had opportunities talk with local business leaders or take part in field trips to “green” business operations.

ii. Calm Before the Storm: Flood of initial praise prior to political ecology barriers

The Green Impact Zone enjoyed a high profile from its inception. Its initial

target goal to weatherize over a thousand inefficient homes garnered the most media recognition. By 2010, the GIZ was also receiving recognition for its focus on multiple stakeholder interests and its intent on empowering local community members through continual engagement. Michelle Obama invited GIZ members to attend the 2010 State of the Union Address and White House officials visited the GIZ on multiple occasions -- including President Obama who dubbed Cleaver as the brainchild of a community-based approach he viewed as model for the country.

IV. The Political Ecology Barriers That Surrounded The GIZ

After the initial flood of praise, congressman Cleaver was also warned, “You'll

be under a microscope and a spotlight as you spend this money” (Bender, 2013). The spotlight arrived well before the microscope. Cleaver had to hurdle numerous barriers created by the political ecology surrounding the GIZ as the funding required to continue ultimately diminished.

i. Power Relations Politics as Usual: Delays in Spending Opens Door to Reallocate Funds

In October 2010, MARC secured $4.5 million in funds for the proposed

weatherization of 659 homes and had until March 2012 to spend funds. Despite delays in spending caused by existing regulatory requirements and training a new workforce, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) announced in February 2011 that it would be reducing the zone’s weatherization program funding to $2.7 million (Bender, 2013).

Essential to understand, however, is that the weatherization funds rescinded

from the GIZ did not leave Kansas City entirely. Instead, due to the fact the city typically allocates funding evenly throughout all of its districts, funds were rerouted to fund

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energy efficiency measures in much wealthier areas outside the Green Impact Zone (Montgomery, 2014) As power dynamics took shape the weatherization efforts that directly impacted homes within the GIZ ultimately diminished. Though 329 GIZ homes by 2013 had been weatherized and met with great results within the community. However, the original 2009 target was over a thousand homes, and by reallocating a percentage of the remaining 2010 funds to weatherize wealthier Kansas City homes, equity behind energy efficiency goals was altered in the process. (Montgomery, 2014).

Landlord holds cards in ‘Split Incentive’ Scenario

As is often the case in low-income neighborhoods, many GIZ residents were renters of apartment buildings, not homeowners. In this scenario, the landlord and not the renter holds the cards as to who decides to fund energy efficiency measures at the rental building. This, combined with the reality that renters hold the responsibility to pay their own utility bills, creates a ‘split incentive’ where he/she who holds the ability to decide the fate of a building will ultimately dictate its participation of weatherization efforts.

Such power dynamics were exhibited in the GIZ’s weatherization program and

were exacerbated by the program’s requirement that landlords pay 50% of the weatherization costs (Reames, 2016). Program participation was largely dictated by the fact that landlords ultimately had no incentive to spend money on measures that would ultimately benefit others.

ii. Structural barriers to entry Time Required to Train & Mobilize a New Workforce

Given the fact that weatherization funds were given in 2010 and needed to be spent by 2012, there were time constraints to adequately train and mobilize a workforce which previously held unemployment rates above fifty percent. As Bob Housh, leader of the Metropolitan Energy Center who trained the future green job seekers puts it, “[y]ou don't create a whole industry overnight” (Helling 2011). Given the surrounding political climate, there did not seem to be much patience to spend the adequate time or appreciation towards the difficulty of readying a new workforce in a short amount of time. Nevertheless, at the time funds were rescinded in 2011 and then reallocated to wealthier districts outside the GIZ, MARC was still able to spend $1.7 million and completed weatherization of 115 homes, another 44 were in progress, and 176 were at some stage of the intake and audit process (Helling, 2011).

Up Front Costs Needed Prior to Weatherizing Home

Prior to weatherizing GIZ homes, pre-weatherization repairs were often needed, incurring additional costs to improve the structural integrity of the home or electrical repairs prior to receiving any future savings from weatherization. “It was extremely

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frustrating,” said Anita Maltbia of the GIZ, “The state’s program didn’t take the human pieces into account. You have an elderly lady with a house leaking like a sieve, but workers couldn’t get into her basement” (Bender, 2013).

Missouri Applicants eligible to apply for weatherization funding are already at

or below 135 percent of the poverty level, or $26,716 for a family of three, so additional up-front costs can “make a difference of an eviction notice, or that makes a difference of having the gas shut off when you have four kids in the household and no place to go,” said Holly Grimwood of the GIZ. (Montgomery, 2014).

Regulatory Requirements

Households in the GIZ that had received federal funding for weatherization work done since 1994, were prevented from benefiting from ARRA funding for weatherization assistance. (Buffa, A, 2013). This occurred despite the fact that not only has appliance efficiency improved dramatically since then, but also most prior recipients did not receive the comprehensive weatherization improvements needed to climb out of energy poverty.

The regulatory barriers that hindered participation in the weatherization of

homes in the GIZ reflects a nationwide trend. According to the Campaign for Home Energy Assistance, the number of households receiving aid from the Federal Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program has dropped 18 percent -- largely to barriers such as the up-front costs to meet pre-weatherization requirements (Montgomery,2014).

iii. Winners and Losers of Allocated Funds Bureaucratic priorities behind allocated funds

Bureaucratic priorities diminished the amount of funding allocated to

weatherization projects, and at times, made neighborhood residents skeptical if green benefits were immediately applicable to them. Decades of underfunding GIZ neighborhoods prioritized $26 million in funds to be spent on “gray” infrastructure, including new sidewalks, walkways leading to new transit stops or pedestrian bridges(Von Drehel, 2014). In addition, in a longer term effort to scale the nationwide adoption of electric vehicles, the U.S. Department of Transportation dedicated portions of the funding destined for the GIZ towards installing EV charging stations that held more immediate benefit to wealthy Kansas City resident pool. (Von Drehel, 2014).

Public priorities behind allocated funds

The priorities for GIZ residents living below the poverty line understandably

favored weatherization projects that held immediate economic benefit instead of ‘gray infrastructure’ projects which provided less tangible benefits. GIZ community members voiced their desires for weatherization projects that would save money, help

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food purchases and reduce utility bills reduced heating and cooling costs (Reames, 2014).

Additionally, while green jobs hold the potential to improve quality of life for GIZ residents, new EV charging stations did not. They were not salient to a community that was seeking tangible benefits and thus tarnished the view of some regarding the “success” of the GIZ (Von Drehel, 2014).

V. GIZ’s Achievements

With the community engaged in the process, the Green Impact Zone was able to develop a bottom-up approach towards greening a historically disinvested community. Figure 3 above highlights the various accomplishments the GIZ was able to achieve, including 14,000 smart meters, 329 weatherized homes, as well job training and training for green employment opportunities (“Achievements” 2013).

VI. Conclusion & Lessons in for Future Policy

The GIZ initiative provides valuable lessons regarding how to simultaneously adhere to the challenges distressed communities face while addressing energy and equity. Given that energy efficiency measures are among the top initiatives providing

Fig. 2: “Achievements from Green Impact Zone Initiative”, Green Impact Zone, 2013.

http://www.greenimpactzone.org/images/infographic.pdf

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a collective return on investment, other cities wishing to alleviate energy poverty issues ought to prioritize the weatherization of inefficient buildings (McKinsey & Company, 2009). Especially in low-income neighborhoods where investment is needed most, future energy efficiency policies should adopt a community-based approach akin to that implemented in the GIZ. The political ecology lessons realized by the range of structural barriers GIZ members had to navigate ought to likewise inform future energy efficiency initiatives (Figure 4). The successes and failures of the GIZ create a model that cities nationwide can learn from and rework when addressing distributive energy injustice.

Fig. 3: The Political Ecology Components Surrounding GIZ Outcomes

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VII. References Bender, J. “Just how much impact has the Green Impact Zone had?” The Pitch.

January 29th, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.pitch.com/news/article/20568630/just-how-much-impact-has-the-green-impact-zone-had

Brookings Institute. “Kansas City’s Green Impact Zone: Targeting ARRA for

Neighborhood Uplift.” (July, 2009). Buffa, A. “Kansas City’s Green Impact Zone – A Vision for 21st Century Urban

Renewal. ”Triple Pundit. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/09/kansas-city%e2%80%99s-green-impact-zone-%e2%80%93-a-vision-for-21st-century-urban-renewal/

Energy Works KC, MARC, U.S. D.O.E. Better Buildings (2013). Lessons Learned

from Outreach and Engagement Practices from the Green Impact Zone Initiative. Mid - America Regional Council, US. Retrieved from http://greenimpactzone.org/assets/GreenImpactZone_EnergyWorksKC_WhitePaper.pdf

Gotham, K. F. (2014). Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City

Experience, 1900–2010 (2). Albany, US: SUNY Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com

Helling, D., 2011. MARC disqualified from weatherization program. Kansas City Star,

Aug. 18. McKinsey & Company, 2009. Unlocking energy efficiency in the U.S. economy.

http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinking/Unlocking_energy_efficiency_in_the_US_economy

Montogomery, D. “At 5, Green Impact Zone is still a Seedling.” Kansas City Star,

February 24th, 2014. Accessed: http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article340071/At-5-Green-Impact-Zone-is-still-a-seedling.html

Reames, T. G. (2016). A community-based approach to low-income residential energy efficiency participation barriers. Local Environment, 9839(February), 1–18. http://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2015.1136995

Strategies. (2016). Retrieved November 13, 2016, from http://greenimpactzone.org/strategies.aspx#

Von Drehel, D. “Stimulus stalls in Kansas City.” Time. February 26th, 2014.

http://nation.time.com/2014/02/26/stimulus-stalls-in-kansas-city/

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Wise, L. (2015, January 15). Rep. Emanuel Cleaver urges President Obama to increase heating help for the poor. The Kansas City Star. Retrieved Nov. 13, 2016, from http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article6675036.html

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VIII. Exhibits Exhibit 1 & 2: Kansas City did not begin racially divided. Blacks initially lived in clusters with white and other minorities across city wards.

Population by wards in KC, 1880. Table from Gotham (2014).

Racial Restrictive Covenants and Subdivisions, Metropolitan Kansas City, 1900 – 1965. Table from Gotham (2014).

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Exhibit 3: The Post-1950 Impact of Troost Avenue

Troost Avenue forever changed Kansas City’s racial dynamics. Disinvestment in the GIZ followed. Table from Gotham (2014).

Exhibit 4: “Troost Avenue has historically been seen as the Maxon-Dixon Line of Kansas City.”

– Mayor Emanuel Cleaver, brainchild of the GIZ

Source: “Partnership Turns ‘War Zone’ into Homes” Kansas City Star 2012.