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ENEMIES EVERYWHERE: TERRORISM,
MORAL PANIC, AND US CIVIL SOCIETY
DAWN ROTHEWestern Michigan University
STEPHEN L. MUZZATTIRyerson University
Abstract. Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, terrorism
has experienced aprominence in discourse across the U.S. The
representations of terrorists and ter-
rorism by the news media and politi have contributed to the
edice of terrorism as amoral panic. This treatise examines the
social eects that have or may occur due tothe social construction
of a moral panic of terrorism. The thematic frame is situated
within Cohens stages of a moral panic. We oer an analysis of the
medias depictionand coverage of acts of terrorism, and legislative,
political and legal responses in theform of social and cultural
changes occurring from the creation of a moral panic. In
addition, we oer an analysis of the states vested interest in
the social construction ofthis panic, leading to increased levels
of fear, targeted at the general publics con-sciousness. This
article concludes that the presentation of terrorism and terrorists
bythe media and politi have contributed to unnecessary levels of
panic and fear, mis-
guided public consciousness, and the development of legislation
creating negativesocial ramications yet be seen.
Introduction
The American public has been inundated with highly mediated
imagesof terrorists and terrorism since September 11, 2001.
Perceived threatsand heightened security alerts abound in daily
media coverage andpolitical speeches, leading to what may be termed
a moral panic. Theedication of a moral panic among the U.S.
population has exacerbateda culture embedded in fear. While the
events of September 11, 2001 wereindeed tragic, the construction of
a moral panic by the media andpoliticians to support their
interests is a greater social tragedy.
The concept of moral panic has been used to dene social issues
forthe past 30 years (See Becker 1963; Young 1971; Cohen 1972;
Hallet al., 1978; Reiman and Levine 1989; Goode and Ben-Yehuda
1994;Burns and Crawford 1999; Muzzatti 2002, 2003 (unpublished)).
Young
Critical Criminology 12: 327350, 2004.
2004 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.
327
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(1971) was the rst to coin the term, moral panic in, The
Drugtakers (seeCohen 1971; Young 1971). Young examined the
ideological role themedia has in constructing social meanings as
well as the amplication ofdeviance. He provided linkages between
the media, agents of socialcontrol and public opinion, which could
ascend to a moral panic.
Cohen (1972) was the rst to present an inclusive denition of a
moralpanic. The term,moral panic was used byCohen to depict the
reactions ofthe media, the public, and agents of social control to
relatively minordisturbances between theModandRocker youth cultures
inEngland.Hisresearch illustrated how these reactions inuenced the
enforcement andformation of social policy, law, and societal
perceptions of threat and theyoung tribes. According to Cohen, a
moral panic can occur, when:
A condition, episode, person or group of person emerges to
becomedened as a threat to societal values or interests; its nature
ispresented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass
media;the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops,
politicians orother right-thinking people . . . Sometimes the
subject of the panic isquite novel and at other times it is
something which has been inexistence long enough, but suddenly
appears in the limelight.Sometimes the panic passes over and is
forgotten . . . at other timesit has more serious and long lasting
repercussion and might producesuch changes as those in legal and
social policy or even in the waysociety conceives itself (Cohen
1972: 9).
Cohens work focused on the reactions of the media, agents of
socialcontrol and the general public to relatively minor clashes
betweenmembers of youth subcultures (the mods and the rockers) in
England,and, as the above excerpt illustrates, the ways in which
these reactionsinuenced the formation and enforcement of law,
social policy, andsocietal conceptions of the youth
culture-delinquency nexus.
While many subsequent scholars have similarly applied the
conceptto youth subcultures (e.g. punks, skinheads, goths, ravers
etc.) othershave gone beyond the original focus to apply it to more
generalised andadult manifestations of deviant and criminal
behaviour (e.g. soccerhooligans, motorcycle gangs, immigrants (both
illegal and legal), wel-fare mothers, Satanists, paedophiles,
squeegee merchants, serial killers,etc.). While some of the
research is 30 years old, with antecedentsperhaps even a generation
older, the concept of Moral Panic continuedto grow in importance in
the 1990s and into the 21st century, spurringconsiderable
theoretical development, particularly the emergence ofcritical
cultural criminology.
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Simply put, a moral panic is an exaggeration or distortion of
someperceived deviant behavior or criminal activity. According to
Cohen(1972: 31), this includes grossly exaggerating the seriousness
of theevents according to criteria such as the numbers of people
taking part,the number involved in violence, and the amount and
eects of violenceand/or damage. This is, of course, not something
that happens spon-taneously, but rather is a result of a complex
interplay of behaviors andresponses involving several actors. For a
moral panic to take hold, thereneed to be in place six sets of
actors. These include: (1) folk devils, (2)rule enforcers, (3) the
media, (4) politicians, (5) action groups, and, (6)the public. Folk
devils are the individuals responsible for the deviant orcriminal
behavior. Unlike normal deviants or criminals, these folks
areunambiguously unfavorable symbols: the embodiment of evil.
As those responsible for the enforcement of norms, codes of
conduct,and law, rule enforcers are a vital part of the moral
panic. These groups/organizations, particularly the police,
prosecutors, and the judiciary areexpected to detect, apprehend and
punish the folk devils. These agentspresent the social situation as
one that teeters on the brink of chaos if itwere not for them,
deviance/crime and all that it entails would abound.They present
themselves as the thin blue line, which separates order
andcivilization frommayhem and anarchy. Depending upon the content
andstrength of the discourse, it often includes calls for increased
numbers ofrule enforcers andmore extensive authority (i.e., greater
power) for them.
The media is likely the single most inuential actor in the
orchestra-tion and promulgation of a moral panic. Media coverage of
certain kindsof deviant/criminal behavior, particularly those
involving perpetrators ofthe aforementioned type is usually
distorted. It serves to inate theseriousness of the incidents,
making them appear more heinous andfrequent than they truly are.
Public anxiety is whipped up through the useof journalistic and
linguistic devices. Special cover story, in-depthexpose or
investigative report style coverage employs dramaticphotos, video,
and sound bites with moralistic rhetoric.
Politicians are also vital actors in a moral panic. As
individuals, whomust operate in the court of public opinion, it is
important that poli-ticians present themselves as purveyors of the
moral high ground. Assuch, they often align themselves with the
press and the rule enforcers ina struggle against the evils
perpetrated by the folk devils.Self-righteousness and the politics
of rage (Berry 1999) characterizethe response of politicians in
dealing with crime/deviance. Even themost liberal politicians
usually take a moralistic, no-nonsense, war oncrime stance,
advocating reactionary and punitive strategies to deal with
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this new threat. Common calls include special hearings or
sub-com-mittees to deal with the problem, zero tolerance policies,
tougher lawsand harsher sentences.
The nal, and some would argue ultimately the most
important,actor in a moral panic is the public. The success of the
media, poli-ticians, rule enforcers and moral entrepreneurs in
generating andsustaining a moral panic is ultimately contingent
upon how success-fully they enrage the public and marshal their
support against the folkdevils. The vox populi is enlisted as a
front-line agent in the crusadeagainst the designated evil. Members
of the public are relied upon toexpress contempt for the folk
devils and support for the rule enforcers,to consume the media
coverage, and wait for the latest pronounce-ments from politicians
and/or action groups on how the problem is tobe solved.
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) assess the dierence between a
moralpanic and a normal societal concern with ve characteristics.
Theseinclude: (1) the generation of heightened concern, (2)
hostility, (3) asocietal consensus that the actions are injurious,
(4) disproportionatesocietal reaction, and (5) volatility.
Societal concern about crime and deviance always exists at some
level;however, heightened concern infers an increase in public
dismay about acertain group or its impact. Assessing heightened
concern can be quan-tied by newspaper reports, public opinion
polls, and enhanced mediacoverage (Good and Ben-Yehuda 1994).
Increased hostility is a necessarycatalyst for a moral panic.
Hostility refers to heightened levels of intol-erance directed at
the behavior of a group (evil-doers) accompanied bycontempt for
those responsible. The third catalyst, consensus, refers topublic
agreement that the evildoers are real as is the threat they impose
tosociety. Consensus is not meant to necessarily incorporate all of
a societymerely that it is widespread. Disproportionality refers to
over-reaction toa problem and includes frequency, severity, and
scope. This includes thebelief that greater harm is eminent. The
nal tool for assessment is vol-atility. Simply stated, the
precariousness of a moral panic can allow it toappear quickly and
without warning. Interestingly, even after the dissi-pation of a
moral panic, a litany of repressive social controls strategiesand
mechanisms may be left in its wake (Muzzatti 2002).
This treatise will be situated within Cohens stages of moral
panicintegrated with Goode and Ben-Yehudas characteristics
assessing thata moral panic has occurred. Simply stated, we use
Cohens model toassess the stages of a moral panic accompanied with
Goode andBen-Yehudas model illustrating that a moral panic indeed
occurred.
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The terms terrorists and terrorism are entrenched in a
denitionalquagmire. The diculty in dening (conceptualising)
terrorism is thepejorative connotations it holds. It is subjective
in terms of the socialand historical context. It is dependent on
political power. The State canincrease its power (or perceived
legitimate power) when the enemiesbecome labelled as terrorists
(White 2003). The term terrorism has beendened in ocial U.S.
documents as the calculated use of violence orthreat of violence to
attain political, religious, or ideological goals.Terrorism is
accomplished by means of intimidation, coercion, orinstilling fear
(White House 2002). Laqueur and Alexander (1987)denes terrorism as
the illegitimate use of force to achieve politicalobjectives by the
targeting of innocent people. There is also a propa-gandist
denition of terrorism (Chomsky 2001:90). It refers to terroristacts
that are committed by our enemies against our allies or us
per-sonally. This leads to the counter-terrorism measures that
could also bedened as terrorism and to the today a freedom
ghter-tomorrow aterrorist dichotomy. According to Solomon (1999),
there is anOrwellian logic behind dening terrorism. Bombings by
Third Worldcountries are dened as terrorism while bombings by the
U.S. are vir-tuous strikes against terror. Discursively
constituted, terrorism simu-lates the crisis of international
order, and hence Counterterrorism iscounter-simulation an attempt
to engender a new disciplinary order(Der Derian 1989). Such
discursive practices serve the function ofprivileging State
techno-bureaucrats, while simultaneously marginaliz-ing both
critical criminologists, and even more disturbingly, the
generalpublic. White (2003) posits that denitions of terrorism are
useless, asthey do not account for the social or political nature
of terrorism.Terrorism is politically associated as isolated events
that are out ofcontext, disregarding the precipitating events
leading to the terroristattack, leaving the perception of the
perpetrators actions as unpro-voked and inexplicably evil (Herman
and Sullivan 1989).
Regardless of the lack of consensus in what constitutes
terrorism, thedenition and imagery put forth by the media and
politi is real in itsconsequences; a socially constructed label
that denes someone orsomething (folk-devils/evil-doers) as a threat
to our values or interests.Having said this, the actual fear and
impact that victims of randomviolence and terrorism experience must
be acknowledged, and suchvictimisation should not minimised. The
following sections will addressthe moral panic that emerged from
the tragedy of September 11, 2001.This will be framed in Cohens
thematic frame; the creation of a moralpanic, along with Goode and
Ben-Yehudas characteristics assessing
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whether a moral panic has taken hold. We have taken the
generalframes of both, Cohen and Goode and Ben-Yehudas models,
andestablished a model from which this analysis proceeds. In other
words,we take Cohens criteria of actors and situation with Goode
and Ben-Yehudas tools for assessing if it is indeed a moral panic
or mere societalconcern. Beginning with a person or persons being
dened as a threat,the media presents this perceived threat in a
consistent and recognisableform (Erikson et al. 1989). This leads
to a build-up of public concernand the generation of hostility. A
societal consensus is formed acceptingthat the threat is real and
injurious. This is fuelled by the moralentrepreneurship of
politicians responding with disproportionate reac-tions to the
portrayed threat. These reactions can then lead to longlasting and
deleterious social change. We will analyze each of these
stepsframed in the following sub-chapters: (1) someone dened as a
threat tovalues and interests, (2) Threats depicted by media in a
recognisableform, (3) a rapid build-up of public concern generating
hostility, (4)response from authorities disproportionate reactions,
and (5) socialchanges resulting from panic. Incorporated within the
conclusion, weuse Goode and Ben-Yehudas model to ascertain that a
moral panic didoccur.
Stage One of a Moral Panic: Someone or Something Denedas a
Threat to Values or Interests
The atrocious nature of the attacks of September 11, 2001 was
sucientfor the acts to be dened as a threat. According to Cohen
(1972), thedening of something as a threat to values and interests
is the rstelement in the creation of a moral panic. While the media
began thisprocess immediately, the formal denition occurred, when
PresidentBush declared, America was targeted for attack because
were thebrightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.
And noone will keep that light from shining (President Bush
9/11/2001). Thedening of threatened values continued to be
re-enforced by theAdministration.
Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the
bestthat is in our country, with courage and concern for others.
Becausethis is America. This is who we are. This is what our
enemies hateand have attacked. And this is why we will prevail
(President Bush 9/15/2001).
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The dening of actors is the second part of Cohens rst element.
TheBush administration formally pronounced this with,
The people who did this act on America, and who may be
planningfurther acts, are evil people. They dont represent an
ideology; theydont represent a legitimate political group of
people. Theyre atevil. Thats all they can think about, is evil
(President Bush 9/28/2001).
The original identication of the enemy was Bin Laden and the
Al-Qaeda network. During the gradient process of constructing
andenlarging the folk devils, the enemy became increasingly broadly
de-ned. The Administration began their initial targeting of the
enemy withThe al Qaeda organisation is not an organisation of good,
an orga-nisation of peace. Its an organisation based upon hate and
evil(President Bush 9/24/2001). The threat to U.S. values and
interestsgrew. A press release by the Presidents Press Secretary
stated, The alQaeda organisation is present in, as youve heard from
the President,more than 60 countries, and its links are its links
are amorphous(Fleischer 9/18/2001).
Throughout the following year, those categorised as the
enemycontinually expanded. The Administrations war on terror began
withAl-Qaeda but did not stop there. It will not end until every
terroristgroup of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated (Presi-dent Bush 9/23/2001). The State of the Union
Address of 2002 set thestage for the Axis of Evil: Iran, North
Korea, and Iraq.
The second actor involved in dening someone or something as
athreat to values or interests is the media. The day of September
11, 2001,the media began the rst stages of a moral panic by dening
the evil.The U.S. populace was presented with a barrage of
newspaper headlinesthat escalated the shock of the attacks. The
media are the vehicle ofmoral condemnation, and propagate a brutal
fascination with the ter-rorist act (Baudrillard, quoted in Der
Derian 1989) The media hadbecome terrorvision; a choreography of
violence, fear, revulsion andhatred. The attachment of
unambiguously unfavourable symbols(Cohen, 1972: 41) had begun; the
hijackers (and by extension, as we willlater illustrate, those who
allegedly supported, harboured, or defendedthem) were the
embodiment of evil. The identication of terrorism,terrorists, and
war were fed to the press by State information dissemi-nation.
Oddly enough, before the State had formally identied theenemy, the
media was clued in to prepare the U.S. citizens for the
BushDoctrine that would follow. Already on September 11, 2001,
media
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reports connected Bin Laden with the terrorist attacks, All eyes
look torich Arab terrorist . . . Bin Laden is the leading candidate
said a seniorintelligence ocial (Billings Gazette 9/11/2001).
These examples were only the rst stage in an ongoing process
ofidentifying someone or something as a threat. The depiction of
thethreat of the folk devil by the media continued as stage two of
Cohensmodel asserts: threat is depicted in a recognisable form by
the media.Throughout the process of creating and maintaining a
moral panic, themedia and politi have continuously re-enforced this
identication ofterrorists to the embodiment of evil that threaten
U.S. values andinterests.
Stage Two of a Moral Panic: Threat is Depicted in a
RecognisableForm by the Media
For months after September 11, 2001, the press was consumed
withcoverage of the event. Every hosted TV show, newspaper
editorials,syndicate columns, panel of pundits, and news stories
dwelled on theterrorist attacks (Parenti 2002). For one year and
fty days,1 a total of17,744 stories ran in the New York Times
regarding terror, 10,761 in theWashington Post, and 5,200 in the
USA Today2 (Rothe and Bower2002). Objective journalists simply
relating the facts informed us. ANY Times analysis stated, The
perpetrators acted out of hatred for thevalues cherished in the
West as freedom, tolerance, prosperity, religiouspluralism and
universal surage (NY Times, 9/16, 2001). Barak (1998)addressed the
role of the medias representations as being the mostsignicant
communication that the average person will come to knowabout the
world outside his/her immediate experiences. The media is
theprinciple vehicle for popular views, ideology, and information.
Societalfoci are commanded by media accounts of events and
political dictates(Burns and Crawford 1999). The rigorous adherence
to coverage of theevents of September 11, 2001, and the war on
terrorism as doctrinaltruths and imminent threats, repeated day
after day, succeeds in itspurpose of establishing a sacrosanct
doctrine. The absence of alternativecoverage helped instil beliefs
and a consensus of concern. As consumersof this coverage, the
average American was transformed into a fac-totum (Der Derain 1989:
234) of State discourse, organising agent ofhegemony, and proactive
resonator of terrorology.
What Der Derian referred to as media spasms of a seismic
scaleand hyper production was clearly evidenced by the abundance
of
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books written about terrorism in response to the event.
Similarly, fol-lowing a brief respite from its standard fare of
exploding buildings andvehicles, Hollywood aired weekly drama shows
with themes of terrorismand terrorists, always depicting the evil
and horrors of the folk devil(The Shield, Third Watch, 24, and Law
and Order). Conversely, moviereviewers wrote that this or that lm
was a welcome antidote to theevents of September 11, 2001 (Parenti
2002). Travel agents encourageddomestic vacations as a healing
experience and often, not so subtly,suggested that they were a
patriotic way to aid a sagging economy.
Everywhere the U.S. populace turned, a reminder of the
terroristsand their evil doings was present. Repeated reminders of
the fear thatpeople in the U.S. should be experiencing echoed
through the terror-vision. CNN journalists broadcasting from live
from Kosovo remarked,I probably feel safer here than you do back
home in the states (CNNNews, 2/2/2001). The terrorist and terrorism
had been reied to a newreality. It had become a necessary truth,
requiring no further evidence:the terrorists sought the violent
transformation of all the things westand for while they only stand
for apocalyptic nihilism (Ignatie,quoted in Chomsky 2001:117). The
production and reproduction ofsuch pieties are an important
discursive practice insofar as they serve tore-establish order and
meaning by reinforcing State hegemony.
The interests of the media and entrepreneurs reect
self-interest(economic interests), but also the narrow conformism
of the media tothe State (Chomsky 1988). The media has two
competing and con-tradictory roles. They control the ow of
information (guided by thedissemination of information by the
State) while making the newsentertaining to sell (White 2003). The
media serve their function bydening the range of expressible views,
framing the news reportingwithin assumptions laid down by the
State, and excluding coveragedeemed inappropriate (Chomsky 1988).
In a dark parody of thegeneral narrowness of debate on a host of
social, political and eco-nomic issues in the U.S. media, over 75
percent of terrorist storiescome from State sources (Paletz 1982).
This is in part a response to theState propaganda system, to wit
guarantees the eectiveness of theState to ensure a moral panic,
thereby serving the political interests ofthe Administration.
The restrictions imposed on the medias coverage included
main-taining control over media access to information about the
investigationinto the hijackings and Counterterrorism operations.
The media werenot only limited by the political reigns, but high
level executives, fearingState reprisals (i.e., being cut out of
the loop) ordered correspondents
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to remind viewers that the Taliban were evil and harboured
terroriststhat killed thousands of Americans whenever they
broadcast reports orfootage of civilian deaths, hunger, or
devastation in Afghanistan as aresult of the U.S. war on terrorism
(CNN Chair, Walter Isaacson,Quoted in Parenti 2002: 51). Such media
subservience and theunquestioning reproduction of the States
political economy of terro-rology exemplify its role as an
ideological State apparatus. The outcomeof these restrictions has
ensured that the media would feed the con-suming audience the
propaganda necessary to create a moral panic.Creating a generalised
fearfulness gives State leaders greater freedom ofaction to advance
and justify exceptional legislation, encroach on civilliberty
rights, and accomplish their geo-political agendas (Herman
andSullivan 1989).
Stage Three of a Moral Panic: A Rapid Build-up of Public
ConcernGenerating Hostility
Public concern about terrorism and terrorists escalated after
September11, 2001, taking many forms. Patriotic jingoism was
evidenced by theabundant sale and display of American ags, bumper
stickers, lapelpins, and patriotic clothing all aimed at publicly
signifying concern andunity. Rage, anger, and confusion
proliferated (Parenti 2002: 33). At-tacks on Mosques were
conducted, grati saying, bomb the terroristswas etched on vehicles;
hate crimes escalated targeting the terroristboogeyman image.3 The
media portrayed images of the united agwaving country: indeed, it
was reactionism guised in a narrow, highlysuspect, and problematic
patriotism while simultaneously remindingthe consuming audience of
the evil that lurked around the corner.
The Bush Administration not only built on the public concern
butalso fed it with political jargon that would pave the way for
the State toensure its interests. The dichotomous, Either you are
with us or youare with the terrorists speech by President Bush
became typical. Anypublic dissent that contradicted the propaganda
for a moral panic wasmet with political repression (Gumbell 2003).
John Ashcroft addressedthe Senate Judiciary Committee by
saying,
To those who scare peace loving people with phantoms of
lostliberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists,
for theyerode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They
giveammunition to Americas enemies (Ashcroft 12/6/2001).
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As the Administrations narrow war on terrorism, took hold;
therallying for public concern and support continued. The New
Republicran an editorial criticising dissidents for speaking out
againstmilitary action, This nation is at war. And in such an
environment,domestic political dissent is immoral (Parenti 2003:
8). Public con-cern turned to public support for getting the evil
that threatened ourvalues and interests. Rooted in the sense of
individual vulnerabilityand loss of national impunity, sentiments
such as, If we go afterBin Laden, my family or I will be safe,
become prominent (Bennis2003: 86).
As the political schema enlarged to include geo-political
agendas ofimperialism, the level of public consensus and concern
was even morerelevant. It was necessary to make the U.S. populace
acutely sensitive tothe threat from a thousand cuts, so as to
ensure their malleability andconcessions to the demands of the
political elite (George 1991a). Fearwas continuously instilled in
the public with escalations of terror alerts.Notications of things
to be weary of included household products(bottles, suspicious
mail, boxes). Air travel and public transportation(particularly
subways) became less popular as the Administrationwarned that
retaliatory attacks could occur due to the righteousdecisions of
this Administration to rid the world of this terror.
Smallpoxvaccinations were suggested as protection against a
biological attack.The Anthrax scare was immediately associated with
terrorists, aidingthe heightened level of public concern.
Similarly, media speculationabout possible terrorism immediately
arose surrounding other acts ofviolent crime, and was quickly
discarded when the violence was linkedto traditional street
criminals (the Washington Beltway snipers) ordetermined to be
tragic accidents (e.g., the corporate and State-cor-porate
criminality behind the Chicago nightclub stampede and
thedisintegration of the Space shuttle Columbia respectively). The
assertionthat there is no evidence of terrorist involvement
accompanyingnewsworthy violence became a strangely banal component
of themedia lexicon.
Despite the ever-present threat of terrorism, and ongoing
specu-lation of possible terrorist involvement which abounded, the
nationwas not to be paralysed by fear. Entrepreneurs opened stores
tar-geting the existing fears (Safe At Home Store).4 The media
continued togrip America with stories of how to be prepared.
Whether it wasupdates about the status of the availability of
plastic sheeting and ducttape at the local hardware store or the
appearance of the HomelandSecurity Director Tom Ridge on NBCs Today
Show showing the ration
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of canned goods, bottled water, and a rst aid kit they keep in
acardboard box in their home, the media continued to feed
theconsuming public safety tips generated by the
Administration.
The general public is one of the key actors in a moral panic.
Thesuccess of the politicians and media in generating and
sustaining amoral panic is contingent on how successfully they
enrage the publicand marshal their support against the evil-doers
(Muzzatti 2002). Thecrusade against evil requires the public to
express contempt for the folkdevil and support for the decisions
from politicians on how the problemis best solved.
Initially, public concern was not limited to domestic
concerns.Immediately after the event of September 11, 2001, the
internationalsociety united in condolences and support. The
response to terrorismand terrorists was felt throughout the world.
Of course, each nation/state had its own vested interests in
sharing the immediate concerns ofthe U.S. populace and politi. It
is these vested interests that stood in theshadows of international
society as they grasped, used, or objected tothe Bush
Administrations public and private reactions (e.g. Israeli PMSharon
implemented Bushs jargon to diract his actions against
thePalestinians). Condemnation after condemnation of terrorism and
ter-rorists were publicly stated, domestically and internationally,
whilecounter-terrorism actions escalated. State criminality (and/or
encour-agement for human rights violations) was neutralised, and
ceased to beof concern; in fact, it disappeared through discursive
strategies. Whatinternational society had previously viewed as a
state in violation ofhuman rights became redened as a State using
self-defence againstterrorism. While international terrorism had
been at the forefront ofmany nations problems, after September 11th
many utilised Bushsjargon to transmogrify their own State
criminality into a defence againstterrorism.
While overwhelmingly sympathetic and supportive of the U.S. in
theimmediate wake of terrorist attacks, international society
becameincreasingly uneasy with the U.S. plan for addressing the
evil-doers. Inthe U.S., the concept of unilateral actions necessary
to ensure victoryover the folk devil was being portrayed to the
public as natural andnecessary; however, international society
began to worry about thehidden Imperialist agenda of the Bush
Administration. Still, the pro-paganda at home continued: We are in
imminent danger and pre-emptive measures are now necessary. Through
prohibitive reliance onState sources and terrorologists (who
themselves are often substantiallysupported by federal funding
sources), the media reied terrorism
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(Chomsky 1989; Herman and OSullivan 1989 ,1991; George
1991b;Herman 1992).
Stage Four of a Moral Panic: Response from Authorities,
Politicians,and Moral Entrepreneurs: Disproportionate Reactions
A call to war and Legislative Responses section is perhaps the
mostsignicant part of this created moral panic. It is the
disproportionatereactions of politicians that can craft negative
social ramications,leaving long-term social consequences.
Therefore, this section will bedivided into two separate types of
responses from authorities, namely, acall to war and legislative
responses.
A Call To War and Legislative Responses
The initial response from the State took the form of a massive
mobili-sation of military, strategic, and diplomatic power: a call
to war. Themedia had made this connection for the State prior to
the formalannouncement as headlines read War at Home (The Dallas
MorningNews 9/11/2001), ITS WAR (Daily News, 9/11/2001), and ACTSOF
WAR (The Day 9/11/2001). Early coverage of the event by TVAnchor
Tom Brokaw declared, This is a war zone, we are at war. Theinitial
war on terrorism was portrayed to the public as the means tocapture
those responsible for the events of September 11, 2001; how-ever,
the folk devil, terrorist, quickly grew to tens of thousands of
ter-rorists that remained at large, threatening our very way of
life and ourfundamental values and interests. Bush stated, Tens of
thousands oftrained terrorists are still at large. These enemies
view the entire worldas a battleeld, and we must pursue them
wherever they are (Bush 9/24/2001).
September 11, 2001 was identied by President Bush as an attack
ofall the civilised nations (Bush 2003: White House archived
addresses).The need to legitimise the war on terror was a concern
for theAdministration, and hence it felt the need to escalate
public fear athome, muster pseudo-international support, and
increase threat levelsto mask the global war that was under
way.
The rst ocial response to the crisis of September 11, 2001 was
onSeptember 13, when the Senate and House of Representatives voted
toapprove the administrations Authorization for Use of
MilitaryForce. The bill gave President Bush a virtually unlimited
mandate,
ENEMIES EVERYWHERE 339
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To use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations,organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, com-mitted, or aided terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11,2001, or harboured such organizations or persons in
order to preventany future acts of international terrorism against
the United States(White House 2003).
This opened the doors for the utilisation of a moral panic to
aid theAdministration in expanding its doctrine. Terrorology was
employedto neutralise those who might pose an impediment to the
Adminis-trations agenda by raising constitutional questions. When
read, itbecomes clear why the connection of Iraq to Bin Laden was
essential.Without the acquiescence of the public and the
legislative branchesregarding the connection between Hussein and
Bin Laden, the Presi-dent must have Congress make the Call to War
according to theU.S. Constitution.
On September 12, 2001 the US called the UN Security
Council(UNSC) into special session. The outcome was Resolution 1368
whichcalled on nations/states to work together to bring to justice
the perpe-trators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks. This was
not an authori-sation for war, nor did it invoke Article 51 of the
UN Charter (self-defence clause). On September 28th, 2001,
Resolution 1373 was passedand although it did not condone military
force, it did provide economicmeasures to cut terrorist access to
funds (United Nations, 2003).However, the disproportionate
reactions by politicians and the rush todeclare war on unknown
enemies overpowered the internationallegalities of war. The Bush
Doctrine of war was begun in a cloud ofillegalities and will
continue on that course throughout the duration ofthe
Administrations ability to induce fear and inoculate the public
fromthe realities of its underlying political interests. A
pre-emptive, unilat-eral rst strike would set a terrible
international precedent.
Along with the change of course doctrine comes the
understandingthat history is irrelevant, the lessons of the past no
longer matter andconventional tactics can be disposed of (Chomsky
1988). As a nation,we no longer need to adhere to previous studies
and advice provided bythe Pentagons Defence Science Board (1997)
that showed a strongcorrelation between U.S. involvement in
international situations and anincrease in terrorist attacks
against the U.S. Instead, the U.S. must takepreventative measures
against the imminent threat that terror, terror-ism, and terrorists
pose. The Axis of Evil must be contained. Especiallythe one posing
the greatest threat: Iraq.
DAWN ROTHE AND STEPHEN L. MUZZATTI340
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Regardless of reality, the rhetoric of propaganda assured the
U.S.public that Iraq was among the existential terrorist threat. It
would havebeen dicult to convince the public that Saddam Hussein
really was athreat to the U.S. had Iraq not been included in the
Evil Empire thatwas poised to attack: amongst the evil doers the
terrorists. Adminis-tration ocials seemed to think that simply
repeating the phrase Iraqis a threat to America would somehow
validate a war. Sadly, asBenjamins (1936, 1968) sociological
inquiry into demagoguery illus-trated, saying something frequently
and loudly through the conduit ofpolitical power does often make it
so.
During November 2002, British and U.S. warplanes attacked
Iraqsdefences daily, and made practice runs on other targets, and
U.S.Special Forces were deployed in Western and Northern Iraq. In
manyways, the war on Iraq had already begun well before 19 March
2003. Toinduce fear, the propaganda system was utilised to conjure
up the newHitler/Satan. The inducement of fear to obtain the
acquiescence ofthe public to policies it may oppose was continually
attempted by theAdministration through the use of inammatory
rhetorical strategies(Chomsky 1988).
Other disproportionate reactions by the polity included the
crea-tion of a large bureaucracy to ensure domestic security: the
Oce ofHomeland Security. The Bush Administration also instituted an
alertsystem to keep the public informed as to what level or how
muchfear we should be experiencing: The Homeland Security
AdvisorySystem. The ocial purpose of the Homeland Security
AdvisorySystem is a means to disseminate information regarding the
risk ofterrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and
to theAmerican people (White House, Division of Homeland
Security2003). However, the vague information (i.e., an unspecied
threat)given about changes in the alert is not adequate enough for
otheragencies or the U.S. populace to know what to look for or
expect. Itis however, an eective tool for maintaining fear and
suppression ofits citizens.
Still other reactions included the legislation of the Uniting
andStrengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
toIntercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) and
theHomeland Security Act (2001). Both of these legislative
documents werea direct response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
A time for international justice for the perpetrators of
September 11,2001 had expired. The opposition to using the
international society as aforum for justice against the terrorists
reinforced the disproportionate
ENEMIES EVERYWHERE 341
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reaction by political leaders: the perpetrators must be dealt
withimmediately by the US in a unilateral position.
On November 13, 2001 President Bush signed an Executive
Orderauthorising military tribunals for suspected terrorists. This
sets a newprecedent that is in violation of international law
(Geneva ConventionsArticle 5: International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and theUN Principles of Protection Under any Form
of Detention of Impris-onment). Under Bushs Executive Order, any
foreign national who hasbeen designated as a suspected terrorist or
as a terrorists aid could bedetained, tried, convicted, and
executed without a public trial orcounsel, without the proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, andwithout right of appeal.
Ironically, the State has enacted an order that ithas denounced.
The State Department has routinely criticised the use ofmilitary
tribunals, practices of secret trials that do not adhere to
fairpublic trials, and omissions of due processes in similar
situationsaround the world. In the annual Human Rights Practices
CountryReports the US has condemned Burma in 1990, China in
2000,Colombia in 1996, Egypt in 2000, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia in
1975,Nigeria from 1966 to 1999, Peru in 1996, Russia in 1999, Sudan
in 2000,and Turkey.
Direct legislation regarding terrorism is not the only response
fromauthorities to the events of September 11, 2001. Many other
responsesinclude the expansion of the military budget. Major social
aid cutbackswere initiated (to fund the escalating military
expenses, corporate crimebailouts, and to oset the tax relief to
the minute percentage of wealthyAmericans). Additionally, a renewed
passion and support for the starwars project suddenly overcame
previous opposition. This occurred inconjunction with President
Bushs declaration that the U.S. was uni-laterally breaking the
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia. Bushstated, It hinders
us from developing an anti-missile shield that willdeter an attack
from a rogue state (President Bush, quoted in the NewYork Times
12/13/2001).
The Pentagon had become increasingly weary of any unltered
mediaexposure, which would lead to public awareness (especially
interna-tional awareness) of civilian casualties in the
counterterrorism war. Thewarnings given by reporters to remember
the folk-devil did not have assignicant of an impact when charred
or mangled bodies were televised.In response to this, the Pentagon
established the Oce of StrategicInuence (OSI). The OSI purpose was
to feed information to interna-tional press; including news
dissemination to the international public,dropping leaets promoting
rewards for information about the where-
DAWN ROTHE AND STEPHEN L. MUZZATTI342
-
abouts of Osama bin Laden, and radio scripts. The radio
scripts,according to Rumsfeld, counter the lies that this was a war
against theAfghan people or a war against the Muslims, which it
isnt (Wash-ington Post 2/25/2002). When a leak exposed this
department, theAdministration shut it down. It was replaced,
however, with the Coa-lition Information Center (CIC). The CIC
coordinates the publicinformation output by the State, providing
sound bites for internationalsociety (Bennis 2002).
The aforementioned examples of legislation and
disproportionateresponses by the State to September 11, 2001 are
not exhaustive. How-ever, they do provide examples of the States
use of terrorism to: (1) ensuealternative political interests (the
war on Iraq), (2) maintain legitimacyfor public concern, and (3)
continue the generation of a moral panicthrough intimidation,
coercion, and induced fear. Just as the CommunistBoogeyman role
aided US imperialism and military supremacy (andwhile generating
tremendous prots for military contractors, did little toenhance
national security) during the Reagan administrations, the
Ter-rorist Boogeyman is aiding the Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld,
andWolfowitzDoctrine of Imperialism and military supremacy.
Stage Five of a Moral Panic: Panic results in Social Changes
The nal stage in Cohens moral panic states that while the panic
oftenpasses and is forgotten, it has serious and long lasting
repercussions.This moral panic was created in such a way that its
diusion isimpossible. There are, undoubtedly, serious social
ramications hithertobe comprehended.
One of the earliest signs of negative social changes was reected
inthe Uniform Crime Report (UCR) gures or hate crimes. Prior
to2001, the fewest number of hate crimes incidents resulted from
ethnic ornational origin bias. Crime incidents motivated by bias
against thisgroup became the second largest reported bias in 2001,
more thandoubling the number of incidents. The anti-other
ethnicity/nationalorigin category quadrupled in incidents, victims,
oences, and knownoenders. Anti-Islamic incidents (once the second
lowest) became thesecond highest reported among religious bias
incidents: a growth ofmore than 1,600 Percent over the 2000 volume.
The FBI Forewordstated, The distribution changed in 2001,
presumably as a result of theheinous incidents that occurred on
September 11 (FBI Hate CrimeDivision-Uniform Crime Statistics
2002).
ENEMIES EVERYWHERE 343
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Controversy over antiterrorist legislation surfaces whenever a
Statereacts to terrorism with the implementation of new laws. The
laws giverise to concerns about the infringement of civil
liberties. Critics maintainthat anti-terrorist legislation is based
on a political schema versus anobjective evaluation of the real
threat (White 2003). Americans havebeen lled with terrorist
anxiety, fear, and panic, which is conducive tothe overregulation
of society without opposition. Suce to it to say,. . . the price of
freedom is high when hysteria is the norm and moralityhas gone on
holiday (George 1991a: 91).
Legislation and the use of enemy combatant labels are
alsoproblematic today and certainly in the future. The Bush
Administrationset a new precedent using the Executive Order to
classify any individualas an enemy combatant the Administration
deems a threat or danger tothe U.S. This includes U.S. citizens. A
document led in the US DistrictCourt recognizes citizens as
possible enemy combatant: citizens whoassociating themselves with
the enemy and with its aid, guidance, anddirection, or enter into
this country bent on hostile acts are enemybelligerents (US v.
Padilla 2002) (Rothe 2003). The Justice Departmentstates that
individuals so labeled may be denied counsel, held incom-municado,
without due process, and without review of the designationas enemy
combatant by the US Court of Appeals. The implementationof the
label, enemy combatant, contradicts both International Law(Geneva
Conventions: Article 3) and the U.S. Constitution posingmomentous
ramications for U.S. policy, constitutional guarantees, thejudicial
processes, and the correctional facilities (Rothe 2003). The waron
terrorism has not been myopic in nature (Muzzatti 2003
(unpub-lished); Rothe 2003).
New precedents have been set in the legal realm. Some of these
arereected in changes occurring in the prison facilities. Justice
Depart-ment Ocials have stated their concerns over the alleged
recruitment ofpotential terrorists among prison inmates. All though
ocials havestopped short of publicly proclaiming state and federal
prison ocialshave been put on alert, they have warned that prison
ocials should bealert to internal conversations among inmates. This
can lead to over-stepping the bounds of monitoring conversations
between inmates. Thisexplicit attention has been reected in the
monitoring of religiousgatherings and religious groups that could
be linked to terrorist activ-ities (Rothe 2003).
The USA Patriot Act has many potential long-term negative
socialimpacts. The implications for the 20 million immigrants,
non-citizens,and short-term visa holders include potential
subjection to military
DAWN ROTHE AND STEPHEN L. MUZZATTI344
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tribunals, expedited deportation, and detention (for an
undeterminedtime) if they are suspected of having something to do
with terrorism. Itis not only the non-US citizen that is at risk,
but US citizens now facethe potential to be classied as enemy
combatant and or stripped ofcitizenship. The power given to the
State to snoop on citizens over-turns some previous restriction
placed on the State from previousabuses of such powers. As Nancy
Chang, attorney for the Center ofConstitutional Rights, has stated,
the Bush Administrations actionssince September 11th portend a
wholesale suspension of civil libertiesthat will reach far beyond
those who are involved in terrorist activities(Chang, quoted in
Zinn 2002: 40). Legitimate political dissent mayqualify for
criminal proceedings.
On November 1, 2001 President Bush signed yet another
ExecutiveOrder that allows a sitting president to keep secret the
papers of aprevious president, even if any previous president
wanted his paperspublic (White House 2002). This too, has been
legitimised under therubric of post-September 11th national
security, as potentially beingdangerous information to give to any
terrorist. In eect, what it hasdone is rescinded many of the
advances of the Freedom of InformationAct that were gained in the
1960s as a check for State power. Themotivations of and for
presidential decisions are no longer available forthe public to
scrutinise. This can have major social ramications andcarries a
resemblance to Stalinism. Stalin also closed the books,removed
access to who was involved in the Russian Revolution,
andessentially attempted to wipe out traces of history (Zinn 2002).
Thissuggests that Bush is closing the door to citizens learning the
motivationbehind decisions of presidents (ironically, his fathers
records areincluded in this).
Perhaps the most signicant social change that has and will occur
isthe U.S. expansion of American hegemony and imperialism. The
eventsof September 11, 2001 (as horric as they were) provided the
Admin-istration with the excuse to act on its simmering
geo-political agenda.The orchestration of the Administrations
intentions had begun prior tothe terrorist attacks. Prior to his
appointment as Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld told President Bush
that US military power was needed todiscipline the world (Woodward
and Balz, January 28, 2002, quoted inBennis 2002: 86). Then came
the terrorist attacks. The time was perfect,an excuse had been
given to them, and the ease of creating andenhancing a moral panic
to ensure public conformity was ripe. Over-looked by many, the
intentions of the Administration were slightlycaptured when Bush
himself made reference to the attacks of September
ENEMIES EVERYWHERE 345
-
11, 2001 as an opportunity to strengthen America. The media
alsohinted at the opportune time given to this administration
claiming Bushshould take advantage of the unique political climate
and to assert hisleadership not just on security and foreign policy
but across the board(Wall Street Journal, quoted in Parenti 2002:
2). Clearly, the terroristinspired boundaries of the nations
insecurity culture serve multipleimperatives, both domestic as well
as foreign.
The implications of the imperialistic agenda are far
reaching,heightens world tension, creates a further chasm within
theinternational community, and debases international laws,
charters,treatise, the United Nations, and the International
Criminal Court.Simply stated, it is pitting the U.S. against the
rest of the world andis proclaiming U.S. justice and values as the
only ones with merit.Remember the doctrine, your with us or against
us. Many othernegative social ramications (both manifested and
latent) arehitherto be comprehended.
Conclusion
The use of a moral panic by the media and polity has been
illustratedaccording to Cohens (1972) stages; however, an argument
could bemade that it is less a moral panic and more normative
concerns. Goodeand Ben-Yehudas (1994) have provided ve
characteristics that deter-mine if a moral panic has taken hold
which re-enforces our position: amoral panic does exist. Indeed,
heightened concern has been illustratedby societal reactions and
media coverage. The second characteristic,hostility, abounds.
Political agents and individual responses have suc-cessfully
generated intolerance, and contempt for terrorists and terror-ism,
and indeed even dissenters. The third characteristic, consensus
thatthe evildoers are real and pose a serious threat has been
fullled. Again,the consensus does not need to incorporate all of
society, merely bewidespread in nature. The mass amount of media
coverage coupled withthe Bush Administrations constant reminder to
the U.S. public that weare under a real and imminent threat has
ensured a large proportion ofsociety unquestioningly accept this
moral panic.5 The fourth charac-teristic, disproportionality, or
over-reaction to a problem by severity,frequency, and scope has
undoubtedly been met. The scope of thepolitical decisions, war on
terrorism, and overly stated imminent threatsmeets this criterion.
The mass mobilisation for a call to war concurrently
DAWN ROTHE AND STEPHEN L. MUZZATTI346
-
with enactments of legislation aimed at enhancing the
Administrationspower while simultaneously limiting civil liberties
reaches beyond dis-proportionate reactions. The nal characteristic,
volatility, has also beenmet. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon,
but the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001 brought terrorism to
the forefront of Americanconsciousness resulting in a quick and
extreme moral panic.
In lieu of the detrimental and traumatic eects a moral panic
canhave on policy and levels of societal fear, the images,
denitions, andprojections of terrorism should be presented in an
integrated and multi-positioned frame. The current use of terrorism
by the polity and mediais one-dimensional: them or us. It is not
until the media apply multi-level factual coverage to terrorism and
the potential threat will the U.S.populace be able to make a broad
assessment and to voice a knowl-edgeable position on the reactions
by social agents of control. Terro-rology must be replaced by
cultural readings of retail-terrorism whichsituates it historically
and geo-politically, and must involve . . . not onlyan inquiry into
the States archival accretions but also into its mostsensitive
secretions (Der Derian 1989: 231). Peoples eorts should bedirected
toward deconstructing political propaganda and demystifyingjargon
rather than supporting with blind faith unsubstantiated
threatsabout evildoers.
The Bush Administration would be hard pressed to explain to
thepublic how its responses have or will destroy existing terrorist
cells orend terrorism. The reality of protecting the U.S. populaces
from ter-rorism is far reaching, leaving the creation of the
Homeland SecurityDepartment nothing more than a mask of appeasement
and opportu-nity to pass legislation fullling political
agendas.
The September 11th crisis was seen as a great gift (Bennis 2002:
xv)for President Bush. It enabled him to strengthen his faltering
credibilityand to implement the long-standing right wing agenda.
September 11thbrought the opportunity to vastly enhance State
power, erode civilliberties, undermine environmental defences,
reject and ignore foreignpolicy imposed on the rest of the world,
and establish an empire (Bennis2002). The responses of the
Administration were not solely aboutbringing anyone to justice for
the terrorist attacks. It was also aboutexpanding U.S. global power
and conquest all in the name of righ-teousness. Yet, the rhetoric
gushed at the American people serves tomask this reality:
America will always stand rm for the non-negotiable demands
ofhuman dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the
state;
ENEMIES EVERYWHERE 347
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respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice;
andreligious tolerance. America will take the side of the brave men
andwomen who advocate these values around the world, including
theIslamic world, because wee have a greater objective than
eliminatingthreats and containing resentment. We seek a just and
peacefulworld beyond the war on terror (State of the Union Address,
2002).
Between the lines of propaganda and rhetoric, the generation of
publicfear stands to suppress opposition to the legitimacy of a war
againstenemies that have been so broadly dened, the end is not in
sight.Today, the moral panic continues: the Olympics of terror.
Regrettably,future research on negative latent and manifest social
implications maywell abound with information.
Notes
1. The 50 days was added to encompass the coverage of the
one-year anniversary of 9/11 and the following days.
2. The three newspapers used in the content analysis were
searched via the computerdatabase LexisNexis.
3. The social changes that occurred will include a detailed look
at the eects of social
concern in the form of hate crimes.4. Just blocks from ground
Zero this store opened to sell survival tools (e.g. gas
masks).
5. Mass movements have begun to surface showing support for the
administration andadmonishing protesters as dissidents and
anti-American.
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