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EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014
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EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

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Page 1: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICYIN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS

Coen Teulings

University of Cambridge

Presentation OECD Paris

14 Februari 2014

Page 2: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Introduction

Employment at this stage of European history

Based on my previous CPB experience Minimum wages? EPL? Wage subsidies?

?

Page 3: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Introduction

Employment at this stage of European history

Based on my previous CPB experience Minimum wages? EPL? Wage subsidies?

Page 4: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Introduction

Employment at this stage of European history

Based on my previous CPB experience Minimum wages? EPL? Wage subsidies? Housing and macro policy On-going research

Page 5: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts2. Theory framework3. Outline of the model4. Policy experiment5. The 10 commandments

Page 6: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts2. Theory framework3. Outline of the model4. Policy experiment5. The 10 commandments

Page 7: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

The effect of Financial Crises

15 cases (Reinhart & Rogoff)Peak to Trough (%)

Duration (years)

Income per head -9 1.9

Unemployment 7 4.8

House prices -36 6.0

Stock prices -56 3.4

Sovereign debt 86 3.0

Page 8: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

GDP effect largely permanent

Sweden Finland

Hong Kong, Indonesia

Page 9: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

House price slumps

Benetrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke

Page 10: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Anecdotical Evidence on Europe House price decline ↔ Unemployment

Small decline: Ger, Swe, Nl (till 2010) Strong decline: Esp, Ire, UK, Denmark, Nl (since

2010) Denmark and Nl high mortgage debt, unemployment

Spain 25% males work in construction fall in human capital

Current account since 2002 Surpluses: Ger, Swe, Denmark, Nl, Austria, Finland Deficits: UK, Gre, Esp, Por

Page 11: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

House prices

Page 12: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Unemployment

Page 13: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Sovereign debt interest rate

Page 14: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

House price overvalued?

Page 15: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

House prices, wealth, employmentMian & Sufi

Page 16: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Decomposition of demand

Page 17: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Fiscal multiplier

Page 18: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts2. Theory framework3. Outline of the model4. Policy experiment5. The 10 commandments

Page 19: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

House price decline =Wealth transfer between generations

High house prices Good for current generation: wealthier Bad for future generation: must buy expensive houses

Hence: fall in house prices = wealth transfer Large! 30% decline = 60% of GDP

= 80% of sovereign debt Balance budget reduction in tax deductibility

= intergenerational wealth transfer Value of housing captures NPV deductibility

Page 20: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Saving response

Take a real, not a financial view of saving

What is saving in a small open economy? Export more! Shift of employment from domestic to

tradable

Page 21: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Keynes or Friedman?

Paradoxical situation Only current income matters?

House price decline would be irrelevant

Argument relies on Permanent Income Hypothesis

Can we do macro without rigid prices? Would be much simpler! It turns out we cannot

Page 22: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts2. Theory framework3. Outline of the model4. Policy experiment5. The 10 commandments

Page 23: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Structure of Economy Overlapping generations model Blanchard-

Yaari Workers die at fixed rate 2. 5%, new cohorts enter

Once and for all shock, perfect foresight after 5 industries + share in consumption

Tradable 20% Domestic 25% Informal 25% Construction/Land 5% Government 25%

Cobb Douglas utility Both inter-temporal and across commodities Hence: constant gross consumption shares over

lifetime

Page 24: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Unemployment

Workers enter unemployed Industry specific human capital Switching industries requires

unemployment 2-5 years period

No congestion effects Runs counter to empirical evidence

Page 25: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Labour reallocation

If wages are flexible Hiring industries pay full wage Non-hiring industries pay lower, clearing wage

downsizing by retirement Firing industries pay lower bound wage

firing = quitting unemployment = good limit to wage reductions, though at low levels: 50% fall

If wages are inflexible Wage determined by competitiveness on global

market Drop in industry demand? Firing workers

firing ≠ quitting unemployment = bad

Page 26: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Government

Pays interest on debt 1.5% Pays its civil servants (Pays mortgage subsidy) Collects consumption tax

VAT … but also income tax: pension contributions are

tax exempt Policy instrument: future taxes

We assume an exponential path back to LR equilibrium

Hence: Model = system of linear differential equations … if there is no construction (housing is only land)

Page 27: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

What not?

Apart from housing, no capital Constant interest rate

Hence: no sovereign debt crisis No financial intermediation No uncertainty / precautionary saving No bequest motive More general: no behavioural issues Perfectly elastic demand for tradable

Page 28: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts2. Theory framework3. Outline of the model4. Policy experiment5. The 10 commandments

Page 29: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Policy experiment

Start from a steady equilibrium Applies to the Netherlands (?) … but not to Spain (excess construction, bubble) … and Denmark (overheating?) … Germany (catching up due to labour market

reform) Shock to productivity ↓and debt↑ (e.g. 10%)

Hence: excess housing (e.g. 5%) Policy response, fully credible Perfect foresight of adjustment path

Page 30: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

What policy response?

No response = No option: higher interest Raise taxes to cover only higher interest?

Optimal from tax smoothing perspective Sovereign debt becomes random walk Increases vulnerability for future shocks

Hence: recovery of old public debt level 60%? Temporarily higher taxes, converging to steady

state Question however: at what speed?

Risk of (too much) overshooting

Page 31: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Phases in adjustment processTypical adjustment process

1.Initial non-hiring/firing in domestic (construction?)

Firing only under wage inflexibility Accelerator mechanism

2.Substitution to informal industry due to high tax3.Domestic starts rehiring4.Construction starts rehiring

Page 32: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Effect on wealth and consumption Human capital current generation falls

1. Lower wages in non-hiring industries2. Unemployment

Financial capital falls due to house prices Hence: permanently lower consumption

Retirement + interest rate = 4% Fits wealth effect of 4 cents per euro

New generations gross consumption unaffected

Conditional on tax policy Consumption effect lasts long

Unemployment effect not

Page 33: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Implications for debt and deficit

Higher taxes reduce wealth current generation

… and induce inter-temporal substitution Hence: aggregate consumption postponed Leads to employment shift to tradable

… which reduces value of human capital … and hence current consumption ... and house prices, hence consumption

Short run effect on deficit is negative Might even be negative? Open research question Fits multiplier studies Auerbach & Gorodnichenko

Page 34: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Welfare evaluation

Optimal fiscal policy = setting wealth distribution between generations

Market is efficient Hence, postponing hurts future generations? Might be false: taxation leads to distortions

Temporary overshooting Inefficient unemployment instead of retirement Substitution to informal sector

All depends crucially on degree of wage flexibility

Assuming wage flexibility contradicts empirical evidence

Page 35: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Other things

Tax treatment mortgage interest: balance budget reform makes

things worse! Same applies to NPV of market distortions

Italy … and in the future Germany?

Bubbles? Lead to excess consumption Adjustment unavoidable Critical role trade balance Also bubble adjustment can be overshooting

Page 36: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

Overview of the talk

1. Stylized facts2. Theory framework3. Outline of the model4. Policy experiment5. The 10 commandments

Page 37: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

The 10 Commandments (I)

1. House price decline = intergenerational wealth transfer (large!)

2. House price variability, not level is main concern

3. Reduction sovereign debt = substitute, not complement

4. Adequate response fiscal policy: intergenerational insurance

5. Requires long run stance fiscal policy

Page 38: EMPLOYMENT AND MACRO POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS Coen Teulings University of Cambridge Presentation OECD Paris 14 Februari 2014.

The 10 Commandments (II)

1. House price decline = intergenerational wealth transfer

2. House price variability, not level is main concern

3. Reduction sovereign debt = substitute, not complement

4. Adequate response fiscal policy: intergenerational insurance

5. Requires long run stance fiscal policy

6. Shock therapy likely to be counterproductive

7. Maybe adverse short run response budget deficit

8. Hence: budget deficit=wrong control variable

9. Hence: EU regulatory framework inadequate role output gap

10. Applies also to product market reforms