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Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56

Special Staff Officers' Reports

\. Artillery Officer's Report

2. Ordnance Officer's Report

3. Public Relations Report

4. Signal Officer's Report

5. Surgeon's Report

6. Transport Q $

DOWNGBiIDED AT 3 YEHR INTERVALS; MCLi.wl::-iedapteb 12 y»a&.

DOD DIR 5200.10

IWO JIMA OPERATION

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HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,

0/0 FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

1 April 1945.

ENCLOSURE G 1.

TO ACTION REPORT OF

COMMANDING- GENERAL, EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS

FOR IWO..JIMA OPERATION

ARTILLERY OFFICER'S REPORT

' I1I1

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 3200.10

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEfIR INTERVALS;

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HEADQUARTERS, I§lliii**I* M %. \ ''. . I" «j

¦ !FLEET MARINE FORCE, Afimlbp Xi-V A!"h" "

C/0FLEET POST OFFICE, SATTISMTObBH wli^ fe *«*fc*>

1April 1945,

From: Field Artillerj;- Officer. To The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific.

Subject: Field Artillery'Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, Report on iWO JIMA Operation, ,

1. Submitted herewith is the Field Artillery Report for the IWO JII4A Operation.

M. L. CURRY.

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OUTLINE

I.FRIENDLY ARTILLERY.

A, Artillery Units Employed.

B, Organization for Combat.

C f Materiel Used.

D. Liaison.

E, Fire Direction.

F9F 9 Tactical Employments

G-. Artillery Intelligence.

1. Observation.

2. Maps and Photographs.

3. Sound and Flash Ranging.

H. Gunnery.

1, Survey.

2. Conduct of Fire.

a. Observed Fires.

(1) FO Adjustments,

(2) OP Adjustments.

(3) Air Adjustments.

(4) Flash Ranging,

b. Unobserved Fires.

(l) Transfers of Fire.

(2) Sound Adjustments.

-I, Communicatiâlf;^' t I , v¦

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OUTLINE (Cont !d

J, Logistics.

1, Loading,

2, Landing,

3, Supply,

a. Automatic supplies.

b. Ammunition,

4#4 # Motor Transport.

5, Casualties,

Personnel,a.

b. Materiel.

11. ENEMY ARTILLERY.

A. Organization.

B. Materiel.

C, Tactical Employment,

111. COMMENTS.

A. Anticipated Nature of Future Operations.

B. Centralized Artillery Control.

C. Artillery Materiel.

D, Artillery .Training. *

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FIELD ARTILLERY OFFICER. EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS. TASK FORCE 56, REPORT ON TWO JIMA OPERATION.

I.FRIENDLY ARTILLERY.

A. ARTILLERY UNITS EMPLOYED. The artillery' employed in the IWO JIMA operation from 19 February to 16 March 1945, included the 12th, i3th and 14th Marines, which were the organic artillery regiments of the 3d, sth and 4th Marine Divisions, respectively, plus the Ist Provisional Field Artillery Group as, Corps Artillery. This group includ-

Howitzer,ed the group headquarters battery and the 2d and 4th 155mm Battalions, only.

B. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT. Divisional artillery of the 4th and sth Divisions, in assault, was under regimental control throughout the operation. The 3d Division, in reserve, was combat loaded in regimental combat and battalion landing teams, but the 9th and 21st Marines (infantry) were committed to action before their artillery elements. When the 3d Division Headquarters assumed command of its two (2) landed infantry regiments, the 12th Marines Headquarters assumed control of one (l) artillery' battalion each from the 13th and 14th Marines, temporarily attached, on D/6. These battalions reverted to their parent organizations on the morning of D/7, by which time the l'2th Marines had two (2) of its own battalions ashore. All,the 12th Marines were in action by the evening of D/8. The 13th Marines was ordered to detach one (l) battalion to the 14th Marines to support the attack of the 4th Marine Division until 1200 on D/3and again until 1600 on D/4. After D/7each artillery regiment supported its parent organization normally. Corps Artillery established liaison with each of the divisional artillery regiments and reinforced their fires on request. Corps Artillery concerned itself primarily with counterbattery, but also contributed to attack preparations and fired harassing and Corps general support missions. Corps Artillery had gotten four (4) batteries ashore 'and assumed control of them by the evening of D/4, and from then on, its weight began to be felt. All of Corps Artillery was in action the next afternoon.

c« MATERIEL USED. The 12th Marines had two (2) battalions equipped with the 75mm Pack Howitzer and two (2) with the 105mm Howitzer. The 13th and 14th Marines each had one (1) battalion of 75mm Pack Howitzers and three (3) battalions of 105mm Howitzers. Corps Artillery included two (2) battalions of 155mm Howitzers. Total: four (4) battalions of 75mm Pack Howitzers, eight (8) battalions of 105mm Howitzers, and two (2) battalions of 155mm Howitzers.--

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' D» XiXA^BQIjI, Liaison among artillery units and between artillery &n&-support ed infantry units wa^s normal and functioned well.

;: S>; ¦:jP!JtRg DJRSCTIQN * The 12th and 13th Marines and Corps Artillery within their organizations in accordance withoXot4X&â^Xre^ltectlon

£ur:Pe*tt doctrines. The 14th Marines did not employ a regimental fire directioh cent-er, but massed the fires of two (2) or more battalions by* iaetlih^ general directives to its subordinate battalions, which,

involved more delay than when regiment exercises te clinicalof cottree^&c>nt£Gl«..; In view of the highly stabilized situation existing on the fron^ of its supported unit (the. 4th Marine Division) after D/3, this practice is considered questionable.

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(; •¦•';^Wi---^!igSS^-'-EMPLOYIiENT OF OUR ARTILLERY. HJarly in this opora

tipn,,: !tt tsodam4 apparent that our forces were opposed by a well trainai'^ftd force of Japanese who were conduct inr; a skillful de

undgr a,hf-en#e able commander. As the attack progressed, it became iriQj»6aîn^ly that the defenders were committed to a passive defers e., ac counterattacks were local and generally limited in strength. It;appeared from the absence of counterattacks in force at. 'critical phases,, from the elaborate and extensive field fortificatipnsy atid from the extensive use of land mines and booby traps, that the defender expected to be driven back, and that his essential strategy consisted in exacting the heaviest casualties possible from us. I'Jhetner thi's course was followed from necessity or choice can only be- surmisejl. 'In any event, it had a definite bearing on the use- of our artilleryy The intense bombardments from air, naval gunfire and artillery were doubtless decisive factors in driving the defenders underground and. keeping them there. "Jhen local counterattacks were atteapiied, the x artillery generally did its full share in stoppingthem, arid.- when -.812081516 forces of Japanese attempted to circulate above ground, artillery fire was usually brought on them promptly with exqeilent results.* However, the enemy exposed himself as little as poss~il?lc, and made maximum use of his excellent fortifications. In shorty Wa. were' confronted with a solid zone defense which experience

Ahas/iang- v eince taught requires considerable means in heavy artillery for methodical" destruction. The inadequacy. of such means led to occasional (disappointment in results achieved by certain intense artillery, attack preparations, particularly during the final phases of the operation near the northern end of the island. On the favorable ground.'between, or 0 constructionAir^filciifcL.2. SB^tt'jjjJvi£SJL£ c^G^

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Subject; Field Artillery refer,' SxrjeYTi'tioWry "Troops, Task Force 55, Report on IWO JIMA Operation*

of Airfield "o. 3, when the artillery of the 3d' Marine Divisiqn ras brilliantly integrated with the infantry attack, it certainly did all that could be expected of it. The strongly fortified pattern of the Japanese defense included their artiller3~, and some were in concrete casemates and other were sheltered in caves • Mortars . and rocket launchers were fired from dse'o pits with snail _ camouflaged openings. As a result, count erbattery was slow and difficult but most of the enemy artillery had been silenced by'D/14. The "Durr den of this task, of course, fell to Corps Artillery, whose counter-battery missions reached a high of 55 on D/7and dropped progressive^ to 2on D/13 and remained low thereafter. On D/12 our rear

'

areas were reported free of enemy artillery fire for the first time. Air strikes and naval' gunfire, closely coordinated with the artillery, must, of course, be given full credit for their share in the-destruction of enemy installations. For the period ending D/17 f Corps Artillery reported the following targets definitely destroyed:

3 antiaircraft guns 14 field pieces

4 12cm guns 5 15cm guns 1 AT c:Un . /

3 Rocket launchers ¦z Mortars 2 Tanks

IS Trucks 1 Tank Park (number not reported) 5 Ammunition dumps

cTuot)1 Fuel 2 Supply dumps 2 Pill boxes" 2 Buildings 1 Blockhouse.

Divisional artillery was used mainly in its normal rols of direct and general support of its associated infantry and all infantry commanders appeared to be more than satisfied with the support received* Host missions fired b:/ divisional artillor.y were delivered for purposes of neutralization and Cor-bs Artillery frequently rein- •

forced such fires. That the enemy was, for the most part, kept underground and seriously hindered in his movements testifies to the effectiveness of this noujto^Lizstion. On the other hand, 8.11

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Subject; Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 58, Report on IWO JIMA Operation,

S3

artillor;r fired a considerable number of precision adjustments for purposes of destruction, much more than in any previous operation. Probably more emphasis should be laid on precision firing in training and the question of obtaining heavier artillery for destruction must be given serious consideration.

It is interesting to note that our artillery fire became more and more concentrated as the operation developed and enemy resistance stiffened. This. began to be apparent after D/7, mainly in the zone of action of the 3d Marine Division, when rolling barrages reinforced by Corps Artillery began to be used in coordination with the main effort, and to good advantage across the favorable terrain around MOTOYAMA. On D/lb Corps launched an attack in echelon, first on its left on a front of about 2500 yards and then an hour later on its right on a front of about 1300 yards. Each phase of this attack was supported in succession by eleven (11) battalions of artillery (nine. (9) light and two (2) medium). This support consisted initially of a rolling barrage to a depth of 300 yards, moving forward 100 yards every seven (7) minutes. During the first phase of this attack, the density' of artillery per 1000 yards of front was about eleven (11) light, two and one-half (2f) medium, and no heavy batteries. In the second phase, the density was about twenty-one (21) light, four and a half (4-J-) medium, and no heavy batteries. At this time, the Japanese were organized in a strong zone defense with a profusion of mutually supporting pillboxes and elaborate underground galleries. Experience tables indicate that for all types of operations, the number of medium and heavy batteries combined should equal the number of light batteries and' that the total number of batteries used against organized positions, should vary from twenty (20) to thirty-six (36) per thousand .yards of front, depending on the strength of the defense. Here was encountered a zone defense of the strongest kind. In the first phase, the number of light batteries used was about equal to the minimum allowance (which contemplates a certain amount of disorganization on the part of the enemy who occupies a poorly prepared position, but it'is considered sutiable for a secondary attack). In the second phase, the number of light batteries corresponded to the full allowance. However, in both phases, the number of medium batteries was only about 2dfo the indicated needs and the heavy artillery was completely lacking. These factors were weighed in the planning phase, and it was thought at that time that Corps Artillery should 'be kept to a, minimum, because of a lack

8

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'Subject: Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary Troops,Task Force 56, Report on IWO JIMA Operation.

of space to emplace it and because of the compensation offered "oy air and naval gunfire. It is now evident that heavy field artillery is necessar.y to reduce such fortifications by methodical precision fire and had it.been possible to utilize the full allowance of Corps Artillery (six (6) battalions), the indicated standards could have been met. Neither air nor naval gunfire is completely suited to destruction of fortified targets in defilade. If tbJe I.WO JIMA defenses may be accepted as a fair example of those to be encountered in the future, the need for more powerful means in heavy artillery than was used in this operation is definitely indicated.

3y D/14 the major part of Corps Artillery may be considered as having been iriaction about twelve (12) days. During this period, it fired four 'hundred and sixty-seven (467) missions, of which two hundred and fifty-three (253) were counterbattei^, or an average of thirty-nine (39) missions a day, of which twentjr-one (21) were counterbattery, At the time this report was prepared, no information wa-e available as to the total number of missions fired by divisional artillery.

G-. ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE. Practically all standard methods of locating artillery targets were used in this operation, including sound a.nd flash ranging. The air photo studies by JICPOA prior to the operation were excellent, and up-to-date air photos were furnished the artillery throughout the operation. These proved particularly valuable to Corps Artillery (which had its own API team) for counter-battery studies. Forward observers gave their usual reliable information of localized areas. The 13th and 14th Marines each operated the DODAH sound ranging equipment in combat for the first time, and this gave excellent results. The DODAR is light, short range equipment developed .at Duke University for use within divisional artillery and proved to be well adapted to the needs of 'the artillery on this small island. The long range sound equipment, standard for Corps Artillei^, was not' used on this operation. As usual, the OY observation planes operated efficiently both to locate artillery targets and to adjust fire thereon. The 13th Marines obtained a considerable amount, of useful information via the sth Marine Division's Intelligence communication net, and also furnished a good deal of general information to the Division Toy the same means.

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Subject: Field Artillery-'Qfficc^ r .Sxp^dj^t^pnary Troops, Task ForcevJ)6) "Her>ort ori* WD "WmA' Operation.

H. GUNNERY, »

1. SURVEY. Since the Group' Headquarters Batter?/ of Corps Artillery included no survey elements, the 13th Marines was directed to establish the basic artillery. survey. The 13th Marines was selected for this task as it was the only unit having the services of a Goast and Geodetic Survey Officer, The surve3' was rapidly and accurately established enabling all the artillery with the Corps to mass their fires promptly and effectively at selected points. The initial point selected was the intersection of railway track, extended, and a road in target square 148 R (Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JI IA). Coordinates of this point were taken -from the msco and direction was established by a line from' the IP tangent to the eastern edge of the island at the water line, the azimuth of which was also measured from the map* These basic data were extended to each artillery regiment and to Corps Artillery where place marks were established. Surveys within -regiments were extended by the regiments

•themselves, The excellent results thus obtained were a tribute to the skill of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Officer who was responsible.

2. FIRE ADJUSTMENT. All artillery depended heavily on air spot for registrations, with some being accomplished by ground observers. Adjustments of direct support missions were effected mainly by forward observers, about 75$ of all such missions being thus accomplished. The remainder of the divisional artillery missions were^generally fired by air spot. It had been anticipated that the capture of MT. SURIBACHI would greatly facilitate artillery observation, but by" the time this eminence was secured, the front lines had swept on so far as to minimize its importance. However, some artillery missions were fired using observation ;from this crater (particularly by the 13th Marines using a captured Japanese 20-power telescope), and the Corps Artillery'established a short flash ranging base there, which gave fair results, although the base of one hundred and eighty (180) yards was so short as to seriously limit the accuracy of trlangulation. A considerable number of unobserved concentrations were delivered on known enemy, installations by X transfers. Corps Artillery depended on air spot for the great majority of its missions as most of them were beyond the limits of ground observation. The cap" tured Airfield No. #££&£, for cllc operation of OYTR^ms*fMss.aßs£^planes about D/7, bi|^ (jfs£j^jtfe f|i^t!^ltln||^ '•'^ltillery spot planes were

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Subject: Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, Report on IWO JIMA Operation.

operated from CVSs, during which period the artillery was badly handicapped by being limited to only three (3) ; spot planes for ten (10) battalions of artillery. In any future operations, Corps Artillery should be assured tne continuous availability of one (l) spotting plane per battalion, because of its heavy dependence on them. Some fire missions were actually adjusted using sound equipment, only, with excellent results.

3. MAPS AND PHOTOS. The .maps furnished' were excellent 'and

thoroughly satisfactory for fire control purposes, however, several artillery officers expressed'

1

a- desire for maps not congested by over prints of enemy installations, as were all maps furnished. Photo coverage was good throughout and facilitated the location of many targets by air photo interpretation.

I. COMMUNICATIONS. In view of the semi-stabilized situation, communication presented no particular difficulty except to forward observers, who had some' difficulty in maintaining wire communications in the front-line areas, which were subject to heavy enemy'mortar and shell fire. Radio functioned well. In this operation, 2x4 poles were promptly established in rear areas as telephone poles and paid big dividends in maintaining wire communication, which would otherwise have been frequently interrupted by the extremely heavy motor traffic. Lack of trees on IWO JIM made this a necessity*

J- LOCISTICS. J

l.LOADING-. The 13th and 14-th Marines, with the assault divisions, were loaded in LSTs with excess equipment in AKAs. Corps Artillery was loaded in LSTs, The 12th Marines, belonging to the 3d Marine Division in reserve, was combat loaded in APAs and AKs.

2. LANDING.

(a) Corps Artillery: C 3attery 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed at 1700 D/l and was attached to 13th Marines. A Battery, same battalion, landed at 1950 D/3and was also -attached' to the 13th Marinas. A and C Batteries, 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed and Corps Artillery Headquarters took control of its two (2) battalions by 1730 D/4, at which time each battalion had two (2) batteries ashore. All units of Corps Artillery were ashore by 1800- D/5«

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Subject: Field ArtilJ|p||^^ Troops,

b. 15th Marines (sth Marine Division): Regimental Headquarters, and 2d and 3d Battalions, 13th Marines were in action on 1700 D Day. The 4th Battalion, 13th Marines had six (6) guns ashore by 1330 D/l. All of the 13th Marines were in action by 1800 D/2.

c. 14th Marines (4th Marine Division): The Ist Battalion 14th Marines were in action 1800 D Day. The 2d Battalion 14th Marines had one and a half (1-J-) batteries in action by 1800 D Day. All units of the 14th -Marines" were .in action by 1000 D/2, but the 4th Battalion had lost seven (7) guns sunk in DUKWs.

d. Landing, in the case of Corps Artillery, was delay-Ed by higher priority being given other units. Congestion on the beach due to enemy fire, wrecked landing craft, heavy surf and poor rqads made landing very difficult for the first four (4) days.

c. 12th Marines (3d Marine Division): RegimentalHeadquarters landed about 1800 on D/4. Artillery support for the 3d Marine Division attack on D/S'was furnished by the Ist Battalion, 13th Marines and the Ist Battalion, 14th Marines under control of the 12tU Marines Headquarters. The Ist Battalion, 12th Marines had one (l) battery imposition by .1500 on D/6. The entire battalion was in . position by 0900 on D/7. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines had one (l) battery in position by 1500 on D/6and nine (9) guns by 0900 on D/7. The 3d Battalion, 12th Marines had five (5) guns in position by "1730 on D/8. The 4th Battalion, l2th Marines had two (2) guns in position by 1730 on D/8. All of the 12th Marines was in action by 1900 oii D/8.

3, SUPPLY.

a. Automatic Supply. In spite of difficult landing conditions, due to heavy surf and congested beaches, automatic supply o£ artillery units- (with the exception of ammunition) was generally satisfactory. Movement of supplies from the beaches to artillery position area,s presented no particular proble.m.

b. Ammunition Supply. Ship-to-shore transportation proved to be a "bottleneck 11 for artillery ammunition supply. In this respect, Corps Artillery fared best initially. C Battery 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed on 1700 D/l and had 1000 rounds ashore by

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Subject: Field. Artillery Officer,- fixpedijtioflary Troops, • Task Force 56, Report on IWO UtllA Operations

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0700 the next morning. The 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed two (2) batteries on D/4and got 4000 rounds ashore before the next morning. From D/4through D/9the Corps Artillery ammunition level averaged about 3.3 units of fire, and from then on, it became difficult to maintain it above 1 unit. This was due to the fact that the initial allowance of 7 U/F was loaded in LSTs, which could be beached and unloaded with relative ease, whereas the re supply had. to be handled in small craft from AKAs. Average artillery ar-imunitio. levels up to D/17 within divisions were about as follows in units of fire

7 bmm 105mm7 bmm 105mm

2th2th llarinesllarines 1.3 1.11.3 1.13th3th llarines'llarines' 1.6 1.51.6 1.54th4th llarinesllarines 1.4 1.01.4 1.0

ForFor D/16,D/16, thethe artilleryartillery ammunitionammunitionammunition viavia restrictexpenditureexpenditureexpenditure was Ed to about 1/3 units of fire for all weapons to permit suyply to catch up with expenditure. The slowness of this supply was due mainly to the difficulty of transferring the ammunition' from AKSs tc small craft in heavy seaways and unloading through heavy surf on congested beaches. Many artillery officers thought a better solution would have been to have the artillery ammunition loaded in LSTs which could have been beached with comparative ease.

C SUUIiARY OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE. Complete data were not available at the time this report was prepared, but a partial analysis will give an indication of the rate of ammunition expenditure in this operation. . Units concerned will submit complete anaylses with their reports. As of 1800 on D/15, the total artillery ammunition expenditure was as follows:

Corps Artillery - 56,721 rds 155mm

75mm 105mrn

12th llarines 58,147 "32,685 13th llarines 34,517 58,729

74,71314th llarines 59,198 TOTALS 151,862 166,127

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Subject: Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, Report on I¥o JIMA Operation.

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This represents a daily average expenditure of about 9,500 rounds of 75mm, 10,400 rounds of 105mm and 3,500 rounds of 155mm ammunition. The average number of rounds per battalion per day were :

75mm 105mm75mm 105mm

12th llarines12th llarines 3,230 (0.9 U/F) 2,3353,230 (0,8(0.9 U/F) 2,335 (0,8 U/FU/F13th llarines13th llarines 2,160 (0.6 U/F) 1,2202,160 (0.4(0.6 U/F) 1,220 (0.4 U/FU/F14th llarines14th llarines 3,700 (1.0 U/F) 1,5603,700 (0.5(1.0 U/F) 1,560 (0.5 U/FU/FCorps ArtilleryCorps Artillery 155mm155mm 2,360 (1.32,360 U/F)(1.3 U/F)

d. SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF FIRE MISSION. Ho data were available on this item when this report was prepared, "Units conerned will include this information in their reports.

4*4 * MOTOR TRANSPORTATION. Full allowance of motor transportation were not needed in this operation, the artillery using less than half the T/A allowances. This proved to be adequate, and all types performed well. The 12th Marines praised the performance of ten (10) "Weasels" in their possession, saying that they operated with great dependability in the soft volcanic ash found on this island.

5. CASUALTIES.

a. PERSONNEL . Casualties to artillery personnel were comparatively light. As of D/15,' Corps Artillery had had only about 2% casualties, the 12th Marines 2%, the 13th Marines 5% and the 14th Marines 10$. 0

b» MATERIEL. Generally speaking, the materiel losses in the artillery were not excessive, the greatest casualties occurring during ship to shore movement. Many PUKWs swamped and sank and some were destroyed by enemy action. The 4th "Battalion, 14th llarines lost seven' (7) 105mm howitzers which sank in the DUKWs carrying them. As of D/15, Corps Artillery reported the following losses from enemy shelling:

* ¦¦¦¦ mwm 14 nT""1 M''"T1""SSi

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Subject: Field Artillery'Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, Report on IWO JIIIA Operation.

1 TD-18 tractor w/dozer.1 TD-18 tractor. 1 \ ton 4x4 truck, radio equipped.

2000 Sandbags. 632 "C" rations.

1 Blackout tent. 1 Tent fly. 2 Tarpaulins.

580 Powder Bags, 35 Reels of ¥-110 telephone wire.

Miscellaneous radio small .parts.

In addition, the attached D.UKW company had lost 18 DUKWs. At the time of this report, detailed information on materiel casualties of divisional artillery, was not .available. Detailed reports willbe submitted by the units concerned.

ll*ENEIIY ARTILLERY.

A» ORGANIZATION. Intelligence studies compiled prior to the operation indicated that the Japanese field artillery on IWO JIMA consisted of the Artillery Battalion of the 2d Mixed Brigade, four (4) 75mm mountain guns of the, 145th Infantry Regiment, and the 3d Medium llortar Battalion (equipped with twelve (12) 15cm mortars). The Artillery Battalion, 2d Mixed Brigade was reported to include the sth and 7th Batteries (formerly of the CHICHI JIMA fortress' Heavy Artillery Regiment) , each equipped with four (4) 75mm, Model 38, field guns, and the 7th Fortress Mountain Artillery Battery, equipped with five (5) 75mm, Model 41, mountain howitzers. In addition, the IWO JIIIA Naval Guard Force was reported to have AA and coast defense guns which could also be fired at ground targets. These included

4 .Bcm AA 8 12cm AA 6 12cm CD 4 14cm CD 4 15.0 mCD.

In addition to the above listed units.,- the following artillery units were identified after we landed:- the "S& Medium Mortar Battalion,

-15

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inary Troops, Operation*

equipped similarly to the 3d Medium Mortar Battalion; the AA Artillery Unit of the 109th Division (conroosition uncertain but reported to include two and two-thirds (2-2/3) batteries); a rocket unit (composition unknown), and the 20th Independent Mortar Battalion (composition unknown).

C. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ENEMY ARTILLERY.

1, In this operation, the employment of the Japanese artillery followed the same fixed and decentralized pattern that has been apparent consistenly since the beginning of the war. In this pase it was generally in keeping with the enemy's plan of a rigidpassive defense as far as mobility was

f

conerned but his numerical inferiority (intelligence studies indicate that he expected to be attacked by five (5) divisions), and the small area defended, would clearly indicate the need for centralization of his artillery. From the enemy's viewpoint, factors unfavorable to centralization were his obvious determination to delay the ultimate destruction of his forces by protecting them underground (keeping guns in caves and deep holes), §nd also the fact that his artillery was made up of a heterogeneous assortment of units making coordination difficult. However, there <|id not appear to be any effort to mass fires even within groups armed with the same weapons.

2# The main targets attacked -by Japanese artillery were landing benches and our rear areas. Some artillery fire fell on our front linos, but most fires there seem to have come from mortars. f2?om D Day through D/3very heavy fire from large high explosive projectiles covered the areas in the vicinity of the Yellow and Blue Beaches causing extensive casualties. This may have been artillery op mortar fire but its dispersion was such as to suggest rockets. However, these same areas did receive sporadic fire, definitely artillery, up to about D/14. Some artillery or mortar fire fell on Red and Green Beaches to about D/14 but never with the neutralizing effects encountered on Yellow and Blue 3eaches. This would suggest that the fire falling on Yellow and Blue Beaches was from a short range weapon, as Red and G-reen Beaches were just as visible to the enemy and were used by us just as much, yet the fire on them was not nearly so intense, and it is likely that what did fall there came mainly from the SURIBACHI area.

2295-30 0213/134Ser 01858-45

•"?

Subject: Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary, Troops, Task Force 56, Report on IWO JIIIA Operation.

•^

3. Although some of our installations, such as command. posts and batteries, received artillery fire in sufficient, density tr indicate that they were specific targets, the great bulk of Japanese artillery fire seems to have been aimed at large areas* In addition to the previously mentioned beach areas, target areas 147, 163 .and 164 (Special Air and Gunnery Target Hap) received daily enemy artillery fire until about D/14. These areas were occupied by the 12th and 13th ilarines and Corps Artillery and it is likely that the enemy 1;

attention was drawn there by the large flashes of Corps Artillery; also this area could be observed from KAMA and KANGOKU ROCKS and there is abundant evidence that the, enemy occupied these points as artillery observation posts after the loss of the high ground around MOTOYAUA. In the main, Japanese artillery fire was delivered by from one (l) to four (4) guns and the fire was scattered, over areas five hundred (500) to one thousand (1000) yards in depth, indicating large range bounds. His artillery was particularly active at night probably to escape our observation aviation. Nightly artillery cLuele occurred until about D/12 when our rear areas were reported free of artillery fire for the first time. Some scattered artillery fire war reported in rear areas occasionally thereafter. From D/5to D/12 the Corps CP, immediately behind the 4th 155mm Howitzer Bs.ttali.on, received some casualties from large caliber shells 'apparently aimed at Corps Artillery. All types of Japanese artillery seem to have participated in this shelling, as shells estimated as 75mm, Bcm, I2cr and 14cm fell scattered in our rear areas for the first two weeks, but most of the projectiles fired at Corps Artillery seem to have been from naval guns of 14cm or .15cm caliber judging by recovered shell fragments. When Airfield No. 1 was put in operation by us, it began to receive occasional artillery fire, particularly upon the landing of transport planes. Most of the enemy's heavy artillery must have been silenced by that time as the fire received there was usually from a high velocity piece of moderate caliber (about Bcm).

4. All our artillery received enemy shell fire, the heaviest falling on the 14th Marines occupying the above mentioned Yello*T

and Blue Beaches. The 13th Marines and Corps Artillery, closely grouped in the same general position areas, received a moderate amount and the 12th Marines/ not committed to action for nearly a week after D Day, received a small amount of scattered fire, if the fire which fell on our artillery was intended as counterbattery, it failed, as casualties and damage were light and our artillery was never prevented from executing its missions.

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2295-30 0213/134Ser 01858-45

—i

Subject: Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56., Report on IWO JIIIA Operation*

¦*¦'¦'"-' T i_

5. Throughout this operation, the enemy artillery displays ed iss chronic weakness of failure to mass on important targets. Considering the amount of artillery available to the enemy and the wealth of profitable targets offered him, results accomplished are not. considered outstanding. Rockets and "spigot mortars" caused quite a number of casualties, but those weapons are not, properly speaking, artillery. The unprecedented congestion existing in rear areas practically assured that every Japanese shell which fell therein would cause some damage, but that is no particular tribute to Japanese gunnery. Until MOTOYAIIA was captured, observation available to the enemy and his previous knowledge of the island should have enabled him to locate many of our important installations, yet at no time was his artillery massed on profitable targets. He appears to have been content with harassing our rear areas. When our artillery was firing preparations, it received a negligible amount of counter-battery fire, although the enemy must certainly have known the locations of a considerable number of our batteries. Operation of the airfield was never seriously hindered by enemy artillery fire. Ships of ail types which continuously crowded the waters off IWO JIIIA offered'a golden opportunity to Japanese artillery, both field and coasf, yet the number of ships attacked was amazingly low and was

mainly to naval gunfire ships in the pre-D Day activities,confinedof w&ich only four (4) were hit. At this time, one of our cruisers did sustain serious damage. The infantry did take serious losses froim-large high explosive projectiles, but not to the extent which coul4 have been expected under the circumstances. Aside from the rockets and mortars, the shells themselves frequently seemed to be of nidiocre effectiveness. For example, a direct hit in a* lssmm howitzer pit resulted in no worse damage than' the wounding of two (2)cannoneers, breaking the sight and igniting exposed powder. A direct hit:^n the edge of the fire direction center of the 155mm group disrupted communications for about an hour but produced no personnel

It is true the projectiles involved in these twocasualties. that examples may have been low-content armor piercing shells from naval, guns '.and poorly adapted to land warfare. Several reports received from -the front line troops indicated that some enemy- shells produced a greenish-yellow gas which caused a violent but temporary nausea and a: considerable number of such bursts were noted. However, prisonersConsistently reported that there was no gas in the enemy's possession, so it seems more likely that this effect was caused by low order bursts of picric acid projectiles, indicating some defective ammunition. The most commendable thing about the Japanese artillery was

it verythe small amount of smoke and flash which it produced, making _difficult to locate. V "

18 <&igMOOH± 4,

2295-30 0213/134Ser 01358-45

Subject: Field Artillery Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, Report on IWO JIMA Operation.

w» <*a m wr «• as

6. In summary it may be said that, while some of the Japanese artillery materiel may be considered obsolescent, it could have been put to better use than it was. The Japanese do not yet seem to . have learned how to use their artillery, their tactical decentralization being characteristic of the- Nineteenth Century. In no operation to date have they employed their artillery in a manner which could bq considered skillful by European or American standards. This statement, however, should not lead to our overconfidence. There is evidence that the enemy is fully aware of this weakness and is striving to correct it; the 75mm field gun, ModelÔ, has the earmarks of modern German materiel and they may yet learn a lot from their competent allies.

111. COiniENTS.

A. ANTICIPATED MATURE OF FUTURE OPERATIONS. From the results of the- IWO JII-1A operation and from a study of captured documents, it is evident that the enemy may be expected to resort more and more to strongly fortified positions, particularly in areas he considers critical. While he may conceivably achieve temporary local superiority in the air or on the sea, it is unlikely that, he will ever again attain a general strategic superiority in these elements and he cannot hope to match our mechanization on the ground. In accordance with military logic and also Japanese mentality, the enemy's nost obvious course is to resort to strongly fortified strategic_areas in an effort to make the cost of the war unprofitable to us. In the future we must anticipate defenses as strong or stronger than those found on IWO JIMA in areas vital to the enemy. Consequently, we must be prepared to conduct some operations which will be more or less stabilized until we can amass sufficient means to crush positions strongly organized in depth.

B. CENTRALIZED ARTILLERY CONTROL. In the IWO JIMA operation, the original artillery plan contemplated a loose artillery coordination by Corps. Each artillery regiment was to be in support of its own division and the artillery regiments of the assault divisions (4th and sth) were ordered to have one battalion each prepared to fire in the zone of action of the adjacent division, but this was not to be done without permission of the division concerned. Corps Artillery established liaison with divisional artillery and reinforced their fires on request, as well as firing long-range missions for the Corps.

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-19 : "Bl JHHHBBV

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2295-30 0213/1343er 01858-45

Subject: Field Artillery'Officer, Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, Report on IWO JIMA Operation.

The Corps. Artillery Officer was directed to coordinate all the artillery with the Corps but was not authorized to exercise technical fire direction.. Coordination originally consisted mainly in the establishment of a common survey and the exchange of information; no artillerydisplacement coordination was necessary. Heavy concentrations of artillery involving more than one (1) regiment were usuall}7

" accomplished by mutual agreement among the commanders conerned, or by general directives issued by Corps sometime in advance. Actually, cooperation among artillery units was generally excellent, which is a tribute to the unusually cooperative spirit of the artillery officers concerned, but their primary interests lay quite properly in their own particular problems. As the operation progressed, artillery fire became more and more concentrated on critical areas, from necessity, until the high concentrations mentioned in I-F above were finally resorted to.

It can now be seen that a better plan would have been to provide the machinery in the original plan for close technical control of all the artillery present. The excellent survey, map and communications and the semi-stabilized tactical situation offered the best opportunity for centralized artillery control yet existing in any Uarine Corps operation to date. Complete centralization would have enabled the Corps Commander, through his Artillery Officer, to concentrate all the artillery, or any part of it, promptly at any selected point to meet critical situations'. Nothing would have been lost by so doing as the bulk of the divisional artillery would generally be left in direct support of its parent organization and only their idle battalions utilized; but when favorable opportunities did present themselves, the artillery could have been massed quickly and with surprise, to best favor' the Corps attack as a whole. The limited amount of corps artillery, in this case, is another factor recommending centralization. Had an overall fire direction' center been provided, under control of the Cor-os Artillery Officer, it would have been possible, in this -operation, to concentrate all or any part of the artillery on critical areas within ten (10) to twenty (20) minutes, utilizing idle battalions to the best advantage of the Corps attack.

C. ARTIIiERYMATERIEL.

1. Our artillery materiel used in this operation functioned well on missions for which designed, but there was a very evident need for heavy artillery for destruction. The destructive efficiency

20 •

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2295-30 0213/134Ser 01858-45

struction field artillery using

Subject: <** «¦

j^flfc&^CTjkonary Troops, liSpil SWffEMA Operation.

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of naval gunfire the firing ship,

drops off sharply when the target is invisible nor is aviation well adapted to the methodical

from de-

of extensive fortifications. Heavy precision methods remains the best means of doing this, but was not available 'on the IWO JIMA operation. TM 9-1907, Ballistic Data, Performance -of Ammunition, shows the 8" Howitzer, Ml to be vastly superior to either the 155mm Gun, Ml or the 155mm Howitzer, 111, in its destructive power against concrete, and its need is considered urgent for future operations.

2. The T#rge number of reinforced rock or concrete emplacements, which had to be destroyed at point blank ranges, indie*,

ates the need of powerful self-propelled artillery capable of attacking such emplacements by direct fire. The 105mm Howitzer on motor carriage M7, now being procured, while an excellent weapon in its place, is not sufficiently powerful to meet all needs. In many cases the 155mm Gun on Motor Carriage TB3, or an equivalent weapon, will be needed for point blank destruction of concrete blockhouses or reinforced caves. Probably one (1) battery of these guns per Corps would be sufficient for these specialized missions and they could be used on normal Corps field artillery missions when not employed for assault of fortifications.

D« ARTILLERY TRAINING. For future operations, artillery training should stress" centralized fire direction and all the artillery which will operate with a corps should conduct at least one firing exercise together under the control of a corps fire direction center, before going into combat. In all artillery echelons, the technique of precision adjustments should be mastered for the destruction of field emplacements and fortifications. In gunnery training emphasis should be placed on accuracy and every effort made to reduce dispersion within units to a minimum.

HEADQUARTERSELM! MARIK3 FORCE, PACIFIC

C/0FLCT POST OFFICE, SAIT FRANCISCO.

.v 2^ Ma^^T'

ENCLOSURE H (2)

TO ACTION RÎPORT 01

* COIÂMJING GTOîRAL T^TSDITIONARY TROOPS

FOR IWO JIMA GP3RATION

ORDNAHCB OFFICER'S REPORT

|Ji\i'isia.i^:wîl*»

1* This report, since detailed reports from the Fifth Amphibious Corps are not yet available, contains only general observations made by the Ordnance Officer Expeditionary Troops,

¦•2, '

Ordnance, and ordnance r^sinply in the operation against ITO JliiA fimctioned satisfactorily^ it is believed, that modifications to the re'supply pla-ri, for both ordnance-major items and ammunition, could result in increased efficiency,

3. Selective loading of ammunition resulted in being able to remove any type of ammunition, from a resupply shin, with a minimum of delay. This was not entirely true of the ship loaded at Oahu, but the fault lay in that it was necessary to overload this ship, and not the system. Once the hatches were cleared, it functioned well. However, it is physically impossible to load a ship so that, seven or eight different types of ammunition can be removed simultaneously. Since mortar and artillery ammunition constitute the greatest supply problpn, two or three- Landing Ships Tank, loaded with approximately a thousand tons each of assorted types of this ammunition, should be a part of eny resuroly plan. The advantages gained arc that, a smaller ship *Tith less valuableT

cargo is exposed to one my action, and when such p ship is beached the effect is to establish a dump ashorr. The latter can beco"ie vital when, as happened in this operation, thr weather becomes such that it is impossible to rork a large ship. Also, thr vs^ of a Lendim. Ship Tank, in conjunction with a Victory type sMp, wn^ld allow th- supply in greater quantities of more typ^s of pnmvnitinn, at the same timr» An alternate is to ord^r v > two Victory sMps,-at once, and work thrm simultaneously. This Trould hrve be^n impossible at IWO JIKA, dur to thr lack of sufficient TI^KS, pnd

-¦landing craft.

4. There is a definite- n^- r d for more types of Illuminating ammunition. A definite unit of fire should br established immediately, for types and sizes now in drvelo-oem-nt , so that area quotas may be set up.

5. An analysis of the ammunition expended on IWO JIJiA. will show that, too much small arms am munition was included in the resupoly. Further analysis will show a deficiency in 81mm mortar ammunition. This latter situation has been reliev-d by an increase of 50;/b in the CinCPOA. unit of firr schedule, .which k^s issued too late to take effect in this operation. A careful study should be made, from all available sources, of ammunition expended in combat in this arâ, with the view of specifying the rmounts to be included in resupply by caliber, rrther than by an overall figure. This should result in the saving of pn appreciable amount of shipping sp3.ee.

-^""?¦ 1'"^~1 /7, T* -T^-pw * r

.•« 1 ENCLOSURE h (2)

Mjjjj^KM

6. Care- should br taken to srr that DI"rvKS carrying artlllrry err not overloaded. The loss of srvrn 105mm 'Howitzers, in this oprret ion may have bbr -~n so caused.

7. Smoke, HC, 105mm vSS substituted for Srnok^ , WP, in the rr-supply ammunition ships. This vee an rrror as PC is worthless, oyce^t for laying smokr screens. Wipn a substitution is necessary in artillery ammunition, it should always "br High Explosive, which is substituted.

8. The unit of fire, as it now exists, provides ten rounds of High Explosive Anti-tank ammunition for all 105mm Howitzers. It is believed that this should be modified to apply to Carriage, Howitzer, 105mm, M7or H7BI only, eB Howitzer Battalions rrpratrdly reported that- this type was useless to thrm.

3UCLOSUBB H (2)

0203/570 HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORGE, PACIFIC, C/0FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRATCISCO, CALIF.

;

From: The Public Relal|||sA^f^d^\ "v' ;^ ,' "^ §-To: The Commanding General 1; "M ~ v : * /'•/ Subject: Public Relations Officer, Expeditionary Troops Task

56, Report Operation.Force of Iwo Jima

I. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

(a)(a) The planning for public relations coverage of the Iwo operc tior: was started in November of 1944.

(b) There was no public relations officer in the Fifth Amphibious uorps, and Major D.W. Pollvka wr-s assigned to this billet, Second Lieutenant C. P, Zurlinden was assigned ds assistant public relations officer ftfter Second Lieutenant Bern Price, who wr. s originally assigned, was injured in an accident. Enlisted public relations, clerical, photographic, and general duty personnel were transferred from FKF-Pac^to" the Fifth Amphibious Corps as requested.

(c) The Public Relations officers of the three divisions involved in the operation were consulted ss tc their equipment and personnel needs. As the Fl'F PRO also acted as photographic officer FLiF, the photoPjrniiic officers of the divisions were included in all preparations* Through the transfer of public relations personnel and Dho togrannie personnel from FMF Pac, the public relations and photographic sections of the 4th and sth Divi

upsions were brought to full strength as desired by the officers involved. This strength wps in excess of the existing T/0 T s and was based upon the estimates of division officers as to their needs in order to properly cover the operation. The enlisted strength #f the 3rd Division public relations section was below the standard allowed by the T/o due to. the apparent satisfaction of the PRO of the 3rd Division with his organization and the lack of public relations personnel available for transfer, An FMF order was issued allowing divisions to filltheir public relations T/O's', when deficient, with non-public relations personnel qualified to perform the duty. The PRO of the 3rd Division brought his section up to full strength by the addition of non-public

relations personnel. Second Lieutenant Richard Wright was assigned to the ord Division as assistant PRO. The transfer of photogrf^rxic personnel to the 3rd Division was effected, which brought this section almost up to strength.

Officers and to fiWpSliiJ^B^R^ methods 'of handling of public- relations and pholo^rtîi traaisaSial during the operation*

(c) • Starting in December many conferences were held with Oincpao public relations-, radio and photographic officers ?>s well as the ComPhibsPac PRO* . :

(f) An overall coqperal;iv/;e; .plan for;;the handling of motion picture film was out "into effect as defined in Cincpac secret letter SB5, serial 00276. Lieutenant Commander MeLain and Lieutenant David Hopkins arrived fror Washington to work out the plans for this coverage. The photographic officers of the 4th and sth Divisions attended planning conferences and lent the- value of their previous coiibat experiences to the discussions. Warrant Officer Paul White, assistant photographic officer FMF., was transferred to Cincpac, u-oon request, for duty. The Photographic officer of the 3rd Division wao advised of all plans "oj mail and ws visited just prior to the operation by a Cir/cpac photographic officer. Agreement wrs reached on details of the disposition of motion picture film made by Marine photographers which f:illy.protected the interests of the Marine Corps. At Sfcipan a final conference w^s held by PRO Expeditionary Troops with the division Photographic officers', and arrangements were completed

for the daily forwarding of their film to the flagship through public relations channels. Anr order was issued to LanFors which outlined the procedure to be followed in ordering the photographic officers of the Division fro- the scene of the operation to Cincpa'c editing ofPearl on temporary duty to aid in the the overall operational motion picture, The planning provided for the processing of all 16mm Koda chrome film at Kodak Hawaii, n.t which time a duplicate print would be mr.de for the originating organization. The original was rushed by air to Washington. The duplicates were delivered to FMF Pac PRO to be held until requested by the originator. While being held at FHF Pac, arrangements were made for the showing of the "better films at the daily staff conferences,

(g) In the field of radio, conferences were held with Lieutenant Commander Jack Hartley, rlavy radio officer on temporary duty as Cincpac radio officer, and arrangements were made for the handling of Marine dorps wire and film recordings aboard the flagship and at Radio Guam. A dispatch was sent to the radio networks inquiring as to their policy in regard to the use of Marine Corps recordings. The inquiry received a favorable reply. As Havy radio uses 'film recorders exclusively, its studios are geared t# handle only this type of recording. Therefore, a wire recorder was sent to Guam which enabled Marine wire recordings to be used. Lieutenant James Hurlbut, Headquarters Marine Corps radio officer, wps sent by Washington to FMF Pac with a large amount of badly

accompaniedneeded radio gear. Lieutenant Hurlbut the PRO FHF •

on visits to the 4th and sth Divisions, following which he visited the -3rd Division. All three Divisions were completely equipped with gear and rgrsonnel prior to the operation. Lieutenant Hurl-but, after visiting the Third Amphibious Corps and the Ist, 2nd and 6th Divisions, ven^ttSf^Gîjuj-orc Advance Headquarters to awa.lt

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the arrival of the first fey.T days of Mprine recordings and to fly them back 'to Washington. While at Cincpa.c Advance he aided the PRO of the Marine section of Cincpac, Major W. McCahill, in many ways to prepare for the litois4&4£ig -o^ opePf&iona^ material. Complete cooperation was given to i;"|pjt|l6yFy^ S^P^%- C Rfl&io officer,

1Lieutenant Oommarider Hart^H^'PjftP.^^yWp^^R^^fl oon<b^ne<^ with the work of Lieutenant Hurlbut"'^?;^ larît^re^^sible for the success of the combat radio recordings of the operation.

(h) Thirty-five transcriptions of the sth Division's Commanding General's message to his trooos were made. These were plryed back on the nifrht before D-day on each ship carrying sth Division troops.

(i) Delegation of responsibility in the handling of public ptrelations material, both service and civilian, was arrived

after many conferences with Cincpac and ComPhibsPac PRG's, Major McCahill, Marine Section PRO at Cincpac, ana the PRO FMF participated in all of these conferences, Major McCahill wr.s largely responsible for the inclusion in the operation plans of provi-, sions essential to the success of the Marine public relations coverage. Corps and Division PRO's lent their assistance and combat experience to many of the discussions. The Cincpac and ComPhibsPac operation plans 1 public relations appendexes and annexes were prepared as a result of these conferences. Certain objections to details of the plans were offered, but no action was taken upon these suggestions. Prominent among

% the objections

were: (A) It was doubted that seaplanes could operate successfully under the surf conditions predominating at Iwo and no alternate method of moving press copy had been set up; (B) the marking of boats designated as press boats distinguished them from other boats and might attract enemy fire; and (C) the appointment of a Cincpac coordinator on the beach seemed to be a duplication of effort of Corps PRO's responsibility*

(j) Major Polivka, Corps PRO, participated in all final conferences and imparted full information of conclusions reached to Division PRO's/ The sphere of activity and responsibility of each echelon" in the operation was fully defined in the Cincpac public relations annex in the operation Plan. The ComPhibsPac public relations annex to the operation plan defined LanFors responsibility for the transmission of civilian and service press material as well as the facilities to be- extended ashore to civilian war correspondents.

(k) Still photography presented a problem in handling because Cincpac public relations moved its main photo -section to Advance Headquarters .und was not prepared to handle Marine Corps film. It had always been a practice in previous operations to process Marine im'jiarine Corps laboratories. This wass^RsftfJl 1! "^ done in the inter*jH|W Kx (^S^C^SS^fe^lînsm^ ss^LOn an(^ Preven

burdening Navy photographic facilities. The continuation of, this practice was particularly/ desirable during this operation because of the disrupted state of Navy facilities, and it wes decided that all film packs, roll film and cut film would be sent to Cincpac Pearl where it would be censored and forwarded by the Marine section at Cincpac Pearl after -orocessing at the photo labs of the 14th Naval FMF ?ac. Brigadier GeneralDistrict and L. ¥. T. Waller, Jr. , placed his entire staff and photographic facilities at the disposal of PRO Fi:F and the Marine Section Gincpac Pearl, Additional equipment in the form of photo trailers was installed at FMF while plans were submitted for the construction' of a photo lab at the headquarters Forward Echelon FMF Pac. It was agreed between the PRO Marine Section Gincpac and PRO FMF that in order to take advantage of radio-photo facilities at Guam the PRO Expeditionary Troops would process aboard the flagship film designated by Division PRO ls and photographic officers as possibly containing outstanding shots during the early stages of the or>errtior. , Selected top news pictures were to be forwarded to CincDac G-unm. All other film was to be forwarded unprocessed to CincGTmc Pearl.

(l) Fundamentally all planning was based upon the fact the division was the basic unit ofcoverage. Cor-os wr.s a replacement and coordination echelon charged with the primary care of civilain correspondents., r.nd. PRO Expeditionary Troops was charged with seeing all public relations material was expedited from the flagship to Gincpac for disposition and censorship.

11. EN ROUTE TO 'THE TARGET

(a) At both staging points en route to the target, public relations material was picked up from public relations personnel aboard various ships in the convoys and brought to the flagship,This material was dispatched by air to Cincpac to be held until the assault had been announced officially.

(b) At Saipan a meeting was held aboard the flagship. All Corps and Division PRO's and their assistants, all photographic officers, the PRO of the Marine section of Cincpac, the Marine Fleet Censor and Expeditionary Troops PRO T s were present. The ComPhibsPac PRO was" invited to attend but was unable to do sc# At this meeting, final arrangements were discussed and enclosure (A) was distributed.

(c) The official Dress conferences with all civilian correspondents assigned to the operation itas held aboard the flagship on the day of departure. Admiral burner desired the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops, the Commanding General LanFors, his chief of" staff and two of his assistant chiefs of staff to participate in the r>ress conference. The Chief of Staff Expeditionary the Expeditionary Troops to visitTroo^ ordered PRO the PRO LanFors £^$glSAofi -information. This wps accomplished.* ,(sbrp's PRO and the division PRO's with their

-. 4 .

assistants attended the conference. The division PRO's met nil the war correspondents fissioned to cover their divisions during the operation whom they had been unable to meet previously. Corps PRO was present to anffffPf*^ fA^^^M;^li^|B||arrangements that the war oorrespondentslJmiSefl Iga wj^fij^rrfa H ij.

(d) Two civilian correspondents V/ssigried to the flagship Maicoin Johnson of the UP and John Henry of INS, boarded the ship at Pearl. At Sal-pan they were .joined by Morrie Landsberg of AP, Perry Finch of Reuters, DonPryor and Gene Rider of CBS. The PRO Expeditionary Troops arranged interviews with various members of the staff during the trip from Fearl to Saipan, and an Informal pre.-.s conference was held at the invitation of the chief of str.ff in the senior officers wardroom the dny after leaving Saipan. '^hia conference was attended by all of the war correspondents and the heads of all General Staff sections on the Expeditionary Troops Staff. The same afternoon the Commanding; G-eneral held. a press conference attended by all the civilians.

(c) While en route a press reference book was prepared fnr each civilian war correspondent, book contained the Fleet Censor's memorandum on censorship policy for the operation, the Corps 1 and each division's reference material and that of Expeditionary Troops, The reference material contained a history and geographical outline of the target, biographies of all officers of the grade of major and above, histories of each division and the Corps, as well .as a directory of all Marine Corps public relations personnel assigned to the operation and the units to which they were assigned.

(f)(f) A memorandum (enclosure (3) ) was presented to each civilian correspondent aboard ship.

(g) A considerable time lag between the issuance of the official Oincpac communique and Its delivery aboard ship was noted. The PRO Expeditionary Troops enlisted the aid of the Expeditionary Troops communications officer, Captain Clough, and it wns found that a lag of from two to five hours existed between the receipt of the communique in Radio One aboard ship and its delivery to the PRO T s, and subsequent delivery to the civilian correspondents and the Fleet Censor. As civilian stories had to be written within the limits of the communique, it was important that the war correspondents receive the communique as soon as possible. Arrangements were made whereby the communique, as soon as received in Radio One, regardless of time of day or night, would be delivered to the PRO Expeditionary Troops by special messenger. Copies would be made^ in sufficient quantities for all civilian correspondents and the Fleet Censor, while the messenger stood by. After ftiftlpi"4ffl§'Q%f4gy jfcfeid&Tin^ nR -^ was returned to Radio

Troops were imme cOlil||jli^^ ComPhibsPac approvedthe idea, and later "coM™WeT^Si»(rfe«aSJlnent as he felt it was

— — 5

more appropriately his function. This method was later improved upon by Lieutenant James Shattuok, Oinopac radio officer, who received the .communique by voicecast direct from Guam,, thus saving more hours.

(h) Through the excellent c6operati&r. of- G~2 and G-3, arrangements were made for t.he 'PKO to receive copies of G-3 periodic summaries and G--2 and G-3 daily summaries. Arrangements were also made with the G^2 officer whereby any war correspondent stories containing possible security violations were referred to him for final decision, was done hir the Fleet Censor, either airect or through the Expeditionary Troops PRO.

(i) The Commanding General extended an invitation to the war correspondents to visit him at vany time in his quarters and to feel free to ask his ony questions about the operation. The General, when asked, informed the PRO he would be glad to meet with the war correspondents at any time for press:- conferences.

(j) The Chief of Staff wei requested to hold a nightly press conference with the correspondents at which time he would review the day's events, give the latest front lines, inform the correspondents of the following dry's plans and answer any questions, Chief of Staff replied favorably to this request.

(k) Other staff members agreed to aid the correspondents in any way possible to see that they were provided with authentic information to aid in the preparation of news stories and broadcasts.

(l) Correspondents were taken on a tour of the ship to acquaint them with the locations of the offices of all Marine CorDS sections.

($) Correspondents were issued battle gear by the PRO of the Marine Section of Cincpac and items such as binoculars wePe loaned by the Expeditionary Troops PRO's, Typewriters and various supplies in the office of the public relations section of Expeditionary Troops were placed at their disposal. A selection of books provided to the PRO by the chaplain of EMF was provided for the correspondents' and staff members' use. Radio transcriptions given by AFHS to Expeditionary Troops PRO were given to the ship's chaplain to be used on the ship's radio.

(n) A schedule was worked out for all public relations personnel which guaranteed the public relations office would be staffed twenty-four hours a day. Letters of transmi\.tal, complete except for the list of enclosures, were mimeographed and two log books established for the listing of material received from the— beach one log bocMMj^ttft'ji115£it<ffr£.p4w£o be sent to Pearl and one for Guam liiJfcfib^Jl;]Aîaagerfent's 'wis?H?9 made for the delivery of civilian copy serlMxEbr;, -the", beach in Marine packages to the

6

ComPhibsPac PRO, A last minute Shangs in plans specified that all material going out by seaplane had to be packed in para

chute Oc?rgo containers to be dropped over Aslito airfield. Cargo containers were assembled in adênce. The Soslst Guard PRO had requested the Expedit.io-n.ary Troops .PRO \"66 handle Coast Guard mater id, as had the Pacific edition of the Leathernedk magazine and the Seabee PRO. The ComPhibsPac PRO felt he should handle the Coast Guard and Seabee material, as they were prrt of the Wavy. As Seabee material was being distributed by the Marine Section at Cincpac, the Expeditionary Troops PRO retained the handling of Seabee and Leatherneck copy aboard ship but arranged to turn all Coast Guard material over to ComPhibsPac. PRO in the interest of harmony.

111. THE OPERATION

(a) On D-day word reached the flagship that the LCl's originally designated as press boats had been disabled by enemy fire. There were no LCVT1s available as press boats, but a boat made a trip to the beach on the afternoon of D-day in an attempt to pick up press copy. The boat oould not get to the beach because of the confusion which existed. There was no press copy, either civilian or service, brought from the beach on D-day, nor was a press plane available to dispatch civilian copy from the scene of the operation.

(b) On the morning of Duplus-1 Sergeant Heinecke of the Fifth Amphibious Corps was brought aboard the flagship. He had been wounded by mortar fragments. From liim it was learned that Lieutenant Zurlinden, assistant public relations officer of the Fifth Amphibious Corps, had been hit by the same shell. This meant that the advance shore party of Corps had been rendered inoperative.

(c) Shortly afterwprds a combat correspondent from the 4th Division arrived aleoard the flagship from an Amtrac with Marine anr civilian press material. man reported that the public beenrelations officer of the sth Division had wounded •nnd evacuated and that the assistant public relations officers of the 4th and sth Divisions had not been able to get ashore.

(d) The PRO expeditionary Troops requested and received permission to visit the Corps PRO aboard the Auburn. The Corps PRO had been advised as to the developments and had immediately tried, unsuccessfully to get permission to go p shore. It was agreed that the 'assistant! public relations officer and Master Technical Sergeant Black of Expeditionary Troops would be transferred to Corps as soon as the" Corps PRO advised the Expeditionary Troops PRO they were needed* A combat correspondent from the sth Division arriveqL4.ale._.in £he^ Bjrternoon__witl: more press copy and further word of

'

casualties ¦' a'monfe^piffilTc ?!>relat ions and photo

— — 7

graphic personnel, and reported that Captain John Thomason,public relations officer of the 4th Division, wps coordinating the gathering of press material £ffimp(&ly~ifr^tslon&z&Bwell as could be done under the cond||^mj& fe|ki^l^ no press plane available for rlS^fjlft§^^^ Guam on this day. LanFors public^relaWonß onitfS1 eerua dispatch to the sth Division requesting them to make First Lieutenant Burns Lee acting public relations officer.. Lieutenant Lee, assistant division FRO, took over at 1600 21 February.

(c) On D-plus-2 a press plane arrived and oil copy received as of that time was placed aboard this plane. Press copy arrived from the beach by all means. Some was brought out by civilian correspondents, some by passing LVT's and some by Marine combat correspondents,

(f) A dispatch was received from Cincpac Advened inform-Jpnesing the Expeditionary Troops PRO that First Lieutenants

Hurlbut and Earl Johnson had volunteered to be "replacements for PRO !s who were casualties en D~plus-one, and Cincpac offered tit) fly these officers to the scene of the operation. This fine gesture was refused by the Expeditionary Troops PRO, as he felt the funciton of these officers at Cincpuc wps too important to be disrupted and that Gorps and division PRO's with reorganization rind supplementation from Expeditionary Troops public relations personnel could handle the situation.

(g) Very little copy arrived on D-plus-3, but a boat officer of ar LCVP press boat' sent a note by his coxswain with two medsages from the PRO 4th Division. ensign reported he had tried to find the Cincpac beach coordinator end had failed, but 'had seen Certain Thomason who had given him Dress material

messages from the PRO 4th Division con-from both divisions. The outlingingtained information of personnel losses as well as ar

rangerm^s he had ran de for the transmission of 4th and sth Divioion material from the beach along with civilian copy.

(h) Later in the day Captain Cenna came aboard the flagship with a small amount of material and reported he had been unable to contact any of the division or Corps PRO's and that he had seen no press boots near the beach. It wp.s suggested to the ComPhibsPac PRO that the press boats be ordered to the control boat and await a signal fron shore which would indicate that there vas copy to go to the flagship. The copy would then be sent to the control boat by Amtrac or Duck. The location of the press headquarters of both divisions wa.s given to Captain Cenna, and he planned to arrange a liaison with them. For some reason the signal system was never put into operation.

(i)

--¦8

(j) No copy was' returned by the press boat on the morninL. run on D-plus-4 and no word had beer: received from Goros PRO, so permission was requested for Lieutt-nart Venn ma Master Technical

>Ser d er-.n'i Black zo c:o ashore to try to I,oc^/u^-ôo>iv>6n and swe what could be done to help those ashore te;

' he1

ir.Qjo^y', delivered from the beach. They returned ir/the s»i ternoon. ]&o ?Vifepbrt a system had beer agreed upon by division PEO !s -tc uee ¦3fe!rire combac correspondents : s mee senders. These messengers would not deoend upon press boats but vo./.ld utilize e,ny available nea.is of transportation to rêt to the flr^.shiT). This vfs done because the -cress boa., pirn was not working. The natter was taken \ro the ConPhibsPac PRO, and he aran'ced permission for the Expeditionary Troo'os PRO to mr he firrnnrements with the Dress boat- coordinator to' send his boats each dry to a be-ch desicnrted by PÔ's rsho?ê rs be In?; best suited to receive then, ifian effort to mpke it easier fo" the messen§:e""s to find tvf:-ns-oortntion. Although it wr s i^ter learned ;he Corr)S PRO i*v? •••shore, the pesistpnt PP.C Expeditionary Troops did not find him. No "oress olane wra rTTailable this date.

00 On D-plv.s-5 no co"oy prrived on the enrly morning press bort md. the senior rire service re^resentati -es rboard the flagship ye re Trer^ disturbed thrt no coôy was p'tWh:' from their representatives r.shore, so the PRO E^'oeditionrr" Trocos :"'e:''uested r-r.c. received permission to :o ashore with Cor-oor-l J. Bishirji'-n, pv.blic ?°el'-cions clerk, All Division FRO's --ere me. the' previous , d;-:.y s arr^n/êênts were sli-"ht-l:,r clarified r>nc. a.m'olif led. The, Cinep r-c cooz-dinator was / .ivised 01 the chan.;,es, ,:îd as his ser

rvices re:~e no i: required he left ::he be; oh ?-it r later drte. The Gh Division press he -.dcuarters wrs ";¦,•-. de the central ?,:r'Chering

point for :.11 divisions, <mc. rrrani e^f-n -;-s T ve--e ::irc:e whereby each uiîsiDTi--would alternate in sending t correspondent ; s copy messenger. Two press bort trips a day scheduled, one at 1100 and the other at 1600 to "Che control bort of r previously desi^ nated beach, where the messen;.,er would be wîtinf. with material for the il;:^ship. The control bo:; t rendeôus would remain the sarae until uhe PRO's ashore notified 'Ghe flr^ship to the contrary. After oompletin^. yrri.êr.ents with division PRO's, uhe ixpeditionrry Troops FRO neard that Cor'os Keadruarters wr s being, moved ashore; and since he knew the Corps FRO would be ashore ?monî the first, he tried to locate Gor-oe. Finally the site of Corps conmanc post

FjtlO'sWf- s lea-rned, and u'oon arrival at ''he location the Corps quarters were found. The Cor-)S PRO had cone r shore the day before md with the limited help he hr&, h^d set ur> p temporary he?-dqurrte"'s. The balance of his "oersornel hrd. not rshore nor had the bulk of his eaiiir>mer.t. ?v.ll details of 3he prranê

ments made for deli^rer^ r of cooy to the flp.-: shio were ivi-.-en to Oorr)S PRO, He requester, th^t Lieute:"a'"t ""enr. md Serjeant Black be transferred to CorDs the following dry. The Coros FRO a-oioroved the nrânv-ements m-de with the divisions, .-nd it was agreed they would st-T-d until such tiT,ea ii^Gotj? f^lJ: \+ "disable to change "'"hem. "The S>roe ditionrr"*jJlt^'priil^JH flaf.shit) with

4* 1 .", . » I 5 |

some Dress materiel to find thrt no Drees Plane wag. scheduled to leave. \s the . Secret?. ry of the Navy was leaving that- evening, rrr ngements nrrlswere mp.de Kith p. member of the Secret party

for press copy to 33 -out aboard 1

the ship returning the Secretary t o G-ua m,

(1) On D-plus-6 Lieutenant Venn and Sergeant 31a cli were transferred to ~ress onCorps. copy arrived by nessen^r schedule.' The messenger carrying copy out on the 1100 boat returned on ..he 1500 boat , and the messenger on the 1600 boat was kept overnight aboard ship, returning the next; dry on the 1100 boat. rhis arrangement continued in operation successfully for the balance -of the operation. Press planes operated daily from D-plus-6 on.. Land planes >:eirt into operation on 5 March, D-plus14. Tiie cancellation of seaplanes as press planes had been effected without i-dvpnce notification by the ComPhibsPac FRO. The PRO Expeditionary Troops requested and received permission iron "Che Chief of Staff uo go ashore D-plus-13 to visit the Corps PRO

•and arrange for the transfer of records, rtc, used in loylnfs and processing Marine Corps public relations material and to advise him of the procedure to be used in connection with civilian copy to be transmitted from the flagship. The same method of delivery as described previously was used to get civilian copy to- the flagshit). Arrangements were .«lso made for transmission of civilian copy to continue from the Auburn after the ceparture of the flagship.

(m) The services to be provided to the civilian correspondents were carried out ooimDletely pq "ol^nned. The Commanding G-eneral held four Dress conferences for tht=-- co?""'>est)ondents. The Chief of Staff, Colonel D. S. Brown, held a nimhtly conference a i- tended by all ciTrilisn co-respondents aboard ship, which was the subject of much favorable comment "t* the corres-oondents In appreciation of the information and time /viven to them. Other sta.ff members made themselves available to answer specialized inquiries. G— 3 by ¦periodic summaries were rewritten the E:':oeditibRB.ry -Troop s_Pßo---'and : delivered' imrnediatels r^tb-""ail Giyillanc eo^respondents.?" ;fhere were" usually 'three ii:ssu'e-dî^r--da'5 l:i: A situation map was maintained in the public relations office. jkvery ..ime reports of new front lines were received they were posted. As out standing Marine Corps combat correspondent stories suitable for wire service and radio network release were received from the heath, they were submitted to the fleet Censor. After bein^ censored, sufficient Copies were made to service each war correspondent aboard shir; as well as the ComPhibsPac PRO. The snip's paper was also supplied with a copy. Seventeen such stories were f A^.-en to the civilirns, p^c. it is believed that all or part of e r ch of them wr s used by at le-st one of the wire services or the rrc.io network brop.d.Cf-s t&ii&£y'£s&ssz stories arrived aboard s'ni-o in duplicate.-. The duplicates retained in a file before beina sent to Cincprc the day .fallowing the time the

- 10

ori...'in.cl v*r s dispatched (r protection atafnst the ¦possibility # press plane might be lost). This file w#s referred to many times oy trie Wei1 correspondence. Greet cere w*s ken to see tii;t c---.1l correspondents abQ^/d^-sî'j g..ec;eig~£.<? Mcp^Mies of all out-Suandin r karme stories ai'^jmfi^MiW.^"^'^^^l^?%*thus ha rre en ec^-l ."a^k" In usinb th^y^y)^\%M.

(n) Four outstanding film recordings were mode available to the Gincp.-c rr-.dio officer r<board shit) for possible use b:--' the civilian network reisresentrtives . Beer-use of the loss in quality during transmission, none of the recordings w;--s "broader st from the ship, Mr. Don Pryor, representing the combined networks, requested the r^rtlci-option by General Smith in p. nationwide brordcr-st with Admiral Turner. G-enerpl Smith granted the request rnC. the broadcast v°s mrcle on Tuesdry, 27 Februnry, from the flying bridge of the fl'-gsni-o. On 2g February Mr. Pryor md the Tîre service T"es requested th^t Plrtoon Sergei: nt Ernest I, Thomas, ™\io led his to the tor) of Mt. Suribrchi pfter the "ol°ôon le^de^ h^. been wounded, be brought to the flatshir) for m interî^-w me1. bropc.o?st. This renuest wrs r:r?nted, end. Thomrs crme v'bop.r& the ni:.ht of the \'sth, vrs interviewed, md "

rodp the bro -dc^st ?.r Februrry, rftvirnin^ to his outfit irnnedirtely fterw.^rd. rechnicpl difficulties -oreênted the "oro^rpm frorr. be

in- corroletely received in the United 3tr*:es pp.s. the networks psked

for r re-oe^t brordcpst. Thomas vps a»~pin ordered to the flagship on 26 H'eoru."'ry , / no. on 1 Mrrch the bror'dc •¦¦ t st went through

oo'". shn.-oB?.

¦(o ) Lieutcri-m t Ye¦ vrhn Fr?ul (U3:T?.), in charge of a V-v v"f sound motion Picture crew, e";uested the coo"oeration of iiener;.-,! Smith in the -ore-opr* tion of i short newsreel secuenoe. The G-ener; 1 agreed to ¦o<-:r-ticiT)rte if gener:"l Schmidt were included. Plans were mrde for the filnin. to be af.de ?-t the Cor^DS command post, A script was written t-he Corps "oublic relations officer mr.de all for the tr; .sôruption of the motion picture ,_e?r from the 'oei;^^ to the commrnf: ?)ost, r-s veil <¦. s handling rlldetails on the dry of the filming.

(p) On 2 harch ; disprtch from Cincprc Ad^rnce fcLisc.c. PRO £xpeditionpry Troops thrt Colliers mr^f sine wanted

a 4,;00-wcra eyewitness story written 'oy Marine CC's to be sent to them crble collect. ?H0 Expeditionary Troo'os dispatched the inform,-, tion to PRO LpnFors end suj ;. ested Sergeants Josephy, Denpsey and T. Smith of the crcl, 4th :nd sth Marine Divisions, respectively, be appointed to wîte this story. The sergernts arrived rcorrd shit) the srme dn':* md started to work writing the stor3". Urgency/ w^-'s -indicated in the recuest dispatch so the story could not contain the nrmes of mciTridupl Marines be— cûse of censorshi-o regulations, md .". s the writing wrs so close to the "ction the censor °o.T*ised the elimination of certain e..inientpl references. As r result, the PÔ iLv-oeditionpry

Troops took out r-11 reriêntrl references, feelinm it would no

- -

-mentioned. A.s the story vould be edited inc. portions re TTrit~J. uen before bein,. puslished, it >ws

/ could? .:>}_ :; v'b r-£ *3ue~> <feTer e ces

rt that time be filled in 4^m *^r?s >fift^S|< The story

riter censorship tr- nsîilâ"'^ Xlii-ve^^l^-s^'^T?i'e sergerntswpb

vho wrote the story die an pl'iosx ur.belie~ablt *ob m turning it out in the short time "Hotted to them.

(c) The number of civHipn corresoonder.ts regularly aboard 'Ghe flagship was six, but durinn the course of the "brittle--: a number of other correspondents were aboard the flagship for

1periods of rime "rryinp from one dpy to fi o.r-\ys pnd received the S'--me services fs those T^ho weê recul-i^ly assigned. These''o "•'re s "ooncle nts vere:o "•'re s "ooncle nts vere:

P-ipe AbbotP-ipe Abbot Intern >:: tior.p1 Nc xiT s PhotIntern o so>:: tior.p1 Nc xiT s Phot sJohn 3e-ufortJohn 3e-ufort Christirn ScienceChristirn MonitorScience Monitor--ff-John 3re nn.f.

> r--John 3re nn.f.> r- Sydney BulletinSydney Bulletin

'3-1.1 buncly'3-1.1 buncly King FeaturesKing FeaturesH.-y Coll'H.-y Coll' Honolul7Honolul ;. Advertiser;.7 AdvertiserA.J. CrockerA.J. Crocker St. PaulSt. Diso^'tchPaul Diso^'tchErp/ietErp/iet Cro zi^rCro zi^r New York Her;New Id TribuneIdYork Her; TribuneJohn DukeJohn Duke Mid-Pa cificanMid-Pa cificanHamilton FaronHamilton Faron Associrteo. PressAssocirteo. PressWilson FosterWilson Foster National BroadcastingNational CompanyBroadcasting CompanyFred FrutcheyFred Frutchey National 3roadcastin;National Company3roadcastin; Company7vri11iain Hipp1c7vri11iain Hipp1c . Newswe::. Newswe::

::

JohnJohn L,L, %"dner%"dner NAIÂ-NewGweekNAIÂ-NewGweekAlivyn LeeAlivyn Lee KevspfvoersKevspfvoersAustralianAustralianJ. r.issJ. Lindsleyr.iss Lindsley Associated PressAssociated PressJohn MarqueJohn ridMarque rid Harpers (novelist)Harpers (novelist)William MorienWilliam Morien Sydney HeraldSydney Herald'villiarn HoG-afiin Chicrô Drily News Tom Morrow ChiCt;;:o Tribune Alphonsus Qlsen Melbourne ArJ.us Frederick Painton Herder's Digest Joe Rosen thai Associated Fress thoto Fobert Sherrod Tir:.e , Life Eugene Smith Tirae, Life Lisle Shoemaker United Press Normm Soonf: Chinese News Agency Robert Trumbell New York Times '"Jilli&m Wordcn Sotur&pv ST'enin£' Post

(r) Xnen vr--r correspondents arrived aboard the flpgshit) e TTery effort whs made to spevve bunks for them pnd xo pro-

chp-oipin -oarticulrrlyvice, pnythinf;: they needed. The shioio f sf s chp-olfin wrswrs -oarticulrrl helpful in this connection..

-F^P^tej ixoedltior.ar^ Troops

b(|e^#l rllfiln -orcks inciicrted *&t*1•?&!$ r%(|''%îl|i

12

s containing cutstT.n&irn^jfie^.s .pi^tures^^ê rise took "oictures s reouested %:y ciTrili'an'/c^rêsHD6n;ênt^K:a^p]''d the ilr-.£shi"o pro

viding prints to be.i forwarded,-. wLth:sto#ses they illustrated. He a :,co moan led the Commanding G-ener^l whenever the G-eneral went

print ofr shore , shooting stills and motion pictures. A every Marine film processed aboard the flagship was giTr en to the ComPhife'Spac intelligence officer and the Fl^g Lieutenant for the Admiral.'

' (t) Arrangements were made with the ship's chaplain and communications officer for severrl hundred copies oT the daily ship's paper to be printed without a. masthead. These papers were sent ashore each morning with the combat correspondent messenger for distribution in Corps and divisions. The division PRO r s gave copies to combat correspondents attached to regimental battalions, and whenever possible they were distributed to troops in the front lines.

(v) A statement written by the Commanding G-enerrl to be released upon the raising of the flag arid the reading of the official proclamation of Admiral Nimits's, wrs distribated to

pnC. the opera-the press radio re-oresentatives at the scene of tion ard at G-uam.

•( TT ) The following Msrine Coros public relations material was received from Corr^s and division PRC's from 19 February through 4 March and forvprded to either Cincr>ac Advance or Cinema c Pearl:

-1,150 Stories (newsDa-oer and magazine)-64 Stories (with -oicture's) (film -oacks)- '

25 Stories negatives nô, contacts -246 4 x 5 Film P'cks (2,976 -oho tos)

9-4x5 Sheets of Kodp chrome-21 Rolls Film (168 photos)-24 Reels of Wire Recordings-15 of Film Recordings- Reels -scB 50' Kaâsines 16nn Kodf.chrome ) 55,900 feet of 16mm-175 ICO' Magazines - 16mm. Kodachrome ) motion oicture film-35 Reels oemm black and white, 0,500 feet i!smm motion

"oicture film-6 6 x 10 'orints-96 sketches and paintings-- /.-egatives with contacts

2,540 items

(w) . Every night a detailed list of public relations material received by the Expeditionary droops PRO was made for ecCh Division PRO arid the Corps PRO. This list was sent in by the combat correspondent messenger the nexi morning. In o.n.is way the various public relations officers asaore were able to

<Jlcheck uo see if fl!u^^^rif'l p^êlJ?7!h'e flagship.T -i

15

(>~) On 14 Mrreh MarCorr>s sent a dispatch informing ¦ T=>r" ordPRO Expeditionary Troo-o^ z~ t C'-rîr trnonc Henri, PRO

JMarine Division; Second Li°'JT en^^ -J^^s Luo*|X assistant PRO,-4th Marine Division; 3*r>'t~nts Al"in% J^§j4^fottlTTi<3 Dempsey, and Fe yp s 'Bee c"-., of the? ?rd ; i-A^^^flU fe^^^P^n s »rc sPe c"~

ti-ply, we-ê "being orderq^- t#'^lj^J^w»*co collaborate in the Toreonrption of p .brM^'U^cr? or. the Two camonign. Separate

dis'ortch orders for each man sent by MarCo ids, which re-r ched the men before the contents of the aforementioned disoatch could be transmitted to their respective commands. The gispatch to PRO Expeditionary Troops requested thrt an outline be "orep^red by the writers -?nd presented to LanFors conne-.nder for tactical B.ccur<c cy check before they departed, but such n procedure wb impossible to cornel" vith because of the prior

departure of the nen.

T'T COMMENTS

(c.) The public relations and photogrrphic personnel, both officer1 md enlisted, in Corps and the divisions -produced the greatest quantity of public relations materiel ever L:^thered curing a Mr.rine Corps operation. The quality of this inaterirl was c :;ceptione.lly high. This was accomplished by them despite tne severe conditions which prevailed throughout the cam;oaiun and despite he:^j casualties. Three combat correspondents md three photographers were billed in action. Five public rel tions personnel pnd twelve photographers are bnown to hfve been

¦wounded in ;¦; ction. This does not include at lerst four men who were wounded but returned to r-ct on after receiving treatment.

(b) The assistant PRO j-.-voeditiona?."7 Troo'os, Lieu— tenant Venn, md the enlisted pc sonnel, Master Technical Sergeant Black, Coroorrls Kiely and Bishir iipr., 'oerformed their c. -ties in m outs ta. ndinr: mann cr.out stand inr: manner.

(c) Aft^r the -oroblem of f;ettin" co"oy regularly delivered to the flagshiT^ was solved, ev^ry res"oonsibiliL-y to ci'rrilian war correspondents was carried out by LanFors a no. C.i*r f.sion "oublic relations sections, as defined in- the annex to th

¦

oT>er.r tion •¦¦»lan. The civilian correspondents Tere high in their praise of cooperation to them by M-rinethe pnc.1 help extended Cor^s Toublic relations' - •oersonnel ashore, ces'oite the f ' ct Corps

Tand division PPC s T ere handicapped by lack of ecui'omer.t and ¦0 e'-" sonnel.

\j RSCCIf^-.'NDATIONS

(a) The increasing numbers of civilian war Corresoondents assigned to cover operations in the Pacific, plus the increased responsibilities \lacea upon cli"ision -.nd Corps oublic relations sections by Cincpac and ComrhibsPac, make it obvious 'ciir.t changes must be made in the Organisation and the Tables of AllowFnAlMtft'|h|l"fflkfiß^j|îH««cr-.s sections of corps

„ 14

J_hTiQ. divisions. it(j is recommended th-t The Jr"bles of Orgrnizaion be altered to provide one ol^r1: rot f rinimum of four gen

eral duty personnel in r> section pnddivision public relrti'ons two clerks ;;na c minimum of eight general cj^% %s©u so nnel during ooere tions in the corps public relations sections. This additiOijp.l personnel Is needed to rqt, as tL.yi^r-s/ 'srîed escorts and messengers 'go enable the public 'rel dons sections to properly t^ke Cf-re of civilian war correspondents, p£ outlined in the ComPhibsPrc Annex for the Iwo Operation. Trbles of Allowances-should provide p ir.inirnuni of two jeeps p<--r section, blrck-out tenta.-ve , Colem«n Ipnroe, cots, blankets, m& sr.rll fielr7. stores, to plso e'nrbie division f.ncl cor-os sections to

' public relations

crrrs' out vhrt is ex^Dected of ther. by Cincorc ?nd ComPhibsPrc

(b) . It is felt th-'t the LanFors PRO should be; relieved cf the

'

responsibility of coord inrtinr-.; the trrnsmission of coioy from the berch to the CincTDrc ""e^resentr tlve- pboprd the ,flrrshiô until such time ps Cor-os he'-'dauprters ':oes ashore-. The res-oonsibility be -olpced until thrf tir-:-.e in the hr-nds of erch division PRO.

(c) It is reconnended thrt the -oress bont nlrn, ps

used ;it Iwo for the trrnsnission of ciTrili-?..n md service 'oublic relations nnterial from the be- oh to the flrj-rship, be revised. It is recomraended thrt future operrtion "olp.ns -o2ô Tide th^t personnel of the Kprine oublic relations sections •• shore be utilized ¦¦& nesserucers to trpns'oort civilian mcl service "oublic rel'-tions material fror?. r central point rshore to the flr..:shio, utilising press boots, if possible, but any other convenient items of transportation in the event of the oress boat failure. It is likewise recommended th^t tlie -oublic .velr'tions sections r shore specify during the operation the points to which the Dress boat should be sent to meet messenger a pnd tc 'olcY. up md deliver civilian co: respondents de.siririK trms-oortt tion between the be-',.ch and snips lyin^.. off-shore.

r(d) '

It is felt thrt it is unnece"as?r3 for ri Cincprc public rel: tions officer to be p. shore to coordinate the hrndlin of ci--ilian copy.

(c) Adverse weather conditions, enemy potion, fug.

other extenuating circumstances make it irior cticpl for press sen planes to be relied upon for the tr.-nsportr.tion of press

mftetripl from the scene of the operation to Oincprc. Therefore, it is recommended thrt future operrtionrl "olpns pro-icle

'plternrte neons of returning press r>.r teripl to Oincppc when seaplanes .pre unable to operrte. Cprrier-bpsed Planes, destroyers pnd destroyer escorts for this plternrte.are su :va'ested

ui ?AYI:2

ffArtEnclosure HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS

FIFTH FLEET.

I

-Fleet Marine Force, Public Relations Officer, is re-s-oon sible for the most expeditious handling of Hhe following Marine co^y after it has been brought aboard the command

¦shirr. -'¦'

1. All still film. 2. All press corjy w/oix.3. All 16mm motion Picture film.

The above cooy will be forwarded to the Director, Division of Public Relations, via the Commander in.Chief, Pacific-Fleet (Public Relations) in other words PEARL

'4, All t>ress copy not w/pix. 5.. All radio film and wire recordings. 6. All art material. 7. All 35 mm. motion Picture film.

The above copy will be forwarded to the Director, Division of Public Relations, via the Comnander in Chief, Pacific-Fleet (Public Relations) Advance Headquarters in other words G-UdM.

All copy will be sent from the scene of operations via seaplane or destroyer to Guam in -olainly marked pouches. Material for Pearl will be transhi-ryoed from Guam without delay and without further handling.

II

During this oêrntion, all "hot coioy'1 - Dress, radio or-lohoto will be made available to correspondents aboard the command shit). Division and Cor-os Public Relations Officers will decide what constitutes hot cor>y that is suitable for distribution -to civiian correspondents for immediate release. The co6y will be packaged se-oaretely and forwarded to the FFF Pub-

ylic Relations Officer clearly marke d as hot cor>y. The following procedure will then be employed aboard the command shir):

Sufficient copies will be made by the Fl-tF PAC to service all war correspondents attached to the flagship (one copy to ep.ch of the foreign news service correspondents and one to the network representative) and any correspondents temporarily aboard. A copy will be given to the ComFhibsPac PRO and one will be retained in the reference file to be kept in this office. The original will be submitted to,. the Fleet Censor for censorship before Copies "are made for* distribution. The original will be forwrrded to its proper destination without de-_ lay, stamped "'J-'his article made avrilpble to civilian war

¦"correspondents at the scene of o-oerrtions.

More

RADIO COPYI Only film recordings can be made available to the network representative^ because -there are no facilities aboard shit) for re-recording wires. However, out,pjtrnding wire recordings should be

'• thfc^*o vpI'ube wcEfel-evailpbleindicff£e£U£s to the networks at Guam. M^;V;U JVV^tyfl^RS

In the case of film recordings, Division and Conos PRO's will indicate outstanding frames on the film recording dot>esheets. These frames will be re-recorded by the CINCPAC radio officer aboard the fl*gshir> and offered for immediate transmission to the network representative. The original will be forwarded to Guam with the notation on the dot>e sheet rs to which frames have been m^de pvpii^ble a-t the scene of opera

tions.

PHOTO COPY: All still -ohoto cor>y designated as hot, will be processed aboard the comnand shit), censored by CriTCPAC, and sent to Guam to be wa.de available to the -ohoto pool. The original negative will then be forwarded to the Director, Division of Public Relations.

11l

Whenever possible, letter of transmittal and segregation of copy for CIWCPAG Rear or Advance willbe accomplished on the beach. In the initial stages of the operation, it is anticipated that PRO's on the be-ch may only be able to get the copy aboard ship and will hrve no time to make letters of tra.nsmittal or segregate co-oy. The processing will then be done aboard the commend snip, l-.imeographed letters of transmittal haye 1

been made to help speed the processing.

All incoming copy will be logged. Data will include date and time received, source, originator, story or film peck numbers, dete and time forwarded and destination, .followed by an itimized breakdown. Co^y received will be totalled at the end of each dry.

•A record (made on mimeographed forms -orovidedjof all Marine material processed by this office, will be submitted to the PRO, ComPhibsPac daily. In so f^r ps it is possible, PRO's on the beach will be informed, drily as to the disposition of their cor)y.

IV

A file of background material has been issued to all correspbndents aboard the command shir>. Additional coioies will be ket)t on hand for the benefit of all visiting correspondents. Whenever trocro com^nders or units covered by the reference material are mentioned in communiques or situation reports, the attention of the correspondents will be invited to this material. ¦¦AM*! A **<?% *%**??*&%

A situation report from the Co ire.priding o-enercl, G^-2 end G-3 will be obtained daily for; the correspondents* Gonr.uniques, situation reports, hot copy and reference mrteriol will be fcpt in this office and made readily available to all correspondents. Request for Officers will immediatelyinterviews with Marine Staff be brought to the attention of the FMF, PRO, who will make the necessary arrangements for their meeting with interested correspondent.

V all possibleAll hands will stand reacLy to furnish aid and in

formation to the civilian correspondents and to the ComPhibsPac PRO.

US M C

\

020~/155 HSADQJJA-TERS EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS,

FIFTH FLEET.

17 * February, 1945.

Wa r Go r"•"esid ondents.

1. The Marine Coros Public Relations Office will maintain a roug:i situation map in room 125 which will be continuously posted upon the receipt of periodic situation reports supplied ~by G--2 and G--3.

«•-•¦ » As soon r.s the daily G-c and G--2 sum-Maries are completed (rourhly between ?000 and 2200) this office will mahe the pertinent frets therein available to the correspondents.

o. Arrangements ha T 'e been mrde for PRO ComPhibsPac and this office, to supply each correspondent with a copy of'Cincpac Communique^ as soon rs it i& received aboard ship.

Whenever possible the contents of any operating ola.ns for the following dry willbe i^^de available to the War correspondents as an aid in their olanninc if they contemplate £olnf ashore. The best r:uide as to where action is scheduled can be rotten from the Corps PRO at press headcuarters when you go ashore.

Every effort willbe raade to arrange interviews with the GomândinK General and his staff, as re-cue sted, notice of the rime rr\d. location of such interviews will be j::i-ren all correspondents.to

Cr~> Division and Corps Public Relations Officers on the beach will make all Marine Combat Correspondent material aâilpble to the Civilian co-respondents operating with their units.

-7. . in addition outstanding Marine material not used by the civilians ashore will be segregated by Marine PRO's ashore and forwarded to this office for distribution to

correspondentsWar aboard ship. All such material will be given to both the news services and networks representatives,

6. A full reference file of (a) Background information of k-nr.e runics and •Troop commanders. (b) Communiques, -(o') Op^~a-tional summaries. (d) Marine Combat Correspondent;Hot Gjpy; will be hept in :his office to assist War correspondents writing, round-up stories, etc.

Mere.

q 01 , |lifv|^f^0/2"V\^,^lsll-1 24 hours a cwy

and s11-rids ready to |L'^K36:'ir»e.dtonc.er-*Tj&; i^^m ™ey , at any time in matters Dertnin'in- to the Marine Jonos,

C. P.. PAYNE

\

/

2295-30 Ser. 01837-45

OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER . \*OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER . \*HEADQUARTERS . ' ", ".-. ."HEADQUARTERS . ' ", ".-. ."

%%EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS (TF-.56). ,EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS (TF-.56). ,v 'v

\ :\' :

Fleet Marino Forces,Fleet Marino PacificForces, Pacific **HHHHV April,HHHHV 1945April, 1945

From:-From:- The SignalThe OfficerSignal OfficerTo :To : The Commanding General.The Expeditionary Troops,ExpeditionaryCommanding General. Troops,

(TF 56)(TF 56)

--Subject:Subject: Signal Communications Operation IWO JIMASignal ;Communications Operation IWO JIMA;Islands,Islands,VolcanoVolcano

Enclosures :Enclosures : (A) Daily Communications Journal -(A) (TF 56)(TFDaily Communications Journal- 56)

(B) Procedure, Joint Communications and Message(B) Procedure, Joint Communications and MessageCenter, 'U.S.S. Eldorado, Iwd Jima Operation.Center, 'U.S.S. Eldorado, Iwd Jima Operation.

(C) Training(C) MemorandumTraining Memorandum(D) Joint Communication Office and Message (Tenter,(D) Joint Communication Office and Message (Tenter,--

U.S.S. Eldorado Watch Schedules.U.S.S. Eldorado Watch Schedules.(E) Procedure for Handling Teletype Traffic(E) Procedure for Handling Teletype Traffic(F) Traffic(F) GraphsTraffic Graphs(G) Charts(G) Charts

1.1. This report is divided into the followingThis sectionsreport is divided into the following sections

I. PlanningI. PhasePlanning Phase11. Training11. PhaseTraining Phase111. Approach111. PhaseApproach PhaseIV. AssaultIV. SummaryAssault SummaryV. ConclusionsV. Conclusions

2. The report outlines the preparation and execution of signal communications as performed during tho Iwo Jima operation. Unlike the Marianas report, which included three (3) assault phases, this summary is concerned with only one, the capture and employment of Iwo Jima, and the role that signal communications played toward that achievement.

I. ?LANI-;ii-;C- PHASE This is a responsibility of the Corps Signal Section, however a few items are mentioned hero because of their interest to all echelons.

A. Supply

1. No outstanding difficulties were experienced in equipping landing forces with basic signal equipment. While the

* *¦ ¦' " 'vAv-wJ*

•B^H^HiWßlljpCr OTO CG- EXTRO ( TF 56) SSR. 01837-45 DATED-1APRIL, 1945 re^ Signal Gommunication Operations IWO JIMA (Continued)

i*

p

SCK-500 series were not placed in amphibious tractors due to a lack of time, there was no shortage of frequency-modulated equipment, such as the SCR-300, 528, 608, and 610. Some special equipment was obtained from CinCpac's radio pool. Allparticipating units were asked to obtain crystals for specified frequency. Supplemented by Naval facilities, a crystal grinding team of the Sixth Base Depot xras able to furnish the necessary crystal requirements.

2. Detachments of all garrison forces which could be usefully employed in the assault were embarked with their equipment in assault shipping. Radar facilities for early air warning and ground control interception, communication facilities for the Joint Communication Center, air field communications for the AACS, wire construction, and G-ropac equipment for beach-visual communications wore all included with the assault shipping. A few items of equipment were borrowed temporarily from the garrison forces for use by" Corps units.. This equipment included that which could not be provided through Marine Corps sources, such as AN/TRC-1, for use in the radar-reporting net of the landing forces, two DUKVJS equipped with SCR- 399, and rubber-covered five-pair cable for Corps telephone" trunk lines.

3. Though replenishment equipment was not available in desired quantities, there were no serious shortages noted in the initial allowances of the units engaged. Each signal unit was loaded with thirty (30) days signal supply. Such items as spare parts for use in repair and maintenance work, however, have never been furnished in adequate amounts. As a result; the requirements for re-supply of batteries, FM-type radio and spare parts as provided were excessive in view of initial "pool" allowances for Corps and signal units. This was added insurance againstpossible shortages during the early phases of the assault. All figures concerning re supply and replenishment ifere based upon the specific number of participating troops.

4. Supply plans for Iwo Jima operation made pro vision for additional allowances of dry batteries and telephone wires. Thos<3 were authorized to all units in a quantity equal to fifteen (15) per cent of the initial allowances. Secondly,

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* -.

tBBHHHHHHHJpiG O TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 A?Rj.L, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations n IWQvJIMA(Continued) f ," ¦*'?.,

f ; . \-U V'f

division signal company pools of equipment that might be subjected to mechanical defects were increased as much as possible, such as the raclio set, model MZ which was issued in excess of allowances.

5. Installation of the AN/TRC-1 was made on each of the command ships the USS AUBURN (AG-C-10) and USS ELDORADO (AGC-ll) as well as the USS ESTES (AGC-12). Its purpose is to provide a communication channel from the shore-based air warning squadrons. This equipment is calibrated for use on ninety (90) megacycles. It may also be used for direct radio-telephone connection between Flag Officers. Distribution was made to Corps and Division Headquarters.

S # For experimentation, one Navy type Mark IV van, mounted on a two and one-half (Zi) ton 6x6 truck was made available. The equipment consisted of two metal "houses", one containing transmitter equipment and the other carrying receiver equipment. As a component of the van, a TCZ transmitter having ten (10) pre-set quick-shift channels with a rated power output of fifty (50) to one hundred (100) watts on both CW and voice was installed.

The following equipment is included in the Mark IV vans:

Transmitter Van

1 Transmitter, Model TCK 1 Transmitter, 2'lodel TCS 5 Radio T&R Equipments Model TCS

Receiver Van

2 Radio Receivers, Model RBK 2 Radio Receivers, Model RBG1 Radio Receiver, Model RBM 1 Radio Receiver, Model RAO 1 Radio T&R Equipment Model TCS

7. Study of the objective made evident that all major

ICx 0 1)G £X!ERO <TF b6) SER. D1837-46 DATED -1 APxLii,, 194^re: Signal Communication Operations IWO JIMA (Continued)

v-rire lines would have to be either buried or installed atop lance "Dole 8, In conformity with the latter, a total of two thousand .(2,000) 2x4 !s of twenty (20) foot length were authorised to each division as signal equipment* An allowance of five (5) plows,(LO-S1), were made available for burying wire.

8, Since the needs of the landing forces, in the past, have not oeen satisfied by a thirty (30) day plan of replenishment, it was deemed necessary to provide other means. of supply. Initial signal re-supply was based upon the use of a floating dump which included items that would be in critical demand during early phases of the campaign. Tine wê intended, primarily, for emergency replenishment, since battle expenditure does not follow totals enumerated by Marine Corps average replenishment rate. The equipment was loadsd on LST 641 so it could be landed at any desired time, either subsequent to H-hour, or before larger landing craft could safely approach the beacfr.

9. In addition, signal supply replenishment was enlarged by use of the air delivery section of the Seventh Field Depot at Saipan. Automatic re-supply shipments were to be used, as in the past, with the elimination of standard blocks based on a single group of organizations. To build and maintain a gradual reserve and variety of stock, thirty-three (33) per cent in excess of the authorized re-supply rate was provided in each twenty (20) day shipment „

-.0. loc Pools and stocks of important signal equipment were Issued .to division signal companies and the Corps Signal Battalion in an effort to effect immediate replacement and repair of such equipment, few exceptions/ personnel of the Eighth •Field Depot Signal Company were assigned, Initially, to enlarge shore parties. Their duties were to operate the landing force spare parts replacement and signal repair facilities during the assault, distribution of signal supplies in the floating dump, and control and distribution of signal re-supply shipments. The Corps signal battalion was also allowed the use of the mobile repair facilities of the field depot.

-4 ~ ri'x

i

° " T¦HfIKWWHHHHHHF1 To C EXTRO (TF 56^ SSR * 01837-45 bated Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA

(Continued.)

11. Since amphibious assaults have proven tho effective-n ss of coordinated employment of small infantry units and tanks, tho SCR- 300 and exterior sound powered telephones were installed in tanks for more adequate communication with infantry troops.

12. One army DUKW company was attached to each division. The army T/A authorizes one SCft-610 radio to each company and each platoon-command vehicle. There appeared to be a reasonable requirement for command control within these organizations, so the Corps DUKW companies xforo equipped in a similar manner.

13. The Philadelphia Depot of Supplies developed >

machinery for winding wire, W-130, with a pre-twist in coils for high-speed laying. The first model was sent to tho Sixth Base Depot in time to provido limited quantities for test in this operation. In order to determine practicable uses, the Fourth Division was directed. to test not less than one hundred (lOO) miles of the wire. The tests were to include laying from air«». planes, all types of vehicles, and the possibility for laying by use of radio-controlled planes and rocket launchers.

14. Captured enemy signal equipment was to be tallied in organizational periodic reports to landing force and division signal officers. Attached JICPOA teams wore designated to collect and advise the disposition of tho captured equipment.

B. Connuni cations

1# Flans for the capture and employment of Iwo Jina began on 12 October 1944, when the first information was re-, ceived. The three (3) divisions scheduled for the assault were distributed as follows:

a. The Third Division remained -at G-uan. b. Tho Fourth Division was based on Maui. c. The Fifth Division hall arrived at Hawaii

after completion of their basic training at Camp Pendleton, California.

¦p^r*. r~; ~.3pf* ?*¦*.¦' W¦

%

5

¦HHHHHHHBSIG' OTO CG- EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 'Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA

(Continued)

2. The task of coordinating the plans of the Landing Force with subordinate shore parties remained the responsibility of the Corps Signal Officer. The planning staff of the he&dr quarters section consisted of the signal officer, four (4) lieutenant colonels, three (3) captains, and four (4/ lieutenats. Personnel of the signal battalion were also enjoined within the organization.

3. The communication plan, as prepared by the Corps headquarters section, had to conform with the communications plans of other naval and air forces* This required close integration and constant liaison with all agencies assigned to the operation. Each item of the communication plan had to be cleared and understood in all respects. Among those agencies with whom continual contact and clearance was maintained were:

CinCPAC ComFifthFleet ComPhibsPac ComSupÂircraft ComG-enThirdMarDiv ComGenFourthMarDiv ComG-enFifthMarDiv TransDivCommanders ComGenPOA Island Commanders (Garrison Forces) 7th AAF

4. As. issued by CinCPOA, the Central Area- Pacific Communication Plan and Doctrine (short title CentComTwo, with annexes,) outlined the communication plan for the operation.

lf6BAnne* prepared by and in cooperation with agencies committed to the execution of the operation, provided the landing force plan. It consisted of extracts from other annexes and was consolidated for easier reference.

C Organization.

1. Impetus was a<3£e& to a realisation that, by

~Xr6^ -*

!~*/*\*-TUUîJ IDIITTIALLTR SIG 0 TO CG- EXTRO (TF 55 ) SER. 01837-45 DATED

re; -1 APRIL, 1945 Signal Communication Operations - iyjjj JIMA (Continued) , i. • ,;.;Si .X4*i*« -.*hI

employing pickecj elements of the garrison forces within the initial assault, more efficiency and a more rapid exchange of responsibilities could be attained once the beach-head was secured.' Previous operations had proven the feasibility of the combination, particularly during the Marianas. As far as organizational plannihg was concerned, this stipulated a larger amount of coordination and the necessity of forming a provisional signal group under the Corps Signal -Officer.

2, The organization of the Provisional Signal Group consisted of personnel of the following units:

a. VAC Corps Sig, Bn. b. Bth Field Depot Sj,g, Co, c. Ist Separate Radio Int. Plat. d. Shore Party Comm. Unit c. 7th Fighter Cornm, AWS Det. f. 568th Air Warning Bn. g. 726th Search Air Warning Co, h. Det. #44, 70th AACS i.Unit 434 of G-ropac 11 j. 49th Signal Construction Bn.

Totaling 104 Officers and 1148 Enlisted.

3. Signal officers of the garrison forces were assigned to the Corps Signal Headquarters for staff duties* This gave assurance that the garrison units would be given adequate consideration. As covered elsewhere in this report, all garrison forces which were to be employed in the assault phase where embarked with their equipment in assault shipping.

4. At the completion of the Marianas Campaign, all Corps units were below authorized strength. Casualties, rotation and promotions were responsible for nearly a fifty (50) p@r cent turn-over of communication personnel. However, with a sinalJcontingent of battle-seasoned troops and an aggressive training program, a state of preparedness was attained. At embarkation,

CG EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837~45 DATEDVRRHHHHHBHBBtt TO 1 APRIL, 1945 reîH^nal Communication Operations IWO JIHA (Continued)

j

all units irere near the authorized level of five (5) per cent over strength.

5. Seventy Five (75) additional communication personnel were attached to the divisions in groups for assault replacements. While it was understood that they would not fillany existing vacancies before the beginning of the operation, they were available for training purposes as directed by division signal officers.

6. Diversions were made from the Table of Organization in regard to enlarged personnel requirements. While a few troops were available in divisional areas, the majority were obtained from the Corps Signal Battalion. Following is a listing of personnel not authorized by existing tables:

a. Seven (7) radio operators, four (4) to the Second Bomb Disposal Company and three (3) to the Provisional LVT group headquarters were assigned respectively.

b. Pending further action in the revision of JASCO allowances by FMF PAC, thirteen (13) officers and one hundred ninety-six (196) enlisted were assigned to division a.nd Corps naval gunfire liaison teams.

c. One (l) officer and forty-five (45) enlisted were assigned to each division signal company to augment wire construction and the handling of portable equipments.

d. One (l) officer and eighteen (id) enlisted '¦ere assigned to the Provisional Artillery Group headquarters.

?

c. Additional personnel were placed aboard control vessels to operate radios and radip-teletypewriter circuits. Their employment, however, was of temporary nature.

7. Navajo Indian talkers were utilized as code-talker's between division, Corps and Expeditionary Troops Headquarters as well as within various units of Corps Eeadquarters itself.

- -8

|w^

CC3- EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re : Sig Communication Operations - IV/O JIMA (Continued)

t

'¦4

8. Organization and Operation aboard the Headquarters shiio

a. It was planned that the Signal Detachment,Task Force 55, would operate in conjunction with the USS ELDORADO 1 s communication personnel as well as a similar group of the Fifth Amphibious Forces (TF 51 and 52).

No radio equipment was embarked.

b. The detachment's communication office -ocrsonnel included eight (8) officers, two (2) message center chiefs, two (2) supervisors, two (2) clerks, twelve (12) messengers, and four (4) teletype operators.

'

Radio personnel consisted of one (l) officer, six (6) radio supervisors, thirty (30) radio operators, three (3) teletype operators, and two (2) Navajo talkers. (Operation and procedure of the Joint Communication Center is outlined in Enclosure (B)),

c. The Marine detachment permanently stationed aboard the USS ELDORADO -consisted of four (4) officers, and thirty (30) enlisted men. Other than two (2) officers, who acted in the capacity. of C3os, and twelve (12) enlisted personnel in the code room, the detachment was used for ship and Flag duties exclusively, The fact that such detachments are placed aboard AG-Cs for the purpose of operating landing force tactical circuits and are not made available for this purpose, necessitates Landing Force Commanders to embark a larger staff than would be normally necessary.

11. TRAINING PHASE.

This section is divided into four sub-divisions namely:

A Shake down cmise. S< Rehearsal (Hawaiian Area).

.C Rehearsal (Forward Area). ,D. Troop Training.

-.AJ Shakedown cruise. (IS -22 December).

Pf^F^ W(f?{gyfBFi£'hisrß and thirty (30) enlisted

*« — -• 9

¦ 0 TO CG- EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED ignal Communication Operations Iv/O JIIIA

( Continued

reported for temporary duty aboard thec^^-îcation personnelUSa ELDORADO on 9 December, 1944. Because there were insufficient radio operators available to FHF PAC, twenty- three (23) men of the First Radio Intelligence Platoon detachment were ordered aboard on 15 De comber. It was intended that the detachment would join its parent organization in the forward area once their services aboard the command ship were completed.

2. The purpose of the shakedown cruise was to provide, maintain and execute a training program in preparation for the operation. The availability of the USS ELDORADO granted, the Signal Detachment, Task Force 56, an early introduction to the facilities of this command ship. T'ftiile in port, the training schedule was restricted in scope due to (l) embarkation details,(2) initial acquaintance of personnel to their new quarters, and (3) the complete formulation of training plans. However, upon leaving port, a detailed program, designed to acquaint each man with an assigned tr.sk, was already underway. An average of nine (9) hours a day was maintained in formal schooling.

3. Radio Schooling.

a. All radio personnel, on 10 December, began a four and one-half (4^) day period of instruction on radio-telephone procedure. Especially prepared lessons and examinations were provided. These covered the use of prosigns, messageaddress, re-addressing messages (double headings), use of operating signals, calling and ansxfering, repetitions, corrections, verifications, acknowledgements, the executive method,'"Fn, "I", and "R" methods, procedure phrases, group counting, authorized abbreviations, defensive measures against interception and direction' finding, radio-telephone security, circuit discipline and operator training, radio deception, uso and application of the shackle authentication system ana shackle nume ralral ci")her.

b. Training on voice circuits was held over a period of four (4) days employing the ships sound-powered telephone system. The circuits were continuously monitored by qualified NCOs in order to correct errors. The use of a magnetic

10

MpBJIHHHBHHIiBb O TO CG- EXTHO (TF 56) SER, 01837-45 DATED-Signe.l Communication Operations IWO JlrIA

(Continued) _i

" u•**"¦*v-jJri '-^

wire recorder was made available and each operator was given an opportunity to use the device. This provided him with the advantage of hearing his own voice, thereby enabling him to correct his articulation, speed and phrasing.

c. On 18 December, an exercise was held to conduct tests and drill on landing force frequencies of the Fifth Amphibious Corps, This afforded opportunity for the operators to put to practical use the material that had been presented during periods of classroom instruction.

Aboard the USS AUBURN (AG-C-10) were Marine personnel from VAC;representing Headquarters, Landing

t Force

Command, Attached to the USS ELDORADO were Marine personnel representing Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops, TF 56, Ship personnel of the USS ESTES (AG-C-12) were used as required to maintain intercept watches on designated frequencies.

d. Circuits lorescribed for the drill were 5

¦Expeditionary Troops Command 2956 kcs (V) Expeditionary Troops Command 5605 kcs (CW) Landing Force Command 29.2 mca (V) Landing Force Command 2404 kcs (CW) Landing Force Command 1918 kcs (V) Landing Force Liaison Net 5940 kcs (V) Corps Arty Group Command 1982 kcs (V) Corps Arty Group Fire Direction 2862 kcs (V) Corps Arty Air Spot 4965 kcs (V)

c. 'Monitering of all circuits during the exercises provided information for the following observations:

(1.) Faulty and incorrect use of shackle code. (2.J Lack or misuse of authentication. (3.) Improper use of call signs, (4.) Interchanging of voice and CW circuits as

prescribed by the initial training order.

°T0 CG" EXTHO (TF 5S^ BER * 01837-45 DATED"^ '"VKPKSP^PBHB SIC' w"A7l^rL7w'""T"A71^rL7" I*94^?e: Signal Communication Operations - IWO JII-1A

( Continued)— — •¦• *-f.* «~ .«•—*-¦• *^ —» .^ •*» •*• ••*

— —•*

— m *•— «^ -*•• -*• y*«

— — —«?

— —• *^*"" —•—• * * *

ii-^x' * ii*

v - rv^ >

f. Following the exercises, "SNOWFLAKE", a simulated operation was held by communication personnel, in an effort to smooth out rough edges on operating procedure and authentication. Drillmessages were prepared in advance, using varied situations. Some were made with purposely false authentication and incorrect call signs. Monitoring NCOs attempted to effect "enemy" deception. In all cases, the primary motive was to ascertain the wariness and procedure habits of radio personnel.

4. Message Center Instruction.

a. Personnel of the message center underwent similar courses of instruction. On 10 December, school was held on the working procedure of the radio-teletype with the assistance of Ltt Hollis, instructor from Buships, Emphasis was placed on factors with which an operator must be thoroughly familiar, such as methods of establishing initial contact, variations of teletype procedure, use of two (2) or more machines on a circuit, and the examination of possible trouble sources.

b. in port, radio teletype operators were continually working a drill net between the USS ELDORADO aha. USS AU"3U?a", Operators from this detachment were sent aboard the latter ship in order that all hands would have a greater opportunity to participate. At sea, contacts were established with the USS SSTSS and tJSS AUBURN, and the maximum working range was found to be eighteen (18) miles.

c. Large quantities of dummy traffic were preloared and transmitted over the radio-teletypewriter. Complete logs uers kept of all transmissions. These were analyzed with the operators in daily- critiques.

d. Men assigned as messengers were kept busy after they had become acquainted with the ship. They expeditedthe delivery of all ship fs traffic, thus affording a practicalintroduction to their future duties.

c. Teletype operators were place on twenty-a ' four (24) hour schedule operating the drill net. AG-C 11 acted

° fH^l^^îHH^- SIG T0 CG SXTRO (TF 56) SSR. 01837-45 DATED T^ Sf^jULi" y9y945 re: Signal Communication Operations - IVJO JIMA

( Continued)

as ".let Control. A two section watch bill was placed in force.

f. Since personnel attached to the code room had only two (2) weeks instruction with the electric coding machines prior to the shakedown cruise, they were kept busy processing normal ship traffic and preparing dummy messages to be used on the Flit1 administrative net. This allowed continued practice in coding and decoding. Personal instruction was given on garbles occur ing in decryption. Each code clerk was responsible for coding breaks, and these were checked daily by training officers.

g. All supervisors and KCOs were briefed on the working procedure and use of CenComTwo,

h. At the conclusion of the training phase Hie following was evident"

(lj The coding board was not sufficiently trained to handle the anticipated traffic.

{2) The services of an experienced radio-teletype maintainance man would be necessary.

(3.) Since the 3SR teletype installed for the shakitional schooling and

circuit edown crupractice

was ise was

not addneeded.

3 REHEARSAL (HAWAIIAN AREA).

1. Between 13 January and 18 January, this detachment participated in rehearsal exercises aboard the USS ELDORADO,

2, The following is a condensation of communications during the rehearsal. In an effort to stimulate a higher degreeof perfection these observations were made.

3, The examples listed below are representative illustrations of varying procedures, and were presented for perusal and discussion during the period of rehabilitation.

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>IG 0 TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SSR. 01337-45 DATED-FaPRIL, 1945 re : Signal Communication Operations IWO JIIIA. (Continued)

4. For identification purposes, units have been substituted for actual call signs used.

RADIO

1. Net Discipline and Procedure.

a. Viewed as a whole, radio procedure and net discipline irere good throughout. On 13 January there were numerous minor discrepancies, as was to be expected. 3y the end of the second day of the exercises these errors dropped markedly.

b. A total of 43 discrepancies were observed duringthe four-day exercise. Generally, they fell into the followingcategories :

(l) Lack of security.(2) Improper use of authentication.(3) Incorrect use of shackle code. (4) Use of unauthorized call signs.

c. On January 15 the dispatches on the operational circuits reached a peak of 715.

Location of Total Frequency Circuit Receiver Dls'oatches

29.2 (V) LanForCommand (T&R) Joint Operations 85 5940 (V) LanForLialson (I) Joint Operations 51 5605 (CW) SxTrs Command (T&R) Radio I 0 2404 (C\l) LanForCommand (I) Radio I 15 2956 (V) ExTrs Command (T&R) Radio I 39 1913 (V) LanForCommand (I) Radio I 59

(Ctf)5780 4thDivTactical Command (I) Radio I 562590 (Cl/) sthDivTacticalCommand (I) Radio I 7 2275 (V) 4thDivShoreFartvLat. (I) Radio I 15 2154 (V) sthDivShorePartyL at. (I) Radio I 0 2932 V) 4thDivLogControl (I) Radio I 131 2304 (V) SthDivLogControl (I) Radio I 95

(V) (I)27.4 4thDivCommand Radio I 55 27.8 (V ) sthDiyCommand. .(l) . . Radio I 90 27,2 (J)" 'Emergency Common (I) Radio I 7

Total 715 - 14

IG 0 TO CG EXTRO (TF 55) SSR. 01837-45 DATED 1 AFR.IL; 1945 re : Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA (Continued)

No delay in deHMy was encountered. The bulk of this traffic was delivered by messenger. The Communication Officer of CoiiiPhibsPac felt that the use of the 3SR teletype circuit should be limited to only such traffic that would be of interest to the several commanders.

2. Voice Circuits.

a. Voice circuits furnished excellent material for analysis. A few examples of repetitious, unnecessary and incorrect transmissions are recorded:

The. following was observed on 1918 kes (January 14) :

1405 Hq LanFor v ADC sth MarDiv 141258VW BT (I-iESSAGE) IF YOU Tf!SH I"JILL RPT MSG X

1406 ADC sth MarDiv vHq LanFor DO RPT X

b. On the same date, the following was noted on 27.8 kes:

1350 Hq sth Div v CommO sth Div TTILL CHECK OUT OF NET IN 2-3 MIN X

v Hq sth Div R AR -1355 CommO sth Div v Hq sth Div WHY DO YOU HAVE TO CHECK OUT OF NET X

Hq sth Div v CommO sth Div HAVE TO MOVE SET T7KICH NECESSITATES CHECKING

"¦"•OUT OF NET X (next transmission not received due to interference)

1358 CommO sth Div v Hq sth Div GET OUT OF NET AND-STAY OUT OF NET HAVE NO BUSINESS IN THEREACKNOWLEDGE X

3, Net Circuits,Control

a. On 2404 kes. the net control station (Hq LanFor)

TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SSR. 01837-45 DATED-1 APSIIL, 1945 reTsignal Communication Operations TWO JIMA (Continued)

'' V W - "* , ! ¦ II I \

-V' •XT

confused the calls of the forward and rear echelon units on 15 January, as is indicated in the example below:

IS3O Hq LanFor v Rear Ech ADC G-rp 4th Div INT QSA X ADC Grp 4th Djy vHq LanFor QSA 5 X

¦q LanFor v Rear Sch ADC G-no 4th Div AR 1635 Hq LanFor v Adv Msg Ctr 4th Div IST QSA.K

Hq 4th Div v Hq LanFor QSA 5 AR

b. On 16 January transmitters on division and shore party frequencies were not properly calibrated. It appeared that net control stations made no effort to adjust the frequencies of the stations on the nets. There was a difference of 10 to 30 kilocycles noted. On several occasions the operator of the MG3 adjusted his transmitter to the signal of the subordinate station instead of instructing the subordinate stations to correct their calibration.

4. Authentication.

a. At varying intervals on January 14th and 15th, Hq. LanFor authenticated the last three letters of the word "unshackle". This was in violation to Annex "F", Cent Com Two, Part 111, 3(d) #

b. On January 14, the following was intercepted on 5780 kcs

1123 Hq 4th Div v RCT 23 141106 IMI141106VW— IfA DISPATCHED AT--(AOLV) IMI (AOLV) X

1125 RCT 23 v Hq 4th Div PSE CHECK THAT SHACKLE NUMBER IT ISNT POSSIBLE X

Hq 4th Div v RCT 23 ASI AR RCT 23 v Hq 4th Div R

1127 Hq 4th Div v RCT 23 .C IMI C WA AT—(AOJV) IMI (AOJV) X

1128 RCT 23 v Hq 4th Div R

RCT 23 changed only one letter of his four-letter shackle (sub

'*< :lyitiHa'CL'U -;>»,'¦ V ,S' V^ « Aiijii*"' '

gHMM^^^MMIHfI^HMMHHMtf

C(XHpHH|^|BICT 0 TO CG EXTRO (TF 55 ) SER. 01837-45 DATED IA?rUL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA. \ Continued)

stituting If j» for "L"). A better choice would have been a com-different authentication.

Authentication was fair, with evidence of confusion among operators. Attention should be called against unwarranted repetitions of authenticators without specified requests for the same.

Security*•« -w w5. t,'

a. Overall security was satisfactory. However, the following examples are worthy of attention:

Convent v Sawbones BT

HDC* COLIMAHDANT CROSSED LD FOR BEACH AT 1127 BT

(Intcpt/2404 kcs/15 Jan)

The rued for shackle is readily apparent, above, since the message reveals the presence of a high ranking officer as well as the time of his noveraents.

ExTroPac v ExTroPac Liaison Officer w LanPor

A 0 HARLEM REPORTS FRIENDLY TROOPS IN TARC-ST AREA 177 H-I-Dr- AND TARGET 186 Q-L at 1036 BT

Here a;;ain the shackle code should have been used. The location of friendly troops is given to the enemy. This could be of immeasurable value to them if, as during the 3AIr£N operation , the enemy succeeded in acquiring a copy of our operational map.

The following was intercepted on 27,8 mcs January 13;

1137 sth Div SigO v Div Arty 13 MarSigO WILL YOU PLEASE (JIVE THE Ist 13TH AND 26Tfi LETTERS OF THE SHACKLE I HAVENT BEEN

17

T>

0 TO CG SXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED- 91 A?Hj.L, 1945 re : Signal Communication Operations IV/O JIMA (Continued)

i

ABLE TO BREAK DOTJN ANY OF THESE SHACKLES X

Div Arty 13 Mar SigO v sth Div SigO AS _.AR 1140 Div Arty 13 Mar SigO v sthDiv SigO REFERENCE YOUR

LAST MESSAGE. . MNZ...K

sth Div SigO v Div Arty 13 MarSigO R. ...AH

5. Circuits (general).

a. On 13 January, Hq LanFor called Hq SxTrs on 5940 kcs at 0907 and asked for a long test. Hq LanFor was informed (via 29.2) that ExTrs would be unable to comply as he was only maintaining a listening watch. Nevertheless the requests from Hq LanFor were repeated at 0919 and 0939.

b. On the same date, the following message was sent to Hq LanFor hy ExTrs': "13th MARINE ARTY INTERFERING TfITH SCA TO 51.10 OH 5455." Interference was caused by the first harmonic of 2732 assigned to the artillery group. The 13th Marines was requested to change by LanFor to 2157 kcs. Upon complying with this request, interference was created, on the Fighter Direction c ircuit (209S kcs), due to the 13th Marines transmitter not being properly calibrated. This interference was soon corrected.

7. Call Signs.

a. It was noted that when Hq LanFor desired the use of "Indian Talkers" (on 29.2 mcs) the request was made by using the word "Arizona". This is in variance with Para. 6630, Appendix One, Annex "G-" of Cent Com Two.

b. On several occasions the "air observer" was indicatod by "A3LE OBOE." . FacCnll specifies that the tactical air Observer for the Fourth and Fifth Divisions will be referred to as "RAJ?'FL3S" and "SOCKEYE" respectively. The organizational call sign r. such as ABLE\O3OS;.HARLEM, is incorrect.

18

-"3- <"P

ICt 0 TO CO- EXTRO (TF 56) SSH. 01837-45 DATED 1 A? aiL, 1C45 re: Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIIIA (Continued) . . r

?, .r . ?*y» , n^

c. PacCall 71, part 7, page S3O, states that "liaison-" rillrillap-oend go <beams icr.ted append the call s ir?n ofxncica'cecl to tne their attached organization the following letters"

From the lianding Force L From the 3rd MarDiv LL3From the 4-th I-larDiv L4 From the sth I'iarDiv L5

¦At t/io same time, Appendix One, Annex "G", Cent Com Txfo. states that the "liaison teams T-illa/roend to the call si?n of their ora-anisat ion (Cl'.:), LOV2 (Voice) plus the number of the division or orn;ans.za'uioii to rhich attached" as listed. 11

To the Landing Force L To the 3rd MarDiv L3 To the 4th IârDiv L4 To the sth HarDiv L5

Therefore, as an example the call for the liaison team from the Lgndin-^: Force assigned to the Fourth Division can be exonerated t>To different TTa: rs, de-oencling uoon whether a station uses PacCall or Anne:- :r G-".

To conform with PacCall-: HARLEM LOV2

-To conform Annex "a" IG-LOO LOVE FOUR (i?ote-Pac 71 v/as later corrected to apcree with Annex ;'G-If )

S, Miscellaneous.

a. PCS 1403 will ua rd 'the following circuits when C SxTrs is embarked on that craft.

LanFor Command Net 29.2 (V) « SxTrs Common 2955 (V)

SxTrs Common 5605 (CW) Fleet Common 34.8 Control Vessels 30.8

1

(

i

1

J

1 .5

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0 TO CG- EXTRO (TF 56) S2R. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re : Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIl-iA (Continued)

?. „, -'- .. -._.

%~l ,&7a, ~ ¦

The call sign of PCS 1403 is EXAMPLE THREE.

b. The s th MarDiv used superseded loublications (CSP 1607). This may have been agreed upon within. the Division prior to Rehearsal. This Command was not informed.

0825/PRC/274/14Jan45RCT 26 (CoriDs Res)-V-Hq sth Div-P- 140740 PPDBA NFCJVI

-PPDBA-NFCJV

RADIO-TELETYPE (RATT)*

1. The radio-teletype net established between the Eldorado, Auburn, Bayfield and Cecil did not provide an effective communication channel during the rehearsal, but as the opera-tors gain experience and with improvements and corrections, the quip-men t could be utilized to advantage.

2. Principal weaknesses exposed during the period fell into four groups: (a) incapability of personnel (b) procedure problems (c) interference, and (d) difficulties encountered on "the beach. Each of these groups is discussed separately*

a. • Incapability of personnel:

Experienced radio-teletype operators or technicians were not initially available. Radio technicians aboard the respective ships assisted in the installation of the several eets, and performed the duties of teletype technicians aboard their ships. In addition, army personnel were obtained to provide one technician for each of the mobile teams.

Experienced teletype were andoperators recruited trained aboard ship during December on the basis of expected •. procedure to be employed, T;Jhen the approved SOP (Comphibspac serial 0022) was published (10 January 1945) it was found that changes would have to be made in the procedure used during the initial training. Due to this delay not all teams received sufficient in^p^^wa^tît, in all of the mechanics of the approved

4 i

i 21 FIDENTIAL

lC-9NNNHHHHHbiC- O TO CG- SXTRO (TF 55). SER. 01837-45 BATED-1 a?'Rj.L, 1945 re : Signal Communication Operations IWO JIMA (Continued)

SO?. The radio-teletype had not been previously employed by this force, consequently few of the difficulties could t>e anticipated,

b. Procedure Problems: >

)The basic principles of the SOt , upon which effective radio-teletype communications hinge, were not complied j with, particularly in. the following respects:

1(l) Stations habitually failed to turn off their

transmitters:

(a) After the initial callup.

v(b) After the transmission had been completed. (With the transmitter on, other stations are denied the use of the net) .

(2) Stations failed to use prosign "AR" to indicate end of transmission. Unless b.oth the originating and the receiving station indicate the completion of transmissions, other stations are not informed that the circuit is available.

(3) Much garbling and lost time was caused by stations attempting "callups" (or merely turning transmitter on) while the circuit was in use. The SOP specifies that when the net is in use, no station willattempt to break in. By inspecting his receiver log an operator can determine whether or not the circuit is clear* If the last signal received was the prosign "X", the net is in use; if "AH", the net is clear.

(4) Some stations were guilty of monopolizing the net. Since there is no "break-in" procedure, such practice prohibits other stations from using the net. The danger in this situation is -apparent when it is considered that the other station may have traffic of a higher precedence.

c. Interference:

Interference from an unknown source or sources

I:, — — PI

0 TO CC- SXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED-1 A::~UL, 194t> re: Signal Communication Operations IV7O JIMA ( Continued)

continually restricted radio-teletype communications ? Efforts to identify such interference were unsuccessful. Subsequent installation of wave traps, re tuning of transmitter and receiver, and longthing the antennae, eased the situation.

cl. Difficulties encountered on the beach:

The mobile team aboard the Bayf ield was to have landed and established ship to shore communications on 15-16 January; boats ordered to move the quipment did not arrive on time, hence, the team did not reach the beach until dark and was unable to rif; the antennae properly.

Damage to the- relays and other sensitive parts of the modulator unit was caused by unnecessary rough treatment while lowering the equipment over the side.

Only intermittent voice communications were heard from the beach.

C» Rehearsal (Forward Area).

1. Upon arrival at the staging area, a two (2) day re-her.'rsal" (February 12-13) was held .with units of the landing forces participating. Troop landings were not made. The purpose of the exercise was to test all circuits and ascertain the working condition of all communication equipment to be used in the assault "onase i

a. Despite -the prevailing radio silence, authorization was given to test all tactical circuits at least once during' the rehearsal. It was directed' that transmissions on frequencies from 2000 to SOOO kilocycles be kept at an absolute minimum between 1500 and 0900, In a like manner, the use of SCR-608, 610, and 808 frequencies was restricted between 1000 and 1800.

This schedule was later amended by dispatch

-- 22

- °IG To CG" EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 A?RIL, 1945 re! ° Communication Operations JII-1ASignal - IWO(Continued). J|M^& A^vEKft alloxjino; medium and high frequency radio circuits to be tested be tireen" 1300 and 1530, using low power. The testing of SCR VHF radio equipment was permitted between 2100 and 0700.

b. During the movement to the staging area, installations of new equipment, cleaning of antennas and changing of receivers made additional testing requisits aboard the USS ELDORADO. Because of strict radio silence, it was not possible to test the circuits until the rehearsal.

On February 12, the Navy calls ANZAC, TROJAN and BUCKETS were heard on 2532 kcs. The frequency was assigned to HARLE.I who was NCS and who did not come up until late afternoon.

An indication of the extent of interference on circuits is noted by the appearance of ANZAC on 2154, 2932, 5780, 2955, and 2950 kcs, and 27,8 mcs, 3y the second day,however, this condition was alleviated by the use of wave traps and proper employment of antenna systems.

All circuits were monitored and tested with the exception of 2950 kcs (assigned as Fifth Division tactical command net ).

2. On both days unidentified voice calls were heard on many of the tactical circuits. With the exception of

Magneto", which is assigned in PACCALL, the following calls were not listed in PACCALL 71, Corps and Division SOls or training-orders :

CIRCUIT CALL SIGN i

2956 (ExTroPac Command) Shortstop \

1918 (LanFor Command) Magneto Magneto 1 Rookie Shortstop

s

T*l ¦«"!..N'T L.

0 TO CC- 2XTRO (TF 55) S2R. 01837-45 DATED-r^pßiL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations ItfO JBiA (Continued)

2276 UthDiv Log Control) Tabasco Pope Park PattyClark

27.8 (sth Div Command) *Elpaint 6 Amphtrac

2154 (Shore Party Lateral) Builder Builder 1 Tollhouse 1 Material Spade 2, 8 Bottleneck 18 Bottleneck 19 Bottleneck 20 Footloose Penpoint 1

mis copied in lieu of "Elephant 6", LCT 776 (Brodie).^

a-# Investigations were made ashore at Saipan, but the examination' of communication agencies proved of no value.

(1.) Captain Strickland, Communication Officer of the signal company, Second Marine Division, could not identify the voice calls.

(2.) The JCC at Saipan was unable to offer any explanations or information. Special calls assigned to army and navy units were checked, but with one exception there was no similarity noted. The possibility exists that some interference

¦on 1818 kcs may have originated on Tinian. Iscom Tini&n has the assigned frequencies of 1915 kcs and 1920 kcs.

{•3J A further check was made at the JCC t

aboard the US B AUBURN. Many of the same unidentified calls wdFc noted by the Landing Force. A similar attempt was made by that unit to trace the voice calls with negative results.

SIC- 0 TO GG EXTRO (TP 56) SER. 01837-45 DATEDIPPHHMP'LTR lA?klL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations IV7O JIMA (Continued)

(4.) The 73rd BomWing (Saipan) was visited because of the possibility of local army air voice calls. Accord' ing to LtCol. Hotchkiss and MT/SG-T Hancock, some of the calls appeared to be similar to those being used for local AA defense, out definite information was not available. It was pointed out that voice calls for AA defense units change periodically. The lack of time and transportation did not permit further investigation.

(5.) The Signal Operating Instructions of the Fourth ana Fifth Divisions were examined for special calls, but none similar to those heard on LanFor circuits were found.

fo. Inasmuch as units smaller than platoons or sections may employ nicknames as desired (Art. 2580, CENT COM Til0

3 Appendix 1, Annex. "C-"), this may be a partial explanation of the unidentified calls. Further suggestion is made . that the calls (upon the basis of the voice -text copied) were small, internal garrison units operating within the harbor area. There is no doubt that the voice calls could have been anything but local transmissions.

3. Security.

a. Japanese transmissions, both voice and C¥, were heard intermittently during the testing and monitoringphases of the rehearsal on 2404 kcs, 5605 kcs, and 27.4 mcs.

0- .) Two call signs heard on 5600 kcs were WA-YU-i-TI and YO-SI-YA. The three (5) syllable call usually distin;uiches Japanese shore stations. Their transmissions were confined to the sending of Vs.

(2) At 0750 February 12, a Japanese woman's voice waa heard distinctly on 27.4 mcs. This was followed by a test, count from an unknown station. After 0805 , a Jap 017 transmission lasting for ten (10) minutes was heard on this frequency.

25

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R SICr 0 TO CO- EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations - T:tO JIMA (Continued)

L-*jjHillstit b. On February 13, at 1442, the following was

intercepted on 2404 kcs.'

ABS vAB 1 BT DID YOU KNOW THAT INDICATORS ARE NOT AUTHENTICATED IN TEXT 3T

_(This transmission was assumed to have been made by the Second Marine Division ashore.)

Transmissions such as these might give the enemy one more item with which to reconstruct the shackle grid.

c. There was some incorrect and superfluous

authentication noted. For example, on February 13, the followingcopied kcs:was on 2932

0831 HAROLD V HARLEM U ARE USING WRONG- SHACKLE V HAROLD VBX X GRID X V HARLEM AUTH X V HAROLD N?R X V HARLEM KWV X V HAROLD EFD X V HARLEM KOB X

The last two (2) authentications were not required to completeadequate authentication* Both stations used three (3) random letters for authentication. Such prolific authentication provides the enemy with sufficient information to employ successful deception and to compromise the shackle.

d. At 1038 on 12 February, GORILLA called HAIRSPRING on 2154 kcs. Since MAINSPRING maintains an intercept watch only on 2154 kcs (sth Division Shore Party Lateral), GORILLA'S transmission was not acknowledged.

Circuit Discipline4.

a. Because of the limited nature of the forward area rehearsal, and the necessity for limited radio usage, exer~ ciseJJ*|^ftnJHi^^'Ri Bl^"ljsl.icBl^"lj51.ic testing of tactical circuits.

26

C^^^^ °T0 CG EXTRO ( TF s^) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 -APRIL",I94Sre: Signal Communication Operations - IV/O JIMA ( Continued)

T

• i> ,; '',1 ffv .'¦ *X

Dv TROOP TRAINING

1. Adequate training areas were available to all three divisions. Numerous command post and landing exercises were held. with a basic communication training program, emphasizing the importance of communications during ship-to-shore movements and the intial assault. Air support, artillery communications and naval gunfire received particular emphasis.

9. During the training phase, the Corps Signal Battalion was somewhat handicapped by the necessity of moving to Maul. This separated 'the Signal Battalion from the Signal Officer's -Section.

3, Combined training was not possible for units of the garrison forces scheduled for

'

the assault. Only the early air warning units attached to the assault divisions were able to participate in preliminary training with landing force units.

4. While commanders of garrison assault units participated in early planning and were able to familiarize themselves with the nature of their missions, some of the garrison assault elements did not arrive in the Hawaiian area until time for embarkation. Others were able to complete only their basic training.

111. HOVÎIENT AND APPROACH PHASE

A.A. Communications during movement to the staging area (27 .January to 11 February),

1. Strict conditions of radio silence prevailed at all times during the movement of the Joint Expeditionary ,Force to the staging areas in the Marianas. The average daily total of dispatches "distributed 'oj the JCC aboard the USS ELDORADO was two hundred and five (205), .including some visual trans-. missions. This average exceeded the one hundred and thirty five (135) distributed during the approach phase to the Marianas-;

o The JCC employed a three section watch during this

jTR SIG" ° T0 CG" SXTHO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED-1 APRIL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations IWO JIM (Continued)

.

phase. Instruction or formal schooling was not given to message center or radio personnel. Radio personnel assisted the Fox operators and copied press. The teletype operators practiced each day.

3. The Radio-teltype was checked every two hours when not in use.

B, Communications at the staging area (11-16 February).

1, .While anchored at Saipan, the Task Force continued to maintain radio silence. Outgoing traffic to rear areas was passed by mailgrprn or delivered to island commanders for transmission.

2, The JCC aboard the USS ELDORADO distributed an average of two hundred sixty-three (263) dispatches daily > as compared to one hundred seventy-six (176 ) dispatches delivered daily at the staging area during the Marianas approach.

3, The report of the communication rehearsal held at the staging area between 12v13 February is contained in section II.C.

C. Communication during the approach to the objective (16-19 February).

1, Radio silence was continued throughout the approach with the exception of TBS, RATT, and visual transmissions, all of which were kept to a minimum.

2. During February 15 and 16, the Second Marine Division simulated our rehearsal transmissions to cover our approach to the objective. Discrepancies were noted in that unit calls were -heard on frequencies on which they T rould normality" not be heard. On 2404- ltcs it was evident that the same operator sent messages and rogered for them. The majority of the traffic consisted of random-selected five (5) letter groups. The overall pattern did not conform with rehearsal transmissions.

3. All communication personnel were briefed on the assault; details of the operation.

?

- -* ' 28

1 <i

R- ~-\ LDENT

¦(WpHBBBHBHBP IG- OTO CC~ 2XTRO (TF 56) SEE. Q1837-45 DATED 1 Ai-diL, 3.945 re : Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA (Continued)

i

4. A review of CZMTCOM WO, amid combined annexes, was' hole, -ôr all communication personnel. Task force organization, radio circuits, call signs and authentication were covered during the oral discussion.

-IV, ASSAULT STJIII-lARY I*7o JIMA

A« General.

1. Communications are measured in terms of speed, security, and reliability. These principles, when applied to the tactical communications of the operation, form the basis of this rei3ort. Enclosure "A11 (Daily Communication Journal) stresses casses uhcro these principles were misused, disregarded or the choice of application questionable. The cases quoted are presented for study and training. Needless to say they represent a minor quantity when compared with the total volume of traffic handled.

2, Additional details are found in other enclosures to the basic report (procedure of the Joint Communication Center.., watch, bills, traffic graphs, etc).

3, Speed of Tactical Communications,

1, Circuits guarded by TF 56 operators during the initial assault phase 'of IlvO JIKA included:

Lanfor Command 29.2 (V) T&R' Lanfor Liaison 5940 (V) Int. SxTroPac Command 5605 (CV7) T&R Lanfor Command 2404 (Otf) Int.2:cTro?ac Command 2956 (V) T&R Lanfor Command 1918 (V) Int. 4-tliDiv Tactical Command 5780 ( CVD Int. othDiv Tactical Command 2590 (CM) Int.4thDiv Shore Party Lateral 2276 (V) Int. othDiv Shore Party Lateral 2154 (V) Int. 4t?.iDiv Logistic Control 2932 (V) Int. sthDiv Logistic Control 2304- (V) Int.

/

[SIC- 0 TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SSR. 01837-45 DATED Signal Communication Operations - IHOIH0 JII-1A

(Continued)

4thDiv Command 27.4 (V) Int. othDiv Command 27 # 8 (V) Int. Emergency Common 27 # 2 (V) Int. Corps Arty Fire Direction 2862 (V) Int.

Traffic intercepted on tactical circuits was handled -as addressed dispatches inasmuch as they were immediately delivered to staff sections concerned. Tactical dispatches were predominantly plain language as compared to administrative traffic, which was invaribl y encoded.

2. Incoming Traffic.

In order to ascertain a representative time analysis circuits,of incoming traffic handled over internal teletype the

time element of all traffic placed in the ISR circuit from' "D" day through D plus 2 days was averaged. By the same tolcen, the average time required to handle traffic over radio circuits was ascertained by analyzing all action traffic handled over the period covering D tdlus 4 through D plus 9 days.

a. ISR (Action)

Urgent .17Urgent .17 MinutesMinutesOperational Priority....19Operational Priority....19 MinutesMinutesPriority 27Priority 27 MinutesMinutesRoutine. .25Routine. .25 MinutesMinutes

AllprecedencesAll 22precedences 22 MinutesMinutes AveraAvera

The average delay on action traffic occuring between time of receipt and time of delivery by teletype is clue to the fact that teletype delivery was effected after G--3 had reviewed the dispatch and taken action as necessary.

b. Radio (All circuits)

Average delay between time of receipt and time of.delivery:

IQ 0 TO Ca EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED •IArRIL/194-0 r~ Signal Communication Operations -.-IWO JIM

(Continued) ' '' 'i\jIUUCU/i\jIUUCU/ !¦ ¦'!¦ ¦' ¦•¦• ——

¦ ¦¦ >^ _

¦ ¦¦ >^_

mi jmi mmmj mmm mm

'PRECEDENCE'PRECEDENCE PLAINPLAIN CODEDCODED

UrgentUrgent 12 minutes12 minutes (s)(s) 23 minutes23 minutes (25)(25)Operational PriorityOperational Priority 13 minutes13 minutes (11)(11) 20 minutes20 minutes (49)(49)PriorityPriority 23 .minutes23 .minutes (11)(11) 30 minutes30 minutes (65)(65)RoutineRoutine 16 minutes16 minutes (12)(12) 21 minutes21 minutes (32)(32)

Average delay for all codedcoded trafficAverageAverage delay for alldelay for all coded traffic 23.5 minutes23.5 minutes (43)(43)Average delay for all plain traffic 16 minutes (io) Average delay for all incoming traffic ,19.7 minutes (26)

The figures in parentheses represent the delay in minutes for the $ame items taken from the SAIPAN report. It is evident that the plain language dispatches on this operation took longer for delivery. This can be attributed to the greater volume of traffic handled as well as the employment of messenger deliver in lieu of teletype deliver (3SR circuit) used during SAIPAN.

For the purpose of this study the traffic handled by the Navajo talkers was considered as coded traffic. The increased speed with which this type of traffic was handled during the operation as compared with that handled during SAIPAN, is a commentary on the value of the Navajo talkers.

3. Outgoing3. Traffic.Outgoing Traffic.

Plain .Plain Coded. CodedUrgent no traffic no trafficUrgent no traffic no trafficOperational priority 13 minutes 20 minutesOperational priority 13 minutes 20 minutesPriority 35 minutes 69 minutesPriority 35 minutes 69 minutesRoutine 21 minutes 16 minutesRoutine 21 minutes 16 minutes

All -precedences (plain) 23 minutes averageAll -precedences (plain) 23 minutes average(coded) 35 minutes average(coded) 35 minutes average

Average delay of all outgoing traffic (including plain andAverage delay of all outgoing traffic (including plain andcoded)coded)

PRECEDENCE AVERAGE TIME DELAYPRECEDENCE AVERAGE TIME DELAY¦¦Urgent (NoUrgent traffic)(No traffic)

priority 16,5priority minutes16,5 minutes

BIG- 0 TO CCt 2XTRO (TF 55 ) S2R. 01837-45 DATED-1 APHILj 19-1-5 re : Signal Communication Operations IVJO JIMA ( Continued)

Priority 52 minutes 18,5Routine minutes

Practically the entire volume of outgoing traffic was given the precedence of "priority" causing a greater delay on this precedence than on routine traffic. During the night, traffic was usually marked Routine and the decreased volume as compared with day traffic allowed speedier handling.

4, Conclusions.

a. A total of 1203 dispatches were handled by the JCC on D-day. Of this total 347 were administrative and 856 were tactical. Administrative traffic was prepared and distributed in accordance with normal procedure as proscribed by the JCC.' However, upon receipt tactical dispatches were delivered by messenger to the staff sections concerned. Those worthy of wider distribution were either placed on the teletype circuit (ISR),writton up and distributed, or both.

Since the use of the 3SR circuit was curtailed throughout the operation, deliyery was effected by messenger.

A total of 99 messages were flashed on the 3SR circuit on D-day. These dispatches consisted of n fla.::hn reports,summaries, end information warranting general and immediate delivery. Such transmissions, however, did not constitute final delivery, and the messages were later routed through the JCC.

Despite the restricted use of the ISR and 3SR teletype circuits, the following represent daily totals flashed. by these circuits.

ISR

175 239

D/ 2 293 205

D/4 141 /.D/5

{?:/ 153

32

1

/

m'

EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATEDfHHPHHI LTR SIG °T0 CG"

iAPxlj.l,, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA (Continued)

D/ 6D/ 6 8383 3333D/ 7D/ 7 6969 4242D/ 8D/ 8 7777 2828D/ 9D/ 9 7878 3030D/10D/10 8080 4444

5151 26263^123^12 4141 3131IVI3IVI3 3434 3030D^l4D^l4 1818 4343D/15D/15 26263VIS3VIS 5252IIB/17B/17 4343

X74SX74S TOTALTOTAL 780780 TOTALTOTAL

The peak load, a total of 1500 dispatches, was handled on "D" plus 3 days. Of those, 449 were administrative and 851 of tactical nature.

All tactical traffic received in Radio One was processed and a preliminary routing was indicated by the radio, supervisors. Three (3) copies were immediately delivered via pneumatic tube to the JCC. The routing was checked by the traffic chief who stamped the Time of Receipt on each dispatch, and promptly effected delivery to the indicated sections. The average length of time required to effect delivery of a message from Radio One to the prescribed sections (by messenger) was seven (7) minutes, since there was no backlog of dispatches awaiting teletype transmission. Once the rough copy had been delivered, the original, bearingsignatures for receipt purposes, was returned to the JCC for filing or writing up, depending upon the addressal and importance of the text.

RELIABILITY OF TACTICAL COIEIUNICATIONS.

1. The JCC aboard the USS ELDORADO handled a total of12,903 dispatches between D-day and D plus 17 days. Administrative and fleet traffic constituted 7,374 of this" total, while5,529 comprised tactical intercept and action traffic from shore units of the Landing Force.

-\

i

°To CQr EXTRO (TF 56) SSR. 01837-45 DATEDfHHHHHNHBLTR SlCr r~APHiL^^4S re: Signal Communication Operations - I'-JO JIIiA (Continued)

1~:

2. It should be noted that TF 56 radio operators were not required to transmit as frequently as shore stations, and because' of the large number of tactical (intercept) circuits guarded, a complete survey of procedure employed by these operators could not be ascertained with the exception of that' noted during the rehearsal periods. The operators were given,however, extensive training that covered a period of two (2) months prior to the actual assault.

3. Radio Procedure.

a. There were numerous instances of operators failing to observe correct operating procedure. Field stations were

Qlffound operating without signal publications (CCBP2-2) or shackle coordinates and could not fulfilltheir duties. Security was endangered by operators' failure to use authentication. Stations frequently secured from nets without obtaining permission.

b. Excessive testing was noted on the majority of circuits after the peak of operational traffic had passed* Superfluous conversations were noted among operators standing midwatchos. Verbal accounts of the battle and relative topics were discussed. Faulty headings were prevalent- during the campaign. They conformed to no established pattern, but contained a variety of improvisions # Officers evidently lacking "oropcr communication training carried on conversations relative to the movement of supplies and ammunition, using radio circuits much in the manner of a field telephone circuit. This was "part-. icularly noted on the logistical nets, In other instances, opcrr.to.rs inquired as to the locations of CP's, asking for visual directions. At times, frequencies of other stations were frooly discussed on voice circuits.

c. While such errors, at first, can be ascribed to the unusual conditions experienced during the initial assault, their repetition shows a lack of experience and training, The reoccurance and prevalence of poor procedure and disregard for security among operators indicated a fundamental weakness iniheir training. Radio equipment is only as reliable as the operatorwho controls it.

¦~v 34

ttM^^|^«fc LTR SIG 0 TO CG- EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED--Signal CommjKLeation OperationsOperations liv<re: lâtion IWO JIM (Continued)

'd. Local time (X Zone) was employed for all dis** HKlfpatches within the area of operations. The suffix was

attached to each time group. No confusion resulted from the use of G-CT and local time in operational traffic.

SECURITY

1. Clear Text Radio Traffic.

a, With few exceptions, transmissions of a tactical nature wore sent in plain language. The confined area of operations, the proximity of participating units, and the determined enemy opposition necessitated extensive use of plain language. Breaches of security were many and varied and conformed to a pattern established in earlier campaigns; as long as the military situation remained critical, security violations wore prevalent. As the assault phase became stabilized, personnel became more security-conscious.

b. The most serious violations were plain text transmissions of intelligence reports gathered from enemy sources. This ceased on D plus 4 days on orders from Hq LanFor. Continual plain English references to units (fleet and shore-based) and locations were noted. In some instances, the- shackle code was not used correctly* This discrepancy revealed numberical lists of casualties, amount of equipment and ammunition landed or expended. Scheduled times of attack were occasionally transmitted in plain text.

c. Overall security was augmented by the extensive use of Navajo talkers and radio-teletype circuits. This accounts for tlio small volume of coded (tactical) dispatches. The two (2) talkers were unable to meet the unexpected demand, but their use provided a rapid and safe method of transmission, particularly insofar as operational summaries and secret reports were concerned. In a like manner, it was possible to relay iarg*evolumes of confidential traffic via radio-teltype, from the beach as woll as units afloat. This was the first Central Pacific operation in which Navajo talkers and radio-teletype were extend sivcly employed. 'Their value was proven many time9. Towards

tffIHBM&TRSlCr 0 TO Ca SXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED-IWO JIKAre: Signal Communiba&lQff- Operations" (Continued) .o?^;fe \ '

:, ;/•¦•' •.'. \.dM^ML 'A

the end of the campaign, some commands began to rely heavily upon the use of Navajo talkers for traffip that did not warrant such use, and fatigue of the* talkers became evident. One talker each was obtained from the Fourth and Fifth Divisions. These were insufficient to meet the demands of operational traffic. In.some cases, both talkers were used at once, allowing no relief nor regulated working schedule. Sigtotswere not available for installation on radio-teletype nets prior to the operation, and traffic classified "secret 11 was encoded in the Combined Assault Code, Hagelin or strip. Transmission of daily summaries was effected by the use of either talker or radio-teletype.

d. It was evident that all concerned were better acquainted with the shackle code and its application. There was a. marked improvement over other operations.

2. Authentication.

a. After the assault phase, with the gradual reduction of traffic, authentication became more of an exception than a rule. Some operators relied upon recognizable transmission characteristics of other operators rather than authentication* In some instances (see D/4) stations did not have authentication grids available. During air-raid alerts, when "flash-red" was transmitted to all stations, there were instances of no authentication being asked for or given. The enemy, observing our carelessness could easily have created considerable confusion. Futher authentication discrepancies were noted when operators did not use the system properly. Instances were observed wherein operators upon having their authentication chanllenged, substituted singleletters of the original authenticator rather than give an entirely different one, thus offering a partial compromise of the current shackle grid. Although the incorrect use of time in regards to the shackle grid resulted in considerable confusion during the rehearsal periods, discrepancies of this type were not noted during the assault phase.

b. The necessity for proper use and application of authentication will increase in future operations, "requiring a greater need for its fullest employment. The nearness of Japanese

™ki/issi)&£<i!J[ijj

MS!

SIG- 0 TO CG- EXTRO (TF 56) SSR. 01837-45 DATED*IaPftß^Mfc re Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA

(Continued)

Empire and other adjoining land-based enemy communication facilities will require. absolute adherence to security regulations.

Serious consideration should be given to the adoption of a more adequate authenticator. The shackle authenticator nests the need for a simplified system but did not provide a means of identifying the station receiving the dispatch. Another factor of importance is the need for substitute authentication systems in case of compromise of the one currently used. These should be provided the divisions as H0B #

3. Enemy Deception and Jamming,

a. Due, perhaps, to the fact that the closest enemy bases to I'-'O JII-iA were Chichi Jima and HaHa Jiima, 145 and 120 miles respectively, few attempts at deception or jamming were heard cya the tactical circuits. Enemy commercial stations were. heard repeatedly on many of the frequencies. Continued interference prevented obtaining more, than a few station calls, and no positive identifications were .possible.

/

b, Intentional jamming was observed on D plus 3. Probable intentional jamming was noted on D plus 1. A combination of enemy and atmospheric interference provided a nuisance and resulted in reception difficulties.

c. The enemy's use of radio-direction-finders to locate our transmitters caused considerable confusion and concern to the radio teams.

4. Call signs.

a. PAC 71 was a step forward in the attempt to bringall call signs within the alphabetical sequence.

5. Signal Intelligence.

a* At the time of the departure of CTF 51 from IWO -Jli-iA, no' known enemy communication personnel had been captured, and desired interrogation could not be obtained.

*.

37

SIG- 0 TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA (Continued)

b. Overall, satisfactory communications existed as is evidenced by the examination of the amount of security applied to tactical communications.. Its importance to the success of future operations depends upon the acceptance by officers and men of "discrepancy" reports in the interests of improved comrnuni cations.

c. Satisfactory signal communications can be achieved only if due consideration and study is given errors committed on previous operations and preventative steps instituted through training. It is with this view in mind that Enclosure "A" is prepared in some detail.

COMMUNICATION PROCEDURE ABOARD THE USS ELDORADO

of the 1. Enclosure (B) presents

Joint Communication Center. the procedure and organization

2. Adequacy of Personnel.

a. Sufficient embarked personnel enabled the Signal Detachment, TF 55, to fulfillits assigned duties. The officerin-charge of the JCC was a member of ComPhibsPac staff. Members of this command were assigned duties in Radio One and in the -JCC as CBO's, traffic and distribution chiefs, messengers, supervisors and radio operators.

b. The code room was manned by members of the Marine Detachment assigned to the USS ELDORADO. Enlisted personnel of• ComPhibsPac were assigned to the write-up room. CBO s were responsible for the code room and write-up room. Distribution to both Marine and Navy staffs were handled hy messengers provided by TF 55.

• c. Communication personnel of TF 56 remained on.a

two-section watch from D minus 1 until D plus 17. Towards the end of the campaign, fatigue was evident among. all personnel. The departure of the First Radio Intelligence platoon necessitated the securing of logistical and shore party circuits in Radio One. Many ojt- rjtjae remaining circuits were split-phoned. Traffic was

38

n r\ at m T-| A L

tHHHHHHHKTH SIG 0 TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re: Signal Communication, OpepaîonA JIÂ

negligible. At no time was it possible to employ a three section watch. Four (4) instead of two (2) Navajo talkers would have been desirable, due to the heavy volume of Navajo traffic placed on the circuits, however, the employment of Sigtot in future operations will lessen the requirement for transmitting secret dispatches by this method.

MISCELLANY.

1. Throughout the Daily Communication Journal the adaes are shown in plain language in order to identify units. This does not mean that they were transmitted in the clear, ''then such a violation occured, it has been indicated by underlining that portion of the dispatch in error.

2.- The formation of the JCC ashore at IWO JIMA between D plus 1 and D plus 19 is indicated by the following activities:

DD 11 Blinker lights putBlinker into operation*intolights put operation*DD 2,2, 33 Radio equipmentRadio was landed.wasequipment landed.DD 88 Radio personnel of the JCCRadio were landed*werepersonnel of the JCC landed*DD 99 Power suppliesPower brought ashore.broughtsupplies ashore.DD 1111 Circuits were establishedCircuits on SxTroPac,onwere established SxTroPac,

LanFor Command, and LanFor Command netsLanFor Command, and LanFor Command netsin accordance with Annex "G" C2NTCOMin accordance with Annex "G" C2NTCOM

DD // 1212 Circuits were establishedCircuits with Guamwith andwere established Guam andSaipan,Saipan,

DD 1313 Anti-aircraft ControlAnti-aircraft Squadron (AACS)SquadronControl (AACS)was established.was established.The first B-29 landed on Airfield No. 1.The first B-29 landed on Airfield No. 1.

1414 Ground control (intercept)Ground established.control (intercept) established.DD tt 1616 The JCC ashore requested that ECMThe fsf beJCC ashore requested that ECM s be

made availablemade •available •JJ teleDD // 1818 The JCC took overThe and expandedand dheJCC took over expanded dhe tele

type network already established by Hqtype network already established by HqLanFor,LanFor,

// 1919 The ECMls were brought ashore forThe the JCCtheECMls were brought ashore for JCC

there was a five (5) day delay in landing the radio personnel remains unexplained, (D plus 2 until D plus 8).

AT T7I T> -n ,T L

LTR SIC- 0 TO CG SXTRO (TF 56) SER, 01837-45 DATEDPP^^PP^L"'IAPRIL, 1945 re : Signal Communication Operations - IWO JIMA (Continued)

V '!

HEADINGS

In a study of all dispatch traffic handled on D-Day, the following discrepancies were noted:

-a. INCORRECT HEADINGS These can be divided into

catagories, with examples and comments, as follows:

(l) Failure to use normal (full) form when required.

EXAMPLES:

(a) HARLEM V IGLOO 192220 -W- MAINSPRING BT (1918 kcs at 1241K)

(b) HARLEM V HARLEM GEORGE -W- SHAMPOO BT (2932kcs at 1338K)

(c) PATRICK GEORGE V HARLEM GEORGE -Tf-HARLEM SHAMPOO BT (2932kcs at 1315K)

(d) PATRICK GEORGH" HARLEM SHAMPOO V HARLEM GEORGE -W- KAXLSM SHAMPOO BT (2932kcs at 1418)

(c) 24AIN8PRING 22 ACCURATE 6 V ACCURATE 191500 -W- MiINSPRING 22 BT (2862kcs at 1545)

(f) HARLEM SHAM7OO V HARLEM GEORGE -W~ SHAKPOO BT (2932kcs at 1537K)

(g) MAINSPRING 22 ACCURATE 6 V ACCURATE 191455 -W- MAINSPRING BT (2862kcs* at 1530K)

(h) ACCURATE 6 V ACCURATE 191440 -W- MABTSPRING 2* BT (2862kcs at 1808K)

(i) PATRICK GEORGE HARLEM SHAMPOO V HARLEM GEORGE -VI- HARLEM SHAMPOO 3T (2932kcsat 15340

(j) PATRICF' GEORGE HARLEM SHAMPOO V HARLEM GEORGE -W- HARLEM SHA2'4POO BT (2932kcs at 152LK)

(k) HARLEIi V SHAMPOO 6 -P- 191615K BT -\U CONVEIT (27.4mcs at 1627K)

'*" i y/js

771 771

fHBHHHHHkL'TR SIG O TO CG EXTRO (TF 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations - I¥o JIM (Continued)

(1) HARLEM SHAMPOO V HARLEM GEORGE -WSHAMPOO BT (2932kcs at 1721K)

(m) HARLEM HARLEM GEORCtS V AVENGER GEORGE -W-- HARLEM GEORGE BT {2932kcs at 1755)

(n) CONVENT V CORDUROY -A- BRUTUS BT (2304kcs at 1801)

(o) HARLEM V AVENGER GEORGE -W- HARLEM GEORGE BT (2932k0s at 1848K)

(p) HARLEM V HARLEM GEORGE -A- GOMEZ 6 1843K BT (2932kcs at 1928K)

(q) HARLEM V AVENGER GEORGE -W- HARLEM GEORGE BT (2932kcs at 1934K)

(r) MAINSPRING V IGLOO -P-A- MAINSPRING LOVE 192050. BT (2956kcs at 2057K)

(s) HARLEM V HARLSM GEORGE -OP- 192045 ~W~ SHAMPOO BT (2932kcs at 2129K)

(t) ACCURATE 6 V ACCURATE 191730 -If- MAINSPRING 22 BT (2862kcs at 1748K)

-Allunits were frequent offenders HARLEM GEORGE more frequent than others.,

(2) Incorrect uoCTof normal (full) form vrhen attempted.

EXAMPLES :

(a) IGLOO CONVENT V HARLEM 191651K IGLOO -VCONVSNT BT(29.2mcs at 1555K)

(b) IGLOO CONVENT V NUTMEG -P- 193050K lOLOO -W- CONV^T BT (l9lBkcs at 1359K)

(cj MAINSPRING CONV2NT HARLEM V IGLOG -P-AIGLOO MAINSPRING -T- AN2AC 191421K

¦ANZAC -17- MAINSPRING GLACIER CONVENTHARLEM BT (29,2mcsat 1430K)

(d) HARLEM GEORGE V HARLEM -OP- ACTION HARLEM GEORGE -If- COUSIM AVENGER SHAMPOO 3T (2932kcs at 1549K)

(c) HARLEM V"PATRICK 191525 -A- PATRICK -VJHARLEM BT. (27.4mcs at 1537K)

i ~ -41

'i

V*.

LTR SIG 0 TO CG EXTRO (TP 56) SER. 01837-45 DATED 1 APRIL, 1945 re: Signal Communication Operations - IMS JIMA. (Continued)

(f) PATRICK REX V COUSIN 191525K REX -WPATRICK BT (27 # 4rncs at 1539K)

(g) HARLEM GEORGE V HARLEM -OP- ACTION IGLOO -W- SHAMPOO HARLEM GEORGE BT (2932kcs at 1517K)

(h) HARLEM GEORGE V HARLEM ACTION COUSIN -ITCONVENT BT (27,4mcs at 1627K)

(i) HARLEM V AVENGER PETER -A- AVENGER 6 -W.HARLEM GEORGE BT (2276kcs at 1800)

(J) MAINSPRING V IGLOO -OP- 191755 MAINSPRING -¥- GLACIER BT (2956kcs at 1803)

(k) IGLOO V HARLEM -T~ GLACIER -OP- 191831K GOMEZ -W- GLACIER 3T (l9lBkcs at 1952K)

(l) AVENGER V HARLEM --CP- 191820K HARLEM G2ORGE -W- AVENGER GIORG-Ei PATRICK PATRICK GEORGE BT (27.4m0s at 2202)

V. CONCLUSIONS.

1. It is recommended that all coCe names and nicknames, special calls, etc, found throughout CSHTCOM TWO be listed in the alphabetical section of PAC 71. In addition, all calls assigned by divisions in their SOI should be officially distributed as a change to PAC 71.

2#2 # Recommend that the "A" type headings be followfed in \

the voice procedure. This is particularly desirable when the dispatch has multiple addressees and/or transmitting instructions are extensive.

3. It is suggested that a Corps training team participate in the division field problems for the purpose of bringing all units of the Corps to a unified level of security-consciousness t

4. Further efforts should be directed toward the developing of a more satisfactory authentica'uor embodying .the simplicity of the current systems but allowing a means of identifying the receiving. station.

5. Suggest that the Navajo talkers be more thoroughly

42

i

LTR SIC- 0 TO CG- EXTRO (TF 56) SER, 01837-45 DATED-1 APRILi1945 re: Signal Communication Operations IWO JIMA (Continued)

.tiiWJ&i"Wvi v/a J t.«^lJ \

indoctrinated in radio procedure, and that their use be restric ted to that traffic requiring their employment.

y"" y

\

c* r; cloug-h

Capt. USMCR Signal Officer

Olii'^SeS^^ <J* si» ««

43

|HM|^^^^

DAILY COMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL

TF 55

;« ;,-h •"»D DAY , * /f

A. RADIO !>v

i

1, Circuits

ra, In accordance with ComPhibsPac s master schedule of l!(D {;events for day, 0630 was designated as the time for all units

11.to "break radio silence on amphibious circuits for test and use At 0744, riQ, LANFOR called ExTroPac for a test of signal strenth* Radio silence was then initially broken by the Expeditionary Troops and the inquiry was acknowledged.

b. Marine Corps operators of the Signal Detachment, TF 55, began a continuous guard on the following tactical circuits

LanFor Command 29.229.2 (V)(V) T&R LanFor Liaison 59405940 (V)(V) Int. ExTrs Command 56055605 (CW)(CW) T&R LanFor Command 24042404 (CW)(CW) Int. ExTrs Command 29562956 (v)(v) T&R LanFor Command 19181918 (V)(V) Int. 4thDiv Tactical Command 57805780 (CW)(CW) Int. sthDiv Tactical Command 25902590 (CW)(CW) Int. 4-thDiv Shore Party Lateral 22762276 (V)(V) Int. sthDiv Shore Party Lateral 21542154 (V)(V) Int. 4thDiv Logistic Control 29322932 (V)(V) Int. sthDiv Logistic Control 23042304 (V)(V) Int. 4th Division Command 27.427.4 (V)(V) Int. sth Division Command 27.8,27.8, (V)(V) Int. Emergency Common 27.227.2 (V)(V) Int. Corps .Arty Fire Direction 28622862 (V)(V) T&R

c. A total of eight hundred fifty-six (856) messages were sent and received on the above circuits.

2#2 # Circuits (general)

a. The excessive interference heard on the majority of '"•.,the circuits can be attributed to the following factors:

amma^R

% _ -; ?.„ . •^p rM^*_ .^

-DAILY COIC-lUIJICATIONS JOURNAL IF 56 D DAY (Continued)

(l) Atmospheric conditions.

(2) Proximity (650, miles') of Japanese empire commercial stations and numerous army and navy stations. Approximately 120 miles from Haha Jirna and 145 miles from Chichi Jima.

(5) Ship's use of the high-powered Boehme keying (automat:, c) machine for press copy trans-mi bs ions to Guam and Pearl Harbor,,

b« There was continuous interference by intruding voice stations The J?'M circuits throughout the ship were blocked by the continual use of the Boehme machine in transmission of press copy. During the critical assault phases it was practically impossible to get a complete transmission on the Division and Corps Command Circuits .r

Every attempt was made to remedy the situation, but since it was directed that press be sent by this method, reception on tactical LanFor Command circuits was greatly hampered. The radio logs persistently reflected this interference.

c. Extensive "splashing 11 was noted on all circuits throughout the day., Tv%/JAN and GLACIER were particularly rep etitious.

exampleFor

.lt TROJAN was reported intermittently on 27.8, 2r2 r7

t.4, mcs 2276, 2862, 5605, 2932, 5940, 2154, 2955 kcs.

2A2 GLACIER appeared spasmodicly on 2590, 2i54,A

5780, 5940 kcs and" 27. 4, 27.8, 29.2 mcs.

3, DELEGATE BASE, BANJO, ANZAC, and MAINSPRINC3caused interference on various frequencies.

o. Circuit Discipline and Procedure.

N SNCLOSURÂ^^^^^^^

~DAILY COMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY (Continued) ~ _

„_ ______ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _. . ___. „ BLE| E* P-jS *jJ ,'"L- '_, e_r™""3»»" j¦nr. v .[rin

1a. Excessive testing was notea on cl?^c ?^ aW^.o Iffir Interference prevented stations on the above two circuits from establishing^ satisfactory communications .

b On 2304 kcs, Ilq sth MarDiv Shore Party receivedt

permission from sth.Mar.Div Log Control Officer to transmit a message^ Ha 3th MarDiv Shore Party transmitted his message, too rapidly to copy, sthliarDiv Log ContO c requested a repetition, , and instructed Hq 5tr.2-fe..rîv Shore Party to send more slowly. The repetition vra.-: mady at t;hu- same speeci,. Numerous repetitions were requested and gj."ven c

ri/raivty-ncên \2;r) minutes x-r^r^ required to

send this .one meeâge

c* 3'yi;wean 0520^ tjn'i 0525K or? 5305. kos, a station. wa,s heard traiipmitting wibLcu^" using calls. All transmissions began with "?0R ;l and a numeral, followed by "MOSKWY'1. (Not recognized by men of HI Platoon',

d. Dux ing the morning hours, stations on 4th Div Shore Party Lateral {.:riZ°6 kcs.) were scattered over an area covering ten (10) clial oj.vj. sions,

Agc, a34J : the following was sent on 2862 kcs: -Hq K-ped Troops Arty Off CG- Corps Arty -V

Hq nor-p Arty -• OP -A ~ Chief Arty- - of*Staff \ Corps1918Eo CG- Corps Arty ¥ Hq Exped Troops Arty Off

Upon transmission 'j^ the dispatch.* %

V CG CjRPL; ARTY R 191825 AR V SXTR';i-AC ARTY OFF INT QRU X V CORPS ARTY CFF (4JZ

At 18b3 Corps Arty Off again sent the dispatch

-SXTROPAC ARTY OFF V CORPS ARTY OFF - OP - A /

Corps Arty Exec Off 191825-' WCG- CORPS ARTY - EXTROPAC ARTY OFF BT

This was not acknowledged by SXTROPAC ARTY OFF. At 1900 Corps

11 T-1

GB tS fo $jjjj^£jsC&M

%

DAILY COMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY (Continued)

Arty Off, resent his message for the fhird time, and a ffroger" was given at 1902, This repetition was unnecessary as there was not enough interference to warrant two (2) retransmissions.

This circuit (2852) was manned in Joint Operations and was not handled by communication personnel. Proper voice procedure was not always followed.

f* Use of plain text and incomplete heading by Hq LanFor.on 2956 kcs caused confusion at 2210. Originally the text made HQ SxTroops action. Upon investigation, it was found that ExTrps could not take action, and the message was "jigged". IGLOO corrected his heading making ExTrps info, but neglected to add the action- addee. It was necessary to call Hq LanFor again for identity of the action addee.

g. Improper association of voice and CW' calls, as well as repetition of authentication, was noted on 5780 kcs at 0719:

¦SSLG V 481 CAN YOU CHANGE TO //MYRI// KCS X V SSLG AS AR V SSLG- N -IMI- X X V 481 R AS ARE YOU PATRICK GEORGE IMI ARE YOU

PATRICK GEORGE X V SSLG C X V 481 WHY CAN YOU NOT CHANGS TO //MYRI// XC& X V SSLG WE HAVE ANOTHER STATION ON THAT FREQUENCY

PATRICK GEORGE was the voice call of SSLG (RCT 23 representative ¦aboard trans group vessel). "\v..

h. The following incorrect heading was noted in a dispatch transmitted by HQ 4th MarDiv (HARLEM) to Spotter Group,4thDiv (HAROLD) on 2932 kcs at 0703K:

'

HAROLD V HARLEM - OP - A ~ HARLEM 192030K GOMEZ HAROLD BT GLACIER BANJO THIS IS HARLEM ACT IGLOOINFO BANJO GLACIER CONVENT COUSIN PATRICK AVENGER GOMEZ HAROLD FOLDFORK GAMECOCK X BANJO RELAY TO IGLOO AND TROJAN X GLACIER RELAY TO MAINSPRING AND ANZAC X INFO GOMEZ HAROLD VIA HARLEM COMMAND X INFO! FOX

DHAWK GAMECOCK - OP -192030..

- -41 i *

m

DAILY COIiiUNICATIONS JOURNAL TF 56 - D DAY (Continued)

In addition, the shackle employed in the text of -this message was incorrect. The originator used the ;shacltle grid of 19 February when that of 18 February was effective.

4. Interference

a. No intentional enemy interference was noted; however, due to the nearness of the objective to the Empire and other enemy bases, considerable interference was heard.

i

(l) On 5780 kcs at 0800, three (3) Jap stations were heard: SIHA 6, ER&RU, and KjEWI. Reception was loud and clear*

(2) At 1044 on 2276 kcs, a Jap operator was heard sending V'e and using an unidentified CW signal. His transmissions did not interfere with tactical circuits.

(3) Jap transmissions were heard with regularity on 2154 and 5605 kcs throughout the day. During evening hours, a Jap commercial boradcast station caused some interference on 2154 kcs.

5. Authentication

a. There were many examples of incorrect authentication noted throughout the day, as well as *some' indications of failures to authenticate at all.

(1) On 2956 kcs, at 0759, Hq LanFor authenticated-his dispatch to Hq ExTrps : "QKA D A V." Upon investigation, it was found that the LanFor operator was attempting to authenticate the last three ..(3) letters of the worS. "unshackle". Three (3) attempts were made before correct authentication was obtained.

6* Security of Text

a. Approximately 96 per cent of the tactical traffic was transmitted in the clear. The following was noted:

..1 H

¦4' * It i

b

-3

DAILY COIi-ItH'lCATIONS JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY (Continued)

-^ - ~(1) 191620K 27.4 kcs Plain

From: 4th Div IntelligenceTo : RCT 23, RCT 24, RCT 25

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE REVEALS FOLLOWING X QUOTE ALL HANDS '/ILL CARRY OUT TO THEIR UTMOST IN COMBAT POWER AND ZEAL X THE FINAL ATTACK FOR THE CAUSE OF THE EMPIRE X LONG- LIVE THE EHPEROR X UNQUOTE ALSO BELIEVED TO INDICATE COUNTER ATTACKS IN FORCE POSSI3LY TONIGHT X ENEMY ALSO SHOWINGCONCERN OVER 3ITTER ATTACK 3Y OUR TANKS IN HOT ROCK- AREA 3T

This same transmission was previously transmitted by Hq LanFor to the Fourth and Fifth Divisions by Navajo talker. It compromises the Navajo text, and reveals to the enemy the fact that we are successfully copying his circuits and/or breaking his codes, thereby jeopor&izing our sources of intelligence.

(2) 19/1509 1918 kcs Plain

From: Fifth Division To : FourthFourth DivisioDivision

STRONG INDICATION THAT ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT COUNTER' ATTACK 3Y NAVAL LANDING FORCE IN VICINITY AIR FIELD NO. 1 ESTIMATED STRENGTH SCO

In turn, the text was Dassed by the Fourth Division at 191338 to ROT's 23, 24, 25, 14th Marines, ADC 4th Division, and 4th Division representative on transgroup control vessel.

At 1343, further distribution in plain voice was given by the Fifth Division to the sth MarDiv"shore r>arty and RCT 'a 27 and 28.

Hq LanFor, at 1355, sent the same text via RATT to the Fourth and Fifth Divisions and CG Extrps, Following such violation, the following was sent from Hq LanFor:

- - ENCLOSURE (A) 6

;-\?

ljîttttjnttttßttj|^mMM^|^^^^^^M^^^^^^^^b_~^^^l^^^^ m^

DAILY COIiOJITICATIONS JOURNAL TF (Continued)56 _ — —f — —-fifa^tii -— " ____-._______.^____-__ *i-ii(> -*.•' ¦—•"¦.a- .. -.

"'" •¦19/1832 1918kcs ih:kifr ¦< ..: ...'•/

From: Hq LanFor To : 4th Division Info: sth Division, Hq ExTrps

UR DISPATCH 1620 CONCERNING- INFO OBTAINED FROM COUNTER INTELLIGENCE IS A VIOLATIONOF SECURITY THIS PRACTICE LIKELY TOCOML;IJOMISE SOURCE AMY MSG FROH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SOURCE IS NOT TO BE DISPATCHED IN PLAIN LANGUAGE IN FUTURE

(3) Although a complete copy was unattainable clue to heavy interference on 29,2 ftcs, the following is noted:

19/1505 29.2 mcs Plain

From: Hq 4th Division To : 'Ha LanFor Info: Hq sth Division

MONITORING JAP CO24MUNICATlONS ON //RC// POINT //P//-X (MISSED) OF MESSAGE INDICATES ENEMY IS EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY IN RECEPTION

(4) 19/1925 27.4 Plain

From: RCT 25 To : RCTRCT 2424

ONE COMPANY MUST BE SENT TO LEFT FLANK AT QUARRY OR LINES WILL FALL

While this message reads with the urgency of the situation, use of the word "quarry" could have been of immeasurable value to the enemy in bringing increased mortar, artillery and infantry power to bear upon the admittedly weakened position. Annex G AppendixCent Com 2 page 38 approves "geo, 22" as geographic location obviating any possibility of benefits to enemy. This message was transmitted at" 1925 and 2009 on 27 # 4 mcs,

•p. T-l

DAILY COMMUNICATIONS JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY (Continued)

19/1710 2154 kcs %?£

Plain

From: RCT 28 Shore Party To : sth Divisionsth ShoreDivision Shore Party

CP AT APPROXIMATELY BEACH CENTER HAVE SENT RSQU2ST ALL EMERGENCY SUPPLIES FOR NIQHT 3E LANDED X BEACH NOT ORGANIZED FOR HANDLING GENERAL CARGO X UNABLE TO UNLOAD LSM*S X DIGGING IN FOR NIGHT

Location of the CP is vital information and particularly useful to the enemy. Again geographical locations or coordinates, should have been used.

B. DISTRIBUTION (internal).

1. Total traffic handled by the JCC on D-Day:

Administrative 347 Tactical 856

1203 Total

2, Of the eight hundred fifty-six (856) dispatches processed by Radio One and Joint Operations all Here routed immediately to staff sections by messenger. Those dispatches considered worthy

JCC,of wide distribution were flashed on the 3SR circuit in the At all times delivery was prompt. No delays were encountered.

DAILY. COMMUNICATION JOURNAL

TF 56

D PLUS 1 DAY

A» IIISCSLLANSOUS EVENTS AFFECTING COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Kg LanFor granted 4th and sth Divisions permission to use communication personnel of replacement; drafts to replace signal casualties. (See I"-C-5)«

2. ROT 25 reported that the use of radio generators drew motar fire,, Indication enemy using RDF.

3, Information concerning the 4th Division, during night, difficult to obtain due to shortage of radios ashore.

4. BLT 1/23 reported beach party communications nil due to heavy casualties and congested beach area.

5. Kg LanFor authroized 4th and sth Divisions to obtain necessary signal equipment from LST 641 in a quantity equal to . one-half (i) of total amount available.

6. Fourth MarDiv signal quartermaster was ordered to establish Division Signal Dump of critical materials at location of RCT 23 CP and commence re-sutroly as soon as possible. Repair and salvage to be effected as rapidly as conditions permitted.

7. RCT 28 reported no wire in at 1200, three (3.) radiomen Casualties and evacuated.

8. Hq sth MarDiv requested sth Corps Signal Battalion to pick: up radio teletype from Cecil (APA 96) at convenience.

9. CTF 53 notified CTF 51 that LST 641 has signal equipment aboard necessary to replace infantry equipment lost on the beach.

10. ADC 4th MarDiv went ashore to select site for CP. Due to the lack of sufficient communication equipment ashore, he returned aboard.

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY PLUS lDAY (Continued)

B# RADIO

1» Circuit:Discipline and Procedure

Example :a.

201055 Plain

From: SxTroPac Artillery Officer To : CorpsCort)s ArtyArty

.... COMGEN SXTROPAC DESIRES INFO GENERAL' STATUS ARTILLERY Alil-iUNITIONSUPPLIES ASHORE. ..„

201137K Plain

From: Corps Arty To : SxTroPacSxTroPac AArty Officer \.

UR 200935 X 3RD BN 13TH HAS SOME ELEMENTS ASHORE X TRANSMISSION DIFFICULTIES EXTREME X ONE NET FOR ALL TRANSMISSIONS X .LAST INFO GIVEN YOU IS BEST THAT I HAVE X AS IGST OTHER INFO WILL GIVE IT TO YOU X TH2SS TRANSMISSIONS SERIOUSLY INTERFERING WITH AIRSTRIKE WARNINGS X TRYING TO GET INFO DESIRED IN YOUR 201055

b. Noted is the following heading of a dispatch originated by 4th MarDiv and intercepted on 2932 kcs:

200400 2932 kcs Plain s,

ACTION PATRICK AVENGER IGLOO INFO BANJO GLACIER CONVENT GOMEZ ANZAC COUSIN TROJAN HAROLD MOHAWK GAMECOCK X BANJO RELAY TO IGLOO TROJAN GLACIER RELAY TO MAINSPRING AND ANZAC X INFO GOMEZ BAHDLD VIA HARLEM' COMMAND X INFO FOX MOHAWK GAMECOCK OP

3.,..200400

2* Interference

a # Enemy interference was heard on 2956, 5605, and 21£4

ENCLOSURE (A)

-DAILY COIiIIUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY PMSJ. DAY lCoriUsned)

4 »— -i~ _+ «. i— 5-4 4 i|l

w*iMV J '-J kcs, as well as 27.4 and 27.8 mcs :

(l) Two instances of pbssible intentional enemy interference were noted:

(a) At 0952K on 2154 kes (volte) RCT-28 shore party began to send traffic. His transmissions were blocked completely by enemy C\l transmissions.

(b) On 27,4 mcs. RCT-23 was challenged by 4th MarDiv at 2352K. 4thMarDiv called RCT-23 ancl other stations on the circuit for receipt of a dispatch. RCT-23 answered in such a way as to cause 4th MarDiv to

#

be suspicious and he immediately requested authentication which RCT-23 did not give.

The message, however, was transmitted to all stations. (No vital information was contained in the message and' all numerals were concealed by shackle code).

b« Overall interference leasened somewhat, but many tactical circuits wore still below their maximum efficiency due to strong iinterference.e c.

For example, the following conditions were observed on 27,4 mcs (4th Division Command) t

(l) At 0818, the ExTroPac operator standing an intercept watch was unable to copy an urgent message duemessage due to heavy interference from GLACIER ancl TROJAN.

(2) 4th I'JarDiv sent an OP at 0850K, but interference prevented interception by ExTroPac.

(3) Interference was noted from TROJAN, DELEGATE BA3K;, ERSKINE BASE, GLACIER, GORILLA, BUCKEYE, SERGEANT BASE and ANZAO. Observations -show that signals from these stations were as strong, or

ehclosukema)^^^^^

)

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 5 DAY PLUS 1 DAY (Continued)

stronger, than that of the 4th Division on this frequency.

c.. On 27.8 mcs (sth Division Command) no improvement was noted* Interference was attributed to radar and high-speed Dross transmissions.

From 0025K to 0555K and periodically throughout the remainder of the day transmissions could not be copied on 27,8 mcs because of heavy interference from press transmissions.

3, Authentication

a. Authentication was generally fair. Mention should be made of the system in use by Hq LanFor, Of thirty-six (36) dispatches examined, the following two (2) are exemplatory:

)-(1) MAINSPRING V IGLOO -OP MAINSPRING L 202440K BT HARLEM REPORTS ENEMY ATTACK 183 KLQ AT 1422 X

<4KA CFN - YKT

(2) MAINSPRING V IGLOO -OP- RELAY TO GLACIER 191831 ACT GOMEZ INFO GLACIER 3T

RSF MY 191655 X IT IS URGENT THAT BALKAN ONE 3E DIRECTED TO RETURN TO BASS IMMED X ADVISE ACTION

-Q&A VDF EVP

b. Following the given indicator "QKA" three (3) letters" were chosen at random by the originator. In turn, the originator authenticated these three. (3) letters.

This system offers a compromise of current shackle grids, 3y compilation and substitution the enemy could construct a shackle to vie in authenticity with the currently effective one. For example, if the letter "C" was used but three times on' this date, the enemy would have three letters which adjoined "C0.

— — 4

- -

-DAILY COI-11-lUHICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY PLUS 1 DAY (Continued)

More than three gives repetition, and confirms their efforts.

4. Security of Text

a. The transmission of vital information in plain text caused flagrant violations of communication security, VJhile many of the messages were prompted by the critical situation ashore, employment of the shackle grid, call signs and combined assault code would have taken little additional time.

(1) 20/2310 2932 kes Plain

From: Spt, Group 4th'

MarDiv To Her). Trans 1: 4th Mar4th DivMarDiv Rep. TransGroup Vessel

PSRSONI^SL CASUALTY REPORTS AS FOLLOWS VARR, LEE 1-7. JR NR 475596 SGT. MCR KILLED IN ACTION 20F2845 BIAS, KSRMIT L. ~NR 854064 PFC. MCR KILLED IN ACTION 19FE845 X DAVIS, CARL M, -NR 800720 PFC MC KILLED IN ACTION 20FEB X FRIDELL, MAURICE H. NR 837847 PFC MCR KILLED IN ACTION 20F5845 X....

At this point, 4th MarDiv Rep.. Challenged the transmission by voice and HAROLD ceased sending.

(2) 201830 5780 kes Plain

From: 14th Marines To : 4th Division

DISPATCH SUMMARY FROM 1800 FEB-19 TO 1800 FEB 20 AS FOLLOWS OPERATIONS ELEMENTS ASHORE D NIGHT I-JSRE SILVER STAR PEPSICOLA AND WILDUOOD RECON PARTY. SILVSRSTAR FIRED DEFENSIVE FIRES. PEPSICOLA DUG IN GUNS AND REMAINED ON CALL TO PATRICK. D PLUS ONE BOTH BNS CONSOLIDATED POSITIONS AND FIRED. 'JILDWOOD REAPER AND GOMEZ ADVANCJJDCP LAUNCHED AT 0930 1515 and 1545 .RESFfiCTITOLY. REAPER IS STILL AFLOAT. WILD 3

_:-'S*v ,-?

¦(A)

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY PLUS 1DAY (Continued)

¥OOD IS LOCATED AT //WXTO// 1489 - GOMEZ OP AT

1 /AfAY//v 1 DUKW OF 476TH DUKW CO REPORTED DESTROYED ON BEACH WHILE tfORKING WITH PEPSI-COLA. SUPPLY 1200 RD3 OF 105 AMMO LANDED 3Y DUKWS FOR PEPSICOLA SILVER-STAR REPORTED HAVING- SUFFICIENT AMMO AND SUPPLIES UNTIL D PLUS 2

The originator, 14th Marines, compromised the underlined portions by sending actual numerals and then repeating same shackled. A series of S's (error) was sent before the shackled correction.

(3) 20/1834 2590 kes Plain

From: RCT 27 To : Hq sth Division Info: ADC sth Division

CASUALTIES AS OF 1730 KIA SH 6 UNS OFF SH 9 UNS SNL X :JIA SH 15 UNS OFF SH 447 UNS INL X MISSING- SH 1 UNS OFF SH 110 UNS ENL X ESTIMATE CASUALTIES SH 90 UNS EVACUATED X FIGURES INCLUDE GLUTTON

The numerals were not actually shackled in this transmission, although their use was indicated by !lsh" and lluns".

(4) 200847 2340 kes Plain

From: RCT 26 To : sthsth Ma PartyMarDiv Shore

UR 201538 NEED 2000 GALLONS WATER X 3500 X RATIONS 3T

(5) 200658 2590 kes Plain

Frôm: sth Division To : ADC sth Division

RCT 26 RCT 28 13th Marines

- ENCLOSURE ¦ U)¦"> -/ ,

f. ? 6 1

TF ,56 1 DAY (Continued)DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL - D DAY PLUS — ' ij£> pa. £H .' _"—— li~*3fc

fra _

AT DAWN TODAY AND FROM SOUTH COAST MAKE PROMPT REPORT SO NEUTRALIZATION CAN 3E ACCOMPLISHED

Page 38, Appendix I, Annex "G11 , (CCBP 01S>J>2) ,CENTCOi-1 TTJO, has assigned code words to be used in lieu of place names attached to the target. Sithai(l) this communication aid was not ashore or (2) the parties concerned were not aware of its contents.

Seven(7) violations of this nature were observed, concerning airfield no. 1, airfield no. 2, and Surabachi.

The effectiveness of our intelligence information is neutralized by the transmission of such reports in clear text.

(6) 201325 27.4 :mcs Blain

From: RCT 23 To : RCT 25 Info: 4th MarDiv

REX REPORTS RECEIVING HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE FROM AREA JUST NORTH OF BOAT BASIN X REQUESTYOU TAKE UNDER FIRE SIGHED PATRICK

Code name for (cast) boat basin is listed in AppendixI, Annex G, CcntCom 2 (CCBP 0130-E8) which insures security" of location against further enemy action.

0. DISTRIBUTION OF TRAFFIC

1* Total traffic handled by JCC on D plus 1 Day


1294 Total

2. This total exceeds previous operations in the amount of daily traffic handled. As compared to FORAGER (on D plus 1Day)

DAILY COl-H-iraiCATIOH JOURNAL TF 56 D DAY PLUS 1 DAY (Continued)

!-• it is an increase of four hundred f6r'ty-tT-ro dispatches (442) over the former total of 852.

3» The JCC was able to keep up with the volume of traffic.

r

¦**f5?f&9 ,I,^^,^--^^^

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL

TF 56

D PLUS ft DAY

¦rx. lIISCELLANEOUS EVENTS AFFECTING COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Hq LanFor reiterated an earlier order to Third, Fourth, and Fifth MarDivs that "information derived from enemy sources willnot be forwarded on any radio frequency in clear text."

9 Throughout the day congestion of supplies on beaches was seriously hampering re supply:

a. 210902 5780 kes Plain

From: RCT 23 To : SignalSignal Officer, 4th MarDiv

x only two1:0 3a-70s or 3a-80s received scr-300 and x urgently gear previouslyone scr-slO arrived need

rsg'Ulsitio::ed~to communicationsmaintain

b. 210940 2304 kes Plain

From: ADC sth MarDiv To : sth Marsth DivMarDiv Lop:Log. Control Officer

LST 641 EXPECTED NEAR L OF D AT 1200 X CRITICALLY NEEDED SIGNAL GEAR ABOARD X CAPTAIN JOHNSON IS OIC X STH MARDIV SHARE NEEDED IiOSDIATSLY ON RED 1

3. a, 2X2130 29 # 2 mes Plain

From! Hq LanFor To : Hq 4th Div

Hq sth Div

3LT 3/23 REPORTS OBSERVING JAP WAR DOGS RUNNING IiSGS X KILLED ONE X RCT 23 ADVISES WOUNDED PO¥ SNROUTE 3AYFIELD.

¦¦j srvi

t

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

4. A signal repair team, consisting of four men, one jeep and portable repair gear, was dispatched to 4th MarDiv signal quartermaster.. A radio maintenance trailer was later landed.

5. After reconnaissance by ADC 4th MarDiv, it was- decided not to move the 4th MarDiv CP ashore. Communications and control were deciding factors.

6. 210010 RATT Plain

From: CTF 53 To : CTF 51 Info: CTF 56

INTEND TRANSMITTING CTF 51's OPPLAN AND ALL SUMMARIES EACH EVENING "n* chZAR ON RATT USING VOICE CODE NAMES AND SHACKLE CIPHER X DESIRE SPELL OUT SHACKLED LETTERS TO AVOID POSSIBLE ERRORS IN, IMPORTANT NUMERALS WHICH "70ULD OTHERWISE RESULT FROM RADIO EMITTED- INTERFERENCE X ADVISE IF THIS ARRANGEMENT NOT SATISFACTORY

CTF 51 's decision was: "SEND IN PLAIN LANGUAGE ONLY ON RADIO TELETYPE X OTHERWISE USE ENCRYPTED CW DISPATCH OR MESSENGER 30AT". .

v

7. Ho LanFor shore party signal officer asked signal .. v officers of the 4th and sth Division shore parties if' they desired assistance of a cable plow to bury W-110.

a. The 4th MarDiv declined inasmuch as 80 per cent of their wire is installed overhead.

' .. b» The sth MarDiv desired cable plow, three (3) miles

of W-110, lance poles and' spare tubes for SCR-300.

8. The CP of the Fifth Division was established ashore at 1530.

— — p

-DAILY COI&ItniGATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 2 DAYS (Continued)

\> 43. RADIO 11

1, Circuit Discipline and Procedure. -y

a The operators log of the 4th I-iarDiv logistical net,(2932 kes), indicates continued prevalence of improper circuit discipline, incorrect operating procedure, and transmissions of obvious value to the enemy.

These conditions were largely duo to the critical supply situation ashore, and the use of the circuits' by officers inexperienced in communication procedure, the following is noted:

(l) 0857 PATRICK a V HARLEM GBT

BSACHSS ARE UNDER FIRE X".."E ARE REQUESTING THAT ALL &]Wi SHELLS BE SENT IN IMMEDIATELY. YELLOW BEACH IS CONGESTED AND CLOSED TO SHALL CRAFT

(2) 1145 PATRICK G V HARLEM GBT

persituation on yellow beaches as reports gomezlat:st embankment un

loading AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPLY DUI'IPS. BEACHES ARE BEING CLEARED. WHEELED VEHICLES WILL NOT BE LANDED UNTIL ROADS HAVE BEEN CO24PLETED. UDT ARE NOW BREAKING UP LANDED BOATS AND CLEARING WRECKS OFF BEACH. BEACHES ARE SUFFICIENTLY OPENED TO RECEIVE* SOME LCM AND LCVPS...EXTENSIVE DAMA&S BLUE BEACH ONE. EXPLOSIONS TILL GOIITiS ON

¦With permission of the net control station, Hq 4th MarDiv, the 21st Marines entered the net on 5780 kes with the correct call sign ITJ, During

JNCLOSUREMA^^^^^^^

0 -DAILY COiHiUinCATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

the frequency testing period, net control continually confused ITJ (21st Marines) with IJT (assigned to Sansapor, FCC 35) :

(l)- 2046 431 V ITJ QMC INT QSA X 2047 IJT V 481 (sent V's) QVF X 2048 481 V ITJ QSA 3 INT QSA X

c. Several incorrect headings were noted throughout the entire day. The most constant violator was the 4th

• MarDiv. The following mes.sage was given a different heading each time the message was transmitted. Example (l) was transmitted at 0821, (2) at 0828 and (3) at 0843.

Example (2) compromises the other two headings by the use of CW and voice calls within one heading. Inconsistency of the date- time group was noted.

(l) 210755K 2932 kes Plain

HAROLD PATRICK AVENGER V HARLEM ~OP-A- HARLEM 210755 PATRICK AVENGER -W- COUSIN GOME2HAROID IGLOO BANJO GLACIER CONVENT MOHAWK GAMEfCOCK MAINSPRING TROJAN ANZAC X BANJO RELAY TO* IGLOO

}'TROJAN X C-LACIER RELAY TO MAINSPRING AND INFO GOMEZ HAROLD VIA HARLEM COIIMAND X INF& FOX

<<I4OHAUK GAHSCOCK X BT... (2) 210601 5780 kes Plain

SSL IKT 3lvH V 481 -OP A- 481 210601 SSL IKT-INFO COUSIN GOMEZ HAROLD IGLOO BANJO GLACIER CONVENT MOHAWK GAMECOCK MAINSPRING TROJAN ANZAC X BANJO RZLAY TO IGLOO TROJAN X GLACIER RELAY TO MAINSPRING AND ANZAC X INFO GOMEZ HAROLD VIA HARLEM COMMAND X INFO FOX MOHAWK GAMECOCK X -OP-210611K 8T....

?'

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

(3) mes210601 27.4 Plain

COUSIN V HARLEM -OP-A-210601K PATRICK AVENGER -W-COUSIN GOMEZ HAROLD IGLOO BNAJO GLACIER CONVENT MOHA*7K GAMECOCK MAINSPRING TROJAN AITZAC X BANJO RELAY TO IGLOO AND TROJAN X GLACIER RELAY TO MAINSPRING AND ANZAO X -W- GOMEZ HAROLD VIA HARLSH COMMAND X -W~ TO FOX MOHAWK GAMECOCK X -OP-210601K BT..

a. RCT 25 was assigned the voico call "BAZOOKA" in Pac 71. This caused confusion with the Bazooka weapon * used by the Infantry Troops.

(l) 21/0655 2154 kes Plain

From: RCT 27 To : RCT 27 Shore Party Info: sth Division Shore Party

%

SEND IN RATIONS X BAZOOKA AMMO AND DEMOLITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BT

This could be interpretated as "send in rations X RCT 25 Ammo..."

o. Hq Corps Artillery dispatched the following to Chief of Staff and the liaison officer with tho* 14th •

Marines at '1416 on 2862 kes:

THIS CHANNEL iIUST BE CLEAR FOR AIRSTRIKE WARNING ; JHICH ARE IMPEDED BY X HEREAFTER ONLY INFOR2CATION VITAL CORPS ARTY UNITS WILL BE SENT X . NO MORE POSITION OF FRONT LINES AND GENERAL IrJFOa-MATION. *

As sent.

f. A cardinal example showing an effective delay in \

transmission of high-'oroccdenbo traffic is noted on 2404 kes : —

ENCLOSURSU) ?^M ^ g

•i

1

_v

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 -* D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

(l) At 0040K, Hq 4th MarDiv (4lB) notifiod the '

forward echelon, 3rd MarDiv (3«JTX) that ho had a 559-group OP to send, and asked if the 3JTX operator could receive speed-key. The answer was affirmative and transmission was begun.

(2) At 0242K, the 3rd- MarDiv operator rogcred for tHo dispatch.

(3) Interception on the circuit gave every indication that 418 was not proficient with the speed

¦key. Ko was unable to send his own call correctly. This inability to handle the speed key made actual transmission longer than if a regular hand-key had been used.

(4) At 0255, Hq 3rd MarDiv asked for re-runs of groups 80 to 89, 325 to 400, and 506 to 509. This second transmission (still by speed key) was completed at 0305K.

(5) A second request was made at 0316 for a repetition of the message before group 150. This request was complied with by 0335K.

(6) At 0452K a further request was made for repetition of groups 154 to. 160, and 252 to 258. This was made at 0510K.

A total of four and one-half (4§) hours were taken In completing the transmission. The delay was due to the inefficiency of the 4th MarDiv operator to use the speedkey correctly. However, the 3rd MarDiv operator should havq broken the transmission whenever errors were made or it was impossible to copy.

2. Authentication

a. Authentication was good throughout the day. T'Jith a continual flow of traffic, operators recognizedtransmission habits of other stations. The use? of

-E.~

*

DAILY COl&lUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56— D PLUS 2 pAYa C&mt£Hj%d)

VS"* Ji y

random authentication iLÔarcd to have declined.

3. Interference

a. Overall interference had lessened on all circuits, with the exception of 27.4 and 27.8 mes, which were still harried by heavy interference.

(l) At 0145K, on 27.4 racs, 4th MarDiv sent a portion of a message and then asked for a "roger", , All stations immediately complied. RCT 23 me.de repeated requests for a further repetition.RCT 23 actions were suspicious, and particularlyv;hen he asked for a repeat on the portion of the text which he had already acknowledged. At 0150K, RCT 23 requested a complete re-run (I1II). of a message that he had receipted for earlier.

(2) Enemy interference was noted at 0630K on 5780kcs by a station using the call "MI NA NO", On' 2276 kes, enemy OW transmissions were hoard. At 1510K, KANA (enemy code) was heard wlicncver a station on this frequency attempted to transmit.

b« Sxcessive blocking from automatic press, SAD and SAG circuits was experienced on 29,2, 27,4, and 27.8 rncs. Attempts to correct this by decoupling the antenna of the automatic press transmitter proved unsuccessful, SAD and SAC would not release control of their transmitters (to Radio Iand 2) long enough to adjust the variance. This was understandable as the Japs were making successful air attacks, and friendly planes were continuously airborne.

Interference continued throughout the day until approximately 1800K. This condition caused much repetition on 29.2 mes and accounted for the fact that some operational traffic (intercept) was missed on 27.4 and" 27.B mcs. .

TTT-TnT PiQTTDIT / A

-DaILY CO2IIIUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

4, Security of Text %ffi a» Security violations were rib-t' as apparent as those

of the two previous days. However, information vital to the enemy was still being transmitted in plain text :

(1) At 0730K on 27.8 mes, CASCU was heard conversing with an unknown station:

THERE WILL 3E A GENERAL ATTACK IN FRONT UR POSITION X ALL STATIONS DO NOT CHECK INTO NET BY CALLING UP UNTIL //0900// UNLESS YOU HAVE URGENT MESSAGE AR

At 0805, ComAirSup TG 51.10 notified RCT-25 that :

A CLOSE ATTACK IS BEING RUN AT THE BASS OF THE ¦MOUNTAIN AND DUPLEX IS OBSERVING. . MY TRANSMITTERS ARE BEING SHUT OF? FOR A FEW MINUTES., WILL YOU TAKE CONTROL OF NET. . .MY RECEIVERS ARE ALL RIGHT X

V,At 0847, GLACIER contacted REDWING:

THERE WILL BE NO AIR ATTACKS ON THE EAST SIDES OF THE ISLAND X

210942K 1918 Plain

From: Hq LanFor Hq ExTroPacExTroP,To : Ha

DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY CONVENT ON 19FEB IS PYROTECHNIC CODS YELLOW DRAGON REQUESTING ARTY SUPPORT REQUIRED X THREE WHITE STAR STREAMERS COUNTER ATTACK (CLOSE COMBAT ) . BT

(2) Clear text transmissions, such as the following, givo the enemy indication of the extent of our

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

Intelligence efforts,' and could be used to their own advantage through trickery:

(3) 21/1550 2154 kes Plain

From: Hq Fifth MarDiv To : Fifth DivFifth ShoreDiv Shore Party

ENEMY FORCE REVEALED BEACHES TO BE BROUGHT UNDER ROCKET FIRE AT 1845 X BT

(4) The following numerals should have been shackled, as the clear text reveals our supply routes to the beach, and the amount handled!

21/1824 2304 kes Plain

From: Log. Control 0. RCT-28 To DivDiv Los: Control 0.Control 0.: sthsth Log

FOLLOWING- SUPPLIES WERE SENT TO BEACH BY "

SARDINES X WATER 5 LOADS AMMO 70 LOADS RATIONS ~

5 LOADS FOLLOWING- SENT BX^BQAT WATER 4 LOADS . AMMO 13 LOADS PROVISIONS 5 LOADS X IT IS ESTIMATES THAT 50 PERCENT OF ABOVE LVT!S WENT •to r::d 1 x it is estimated that all g-ypsies WILL 3E UNLOADED BY NIGHTFALL BT

(5) The use of the Combined Assault Code has been neglected almost entirely. The information' below is of immeasurable value to the enemy, particularly if they knew the location of this unitit #

21/0830 2932 kes Plain

From: RCT 25 io 4th Div Rep, Aboard Control Vessel w/La.n

For

\- ,. w

2f5:*•' "s

J

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 2 DAY (Continued)

HAVE EXHAUSTED IffiNT IM'ISDIATE THE LST AS IJEL

REPLACETHOSE FROM

C. DISTRIBUTION OF TRAFFIC

li Total amount Day :

of traffic handled by tho JCC D plus 2

Administrative Tactical

434 837

1271 Total

i

\i i

\


TF 56 * t :'.^ ¦- *jp -^ D PLUS 5 D|f^v

A. MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS AFFECTING- COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Kg LanFor directed CTG- 53.1 to land radio teletype from USS CECIL as weather permits tomorrow. Site of installation will bo in vicinity of Green beach as determined by Kg LanFor advance party. FifthPhibCorps Signal Battalion or Hq LanFor shore party communication officer* was ordered to assist in handling. ti

2. Signal re-supply remained critical among shore parties f particularly the need for lance poles. The sth Division shore party sent a dispatch stating that cable and wire cannot be buried. A total of 120 lance poles were issued, 50 to sth Div Shore party, and 70 to 4th Div chore party in addition to 40 miles of wire (W-110) divided between these two units.

a, 13th Marines made urgent request for two (2) radio jeeps and three (3) 1-ton signal trucks.

b, HCT 27 was not in wire communication with ADC "fjth MarDiv,^

c. Additional radio jeeps were requested at the 4th MarDiv CP ashore.

cl, Hq LanFor ordered the FifthPhibCorps signalbattalion detachment to land at 0800 for employment with the LanFor Shore Party.

V.t

3. The FifthPhibCorps signal battalion embarked on LSM 141 prior to landing ashore the following morning.

A RCT 24 requested 4th l/fcrDiv to land all division signal supply and repair men as soon as possible. RCT 21 had very little communication equipment ashore.

5 The 4th MarDiv forward echelon (ashore) reported adequate oommuni cat ions with all units and suggested

ENCLOSUREMA^^^^^^^

-DAILY COlfl-iUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 3 DAYS (Continued)

that Hq 4th MarDiv come ashore the following day.

B. RADIO 4 \

1. CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE AND PROCESS.

a. Hq sth MarDiv (2QI) did not maintain proper net discipline on 3155 kcs. Excessive testing was noted throughout the day.

(l) Only tiro (2) messages wore handled between 1130 and 2359.. During this lull,Hq sth Mar Div, acting as net control station, made frequent tests.

(2) The failure of the other stations to answer forcodJ 2QI to call them individually, test ing lasting from 1754 until 1928.

b. The follwoing was observed on 5780 kcs:

(l) Hq 4th MarDiv (4BI) occasionally transposed call sign of unit he was in contact with. For example

1448 IKT V 431 QSA/QKA YHE/ QKA NTA X V IKT QKA XUC

IKT V IKT R AR

c. A triple-transmission from Hq LanFor to Hq ExTrs caused unnecessary delay of traffic on 29.2 mes and 1918 kcs :

(l) A summary rcroort, 221904, was sent via Navajo talker on 29.2 mes lasting from 1745K until 2030K.

(2) %

The same text was again transmitted byNavajo over 1918 kcs employing the circuit from 2057K to 2353K.

znclosure_Ja2;

2r*j-.;.fc ¦*

'0 i

- -

DAILY COKI-lUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 3 DAYS (Continued)

(a) This made a total of six (6) hours and 1

cloven (ll)minutes for the . transmission of one message over two separate frequencies.

(3) For some unexplained reason at 2238 (1038K),the text was again sent from Hq LanFor by radio-teletype in clear text.

There were other instances of unnecessary transmissions. These not only decreased the radio circuits available to the LanForce but forced a needless load on the Navajo talkers. TheNavajo !s should bo reserved for traffic that cannot, because of classification, be transmitted by other moans.

cl. There were many instances of incorrect headings:-(1) IGLOO V CONVENT -T- A FACULTY P LIAISON OFF IGLOO P 1145 FACULTY BT

(2) THIS IS A JIG ON CONVENTS MSG NR 1839 SAWBONES V CONVENT 39 1839

(3) BLACKSMITH V COUSIN-OP -BT

WARNING ORDER //E-TR// BECOMES EFFECTIVE AS OPERATION ORDER //Q-KZ// WITH THE FOLLOWING

ARTILLERY ADDITIONS

NGF-FROM ATTACK PRECEDED 3Y COORDINATED '

KING MINUS //KU//TO KING HOUR X AIR PLAN VICTOR HARLEM FRONT KING PLUS //CV// TO KING PLUS //NO// ADDRESSEES ARE AS FOLLOWS-A3NER. REX, BLACKSMITH, CATSKILL. ABLE. GOBLET. OLD NICK, AMBITION. ABLE. BAZOOKA. WILD, WOOD A OQUSIN X

(4) ALL STATIONS THIS NET V GLACIER (2862 kes)

(The correct collective station call is EXBROOK, Pac 71, Part 7, Page 230 )

~ -3

"T

-DAILY COIH-lUNICATION JOURNAL. TF 56 D PLUS 3 DAYS (Continued)

MIKE, MA§fenIc' Officer" or anwhether as used, meant "" ,MA§fenlc',

individual "Mike sends 11. V:.- v

(l) 221710Z 2955 kes Plain

From: ExTroPac Liaison Officer

To : Hq ExTroPac

4TH DIV DISPATCH TO RCT-21 AT 1608 AS FOLLOWS X REPORTED THAT ELEMENT YOUfl RIGHT FLANK CAlffi UNDER FIRE AND WITHDREW LOSING CONTACT WITH RCT-25 X VERIFY AND REPORT X MIKE,

2. Authen ticat ion

a. Authentication was generally good. Following, however, is a. message intercepted on 27,4 kes.

2205 AVENGER V HARLEM -OP-A- HARLEM 2221 37K IGLOO-lf-MAINSPRING- ELEPHANT 6 AVENGER 14

After the transmission of 222137K, AVENGER (RCT 25) told lIARLEM (Ha 4th 24arDiv) : "Sorry, Idon't have my authenticator here, but please— send message again more slowly."

HARLEM complied.

3. interference v

a. Strong interference still continued on 27.4 and 27,8 mes, due mainly, to the following factors:

(l) Excessive regeneration

(2) Atmospherics

(3) High-speed press transmissions.

ENCLOSURÂ^^^^^^^ •«

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 3 DAYS (Continued)

b# On 2276 kes, the enemy endeavored to $$xn. the circuit during "condition RED". The enemy station was heard sending random characters but no calls or station identifying procedure.

c. The enemy call FU URO was heard at 0602K on 2404 kes. Some enemy C¥ traffic was sent. Prolonged testing was in evidence.

a. At 1100 the call YO NO 0 was heard on 5605 kcs.

4. Security of Text.

a. Security of clear text transmissions left much to be desired.

\ (1) 221620 2404 kes Plain

From: 4th MarDlv To : RCT 21, RCT 25, 14th Marines Info: RCT 24, RCT 23, Kg LanFor

CONSOLIDATE AT 1650 X PREPARE TO CONTINUE ATTACK 0730 TOMORROW BT

Hq LanFor later notified the originator of the security violation in not shackling the time.

(2) 221732 5780 kes Plain

From: 4th MarDiv To : RCT f s 21,, 23. 24. 25

STRGiTr> ENEMY COUNTER ATTACK REPORTED ALONG ENTIRE FRONT OF FULLBACK AT //QMYZ// X BT

Sln-jc the enemy is aware of the time of his- count er-::v'--uack, the use of shackle under this condition becomes a misuse..

n-! a T*y (¦;•'¦ENCLOSURE (A)y — —

5

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 3 DAYS (Continued)

(3) 221613K 5780 Kcs Plain

From: 4th MarDiv ' To : Hq LanFor, RCT 25, 14th Marines Info: Hq SxTroPac, BLT 1/23, RCT 21, 23, 24

MAP INDICATES BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS IN NORTH 184 BC

This dispatch discloses three (3) violations of security. First, information is given to the enemy that we have one of their maps in our possession. Secondly, "brigade headquarters" discloses our knowledge of .their unit locations. Lastly, if the enemy had a definite location of more than one of our coordinates, he could reconstruct our target map*

f

(4) Further clear text transmissions revealed exact numbers of unit casualties, names of navy vessels »* and quantities of equipment.

(a) 211210K from sth MarDiv" sth Div MA Observer aboard

Arkansas.

(b) 221900JC from RCT-23 "Supply situation" good with exception0$ 81MM amm0....

(c) 211725K from sth Tank Bn "Medical officers report casualties to date dead 4 evacuated 7..."

(d) 211950K from 4th MarDiv " "-..Casualties 14th Marines 211, .. C. DISTRIBUTION 01 ¦j.'RA.FFIC

1. Total amount of traffic handled by the JCC:


1300 Total '

*. ¦^•^ :;--. 5

¦--¦?-"TtDAILY COMMUNICATION REPQRJ,., « P\ - •v. ¦¦¦li*

V

i ¦¦ V4

D PLUS 4 DAYS

A. ¦iISCELLANZOUS EVENTS AFFECTING COMMUNICATION.

1. 230603 2404 kcs

From:, Hq LanFor To : CTG 56.2.1, CTG 56.2.2 Info: CTF 56, CTF 53

INDICATIONS TARGET SQUARE MAP COMPROMISED X SHACKLE ALL NUI33RS BY VOICE RADIO EXCEPT WHERE URGENCY JUSTIFIES SENDING IN CL3^

2. Comment on the contemplated use of radio-teletype was made by ComPhibsPac by dispatch to CinCPAC :

"...VHF RADIO TELETYPE HAS PROVED VERY VALUABLE BETWEEN SHIPS X REQUEST ALL TRANSPORT SQUADRON FLAGS HAVE "PERI'IANENT INSTALLATION WITH SPECIAL EFFORT TO COIIPLSTE INSTALLATION IN TRANS-RON FLAGS AND AGC'S SCHEDULaD FOR N3XT OPERATION..."

o. Improved weather and the capture of Mt. Surabachi material ly aided the ship-to-shore movement of equipment-.and supplies. Congested beach areas x-roro cleared and supply dumps moved inland.

a. The Fourth " dump established, onDivision signal was ¦Blue beach Two. v

b # The LanFor shore party CP >ras set up at the -rightflank of Red beach one (l) and lateral 'communications wore established.

c. Radio-teletype portable equipment was landed on\

Green beach bno (l). LVTs were employed to transportthe gear to the LanFor shore party* CP.

'-^ '^'¦"iJ (AENCLOSURE* iwlv''''^' -j

DAILY COMI-iUKICATION JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 4 DAYS (Continued)

*

d. Corps Artillery reported the npbS of 4 radio' operators,1 TBX with spare batteries, 1 BA-39, I'.BA-40, communication tents, nio;ht lighting equipment, 50 BA-30*s and 15 telephones, (£E-8).

4#4 # A reconnaissance party of the Third MarDiv wont gishorc for the purpose of establishing a suitable location for

. the division CP.

5. The Fourth MarDiy CP was closed aboard the USS BAYFIELD (APA 3,3) and opened ashore at 0930K,

6, Location of the Hq LanFor CP was selected, but due to conditions ashore, CG LanFor returned aboard the USS AUBURN (AGC 10 ) for the night.

7#7 #

' 4thMarDiv requested that HQ LanFor contact JICPOA team regarding movement of salvaged enemy gear.

B. RADIO

1. Circuit Discipline and Procedure. ' a. At 1528 on 2404 kes Hq LanFor (4-IB) asked the Corps

Signal Battalion (IUD) for his signal strength. Both stations a cknowledged good (QSAS) communications. LanFor then asked IUD to authenticate:

1529 IUD V 418 QPA GNC X 1530 V 418 QPA GNO X 1531 IUD V 4-IB QPA GNO IMIQPA GNO X 1532 418 V IUD UD SAVE RONG CHAR WILL AA

(unrecognizable*) . 1533 V 418 IMI X

V IUD HAVE NO QPA CHART ALLPA HZN V 4-IB IMI AA QPA X

1538 V IUD IMI NO QPA CHART 'TILL QPT HZN X

It is believed that"QPA chart 11 refers to shackle gridf and if thr.t be /true, the reason for their absence is

- •*%?• " . .?

2

_ _ _ ¦J>

-DAILY COIJKUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 4 DAYS (Continued) -.^.^csfad—

not understood. Use of tA^l&fehal "QPT U is in error.

From 1540K until 1610K, 418 '(Hq LanFor) was unable to receive correct authentication from IUD (Corps SignalBn):

1609 IUD V 41.8 QPA KRL X 1610 V IUD QLA KRL - XAF X 1611 IUD V 418 QHA QLA. X 1612 413 V IUD HAVE NO Q BOOK QPA XXN X

The inability of the Corps Signal Battalion to authenticate.,' and having no shackle grid or "Qn signal book is not explained. It is necessary that ,radio stations be supplied with such communication aids.

o. A decided laxity has been noted in using code names of units rather than given names t

(1) 221320 from Hq sth 14arDiv:

REQUEST (SHACKLE) IGLOO SHORE PARTY PERSONNEL. . (2) 231242 from C.Q.. Corps Artillery:

\ CASCU HAS ORDERED BIRD FOR TODAY

(3) 231225 from CO. Corps Artillery:

.. -iUOTE FROM Ca LANFOR 3ELIEVE THAT MORE ARTILLERY NECESSARY FOR ADVANCE OF RCT 21 X IF PRACTICABLE &ET ALL CORPS ARTILLERY ASHORE UNQUOTE X THIS FROM CONVENT CP TO LANFOR X BE READY FOR ALL. ACCURATE UNITS TO COME IN

This example (3) results in a compromise, as the text lists both given and code names.

(4) 23/2029 from SxTroPac liaison officer with LanFo r:

-71

rz IHRHIIM||||||^^B^BB|IPMM

,T

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 P PLUS 4 DAYS (Continued)

ARE ELEMENTS 3RD TAl^^llf."fe '--rCV-" j\ V^

2. Authentication

a. Inattention regarding proper methods of authentication were noted:

(l) Failure to use correct "Q" signals indicating a desire for authentication was observed on 5780 kes

1020 SSLR V 481 XOD X V SSLR IMIIMIX

1021 SSLR V 4-BI XOD IMI XOD X 431 V SSLR INT XOD X

V SSLR WHAT MEANING????? 1024 SSLR V 431 QPA Q?A XOD XOD X 1025 431 V SSLR QKA RUV IMIRUV X

V 482 SSL 5 SL ON (JPK) X V ,SSLR R.....AR

SSLR (RCT 23 Roar) was required to inquire in clear text as to the procedure of 431 (4th Mar-Div). The signal uQ,KAn should have proceded the initial XOD (Cent Com 2 Change 2 Para. 2400 d) „

3. Interference

a. Interference on 27,4 and 27 # 8 mes xras reduced bjt

(l) Decoupling the antenna on 5465 kes, (fighter director circuit), thus eliminating extensive interference from GLACIER (CSA).

(2) Decoupling the antenna of high-speed press transmitter to rid the circuit of excessive "humming".

(3) Shifting of the daily news broadcast frequency.

b» Enemy interference was limited to CW transmissions on 2154 and 3155 kes. There wore no instances of

ENCLOSURE (A) 4,

X:IPOT $&&P-r'

n it

DAILY COI-MUNIGATIQN JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 4 DAYS (Continued) *?

intentional jamming.

4. Security of Text.

a. Violations of security showed a marked decline.%

Numerous errors, however, continued to appear due to failure to shackle numerate;

b# Despite the shackling in the following message, enough information is given to make the shackled portion of little value

231746 2862 kes Plain

From: Corps Artillery To : Corios ArtilleryArtillery Exec.Corps

TARGET AREA(SHACKLE) ROAD RUNNING THRU GEORGE AND MIKE X THERE IS A HUGE TREE EASILY SEEN AND EASY TO SPOT X NORTHEAST OF THIS TRUE IS HIGH GROUND X ON TOP OF THIS HIGH GROUND IS A ROCKET LAUNCHING POSITION X THIS INFORMATION FROM BIRD.


1. Total amount of traffic handled totaled:


972 Total

\

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOUtxNAL

' fk\*

D PLUS 5 DAYS \A A. MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS AFFECTING COMMUNICATIONS

1. ComGenLpnFor established his CP and assumed command ashore at 0955K.

<-> ComGen Third MarDiv opened CP ashore at 1530K,

3« Although landed ashore, the radio-teletype was not in continual operation due to enemy artillery fire being received at the Hq LanFor command post.

a. 240625

From: Sipnal Officer, SxTroPac To Fwd Msg Center, Hq LanFor

HOW MAK&TRATT STATIONS ON BEACH X WHAT ARE THEIR CALLS X DO YOU HAVE AN ECHELON ABOARD AUBURN

This message was occasioned by a RATT dispatch from Kg LanFor Liaison Officer with 4th Div to Adv# Echcloi HqLanFor received at 231503.

b. 241332

From: Hq LanFor To : ComGonComGon ExTroPac~>x

YOUR 240525 X 1 RATT STATION X CALL IG X ONLY TQM AND FEW COMM PERSONNEL ABOARD AUBURN

A CTF 53 notified Hq LanFor that the Corps Signal Battalion personnel and equipment would be landed tomorrow. In turn, Hq LanFor ordered the Corps Signal Battalion to land all general cargo and available batteries, RADIO REPAIR truck and balance of personnel of the advance echelon Corps Signal Battalion.

--1 ¦¦¦¦¦¦¦¦¦¦¦

DAILY COIH-lUi-TICATIO;! JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 5 DAYS (Continued)

\:

5. Eighth field depot personnel (less motor transport) were ordered ashore to report to the LanFor shore party.

5. The Fourth MarDiv shore party ordered the repair trucks and signal repair personnel to report ashore at the RCT24- CP. The remainder of signal vehicles, supplies, and personnel were to report to the Fourth MarDiv CP»

?•> The following personal observations were made following the landing and establishment of the signal section of' the LanFor CP on D plus 4 Day

a. Landing and moving basic equipment to the CP required most of the first day ashore, and enemy artillery prevented further progress during the night. Before darkness, however, all radio circuits had been established and tested, including the radio-teletype.

b. Telephone lines wore in and working to all divisions. Wire had been strung on. 2" x 4lf, twenty (20 ) foot poles within the Corps CP.

c. An attempt to bury cable by use of a plow was temporarily abandoned d.ue to numerous concealed culverts and concrete pillboxes.

d« The "weasel" proved to be of great value in negotiating the difficult terrain.' It was used to lay wire and did so with rapidity.

8. 241050K 6880 kes

From: CTF 51 To : CinCP^ (Pearl)CinCP^C

RADIO TELETYPE USED WITH TBK TRANSMITTER ABOARD 2&DORADO HAS FURNISHED EXCELLENT DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS TIO JIHA TO GUAM X RECOMMEND ALL AGC 3E FITTED TTITH RATT EQUIPMENTSII-IILAR TO THAT FURNSIHED ELDORADO AT SAIPAN BY COMFWPAREA

THAT PROJECT 3E ASSIGNED VERY HIGH PRIORITY X 11-jpiIOVED SIMPLIFIED EQUIPMENTS DESIRABLE '.THEN -AVAILABLE

(-\ dHfe^^âLZ*^^^22|ldßb|l2iHißißflHHHßißHi^H^^^^^^^^^^^K

Rail;cl COl-EIUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 5 DAYS (Continued) *r\

*?. Ji

¦\

3. :UDIO

1. Change of Circuits.

a. Changes wore made aboard ship in the location of transmitters and receivers to allow this command to intercept Third Division Command, Logistical Control and Shore Party circuits.

(l) The following additional (Third Division) circuits were guarded:

2052 kes (V) 2516 kes (V) 2808 kes (V) 27*6 mes.

2. Circuit discipline and procedure.

a. Poor operating discipline was observed on 2052 kes t

(1) At 1700K, it took the rear echelon of RCT-9 25 minutes to transmit an OP. This delay was caused by the Third Tank Battalion's testing with the 3rd MarDiv.

(2) On 3155 kes, the prosigns trAR" and "X" were frequently omitted by Fifth MarDiv.

(3) Excessive testing was observed on 5940 kes through-out the day. At 1945, IG-LOO 10 gave a station check and asked all stations to zero brat their receivers to his transmitters. The result was utter confusion. This was followed by the roar echelon of IG-LOO i-fao similarly attempted to have aJ.I stations on the net zero beat to his transmitter. They conducted tests for forty(40) minutes with questionable results.

3. Authen ticat ion

a. Failure to change entire shackle grid when one letter is substituted was noted on 27*4 mes :

j_

DAIL3: COIEIUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 -r-D' PLUS 5 DAYS (Continued)

1714 HARLEM V PATRICK R IN REGARDS TO YOUR 241640 WHICH YOU SENT TO PATRICK... PLS SAY AGAIN X

PATRICK R V HARLEM ONE STEP //DYJP// X HARLEM V PATRICK R OUR SHACKLE DOESN'T AGREE ON

THAT.. .X 1715 PATRICK R V HARLEM CORRECTION ON MY 241640...

SHACKLE AFTER ONE STEP IS //OYJP//....K

b. At 1846K, roar ochclon LanFor notified all stations on his circuit (2404 kes) of the condition "Flash Red" * This was followed by "disregard Flash Red" from roar echelon LanFor at 1851, In neither case was authentication asked for or given. The enemy observing our carelessness " could crerte a state of unprepardncss by flashing a "disregard 11 when a raid was imminent.

4, Interference

a« Some interference was observed, on 27,4 mes and 27.6' mcs. Considerable enemy GW transmissions were hoard, particularly on 2404 kcs ; but none appeared to be deliberate attempts at jamming or deception.

5#5 # Security

a. The message below was received on 3845 kes (naval gunfire control net) at 0824-K:

From: Pcnsacola

199 Oboe REPORTED AS FRONT LINE BY VOF

'This area was a strongly fortified Jap position and had been shelled throughout the night. Immediate verification was sought and the Pensacola denied having sent it. It was not believed to be enemy deception because the Japs had tried it before and their signal strength was weak and the; voice tones different. The report was in error as this position was enemy territory.

»

ENCl^SURljMA^^^^^^Â

#

DAILV COIi-iUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 5 DAYS (Continuod)

b. General security continued to be good, but numerous minor violations appeared with regularity:

Ilpr i¦» fl b \\N ¦<> W/ia r ?Ii From: LanFor Shore ParlsrB.,in c-i- LJ-, W&i kakU To : Ha LanFor yi^'îisJtivy***"¦»¦

R3COI4MEKD LTCOL KING AND CAPT DECKER OF 586 TH SERVICE GROUP OaRRISON FORCES BE LANDED FOR PURPOSE OF KEOON X HAVE THSH LAND RED TYJO AND REPORT TO CSP HEADQUARTERS

This identifios unit not yet publicly committed to the operation.

241010 2154 kes

From: Fifth MarDiv To : Fifth MarFifth DivMarDiv TQ.M

REQUEST PERMISSION TAKE PERSONNEL ASHORE FROM APA RAIN DROP AKA BUDROSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE LAND RED ONE BT

Unnecessarily affixing the typo of ship to the. call compromises the call and previous transmissions.

25/0016 2304 kes

From: Fifth MarDiv Log. Control Officer. To : FifthFifth 1-larDivl-larDiv Shorel'.-BartvShore:- Party

T X '/ILL 3E R£i£YWE HAV3 LSH LOADED iITH 150 TONS AMMO TO BEACH AT 2400 X T;HERE X ADVISE

•Such transmissions enable the enemy to find the most valuable targets.


1. Total amount of traffic handled:


937 Total5£S^R r\,^

ENCLOSURE (A)v*-'v*-' v— -.SJ

ft S"

* ! ;!

1 •¦isTF 56

DPLtJS 6 DAYS

** MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS AFFECTING COMMUNICATIONS.

1. 252104 29.2 mcs

From: Hq LanFor To : CTF 52 Info: Hq SxTroPac, CTF 53, Hqs3rd, 4th, and sth MarDivs

COI-SMUNICaTIONS. ASHORE AT PRESENT INADEQUATE FOR CLOSE CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF NGF BE.C.&USE SIGNAL EQUIPMENT EIOARKED IN CORPS SHIPPING HAS NOT 3SEN LANDED X OUR RZPRESSNATIVE "iITH CTF 53 NOW COORDINATING REQUEST IN ACCORDANCE COMGSN DIRECTIVES X HOPS TO HAVE FACILITIES AVAILABLE ASHORE WITHIN 24 HOURS.

2. Portable radio-tele typo equipment and operating personnel aboard the USS 3AYFIELD will not' be landed ashore, but to be transferred to the USS ELDORADO.

v 3, Urgently required clue to combat losses, Kg LanFor asked

the assistance of CG ExTroPac in locating fifty (50) SCR—300's, A total of thirty-two (32) sets were collect ed from various (UDT) naval sources.

t \ CG Third MarDiv directed its rear echelon to debark all but enough men to maintain a small message center aboard ship.

5. 251533 2362 kes

From: CO Corps ArtilleryCorps ArtilleryCorps Artillery Li,To : Liaison Officer.

COIIAIRSUP (TG- 51.10) HAS BEEN UP AND ON AND USING- CORPS ARTY AIR SPOTTER FREQUENCY X THIS HAS BEEN INTERFERING COI'SIDSRABLS WITH MISSIONS TO BE FIRED X SEE IF COMAIR SUP (TG- 53.10) CAN DO ANYTHING ABOUT KEEPING THAT CHANNEL OPSN FOR IMPORTANT FIRE MISSIONS.

—— ENCL^fiiß MM ¦^

.1

3

-V

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 6 DAYS (Continued)

RADIO

iCircuit Discipline and Procedure.

C" At 251020K an intercept from the Fourth MarDiv ordered"FLASH RED". This action was contrary to Para 2-B Appendix 13, Annex 1, ComPhibsPac Op-Plan A 25-44, Upon investigation, Hq LanFor notified SxTroPac that the airflash was "inadvertently put on air by uninstructed operator and that steps have been taken

-preventto reoccurence."

b. Nicknames are occasionally confused with call signs listed in ContCom Two:

From: 73 BW Control 1667 To : CTFCTF 51. CTF 94CTF 9451,

HONST3R DITCHED AT 27-00N 141-10E 250145Z SURVIVpHS DOUBTFUL

"Monstor 1'

is the nickname assigned to 3-29's by BomCom 21, The same call is also listed in Cent Corn Two as the call-sign of CTO 51.8.

c« The followinfr heading was transmitted by Hq LanFor on 240-ikes at 1947:

¦I? V -M3R TJOS TRANSMITTED IN ANS TfSR TO YOUR. ¦JQI UR 242314Z X TIT2L-418 V 4IBR 241305 X

23F 2Q3 3YC 4-BU 05CB 7IA ITY BT

cl. On 2956 kes, Hq LanFor sent ExTroPac an operational summary with the following incorrect heading:

MAINSPRING V IGLOO -OP- 252044 K-W-CONVENT HARL2M FACULTY PATRICK

As ExTroPac was the only addee that could be reached

TjßfiiM^BSiÂY—¦¦¦—

- -

DÎLY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 -*V MY'PLfe'ls BAYS (Continued) *-f!

on 2956 kcs,, LanFor asked SxTroPac to relay the message. Cognizant of the fact that all" addcos could be reached on 1918 kcs, the following transmissions were noted:

2245 LanFor V ExTroPac ARE U IN CONTACT WITH FACULTY //1918// X

V LanFor AS AR 2300 LanFor V ExTroPac ARE YOU IN COMM. WITH FACULTY

HARLEM CONVENT. ON //1918// X V LanFor AFFIRMATIVE X V ExTroPac DO YOU STILL WANT MS TO ~T~UR

252044 TO ALL INFO APDEasHC 2308 ExTroPac V LanFor A5.... ,AR 2310 SxTroPac V LanFor PLEASE -T-AS WE HAVE NET HELL

OCCUPIED X V ExTroPao THE ONLY FREQUENCY ICAN

-T-TO THEM ON IS 29,2... ASK IGLOO 10 IF HE IS WILLING TO LET ME CONGEST THAT NET X

2312 SxTroPac V LanFor AS AR 2323 V LanFor WHAT WAS THE DTG ON THE MSG

THAT ALL OF THE TROUBLE WAS ABOUT -T- TO ALL OF THE INFO ADSES X

V ExTroPac. 242044 X V LanFor DISREGARD ~T- THAT MSE AS ALL

OF THE INFO ADDSES HAVE THAT HSG- NOW X

2325 V ExTroPac R....AR

LanFor was in direct contact with 4th Div, sth Div, 3rd Biv, and LanFor Roar on the LanFor Comd Net (1918 kcs). That message would have required at least two hours to retransmit by Navajo,

The continued use of incorrect headings indicated that trained Message Center personnel were not always assigned the duties of traffic chief*

ENHJ^l^g^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 3

• *f'W f*v.jf*,' k X" .1

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 6.DAYS (Continued)

2. Authentication

a. With the gradual reduction of traffic, authentication became more of an exception than a rule. Such practice was progressively more dangerous, when circuit traffic ebbed and the operators sending characteristics became less recognizable.

o» Interference

a. Local interference was still noted on 27.4, 27 # 8 mes and 2154 Ices.

C T"o. Enemy .f interference was noted on 2154, 3155, and 2404 kcs.' Intentional jamming was not observed.

,1 Security

a. Violations of security occured in clear conversations amongst operators listed below:

0924 IGLOO PETER (LanFor SPSP

0953 IGLOO PETER

¦

* 4f!tv 'J p.

ashore, as indicated in examples

35" VIGLOO PETER 6 35)(LanFor SP 6) V IGLOO PETER 35

V IGLOO PETER 6

V IGLOO PETER 35

V IGLOO PETER 6

V IGLOO PETER 35

V IGLOO PETER 6 V IGLOO PETER 35

V IGLOO PETER 6

V IGLOO PETER 35

WHERE LOCATION sth DIV SP C.P* X ON GREEN. BEACH AT EXTREME END...LST 785 NEAR MS. ? ?IAM RIGHT NEAR HIM... IAM OPPOSITE 725. DO YOU SEE IGLOO' X R AR'

WHERE IS STH. DIV SI GP"AT X.~ DO YOU KNOW WHERE

O.P;CORPS IS X YEAH X WELL TURN L&FT... ABOUT -| MILE IDID..CANT FIND IT THOUGH X WELL ASK SOMEBODY THERE THEN X

DAILY COLMUNICATION JOURHAL TF 56 - D PLUS 6 DAYS (Continued)

IGLOO PETER V IGjIOO PSTER 6 DID YOU FIND OUT ANYTHING X

V IGLOO PSTER DO YOU WANT STH DIV SP C.P. X

V IGLOO PETER 6 WELL HE SAID STH DIV SP

V IGLOO PETER R. . .Wilco V IGLOO PETER 6 THAT WAS STH DIV

C.P,SP V IGLOO PETER THAT IS CORRECT KR

(Unidentified voice breaks lnr) "NOBODY SEEMS TO KNOW ANYTHING AROUND HERE... IAM ON THE BEACH"

1006 V IGLOO PETER SP C.P, IS ON RIGHT FLANK OF GREEN NEAR RED BEACH ONE. .DOES THAT HELP U ANY X

b. On D plus 4 Days a possible compromise of the target area map was reported. Further information to' the enemy was probably given on 2932 kcs. At 0702, -1-th MarDiv-Rop. on transgroup Control Vessel asked for a compilation of the front line locations* 4th 1-iarDiv Roar complied, using the shackle code.

C Laxity in the use of the shackle code was still observed particularly in summaries wherein numerical designations were contained.

C. ;ISTRI3UTION OF TRAFFIC



748 Total

— 5

— S^LOSURE (A) m^^M

x

C i

rp I

1 From 0410 to 0445K, D plus 7 day, Hq LanFor received heavy enemy artillery fire which disrupted wire communications and temporarily halted teletype communications with Division CP's. There were minor communication personnel casualties.

o- 270540 7-5 Secret

From: CTF 56 To : ComGcn Pl^F ?AC Info: GomG-cn SupSorv FMF PAC, CTF 51, CinCPOA Adv« Hq.

DUE TO COI-SAT LOSSES 32 SETS, RADIO, SCR-300 WERE PROCURED FROM ITAVAL SOURCE AT TARGET X REQUEST RE~ FLACSMENT OF LIKE NUMBER BE DELIVERED BY 10 MARCH IF POSSIBLE CINOPAO RADIO POOL GUAM FOR ALLOCATION BY COI4PHI3SPAO X ADVISE

o At 1800K, D plus 8 Detachment 568th Support Air WarningBattalion, 726th SAW Company, and detachment 44, 70th AACS were released from operational control of Provisional Signal Group, They were assigned to operational control of Commander Air Support Unit.

/ The following information was obtained while ashore on D plus 7 days.

a. Teletype communications were initially established with the Fourth MarDiv on D plus 6 clays. As the Corps Signal Battalion supplies were not unloaded, one (l) teletype was borrowed from the Division for this purpose.

b. On the following day, teletype circuits were? established with the Third and Fifth Divisons, as *we11 as with C-2.

N

IfT

*¦<

4

!

,t

JS,

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 & 8 DAYS ("Continued)

,>

c*, Tho majority of teletype jAnes, were underground.Frequent enemy shellings,^-'however, caused interrupted service.

d. Because of the sensitivity of the teletype equipment, constant maintainance, adjustment and cleaning of this equipment was required.

c« The circuits handled by the LanFor ashore were?

•HO tO -\P Oi*&G) (j) O>

ExTrps XXX LanFor XX X XX

LF SP X

3rd M XX XX

4th M XX XX sth M XX XX ADC 3rd M x

cnto OSW co G)<J) 0)0 O Oir-i O3&H CD !

o in

Accurate figures of dispatch traffic handled by thef. LanFor message center were not available. There were

(22) on each writtentwenty- two individual deliveries up dispatch.

p\ The personnel and some equipment of the JCC were still afloat. The site for' the installation of the JCC had been* selected, and preparations were being made to move this unit ashore. GroPac 11 unit (434)

had been using only visual communicative methods until this time.

** 1<= Pt^* ,

|j^^Êsk^^fi^^^£a^ 2^^S|ttywM|^^^^^^^g|^^_M^£Ql M

-DÎLY COl-I-iUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 & 8 DAYS (Continued)

B, RADIO

Circuit Discipline1. and Procedure

<^ i. Laxity of discipline and superfluous testing was observed on many circuits. This was attributed to the sharp decline of operational tra.ffic, as well as the fact that Net Control Stations did not exercise proper control. The immoderate use of circuits for impromptu conversations and testing was noted.

(l) On 2404 kes, testing and requests for signa.l strength reached abnormal proportions* The Fiftl-Tl'larDiv (20,1) continued to call other stations on the not throughout the day, asking for traffic. Meaningless "dits" and "Sails" also eminated from that station.

(2) The following ©xcorpt wa-s-' J^Xqxp from operators

"71^.20,1 SENDS DITS AND DAHS WITH NO SENSE... NO NOTHING. . . .CONTINUES TO FOUL UP. ..HAS BEEN DIRECTED SEVERAL TIMES TO -UIT SENDING AND TO GiUIT SENDING SO MUCH IN THE FORM OF SIGNAL STRENGTH CHECKS... 2QI ASKS FOR TIME CHECKS A3OUT EVERY 20 TO 30 MINUTES...IN THE SPACE BETWEEN THESE HE SENDS DITS AND DAHS.. .fl

(3) On 2852 kes, D plus 8, a conversation was heard between the operator and an unidentified person at his station • While the parties involved were some distance from the microphone, their voices were plainly audible: . '¦

?

0821 Operator: What was the frequency, sir? Person : uh, 3865 Operator: 3865, Irllshackle it.

This was then followed by the transmission:

¦&¦ \

S^LOSURi^^^^^^^^Jf

I

f -:< \

— — -» >r- .-*

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 <sfc 8 DAYS (ContinUod; V'-.'irff

I

ACCURATE 24A V ACCURATE' IS THE SPOTTER OF EMPEROR//JKLT//X

ACCURATE V ACCURATE 24A AFFIRMATIVE...AR \

(4) Lack of proper vigilance and procedure charactcrizod the transmission noted below on. 5940 kes:

1023 IGLOO L4 V IGLOO L 5 ••...DO YOU WANT ME TO ROQER FOR IGSSAGES I AH IKFO.ADDEE ON# ?X -1024 V IGLOO L4ASAS LO-NG COi-EIUNICALONG ASAS COICIUNICATIONS ARE AS OOOD AS THEY AR£, IifILLTAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT

IFTOU DON'T. YOU CM . COME UP AND ASK FOR~ REPEATS, T.K

1025 V IGLOO L5WltCO, ... .AR

(5) At 2326K, on 2304 kes, the following con>s<sat~ion was recorded: •.

/

SA¥3ONSS V CONVENT 39 (#E ARE HAVING) DIFFICULTY AND !JOd-IDEJI IF YOU COULD 'HEI^ US.. WE HAVE'A CALL HERE TTE'CANT FIGURE OOTî. GROPAC..G-JUO^P-A~C .:.X

CONVEOT 39 V SAY/BONES A5.....'.AH V SAWBONES GROPAC IS A GROUP" THAT

TAKES OVER AFTER THE TASK FORCE LEAVES X

(6) Tho example below occured at 0240K on 2862 v£cs

HARLEM V HARLEM GEORGE COULD YOU GET FROHT LINE POSITIONS FOR ME... .NO OFFICIAL MESSAGE, IT'S FOR MY INFO X

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 & 8 DAYS (Continued)

HARLEM GEORGE V HARLEM IAM NOT POSTED ON THAT BUT ITHINK THAT THEY ARE ON THE SECOND AIRFIELD AR

Deception2. Interference and

In addition to the usual interference on 27.4 and 27,8 mcs, evidence of possible enemy deception was heard on 27.4 mcs. The examples below are but two of several that occurod throughout D plus 7 Day:

1131 PATRICK V HARLEM WERE YOU CALLING- ME X COUSIN V HARLEM DID YOU HEAR ANYONE USING

MY CALL SIGN JUST THEN X V COUSIN NEGATIVE AR V PATRICK NEGATIVE AR

1413 AVENGER V PATRICK WE HEARD SOMEONE USING- OUR CALL..WILL YOU FIND OUT VJHO THAT WAS X

V AVENGER (?)(N0 audible reply)V PATRICK WE HEARD IT OVER HERE AND

YOU ANSWERED HIM X V AVENGER (?)

b. An enemy station was heard 0n. 2154 kes at 0205. Interference prevented recognizing the call, but text of his transmission consisted of air contact reports.

3. Security of Text

a. The following messages were sent in clear text:

(1) '

271340 27.4 mcs Plain

From: RCT-24 To : 3LT-3/;3LT-3/24 INDICATIONS SHOW THAT THE ENEMY IS IN DERE

- 5 - ENCLOSlTJl^^^^^^^^^

rriTn -r LV

-DAILY-COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 &. 8 DAYS (Continued)

STRAITS FOR WATER KM'INFILTHATIpX-AO1flt&T IS FOR THE PURPOSE <sg^ GETTINa T *AT3R X DESTROY ALL ENEMY WATER ENCOUNTERED LEAVE NO WATER OF OUR OWN EXCEPT UNDER GUARD X FRONT LINE UNITS WILL EMPTY WATER FROM ANY OF OUR OWN CONTAINERS IF THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST POSSIBILITY OF ITS FALLING INTO ENEMY HANDS X AT NIGHT NO WATER IN CONTAINERS WILL 3E TAKEN FORWARD OF COMPANY DUMPS

(2) 261504 29.2 mcs Plain

From: ExTroPao Liaison Officer W/LanForTo : ExTroPaoExTroPao

POW 'CAPTURED BY CONVENT STATED THAT RAIN WAS ONLY SOURCE OF WATER AND IT VAX STORED MAINLY IN DRUMS A FEW OF WHICH WERE

'

TO BE AT EACH 'INSTALLATION X POW SAID THAT AS FAR AS HS KN2W THEIIE WERE NO LARG-E CISTEHNS AVILABLEFOR STORAGE X OTHER INFO FROM SNEIiY SOURCES INDICATE LARGE UNIT HEADQUARTERS HEAR TENZAN

(3) 27/1500 5940 kes Plain

From: Lr.nFor Liaison Officer W/3rd Div To : Hq LanFor Ini'o: LanFor Liaison Officers W/4th, sth Divs

liÔ FROM TWO POW X ENSICT LAVA BLOCKHOUSES EXTENDING //WSL// L CENTER G CENTER H NORTH I NORTHW23T D SOUTHEAST E NORTHEAST //T/HA// U CENTER V TO W DEFENDED 3Y ONE BN OF 145 INFANTRY REGIMENT NOT YET COMMITTED X ENEMY DEFENSIVE

•SECTOR IN //WJD// CONSISTING OF 314 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BN NOT YET COMMITTED X SNE24Y ARTILLERY DISPLACED TO //MJO// AND //MSJ// AND //WHF//SOUTH

b. Further security violations were noted as shown:

-TMr'T ( a \

m T,TT^ T

-DAIL C01£IUI"ICATI0N JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 & 8 DAYS (Continued)

nrrrrzv&T^*~ (1) 261351 '

am '

2|l|#£** From: 3rd MarDiv To : 3r-d Mar3r-d DivMarDiv Roar

REGARDS OG COMMA 3RD iIARDIV MSG-' 252045K X HAVE THHibE PERSONNEL LEFT THE SHIP

(2) 261710 2932 kcs Plain

From: RCT-23 Roar To : RCT-23RCT-23

ALL PAT BA&GAGE LESS NCB SSABAGS DISPATCHED FROM CARINA TODAY AT //G-PUL// X P 2ROENTAG-ES CARGO DISCHARGED AS OF 77CT0W/ TODAY X BENSON //Gil// MISTLETOE //U5E77 ONESTEP //BK//JERKVJATER //YE// OCARINA/TZC// X OCARINA SENDS

This dispatch was later re transmit tod with the percentages unshackled.

261715 2932 kes Plain

From-: RCT-23 (REAR) To : Yellow Beach Control Officer. Info: RCT-23 Representative on TransGrp

PERCENTAGE OF CARGO DISCHARGED AS OF 1505 X BENSON 100 X MISTLETOE 100 X ONESTEP 88 X JERKWATER 56 X OCARINA 41 X OCARINA OSCAH SENDS



a. D Plus 7 Day \

\ \

Administrative 446 \ Tactical 164

~610 Total

\ — MAI$^Qa?^*" JKCLOSURJ^^^^^^^^

V

r

ji '-'ml

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 7 & 8 DAYS (Continued )

b. D Plus 8 Day

Administrative Tactical

395 205 600

:

Total

*¦¦

- "8 •¦¦¦¦¦¦¦¦V« Jl J.I

!•

1

A

A

DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL r

TF 56

,D PLUS 9 AxND 10 DAY

a. MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS AFFECTING- COMMUNICATION.— 1, Twenty three (23) enlisted men of the First Radio Intell

igence Platoon reverted to their organization the USB AUBURN. By securing intercept watches on Logistical Control and Shore Party Command circuits aboard the USS ELDORADO, the release of these men "was made possible #

It was necessary, however, to split-phone the remaining personnel.circuits due to insufficient

2. 280415 6-S Secret

From: ComsthFlect To : CinCPAC ADV Info: CTF 51

FiiF PAC RI UNITS IN ESTSS DURING- CURRENT OPERATIONS HAS PROVED OF GRE^T VALUE TO 30TH AMPHIBIOUS AND LANDINGFORCES X CONSIDER ADMITTED SUPERIORITY SHORE FACILITIESOVER FIELD UNITS IS FREQUENTLY OFFSET 3Y UNAVOIDABLE DELAY ARISING- FROM CODING AND TRANSMISSION INTERVALS AW 3Y IMPORTANCE LOCAL CIRCUITS UNHEARD BY PEARL ON GUAM X REQUEST 2 UNITS BE ORDERED COMPHIBSPAC FOR ASSIGNMENT NEXT OPERATION

o. Upon direction of CTF 51, transfer of the radio-teletype team and equipment' of the USS 3AYFIELD to the USS ELDORADO was effected Drior to the departure of the USS BAYFIELD from the area".

B. RADIO

1» The following circuits were secured on D plus 9 when the ship:RI Platoon left the

4thDiv Shore Party Lateral 2276 (V) Int. 4thDiv Logistic Control 2932 (V) Int.

ENCLOSUg^^^^^^^^^^1

¦T

s

~i

F I0

-DAILY COiE-lUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 9 & 10 DAY (Continued)'

sthDiv Logistic Control |l'£;30& .(vJl^w^C^'V-JCorps Arty Fire Direction |iWb&,W s&& -**

3rdDiv Shore Party Lateral 25i6 (V)lnt, 3rdDiv Logistical Control 2808 (V)lnt.

2. Circuit Discipline and Procedure

a. At 2015K, D plus 9 day, on 2304 kes, sthDiv Logistical Control called all stations and secured the net until 0800K. . All stations acknowledged.Nevertheless, between 0100K and 0155K, CONVENT (sth!iarDiv) made thirty (30) attempts to call SAT;73ONSS for testing of signal strength.

b. The following was observed on 2052 kes on February 28:

1143 413L3 V 3JT INT QJC X (LanFor Liaison 3rdßiv V

Hq 3rdDiv) 1145 V 418L3 QJC NOT HELD X

V 3JT QNC 1300 AR V 418L3 NO "Q" BOOK X V 3JT CALL ME AT 1300 ...K

» V 418L3 R AR

c. The incomplete and insufficient heading noted below was received 0n '29,2 mes:

MAINSPRING- IGLOC REAR HARLEM V IGLOO -P~ 281732K MAINSPRING 3T IGLOO REAR -T- 3UCKEYE

In the heading, Hq LanFor designated ExTroPac(i'iAINSpRING) as action addeo. However, no indication was msde for the other addees. It required guesswork to decide whether they were action or info add— oos. The text of the message suggested the latter out there cannot be guesswork if reliable and rapid communications are to bo maintained. Also IGLOO R3AR -T- BUCKEYE becomes part of the text as it appears after BT.

t ENCLOSURE (A)

-DaILY COMLIUKICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 9 & IdDAY ICîiilocL)

1^ d. On' March Ist, and "OP11 dispatch (010810K) was rcc

oivod on 29.2 mcs from Hq LanFor, It was transmitted and received by Navajo talker, requiring one (l) hour to complete the transmission.

(l) At 1011K, twenty-six (26) minutes later, a service from Hq LanFor requested further trns

¦mis sion of ithe dispatch to CTF 53,

(2) Hq LanFor, SxTroPac, and CTF 53 guard 29.2 mcs, Inasmuch as CTF 53 guards this circuit and has Navajo talkers avilable, they should have been in the original heading, and the message transmitted to both stations simultaneously.

(3) Retransmission of the entire disptach by Havajo talker required one (l) hour causing that much delay in the delivery of an operational. priority dispatch to an addressee who should have received it when transmitted originally.

o Interference.

a. At 0650K on 2304 kes D plus .9 day, three (3) enemy stations were heard testing. Two (2) of the calls used were: YO INO and T7I RE XI.

b. , Clear enemy CW transmissions were heard between throe (3) and four (4) dial divisions from 3155 kes (sthMarDiv command net). There seemed to be two (2) separate circuits; one possibly a shore station sending good signals, and the other presumably p field station because of hand-key transmitting and varying signals.

c. Enemy CW signals wore hoard approximately four(4-) kilocycles from the LanFor Command circuit (2404

' kcs). The so signr.ls wcro observed at 0423K, 2115K,2145K, and 2220K.

ENCLOSURE (A) .___J—^.'' ri',"*1! r^s

*'

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D 'PLUS 9 & 10 DAY (Continued)

C DISTRIBUTION OF TRAFFIC

1# Totr.l amount of traffic

D Plus 9 Day


563*

D Plus 10. Day


469

*

\

/

k,» /§ F't^P®^^^1

- - ENCLOSURE (A) 4


TF 56

D PLUS 11 TO 17 DAY

A. GEHERAL

1« Because of negligible traffic and in the interests of brevity the communication journals covering the period from March Z to 2-larch 8 have been combined. The establishment of daily •

officer-messenger runs and shore-based communications (wireins.t.allr.tions) 'we re responsible for the decrease of traffic* Daily totals are enumerated below;

SxTrps Command--

LanFor Command

LanFor Command

LanFor Command

3rdDiv Tac.Com

sthDiv Tac.Com

LanFor liaison

4thplv Command

>A>A 9Q59Q5//JJv/v/ 24042404 29,229,2 1919 2058*2058* 25902590 5959 £2£2 44""

D/1ID/1I 3838 o.o. 1616 00 rr'¦'¦

11 00 88

D/D/12"12" 1717 00 1212 11 oo 00 aa 00

D/l|D/l| ;;2020 00 1717 00 00 00 3,3, 11

P^l^=P^l^= 33 33 1616 00 00 00 00 22

P^lsP^ls 33 00 99 00 00 00 00 >¦>¦

11 11 1212 11 00 00 pp 00

11 11 00 11 00 00 00 00

" ¦ " ¦

¦¦,?'¦¦<;¦ '.-'.¦¦,?'¦¦<;¦ '.-'.

T0?A&T0?A& 8383 8282 1111

B> IiIgC^LAÊOUS EVENTS AFFECTING COMMUNICATIONS,I\

1# Based upon t?he success of EJJF Pac RI UQits aboard the US 3 ESTES,

'

CpinSthFjoet suggested two radio intelligence platoons|i| 9p?-erecl to ComPhibsPac for assignment. The following dispatch

•TT'TiT(*^T / A

i

___ _ __ — ______ -î

— ____—._._ _____.-»_.,_.-.-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 9 PLUS 11 £d 17 PAY vI-/ rt

_ „ • -i \ * : -; «"\ ¦(Continued) KI,;V,r .v V'\

t

T-rr.s received in reply:

030209 Socrot

From: ComGenFMFPac To : CinCPAC Info: CTF 56, CTF 51, ComPhibsPac, CG 10th Army,

Ca 3rd?hibCorps, ComsthFleGt

DO NOT CONCUR COMSTHFLEET 280'H5 X FUTURE EI4PLOY2-iSNT FLIF RADIO INTELLIG3NG2 PLATOON REQUIRES 2 PSR CORPS ASHORE ON TARGET X 3RD SE? RAD INTELLIGENCE PLATOON V7ITH 3RD CORPS I-lUST 3E LANDED Or! TARGET FULFILL OPERATIONAL NEED ASHORE X SERVICES AVAILABLE "WHILE AFLOAT. •.

2. 030935 Confidential

From: CTF 53 To : TF 51

GNOPaC 11 COI?4UNICiiTION UNIT 434 SERVING LANDING FORCE .SHORE PARTY COMMANDER NOW GUARDS HAR3OR RADIO CIRCUITS

34.8 1-iCS AND 2715 KCS USING CaLL NDG (RADIO IWO JIMA)

3. Tlio AN/TRO-l radio equipment of the USS AUBURN was trr.nsf erred to the USS ELDORADO on 5 Inarch.

4#4 # 050710 Secret

From: ConiPhibGroup 2 To : CTD 47 info: OinCpac, CNO, ComsthFleet, ComPhibsFac,

CG FifthPhibCorps

STH MARDIV REPORTS THROUGH COMGEN STHPHIBCORPS AND CTF 53 THaT TWO COPIES OF CCBP (5130^2 MISSING X 27TH MARINES BELIEVE MAY HAVE LEFT 1 COPY IN RUTLaND API 192 AND ALSO 1 COPY ON R3D 3SACH WITH TRANSDIV 47 BEACHMASTSR X

, RE UEST RUTLAND AND COMTRANSDIV ,47 ADVISE

jfc"**T\[".V ;:J^ JjjCLQStJH3_(AI»*' '•

(> %

¦

ti 2y.ry~

DAILY CCI-MJNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 - D PLUS 11 to 17 DAY (Continued)

5, 051926 V/'¦_'¦ Secret

From: CTG- 56.1 To : CTF 55 Info: CTG 10.16

REQUEST AUTHORITY LAND ECM CLASS THREE ALLOWANCES AFLOAT FOR USE IN JaN COM CENTER TA 147VX PROTECTED ENCLOSURE NOW CONSTRUCTED WITH SENTRIES X MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS NOW ON HAND X CTG 10.16 CONCURS

6. RCT-3 (ExTroPac Reserve) departed Iwo Jiraa on 5 March,

7. 070015/131 Secret

From: CinCPAC ADV. To :. ALPOA 131ALPOA 131

RDO IWO JIMa CALL SIGN NDC NOW IN OPERATION HOLDS CSPS 10*1-0 X 1146 X 1410 X 1607 X 1270 AND ARMY CRYPTOS 1501 X 2122 X 2167

8. 070556 Secret

From: ComGen FifthPhibCorps To : CTF 56CTF 56Info: GomGcn SuioSorv FMF PAC. CTF 51. CASCU LanFor,

C£ 10th Army

•ON RECOMMENDATION CTF 51 AND RS-iUEST OF CO LANFOR ASCU REQUEST AUTHORITY TEMPORARILY

'TRANSFER FROM SIGNAL "BN

TO ?ROV ASCU AIRCRAFT FMF PAC 1 HARK 4 COMMUNICATION UNIT MOD IEIO AND F 10 X REQUEST 4 UNITS BE PROCURED AS soon as possible; use next operation x 2 for corps c? x 1 AIR ARTY AND GUNFIRE CONTROL CENTER X 1 SPARE

9, 030547 Confidential

From: ConGon FifthPhibCorpsTo : CNO

frf>%?* wgil«^^f^:^«^Wi|C/#mPhibsPac,"

__¦

ComGen FW PAC,-^ ' 11*'* Comfen' 4th MarDiv r

ENCLOSURE (A) 3

6

-DaILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS 11 to 17 DAY (Continued)

2 CSF-1500 HAGSLIN CODING MACHINES LOST 3Y 23RD MARINES ON 19 FE3 D DAY ON 3 ZkGE AT I"'JO JIMA X COMPROMISE BELIEVED IMPROBABLE X FURTHER DETAILS LATER X KEY LISTS LC6T AT SAMS TIMS NO LONGER EFFECTIVE


From: ComGen iFifthPhlb CorpsTo : CNO Info: CinCPAC, ComPhibsPac, ComGon 4th MarDiv, ComGon

FMF PAC

CC3F 0130-D2 COPY NO. 1346 LOST ON 19 FEB ON BEACH AT r.:O JIMA X FOUND ON AIRPORT NO. 1 ABOUT 1000 YARDS AiiAY ON 2 MARCH X AIRSTRIP REACHED D PLUS 3 X COMPROMISE CLASSIFIED HIGHLY PROBABLE X FURTHER DETAILS LATER X ON CHARGE FIFTH DIVISION

11. 080945 Secret

From: STF 51 To : ELDORADO Info: AdComPhibsPac, ComFwdArea, ComsthFleet, CinCPAC

ADV, ATFC<Sic ATGC'S STH FLT, SCOFA, ComPhibs-Groups 1, 4, 5, 7, and 12

ELDORADO ESCORTED 3Y PUTNAM DEPART lUO JIMA 0900K 9 MARCH PROCEED GUaI-1 VIA POINT ARSON AND ROUTE ROADRUNNSR X SQA 14.5 KNOTS X ETA 1200K 11 MARCH X ORIGINATOR EMBARKED IN ELDORADO

12. 081205 Secret

From: CTF 56 To : CTG 56.1 info: CTF 53

J.F CONSIDERED ADVISABLE YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RETAIN ALL OR PART OF THE BTH FIELD DEPOT AFTER REEM3ARKATION OF OTHER CORPS UNITS X AP TYPE OF SECOND OR LATER GARRISON

. i

-DAILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL TF 55 D PLUS 11 to 17 DAY, (Continued)

' '-¦"*«

ifp'"'^ : -'-''ft ECHELON SHIPPING MAY BE EMHUJSJP FOR THE 3&Bafa&3gAslollOF BTK FIELD DEPOT IF NECESftA?. /.RSSIQARKAÔirOF BTH FIELD DEPOT MUST 3E ACCOMPLISHED AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIMS 1:7 ORDER TO 3E REHABILITATED FOR LATER OPERATION :"ITH VaC


From: ComG-en.ExTroPac m^ . t tn1o .' LanFor Info: CTF 51, CTF 53, CinCPAC ADV, ComGen FMF PAC

CP CTF 56 CLOSES ELDORADO 0900K 9 MARCH X CP CTG- 51,09 (LTGEN SMITH) OPENS AUBURN 0900K

C. RADIO ?:;OCEDU^2 AND NET DISCIPLINE

1. The Third Division tactical command circuit, 2052' kes, was secured on D plus 15. Fifth Division command, 27.8 mes, and Third Division command, 27.5 mes, were secured on D Tjlus 16. 0900K, D plus 17 all circuits x-rore secured upon the transfer of CTF 56 to the USS AUBURN.

2. The traffic handled on all circuits was negligible. There irere many instances of excessive testing and oueries of signal strength.

a. On 5 March, Hq SxTroPac transmitted continuously on 2956 kes from 1018 until 1220 with superfluous transmissions.

b. On 27.4 md 27.8 mes, however, interference justified the numerous tests made on those circuits.

3, Although 418 (Hq LanFor) was net control on 2404 kes, unnecessary signal strength reports were observed' due to the fact that 4-IB was not on frequency. At 1310K, D plus 14, there was a variance of eight to ten kilocylos above and below the given frociucncy. Similar observation* were made at 0550K and 1339K D plus 12, and at 0455K on D plus 13.

r $* %n% n - - - ENCLOSURE (AT^f*^ 5

/

— ! 7T>

-DaIl::DaIL:: COIH-lUNICATION JOURNAL TF 56 D PLUS H to 17 DAY (Continued)

Unusual procedure was observed between Hq ExTroPac (4-ZH) and Hq LanFor (413) on 2404 kcs. The following excerpt is taken from the log of March 5 with the operators own comments included:

0347 4ZH V 418 INT X V 4ZH INT QRU X V 413. -T- KCUZ 050900-&R 94 BT

0418 418 V 4ZH R 050900 AR 0419 V 4-IB INT R

V 4ZH H AR

OPERATOR'S HOTS: 418 apparently sends part of another me s sago, "'ilien Ibreak he say ho ha,s nothing for me, but still desires to send all after BT of some message,

0420 418 V 4ZK QPA QUB X V 418 QKA QIU X V 4ZK j^Ha >iH AR

04£# 4ZH V 413 QMM V 4ZH QPA OFE X V 413 QPU X V 4-ZH QPA VXS X

0435 4ZH V 413 -T- UBl k

OPERATOR'S NOTE: This station (4-ZH) breaks and asks for authentication, 418 willNOT authenticate. Am accepting message, will ascertain its authenticity.

4ZH V aIB -T- UBl 050517 GR 76 BT 0510 V 4ZH R ARV 4ZH R AR

D. DISTRIBUTION. OF TRAFFIC

1. Following are daily totals of administrative and tactical traffic handled by the JCC:

i

T-1 LT.jr

-DaILY COMMUNICATION JOURNAL (Continued)

D plus 11 Day


399

D Plus 1.3 Day


414

D plus 15 Day


TF 56 D PLUS 11 to 17 DAY

D plus 12 Day


Total 402 Total

D plus 14 Day


Total 380 Total

D plus 16 Day


(,

f

\

\i

r

PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESjÊ^JBifIBBR'-^ ';'Tl

ABOARD HEADQUARTMS WEP \ / ,\ Vi -j|| W-.

-> "-"6A Pfectmßer,* 1944,•

I, G-ENSRAL ORGANIZATION

a. The communications Officer of the Joint Expeditionary Force TTill designate an Officer-In-Charge of the Joint Communication Center. The Officer-In-Charge will be directly responsible to the Communication Officer for the accurate and expeditious handling of all traffic passing through the Center, and for all matter pertaining to the personnel of the Center.

b. The Joint Communication Center is jointly operated by Navy and Marine personnel,. Officers and men of the respective services are iaGegratod into watch bills serving- the separate commands, and ail personnel shall be governed by the rules of procedure here oui '1!::<?¦..'...

c. The Corn.rii-.nl c a cion Watch Officer, (17170), is responsible to the Officer-In-'"-har^ for the handling of traffic and for the security of cryptographic aids and devices. He shall, with the approval of the Officer-In-Oharge, issue necessary orders and directives to the Assistant CWO and Coding Board Officers and men. Discrepancies and complaints will first be referred to the cwo.

d. The Coding Board Officer (CBO) is directly responsible for the' maintenance and efficiency of the Coding Room, the Write up Room, and Checking Room, He shall assume responsibility for carrying out the orders and directives of the Officer-In-Charge and the C'JO, and Trill issue such orders as are necessary to the officers and men in his charge.

c.- The Signal Officer will delegate one of his officers to maintain 'and keep currently corrected the Cent Com TWO needed for the Signal Section of ExTrs, All other publications, used in the JCC are supplied and maintained "oy PhibsPac Publication Officer.

f, The basic responsibilities here outlined attach to the above-named officers regardless of changes in four, three or two' section watch bills. In practice, however, the CWO and Assistant CWO will delegate certain of their respsonsibilities

¦

to the Coding Board Supervisor and other members of the CodingBoard in keeping with the effective watch list.

n /T°\ /*7**iH?*'^!?

ENCLOSIB|MB)^^^^^

PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER - A3OAKD HEADQUARTERS SHIP (Continued)

11. DUTIES OF THE COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICES -, J>

a. Incoming Traffic.

1. The CWO will indicate the action and information officers for the Amphibious Force Staff and will read all messages, checking the distribution copy for reasonable reliability and coherence.

2. He willpass the distribution copies to the Ship !s Communication

t

Yoeman, who willbe responsible for internal routing to the Ship, However, the CWO will call the attention of the Yoeman to dispatches which particularly affect the action or movement of the ship, and will see to it that the Yoeman accelerates the distribution of such dispatches.

3. The CWO willmake himself responsible for the work of the routing and distribution messengers. He willmake certain that high precedence dispatches are given immediate routing, and

<tlat the staff duty officer receives his dispatches continuously,

4. The CWO will be on the alert to detect instances, of mismanagement, errors, or inefficiency in the handling of incom

•ing traffic and will take corrective action. •V

b. Outgoing Traffic.

1. All outgoing dispatches, radio or visual, are delivered to the CWO. He will check each to see that the meaning is clear, that no essential words or phrases have been omitted, and that the dispatch is properly released. He will determine the channel of encipherment and the frequency by which it is to be transmitted, and turn it over to the coding board supervisor for encoding.

i

2. The CWO willenter all outgoing dispatches, radio and visual, on his outgoing log, showing; The date-time group (after it has been assigned); the action addressee; the originatingofficer; the precedence; the system by which transmitted; the frequency, the time of delivery. After a TOD for the dispatch has been received, and it has been written up and distributed, the CWO will record the TOD and draw a line through the log entry, indicating that the dispatch has been entirely cleared. — --

M^Ve *

~\ /-* —r j^ —.""% /-»!^ -~~e r~ ENCLOSURE (B)

t

-PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER ABOARD HEADQUARTERS SHIP (Continued)

3» While the message is being encoded, the CWO will call Radio Iand give the Supervisor the adees so that the calls can be properly encrypted and the heading written up. This is particularly important on dispatches of high precedence. He will also call Radio Ion the squawk box at the time he places the dispatch

tube, insure the supervisor is aware thein the to that that dispatch 'is on its way, and to inform him of the circuit to be employed.

4. When the message has been encoded and checked by the CBO, it will be returned to the CWO, who assigns the date-time group and frequency and sends the coded copy to the transmission agency. The CWO willretain the originator's rough and the break-back until the TOD has been received* After the TOD has been recorded on the log and on the originator's roughs the. rough/ and th& break-back shall be returned to., the CBO for write-up and filing, on traffic so designated fey CWO. Typing and duplication

" asof the dispatch is begun as soon the code copy is sent to Radio Ii

5* In the case of messages sent in the clear, the originator !s rough willbe retained by the CWO until his typed copy is returned by the transmitting agency with the TOD*

6. Visual outgoing traffic will be logged, just as radio-transmitted traffic* In general, a visual outgoing is not written up and distributed until the TOD is received, unless in the judgment of the CW6 it requires immediate distribution. It is? understood that the signal bridge reads dtfer the voice tube all visual traffic in which the ship is interested, and normal distribution* from the Communication Center follows* However $ it is important

'

that the C* T0 keep a sharp lookout for traffic affecting the ship or its movements | and personnally see to it that distribution to the ship is accelerated.

c. Miscellaneous Duties,

1, The CWO is responsible for the security and handling of to<p~secret dispatches. However, he will delegate the task of encrypting, decrypting, typing and plugging of top-secret dis^ patches to one officer on each watch.

's »•

C> -I-

*- 3 •• ¦¦¦¦¦HHHVr ¦V\^Hs :


\

2, The CVO having the midwatch will be responsible for having three copies of the recognition signal cards made up for the coming clay (GrCT). An independent check will made by an officer other than the one who makes up the signals.

3. The CWO will check, during the midwatch, to see that the daily news sheet has been made up, mimeographed, and distribution arranged for prior to 0600.

4. Under the supervision of the the CommunicationsCWO^Center is to be given a thorough clean-up during the midwatch, and at such other times during the day as is considered necessary.

5. The CWO is aided by an officer-assistant (ACV/O) who will be considered to be in training for Communication Watch Officer duties. He will be given the opportunity of performing the various duties of the CWO as conditions permit. During a two-section watch, the C¥o may delegate certain of his duties to this assistant, such as the filing of visual and clear—text originals, the handling of services, etc.

6. The ACI/O is in charge of officer-messenger runs furnished by the JCC. He will check to see that deliveries are properly receipted and that dispatches received by officermossengor.are promptly distributed.

7. All incoming traffic will be delivered to the Assistant CWO after being time-stamped by the tube messenger. The ACVvO is repsonsible for determining what portion of intercept traffic should be broken. He is not to delegate this responsible ity unless he is absolutely convinced that trie officer assigned this task is competent to decide what traffic is to be broken.

111. _ DUTIES OF THE CODING- BOARD OFFICER (CBO)

a. incoming Traffic.

1, Addressed traffic and intercept traffic selected ty. the ACVO will be logged by the CBO and passed to the coding room..

2, v-hen the decoded message is returned from the coding room, hr.ving been time-stamped by the individual who decoded it,

— — --'¦* 4

PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER - AB SHBS

HEADQUARTERS SHIP (Continued) --' V;:u

it shall be carefully checked in the checking;, room under the supervision of the CBO, who willbe held responsible for its clear interpretation.

3#3 # The CBO shall decide which traffic is to be flashed by teletype. His decision will be based upon its immediate interest to the several commands and his knowledge of the current delay in the write up room.

4. The message will then be delivered to the write-up room for duplication, and on its return must be carefully checked against the work sheet to see that it has been correctly duplicated in every way, including accuracy, correct form, correct adees, and neatness and legibility* The CBO will indicate the action and information officers for the expeditionary troops staff t return the code copy to Radio Iand retain the work sheet for a 48-hour period. Delivers the duplicated copies to the CVJ"O for routing and distribution.

5. The responsibility for the accurate and expeditious clearance of all incoming traffic falls primarily upon" the CBO,

b« Outgoing Traffic.

1. The CBO will receive the outgoing message from the CWO and will see that it is speedily and accurately encrypted.He, together with the CTfO, will determine if the text is of immediate interest to the several commands, and if so, willhave it flashed teletype.

2. After encipherment, he will check the dispatch in the following respects:

(a) The breakdown against the original assuring accuracy and completeness of text and absence of garbles or confusing phraseology.

(b) The external indicators against the channel and classification assigned.

SNCLOSUR|MB^^^^^^^

fe^L^ 1 '*

JHttlKttHttMtfyftt^My£g^^yy^^^|i^^^^^^^'

PRO GEDUHE" JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER i. ABOARD KEADqUARTERS — SHIP,— (Continued) ..

-» m —¦ ;-" <•'*» .-» ',*^ *«• "«f

(c) The internal .indicator's, assuring similarity and absence of incorrect characters*

(d) The 26~30 letter check ("which is attached to rough draft by encoder) %gainft correct 26-~ 30~letter check for the day.

(c) The precedence and addresses against those assigned on the rough draft 4

3« After the CTJO has returned the breakdown and originnator's rough copies to the C3O for write-up and after duplication, the breakdown is attached to the original and filed in the outgoing file. This file shall be maintained on each watch and except for unusually busy circumstances, it shall be the responsibility of the (3®Q to see that the filing is continuous and always completed before the end of his watch. The TOD must appear on the originator's rough (put*on By the GWO).

c # Miscellaneous Duties.

1. Incoming work sheets are to be retained for forty-eight (48) hours. Itshall be the duty of the GBO on the mid-watch to see that work sheets older than 48 hours are destroyed.

2i The CBO is res-ponsible for the neatness of the coding room, checking room and write-up room* He willsupervise the policing on the midwa.tch.

3» The OBOMs the officer-in~charge of the coding room, room, and the checking room. He is responsible for the

discipline working procedure.and efficient '4# The 080 is responsible for the daily destruction, by

burning, of superceded classified matter, work sheets, extra copies, and other classified non registered material no longer required.

5; The CBO is aided by a Coding Board Supervisor.' Ke may delegate, to this officer stich duties as he fit| i# general, these will include the keeping of a log on incomings

T* 6 If

4


dispatches, editing the teletype, etc.

work sheets for the write-up clerks, manning

IV. RELEASE OF OUTGOING- DISPATCHES.

Traffic originated by expeditionary troops staff willbe released os follows:

a. Traffic for Hawaiian Area, Mainland and higher echelon*

1, Due' to the restrictions of radio silence and other security reason imposed in the Forward Area, this types of traffic should be practically non-existant. Inhere it is found necessary to so communicate with the above areas and commands, the Staff Section originating the dispatch will obtain the concurrence and signature of the Chief of Staff prior to presenting the originatodb rough draft to the Admiral for final release. After obtaining the Admiral's release, the dispatch will bo forwarded to the Communication Center for transmission.

-b. Traffic Operational Circuits.

1. Chiefs of staff sections or officers designated by them are authroized to release dispatches for transmission over operational circuits. These communications do not require further release and usually willbe flashed by teletype. In most instance further routing to staff members will not be necessary,

2. All communications over voice circuits should be written out prior to transmission. This procedure willhelp to obviate errors and prevent discrepancies in security.

V. VISUAL TRAFFIC. a. Incoming.

» 1# Incoming visual dispatches will be logged by the flag bridge supervisor, who files one copy, sees that it is chocked by the Flag Lieutenant, initialed by the Staff DutyOfficer, and then sent to the flag bridge CV7O for smooth book write-up and routing. VJhon the Flag CWO deems the message worthy of general distribution, he will send a copy to the communications

snclosursMb^^^^^^

(

TTi jn


center for duplication. «f,T? r-v-vb # Outgoing.

1. Outgoing visual dispatches may be released only by:

Admiral Chief of Staff Operations Officer Communications Officer Staff Duty Officer.

This rule applies to traffic originated by Expeditionary Troops,

2, Upon proper release, outgoing visual traffic will clear through the flag bridge CwO before transmission. The flag bridge CvTO will type a smooth book, initial it to show release, and send it to the flag bridge supervisor for transmission. The rough draft is filed by the CWO.

VI. DISTRIBUTION.

a. Delivery.

1. Traffic will,be distributed in the most gxpeditlous manner. Traffic will be received from the CWO with both Force. and Expeditionary Troops distribution written thereon. The ship's yoeman will distribute and retain one copy for the ship's file. He then will hand remaining copies to the supervisor who marks the top copy "File Copy 11

? Traffic willbe distributed by the messengers and they willhave all action officers (Force and ExTrs) sign a file copy..

COPIES TO:

FORCE : EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS:

ADI-URAL AIDS TO COMDG GENERAL CHIEF OF STAFF CHIEF OF STAFF ASST. .CHIEF OF STAFF Gwi AND ADJUTANT OPERATIONS Gw2

ENCLOSURE (B)imp!

n T-l

-PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER ABOARD HEADQUARTERS SKIPHEADQUARTERS (Continued)SKIP (Continued)

J&%'*~ I--.---P.-J&%'*~ -.;I--.---P.- -.;

intelligenceintelligence Gw3Gw3force controlforce officercontrol officer 0-4 AND0-4 TQI4!AND TQI4!gu::ltgu::l erytery COMMUNICATION OFFICERCOMMUNICATION OFFICERLOGISTICSLOGISTICS D/T GROUPD/T FILEGROUP FILETQMTQM EXTRA D/T GROUPEXTRA FILED/T GROUP FILECOMMUNICATIONSCOMMUNICATIONSSTAFF DUTYSTAFF OFFICERDUTY OFFICER ONLY ivHENONLY ACTION ORACTION INFO;ivHEN OR INFO;

CASCU (AIRCASCU SUPPORT)(AIR SUPPORT) SIGNAL OFFICERSIGNAL OFFICERAGC (SKIP)AGC (SKIP) AIR OFFICERAIR OFFICERFLAG LIEUTENANTFLAG LIEUTENANT ENGINEER OFFICERENGINEER OFFICERFLAG SECRETARYFLAG SECRETARY MEDICAL OFFI6SRMEDICAL OFFI6SRMEDICALMEDICAL CORPS ARTILLERYCORPS ARTILLERYMILITARY OPERATIONSMILITARY OPERATIONS NAVAL GUNFIRENAVAL ,GUNFIRE ,

ASROLOG-ICALASROLOG-ICAL PUBLIC RELATIONSPUBLIC RELATIONS3SACH IiASTSR3SACH IiASTSR ORDNANCEORDNANCECIVIL ENGINEERCIVILENGINEERSUPPLYSUPPLYREGISTERED PUBLICATIONSREGISTERED PUBLICATIONScom: hatchcom: officerhatch officerAVIATIONAVIATION

• COM UDT PHI3SPAC• COM UDT PHI3SPAC

Distribution to the above-named officers will be continuous until 2200 and thereafter to the staff duty Officer (SDO) who will be responsible for determining if further delivery is necessary before morning.

2, 'In the event that an action officer willnot accept his traffic, the messenger will make a note on the file cojby

n"Traffic presented at showing time of presentation and messenger's initials.

3, Messengers will:

(a) Be in proper uniform of the day, neat and well-groomed at all times.

(b) 3e thoroughly familiar with locations oS all offices of the respective staffs and the quarters of staff officers.

ENCLOSURE (B) £\

-PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND .-MESSAGE CENTER ABOARI3 HEADQUARTERS SHIP (Continued) ;

¦

v.

(c) Willknow by name and sight the principal staff officers to whom delivery is customarily made.

(d) Deliver all dispatches promptly, obtaining receipts for action traffic in accordance with current instructions.

(c) IJhen dispatches are delivered to officers on deck, the messenger will be covered and he will salute the officer vrhom he addresses.

(f) Military courtesy willprevail at all times. The messenger willnot enter an officer's mess unless he has a dispatch to deliver to an officer therein.

4. The distribution supervisor willbe responsible for the enforement of section 3 (Above).

b. Tube Operation.

1» There will be a messenger at the tubes at all times. Incoming fcaab'c :te\-rffiewillbe time-stamped and placed in the CWO's basket.

2, Outgoing traffic received in the JCC by tube will be time-stanroed and handed to the CWO.

3. Logistical traffic received in the JCC by tube will be time-stamped and given directly to Marine OIC of JCC.

Qt Files.

1« Two files are kept by the distribution supervisors.They are the date-time group file and the extra file. Duringthe day, from 0800 to 0800, the date-time group file will be kept on a file board. After traffic on this file has been counted (at 0800) and the total entered in the traffic-book, it will be filed in a manila folder and marked as to the date(s). The extra file Trill be kept on a file board and filed in a manila folder after one full day's traffic. This file will be in date

_ ENCLOSURE (3)-#i^ mi 2.0

V

.77>


time. group order at all times and is mainly for the information of any staff officer or section not on the regular distribution

file copieslist. It trillalso have the of all CTF 56 action traffic. .

2. The chronological .file Tor the Amphibious Force Staff is maintained "ay the write-up supervisor. The ship's file is kept by the ship's ydeman.

3. Extra copies requested for staff members will be obtained from the write-up room and willNEVER be removed from the D/T or extra file.

VII. THE FLO'f OF TRAFFIC

a. Incoming Traffic.

1. Traffic ie received from:

Joint Operations Flag Plot Radio I

2. Clear and encrypted traffic received in Radio Iand Flag Plot concerning troops or the movement of ships is of interesi to all commands and willbe teletyped immediately, regardless of precedence. Other traffic that the Cl/O thinks may be of immediate interest to either command willalso be teletyped to expedite deliver:/. The above dispatches will be typed and distributed in accordance with current delivery lists.

3, Traffic other than operational received from Radio I Trillbe typed up and delivered without being teletyped.

4« Traffic received in the joint operations room willbe flashed to joint operations, intelligence, war command and flag plot by the teletype (ISK Circuit) in the joint operations room. This traffic willnot normally enter the Communications Center.

b. Outgoing Traffic.

INCl^SUR^B)^^^^^

T-l

PROCEDURE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE CENTER - ABOARD HEADQUARTERS SHIP (Continued)

1. Joint Operations.

(a) Only traffic that is processed through Radio I T--illnormally be cleared through the communications office.

(b) Tactical traffic transmitted from Joint Operations willnormally be placed on the teletypewriter in the Joint Operations room. Carbon copy teletypewriter, rolls willbe furnished for the Joint Operations machine. The carbon copy of all traffic transmitted over this circuit willbe picked up by the messenger who goes topside to deliver dispatches. This copy will be used to obtain references on incoming dispatches from Radio I,

(c) Incoming and outgoing' traffic which the perQ sonncl of the Joint Operations feel should be routed to the com- >

mands for file reference, will be sent to the communications center for duplication, distribution, and filing. The teletype carbon copy may be used for this purpose.

2, War Command.

(a) The v.rar Command and intelligence rooms willnot transmit messages but will route all outgoing traffic through the Communications Center for Radio I.

3, Radio I,

(a) Plain language dispatches will be flashed by-teletype immediately all other traffic will clear through the Communications Center, The radio supervisor will break shackle-code in messages before he puts them on the teletype. Traffic flashed ~:Vr tolatypfi will hnar a nntntinn tn t.hg.t Rffftftt,

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE COHI'iANDSR EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS

(CTF 56)

C-O-N-F-I-D-S-N-T-I-A-L 8 December, 19-1-4

From: The Officor-In-Chargoji ?.'¦¦"To : lstLt, Theodore D. HABgON,' Jr. i

2ndLt. Herbert P. ARNESEN, Jr.

Subject : Training Memorandum.

Rof orences : (a) Orders to temporary duty, dated 6Dec44. (b) SOP, JCC, Headquarters Ship, CTF 56

(Rough), dated 6Doc44 #

(c) Approved form for teletype transmission. (attached) .

1 Headquarters Ship1. You will go aboard the as direct ed in reference (a).

2 direction for the following assignments:

2, The enlisted men named below will train under your

(a) Code Room*

T/Sgt. C. R TRAVIS, Jr.

v Sgt. J. F. BEAN

Corp. B. J. FEDDER Corp. E, J, WSSTRICK Corp. C. H. DUNLEVY Corp. R. K. HOOVER Corp. G-. 3. WILKES Corp. TJ. E. DONICA Corp. B. L. JONES

PFC. C. Tf. MILLS' PFC. S. WEISBACH PFC. Or. R. RICHARDS

(b) Message Center Supervisors

Stf/Sgt. i-i. a. PARRISH Sgt. vJ. 0. DAVISS Sgt. C. s. Sgt. W, c. vJISNISWSKI

Subject: Training Memorandum. (Continued).

(c) Teletype Operators:

PFC. ¥. L. ENGLEMAN PFC. R. H. HARRIS PFC. K. V. HOiVELL PFC. K. P. JENKINS

(d) Messengers:

Corp. D. C. RICE

PFC. D, W. ANGLIN PFC. T. C. BROUSSARD, Jr. PFC. J. P. LOSKO PFC. E. PLESE PFC. R. D. WHITESIDE PFC. D. W. WEBSTER

(c) Radio Supervisors:

T/Sgt.'E. P. BERRY T/Sgt. M. M. DAM3ACHSR

StfSgt. K. 3. HARLAND N StfSgt. G. E. KUDREC

StfSgt. S. KRAUSS StfSgt. D. M. LINDGREN

(f)( f ) Radi o Oporators :

Sgt« H. J. FAKLBUSH Sgt. S. B. PROVINCE

Corp. P, R. CONNALLY Corp* 3. W. WEBSTER PFC. J. P. BRICKER' PFC. D. C. CAMPBELL PFC. F. F. CORDONISR, Jr.PFC. E. R. KSENE PFC. 0. C. QUATTLEBAUM, Jr.

3. The training will be directed toward achieving,the peak of proficiency in duties as designated above and will conform to and comply with reference (b).

i2 -

TP *-i A

Subject: Training Memorand um. (Continued) . /

4#4 # Training willbo conducted in each section with the following specific ends to be accomplished:

(a) Message Center Personnel,

(l) Coding Personnel:

a. The Marine Signal Detachment of the.Headquarters Ship is composed of radio operators, tweive Cl2) of whom have been assigned as cryptographers.- These twelve need extensive and intensive training in the encryption and checking of outgoing dispatches and decryption of incoming traffic using all crypto channels to be held and employed by the JCC. The volume of anticipated traffic makes it mandatory that they operate speedily and accurately. To this end, you will work the men assigned not loss thatn eight hours per day* During this period a concentrated effort by all hands is imperative.

(2) Message Center Supervisors:

a. Message Center supervisors will diligently apply themselves to learning the details of operation of the JCC and the handling of traffic therein.

b. They willhave available to them a diagram of the ship and will thoroughly school themselves in the location of each office and staff section.

c. Ifthe final stateroom assignment list is available, they willmemorize the stateroom assignment of each staff office of the joint staffs to whom traffic

is normally delivered.

d. Dummy dispatches willbo processed through the distribution supervisor in order that he may thoroughly familiarize himself with his station nnd duties and the problems involved.

-i

-.3

771.T T7I

Subject: Training Memorandum, ( Continued).

o. Supervisors will aquaint themselves with inttti-ship communication services. This includes teletype, pneumatic tubes, ship's service and sound-powered telephone and "squawk-boxes". He villneed to know how to communicate with any part of the ship by all means avilable.

(3) Teletype Operators

1 a. Experiences on previous operations has-shown that operators, earlier thought to be in all respects capable, have, during the extreme rush hours of the operation, fallen as far as one- to two hours behind in teletype transmissions. This condition must not be repeated.

b. Operators will have available circuit diagrams they may be called upon to work and will thoroughly familiarize themselves with the circuits and the peculiarities of each. Particular attention willbe given to the projector screens and their operation.

c. To increase their speed to the maximum, operators willpractice extensively, using the approved dispatch form attached (reference (c)). Sufficient samiple operational dispatches will bo prepared for their practice.

d. Prior to the above practice, you will. determine that the ma chinos in all locations (3SR and ISR) and the projector screens are working properly. After you have satisfied yourself to this effect, you will disconnect all machines other than those in Ra.dio One and JCC to minimize waste of paper and film.

c. You will learn how to operate and v/111* school all teletype operators in the operation of the

radio teletype. The operators must be prepared to operate a portable radio teletype station ashore. .

SNCLOSIBE(C)^^^^^

-*. — —•«W «• «¦«• -«¦ •¦• ¦«¦ aw* ¦«¦ .^ -mm —m «M« Mi )-¦* «¦• -«

i

Subject: Training Memorandum s p fv16Sn*t inued ). ¦i -4 ¦• i

'*-¦'*¦¦vl: \

(4) Messengers:

a. The principal assignment of messengers is to thoroughly familiarize themselves with every detail' of ships layout that they may, with the greatest dispatch, make their way to any given point aboard under any'circumstances of darkenss and confusion. To this end, messengers willbe schooled in and will thoroughly acquain themselves with all available diagrams of the ship, and, most important, with the ship itself. Particular attention willbe given to the probable location of the various staff sections and officers.

b. Messengers, under the supervision of the Message Center Supervisors, will make "dummy" runs, with "dummy" dispatches, to all parts of the ship.

c. They willmemorize and be governed by the orders to messengers contained in reference (b).

d. Messengers will familiarize themselves with the duties and orders of Message Center Supervisors in order that substitution may be made without loss of efficiency.

(b) Radio Personnel:

(l) Radio Supervisors:

Radio Supervisors will thoroughly acquaint themselves with the transmitting and receiving equipment in Radio One, being diligent to seek out and learn all factors concerned with the location, ueo, probable employment, and capabilities of such equipment.

b. They will outline, plan and conduct school in transmission procedure to be employed. Attention is

. invited to procedure outlined in Cent Com TWO.

- - E|£^|UR^C^^^^^5

•m

Subject: Training Memorandum. (Continued).

¦c. Supervisors will be governed by paragraph(a) 2 c above.

d. Experience on previous operations has indicated an alarming laxity on the part of operators in proper use of authonticators. Supervisors will thoroughly acquaint themselves with, and school operators in, proper use of authenticators, emphasizing its importance.

Supervisors and operators will be schooledc. — in use of shackle code -encode and decode.

f. Supervisors will make up tentative call sign cards for each circuit in accordance with instructions previously issued to them.

(2) Radio Operators:

a. Radio operators will bo governed by and conduct themselves with these paragraphs of section (b) (l) (above) as directly apply to themselves.

b. They will copy 'such,voioe, .press* and Foxbroadcast as can be intercepted.

5, It is understood that Lt. G-. 2. ZAWASKY, of the Ship's Signal Detachment,- will assist you in the above training-program for cryptographers.

«b. T/Sgt E.P. BERRY is designated NCO-in-Chargo .of subject named men. For training purposes, he will be assisted by StfSgt. R. G. PARRISH Message Center, and StfSgt* D.M. LINDGREfI, ¦ . Radio*

7. It is your responsibility to make sure that the Signal Detachment of CTF 56, herein assigned to you, conduct themselves properly aboard ship and that they do not get "underfoot" of the ship's company. The best way to avoid this is to program their work completely. This is not a pleasure cruise.

—¦"?••? »X* ->. . t

' 1

Subject l Training Memorandum, |('Continued ).

8, On your return, you will submit to this office a. complete report concerning tho status of each man as to his assigned task, what training was accomplished, and any recommenda tions you may have.

C. R. CLOUGH, Captain, USMCR, Officer-In-Charge.

/

t>

¦'". - ENCLOSURB (C) -7 fHBHRHHHHHHHHI

Reference (c) APPROVED DISPATCH FORM FOR TELETYPE TRANSMISSIONS «

All incoming and outgoing dispatches, other than coded, will bo placed on teletype in the following manner:

TOR/1442K/5605KC/MUX 1447K/SC/RDO ONE (OR CDE RM)/END

j'>

- -8

7N v

ENLISTED HEN EXTROPAC WATCH LIST

REHEARSAL - FORWARD AREA n [r 1 1 i 'X-JOINT OPERATIONS RADjlfJJft^ V / , . ''.^

7; 'V- XI FEBRUARY, 19^5. 4

SECTION 1 DUTY FREQUENCY POSITION STATUS SECTION 2 JOINT OPERATIONS

StJPR. HARLAND

COHDONI3R OPR. 29.2(V) 3 T & R CAMPBELL THOI4AS rr 5.P(5940(V) 4 INTCPT. 9.UATTLE3AUM

(27.2(V) 4 it

KARRIS TT OPR. HOlffiLL

RADIO I DAM3ACHER CHIEF SUPR. LINDGREN KUDREC S"U?R, JACOBS

PROVINCE OPR. S.P(S6OS(CW) 29 T & R FAHL3USH (2404(CTJ) INTCPT.

WEBSTER « (2956(V) 32 T & R WALKER S.P(1918(V) INTCPT.

nKEY 2932(V) 31 INTCPT STEPHENS

'¦srx.BAKER IT 2154(V) A A ff HERCIK

GRIFFIN it 5780(CW) 43 n ROGERS

MARTIIT v 2590(CW) KOHRING30 n

POTTMSYER it 2304(V) 28 n 3HITTAIN

COLEMAN ti 2276(V) 42 ti TRACK

BRICKER it 2862(V) it KEENE40 CONNaLY If 27.4(V) 16 It JOHNSON

ARCHER it 27.8(V) 17 ii KMAK

YAZZIE NAVAJO TALKER BECENT'Z •sccrrsLD X 1 Vi PL

itfALLACS RELIEF OPR. GAULDING

S. S. CSDER, 2DLT.;USMC. RADIO OFFICER.

ENCLOSURE (D)1ycstiu;i' i-'-ii/^tiiL*h£iQ&_

(^^Sh^LJEVT D "^ X" T1 T AT

WATCH 3ILL AND

CQ STATIONS-Effective 18 February 2200

- OFFICERS -/

CQ STATION SECT SECT ON WATCH OFF WATCH

OUTGOING CUO JOHNSON BAKER COMM OFFICE STATE ROOM

INCOMING CWO MACNAMARA WILLIS COMM OFFICE STATE ROOM

C3O (M) MANTHEY HOUSEY tt it tt H

AC3O (M) MEDLEY HESSE it rr ii v

TOPSEC OFF. LASKY OHNSTAD it it ti n

it ii KELLY DORSEY ii n ti n

O.K. SUP. OFF. HOBAN ZAWASKY 1! II ft II

CENTER ROOM MOCERI SANSOM Ft II fl It

CURRY SCHLISPER ii it ti it

WILLS !t It II It

- 18 19 20 21- ~ 28 23 24 25-26 27 -28-1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-9-

10 11 -12-13-14 15 -16-17-

02OQ - 0730 1 2 1 2 0730 - 1200 2 1 2 1 1200 -1800 1 2 1 2 1800 -2200 2 1 2 1 2200 0200 1 2 1 2f~J

Lt. Wm. P. SEE3OHM

- ENCLQSllRj^^^^^^^. '

IffM^ i l i j

\

iJV

REHEARSAL

JOINT COMMUNICATION CENTER

ENLISTED MENS WATCH BILL

Code Room

Write-upWrite-upRoom #Room #

(typists)(typists)

Write-upWrite-upRoom,Room,

SEC 1

Bean Fedder We s trick Wilkes

Ream,Q,.£Ream,Q,.£ *.*.StromStromRectorRector

(duplicators )Salo ,J.H,(duplicators )Salo ,J.H,

Write-upWrite-upRo

#Room«#om«

(Supervisor)(Supervisor) AndersonAnderson

MessengersMessengers BroussardBroussard?Caldwoll?Caldwoll

Dowd, E.Dowd, E.

TuboTuboOperatorOperator RiceRice

DistributionDistributionSupervisorSupervisor Davies,Davies,

TeletypeTeletypeOperatorsOperators *Jenklns*Jenklns*

SEC 2

Dunlovy Richards Hoover Jones

Phillips,H.Phillips,H.ScarmardoScarmardo

PanchorPanchor

Plose, EPlose, #E #

Webster, W,Webster, W,Crom, R.Crom, R.

ParrishParrish

WisniewskiWisniewski

AnglinAnglin

Those two men will rotate **Man who relieves watch reports to

SFFEOTIVS 10 JANUARY 1800 Onnur.ry 13 14

16 17 19 20

VW 15 18 21

SEC 3

Travis Donica Mills Wcisbach

JabbenJabbenComptonCompton

MurphyMurphy

Losko, J«Losko, J«T'fcesnerT'fcesnerMacDowellMacDowell

RussellRussell

RicG,D.C.RicG,D.C.

EnglcmanEnglcman

Oen.Qtrs. Station

Compartment Compartment Compartment Compartment

CompartmentCompartmentCompartmentCompartmentCompartmentCompartment

Comm.Comm. RoomRoom

Comm,Comm, RoomRoom

HessHess HallHallMessMess HallHallMessMess HallHall

MessMess HallHall

Comm.Comm. OfficeOffice

**Mess**Mess HallHall

Comm. Office

W. F. SESBOHM Lt. USNR OIC22 23 24-

0030 - 0730. 1 2 3 0730 - 12.00 ,* 2 3 1

'1200 - TBo©' 1 3 1 2 ENCH)SURi^£^^^^^—1800 0030 1 2 5

.#¦

«2fe

JOINT COMM. CTR. ¦WATCH BILL

ANDAND

CQ STATIONSCQ STATIONSEffectiveEffective 1818 FebruaryFebruary 22002200

- --- ENLISTEDENLISTED

STATIONSTATIONSECTSECT SECTSECT 22 ONON WATCHWATCH OFFOFF WATCHWATCH

CodeCode RoomRoom TRAVISTRAVIS BEANBEAN 06de06de RoomRoom Chief !Chief s!s Qtrs,Qtrs,tttt ititDONICADONICA FEDDERFEDDER "D" Div"D" Div Comp.Comp.

MILLSMILLS WSSTRICKWSSTRICK itit nn samesametttt titiWSISBACHWSISBACH WILKESWILKES samesame

DUMLSVYDUMLSVY RICHARDSRICHARDS rrrr vv samesametttt ititHOOVERHOOVER JONESJONES samesame

WriteWrite UpUp RoomRoom JAB3ENJAB3EN REAMREAM WriteWrite RoomRoomi "C"i Div"C" DivCOM? TONCOM? TON STROMSTROM tttt nn "C" Div/2ndDlv"C" Div/2ndDlv

titi itit ititSCAMARDOSCAMARDO MORGANMORGAN Ist Div/2ndDivIst Div/2ndDivitit tttt nnPARSONSPARSONS RECTORRECTOR 303L/2ndDiv303L/2ndDivitit tftf iiiiSEATONSEATON MURPHYMURPHY 2ndDiv/Auto Sto2ndDiv/Auto Sto ? rtrt itit nnSALOSALO PANCHERPANCHER 2ndDiv/Auto Sto2ndDiv/Auto Sto

CenterCenter RATTRATT SNGLEMANSNGLEMAN JENKINSJENKINS CenterCenter RoomRoom CompartmentCompartmentRoomRoom 3SR3SR ANGLINANGLIN GOODALE ititGOODALECommComm Dosptr.Dosptr. WISNIEWSKIWISNIEWSKI DAVISSDAVISS CommComm OfficeOffice CompartmentCompartment

tttt irir iiiiRoomRoom Messgrs*Messgrs* SHCKIANKESHCKIANKE BROUSSARDBROUSSARDitit irirLOSKOLOSKO CALDWSLLCALDWSLL

iiii titi »»WESSNERWESSNER DOWDDOWDmm nn ititMeDOMe WELLDOWELL KIDDKIDD-- itit titi ititRICERICE BEHLBEHL(i(i hh ftftWEBSTERWEBSTER OROMOROM

ShipsShips GOLDBERGGOLDBERG WIN6OWIN6O CommComm OfficeOffice ConroartmentConroartmentYeomanYeoman KOVACSKOVACS PHILLIPSPHILLIPS ww

Comiri OfficeComiri Office 3REEN ALL3REEN DAYALL DAY CommComm OfficeOffice CommComm OfficeOfficeYeomanYeoman PRESSLER ALLPRESSLER DAYALL DAY CommComm OfficeOffice CommComm OfficeOfficeVaultVault YeYe LAWVEYLAWVEY ALLALL DAYDAY IkIk VaVa

1818 1919 2020 21212222 2323 2424 25252626 2727 2828 11

22 33 44 5566 77 88 99

1010 1111 1212 13131414 1515 1616 1717

--02000200 07300730 11 22 wmwm 11 •#•# 220730073012001200

1200120018001800

2211

1122 mmmm

2211

.... 1122

13001300 22002200 22 11 22 •• >> 1122002200 02000200 11 22 11 .. 22

Wm.Wm. F.F. SEE3OHMSEE3OHM,:\,.,:\,.;;;; .;.; USNR.USNR.

ENgLOgUHE_jDI

EXTROPAC WATCH LIST (TF 56)

ENLISTED MEN JOINT OPERATIONS -sR&DIO-I

(D-DAY) *»*''••-' --I9'Pfeß^H#s.»

SECTION 1 DUTY FREQUENCY POSITION STATUS. SECTION 2

JOINT OPERATIONS

CORDONIER THOMAS

KROJSS SUPR. OPR.

n 29,2(V)

SP(S94O(V)(27.2(V)

3 A

4

T & R INTCPT

HARLAND CAMPBELL QUATTLE3AUM

HARRIS TT OPR. HOWELL T»

RADIO I DAM3ACHEH CHIEF SUPR. LIHDGREN KUDRSC SUPR. JACOBS PROVINCE OPR. SP(S6OeHCW)

(2404XCW) 298 29A

T & R INTCPT.

FAHL3USH

WEBSTER OPR. . 5P(2956)(0¥) (1918) (V)

328 32A

T k R INTCPT.

WALKER

KEY BAKER GRIFFIN MARTIN POTTMSYER COLSMaN 3RICKER CONNALY ARCHER

OPR. CPR. OPR. OPR. OPR. OPR. OPR. OPR. OPR.

2932(V) 2154(V) 5780 (CW) 2590 (CW) 2304(V) 2276(V) 2862(V) 27.4(V) 27.8(V)

31 44 43 30 28 42 40 16 17

INTCPT. 11

« ii

n n it

it

it

STEPHENS HERCIK ROC-ERS KOHRING GAULDING TRACY KEENS JOHNSON KMAK

YaZZIE NAVAJO •. . BECENTI SCOFIELD TTTT OPR.OPR.

"¦'ljk'"

jj tr»

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING "TELETYPE TRAFFIC*

ISR CIRCUIT—EXPED TRPS CIRCUIT

Copy to G-3 Copy to C-2 Copy to Capt Clou#i (File)

Tho Marine Radio Group attending this machine willbe responsible for the routing.

2SR Circuit—CASCU'

Joint Orj Intel.Rm. Copy to G-3 Copy to G2 Copy to CASCU Copy for File

This circuit in joint OP is attended by a member of the CASCU Group a He willprovide the liarine attendant, on the 3SR Circuit, with one copy which willbe delivered to G-3.

The G-2 Section willprovide a runner to remove one copy from the 2SR Circuit located in the Intel. Rm.— SSR Circuit Joint Communication Circuit

)?)? Km,Km,olntolnttt OPOP dede .adi'o.adi'oJointJoint IntelIntelntelntelLKm.LKm. UoaeUoae Kafli'o lKafli'o l''Cot>yCot>y toto "CASCU"CASCU CopyCopy to &-2to &-2 2 copies2 copies to CWOto CWO Copy forCopy 'filefor'fileCopyCopy toto !! Copy forCopy for filefile War Comd.War Comd.

¦¦CopyCopy forfor filefile Copy toCopy G--4to G--4Copy forCopy Filefor File

Joint 0? (53R). The G~o section will have an enlisted man attend this circuit

in the Joint Operations room. Ho willgive one copy to CASCU and one copy to the G-3 section. Further, he willkeep the fiie copy in a folder available at all times to the several commands #

INTEL RM (3SR The G--2 section willprovide a runner to remove one copy from

the 33R Circuit located in the Intel. Rn,

CODE ROOM (SSR The C.TO will'be furnished 2 copies from the code room machine.

These copies will be used to determine if further action should be t.aken #

-r*

i

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING- "TELETYPE TRAFFIC" (Continued)

1, If the message is written up for distribution, both cooies willbe stamped "Written up". One copy will then be placed on file "by the C3O and the second co-oy willbe bucked to OIC EXTRO for his file.

2, If the message is not written up but is immediately routed to a Staff Section, the Staff Section will initial one copy and retain the other. The initialed copy will be returned to the Comm Center for filing. The file copy will then be routed to OIC EXTRO,

3. Ifthe message is not written up or immediately routed to a Staff Section, the CWO will make anotation on one copy "Not written up" and pass to OIC EXTRO for filing. The other copy can be thrown away.

RADIO 1 (SSR CKT

a The file copy in radio 1 will be kept in an orderly manner by tho liarine Radio Group. This copy willbe retained by them for further study by their command.

WaR COICD. (SSH CKT)

The Gw/- section will remove: oopyene for their immediate use and keep a file copy for what ever reference or study purposes they may wish to make.

RADIO TELETYPE CIRCUIT—RATT

2 Copies to CWO Copy for file

On this circuit the same procedure willbe followed as for tho 3SR CKT in the code room. However, there is one exception.If the traffic is of immediate interest it should be transmitted on the 3SR Circuit.

-RADIO I HANDLING OF TRAFFIC FROM VARIOUS LANDING FORCE RADIO

'

NS^

Clear dispatches received in Radio Ithat are of immediate interest to our command, such as boats leaving line of departure,

\

EjNCLOSUßj^g^^^^^^^,

FHOGSDUia FOB. HANDLING "TELETYPE TRAFFIC" (Continued)

mines on beach, strong resistance etc., will be teletyped immediately. Ho further action need be taken by Radio I. The C3O will watch this traffic appearing on his teletype and will cause that portion of it to bo written up which he believes should be held in the files of one or more sections of the Command or that needs further routing to those sections not having the teletype available, such as G-l, Medical Officer, etc.

Clear dispatches not qualifying with 'the paragraph a bovc, such ac logistical information, requests or dispatches whore the information is not of an urgent nature will be handled as follows:

Send two colics by pneumatic tube to the Joint Communications Center. The messenger will deliver one copy to G--2, &-3, or G--4 as indicated on the dispatch, the carbon will be stamped Clough. This copy willbe placed on the Marino Officer1

?

desk. Messengers will deliver the traffic immediately to the section marked. To avoid confusion the original and the duplicate

in separatewillbe -oiacod tubes.

Coded dispatches willbe sent by pneumatic tube to the Joint Communications Center. After they ore broken, the CBO willdecide whether the contents is of sufficient interest or urgency to teletype, or whether it should be "written up". Much of this traffic not mooting the above requirements can be sent to Joint Operations in the "break down stage". There it will be destroyed after its value has ceased. The Coded copy will reflect what action was taken and be returned to Radio Ifor filing.

C. R. CLOUGH, Captain, USMCR.

1

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OMPARISONOMPARISON OFOF ADMINISTRATIWf^TACTKSALADMINISTRATIWf^TACTKSAL TRAFFICTRAFFIC

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TACTICAL ADMINISTRATIVE

Lines intercept

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action and

Enclosure (GJ

COMBINED OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

IWO JIMA SAIPAN-

TOTAL DISPATCH TRAFFIC (TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE)

Totals shown include action and intercept dispatches.

Enclosure (G)

( I

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HOTS: QSHJBRAL BXBXB7I SfTXBS LAOTOB

*

2295-30 010/247

% l Ser: 01709-45 fJyri >' I \ fiI'll

MEDICAL REPORT

I¥o JIMA

2295-30 OFFICE OF THE SURGEON, 010/247 HEADQUARTERS,

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC, "->. 33 i*;.-1*"1*" r^v?"FLEET POST OFFICE, SAW PIIAfJ#fSCO|

Serial: 01709-45 28 March, 1945.

From: The Surgeon. To The Commanding General.

Subject: Medical Report, IWO JIMA

1. PREPARATORY:

A. In the planning stage for the attack on IWO JIMA, involving the use of the Fifth Amphibious Corps, consisting of approximately three (3) divisions with Corps Troops and Artillery engaged on a small island eight (8) square miles in area and very heavily fortified, it was apparent that the casualty rate would be high and that all the hospital! zat ion available to the Corps would be needed for the care of the sick and wounded. Not only was it necessary to care for the combat force with associated shore based naval units and advanced echelons of Garrison Forces, but it was also necessary to plan for the care of the estimated fifteen hundred (1500) civilians, thought to be on the island. The effect of an Interruption of shore to ship evacuation due to enemy action or rough water over very poor beaches had to be considered also. The very limited area available for setting up such hospital facilities ashore with the large number of troops that would be present, posed a serious problem in the care of the estimated number of casualties.

B. To meet this situation, the V.A.C. had the Third, Fourth and Fifth Medical Battalions, integral components of the Third, Fourth and FifthMarine Divisions respectively and the Fifth Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion. The Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One, which had arrived from the Mainland a short time before, was attached to the V.A.C. , and a request was submitted to transfer the 38th Field Hospital of the U. S. Army from the Garrison Force to the Assault Forces. This request was approved. After the Marianas Campaign, on recommendation by this Headauarters, each Medical Company in the Marine Divisions and the Corps Medical Battalions had been authorized equipment for one hundred forty-four (144) beds instead of the, usual seventy-two (72). This made a total of approximatelyi iî#i,?thû^^^;lêt^hâdred ninety-two (3592) beds

- -V- 1

- -

Subject: Medical Report, IWO JIMA. \

available. Plans were also made to add to the supplies and equipment carried in by the Bth Field Depot which was scheduled to arrive about D plus ten days, a sufficient quantity of cots, tents, blankets and mess gear to augment the organic equipment of the hospitals by fifteen hundred (1500) beds.

C. In this operation, the Third Marine Division was to constitute the reserve for the Fifth Amphibious Corps.

D. Due to the fact that there was some possibility that Epidemic Typhus, Scrub Typhus, Cholera and Plague might be present on the objective, all personnel were inoculated against Typhus, Cholera and Plague in addition to the usual immunizations. The clothing of the landing force was impregnated with dimethylphthelate and DDT powder as a preventive measure against lice and mites. As a means of controllingflies, which have been such a nuisance and a hazard to health in previous operations, plans were made to spray the area occupied by our troops with DDT. Initially, this spraying was to be done by carrier-borne aircraft, later by land based planes when airfield facilities became available. A Medical Officer, familiar with the procedure, was detailed aboard a carrier as technical advisor and the Malaria and Epidemic Control Team of the Fourth Marine Division was designated to furnish the technical ground supervision.

E. Experience gained in previous operations had shown that there was a great need for a blood bank. With the establishment by the Surgeon General of the Nsvy of the Whole Blood Distribution Center Number One at Guam, it became feasible for the first time to establish one at the target area and plans were made to accomplish this. Up to this time, whole blood had been obtained from Hospital Corpsmen, Marines and occasionally from patients of the Medical Companies.

F. Air evacuation of casualties to the Marianas Area was to begin as soon as airfield facilities would permit and it was planned to provide for three hundred fifty (350) patients per week.

(1) Experience gained in the Marianas campaign pointed out the necessity of having the casualties screen ed by a qualified Flight Surgeon, to insure that only those whose condition would permit air evacuation were evacuated by _

;¦-, i %* 2* ¦

'i i

\

Subject: Medical Report, IV/O JIMA. ,_ - "*',

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this means. It also indicated that cer-memâ^^S^b^K^'Wnd^tain medical supplies and equipment shofeTd cc aboard each plane »

A request was therefore submitted for an air evacuation team consisting of one (1) or more qualified Medical Officers end other medical personnel to be assigned for this purpose. This request was approved and the agency furnishing the planes was directed to supply the necessary personnel, supplies and equipment.

Or. An evacuation policy of immediate evacuation during the assault phase and of fifteen days thereafter was established.

H. Two (2) Hospital Ships and one (1) APH were to be available for this operation. The first one was scheduled to arrive on D plus one day.

I. Patients were to be evacuated to Saipan where fifteen hundred (1500) beds and to G-uam where thirty-fivehundred (3500) beds were available.

J. The medical supply plan for the operation included an initial thirty-day allowance carried with the assault forces, plus medical and sanitary supplies for fifteen hundred (1500) civilians and "block" shipments arriving at regular intervals during the operation. Approximately 50$ of supplies of the assault forces and all of the "block" shipments were to be palletized and waterproofed.

(1) There was also established an adequate emergency reeupply that could be sent by air if necesssry.

K. Frequent inspections of the water supply to determine bacteriologic tmrity and freedom from poison were to be performed end each Malaria and Epidemic Control Team was furnished with a water testing kit for chemical warfare agents.

L. Prefabricated "knock-down" type heads and fly traps were to be carried by the assault forces.

M. Plans were also made for the dissemination of information to the troops on the diseases likely to be encountered and the preventive measures necesssry.

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Medicine and Surgery arrived just prior to the operation and plans were made for them to obtain the material they desired. A photographer was also assigned to the Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One.

2. CASUALTIES AND EVACUATION: (See Annex "A")

A. Shore.

(1) Initial (while securing the beach-head) Casualties were evacuated from Battalion Aid Stations directly to the beach to shore party and beach party installations which consisted at first of a shell hole or small pits dug in the volcanic sand. This decentralized evacuation worked well under extremely trying conditions. The beach and water's edge were under constant mortar, artillery, rocket and small arms fire and there were many casualties in this critical area. Boats bringing personnel and supplies ashore were quickly loaded with wounded for the return trip. However, the surf conditions were such that many boats were broached and many were blown out of the water by enemy artillery or mortar fire.

(a) Attached to each Battalion Landing Team was one-third of the collecting section of the Medical Company initially supporting the Regimental Combat Team.

(2) Later (after troops were well established on the beach) .

(a) Regimental Area. In this operation, the distance from battalion and regimental aid station to the beach was short so that casualties were usually evacuated directly from these stations to the beach until divisional and corps hospital installations were interposed in the chain of evacuation about D plus six days. After these installations were set up, evacuation was directly from Battalion and Regimental Aid Stations to the Division Hospital and from there to beach or Corps Hospitals.

(b) Division Area. Casualties were so high and space to set up hospitals was so limited and subject to intermittent enemy fire that many of the hospital sections of the medical companies supporting the R.C.T's. were landed early and remained on the beach to assist in the beach

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Subject: Medical Report, IWO vTCM|. /

evacuation stations until division and corps hospital installations were functioning. They then assisted in the division hospitals.

a, Casulaties among corpsmen were very high, especially among fr^nt line units. In moving about to care for the wounded, they Vere subject to intense enemy fire and frequently were shot down alongside the man they were caring for. For this operation, each division was assigned approximately b% additional corpsmen before the operation, however, the losses among corpsmen in one Marine Division (4th Mar. Div.) were approximately ZSt and a little less in the others so that there was need for additional replacements and medical companies were levied on to furnish these. In one division this was carried to such an extent that by D plus eight days one medical company had been reduced to three Medical Officers and a few Marines and was completely inoperative as an organization. This is contrary to established doctrine and greatly hinders the care of the wounded. The Hospital sections of the medical companies must not be disrupted to furnish replacements for front line units or there will be no one to care for the wounded after they are evacuated from the front lines.

b. One Division Surgeon was evacuated early with a diagnosis of strangulated Hernia and his plsce was taken by the next Senior Medical Officer.

(c) Corps Area. The Corps Surgeon is responsible for the coordination of evacuation in the Corps Area as are the Division, Regimental, and Battalion Surgeons in their respective areas. He is also concerned with hosoitalization, administration, inspection of Medical Department personnel and equipment, control of communicable disease and investigation of conditions affecting the health of the military personnel in his area of responsibility.

a. In this operation, the relieving Corps Surgeon accompanied the Corps Surgeon during the operation so that he might gain the experience of at least one operation before taking over the job himself. This procedure should be followed for both Division and Corps Surgeons, if they are inexperienced in field operations or else experienced junior officers should be promoted to fillthese billets. The latter procedure would contribute materially to the operation

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Subject: Medical Report, IWO JIMA.

as well as to the morale of the forces involved.

B. Air.

(1) A3r evacuation from IWO JIMA to the Marianas supplemented area evacuation by hospital ships and transports. This service was initiated on D plus 12. days and originally planned for three hundred fifty (350) patients per week. However, the very high casualty rate, together with the shortage of ships available to transport casualties later in the operation caused this figure to be revised to the point where half or two-thirds of the planned weekly evacuations were being carried out daily.

(2) An air evacuation unit consisting of two (2) Flight Surgeons and several Hospital Corpsmen arrived with the first casualty evacuation planes and set up near the North end of Number One Airfield in the Third Marine Division Area. All casualties to be evacuated by air were screened by them and were accompanied on the plane by corpsmen. The unit and the planes were subjected to enemy fire at times and did a remarkable job in evacuating such large numbers of wounded in spite of it. Two evacuation planes were hit on the take off but were able to land and transfer their load without additional casualties. This means of evacuation is a very valuable supplement to evacuation by surface vessels. The casualty evacuation planes also brought in whole blood from Guam, as it was needed by the land forces.

C. Sea.

(1) In the normal movement of casualties from a combat area by ships, the responsibility of the land forces ends at the high water mark on the beach. However, in an amphibious operation, this part of the evacuation chain is so closely linked to the shore activities and exerts such a profound influence on the field hospitalization program ashore, that it must be considered in any discussion of the evacuation problem. In this operation there was so little room in which to set up hospital facilities ashore that every effort had to be made to get the casualties off the Island as rapidly as conditions permitted.. The hospital installations ashore were subjected to the further hazard of enemy artillery and sniper fire and the beach conditions were such that the high surf and steeply sloping beach did not always allow evacuation to proceed.

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Several times it was necessary to change the evacuation from Eastern to Western beaches and back again, as surf conditions rendered the beaches on one side or the other inoperative.

(2) The general plan for sea evacuation was to initially receive the casualties from the beaches aboard L.S.T's. to be stationed 2000 yards off each of the four beaches These were known as Evacuation Control L.S.T's. and had a barge tied alongside for receiving the casualties. Ambulance boats (LCVP's) were to be assigned from the transports (APA's) of each transport division standing off that particular beach and were to transport the casualties to the APA's designated by the Evacuation Control Officer on the L.S.T. Casualties were to be sorted on the LST and those whose condition was such that it precluded further evacuation at the moment were to be treated aboard the L.S.T. un.til they were in condition to be moved. It was also anticipated that the transports would retire at night and the L.S.T's. would remain and receive the casualties. They would be retained on board until the following morning when they would be evacuated to the transports.

(3) Beginning at D plus one day, Hospital Ships were to arrive at more or less regular intervals, pending their turn-around in the Marianas, and continue after the departure of the transports. Two (2) Hospital Ships and one (1) AP.H were available initially for this purpose.

(4) One L.S.V. was to accompany the assault transports and receive casualties. It's medical facilities were reinforced by one (1) Medical Company of the Third Marine Division, which was in reserve.

be and

transported by. air as

to Pearl their

(5) At the Marianas, by such surface

condition permitted.

the ships

casualties were as were available

to

(6) Shore to ship.

(a) The beaches on T/70 JIMA were not behind coral reefs but they might as well have been so far as the difficulty of evacuating casualties from them was concerned. They sloped steeply upward in several step-like formations, were composed of volcanic ash that had no binding material in it and in which men sank to their ankles or deeper at each step

Subject: Medical Report, IWO JIMA. i

and In which no wheeled vehicles could move. Deep water extended almost to the shore line and the surf was almost always heavy, so thet small craft could rarely make the beach and pull off again without broaching. This made It Impossible to evacuate casualties in anything except DUKV's, Amphibian .Tractors, or LCM's, so that for the most part, evacuation was by amphibian vehicles. The Western beaches did not slope quite so steeply as the Eastern ones and some LCVP's were used there when the surf conditions on the Eastern beaches made this side inoperative. However, the Western beaches were mined and It was some days before they were in an operational condition so that in the early phase all casualties had to cross the Eastern beaches.

(b) Casualties were brought from the beach to the barge along-side the Evacuation Control LST where they were usually taken off and transferred to a LCVP for further evacuation to a transport or to a Hospital Ship.

(c) The amphibian vehicles were badly needed to haul ammunition, water, retlons and supplies to the assault units and it was frequently difficult to obtain them for transporting casualties. Also, many of these vehicles were destroyed on the beaches and in the water by the heavy enemy fire and the remainder were in great demand. Later in the operation, DUKW's brought practically all of the casualties out to the Hospltel Ships or to the transports .

(d) At first the transports stood some distance out, due to the enemy fire and it wes c long, cold, wet trip for the casualties to make, but later certain ships in each Transport Division were designeted to stand-in each day near the LST's end receive casualties. This reduced the evacuation time and speeded up the evacuetlon but it overloaded the Medical Department of the designated transports so that all casualties could not be taken care of expeditlously , and did not distribute the work.

(c) The number of casualties passing through the ?each Evacuation Stations from D day on was so great that it wes necessery to reinforce Medicsl Sections of the Shore Parties with hospital sections of the medical companies attached to the RCT's. One platoon of Corps Evacuation Hospital #1 was set up to operate a Evecustion Station on the Western beaches. Later when divisional end corps hospltel installations

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Subject : Medical Report, IWO JIMA.

were interposed in the evacuation chain, the hospital sections moved from the beach and reinforced the surgical facilities of the division hospitals. Due to the small size of the island there was no place to set up hospital stations in advance of the division hospitals.

(7) Use of LST's.

(a) Four (4) of these ships had been given additional medical personnel, equipment and supplies to prepare them to receive casualties and act as Evacuation Control Ships. They also had a few structural changes made and

i carried a pontoon barge for transferring casualties. One of the four had reefer boxes, a flake ice machine and the personnel assigned to operate the blood bank. It was stocked with whole blood and acted as a floating blood bank until the blood bank was established ashore on D plus 8. All of these ships, however, brought LVT's to the target and were converted for casualty use after these were unloaded.

(b) The design of these ships makes it difficult to care for casualties when empty and after being unloaded they were covered with dirt and grease. The illumination in the tank deck is very poor and the operating facilities are entirely inadequate. The medical personnel assigned to them was not sufficient to care for the very large number of casualties passing through them in spite of heroic effort on their part. On D-day from 0900 to 1530 there had been 1230 casualties evacuated thru these. LST Is. This was slightly more than three (3) casualties per minute. After a few days and nights of this the medical officers and corpsmen were exhausted.

(c) The barges along-side for transferring casualties were usually violently unstable. At times the berges would rise on the swell to the level of the LST deck and on one occasion the barges had to be cut loose. However, the transfer of casualties to transports from LVT's was equally difficult, if not impossible at times and some means of transfer- ' ring casualties from LVT's to LCVP's was needed since the LCVP s could be hoisted on the davits to the deck level of the transport and casualties brought aboard this way, LVT's and DUXW f s can not be hoisted in this manner. It is easier to handle casualties in a DUKW than in an LVT^, apparently due to the ease of handling the DUKW in a qeawayl' It has more freeboard, steers

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easier and is very roomy. One LST served one beach and evacuated casualties to its transport division or to the hospital ship. With the establisment of hospitals ashore the LST's were withdrawn and at that time more DUKW's were available to facilitate the movement of casualties seaward.

(d) It is believed that the Evacuation Control LST's served a very useful purpose, but if they are used for the care of casualties they should not be used for any thing else and must be adeauately staffed and equipped for this very important Job. They must also have several structural alterations tank deck stallations

to allow for easy to the operating

for the care of casualties

passage of rooms and sh

the ould on the

casualties from have permanent

tank deck.

the in

(8) Use of APA's.

(a) These ships bear the initial casualty load from the beech assault. In the IWO JIMA operation they had received 4956 wounded by 1745 of D plus 2 days. The first hospital ship arrived et D plus 1 day and took 609 of the more serious casualties. It is obvious, however, that all the hospital ships available in the area could not have cared for such a casualty load. However, if several additional hospital ships had been available it would have helped equalize the burden of this heavy casaulty load and it is believed that in general the wounded would have received better care. The transports are not designed primarily to facilitate casualty handling and are not equipped for this purpose. Their primary function is to carry and land combat troops, equipment and supplies. As soon as this mission is accomplished they leave the area. However, on most of these ships the Captain and ship's comt>any gavp every assistance possible in handling the large number of casualties and deserve great credit for their effort. Some of them received a great number of casualties in a very short tim-"» and their medical staff labored long hours to give them the attention that they needed. The Casualty Evacuation Officers on the Casualty Evacuation Control LST's endeavored to distribute the casualties among the different ships so that no one transport would be overburdened at one time. Unfortunately, this did not always work out due to the fact that sometimes the coxwain failed to heed the directions given him or misunderstood them and sometimes the ships were not in the understood location. On a few occasions the ships refused to take the casualties tor oêj^^S^§î§ftno 'kher anc^ the boats


went from one ship to another before someone finally took the casualties aboard and gave them treatment hours after they should have received it, A certain amount of this confusion can not be avoided. It is a part of war, but it is felt that every Officer of the Deck should report to the Captain of the ship when casualties are alongside and any Capatin i\rho refuses to take a boat load of casualties" aboard his ship should be required to make an immediate report to the Task Force Commander of his reasons' for so doing.

(9) Hospital Ships.

(a) The large number of wounded in this operation again emphasized the need for a greatly increased number of hospital ships. These ships 1 only function is the transportation and care of the sick and. wounded. Their loading and unloading and destination is not complicated, as in the case of transports, by the many factors related to the combat situation. They -orovide better facilities for the care of the sick and wounded. Some could remain in the area early to care for the slightly wounded and thus return them to duty end prevent the enormous loss of manpower occasioned by the departure of the transports with men who could return to their organizations in s few days. In this operation it was impossible to set up hospital facilities ashore early due to the priorities of unloading, difficulty of working the beaches, and lack of adequate space. In this stage all casualties had to be evacuated. Later on it was possible to set up hospital facilities ashore, but the lack of space prevented full expansion and the large number of severely wounded required the hospitals to concentrate on surgical theatres so they were never adequate to handle the number of casualties necessary to carry out the 15 day evacuation policy established for this operation. Two hospital ships were originally scheduled for this operation. With the departure of the transports it was thought that the two hospital ships and the greatly increased air evacuation plus the hospital facilities ashore would be inadequate to take care of the 1000 or so casualties that occurred daily, so another hospital ship was ordered to IWO JIMA. It arrived on D plus 21 days and departed two days later with 555 casualties.

Policy.D. Evacuation

(1) The weakness of any evacuation policy

i


was again demonstrated in this operation where a 15 day evacuation policy had been established. In the early stages of an invasion of this kind there is no olace to segregate casualties who willbe ready for duty in 15 days or less. The transports are loaded with casualties of all types and usually leave the area itfith them* "//hen casualties are being evaucated over the beaches by the hundreds, beaches that are under heavy enemy fire, clogged with transportation and equipment of all kinds, Trounded are evacuated by the first available transportation, sorting is not and can not be accomplished. Time, s'oace and the combat situation has not permitted convalescent camps to be established. Beds ashore are needed for the seriously wounded who must have intelligent care all along the line if their lives are to be saved, bounded are not evacuated even from the front lines until the medical officers have out them in condition to endure the movement to the rear. Hours and days ashore are often required before some patients can be evacuated by any

¦means. This problem can be solved for the early stages of an operation of this type by having sufficient hospital ships or transports to allow two or more to be retained in the area and receive slightly wounded by inter- ship transfer. In operations of longer duration by having sufficient hospital beds on nearby friendly islands to hold these casualties until they are ready for duty, when they can be returned to the area. This x/ould

experiencedprevent this dangerous depletion of trained and fighting men.

3. ORGANIZATION AND"OPERATION.

New in the IVfO jIMA Operation affectA. factors ing the Navy Medical Units of the Marine combat organization were:

Ist. The employment of a complete corps with three (3) divisions attacking abreast on a volcanic island, very small in area, but extremely well fortified.

2nd, which preventedBeach and surf conditions the beaching of landing boats, stopped the early use of wheeled vehicles and greatly hampered or completely interrupted the evacuation of casualties over one or more beaches at a time.

3rd, Enemy use of large mortar shells, mines, rockets and artillery over the entire a.rea.

4th. -Sfte'my use of phosphorus shells. L

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12

Subject: Medical Repor t, IWO JIMA. Wlw^-iLwil^t^ sth. Extensive burns resulting from the destruc

tion of numbers of our tanks and vehicles as* a result of enemy fire.

6th. Possible presence of disease and disease bearing Insects not previously encountered in other areas of operation.

B. In the IWO JIMA Operation, the lines of evacuation were short but enemy fire over the area was heavy so that evacuation was extremely hazardous and difficult. This resulted in heavy casualties among the medical personnel, especially among the Corpsmen. The wounds seen were generally extensive and accompanied by great shock. Wounds caused by phosphorus shells were met with for the first time, as were burns from gasoline and flash of explosives. All medical installations were subjected to enemy small arms, mortar, rocket and artillery fire at various times so that they had to be well dug-in, in defilade and protected as much as possible. Space to set up was at a premium and units had to be split up in order to find a place to function. This again emphasized the soundness of the basic medical organizations and their ability to split into small components and operate as a functional unit. Wheeled vehicles could not move until egress roads were constructed from the beach so that the assault forces had to manhandle all their medical supplies and eauipment under difficult conditions, thus again emphasizing the necessity for having as little heavy and bulky eauipment as possible and packing it so thst it can be manhandled if the need for doing so arises. The evacuation from the beach to the ships was difficult due to the surf end enemy fire. Casualties among the medical personnel in the Beech Evacuation Stations were great. This combined to make it necessary to augment the medical personnel of the Beach Evacuation Stations with medical personnel from other units.

C. The Regimental Medical Service.

(1) The casualties among corpsmen and Mcdical Officers of front line units were high and replacements had to be provided. The b% additional personnel given them before their departure for the operation was insufficient to filltheir needs during this operation.-t--?lion*Dfi vôlf c^—

-^jj^gMJ! P_TV*V^ J - uj; Subject: Medical Report, IWO JIMA. \

11'I 1 ,

(1) The form of utilization of the five (5) Medical Companies in the Medical Battalion has assumed a regular pattern based on experience. However, it is extremely flexible and able to operate under unusual circumstances as shown by the employment in this operation of the Hospital Sections of the attached Medical Companies to assist in the Beach Evacuation Stations and later to reinforce the surgical teams of the division hospital. Other operations may require some changes in this organization, but for operations of this sort, it appears to be satisfactory.

(2) Prior to departure for en amphibious i

operation, one company of the Medical Bettalion is attached to each R.C.T. One third of the Collecting Section with litter units, light first aid material and c prbportionate number of compsny jeep ambulances ere embarked with each B.L.T. The remainder of the company is preferably embarked on the ship with the R.C.T. Headquarters. An advance echelon of the hospital section is formed with minimum tentege and pre-sterillzed packs of surgical dressings, laparotomy packs, necessary surgical instruments and utensils, plasma, saline glucose, etc., designed to land early when needed to set up a small portable surgical station. The remainder of the company and heavy equipment is prepared to land on order. The practice of loading vehicles with supplies and equipment is sound, provided it is clearly understood thst the advance echelons must be prepared to manhandle this material in case conditions do not permit landing of vehicles when the personnel are due to go ashore, as was the case in this operation. For this reason, the material must be packed so that it can be quickly removed from the vehicle and taken ashore.

(3) Subsequent utilization of the Hospital Sections of the three Medical Companies attached to the R.C.T Is. must be determined by the Division Surgeon. In this operation, part of these companies remained in the Beach Evacuation Stations. Others reinforced the Division Hospitals. There was no space to set up convalescent hospitals on this island.

(4) The utilization of the other two (2) Medical Companies, which has become standard practice in most divisions, is to set up a Division Field Hospital. In this operation, it was necessary thst these be well dug in, in defilade and protected as much as possible from enemy fire. One

H,


division utilized several enemy water reservoirs that were empty. These had concrete walls, were dug in and by building a roof over them they were made into very satisfactory operating rooms. Their ward and shock tents were erected in.long trenches bulldozed in defilade and near the reservoirs. The soft nature of the soil permitted this otherwise difficult task. This furnished a very satisfactory hosaital set up which, although within sight of the enemy and frequently shelled, was not hit. This Division ran four operating tables almost constantly.

(5) The Fourth and *ifthMarine Divisions landed all five (5) of their Medical Companies. However, one (1) Company of the Fifth Marine Division was utilized for replacements end was not set up. The Third Marine Division landed two (2) Medical Companies. The other three (3) were not employed ashore. One (1) of these companies was attached to the R.C..T. that was in reserve and not committed, another assisted

t aboard an LSV that served as a casualty carrier.

E. The Corps Medical Battalion.

(1) This organization is composed of three (3) Medical Companies and was designed to supplement divisional medical service in combat situations. One is attached to e&ch Corps. In the IWO JTMA Operation, the H&S Company and Company "A" landed on D plus six and set up on the Eastern beach at the foot of Mount Surrbachl on D plus seven. The other two (2) companies set up on the Western Side on D plus nine just below Number One Airfield, where they were in direct support of the Third Marine Division. Company "AM had the Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat specialist, a Neuro-Surgeon, and an Orthopedic Surgeon attached to it, so that cases from the divisions requiring these specialized services would be transferred there. They also had the only Psychiatrist available. He was attached to the Fourth Marine Division, but was placed in the Corps Medical Battalion in order that his services might be available to all the divisions and all cases of this type centralized in one activity. There were available in the" Bth Field Depot sufficient cots, tentege, blankets, etc., to expand the Medical installations by 1500 beds, but sufficient space to utilize this was not available.

F. The Corps Evacuation Hospital.

(1) Corps Evacuation Hospital Number One #,

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was attached to the Fifth Amphibious Corps for this operation.This is the first time one of these organizations has b§en used in ©pmbat. They were organized to supplement the other hospitaliEation available to divisions and corr>s and to furnish such specialized medical and surgical service as is needed. They ere organized into three (3) platoons, each capable of independent operation and equipped for two hundred (200) beds, making a total of six hundred (600) beds for the organization as a whole , but capable of great expansion. The wisdom of setting up this organization so that smaller sub-divisions of it can operate independently was clearly demonstrated in this operation where space was at such a premium that it was impossible to find a location to set it ail up in one place. Accordingly, one platoon was dug in and set up on the Western beaches where it acted as a large Beech Evacuation Station and Hospital since there was no beach organization available for this beech and it was impracticable to move the stations from the Eastern beaches while those beaches were inoperative due to surf conditions. The other two platoons were set up in a series of airplane revetments on the Western side of the Island between Airfield No. 1 and No. 2. They functioned satisfactorily in these locations and furnished part of the much-needed hospital izat ion and surgical service. This organization began landing on D plus 7 days and one platoon was in operation by D plus 12 days and the other two by D plus 15 days.

G-. Army Field Hospitals.

(1) One Army Field Hospital was utilized for this operation (38th Field Hospital). It was a part of the Garrison Forces, but loaded in the Assault Shipping to be available to supplement the other hospitalization if needed. Due to the large number of casualties, it was landed on D plus 8 days and pieced in operation near Number One Airfield on D plus 12.

4. SECURITY OF MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS.

A. The Island was so crowded with troops that the question of security was c relatively minor one in this operation compared to the Marianas. Every Area was subject to sniper, mortar, rocket and artillery fire, but the usual "Banzai" charges end infiltration tactics of the enemy were either lacking or did not penetrate the front lines. It was more of a question of digging in and protecting the installations in every wey possible from enemy fire.

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Subject: Medical Report, I\JO JIMA. / ? i

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5. FIELD MEDICAL EQUIPMENT.

A. In general, the Navy Field Medical Unit furnished adeems te equipment to allow a high standard of Field Medical Service. Very. few deficiencies developed. Most of the field hospitals had obtained materials for the Wangensteen suction apoaratus, but the large number of abdominal wounds soon out these to good use and there was need for more. Oxygen units were extremely valuable, since many penetrating chest wounds were encountered. There was in one hospital an inadeauete supply of non-traumatic abdominal sutures, due to the extensive abdominal surgery necessary, but this need was filled by borrowing from neighboring units. More of this extremely valuable suture

provided.material must be

B. Improvised portable fracture tables were used to great advantage. The wounds encountered were massive in extent and were freauently accompanied by various fractures. The Ziminer portable fracture table, recently adopted has not yet reached ell field hospitals.

C. Portable Plywood Operating Rooms.

(1) These operating rooms proved extremely valuable in this operation, as they have in previous ones. The units* dug them in and each provided a cleen, comfortable place to operate. On the beaches, water seeped into some of the medical installations at high tide and the slightly elevated deck in these huts was appreciated during this period. Dust, as usual, was bad but these rooms were relatively dust-free. Their use should be continued.

6. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES SANITATION.

A. The health of the commend was excellent during this operation and no outbreak of communicable disease occurred. There was some breeding of mosquitoes. The MECon Unit of the Fourth Marine Division reported finding both culicine and aedes larvae. This unit also reported finding many mites in the dug-outs and pill-boxes erected by the Japs. These were tentatively identified as a species capable of transmitting scrub typhus, however no cases of the disease were reported end final identification of the mites must await later studies. Many of the F.O.W's were found to have body lice end some of the

Subject : Peoort,Medical — IWO JsMk » j

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Marines guarding the P.O.VPs. "became lousy through contact. Flies. were not prevalent es in previous operations, probably due to the. spraying with DDT. A complete report of the insects and communicable diseases found willbe submitted by the Malaria and Epidemic Control Teem of the Fourth Marine Division. They were pieced in charge of the sanitation in the entire area in addition to their own and furnished the ground supervision for the DDT

" spraying. It was reoorted that interrogation of prisoners did not reveal the presence of such diseases as Cholera, "°lrgue,

1Typhus or Scrub Typhus. However, one Jap document' was captured that contained an order that any water supply left behind by th*3

Japs was to be poisoned with cyanide. The water used by our forces was all carried ashore from ships initially and later supplied by our own distillation units.

B. Some units had obtained the new knock-down plywood type of latrine box, but most units did not have these and were using types of their own manufacture or straddle trenches. The pre-f abricated plywood latrine box is a distinct contribution to field sanitation and its issue should be expedited.

C. DDT Spraying.

(1) The part of the Island which was in oos session of our troops was sprayed with DDT by two carrier-borne aircraft (T^K's) on D plus 9 and repeated on D Plus 12 and D plus 16 days with good coverage. Regular spraying by land based planes begsn on D plus 22 days using two (2) C-47 planes from Saipen. Planes must fly quite low to obtain an effective ground dispersal of DDT. This makes it necessary to fly well within the limits of our lines. One C-47 spray plane was damaged by enemy fire duringv one of its spray runs. In addition to this, sprsylng details wer^ sent daily through the area occupied by our troops, to spray with DET using the knapsack type sprayer. For the first time in an operation of this kind flies never became a serious problem. This control measure should be used as sn adjunct to established sanitary procedures in all future operations.

7. MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

A. As previously stated, the medical supply plan for the operation Included an initial 30 day allowance carried with the assault forces and en inclusion of medical

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" •>'¦>¦' if} 1 * ' i1it

-'i :4

— *.

Subject : Medics! Report, IWO JIMA.

supplies in the Marine Supply Service combat resupply shiornents arriving at regular intervels during the operation. There was • no shortage of medicel supplies in soite of extremely heavy cas uaities .

B. Palletizing.

(1) Certain items of medical supply can be palletized with advantage. Supplies so pecked are more easily found on the beach, end are protected from the weather. They must be pecked in c standard uniform manner, however, to conserve as much sr>ece ss possible and facilitate stowage. The divisions were ordered, to palletize up to 50v of their medical supplies end the block shipments were ell palletized.

C. Whole Blood.

(1) A blood bank wes established aboard sn Evacuation Control L.S.T. end landed with it's personnel, reefer boxes end me chine on D Plus 8 days. It was set up ashore at the North end of Airfield Number One with "B" Medical Company of the Third Marine division end functioned in that location until the end of the operation. After lending the equipment, it wes found that there was no way of obtaining the reauired water pressure to operate the flake-ice machine; so a working party was sent to different ships daily to obtain ice in order to keep the blood refrigerated. The V Corps Medicel Battalion obteined a smell electric pump end by circulating the weter thru the 300 gallon weter treiier wes eble to operate their flake ice machine. They furnished some of the ice for the blood benk;

(2) At first, blood wes flown in by seaplane j

but after the airfield was secured it was flown in by the casualty evacuation planes. A total of nine hundred sixty (960) pints of whole blood were flown in up to D tdlus 25 days. Additional blood wes received from the Hospital Ships. The Landing Force used five thousend, four hundred and six (-5,406) pints of whole blood and the total used for th? care of the IWO JIMA casualties up to D plus 25 deys was twelve thousend, six hundred (12,600) pints. This is slightly less then 'one Dint par casualty.

(3) The wounds encountered in this operation were, for the most pert, very severe; th- loss of blood wes

--19

,tnv,tnv

mmSubject :Subject : MedicalMedical Report,Report, iwoiwo JIMA.JIMA.

great and shock was profound, go that the reedy availability of whole blood in adeouate quantities undoubtedly resulted in the saving of many lives that would otherwise have been lost.

(4) The svsilability of whole blood for the field hospitals with the greater use of serum albumin by the regimental units decreases the amount of plasma utilization. This necessitates a further adjustment in the ratio of plasma and serum albumin in our "Rehabilitation" and "Combat Re-supply"shipments. The overall procurement of plasma is undoubtedly materially affected by the excellent whole blood program.

8. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

A. The land mass was so small in this operation that the need for motor trans ports tion was not as great as in the Marianas Operation. No wheeled vehicles could get over the beach until steel mats were laid and roads built so that the assault units had to manhandle their supplies and eauipment. Some of the motor transport was stalled on the beach in the early waves and was destroyed by enemy fire. However, 'after roads were built, vehicles could be and were used as was necessary. The jeep ambulances again proved themselves the most valuable single piece of motor transport in the medical organization and were used to haul the thousands of cssuslties that occurred.

B. There were a few Weasels available and they were most valuable In the early stages of the operation. They were among the few vehicles that were able to get off the road and not get stuck in the soft volcanic sand. A few of these vehicles would be a valuable addition to the transport of the

Department.Medical

C. Many DUKW's were used in the evacuation of casualties. Enough were not available in the early stages of the operation. They are roomy, end lend themselves to casualty evacuation most satisfactorily. They go through heavy surf without difficulty and are more manageable alongside a ship than the Amphibian Tractors. Tor days at a time no small boats were able to navigate the surf and nearly ell casualties were removed by means of amphibian vehicles which were for the most part DUKW's. Some of these vehicles should be provided for the Medical Section of the Shore Party c.c eerly in the operation as possible. In almost every operation we have undertaken in the

If*•:!! QSw* 1 S IS

:s \1

Subject: . Medicel Report, IWO JIMA.

Pacific Area , the DUKV has "saved the day 11 for casualty evacuation.

9. DENTAL ACTIVITIES.

A. Medical Company and Regimental Dental Officers were available and eauipped to do emergency work during the operation. There ere always some cases developing dental complaints even in the heat of battle. There are also cases of fractured jaws that reauire attention. However, most of these cases are caused by shell fragments and little can be done at the moment in the way of repair, since not infrequently they are extensive in character and reauire prolonged treatment.

3. There were also Dental Officers attached to each Graves Registration Unit who assisted in the identification of the dead.

10. SUMMARY. A. This operation, fought on a small barren vol

canic island, converted by the enemy into c network of mutually supporting underground fortifications presented nothing of the usual battle-field pattern for the military surgeon to utilize

¦in setting up his medical installations. There were no buildings, roads, wooded areas, fields or streams. 3ut above all there was no room. Airfields, gun positions, pillboxes, supply dumps and troops covered the place. 3ut medical organizations landed and by dispersing their units into such areas es were allotted, with the help of the übiquitous bulldozer literally dug themselves a place on the island. Portable plywood operating rooms were set up in holes in the ground and covered with tarpaulins to keep out the dust end cold. The engineers built roofs over captured empty sunken water reservoirs and they made good operating rooms. Ward tents were set up in airplane revetments or simply in long trenches bulldozed in the ground. The electric lights went in, the field surgical units were set up, the blood bank moved ashore s.nd by the time the transports left, a system of surgical facilities was in operation. Thereexcellent were no wounded

critical shortages. A tremendous received medical cere commensurate

load of seriously with "modern field

medical eauipment* and capable doctors and corpsmen.

3& a 11

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' Subject: Medical Report, IWO JIM. 1" Vi

(1) That the LST !s designated as f'H]vscuation Control LST's" be used solely for this purpose and entirely converted to Medical Department use; That they be eculpped and altered to provide clean, readily accessible operating and shock rooms and that they have a medics 1 staff adeauate to care for the large number of casualties handled, so that they may provide a standard of medics 1 care comoarable to that maintained in other sea and shore based medical installations.

(2) That whole blood, so valuable in this operation, together with the necessary personnel and eauipment for establishing a blood bank at the target be made available in all future operations.

(3) That the early spraying of the beach-head with DDT by carrier based planes be continued in future operations.

(4) That the Marine Coros continue to supply Portable Plywood Operating Rooms to Medical Companies end Corps Evacuation Hospitals.

/•

W. T. BROWN.

-ANNEX: "A" Casualties snd Evacuation.

/

22

30. -W AV1 ti-tjl

j

•

ANNEX "A" To Medical Report, IWO JIMA

CASUALTIES AND EVACUATION

1. Casualties to 13 March, 1945 (D plus 22)

KIA WIA MIA TOTAL Off. Enl. Off Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl.

3rd Marßiv 35 633 127 2673 2 120 164 3426 4th MarDiv 84 1481 272 5647 1 95 357 7223 sth MsrDlv 78 1390 225 5185 4 197 307 6772 Corps Troops 1 7 10 83 0 3 11 93 Corps Artillery 0 5 0 11 0 0 0 16

Total 198 3516 634 13599 7 415 839 17530

Grand Total 3714 14233 422 18369

t 2. Total battle casualties to 1800, 21 March, 1945 (D plus 30).

Percent Strength KIA WIA MIA TOTAL of Strength

3rd MarDiv 15681 816 3162 92 4070 25.9 (less 3rd Marines) 4th MarDiv 21737 1731 6058 74 7863 36.1 sth MarDiv 23218 1893 6138 130 8261 35.5 VAC LanFor 9491 63 324 7 3947 394 4.1 (less 3rd, 4th, sth MerDiv)

Total 70127 4503 15732 353 20588 29.3

Percent of total Casualties: 22 77 1 100

3. Evacuated by water to 21 March, 1945 (D plus 30). Total

Total Pead &Ship Stretcher Ambulatory Wounded Dead Wounded Samaritan Ist trip 400 212 612 11 623 Samaritan 2nd trip 400 201 601 8 609* ** * * Samaritan 3rd trip 603* * Samaritan 4th trip ¦» 5 603 Solace Ist trip 490 147 637 3 640 Solace 2nd trip 400 269 669 9 678* * * Solace 3rd trip ¦* 568* *

•3* ttBountiful 555

1

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\n f ,V

ANNEX "A" To Medical Report, TWO JI t,> ¦)n (- . -*

\

Total Total Dead &

Ship Stretched Ambulatory Wounded Dead Wounded

Pinkney (APH) 390 232 622 8 630 Ozark (LSV) 199 208 407 1 408 LSTs (H) 7 1 6 5 11 Transports (APA) 2606 2213 4819 18 4837 Other ships ¦*•* 41240

Total 4892 3483 8373 63 15005 *

Note:- No breakdown available** Type of ship not known

4. Evacuated by air to 21 March, 1945 (D plus 30)

2393 Casualties.

5. Summary of Casualty evacuation to 21 March, 1945 (D plus 30)

Hospital Ships 4879 Other Ships 10126 Air 2393

Total evacuated 17398

2

2295-30 043/196 HEADQUARTERS, Ser .#o2o4o-45 FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

1 April, 1945.

From; The Transport Quartermaster. To : The Commanding General.

Subject: TQW Report on T#o JIMA Operation.

References: (a) Hq.Ex.Trs, TF-56, Staff Memo No. 3-45, serial 0005-5, dtd 7Jan4s .

(b) FMF, Pac, Staff Memo No. 26-45, dtd 17Mar45 .

Enclosures: (A) Shipping by Types. (B) Consolidated Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies. (C) Utilization of Shipping by Types. (D) Breakdown of Equipment "and Supplies, VAC Ships. (3) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, VAC LST fs. (F) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 3rd Marino

Division. (a) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 4th Marine

Division., (H) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 4th Marine

Division LST's. (I) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 4th Marine

Division LSMf s ?

(J) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, sth Marine Division.

(X) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, sth Marino Division LST !s.

(L) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, sth Marine Division LSMls.

(M) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, Zero Echelon Garrison.

(N) Embarkation Chart, VAC Units. (0) Embarkation Chart, 4th Marine Division and At

tached Units • (P) Embarkation Chart, sth Marino Division and At

tached Units. (Q) Unloading Summary .

INTRODUCTION

1. I¥o JIMA was assaulted by the largest landing force yet utilized in the Central Pacific for the capture of a single island. The following comparisons graphically illustrate the difference in composition of this forcp with those used for the capture

'* <; '"¦ ¦of ShIPAN and GUAM; • . ".\ ¦

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xSubject : TQM Report on IWO JBiA l|p||j^bni :^f'

[:f|j

NUMBER: AY. AY. : AY. OPER- SHIPS : TOTAL : TOTAL TOTAL OU.FT : S/T M/TATION IN :ASSAULT: CARGO CARGO : CARGO : CARGO :CARGO

:ASSAULT: TROOPS: CU.FT S/TONS :PER HAN:PER MAN:P/MAN• *

IWO JBIA: 162* : 84,035: 10,335,752: 97>760: 122,9 1.2 3.0

» » • SAIPAN 129 79,124: 12,349,040: 119,653: 156.1 1.5 3.9

f » *

GUAM 97 67,692: 8,557,025: 100,069: 126.4 : 1.5 3.1

* Note: Includes 6 Zero Echelon Garrison Force Ships.

(a) The above figures illustrate how the small size of the objective made it impractical to take much of the equipment which was necessary for waging war on the larger land masses of the Marianas.

(b) 61 LST's and 31 LSMls were used at IWO JIMA in contrast to the 52 LST's available at SAIPAN and 39 LST's at GUAM. This was the major factor responsible for the wide difference in the total number of ships in the assault phase of each operation* S<.e enclosure (A) for a detailed breakdown of shipping 'oy types at IWO JBIA.

' 2.2. The information contained in this report has been

compiled to accomplish the following:

(a) Present a* running narrative of the mounting out of the IWO JIMA operation from the standpoint of the ExpeditionaryTroops as it pertained t^:

(1) Planning and Loading.(2) Unloading.(3) Summation and Recommendations,

(b) The enclosures were prepared in order to:

(1) Summarize the statistical data attendant to this operation,

(2) Analyze this data. (3) Set forth the experiences gained at IvJO JIMA

so that they may be profited by in planning for future operations.i

•*• iZf mm

Subject: TQM Report on IWO JIMA Operation. v»

\PLANNING- AND LOAlfelfG- . /

3. RESPONSIBILITY

(a) The Commanding General-, Expeditionary Troops, was assigned the overall responsibility for mounting out the Expeditionary Troops. To aid in accomplishing this mission, TQM schools were conducted by the TQ>I Section, FMF, Pac, for units signifying their desire for trained TQM personnel. This aided immeasurably toward making it possible for nearly all ships to be loaded by trained TQJ-I personnel from the organic units being embarked.

(1) VAC was delegated the major responsibility for the preparation of the embarkation plan and the supervision and coordination of loading the assault troops., Sec enclosures Xo) and (P) for the details of the embarkation plan.

(2) The present T/0 for the Transport Quartermaster Section of an Amphibious Corps docs not authorize sufficient personnel necess-Biry to load out the shipping assigned to Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops. To overcome this problem the under-staffed Transport Quartermaster Section of VAC was supplemented by 5 officers and 7 enlisted men from the FMF, Pac, TQM Section. These officers and men were all experienced and served as Troop TQM's for both the loading and unloading of ships lifting Corps Troops.

(b) ComPhibsG-rpII xâs authorized by ComPhibsPac to deal directly with VAC in all matters pertaining to detailed embarkation plans for troop personnel and cargo. This facilitated the rapid dissemination of information between the commands directly responsible for the embarkation of assault troops.

4. ALLOCATION OF SHIPPING

(a) See ComPhibsPac speedletter, serial 000225, dated 23 November, 1944, and ComPhibsPac speedletter, serial 000265, dated 17 December, 1944.

(b) The IWO JII-1A operation was distinctive from previous operations of this Force in the Central Pacific in that there was ample shipping to JLLftL Jfcho assault forces. Heretofore there has

-1 :*f Subject: TQM Report on IWO JIKA Operation.

been an overall acute shortage of shipping and it has been necessary

to shuffle anc, reshuffle personnel and equipment extensively to get that which was essential aboard. Newly constructed ships now available to the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, made it possible to reorganize the composition of transport divisions for this operation. Each transport division contained 5 APAls and 2 AKA's, but it. should be noted that 1 APA and 1 AKA from each transport division was loaded with troops and cargo from the Corps rather than the Division. Each RCT, therefore, had available for its own use 4 AAPrsA r s and 1 aKA from the transport division.

¦(c) Three transport divisions constituted a transport squadron capable of lifting a reinforced division. It was found that the organization of the transport squadrons as used for this operation greatly reduced the need of separating units from their equipment and permitted a larger degree of combat unit loading ?

(a) Loading and Staging Areas.* Loading

¦Staging Area Dates

Kahului, Maui. 27Dec44 to SJan4s.

Kilo, Hawaii. 25Dec44 to 9Jan4s.

G-uam. 9Feb4s to 17Feb45..

Oahu. 9Jan4s to 15Jan45; &

22Jan45 to 25Jan45 •

Zero Echelon Garrison, Oahu 30Jan45 to 4Feb4s.

* Note; The loading areas are for transport divisions only. See the following speedletters for additional information on staging and loading schedules: ComPhibsPac serial 000225, dtd 23N0v44; ComPhibsPac serial 000259, dtd 10De044; ComPhibsPac serial 000265, dtd 17Dec44; ComPhibsPac serial 000284, dtd 19Dec44;AdComPhibsPac serial 0002, dtd 22Jan45,

ae —

4 —

&

Subject: TQM Report on IWO JIMA Operation.

(b) Amounts Loaded Per TransDiv. Short T.ons

Unit TransDiv Per TransDiv

4th MarDiv

RCT-24 45 4945.5 RCT-25 44 4334. 2 RCT-23 45 4362.0

Average Short Tons Per TransDiv 4543.9

sth MarDiv

RCT-26 4-6 3961.5 RCT-27 47 4072.3 RCT-2S 48 5076.9

Average Short Tons per TransDiv 4370.2

3rd MarDiv

RCT-9 -31 4465.3 RCT-21 , 32 4999.9 RCT-3 33 46 39.5

Average Short Tons Per TransDiv 4718,2

Average Short Tons Per TransDiv (Landing Force - 3rd, 4th and sth Marine Divisions) 4544.1

(c) It is of interest to note that the average transport division on the Marianas operation carried 5,389 short tons. For that -operation a transport division was composed of 4 APA!s and 1 AKA which was the same number of ships actually available to each RCT at IK) JIMA'.

(d) The details of the assault loadings will be covered in the report of the Transport Quartermaster, VAC.

/ 5

II

Subject; TQM Report on IYO JIMA' Operation.

ECHELON,6. ZERO GARRISON FORCE LOADING

(a) The Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, was assigned the responsibility of mounting the Zero Echelon of the Garrison Force. The Zero Echelon comprised garrison force units which were recommended by type Commanders to be present at the objective during the assault phase of the operation. It was originally intended that these garrison troops mount out with the assault troops. Limitations on the amounts of personnel and cargo which could be loaded on individual ships precluded the lifting of many of these garrison units in the assault shipping. To alleviate this situation, CinCPOA set up additional shipping in the echeloning schedule which permitted these overflow garrison units to be lifted in a group of ships which would arrive at the target on call after the assault ships but prior to the first echelon garrison ships .

(b) ComPhibsPac restricted serial 2378 dated 18 December, 1944, sets forth the principles for the movement of garrison forces. Every effort was made to load the ITtfoI Ttf0 JIMA Garrison Forces in conformity with this directive so that:

(1) The personnel and materiel could be landed in the contemplated order of their use,

(2) Ships could be unloaded in the shortest possible time.

(c) The garrison forces which were intended for the assault came under the operational control of the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, for preparation for embarkation two months prior to the loading date. Arrangements were made at this time between the Commander Landing Force and Garrison Force Commander for the transportation of garrison force personnel and equipment to be embarked with the assault forces.

7. ORGANIZATION OF TWO JIMA GARRISON FORCE TOM SSCTION.

(a) It had been found through experience that a high ly organized and efficient TQJ-1 Section is required to properly mount a large' garrison force. Units comprising garrison forces are often newly organized, and have little or no practical experience in preparing for an operation. Many problems arise concerning preparations for loading which can be answered best by those who are experienced in this type of loading.

- 6'

Jg^L^ktfUPyne^^Mjg^^^^, <* *¦¦***£

Subject: TQM Report on I¥o JlHA^Jfemtion . (b) As soon as the garrison force vas assigned to

the operational control of the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, the Expeditionary Troops TQM assisted that force in securing the services of POA TQM Team #2.

(l) This experienced team was composed of 13 officers and 14 enlisted .men and functioned as a special staff section of the Garrison Force Headquarters. The TQM team was assigned office space in a building adjacent

1to the Headquarters building where the G~4 of the Garrison Force was located. This was particularly satisfactory for the TQM's received decisions on logistical problems and changes in plans as they developed, thus greatly expediting the prePara "ti°n of tentative loading plans. The members of POA TQM Team #2 functioned under the controlof the Expeditionary' Troops in the capacity of Troop.. TQM s.

(2) Units assigned to the Zero Echelon of the Garrison Force were contacted by POA TQH Team #3. UP&T Tables were prepared by all units and then kept up to date so that an accurate listing of cargo to be loaded could be made.

(c) Experienced Naval Cargo Officers were assigned to each ship lifting the Zero Echelon by A&ComPhi"bsPac. These officers were available during the planning phase and -rendered valuable assistance interpreting ships 1 characteristics and informing the Troop T.QM rs of their ships' capabilities. Tentative loadingplans for each ship were prepared as a joint effort by these Naval Cargo Officers and the Troop TQM's. The Cargo Officers were attached to the staff of the Convoy Commodore and their services were available to the troops until the com fiction of the- unloading at IWO JIM.

8. EXECUTION OF LOADING

(a) AdComPhibsPac serial 0068, dated 24 January, 1945, gives a breakdown of units assigned to the ships of the Zero Echelon, I¥o JIMA Garrison Force. Also see AdComPhibsPac serial 0002, &atocl 22 January, 1945. It should be noted that originally an additional XAP, the SS TYPHOON, had been assigned to liftpart of Echelon. Itsims>£o&nd ' • - of ton-the Zero tfrpo^glv^Mer'W'Gparation'

ft «H . . J :« <*U \. -Ifi1 t | 1-1 'iiIJ ,¦'•" > j / vN \\ i I*t ll'f!

I Subject : TQM Ro-oort on IWO JIMA Operation.

tative loading plans that this ship would not be required for this echelon and it was so recommended "to the Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force.

(b) -Equipment to be loaded in the Zero Echelon ships was carefully screened by the TQM, Expeditionary Troops in cooperation with the G-4, Garrison Force, 3y doing this the maximum use of the vessels assigned was made to best support the troops embarked in accomplishing their missions. That equipment which could not fit was by necessity moved back to subsequent echelons. This screening was accomplished as follows:

(1) The Troop TQK's and Naval Cargo Officers . made tentative stowage plans for* all of

the holds serviced by jumbo booms. These holds TArero paper loaded to capacity with heavy equipment, and it was determined what would have to be left behind because of lack of space. Light equipment and supplies were then paper loaded into all of the remaining spaces where heavy equipment could not be stowed. Inadequate winch capacities on these ships made it impossible to increase the load limits for the booms serving all of the holds. By adjusting and readjusting, the most important supplies and equipment were loaded aboard the assigned ships.

(2) The final loading plans were approved oy AdCornPhibsPac and published, as a loading order by that command. See AdCornPhibsPac serial 0068, dated £4 January, 1945. The ships were loaded in conformity with this order and any changes made were approved by the TQMls of both Expeditionary Troops and AdComPhibsPac .

(c) The units comprising the IWO JIMA Garrison Force were scattered over the entire island of OAHU. It was decided to load the ships at piers near the center of the greatest concentration of cargo, thereby eliminating considerable hauling by truck and rail. The majority of the NCB personnel and equipment, was loaded at Iroquois Point, Army Air Corps at the Hickam Dock, and miscellaneous Army units at piers in Honolulu.

5§

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V

ohuhhp

Subject: TQM Report on I¥o JIMA Operation.

(d) The execution of the lifting of the Zero Schelon was coordinated by the TQM, Expeditionary Troops, as follows:

(l) The loading was accomplished "by utilizing loading and unloading details from the NCB rs and other units embarked on each ship. These same troop details which loaded the ships accomplished the unloading.

(2) Transport Quartermaster Control Offices staffed by Garrison Force Headquarters personnel were established at Fort Kara and Pier 28, Honolulu. Thßse officers coordinated and supervised the loading of all ships. Telephone communica.tions were established with the units which were being loaded, and their movement to the piers was closely controlled.

(3) Daily reports on the status of the G-arrison Loading were submitted to the Commander, Administrative Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific.

(4) The Zero Echelon, G-arrison Force was loaded within the scheduled time-, period.

9. RESUPPLY LOADING.

The loading of both the ammunition and maintenance byNresupply ships on the West Coast and OAHU was accomplished Com

12 and the Freight Office, NSD, 14th Naval District, respectively, as requested by the Supply Service, FMF, Pac .

UNLOADING

10. FACTORS AFFZCTING UNLOADING.

(a) See enclosure (ft) for the unloading summary.

(b) The problem of supply and reinforcement at IWO JIM was as difficult as has been encountered in the Central Pacific. The following conditions seriously hampered the unload ing initially:

~ 9

Subject :

«f"J

r* M f

-t::iS^ %

%r*

TQK Report on 170 JIMA Oporation.

(1) The unloading beaches were under heavy artillery ancTmortar fire for the first five days. Shore party personnel suffered heavy casualties during this period and could not operate with full efficiency. Many boats and vehicles were knocked out at' the water's edge, thereby littering the beaches with wreckage. This greatly restricted the unloading points for subsequent landing craft and amphibious vehicles.

(2) The beaches at IVO JIMA were steep and consisted of loose, shifting, volcanic ash. *:7hoeled vehicles, including DUX71 s, boggod down almost as soon as they hit tho beach and this further congested the few unloading points which were not blocked by wreckage. Soon after the initial landings it became necessary to blast clearings through the wreckage on the beach so that prefabricated matting could bo laid for wheeled vehicle exits. Until this was done it was necessary to supply the troops inland with LVTls and M29C's exclusively, they being the only vehicles capable of effectively negotiating the loose sand in the vicinity of the beaches. The heavy traffic later packed the sand until it could be traversed by vehicles without too groat difficulty.

(3) From D/l on, the- surf became heavy and this further hindered tho beaching and unloading of small craft. Many LCVP's and LC^'s were damaged while alongside the transports or were broached in the heavy surf at the beach. This orogressive reduction in the number of landing craft available slowed the unloading operation considerably. At times the conditions of the sea made it necessary to r sort to LST's and LSM's entirely for unloading the transports, this being particularly true during" the later stages of the operation. These landing ships wore not immune from damage and were often inoperative due to being continually

iIMWiACT-^ l^^

Subject: TQM Report on IWO JIMA Operation.

damaged by the heavy seas or enemy action. The LSM's were especially valuable in unloading transports and proved to be the work horses at IWO JIMA.

(c) Despite these severe handicaps the average amount of cargo unloaded from assault shipping daily for the first 12 days exceeded the daily average unloaded" at SAIPAN for the first 11 days ? The daily average unloaded for the first 12 days at IWO JIMA was 6600 short tons while at SAIPAN an average of 6563 short tons was unloaded for 11 days. It should be borne in mind that general unloading did not begin at IWO JIMA until D/ The large amounts6.

of cargo discharged daily at IWO JIMA can be attributed chiefly to the fact that large landing ships were used for unloading most of the transports. LSM's and LST's received cargo from two holds of a transport simultaneously from both port and starboard. LSM!s were not available at SAIPAN for this Durr>ose»

(d) LVT's proved extremely effective for /unloading at IWO JiMA. They supplied the troops nearly 100$ of the time during the difficult period from D-Day to D/5. They prevented beach bottlenecks and by their ability to travel from ship to. front lines greatly reduced the amount of labor involved in handling supplies.

SUMMATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

!!? TRANSPORT DIVISION ORGANIZATION

(a) The new transport division organizations of 4 large APA's, 1 small APA, 1 large AKA, and 1 small AKA has greatly reduced the need of separating Corps Units from their equipment as . had been necessary in some earlier operations. The increased shipping

(

space permits a larger degree of combat unit loading and increases the rate of discharge for an RCT. The present transport squadron organization should be continued.

12. PREFABRICATED BEACH MATTING

(a) Marston matting welded together into 50-foot folding strips provided the only practical means of furnishing wheeled vehicles traction on IWO JIMA." Without this beach matting it is doubtful if most of the wheeled transportation taken to IWO JIMA could have been taken ashore. This matting proved durable and practical in addition to being economical and simple to construct, and next to the bulldozer was the most important item in the construction of roads. It is strongly recommended that ample footage of this

H,

'} $5 V:'\ .-¦ ir ¦<-% I

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Subject: TQM Report on I¥o JIMA Operation.

beach matting be taken on all future amphibious operations to cover the vehicle exits from the water !s edge" to solid ground or a roadway inland.

13. ZERO ECHELON GARRISON FORCE.

(a) It is recommended that the practice of assigning experienced Naval Cargo Officers and winch operators to the ships of the Zero Echelon be continued. They are of great assistance in preparing and executing the loading and unloading plans of the inexperienced Troop TQM's on these ships.

14. RSSUPPLY AMMUNITION SHIPS.

(a) The following recommendations concerning ammunition resupply ships are herewith submitted:

(l) Ammunition Requirements:- In the Marianas operation and the IWO JIMA operation, each

.ammunition resupply ship carried approximately 9 U/F for one Marine Division. These ships have, therefore, carried not only artillery and mortar and other types of ammunition which has been used in abundance, but also small arms ammunition of all types for which there has never been any demand in excess of that brought in the original convoy of APA f s and AKA's. Rather than bring a stated amount of all types of ammunition, it is recommended that at least 12 U/F be brought on the resupply ships consisting of the ammunition experience has dictated is generally required. This would include 37mm,75mm, 105mm and 155mm howitzer, 155mm gun, 8" howitzer, 60mm and 81mm mortar,-4.5" rockets, etc. The specific typos and the amounts of each willbe finally determined upon completion of an analysis of the ammunition expenditures for this and previous operations, and the types of weapons to be employed and the conditions expected to be encountered for the particular operation. Experience

c? %

12

- -

i

/

Subject: TQM Re-oort on IWO JIMA Operation.

has shown that the unloading of critically required resupply ammunition, including the foregoing mentioned types, has been hampered and retarded because of the presence of undesired ammunition also loaded on the same ship. By loading the types of ammunition as suggested, more of the critically needed ammunition can be brought on the resupply ships and this ammunition can be unloaded in greater quantities in a shorter period of time.

*(b) Loading Requirements.

(D AX Type:- In the assault phase 7 U/F for each organization for all types of weapons is landed from a total of some 60 odd ships ? This ammunition is generally unloaded in from one to four days time, 3y the tinre an ammunition resupply ship arrives, the original 7 U/F of artillery and mortar and other similar types have already been expended to a large degree.Therefore, great demands are made for the least possible delay in the unloading of the resupply ship. But it must be borne in mind that the cargo handling gear of one ship is limited in the amount which can be landed in a days time. Fifty to sevent3 r~five tons per hour from all hatches from one ship under combat unloading conditions is about all that can be expected to be unloaded during daylight hours. Therefore, 800 tons per day total ammunition from a resupply ship under ideal conditions is approximately the maximum that can be unloaded. At the rate artillery is expended when all artillery battalions are ashore and firing, the amount that can be unloaded from a

r* resupply ship is insufficient to maintain the desired level of ammunition at the 'gun positions. For this reason one ammunition ship does not appear to be sufficient to meet the demands made upon it.

13

>7S f?J

\

\ ':%Subject:Subject: TQM Report on IW.O JlMAlpp^rat ion. -"¦"¦''.'.:' *SM,— — a _i-

vu (2) The XAK's loaded with ammunition for the

I¥O JIMA operation had 105mm howitzer ammunition in but two out of five hatches; the 155mm howitzer ammunition was also loaded in one of the hatches containing the 105mm- ammunition. The remainder of the ship was loaded with other types of ammunition to the total of 9 U/F for one Marine Division. As the 105mm ammunition was in great demand, most emphasis was placed on unloading it. But as it coyUld only be unloaded from 2 hatches the. maximum rate of discharge that could be expected was approximately 20 tons per hour, which for daylight unloading would amount to no more than 240 tons per day. This amount was insufficient to satisfy the demands of the troops on shore. The amount of 105mm howitzer ammunition unloaded was further reduced when demands were made for 155mm -ammunition• In the future, loading plans of ships must require that the total amounts of the high priority ammunition be loaded in all 5 holds of the ship rather than in one or two hatches as was the case with the I¥o JIMA resupply ships. By so doing the unloading time from one ship can be considerably speed-Ed up. But it should be again emphasized that under conditions of maximum expenditure of ammunition, one resupply AX in the area is not sufficient for a Corps,

(3) LST's or LSM's;- If the beaches at an objective are satisfactory for landing

LST fs or LSM's there would be a great advantage in loading resupply ammunition ' on this type of ship. As 5 or 6 LST s would be equivalent to 1 Victory type AX, (and 3 LSM's equivalent to 1 LST), ammunition could be unloaded_f rom 6 or --more landing ships either LST or LSM in a relatively short time. Even if tho landing ships could not be beached, ammunition could be put ashore by means of

Subject: TQM Repor-&-©ri%&>- JIMA OperatltfH^

» DUKW!s and LVT's in less time than it would take to unload from one AX type ship. In the case where the landing ships could not be beached, LST*s would be preferable to LSM's because it would be possible not only to unload the ammunition directly into amphibious vehicles driven into the tank deck, but also ammunition could be loaded over the side by means of a crane on the top deck.

(4) In the case where one type of ammunition is exceedingly large, that type of ammunition only should be loaded in one landing ship. For example, probably 2 LST's would be required to load the 105mm ammunition in an operation similar to the IWO JIMA operation. In order to enable proper selectivity of all types of ammunition, a minimum number of-different types should be stowed on any one landing ship.

15. LIAISON THROUGHOUT ALL ECHELONS.

(a) The imDortance of conferences between all echo 16ns engaged in planning and executing an operation cannot be overemphasized. Tho conferences and liaison manifest throughout the planning for the IWO JIMA operation induced a high spirit of.cooperation and resulted in an efficient execution of the loading phase of the operation « .

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•

NN (SF)(SF)TT

004444UUAAEE

EETTTT

4343EEAAII

zz00

4646AA

DDSSTT00WW

EE5656AA

LLEEEE

VVRRRR

1010AA

XXCCAA

MMAA

AA1010

XXCCII

8989RRAARR

APA-llAPA-llNN

(F)(F) 00

••SS

SS XXEE CC

APA-19APA-19

SS IfIf.. ss

EE AA

RRAAVV

AA3434

LLII

NN00

NN

PHIPHIEE NN

SS

AA11IIEE RR

AA

BB1212AA

RREETTII

4343PP

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(*)(*)WW

3535LLAA

AALLRRAA

AA9090AA

NN00TTSSNN

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DDNN

LLAA

AA1111 EE

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HH99AA

LLEESS

CCUU

RR 4141

XXRRAA

22VV

Ser#s2Ser#s2

LSTLST477477

S«#s3S«#s3

LSTLST646646 TOTALTOTAL

ENLISTEDENLISTEDOFFICERSOFFICERS

3983986969

17281728102102

6986986565

206206 147614768181

141914196161

16451645 174174 202202 150515059393

15741574 15721572 717717 2582581010

CARGOCARGO LOADEDLOADED (SHORT(SHORT TONS)TONS)

X>ALX>AL EQUIPMENTEQUIPMENTOFFICEOFFICE EQUIFMBHTEQUIFMBHT

10.610.61.21.2 .7.7 .2.2

40.40. 2727 76.276.2*$*$ •8•8

28.128.1.2.2

117117162.2162.2

3LS3LSRATIONSRATIONSWATERWATERPETROLEUMPETROLEUM PRODUCTSPRODUCTS

HIGHHIGH EXPLOSIVESEXPLOSIVES

71.771.7

71.071.02.02.0

U2.0U2.0

70.8170.81

52.552.5

126.2126.2

10.010.0

.0.0

40.040.011

118.1118.1

MM

60.060.0 60.60.

n7n7

.0.0

67.067.0

100.0100.0

.0.0

200.0200.0 61.61.

7070

61.61. 61.0161.01 60.060.0

128.0128.0

260260 270.270. .o*o.o*o2.02.0

0.00.0

.0.0 16.716.7

59:59:

rrO.BO.B

GRANDGRANDTOTALTOTALTOTALTOTAL

TOTALTOTALVEHICLESVEHICLESCARGOCARGO

369.5369.553.853.8

315.7315.7

594.1594.1176.1176.1418.0418.0

509.2509.2149.5149.5359.7359.7

570.7570.7124.2124.2446.5446.5

U5.U5.80.:80.:

365.365.

874.9874.9 noi.6noi.6392.9392.9479.4479.4708.7708.7395.5395.5

661.661.207.3207.3454.2454.2

646.1646.1198.198.447.1447.1

647.2647.2194.3194.3452.9452.9

286.6286.668.568.5

218.1218.1

335.7335.750.050.0285.7285.7

1136.71136.7289.9289.9846.8846.8

1285.61285.6350.41350.41935.2935.2

636.4636.4120.5120.5515.9515.9

576.576.179.179.396.396.

619.619.250.250.

368.368.

279.1279.1112.5112.5166.6166.6

1262.91262.9409.6409.6853.3853.3

1314.1314.483.2|483.2|

831.5831.5

279.5279.5115.0115.0164.5164.5

798.0798.0798.0798.0

825.0825.0825.0825.0

16057.216057.26109.76109.79947.59947.5

VEHICLESVEHICLES LOADEDLOADED (NUMBER)(NUMBER)

ICEICE

AIRAIR COMPRESSORCOMPRESSOR 10$10$ CU.PT.CU.PT.

DBTILLATIOMDBTILLATIOMUNITUNIT

105105MMMMHOWITZERHOWITZER75MM75MMHOWITZERHOWITZER

HALFTRACKHALFTRACK

TRACTORTRACTORMEDIUMMEDIUMMEDIUMMEDIUMMEDIUMMEDIUMTAHKTAHK

SHOVELSHOVELSHOVELSHOVEL 88 CU.YD.CU.YD.

!TOR!TORTRACTORTRACTOR

TV-9TV-9

:rahe:rahe««

¦¦-

TRACTORTRACTOR D-7D-7 'ANGLEDOZER'ANGLEDOZER

TRACTORTRACTORTRACTORTRACTORTRACTORTRACTOR

TRAILERTRAILERTRACTORTRACTOR TD-18TD-18 KANEKANE

1010

TRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTRAILER

1-TOI1-TOI 2-UHEEL2-UHEEL

TBAILERTBAILERTRAILERTRAILER

TRAILERTRAILER

1-TOM1-TOM.-TOR.-TOR.-TOM.-TOM

1«TOM1«TOM

2-iH.DIST.rL.2-iH.DIST.rL.WATERWATER

STKBMSTKBM2-WH2-WH

TRAILERTRAILER 2-TOH2-TOH STKBMSTKBM

TBAILERTBAILER GENERATORGENERATOR 9.49.4 kvakva 1010

TBAILHtTBAILHt

TRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTBAILERTBAILER

6-TOH6-TOHATHEXATHEX2-IHEEL2-IHEEL

750-OALLOM750-OALLOMWATERWATER

TRUCKTRUCKTRDCITRDCI

l-Tcarl-Tcar HECQHNHECQHN110110 1010 nono

THOCKTHOCKTBDCITBDCI

*RB(?^TWf*RB(?^TWfDUMPDUMP 1515 6565

MACHTiraMACHTira SHOPSHOP

TBXKTBXK WELDINGWELDING

TOTALTOTAL JO.JO. VEHICLESVEHICLES 100100 108108 4040 109109 5959 6767 3535 U7U7 2525 1542*1542*

PREPAREDPREPARED BY:BY: TRANSPORTTRANSPORT QUARTERMASTERQUARTERMASTER SECTION,SECTION, HQS.,HQS., EXPEDITIONARYEXPEDITIONARY TROOPS,TROOPS, STHSTH FLEET.FLEET. APPROVEDAPPROVED 18F<18F<

VIVITRANSDIVTRANSDIV 4646 RCTRCT 2626 TRANSDIV 47TRANSDIV 47 RCT t7RCT t7 TRANSDIV 48TRANSDIV 48 RCTRCT 2828

cc AA D AD A D AD A H AH A TT AA R AR A EE AA S AS A IIkk ¦k¦k T AT A ¦A¦A L AL A D AD A SS AA ii11 00XX PP X PX P A PA P 0 P0 P 00 XX U PU P PP A PA P AA ff IXIX A ?A ? IPIP V PV P IPIP TT XX TT XX D ID Icc kk 0 A0 A ft Aft A C AC A LL AA T AT A 00 AA IAIA IIAA Z AZ A L AL A IAIA B AB A C AC A 00 AA HH AA H AH A

9696srsr

IILL

EE 160160LL

K159K159XX

11121121IIHHGG

LLAAHHDD

6464 LL 192192AAII77DD

119119IILLAAIIDDSS

DD19419400TTAALL

104104SSrroollDD

L2ofL2ofAAdd rriiaaAA

SS 2U2U0000LLAA

BB 19719700CCXX

XX 161161IIIISS

6868XXIISS

2222XXIIXX

LSD-:LSD-:

SS LLTT LL00II

1212LSMiLSMi

1919LBT»LBT»

*•*• OTALOTAL

OFFICERSOFFICERS 8585 7474 6565ENLISTEDENLISTED IU7IU7 15321532 LU9LU9 U75U75 U73U73 15271527 157157 247247 476476 67406740

CARGOCARGO LOADEDLOADED (SHORT(SHORT TONS)TONS)

gupgup RoiPMarRoiPMar

ORGAIUATIOIALORGAIUATIOIAL RUIPWMTRUIPWMTorraaorraa duipmiduipmi

6.6.

1/71/7

12.12.

28.828.8 71.71.

20^220^2

31.631.6

.i.i

15.715.7

71.871.8

15J215J2

28.128.1

15.315.3

50.50.

2.22.2

84.2184.21

1313

52.852.8

100.7100.7

ORDHAHCKORDHAHCKKHQUEBRKHQUEBRSKHALSKHALPIPI SDPPLJBSDPPLJB

OTHEROTHER LRDIP6LRDIP6IATERIATEROTHKHOTHKH PPRQLSOMPPRQLSOM PRODUCTSPRODUCTS

PXBOTKHNICSPXBOTKHNICS AM)AM) PDZKSPDZKS

¦ATTAMMOIfITIOB¦ATTAMMOIfITIOB

[SMALL[SMALL ARMSARMSAmnrnrioHAmnrnrioH

.5.556.956.9

73.873.81.71.7

16.816.8

9.:9.:

42.42.

12.812.8.9.9

62.262.2

56^56^28,228,242.642.6sasa.7.7

12.:12.:

5.5.

21.'21.'

U.IU.I81.281.2

.2.2

109.2109.2

133.5133.5.3.3

•7*l•7*l

.0.0

.5.5

4.24.25.35.3

46.246.21.61.6.6.6

12.'12.'

1.21.22.82.8

46^9146^91A,A,

8.18.1

55A55A3.73.7

27.827.8

U.U.22

11.1111.11

69\3i69\3i

6767

27.8'27.8'

.5.523.823.81.31.3

245.2245.2

160.8160.8

8.78.7

2.2.2.2.

20.20.

4.14.119.319.3

31.831.8

2.12.1

l.il.i33

12.712.7

7.7.

168.168. 63.263.2

50.050.0

.0.0

.0.0275.3275.3

.2.2

>282.1>282.1

CHEMICALCHEMICALMEDICALMEDICAL

1.31.3 l.:l.: 23.723.7.1.1

2J,2J,.1.1

.9.97.7.

.5.5 I.'I.' 3.93.9 I*4I*4 l.l. 50JL50JL 90.390.3

TOTALTOTALTOTALTOTAL

VEHICLESVEHICLESCARGOCARGO

233.3233.3376.3376.3 333.333.

105.7105.7UB.lUB.l

120.i120.i389.389.

379.1379.1

1475.71475.7

191.9191.9

335.8335.8161.2161.2299.8299.8

169.7169.7345.1345.1

481.9481.9209.2209.2386.1386.1 U91.6U91.6

IU.IU.

357357

185.0185.0

336.7336.7U6J,U6J,375.2375.2

203.2203.2

284.5284.5430.2430.2

1732.11732.1

118.9118.9

756.6756.6588.6588.6 >7U>7U

259.9259.94176.14176.12970.92970.9

103*2.5103*2.5

12931.112931.1

GRANDGRAND TOTALTOTAL 609.6609.6 462.462. 523.8523.8 510..510.. 1854.81854.8 527.7527.7 461.0461.0 5U.85U.8 1973.51973.5595.3595.3 502.502. 521.7521.7 521.6521.6 487.7487.7 2168.32168.3 875.5875.5 588.6588.6 .3.3 7U7.07U7.0 23273.623273.6

VEHICLESVEHICLES LOADEDLOADED (NUMBER)(NUMBER)

CARTSCARTSAIRAIR COMPRESSOR,COMPRESSOR,

¦TOH¦TOH•TOH•TOH

CU.PTCU.PT3535 3333 3535 3535 330330

TAHDEMTAHDEMelfelfltdltdMotMot S;S;LVTÂLVTÂ

LVTLVTLYI-2LYI-2

iMMiMM--

1212HOWITZERHOWITZERHALFTRACKHALFTRACK

75MM75MMCUHCUHDODIDODIDISTILLATIONDISTILLATION OHnOHnDBTILLATIOHDBTILLATIOHUHITUHIT

75MM75MMMOTORMOTORCARRZALLCARRZALL

TRUCKTRUCK MOUITEDMOUITEDIRANEIRANE

TT ii

TTTT100100

100100

100100

1010

100100t

I I

I

>CTOR>CTOR

'OR'ORTD-18TD-18TRACTORTRACTORHD-10HD-10TRACTORTRACTOR

'crane'craneTP-9,TP-9, 1/1/TRACTORTRACTORTRACTORTRACTORTRACTORTRACTOR

td-:td-:TRACTORTRACTORRECOVERTRECOVERTtAHKtAHKMEDIUMMEDIUMTANKTANKMEDIWMEDIWTAHKTAHK

SCRAPERSCRAPERCRAKECRAKESHOVELSHOVEL

LARGELARGESLEDSSLEDS

!!¦¦

HHlizrlizr111111111111 11

!l!l

h—h—-i-i

1717

22

I

I

CLBAIDCCLBAIDC UHITUHIT1-TOH1-TOHTRAILERTRAILERiHOPiHOPMACE,MACE,'OH'OH

I-TOII-TOI SHOWERSHOWERTRAILERTRAILERTRATRA

WELDDCWELDDC2-TOH2-TOHTRAILSTRAILSSTOCKROOMSTOCKROOM44-WHEEL-WHEEL2-TOH2-TOHTRAILER,TRAILER,

OHOHWATERWATER.-TOM.-TOMTRATRA

1-TOH1-TOHTRAILERTRAILER1-TOM1-TOMTRAILERTRAILER

2-IH.2-IH. STXKROOMSTXKROOMI^TOHI^TOHTRAILERTRAILERlATEIIlATEII FORITICATIOiFORITICATIOi1-TOH1-TOHTRAILERTRAILERLOBRICATIOgLOBRICATIOg1-TOH1-TOHTRAILERTRAILER2-WHEEL2-WHEEL1-TOH1-TOHTRAILERTRAILERFORUICATIOHFORUICATIOHTRAILER,TRAILER, j-TOBj-TOB

TRAILER,TRAILER, i-TOH,i-TOH, CARGOCARGOHD-UHD-UTRACTORTRACTOR

1616

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._._——jj

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1717

!.!.-- 3|3| 1212

j.j. 111515

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!i!i145145

TRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTRAILS*TRAILS*TRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTRAILERTRAILBITRAILBI

AIRAIR COMPHBS3OICOMPHBS3OI2-VHKEL2-VHKELAMPHIBIOOBAMPHIBIOOBDESTILiATIOHDESTILiATIOH PUilPUil

REPAIRREPAIR

11 11

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1-fO*1-fO*RJCOURJCOUl-TMl-TM

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TBXKTBXKHOHOraociraoci

t-TOHt-TOHTROCITROCIGKHKSATORGKHKSATORTRAILERTRAILERPIR£PIR£ PIGBTIMQPIGBTIMQTRAILERTRAILER

1717

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TURKTURKTIOCITIOCITBDCKTBDCK

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HXPADLHXPADLTUCKTUCK

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NO.NO. VEHICLESVEHICLESTOTALTOTAL••

letlet iael«Al*iael«Al* gflßgflß *^*^SUftSUft *b<rr».*b<rr».

165165 7474 172172

ucoi. aura/ucoi. aura/IQH.IQH. PREPARED BY: TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTERPREPARED BY: TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER SECTION, HQ3,SECTION, EXPEDITIONARYHQ3, EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS,TROOPS, STH FLEET.STH FLEET.

rri—l,rri— MB,l,MB,

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EMBARKATIONEMBARKATION OFOF UNITS,UNITS, 3CAC3CAC SHIPSSHIPS

ISTIST CORPSCORPS EVACUATIONEVACUATION HOSPITALHOSPITAL

10DICALBR.,10DICALBR., VACVAC

BTHBTH FIELDFIELD DEPOTDEPOT

SIGNALSIGNAL BN.,BN., VACVAC

OSSOSS BN.BN. (DCL(DCL L.T.L.T. CO)CO) VACVAC

UNITUNIT

2727

NN

AAPPAA6262

BBEERRRRIIEE

TT

RRTTEERREE

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PPAA7070

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616100WW

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LLAADDEENN

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LSTLST788788

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LSTLST806806

Serjj*Serjj*4141

LSTLST760760

Ser.rfSer.rf4242

L3TL3T724724

Ser.i?Ser.i?4343

LSTLST779779

SerJ>SerJ>

LSTLST784784

S*tJS*tJ4545

LSTLST884884

S«r.#S«r.#4646

LSTLST943943

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Ser>Ser>5050

SerJSerJ4949

LSTLST247247

LSTLST792792

Sor.#Sor.#5151

LSTLST222222

9H9H

Ser.#Ser.#5858

LSILSI940940

S*tJS*tJ4747

LSTLST8484

SurJtSurJt4848

ISTIST944944

S«r.#S«r.#5454

LSTLST4242

S«rJS«rJ5555

LSTLST121121

S«rJS«rJ5656

LSTLST224224

S«r.#S«r.#5757

LSTLST641641

S«r.#S«r.#5959

LSTLST790790

S«r.#S«r.#6060

LSTLST809809

LSTLST776776

LSMLSM143143

LSMLSM201201

LSMLSM203203

10/9610/96

'309'309

'U7'U7

20,20,

AALL

TT00TT

SO6THSO6TH GUNGUN BN.BN. (AAA)(AAA)

Eft.&HQ.Eft.&HQ. BTX,BTX, 138138THTH AUAU GROUPGROUP

62RD62RD NAVALNAVAL CONSTRUCTIONCONSTRUCTION BH.BH.

473473RDRD DUCTDUCT COUPARXCOUPARX

274274

590590 --,445,445

15,15,,243,243

10/23010/230 22/46022/460

ISCOHISCOH HEADQUARTERSHEADQUARTERS

604604THTH G.R.G.R. DET.DET. 058058

HQ.HQ. 7TH7TH FITLRFITLR COM.COM. &&15TH15TH GROUPGROUP

COSCOS *A"*A" && "B""B" 23RD23RD NCBNCB

13,13,

•57•57'83'83

'33'33

TyyjTyyj

78TH78TH rnißrniß SQUADRONSQUADRON

47TH47TH PITERPITER SQUADRONSQUADRON2121 '225'225 '225'225

386386THTH SERVICESERVICE GROUPGROUP (AART)(AART)

548548THTH NIGHTNIGHT FITERFITER SQUADRONSQUADRON 738738'20'20

40,140,1

5<5<

568568THTH SIGNALSIGNAL AIRAIR HARNIRGHARNIRG BR.BR.

SIGNALSIGNAL HEADQUARTERS,HEADQUARTERS, AIB,AIB, 7TH7TH 7.C.7.C. ,69!,69!

49TH49TH SIGNALSIGNAL CONSTRUCTIONCONSTRUCTION BR.BR.

726726THTH AIRAIRHARKINGHARKING COUPARXCOUPARX

13,79:13,79:

sAposApo

DET.DET. 362362NDND ORDNANCEORDNANCE COHPARICOHPARI

DET.DET. 44,44, 70TH70TH AACSAACS

223223RDRD RADARRADAR ifcINTENANCEifcINTENANCE

1212 10,10,

'53'53

GROFACGROFAC 1111

G-4,G-4, ARISARIS GARRISONGARRISON UNITSUNITS

GARRISONGARRISON BEACHBEACH PARTIPARTI

261261

309309

27,19427,194

309309

26;26;

PORTPORT DIRECTORDIRECTOR

38TH38TH FIELDFIELD HOSPITALHOSPITAL

COMMUNICATIONCOMMUNICATION UNITUNIT 434434

255255 438438 ?0,C?6?0,C?6,389,389

9090

FROV.FROV. AIRAIR SUPPORTSUPPORT GROUPGROUP

BOICBOIC DISPOSALDISPOSAL COUPANXCOUPANX

I.B'I.B'

1£1£

10.7:10.7:5555

CIVILCIVILARABSARABS 563563 10,10,

P-4P-4 UNITSUNITS 5252 3333 ,420,420

CO.CO. "B""B" RiCONRiCON BH.BH. 2,1.2,1.

NAVINAVIBEACHLASTERBEACHLASTER

Kill,Kill,FtfFtf,,PACPAC

1818

1010 1010

9}.«W9}.«W BTX,BTX, 483483RDRD AUAU AIAI81.81.

2ND2ND SEPARATESEPARATE ENGINEERENGINEER BR.BR.

2ND2ND 155W155W HOWITZERHOWITZER BR.BR.

4TB4TB 155HH155HH HOWITZERHOWITZER BR.BR.

••70Tn70Tn NAVALNAVALCONSTRUCTIONCONSTRUCTION BR.BR.

U.S.U.S. NAVYNAVY AIJLIUNITIONAIJLIUNITION (H.E.)(H.E.)280280 280280 2,2802,280 2,2802,280 2,2502,250 22002200 3,3003,300

50,300150,30011212 '2'2

;o;oii7722ii

'250'250nn

1212 '250'2505S5S ,409,4091?,1?,

25i25i

,950,950 ,300,300

72,19372,19315/35015/350

,800,800 ,800,800 GOOGOO ,9501,9501

5757

13,13,

,800,800LLBOOBOO

3232 '741'741

36/75036/750

750750

AYIATH*AYIATH*OAHRI3OIOAHRI3OI

-D--D- BTX,BTX,48384838DDAUAUARAR 81.81.

"A""A" &&"C"C BTX,BTX, 48584858DDAUAU AffAffBR.BR.13,13,

51.51.16,16,58,92958,929

ROTESROTES >>

TOTALTOTAL

••ToTo bebe dischargeddischarged atat SAIPAR.SAIPAR.••••PersonnelPersonnel andand CargoCargo forfor thisthis xmitxmit

includedincluded inin figuresfigures shownshown forfor thethe386386ththServiceService GroupGroup underunder sanssans LST.LST.

54,54,77,99177,99162,12762,127 55,84955,849CU.FT.CU.FT.7171 585585 25,25, '447'447 101/5'101/5''699'699ISONNELISONNEL

BY:BY: TRANSPORTTRANSPORTPREPAREDPREPARED

221,1(221,1(60,06460,064 185,'185,' 190,2:190,2:183,183,78,78,9/1659/165ID/103ID/10310/U910/U9 30/l<30/l<70/69670/696

STHSTHTROOPS,TROOPS,SECTION,SECTION, HQS.,HQS., EXPEDITIONARYEXPEDITIONARYQUARTERMASTERQUARTERMASTER

575767.27667.27674,77174,77171,9971,9973,99373,993EL,401EL,401 62.71662.71667,04367,04361,36!61,36!63,05463,05459,15559,15558,4<58,4<59,72959,72950,30050,30058,24558,24510j10j12,12,1212 '2T.0'2T.0'351'35115,15,15,15, '350'350'230'2302/2502/25015/25115/25112/25012/250 12/^5O12/^5O12/2;12/2;W/250W/25012/25012/250 12/25012/250

FLEET.FLEET.

16,16,

CHARLESCHARLES S.S. TRACY,TRACY, //LtCol,LtCol, USMCR,USMCR,

TransportTransport Quartermaster.Quartermaster.

10,10,

*~*~ DUDXEX'9!,DUDXEX'9!, BROWKBROWK,,Colonel,Colonel, USIX,USIX,ChiefChief ofof Staff.Staff.

2,553,6742,553,674.0017.0017

t #

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