Employment and Livelihoods of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo

Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration Vol. 4, No. 1

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Editorial Board

Evan Easton-Calabria and Nina Elizabeth Weaver

Co-Editors-in-Chief

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Debora Gonzalez and Jenny Barrett

Academic Editors

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Evan Easton-Calabria and Roxani Roushas

Policy Editors

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Nath Gbikpi and Katherine Rehberg

Law Editors

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Evan Easton-Calabria

Field Editor

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Nina Elizabeth Weaver

Firsthand Editor

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Graphic designs by Bernd Bauerochse

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed by authors in OxMo do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Edi-

tors. As we are an independent student publication, articles published in OxMo do not represent

the views of the Refugee Studies Centre or the University of Oxford.

Copyright for articles published in OxMo rests with the author(s). Materials may be downloaded,

reproduced and circulated in entirety provided that the title, author and source (OxMo) is

acknowledged.

For more information about OxMo visit our website: www.oxmofm.com


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Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration

Volume 4, Number 1

May 2014

Table of Contents

Editorial

EVAN EASTON-CALABRIA AND NINA ELIZABETH WEAVER 4

Academic Articles

Temporality of Place: Reframing Approaches to Internal Displacement 7

SARAH E. FREEMAN

The one billion ‘climate refugees’ that never was: INGOs and the human

rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement 17

YVONNE YANYUN SU

Policy Monitor

The State of Exception and Legal Ambiguity: The Kenyan Forced

Encampment Directive for Urban Refugees 28

SINMI AKIN-AINA

When Politics Dictates Persecution: The Danger of ‘Safe Lists’ 34

AINSLIE AVERY

Religious Plurality and the Politics of Representation in Refugee Camps:

Accounting for the Lived Experiences of Syrian Refugees Living in Zaatari 37

KAT EGHDAMIAN

Law Monitor

Repatriation of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Voluntary? 42

VALENTINA HIEGEMANN

The Deficiencies of UNHCR’s RSD Procedure: the Case of Choucha

Refugee Camp in Tunisia 46

RICARDA ROESCH, GIULIA JACOVELLA, ANNALISA BEZZI,

AND JULIETTE GARMS

Field Monitor

Employment and Livelihoods of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo 51

BENJAMIN PETRINI

Firsthand Monitor

Firsthand Experiences of a LGBTQI Asylum Seeker in Uganda 57

ANONYMOUS

Call for Papers for OxMo Vol 4, No 2 58


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EDITORIAL

As a student-run monitor publishing the work of students and recent graduates, OxMo is a unique plat-form for international young academics to share articles and engage in transnational dialogues on forced migration. This issue marks the fourth consecutive year of publication and the first edition by the 2014 ed-itorial team. We are excited that a main aspiration for this year's monitor has already been actualised: di-verse themes and foci from authors in a variety of locations across the globe. We hope that further issues will continue to feature diverse voices, as well. Since the last issue of OxMo was published, a variety of events in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East have increased the number of forced migrants in the world. A new displacement crisis emerged in South Sudan in mid-December 2013, which has resulted in more than one million people displaced and left 4.9 million in need of humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 2014); meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Syria has now displaced over 9 million people (World Vision 2014). For both of these situations, it is impossible to ascertain when and if these displaced people will be able to return to their country of origin, and how many will face protracted situations of displacement. Protracted displacement is clearly not new in the field of forced migration, and proposals to address it by minimising the gap between development and relief continue to pose both theoretical and practical chal-lenges. However, the past months have seen the creation of new initiatives such as The Solutions Alliance, which met in Copenhagen in April 2014 to discuss possible solutions to protracted displacement, bringing together UN agencies, humanitarian and development organisations, academics, and government repre-sentatives. Such initiatives emphasise the ongoing commitment by the international community to focus attention on some of the world's most vulnerable populations through new tools and partnerships. Several articles in this issue of OxMo address themes and concepts relevant to the current events discussed above, demonstrating that young academics are doing noteworthy work on forced migration and have key insights on a wide range of issues. Foci of articles here include refugee policies in Canada and Kenya, the need for greater attention to particular groups of forced migrants including IDPs, religious, and sexual mi-norities and transitions from relief aid to development aid in protracted situations. This issue opens with our Academic Section and an article by Sarah Freeman discussing the failure of the current IDP model to address the complexities inherent to the situation of IDPs. Through analysis of the ‘relief-development continuum’, Freeman finds divisions within responses that ultimately hinder the needs of displaced popu-lations including IDPs after the emergency phases of flight. Our second academic article by Yvonne Yanyun Su discusses the important role of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in shaping the human rights dimension of climate change-induced displacement, contrary to a common neg-ative perception of INGOs as unnecessarily alarmist. The Policy Monitor features three articles, opening with Sinmi Akin-Aina’s article on the Kenyan Forced Encampment Directive for Urban Refugees. Analysing the directive and recent events in Kenya through the lens of Giorgio Agamben’s ‘state of exception’, Akin-Aina finds this to be a useful concept to discuss the government of Kenya’s response to urban refugees. The article that follows by Ainslie Avery discusses the role of Canada’s ‘safe lists’ in perpetuating a non-entrée refugee regime dictated by political and trade in-terests instead of refugee rights. The final policy article by Kat Eghdamian focuses on the recent refugee crisis in Syria and the lack of acknowledgement of religious plurality in Syrian refugees living in the Zaa-tari refugee camp in Jordan. Each of these articles take novel approaches to address the discrimination and underrepresentation faced by these groups. In the Law Monitor, the authors address the legal procedures surrounding Refugee Status Determination processes and repatriation programmes. In the first article, authors Ricarda Roesch, Giulia Jacovella, An-nalisa Bezzi, and Juliette Garms analyse the adherence of UNHCR to its own Refugee Status Determina-tion procedural standards in the Choucha refugee camp in Tunisia, arguing for a need to reform the ap-peals procedure and increase monitoring and assessment of UNHCR’s performance. Their assessment of RSD implementation in the Choucha camp raises concerns about the protection of asylum-seeker rights to security and confidentiality of personal information, as well as applicants’ access to fair complaints proce-dures and due process for asylum cases. In the second law article, Valentina Hiegemann draws out legal concerns about violation of the international principle of non-refoulement in the UNHCR-led voluntary repatriation efforts for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, citing the dire need for discussion around the proba-bility of forced return in this context. Both of these articles advocate for ongoing examination of the imple-mentation and validity of widely accepted legal practices as well as initiatives striving for durable solu-tions, demonstrating the importance of institutional accountability in various settings.


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In the Field Monitor, the penultimate section of this issue, Benjamin Petrini draws on fieldwork conducted in 2010 with Sudanese refugees in Cairo, describing their daily challenges and the legal and social frame-works providing them with both barriers and access to support. In particular, when compared with the sit-uation of Sudanese refugees in Cairo today, he finds little change from 2010, citing the need to shift from relief to development aid for this population, and support livelihoods creation in particular. Our final section of this issue is the Firsthand Monitor, featuring the firsthand account of an anonymous transgender Rwandan refugee currently living in Uganda. We are humbled by and grateful to the author for sharing their story while living in a situation of fear and intense LGBTI discrimination. We hope this piece fosters reflection and a renewed commitment by our readership to address the situation of vulnera-ble populations, forced migrant and otherwise. Presented together, the articles in this issue of OxMo concentrate on both emergency and protracted situa-tions of displacement for a variety of populations including LGBTI refugees and IDPs. The innovative use of philosopher Giorgio Agamben and the presence of firsthand fieldwork represent two of the myriad ways in which to address forced migration. Multiple examinations of UNHCR and government policies are valu-able contributions to promoting wider legal accountability and reform. We would like to thank our authors and fellow editors for helping create this issue of OxMo. It was compiled across continents and contains work by authors who are nationals from diverse parts of the world, ranging from Nigeria to Rwanda to Venezuela; it is our hope that these articles will be read and shared just as widely. Evan Easton-Calabria & Nina Elizabeth Weaver Co-Editors-in-Chief Oxford, May 2014


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—Academic Articles—


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Temporality of Place: Reframing Approaches to Internal Displacement

By Sarah E. Freeman

Millions of internally displaced people (IDPs) remain trapped in situations of pro-tracted displacement, unable to return to their homes and left without ‘durable solutions.’ Without a binding global mandate for IDPs, a relatively new focus within the international community, how do organisations respond to protracted IDP situations and are such approaches effective? This paper explores these ques-tions, demonstrating how the model for IDP responses replicates historical trends in refugee policy and ultimately fails to address the complexity unique to IDP populations as a result. To do so, the article traces the construction and use of the ‘relief-development continuum’ within refugee policy over time and outlines how that continuum is reproduced in situations of internal displacement. My analysis suggests that the assistance structure in place for IDPs perpetuates a division be-tween emergency response and development that prevents the long-term needs of such populations from being addressed.

Introduction

Many scholars have highlighted that internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often dependent on aid, unable to return to their homes, left in the hands of governments who may lack the capacity and/or will to assist adequately, and trapped in a debilitated and economically stagnant society due to re-gional conflict and protracted displacement (Cohen and Deng 1998; Ferris, Mooney and Stark 2012; Ferris and Halff 2011; Cohen 2009; UNHCR and Brookings 2007). Already almost tripling the num-ber of refugees in the world today (IDMC 2014), IDPs have become a new focus for the international community in the past decade. As the nature of conflict today becomes increasingly intrastate and wrought with civilian casualties, IDPs displaced by such conflict—the focus of this paper—are a major population of concern within the field of forced migration and could soon become the principal popu-lation to be served by international aid structures.

Yet, despite this refocus toward internal displacement, there is still no global, legally binding framework for IDPs and very little consensus as to when internal displacement ‘ends.’ In not crossing an international border, IDPs remain the responsibility of their home country, with no legal mandate for protection by international actors (in contrast to the protection of refugees under the 1951 Con-vention). How is the international community, therefore, responding to IDPs displaced by armed conflict? How do existing responses change over time, as the nature of displacement becomes pro-tracted1 in many cases? Is a new model required to adequately address the unique needs of IDPs?

In this paper, I argue that the way in which the assistance structure for conflict-induced IDP popu-lations is conceptualised perpetuates a division between emergency response and long-term develop-ment that has been identified in refugee policy for decades. In contrast to refugee situations, within the context of internal displacement, humanitarian aid cannot act on the periphery of states, nor can it avoid being tied to the state within which displacement occurs. IDPs are often confined within the conflict that they are trying to escape, creating an unattractive donor landscape and complex set of needs on the ground. The current framework for response, which treats IDPs as a strictly humanitari-an problem, masks such a nuanced reality, leaving the long-term needs of IDPs in protracted situa-tions unaddressed.

To demonstrate this, I outline how international responses to IDPs mimic models of refugee assis-tance and fail to take into account the complexity unique to IDP populations. I trace both the con-struction and use of the ‘relief-development continuum’ within refugee policy over time. I demon-strate how this temporal paradigm not only fails—and will continue to fail—to address the long-term needs of IDPs, but also, how it reproduces a bifurcated assistance structure within situations of inter-nal displacement. I will critique the framing and consequent discourse that inform the way in which assistance is structured. In addition, I will highlight the problematic implications of this discourse within such complex contexts and on the individuals within them. As a case study, I explore the

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1The definition of ‘protracted’ in the context of IDP situations should be understood as such: ‘Protracted IDP situations are those in which: 1) the process for finding durable solutions is stalled, and/or 2) IDPs are marginalised as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights’ (UNHCR and Brookings 2007: 2).


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cluster approach in Northern Uganda—one of four roll-out countries for IDP response—where I conducted personal interviews with UNHCR and UNOCHA field staff in 2011.

Throughout this paper, the terms ‘relief’, ‘emergency response’, and ‘humanitarian assistance’ are all used to signify short-term responses to conflict and complex emergencies. ‘Development’ here is used to describe more long-term organisational responses, typically implemented in ‘post-conflict’ settings. How these phases (fail to) overlap and attempts to integrate the two in both theory and practice are the subject of this paper. In addition, I use the term ‘continuum’ in both a theoretical and historical sense. Theoreti-cally, the continuum aims to link emergency response, rehabilitation, and long-term development within one continuous process, mirroring the trajectory from war to peace. In practice, however, such a continu-um—as I trace in this paper—fails to be continuous at all; it remains bifurcated, relief on one end and de-velopment on the other.

Trends in Refugee Policy

The traditional paradigm for IDP protection and assistance has been adapted from refugee crisis response models, and constitutes an extension of the well-established UNHCR mandate for refugee assistance. As posited by Jeff Crisp (2001) and Joanna Macrae (1999), despite varied and decade-long attempts to link relief and development to better assist refugees, frameworks developed in the past often failed in practice.

The concept of ‘clean aid’: a division solidified

The concept of ‘clean aid’ provides the foundation of logic upon which the patterns of aid for refugee assis-tance have been built. Such logic provides one explanation for why the relief-development continuum re-mains broken and also speaks to why the phenomenon repeats itself in situations of internal displacement. What I call ‘clean aid’ can be interpreted, most simply, as mechanisms of assistance that attempt to avoid contributing to conflict and/or human rights abuses. In situations of displacement as a result of armed conflict, ‘clean aid’ denotes the support of programmes that are self-contained, often isolated entities, that allow agencies to avoid the (often corrupt) state and other armed actors in an attempt to prevent contrib-uting to human rights violations, corruption, and the propulsion of conflict.

Refugee assistance during the 1970s and early 1980s was shaped by this phenomenon, taking the form of self-contained refugee settlements, and to a more limited degree repatriation programmes, which al-lowed aid to be funnelled to visible entities independent of the host country (Harrell-Bond 1986; Crisp 2001; Duffield 1994). UNHCR did not become involved in reintegration activities, nor was it encouraged to do so by donors, until the 1990s (Crisp 2001).

Towards the end of and following the Cold War, however, there was a greater willingness by and ac-ceptance of the West’s involvement in other states’ affairs and a softening of traditional understandings of sovereignty (Clapham 1996; Macrae 1999). Cross-border operations increased, allowing agencies to direct-ly engage in conflict zones and opening the humanitarian space substantially (Duffield 1994). As a result, the late 1980s and 1990s witnessed a growth of humanitarian presence and interventions. Simultaneously, funding for development declined significantly while relief aid had been on the rise since the 1980s (Duffield 1994), demonstrating the tendency for donors to shy away from the greater economic condition-alities of development and push towards ‘clean aid.’

After the Cold War, however, political support for the aid enterprise as a whole saw a sharp decline. Aid for refugee programming was no longer self-evident to donors with the significant rise in the rate of refu-gee returns in the 1990s. Although relief was favoured both politically and economically, the operational limitations and likelihood of conflict propulsion by relief agencies acting in war torn contexts were also apparent, especially with the expansion of cross-border interventions (Macrae 1999; Harrell-Bond 1986).

Linkage as a solution: creation of the ‘continuum model’

The idea that assistance can play a role in the prevention of conflict, mainly through the linkage of relief and development, became the new justification for the continuation of aid for refugee assistance. Conflict was seen as a ‘transitory setback’ (Duffield 1994) in the larger development process, with underdevelop-ment considered the primary driver of conflict itself (Duffield 1994; Duffield 1999; Ross et al. 1994; Macrae 1999; Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). If assistance can tackle underdevelopment from the start by laying the foundation for development efforts, so the story goes, then future conflict can be pre-vented.

Within this model, relief is delivered during conflict on the assumption that there is no sufficient state structure to provide services for affected populations. Development only enters post-conflict, after the re-institution of a legitimate state structure and peace. Such a model ties relief and development together temporally, using the level of violence and the sovereignty of a state (judged by the international commu-nity) as a marker for when each phase of assistance should be implemented. Within the context of refugee


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policy, a successful relief-development continuum has been posited since the 1980s as a solution to pro-tracted displacement (Betts 2004). This still provides the conceptual model upon which structures of aid for displaced populations are built.

Nevertheless, attempts to implement hybrid models integrating development approaches into relief programming from the start failed and continue to fail due to a division in funding structures. In the late 1970s and 1980s, UNHCR promoted what they called the ‘refugee aid and development approach.’ This strategy aimed for a quicker path towards ‘self-sufficiency’ through the implementation of development-oriented relief programmes. Whereas the former model focused on self-contained entities, ‘refugee aid and development’ placed emphasis on refugees and host communities in refugee-populated areas (Crisp 2001). Despite the good intentions of integrating development mechanisms into relief programming, mirroring the relief development continuum, the programme largely failed due to a lack of funding and donor inter-est (Crisp 2001; Loescher 2001). Thus, UNHCR was left in need of a new approach to attract support for its programmes. This resulted in a new framing of refugee policy that coincided with similar shifts in inter-national aid.

Continuum revisited: A ‘new aid orthodoxy’

The decline of political support for aid more broadly—previously used as a tool to underpin political inter-ests—following the Cold War, placed the international aid community on the defensive. The consequent ‘new aid orthodoxy’ (Macrae 1999, 2001) was constructed on the premise that a comprehensive plan for relief would prevent future conflict from occurring in that region, relying on the assumption that conflict is a hazard derived primarily from ‘underdevelopment’ (Macrae 2001; Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994; Duffield 1994; Duffield 1999; Seaman 1994; Ross et al. 1994). Such an orthodoxy was adopted by donors, the UN, and NGOs in the late 1990s and utilised two key tenets: ‘first, that aid can and should play a role in the management of conflict; second, that it can achieve this by applying more developmental approach-es to the delivery of aid in conflict-affected areas’ (Macrae 2001: 154). This hybrid approach represented a break from the ‘clean aid’ paradigm and, consequently, proved difficult to fund successfully.

Changes in refugee policy reflected this ‘new aid orthodoxy,’ and once again tried to bridge the gap be-tween short-term and long-term assistance. In the mid-1990s, UNHCR expanded its scope beyond its tra-ditional focus on refugee assistance and became a much more broad-based humanitarian agency. Policy was reoriented toward reintegration of refugees to foster sustainable development and, consequently, con-flict prevention, reflecting a broader ‘aid as peacebuilder’ narrative (Crisp 2001; Macrae 1999). The new programme had some successes: increased voluntary repatriation, stronger human rights protections, and greater incentives for and support of livelihood formation. On the whole, however, such programmes nei-ther fulfilled expectations of sustainability nor provided a bridge to rehabilitation and development (UNHCR 1997).

Theories of international crisis response typically categorise the gaps in the continuum in the following ways: lack of coordination and differing mandates (institutional); influence of donor funding (financial); and lack of community participation in such programmes (Crisp 2001; Macrae 1999; Jackson 1990). As described here, there have been many efforts to address such gaps, yet improvements primarily focus on coordination. Managerial adjustments and technocratic analysis only engage the issue on the surface level, however; the underlying assumption that the relief-development divide can be bridged by addressing tech-nocratic failures of coordination and communication fails to address the deeper disjunction between the two phases (Macrae 1999, 2001).

The ‘post-conflict’ problem

In the late 1990s, UNHCR once again reoriented its policy, abandoning ‘returnee aid and development’ and replacing it with the ‘Brookings Process’ (UNHCR 2010). Another attempt to bridge the gap between relief and development by the agency, the Brookings approach aimed to facilitate coordination and in-crease funding by framing aid and development as ‘post-conflict reintegration’ (UNHCR 2000; Crisp 2001). The ‘post-conflict’ label is misleading, however, as conflict is rarely over in these situations. Moreo-ver, the assumption upon which this label rests—that a political transition is possible and results in a sov-ereign state with legitimate authority and recognised to be competent by the international community—is often not realistic (Macrae 1999; Moore 2000). Despite many states’ inability or lack of will to adequately protect their own displaced citizens, UNHCR ‘must [still] adhere to the principle of unconditional respect for national sovereignty, and assume that the state will be the legitimate and competent body for reinte-gration planning’ (Macrae 1999: 15).

Whilst trying to bring new life to the continuum, the Brookings Process did the opposite. By emphasis-ing the ‘post-conflict’ nature of assistance, the temporal division between the two phases was only rein-forced, creating a conflict/post-conflict binary that required two distinct phases of assistance: relief and development. Moreover, the sharp division in donor support for each phase further prevented a bridging


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of the relief-development divide. Although the term ‘post-conflict’ can aptly describe certain select con-texts, it generally obscures the more complex nature of conflict on the ground and can be used as an ex-cuse by the international community to relinquish their responsibilities (Moore 2000). Use of the term, rather than providing incentive to bridge the phases as intended, strengthens the distinction and temporal difference between them based on overly simplistic measures of conflict. Such usage not only has the po-tential to solidify an assistance structure built within a problematic discursive framework, but also (in simply identifying a division), reaffirms a bifurcated continuum inadequate for the contexts in which it is applied.

Yet, the ‘relief-development continuum’ remains a pervasive model upon which the evolution of refugee assistance programmes has been built since the 1970s. The model maintains that relief, delivered in re-sponse to emergency situations, transitions to rehabilitation and then to development as time goes on. As Macrae posits, such temporal shifts in aid corresponded to a shifting political situation, marked by a tran-sition from war to interim government to peace and elections in the late 1980s and 1990s (Macrae 1999). Today, the same continuum exists, although it has been reconceptualised as a transition from conflict to post-conflict, driven by the use of the term ‘post-conflict’ as rhetoric to attract donor funding for more hy-brid models in the 1990s. The shift from conflict to post-conflict relies on a declaration that the conflict is over by the international community or government of the state itself, whether violence has ended or not. The term ‘post-conflict’ is then employed to make it seem as though peace has been restored, that donors no longer have the opportunity to become implicated in conflict. Conflict, however, has taken on much broader definitions within the past decade. Arguably, in many situations of protracted displacement, con-flict is not over; it has just changed in nature and scope.

IDPs: Reproducing the ‘Relief-Development Continuum’

The tendency for protracted IDP situations to be viewed from a relief-oriented perspective, reifying the relief-development binary and preventing long-term needs from being addressed, is evident within the structure of IDP assistance itself. Within conflict-induced IDP and refugee situations, the cluster approach was created in 2005 and launched in 2006, ‘to strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capaci-ty to respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring that there is predictable leadership and accounta-bility in all the main sectors or areas of humanitarian response’ (IASC 2006b: 2; Morris 2006). The cluster approach was implemented in four ‘roll-out countries’ (DRC, Liberia, Somalia, and Uganda) in order to test the success of this new assistance structure on the ground (IASC 2006).

Although the cluster approach was designed as strictly a humanitarian structure, it does attempt to in-tegrate transitional elements into responses to IDPs. In addition to the existence of an Early Recovery Cluster, ‘Sector leads are responsible for ensuring the necessary shift in programming as priorities move from emergency relief to longer-term recovery and development. All sectoral groups should include early recovery strategies’ (IASC 2006b: 7). An emphasis on early recovery will, in theory, set the stage for a suc-cessful transition to long-term solutions (UNHCR 2010). In Northern Uganda, however, although such an approach improved agency coordination and the delivery of emergency services, it remained a strictly hu-manitarian mechanism and failed to facilitate adequate transition in practice.

In Northern Uganda, the humanitarian response or ‘emergency phase’ of assistance was coordinated using this new cluster approach. In order to facilitate the coordination and monitoring of hundreds of NGOs and international organisations in the North, six primary clusters were activated to cover different sectors of assistance: governance, infrastructure and livelihoods; education; food security, agriculture, livelihoods; health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS; protection and camp coordination, which included the hu-man rights and rule of law and child protection sub-clusters; and water and sanitation (Uganda Humani-tarian Clusters 2011; Steets and Grunewald 2010). Although the cluster approach was not immediately in-tegrated into the national structure, in the North, each cluster was eventually co-led by a governmental technical department head and one agency that acted as a cluster co-lead (Steets and Grunewald 2010; UNOCHA, interview, 18 April 2011). During the emergency phase, most organisations within each cluster focused on either the distribution of basic necessities—food, water, and non-food items to those living in the camps—or the protection and security of displaced individuals.

Inter-cluster coordination was overseen by UNOCHA. During the conflict, the agency was responsible for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (including repatriation, return protection concerns, and en-suring the provision of basic services and security for the Northern population), humanitarian financing, information management, and disaster preparedness and response (UNOCHA, interview, 18 April 2011). UNHCR was the UN cluster lead for protection and camp management in Gulu, as soon as the organisa-tion arrived in 2006. The cluster approach was then synergised with the government structure already in place, to try and avoid the existence of two parallel systems for humanitarian coordination and assistance for IDPs (UNHCR, interview, 26 April 2011).


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Despite better coordinating humanitarian efforts in the region, such an approach only addresses part of the larger picture. The cluster approach itself is designed ‘for IDPs during conflict-generated emer-gencies’ (IASC 2006: 3), suggesting that once the ‘emergency’ is over, the approach will phase out. The task of addressing the long-term needs of IDPs is left to the host government and development actors once the ‘emergency’ subsides or the ‘post-conflict’ label is applied. As a strictly humanitarian approach, it is still situated within one pole of the relief-development binary, essentially facilitating the failure of the con-tinuum model through its construction.

This is supported by the cluster approach’s seeming incompatibility with protracted displacement. Dis-cussions from an expert seminar on protracted IDP situations held in 2007, hosted by UNHCR and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, highlights the disconnect that exists between theory and practice:

With full recognition of the role and responsibility of host Government, humanitarian and devel-opment agencies also have important roles to play. In the context of the humanitarian reform im-plementation, participants questioned how protracted situations relate to the cluster approach, especially as protracted situations are rarely seen as humanitarian emergencies (UNHCR and Brookings 2007: 3; emphasis mine).

Regardless of this lingering question, the approach continues to be applied to protracted situations on the ground. Although it was initiated in response to armed conflict in an emergency setting in Northern Ugan-da the cluster approach remained intact until 2010, once many of the remaining IDPs had already become protracted by definition.

Despite the mechanism’s emphasis on early recovery throughout all aspects of implementation, this was not the case in Northern Uganda. UNOCHA noted that, although humanitarian programming should have long-term sustainability in mind every step of the way, early recovery as such did not happen on the ground; it was skipped altogether and development efforts started too late, leaving a significant gap in ser-vices (UNOCHA, interview, 18 April 2011). The IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation for Uganda (2010) also identified a notable gap in recovery services, stating that the ‘Early Recovery Cluster...largely ceased to op-erate in 2008’ (Steets and Grunewald 2010: 25-6), two years before the cluster approach itself phased out. With the development phase left largely uncoordinated, the institutional aid structure was indeed strictly humanitarian in nature, siloed within one end of the relief-development continuum. Such an emergency-oriented response was also applied to a protracted situation, falling short of addressing the long-term needs of the remaining IDPs in the region.

Complexities of Internal Displacement

The cluster approach was designed to set the stage for a successful transition from relief to early recovery to development in situations of internal displacement, yet such a seamless transition remains perpetually divided in practice. The current model posits a linear relationship between relief, rehabilitation, and devel-opment – mirroring the linear relationship between conflict and post-conflict, peace and war. It assumes that there is a direct correlation between conflict, displacement, and needs – that displacement ends when conflict is declared over. Such assumptions no longer hold in situations of internal displacement, due to the complexity and changing nature of conflict and questionable ‘end’ of such situations.

Rather than having a resolute finish, conflict can be understood as a continuous phenomenon. As Mary Kaldor (2007: 117) notes, ‘Just as it is difficult to distinguish between the political and the economic, pub-lic and private, military and civil, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace.’ For IDPs, there is a perpetuation of conflict beyond visibility. Once ‘conflict’ is declared over, the displaced and the conflict that persists are rendered invisible. Whereas refugees re-cross an international border to signi-fy an end (not the end) to conflict, IDPs never leave the confines of that conflict to begin with, making such distinctions more difficult to determine. As Roberta Cohen notes, ‘Even in countries where conflicts are formally over, continuing animosities among individuals or groups may jeopardise return processes and impede an end to displacement’ (Cohen 2003: 21). Conflict extends beyond visibility, transforming over time and creating varied needs within and amongst particular groups. This requires a more comprehensive approach.

The period of displacement of IDPs varies tremendously: short-term, protracted, and permanent situa-tions can all occur within one community depending on individual experience. This varying reality on the ground is complicated by the fact that, within forced migration theory, the question ‘when does internal displacement end?’ still remains unanswered. Not only is there no clear solution to this question, but there is also no consensus as to how to make such a determination (Mooney 2002; Forced Migration Review 2003). This fact prompts the question: how is it possible to prescribe a temporal conflict/post-conflict bi-nary for assistance onto a situation that is not only incredibly varied but also so difficult to determine?


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The erratic process that currently exists for determining when displacement ends is partially due to the descriptive (rather than legal) nature of the definition of IDPs provided by the Guiding Principles, as well as the fact that there is no cessation clause determining when the Principles no longer apply (Mooney 2002). As the Guiding Principles state: ‘displacement shall last no longer than required by the circum-stances’ (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998: 7). Yet, what defines those circumstances, and more importantly, who defines them? Any attempt to determine when internal displacement ends ‘occurs on an ad hoc and arbitrary case-by-case basis, if at all, and on the basis of criteria that differ from one actor to another’ (Mooney 2002: 5-6). The fact that there are such varying points at which displacement is deemed to ‘end’ for IDPs is indicative of how various the needs of individuals can be within each context. The needs of those displaced for a period of months, years, or decades—some often living in the same community—cannot be adequately addressed using a seemingly universal model.

This is not to suggest that refugee situations do not come with their own challenges and complexities, or are apolitical in nature. As Jennifer Hyndman aptly states, ‘Human displacement does not occur in neutral spaces, reducible to particular places and void of political meaning’ (Hyndman 2000: 20). Refugee and IDP situations often have similar causes and consequences, are protracted in nature, and are contained within equally dangerous and varying contexts. Yet, there remain distinct differences. Whereas refugees can be repatriated or resettled to a third country—signalling an end to conflict—IDPs do not cross a border and must rely on reintegration within their home country. In addition, solutions for IDPs are driven by the state whether or not it has contributed to the displacement itself, while international actors drive refugee solutions (UNHCR and Brookings 2007).

These details comprise an environment in which the ‘relief-development continuum’ model is bound to fail in practice. Although a smooth transition from emergency relief to long-term development—informed and driven by displaced communities rather than donor and agency interests—would, theoretically, pro-vide a more effective and sustainable approach to aid for refugees and IDPs, such a transition fails in prac-tice. The same unsuccessful attempts to link the two phases within refugee policy are now being recreated in a different form in conflict-induced IDP situations, in a context that renders the current continuum per-petually divided.

Implications: the failure of ‘clean aid’

Within this environment ‘clean aid’ is not possible in practice. Because IDPs do not cross an international border, aid—even relief aid—must work within and through (rather than around) states, many of which caused or facilitated the displacement of their own people. IDPs are displaced within the conflict that they are trying to escape, creating an additional layer that must be navigated both by the individuals themselves and by the international community. This comprises an environment that donors hesitate to fund. UN-HCR’s expenditure on IDP programmes (Pillar 4) in 2012 amounted to only 15% of total programme activ-ities (a 9% decrease since 2011) in comparison to 79% spent on refugee programmes (UNHCR 2012).

Internal displacement is arguably a more systemic version of the ‘hybrid model of assistance’ for refu-gees. The same reasons why donors were hesitant to fund hybrid models in the 1990s are only expanded and intensified for situations of internal displacement due to the increased complexities described above. ‘Clean aid,’ as such, cannot be ‘clean’ within the context of internal displacement. This results in an emer-gency-oriented response from the aid community, recreating and solidifying the ‘bifurcated architecture of the aid system’ (Macrae and Harmer 2004), that closely mirrors the same failures that occurred in refugee policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As the following sections demonstrate, this distinct binary is con-ceptualised through temporal notions of responsibility, which only serve to reify an already dichotomous assistance structure.

Temporal notions of responsibility The conceptual frame through which the break in the continuum is viewed only reinforces the per-

petual division between emergency and long-term phases of assistance. Such a frame utilises temporal markers—when conflict (and, therefore, it is assumed, displacement) ends—to signal when the emergency or development phases of relief should commence, when the shift in the continuum from relief to develop-ment should and will take place. Such a shift is predicated on certain understandings of both conflict and need. Relief should be delivered whilst the conflict is occurring to those directly affected. Development should commence once the conflict is ‘over,’ across the entire affected region, to address the broader needs of the community. There is understood to be a rehabilitation period in between when relief ends and de-velopment starts that occurs when peace is being established. This linear relationship between relief, reha-bilitation, and development—mirroring the linear relationship between conflict and post-conflict, peace and war—relies on the assumption that there is a direct correlation between conflict, displacement, and needs; the relief-development continuum is dependent upon the temporality of both conflict and displace-ment.


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When within the temporal frame, however, does responsibility for such populations shift? The shift in responsibility is based on the following assumption: when conflict ends, so do both displacement and the needs associated with such displacement. This, in turn, influences not only what kind of assistance is put in place, emergency vs. development, but also, who ends up providing such assistance. When conflict is ‘active,’ the international community responds to those displaced as if it is an emergency situation (which it can be, but is not always); when conflict becomes ‘passive’ or is ‘over,’ the majority of humanitarian ac-tors (those responding to the first phase) leave, and the home country is left responsible for those popula-tions that fell through the cracks of the initial phase of response, supported by certain development organ-isations who enter to fill the organisational void. The relief and development phases not only correspond with, but also, depend on the status of conflict in the environment in which they operate. The shift be-tween those phases is equally dependent on the shift from conflict to ‘post-conflict.’

The declaration of conflict's end, whether accurate or not, determines who is then responsible for the populations affected by such conflict. Although such a declaration by the international community is rele-vant for both refugee and IDP situations, for the internally displaced that declaration is the sole determi-nant of how and to what degree individuals receive assistance. Rather than a strictly geographic marker—the re-crossing of an international border by a refugee, removing his or her status as such—as the signal to shift international responsibility, it is the (arbitrary) declaration that conflict, and therefore displacement, ends that is the marker within an IDP context.

The ‘post-conflict’ problem with internal displacement

What is happening now in the context of internal displacement is a repetition of the ‘post-conflict’ phe-nomenon Macrae critiqued concerning refugee policy in the 1990s. In trying to bring new life to the con-tinuum by emphasising the ‘post-conflict’ nature of assistance, this time within the context of internal dis-placement, such an approach only reinforces the conflict-‘post-conflict’/relief-development binary. Use of the term, rather than providing incentive to bridge the phases as intended, strengthens the distinction and temporal difference between them based on problematic measures of conflict. Such conflation not only has the potential to solidify an assistance structure built within a faulty discursive framework, but also, in simply identifying a division, renders the continuum perpetually divided in practice.

The term ‘post-conflict’ is utilised as a political tool that solidifies such a temporal interpretation. Alt-hough the term ‘post-conflict’ can aptly describe certain select contexts, such a label makes two claims: that conflict is ‘over,’ and that displacement-specific needs no longer exist on the ground after that point. Conflict—defined as such—might have subsided, but is not necessarily over. The application of this label oversimplifies the complex nature and varied meanings of conflict at the micro-level. The scope and com-plexity of the needs presented by those displaced cannot be adapted to a paradigm that, through its very structure, grossly oversimplifies a more complex reality.

Conclusion

The variance within situations of internal displacement causes a conundrum for the aid community; the same factors that prevented the success of the continuum for refugees—the failure of 'clean aid'—is now inherent within situations of internal displacement. The approach taken to address internal displacement is arguably a more systemic version of the 'hybrid model of assistance' for refugees: the same reasons why donors were hesitant to fund hybrid models in the 1990s are expanded and intensified for situations of in-ternal displacement. Confined within the same location as indefinable and perpetual realms of conflict, responses to IDPs are never apolitical; ‘clean aid’ cannot be clean in such contexts. The relief-development continuum is still premised on temporal assumptions that fall apart within an IDP context, rendering the linear assumption no longer valid for situations of internal displacement.

The design and implementation of a strictly humanitarian mechanism, the cluster approach, as the only institutional framework for IDPs is evidence of such a phenomenon, demonstrating that internal displace-ment is still treated as an emergency situation despite the varied and often protracted nature of such dis-placement on the ground. Such an approach does improve coordination efforts and sector coverage, yet does not provide a foundation to adequately address the long-term needs of the community. The institu-tional response on the ground in Northern Ugandan supports this claim. IDP assistance structures work within this problematic temporal paradigm, rather than break from it, having recreated the relief-development continuum in a context that sets it up for failure. Such a division remains an obstacle to ad-dressing the long-term needs of IDPs in protracted situations and, as such, perpetuates the continuum model that must be reassessed for aid structures moving forward.

Sarah E. Freeman is an American national who holds a B.A. in Sociology and International Studies from Northwestern University, where she focused on institutional responses to forced displacement. She con-ducted research on the aid structure in place for conflict-induced internally displaced persons in North-


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ern Uganda, and has worked with research institutions and NGOs in the area of forced migration. The views expressed in this article are entirely her own.

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The one billion ‘climate refugees’ that never was: INGOs and the human rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement

By Yvonne Yanyun Su

The claim that there will be ‘one billion climate change refugees by 2050’ is com-monly attributed to Christian Aid’s (2007a) report Human tide: the real migra-tion crisis. This statement has sparked public and academic debate within the ar-ea of climate change and forced migration (CCFM). For some scholars it evidenc-es the need for action on climate change-induced displacement, whilst for others it indicates that the work of INGOs (international non-governmental organisations) is overly alarmist. I argue that the one billion figure, a common misreading of Christian Aid's report, has negatively impacted the way that the work of INGOs have been portrayed within the literature. I counter this depiction by demonstrat-ing the contribution that INGOs have made to the CCFM debate through a system-atic review of literature published by four INGOs. I argue that INGOs have strate-gically reframed the political and academic debate on CCFM to introduce a hu-man rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement. This perspective allows industrialised states to be held accountable for the negative consequences of climate change predominantly suffered by those who have historically least contributed to greenhouse gas emissions.

Introduction

In 2007, Christian Aid published a report, which predicted that ‘unless strong preventative action is taken, between now and 2050 climate change will push the number of displaced people globally to at least 1 billion’ (2007a: 22). Frequently misquoted as claiming ‘one billion climate change refugee by 2050’ by authors such as Black et al. (2008:5), Kniveton et al. (2008:32), Cugusi and Piccarozzi (2009:43) and Nicholson (2011:11), the report has sparked debate and criticism from a number of climate change and forced migration (CCFM) scholars. Whilst some see it as evidence to discredit supporters of this work as alarmist (Gemenne 2011; Neuteleers 2011), others regard it as a call for ac-tion on climate change-induced displacement (Biermann and Boas 2010; Williams 2008).

This article provides two key arguments. The first is that Christian Aid’s Report (2007a) has been misquoted and misread by some academics within the CCFM literature, which has had negative ef-fects on how the work of INGOs (international non-governmental organisations) has been portrayed. Secondly, the article demonstrates that INGOs have contributed to the CCFM literature by strategi-cally reframing the political and academic debate to introduce a human rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement. INGOs have used the ‘climate refugee’ narrative to highlight norma-tive protection gaps within current international agreements and advance a discourse of responsibil-ity that link industrialised states to the plight of those escaping the consequences of climate change. This link is important because recent scholarship on CCFM has shifted the discussion from one of ‘climate refugees’ to that of ‘climate migrants’, which has replaced the notions of collective state re-sponsibility with that of individual entrepreneurialism (Felli 2013). It is worth revisiting and reas-sessing INGOs’ work on ‘climate refugees’ in the face of often overly optimistic scholarship on ‘climate migrants’ that legitimizes industrialised states’ evasion of responsibility for the consequences of climate change (Scheffran et al. 2012; Tacoli 2009; Bradsley and Hugo 2008). While this paper does not defend or advocate for the use of the term ‘climate refugee’ in a legal sense, the term will be employed throughout this article to refer to the concept of an individual whose displacement is in-duced by factors related to climate change. It is also taken to be synonymous with the term ‘environmental refugee’ which the literature on CCFM was founded on. However, since the issue of climate change currently dominates the public and academic debate on environmental issues, ‘climate refugee’ is considered the more relevant term.

The article draws on a systematic review of four INGOs – Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), CARE International, Oxfam International and Christian Aid. The INGOs were selected as case studies using purposive sampling based on three criteria: (1) The INGO must have a humanitarian mandate; (2) The INGO must have published in a substantial manner on the specific topic of CCFM; and (3) The INGO must still be in operation. These criteria were chosen to ensure that the study included on-ly well-established, humanitarian INGOs that have produced substantive literature that make them authorities on the CCFM debate. However, the main focus of the article is on Christian Aid’s 2007 *This article is based on research undertaken for the author’s MSc in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies at

the University of Oxford in 2012.


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Human Tide report because it has garnered the most attention within the academic and public sphere. The article first provides a brief overview of the academic debate on CCFM and the role of INGOs with-

in it. Second, the article discusses the misreading of Human Tide and critiques the representation of IN-GOs within parts of the literature on CCFM. This is followed by an analysis of the transition from a focus on ‘climate refugees’ to ‘climate migrants’. Finally, the article draws attention to the need for a discourse of human rights and responsibility in the literature on ‘climate migration’.

Brief Overview

The debate on climate change and forced migration

To ground the subsequent discussion on INGOs’ contribution to the CCFM debate, it is important to pro-vide a brief overview of the central discussions prevalent in the literature on CCFM. Traditionally, the aca-demic and political debate on environmental change and displacement has been divided between a mini-malist and maximalist school as identified by Suhrke (1994). In Suhrke’s analysis, two key points of analy-sis help to determine which school an author adheres to: the directness of the causal link between climate change and forced migration, and the scale by which climate change-induced displacement is expected to be affecting populations now and in the future. Members of the maximalist school make the direct causal link between environmental degradation and migration and invoke the notion that environmental factors cause displacement. Norman Myers, the most prominent maximalist scholar, is notable for citing large numbers of ‘environmental refugees’. He estimates that 200 million people will be environmentally dis-placed by the year 2050 (Meyers 2002). In contrast, authors in the minimalist school argue that migration is not mono-causal and thus environmental change does not figure as a separate, causal variable (Suhrke 1994). As such some minimalists advocate for a shift away from a focus on climate change as a significant causal factor for displacement and instead suggest to focus on the role of development in generating vul-nerability and environmental change. For Lonergan (1998) and Black (2001), poorly planned development and global north-south disparities are the major drivers of vulnerability in many countries, while climate change or environmental change is only a proximate cause of displacement. Despite the polarising debate, it is important to note that there is virtually no conceptual disagreement that environmental change im-pacts an individual’s or household’s decision to migrate, rather the disagreement is about how this rela-tionship is represented (Morrissey 2012). INGOs are one group of actors who have played a strong role in representing the relationship between climate change and forced migration.

Role of INGOs in the emergence of the topic of CCFM

INGOs have played a key role in highlighting the issue of CCFM and sustaining the debate in academia and policy making circles. The INGO WorldWatch Institute is often credited with the first formal use of the term ‘environmental refugee’ in the 1970s which helped initiate some of the early writing on this topic (Saunders 2000; Morrissey 2009; Findlay and Geddes, 2012). Essam El-Hinnawi (1985) provided the most commonly cited definition for ‘environmental refugees’ in his United Nations Environmental Pro-gramme report, Environmental Refugees (Neuteleers 2011). Essam El-Hinnawi defined ‘environmental refugees’ as ‘those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or perma-nently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/ or triggered by people) that jeopard-ised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life’ (1985: 4). The issue gained further momentum in 1990, when a International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment noted that millions of people could potentially be displaced as a result of shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural degradation (IPCC 1990).

In the 2000s, the framing of climate change shifted from solely an environmental issue to a topic of wider humanitarian concern (Hall 2010). This contributed to the realisation by civil society and nation states that the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions alone would not be enough and adaptation to the effects of climate change would need to become another prominent responsibility of states (Moore 2010). In the early to mid 2000s, Friends of the Earth (FOE) began drawing attention to the humanitarian effects of climate change and popularising the term ‘climate refugees’ (FOE 2000; 2004; 2007). The challenges of displacement attracted the attention of the international community in 2004 with the aftermath of the Asian tsunami, which brought about increased recognition of the importance of a human rights approach to dealing with those displaced by disasters (NRC 2009).

CCFM came into political, academic and public prominence when a variety of actors called for a new international treaty on climate change-induced displacement. In 2006, the Government of the Republic of Maldives proposed amending the 1951 Refugee Convention to extend the definition to include ‘climate ref-ugees’ (McAdam 2011).In a similar vein, several academics, lawyers and NGOs have advocated for the legal recognition and protection of ‘climate refugees’ under various institutional structures such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate


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Change (UNFCCC) (Biermann and Boas 2010; Williams 2008; Docherty and Giannini 2009; FOE 2007; EJF 2008). This surge of advocacy for legal recognition and protection prompted a volume of academic studies and commissioned reports about the validity of such claims including a United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) position paper which stated clearly that ‘UNHCR has serious reserva-tions with respect to the terminology and notion of environmental refugees or climate refugees. These terms have no basis in international refugee law’ (2009: 8).

As this brief background has outlined, INGOs have made notable and agenda-setting contributions to the CCFM debate, from creating the terminology on ‘environmental refugees’ that led to the production of a large amount of literature on climate change-induced displacement to the exploration of normative pro-tection gaps for those displaced. However, as explored in the following section, these contributions have been poorly represented within the literature.

INGO Representation in the Literature

Misreading of Human Tide: The one billion ‘climate refugees’ that never was

Christian Aid’s (2007a) Human Tide report is often misquoted as predicting there will be one billion climate change refugees by 2050. While the publication makes the estimate that one billion people will be displaced by 2050, the majority of them will not be ‘climate refugees’. Christian Aid’s (2007a: 6) prediction is on global displacement, based on an aggregation of projected displacement by conflict (50 million), nat-ural disasters (50 million), development projects (645 million), climate change-related phenomena (250 million) and political persecution (5 million). From this breakdown, it can be seen that the estimated num-ber of people displaced by climate change-related phenomena is ‘only’ 250 million. Whereas the one bil-lion people globally displaced by 2050 are broken down into different types of displacement with climate change-induced displacement as only one element, some academics have misquoted one billion as the number of predicted ‘climate refugees’ (Nicholson 2011; Cugusi and Piccarozzi 2009; Black et al. 2008; Kniveton et al. 2008), ‘environmental refugees’ (Gill 2010) or ‘people forced to move primarily because of climate change’ (Tacoli 2009).

In addition to this misquotation, academics have often misread the report as being primarily focused on climate change-induced displacement and ‘climate refugees’. However, the term ‘climate refugee’ is not used once within the report, instead those affected are referred to as ‘people permanently displaced by cli-mate change-related phenomena’ (Christian Aid 2007a: 6). Furthermore, within the report there is no ad-vocacy for international protection for those displaced, so it would be difficult to argue that Christian Aid was implicitly writing about ‘climate refugees’. Instead, Christian Aid (2007a) advocated for adequate fi-nancing from rich countries to help poor countries adapt to climate change.

As evident in the introduction of Christian Aid’s (2007a) report, it is focused on internally displaced peoples (IDPs). The report starts with a description of the plight of IDPs and describes them as the ‘real crisis’ (Christian Aid 2007a: 2). The primary focus on IDPs was confirmed in an interview on May 9th, 2012 with Dominic Nutt, former Christian Aid staff member and contributor to Human Tide, who revealed that Christian Aid’s tactic was to use the more attractive story of climate change and displacement as the ‘wedge in the door’ to speak about the often neglected topic of protection for IDPs. Christian Aid’s main objective was to heighten awareness around the issues of displacement and IDP protection. As Nutt describes:

We were looking for a debate, a controversy, and have people argue about it. It being criticised is not a bad thing. The fact that people think it’s worthy of criticising is a good thing because it is forcing people to consider the numbers and forcing people to think about the concepts.

As Nutt expected, this was largely the response that Human Tide received among policy circles, the media and academics alike. With over 220 academic citations (Google Scholar 2014), Human Tide has leveraged a strong response beyond the public domain and arguably played a role in influencing the research agenda of the field.

However, despite the success Human Tide had in attracting media, Gemenne argued that it was ‘harshly rebuffed by the scholarly community as unserious and overly alarmist’ (2011: S45). The report was largely criticised for lacking a clear methodology to explain how it made its estimates of future displace-ment (Gemenne 2011). Numerous minimalist authors have criticised the existing estimates as ‘inflated’, ‘overly alarmist’, or ‘based on assumptions’ (Kniveton et al. 2008; Gemenne 2011; Black 2001). A detailed analysis by Gemenne (2011: 41) showed that of the key estimates, calculations and predictions made in the CCFM literature regarding future displacement, no consensual estimate and no commonly agreed upon methodology exist. The difficulty of estimating future displacement articulated by Gemenne (2011) was also highlighted within Christian Aid’s report, which states that these estimates are ‘very difficult to calcu-late, and depend on many other assumptions’ (2007a: 22). While Christian Aid’s recognition of the prob-


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lems with estimates and the difficulties surrounding them have been recognised in some writing (Kniveton et al. 2008; Black et al. 2008) they are seldom highlighted when the article is cited. Instead, Christian Aid is often portrayed as providing its number without any critical analysis.

Representation of INGOs in CCFM literature The misrepresentation of the Human Tide report has had ramifications beyond the immediate controversy surrounding the report and Christian Aid, with its critiques having the potential to reflect poorly and un-dermine the work of INGOs more widely. For example, some academics have claimed that a significant number of other organisations have uncritically supported and used Christian Aid’s prediction regarding displacement by climate change-related phenomena, however without providing any analysis to support their claim (Campbell and Parthemore 2008). In a similar vein and with regard to Myers’ work, Neuteleer (2011: 236) claims ‘NGOs cited almost unanimously and rather unquestioningly, the enormous numbers of potential refugees’. Such overgeneralisation about NGOs without any analysis to back up the claim about their unwavering support is not constructive. Indeed, an analysis of eight publications from four INGOs show that only one report cited Myers’ work uncritically (Oxfam 2009a), while three cited him with some caution and discussion (CA 2007a; CARE 2009a, Oxfam 2009b) and one challenges his estimates exten-sively (NRC 2008). Two other publications discuss forced migration but do not reference estimates in the millions (CARE 2009b, CA 2007b) and one notes that ‘millions are already displaced due to climate-related disasters each year’ (NRC 2009: 6). In addition, of the eight publications, only one uses the term ‘environmental refugees’ (Oxfam 2009b) and none of the publications used the term ‘climate refugee’ in a supportive manner. Thus, statements about INGOs work on CCFM need to be made more carefully, with an individual assessment and proper analysis of a wide array of publications, to avoid discrediting INGOs unfairly.

Not only have INGOs been accused of uncritically supporting predictions of large scales of climate change-induced displacement, their contributions have often been reduced to a focus on numbers (Nordas and Gleditsch 2005; Cugusi and Piccarozzi 2009; Nicholson 2011; Kniveton et al. 2008; Black et al 2008; Campbell and Parthemore 2008; Gill 2010; Tacoli 2009) which overlook INGOs’ other contributions to the CCFM literature. The publication of Human Tide provides an example of how this can have an adverse effect. While Christian Aid may have wanted to use the more media-savvy topic of climate change-induced displacement to draw attention to the ‘real crisis’ of IDPs, the dispute about the ‘one billion climate change refugees’ ended up overshadowing the complexity of both issues of climate change-induced displacement and IDPs.

The above example demonstrates the importance of exercising caution when engaging with the litera-ture on climate change-induced displacement. Each contribution should be carefully read and contextual-ised in order to avoid misrepresentations. A careful reading of the literature allows for a more differentiat-ed and constructive analysis, which highlights the valuable contributions INGOs have made to the litera-ture and which have too often gone unrecognised.

Human rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement: Information politics and accountability politics

This section argues that the major contribution of INGOs to the CCFM literature is the strategic reframing of the political and academic debate to introduce a human rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement. INGOs have thus helped to highlight normative protection gaps within current international agreements and have advanced a discourse of responsibility which links industrialised states to the plight of those suffering from climate change-induced displacement (Oxfam 2009a, 2009b; Christian Aid 2007a, 2007b; NRC 2009).

The conceptual framework on Transnational Advocacy Networks (TAN) as developed by Keck and Sik-kink (1998) can be used to assess the strategies, tactics and effects of information politics and accountabil-ity politics used by INGOs. Information politics is ‘the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically useable information and move it to where it will have the most impact’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 16). Ac-countability politics is ‘the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or princi-ples’ (ibid). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) outline, when there is a great deal of uncertainty around a topic such as climate change with regards to the severity of its effects, its time frame and the areas which are most vulnerable, it is difficult for INGOs to make a watertight case for political action and mitigation. In these situations, INGOs and other actors need to strategically reframe the topic so claims can be made in-dependently of scientific data. As a result, a number of INGOs have advocated for applying a human rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) note that INGOs have been observed to use a combination of tactics to achieve their goals. In this research, INGOs have combined information and accountability politics in their refram-ing of climate change as an issue of human rights. Accountability politics is often used to pressure govern-


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ments to adhere to their legal or public commitments. Once a government has publically committed to a principle, such as human rights, INGOs can use this opportunity to ‘expose the distance between discourse and practice’ (ibid: 24). In the case of climate change, applying a human rights lens can help to emphasize the unequal distribution of global power, which has allowed states that are most responsible for climate change to largely evade their responsibilities to reduce emissions and compensate those who have been affected (Nicolson and Chong 2011). These actions by industrialised states place a disproportionate amount of the economic, social and environmental costs of climate change onto developing countries, who have historically contributed very little greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere. This unjust burden-ing of developing countries drastically contrasts with the basic notions of equality that underline human rights. Highlighting the issue of climate change-induced displacement from a human rights perspective provides an opportunity for INGOs to hold countries accountable for their commitment to protecting peo-ple’s basic rights in the face of climate change. Thus, human rights language can act as the moral impetus for action which gives INGOs the tools to effectively advocate for action on climate change-induced dis-placement. The rights-based approach overcomes the political impasse that is often at the heart of disa-greements over commitments to emission reductions. By speaking about climate change from the perspec-tive of human rights law and basic rights of life, the issue of climate change is no longer confined to be solely an issue of academic or political concern, rather the issue is reframed to be one of human rights which everyone has a responsibility to uphold.

In addition, Nicolson and Chong have identified two more reasons why a human rights perspective is particularly advantageous: (1) ‘the human rights regime provides a useful set of basic moral principles that can guide and can be used to evaluate climate policy;’ and (2) ‘a rights-based analysis can be leveraged to build more effective political coalitions and pressure for action’ (2011: 122-123). In terms of reframing the issue of climate change-induced displacement as an issue of human rights, two approaches were used by INGOs that parallel these advantages. The first approach is articulating that climate change is threatening people’s basic human rights. As Oxfam argues, ‘human rights principles must be put at the heart of inter-national climate change policy making’ (2009b: 19) because climate change ‘undermines people’s rights to life, security, food, water, health, shelter and culture (ibid.). Thus it is argued that climate change policies are not just a matter of politics; they are also a matter of basic human rights. The second approach INGOs have taken is drawing attention to the issue of protection for those affected by climate change-induced displacement by highlighting the normative protection gaps and demonstrating how current frameworks can be applied to CCFM. NRC and Christian Aid have both taken this approach. In Christian Aid’s (2007a) recommendation section, many of their suggestions are to ask states to adhere to already established frameworks such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-ment, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, and the principles within the UNFCCC. Pointing to-wards the explicit inclusion of displacement by disasters under the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-placement, NRC argues that ‘those displaced by disasters also have human rights and protection needs re-quiring international attention’ (2009: 11). NRC therefore advocates for ‘the protection of those displaced by climate change under the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ (ibid.) and suggests that ‘some solutions to the normative protection gaps may be found in the broader human rights law’ (ibid.).

By arguing that current frameworks and institutions can accommodate those displaced due to the ef-fects of climate change, INGOs are taking a pragmatic and strategic approach to mobilizing action. Their argument demonstrates that existing systems of protection provide a starting point for thinking about the human rights and protection that those displaced by climate change effects should receive. By linking to other institutions and establishments, INGOs are building political coalitions and pressuring for action on the basis that the required legal and political instruments to enhance protection already exist and could be adapted to accommodate the needs of those affected by climate change-induced displacement (Nicolson and Chong 2011). Thus, it can be seen that INGOs have played a strong role in reframing the issue of climate change-induced displacement as a matter of human rights. Introducing a human rights perspective has provided a strong leverage point for the creation of political alliances to mobilize action. By bringing ‘the human face of cli-mate change’ to the negotiations, INGOs have enabled a new variety of actors to take interest in the topic, who contribute resources as well as new ideas and perspectives to the debate. From ‘Climate Refugees’ to ‘Climate Migrants’

More recently, a conceptual shift which undermines the application of a human rights perspective to cli-mate change-induced displacement can be observed in the CCFM literature, namely a focus on ‘climate migrants’ rather than ‘climate refugees’. Felli (2013) examines the turn from a discourse of ‘climate refu-gees’, in which NGOs and academics perceived migration as a failure of both mitigation and adaptation to climate change, to one of ‘climate migration’, in which those actors promote migration as a strategy of ad-aptation.


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Felli draws attention to the initial social construction of ‘environmental refugees’ by the United Nations as ‘helpless victims of climate change who are in need of foreign assistance’ (2013: 338). With this concept came the idea of ‘climate justice’, which argues that developed countries that caused climate change in the first place should be responsible for the damage being done in developing countries due to environmental change. However, Felli argues that this development was largely halted since 2009 when UNHCR an-nounced that ‘environmental refugees’ or ’climate refugees’ do not fall within the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention and hence cannot and will not be categorized and protected as refugees.

Along with UNHCR’s announcement came the conceptualization of ‘climate refuges’ as ‘adaptable sub-jects’ (Felli 2013: 341), which allows UNHCR to effectively shift the burden of adaptation onto the dis-placed individuals themselves. This tactic is a symbolic device in problem definition known as the blame-the-victim story (Stone 2002: 144). The blame-the-victim story is a type of narrative in policy analysis where control is located in the very people who suffer the problem. As Stone (2002) noted, the story often ends with victims being encouraged to reform their own behaviour to solve the problem. Such an approach can be seen in the framing of the ‘climate migrant’ as a rational actor who has the tools to migrate out of environmentally hostile environments, as opposed to a victim of his/her circumstances. The conceptual-ization of the displaced as active agents takes away some of the pressure for states to take responsibility for individuals affected by climate change-induced displacement.

The concept of the ‘climate migrant’ as an entrepreneur is evident in the emerging idea of ‘migration-for-adaptation’, advanced by Scheffran et al. (2012), which depicts migrants as intentionally migrating for the central purpose of adaptation. Scheffran et al. (2012) depict ‘migration-for-adaptation’ as a form of planned migration whereby households experiencing hardship from environmental change send migrants abroad to bring back funds and resources for the purposes of investing in climate change adaptation pro-jects for those who stayed behind. As such, the ‘climate migrants’ who move abroad are described as entre-preneurs who are finding innovative ways to help the community back home adapt to the changes that forced the migrants to move in the first place. Scheffran et al. (2012) present this as a positive model of development and climate change adaptation. Indeed, this model is promising because it recognizes the po-tential of collective remittances to improve a community’s resilience to climate change. From a pragmatic perspective, it can be seen as migrants making the best out of a difficult situation and organizing them-selves to decrease their risk to the effects of climate change. However, within this model, migration and remittance are seen uncritically as social goods and the ‘climate migrant’ is characterized as a utility max-imizing entrepreneur. Morrissey (2014) argues that empirical accounts of migration and adaptation offer less clarity on the role played by migration and remittances. Research by Findley (1994) demonstrates a weak relationship between migration during times of drought and the contribution of remittances, arguing that migration was utilized predominantly as a strategy to reduce household burden rather than to obtain remittances. Morrissey (2014) also found that migration during times of environmental stress has caused further issues in the community such as labour shortage (Afifi 2011). Ultimately, the concept of ‘migration-for-adaptation’ is most problematic for its depiction of migration as self-help and the characterization of those affected by environmental stress predominantly as ‘active agents who develop their livelihood op-tions’ (Scheffran et al. 2012: 126). While those affected by climate change hold a certain amount of autono-my over their livelihood strategies, it is important to recognize how external factors restrain their agency and limit their livelihood options, and to hold the responsible parties accountable.

Emphasizing a human rights perspective in studies of climate migration:

The discourse on ‘climate migrants’ can distract from the need to focus on the protection gap that exists for environmentally displaced people. Zetter and Morrissey’s five country case study of environmental stress, displacement and rights protection found that ‘Resistance to engaging with the politics of and poli-cies for migration is underpinned by the reluctance of these countries [Kenya, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Ethi-opia and Ghana]– combined with different manifestations of weak governance structures – to address hu-man rights issues’ (2014: 71). Their predictions regarding how the protection of the rights of environmen-tally displaced people is likely to develop are grim. Their study finds that ‘limited effort is likely to be put into adopting ‘guiding principles’ or, if adopted, little energy will be expended in implementing them’ (ibid: 71). This situation threatens to be further compounded by the discursive disappearance of the ‘climate refugee’ and the marginalization of a discourse of responsibility around environmentally displaced people.

In order to bridge protection gaps for those displaced by climate change, scholars need to approach the debate holistically, taking both the concepts of ‘climate refugee’ and ‘climate migrant’ into account. The latter contributes to an often under emphasized aspect of the CCFM debate, namely the agency and role of the migrants themselves, whereas the former serves as a reminder that external factors can restrict agency of those who move. Keeping both conceptualizations in mind, one can make a call for protection by point-


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ing out the responsibilities of those actors who have contributed to climate change-induced migration without portraying the migrants concerned as mere victims.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that INGOs have made a significant and noteworthy contribution to CCFM literature by introducing and advocating for the application of a human rights perspective to climate change-induced displacement Contrary to the simplified and often alarmist portrayals of INGO contribu-tions featured in the minimalist scholarship on CCFM, findings from this research show that their contri-butions have been strategic and agenda setting. In light of a recent shift in focus from ‘climate refugees’ to ‘climate migrants’, the human rights perspective on CCFM has however been diluted. The ‘climate mi-grant’ literature and the ‘migration-for-adaptation’ model portrays migrants and those displaced by envi-ronmental stress as adaptive, rational and active agents that migrate for entrepreneurial reasons as op-posed to circumstantial factors beyond their control. Whilst the previously neglected focus on migrants’ agency makes a valuable addition to the CCFM debate, it should not come at the expense of a continued focus on the human rights of those affected by climate change-induced displacement. The responsibilities of industrialized states who have contributed to such displacement, and the need to address existing pro-tection gaps need to remain at the heart of the debate.

Yvonne Su is a PhD student at the University of Guelph in the combined PhD program in Political Science and International Development. Her research is interested in the topics of international migration, re-mittances and natural disasters. She holds a Masters in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies from the University of Oxford. Yvonne is the recipient of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Graduate Scholarship. References Cited AFIFI, T. (2011) Economic or environmental migration? The push factors in Niger. International Migra-tion, 46(s1): 295-e124. BIERMANN, F. and BOAS, I. (2010) ‘Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees’, Global Environmental Politics, 10(1): 60-88. BLACK, R. (2001) ‘Environmental refugees: myth or reality?’, Working Paper no. 34. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. BLACK, R., KNIVETON, D., SKELDON, R., COPPARD, D., MURATA, A. and SCHMIDT-VERKERK, K. (2008) ‘Demographics and climate change: future trends and their policy implications for migration’, Working Paper. Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, Uni-versity of Sussex. BLACK, R., BENNETT, S.R., THOMAS, S., and BEDDINGTON, J.R. (2011) "Climate change: Mi-gration as Adaptation", Nature, 448(478): 447-449. BRADSLEY, D., and HUGO, G. (2010). "Migration and climate change: examining thresholds of change to guide effective adaptation decision-making". Population and Environment, 32(2): 238-262. CAMPBELL, K., and PARTHEMORE, C. (2008) ‘National security and climate change in perspective’ in Climatic Cataclysm, Campbell KM (ed.). Brookings Institution Press. Washington, DC. CARE. (2009a) In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement, London. CARE. (2009b) Humanitarian Implications of Climate Change: Mapping emerging trends and risk hotspots (2nd edition), London. CASTLES, S. and MILLER, M. (2009) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. 4th edition, Toronto: Palgrave Macmillan. CASTLES, S. (2002) ‘Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the debate’, New Is-sues in Refugee Research. Working Paper no. 70. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.


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CHRISTIAN AID. (2007a) Human Tide: The real migration crisis, London. CHRISTIAN AID. (2007b) The Human Face of Climate Change: A Christian Aid Report, London. CONISBEE, M., and SIMMS, A. (2003) Environmental Refugees. The Case for Recognition, New Eco-nomics Foundation, London. CUGUSI, B., and PICCAROZZI, M. (2009) ‘Environmental change and human mobility: A thematic literature and organizational review’ Climate Change and Human Mobility in Africa: Dialogue for a stra-tegic cooperation between Italy and Africa, Rome, 21 April 2009. DOCHERTY, B. and GIANNINI, T. (2009) ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33: 349-373. EL-HINNAWI, E. (1985) Environmental refugees. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION (EJF). (2008) ‘No Place Like Home: Where Next for Climate Refugees’ Available from http://www.ejfoundation.org/page590.html#other (accessed on 15th May 2012). FELLI, R. (2013). "Managing Climate Insecurity by Ensuring Continuous Capital Accumulation: 'Climate Refugees' and 'Climate Migrants', New Political Economy, 18(3): 337-383. FORESIGHT (2011) Migration and Global Environmental Change, final project report (London: The Office for Science). GEMENNE, F. (2011). ‘Why the numbers don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmental refugees’ Global Environmental Change 21: 41-49. GILL, N. (2010) 'Environmental Refugees': Key Debates and the Contributions of Geographers’, Geogra-phy Compass. 4(7):861-871. GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN FORUM, (2009) The Anatomy of A Silent Crisis. Global Humanitarian Forum, Geneva. HALL, N. (2010). ‘Climate Change and Institutional change in UNHCR’, Conference Paper for UNU-EHS Summer Academy on Protecting Environmental Migration: Creating New Policy and Institutional Frameworks, July 25-31 2010. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES. (IFRC) (2001) World Disasters Report. Focus on Recovery. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cres-cent Societies, Geneva. IPCC. (1990) Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment: Final Report of Working Group I, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press. KECK, M. and SIKKINK, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. KIBREAB, G. (1997) ‘Environmental causes and impact of refugee movements: A critique of the current debate’, Disasters, 21:20. KNIVETON, D., et al. (2008) ‘Climate change and migration: improving methodologies to estimate flows’, IOM Migration Research Series, No. 33. IOM, Geneva. FINDLAY, A. and GEDDES, A. (2012) ‘Critical views on the relationship between climate change and migration: some insights from the experience of Bangladesh’, 138-159 in Piguet, E., Pecoud, A., and De Guchteneire, P., (ed.) Migration and Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. FINDLEY, S. (1994) ‘Does drought increase migration? A study of migration from rural Mali during the 1983-1985 drought’. International Migration Review, 28(3):539-553.


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FRIENDS OF THE ENVIRONMENT. (FOE). (2000) Gathering Storm: The human cost of climate change, Amsterdam. FRIENDS OF THE ENVIRONMENT. (FOE). (2004) Our environment, our rights: standing up for people and the planet, Amsterdam. FRIENDS OF THE ENVIRONMENT. (FOE). (2007) A Citizen’s Guide to Climate Refugees, Mel-bourne. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES. (2002) World Disaster Report 2002. Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. LONERGAN, S. (1998) ‘The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement’, Environ-mental Change and Security Project Report, 4: 5-15. MCADAM, J. (2011) ‘Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 23(1): 3. MOORE, F. (2010) ‘Doing Adaptation’: The Construction of Adaptive Capacity and its Function in the International Climate Negotiations’, St Antony's International Review 5(2): 66-88. MORRISSEY, J. (2014) Environmental change and human migration in sub-Saharan Africa. In: E. Piguet and F. Laczko, eds, People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environ-mental Change on Migration. Springers Netherlands. MORRISSEY, J. (2012) ‘Rethinking the ‘debate on environmental refugees’: From ‘maximilist and min-imlists’ to ‘proponents and critics’, Journal of Political Ecology, 19: 36-49. MORRISSEY, J. (2009) ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration: A State of the Art Review’ Back-ground Paper, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. MYERS, N. (2002) ‘Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences. 357:609-613. NEUTELEERS, S. (2011). ‘Environmental Refugees: A Misleading Notion for a Genuine Problem’ Ethi-cal Perspectives 18(2): 229-248. NICHOLSON, C.T.M. (2011). ‘Is the ‘Environmental Migration’ Nexus an Analytically Meaningful Sub-ject for Research?’ COMCAD Arbeitspapiere, Working Papers, No. 104. NICOLSON, S., and CHONG, D. (2011) ‘Jumping on the Human Rights Bandwagon: How Rights-based Linkages Can Refocus Climate Politics.’ Global Environmental Politics 11(3):121 - 136. NORDAS, R., and GLEDITSCH, N. (2005) ‘Climate Change and Conflict’, Workshop on Human Secu-rity and Climate Change, Holmen fjord hotell, Asker, Norway, 22–23 June 2005. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (NRC). (2009) Climate Change, People Displaced. Oslo. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL. (NRC). (2008) Future Floods of Refugees: A comment on cli-mate change, conflict and forced migration, Oslo. NUTT, D. (2012) Interview with author, May 2012. OXFAM INTERNATIONAL. (OXFAM). (2009a) Suffering the Science: Climate change, people, and poverty Oxford. OXFAM AUSTRALIA. (OXFAM). (2009b) The future is here: climate change in the Pacific, Victoria. SAUNDERS, P. (2000) ‘Environmental refugees: The origins of a construct’, in Stott P. and Sullivan, S., (eds.) Political Ecology: Science, Myth and Power. London: Arnold.


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SCHEFFRAN, J., MARMER, R., and SOW, P. (2012). ‘Migration as a contribution to resilience and innovation in climate adaptation: Social networks and co-development in Northwest Africa’, Applied Ge-ography, 22, p. 119-127. STONE, D. 2002. Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision Making. Revised Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. SUHRKE, A. (1994) Environmental degradation and population flows. Journal of International Affairs, 47(2). TACOLI, C. (2009) ‘Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility’, Environment and Urbanization 21(2): 513-525. UNHCR. (2009). ‘Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective’ UNHCR policy paper, Geneva, UNHCR. Available from: http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html (accessed 25 May 2012). WILLIAMS, A. (2008) ‘Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees’ in International Law, Law & Policy, 30: 502-529. WOOD, W. (2001) ‘Ecomigration: Linkages between Environmental Change and Migration’, 42 – 61 in Zolberg, A., and Benda, P., (ed.) Global Migrants Global Refugees, Bergahn Books. ZETTER, R., and MORRISSEY, J. (2014) Environmental stress, displacement and the challenge of rights protection. Forced Migration Review, 45: 67-71.


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—Policy Monitor—


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The State of Exception and Legal Ambiguity: The Kenyan Forced Encampment Di-rective for Urban Refugees

By Sinmi Akin-Aina

Giorgio Agamben defines a state of exception as the point of fissure between political fact and the rule of law. I argue that this state of exception has characterized the government of Kenya’s treatment of urban refugees, specifically in light of the recent forced encampment government directive issued on March 26th, 2014. The state of exception is often borne of tense political mo-ments and, as stated by Agamben, is a paradigm of modern democratic statecraft, specifically in the current temporal and geographical context of the Global War on Terror. This however results in the flagrant flouting of international law, and the invariable re-victimization and persecution of refugees.

Introduction

In this study, I use Agamben’s conceptualisation of the state of exception to explore the government of Kenya’s present and historical treatment of urban refugees, particularly in the wake of the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and in light of Kenya’s historically fractious relationship with local and refugee Somali populations. A state of exception is defined by Agamben, as a political action or dictate by an executive or state body, which contravenes the rule of law of that same state (Agamben 2005). The current state of exception is embodied by the most recent government of Kenya directive, which seeks to expel all refugees currently residing in cities to camps, as well as to halt the processing and provi-sion of refugee related programs. Thus, the government of Kenya’s issuance of the forced encamp-ment directive is in direct contravention of national and international human rights law.

The first section of this paper provides a general introduction and history of urban refugees in Kenya, the recent government directive, and how it can be typified as a state of exception that endan-gers all urban refugees. The following section elaborates on Agamben’s concept of the state of excep-tion, providing examples to elucidate his theory. Next, I frame the government directive as an emerg-ing reactionary and discriminatory policy implemented in a bid to ensure national security in light of Al-Shabaab attacks, most recently on the 23rd of March 2014, at a church in Mombasa (The Star 2014). The concept of the state of exception is particularly useful, as it sheds light on the possibility that such flagrant flouting of the rule of law by an executive or military power is not just a display of force and order in the face of perceived chaos, but a carefully crafted political strategy. Urban Refugees in Nairobi

The population of urban dwellers (refugee and non-refugee) in Sub-Saharan Africa is expanding at a rapid rate. It is estimated that over half of the population in the region will be residing in urban areas in two decades (UNHCR 2006). This trend is also reflected in the population of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as globally (Pavanello et al. 2010). Up to half of the 10.5 million refugees glob-al reside in cities and towns, with one-third living in camps. By 1980, Kenya was host to about 12,000 refugees, mostly from Uganda, today, the number sits at 550, 980 registered refugees, making it one of the top 10 major refugee-hosting nations in the world (UNHCR 2014) (UNHCR Nairobi 2004 as cited in Campbell 2006). There is scarce knowledge about how many they are, who they are, where they are, where they come from, how they survive and earn a living, their refugee status is also un-known. UNHCR estimates, 50,800 mostly Somali refugees currently reside in Nairobi (UNHCR 2014).

Kenya has long had a fractious relationship with both its Kenyan ethnic Somalis and the Somali refugee population. From independence in 1963 until 1992, the North-eastern Province, bordering Somalia, where the Dadaab refugee camp is located, was placed under a state of emergency (Abdi 2006). This was due to irredentist claims on the region and its ethnic Somali population by Somalia. The Somali state called for the inhabitants of the North-eastern Province, then called the Northern Frontier District to secede from Kenya and join Somalia, Djibouti and parts of the Ethiopian Ogaden to form ‘Greater Somalia’ (Abdi 2006, Hakhe 2014). In the 1990s under President Arap Moi’s single-party rule, a period of ‘swoops’ and forcible repat-riations were carried out against both the Kenyan ethnic Somali population and Somali refugees. Eth-nic Somalis living in the city as well as in North-eastern Province were subject to harassment and ar-rest. Individuals were required to show birth certificates, ID papers or a passport to prove that they were not illegal and had a right to reside in Kenya. Those unable to demonstrate Kenyan citizenship were forcibly repatriated (Veney 2007).Large numbers of ethnic Somalis were forcibly taken back to Somalia, many of whom had never been, had been born in Kenya or lived in Kenya the majority of


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their lives. During the swoops around 3,500 Kenyan citizens of Somali origin were forcibly repatriat-ed (Veney 2007). The Forced Encampment Directive

On March 26th, 2014, the Kenyan government issued a forced encampment directive for all refugees living in urban areas to relocate to camps. Joseph Ole Lenku, the Interior Minister stated:

All refugees residing outside the designated refugee camps of Kakuma and Dadaab are hereby directed to return to their respective camps with immediate effect .Any refugee found flouting this directive will be dealt with in accordance with the law. Consequently, all refugee centres in urban areas – Nairobi, Mombasa, Malindi, Isiolo and Nakuru – are hereby closed. (UNHCR 2014)

In addition, the directive ordered an immediate halt to all refugee registrations and service provision (Asylum Access 2013). A tripartite agreement was signed earlier in the year between Kenya, the So-mali Transitional Federal Government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for the subsequent repatriation of one million Somali refugees to Somalia (Human Rights Watch 2014). The government directive effectively renders refugees in Kenya extremely vulnerable to a host of hu-man rights abuses, some of which include: assault by policemen and security forces, extortion, sexual and gender-based violence and a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, forcing them back to a state that is insecure, unstable, and ill-equipped to receive them (Asylum Access 2013). States of Exception

Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben advanced the notion of the state of exception as a means to ex-plain the legitimization and co-optation of political instruments and actions by an executive body or ruler that was often at odds with the rule of law. His most obvious example was in Nazi Germany, where, upon being handed power, Hitler pronounced the Decree for the Protection of the State. This invalidated the articles of the Weimar Constitution addressing personal liberties thus, using the state of exception as a means to erode personal liberties while simultaneously cementing and legitimizing state power (Agamben 2005). Agamben also points to the state of exception as occurring in periods of intense political crises as a means to establish order in the midst of chaos:

One of the elements that make the state of exception so difficult to define is certainly its close relationship to civil war, insurrection and resistance. Because civil war is the oppo-site of normal conditions, it lives in a zone of undecidability with respect to the state of exception, which is state power’s immediate response to the most extreme internal con-flicts. (Agamben 2005:2)

As such, during periods of political turmoil, internal conflict and popular resistance, governments employ a state of exception as a strategy to enforce order and fix ‘social problems’. Lastly, Agamben describes the state of exception as the dominant technique of government in contemporary politics, in this era of the Global War on Terror:

The immediately biopolitical significance of the state of exception as the original structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension emerges clearly in the “military order” issued by the president of the United States on November 13, 2001, which authorized the “indefinite detention” and trial by “military commissions” of non citizens suspected in involvement in terrorist activities...What is new about President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being...Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply “detainees”, they are the objects of a pure de facto rule. (Agamben 2005:3)

History of the Directive

On September 21st 2013, Al Shabaab militants laid siege to the Westgate mall in downtown Nairobi. At the end of the three day raid, there were seventy two casualties (BBC 2014). Al Shabaab the Islamic militant group that claimed responsibility for the attacks, and several since is a local offshoot of Al Qaeda that has concentrated its terrorist operations in East Africa, in Somalia, and most aggressively in Kenya, particularly Nairobi and Mombasa. In the aftermath of the Westgate Mall attack much of the rhetoric by Kenyan public officials conflated refugees with terrorists. Asman Kamama, Chairman of the Administration and National Security Committee stated:


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We have information that quite a number of crooks planned a terror attack from a refugee camp in Northern Kenya. We need to consider relocating all the refugees. The United Nations should take them to other countries… (Walada 2013)

Kenyan officials were of the belief that the terror attacks were orchestrated within refugee camps, and up-on completion, the perpetrators merged seamlessly into refugee communities in urban areas. In December 2012, the government of Kenya announced a directive that would compel all refugees in-habiting urban areas to relocate to border camps. The directive was also designed to shut down all regis-tration and provision of services to refugees in the urban centres of Nairobi, Isiolo and Mombasa. Local NGO Kituo Cha Sheria issued a challenge to the forced encampment directive before the High Court of Kenya; on January 23rd the court issued orders to halt the enactment of the policy. On July 26th, 2013, the High Court of Kenya repealed the government’s encampment directive (Asylum Access 2013). The di-rective was challenged on the basis that it violated the basic freedoms enshrined within the Kenyan Consti-tution, the Refugee Act, 1996, and a range of international human rights instruments. The High Court of Kenya found the policy to be in breach of both domestic and international law, stating:

First, the policy is unreasonable. Second, it violates the freedom of movement of refugees. Third, it exposes refugees to a level of vulnerability that is inconsistent with the States duty to take care of persons in vulnerable. Fourth, the right to dignity of refugees is violated. Fifth, the implementation of the government directive threatens to violate the fundamental principle of non-refoulement. (Asylum Access 2013)

The Court also declared:

Every person who acquires refugee status under our law is entitled to be treated as such. The Government Directive in this respect, being a blanket directive, is inconsistent with the Act and international law. It amounts to taking away accrued or acquired rights without due process of law...I find and hold that a government directive which has no regard for the urban refugee is arbitrary and discriminative (Asylum Access 2013)

On March 26th 2014, the Kenyan government re-issued its forced encampment directive after an attack on a church in Mombasa. Up to four thousand refugees have been detained and 400 deported, in what the Kenyan Security Forces are calling Operation Usalama Watch (Aljazeera 2014). Arrests have targeted So-malis living in the Eastleigh neighbourhood of Nairobi, both refugees and ethnic Somalis. Refugees were initially held in Pangani police station where:

Detainees had no room to sit…the cells were filthy with urine and excrement. Police were also holding detainees beyond the twenty-four hour limit prescribed under Kenyan law. (Aljazeera 2014)

In a move reminiscent of other states of exception, such as the internment and concentration camps dur-ing World War Two, refugees are now being corralled and held in Nairobi’s Kasarani stadium. There, they are detained, screened and cross-examined, those without identity cards are charged with ‘unlawful pres-ence’ and others with ‘residing outside designated areas without authority (Migiro 2014). Most are sent to the overpopulated and under resourced Dadaab refugee camp, designed to accommodate 170,000 refu-gees, but which currently caters to 400,000 ( Human Rights Watch 2014). Some refugees are deported back to Somalia, a country with internal turmoil and a large and growing internally displaced population (Migiro 2014). The Encampment Directive as a State of Exception

The State of Exception is a particularly useful frame to contextualize the actions of the Kenyan govern-ment. As stated by Agamben, it is used to legitimize, maintain and consolidate state power, it is a tactic used in the era of the Global War on Terror, and lastly it often occurs in moments of tense social and polit-ical conflict to enforce or redress the social order. Firstly, the state of exception is used as a means to legitimize and consolidate state power. The fact re-mains that whether or not the government of Kenya believes that refugees are a real national security threat, there are numerous underlying factors that belie this narrative and the government directive. The show of martial force draws attention away from the fact that this is a new government, plagued by in-fighting whose legitimacy has been called into question both internally and internationally (Rawlence 2014). The President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy president William Ruto are under investigation by the International Criminal Court for inciting election violence (Langat 2014). Additionally, the government of Kenya has also been under attack for its inability to ensure national security, and roust Al Shabaab both in Somalia and on Kenyan soil (Rawlence 2014). Thus, the show of force demonstrated by the directive


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could be interpreted as a form of misdirection to draw attention away from the government’s poor perfor-mance. As journalist Kwamchetsi Makokha aptly put:

It appears that the wide net cast by the government to capture terrorists is a major internation-al public relations exercise, visible but not substantive—no terrorist activities have been un-earthed, no plans or terrorist attacks have been revealed. (Kushkush 2014)

Secondly, as stated by Agamben, the state of exception is a strategy employed to wage the Global War on Terror. During which, the unlawful detention, torture, killing and arrests of individuals believed to be na-tional security threats is normalized as state action. Such is the case with the detention of refugees at Kasa-rani and the shoot to kill command by the Inspector General of police who said:

You are justified to use your firearm effectively, you have no control over where the bullet will hit. It can hit the head or heart even when your aim is to disable. (Rawlence 2014)

Lastly, the state of exception is employed in moments of intense political and social conflict to establish order and deal with ‘social problems’. In this particular case, it is being used by the Government of Kenya as a means to address what it believes to be its ‘refugee issue’. As stated previously Kenya is one of the top 10 refugee hosting nations in the world, however, with a refugee protection system that is woefully under resourced and overburdened. Whether real or imagined, the contention that refugee communities harbour terrorists serves two main purposes. First, it is an appropriate means of justification to corral and control the urban refugee population. Second, it is a means to shift the responsibility of refugee protection and care back to the countries of origin, or to another third country. Conclusion

As such, the state of exception calls attention to the Kenyan government’s underlying imperatives with the issuance of the forced encampment directive, none of which prioritize the care and protection of refugees or adherence to international human rights conventions. Furthermore, in light of this marked absence of any evidence, the continued arrest, abuse, and detention of refugees is particularly problematic. As stated by UNHCR Researcher Gerry Sampson:

The authorities have failed to show, as international law requires, that the plan was either nec-essary to achieve enhanced national security, or the least restrictive measure to address nation-al security concerns. (Human Rights Watch 2014)

Thus, what occurs is the flagrant and persistent abuse, detention and deportation of refugees with no thought paid to international human rights law or indeed the commitments undertaken by Kenya as a ref-ugee-hosting nation. The Kenyan government is treating refugees less like vulnerable individuals under their protection but as scapegoats, pariahs and pawns in a political game.

Sinmi Akin-Aina ([email protected]) is a Nigerian national who holds a Masters of Social Work de-gree from Carleton University, Ottawa. Her areas of research focus on urban refugees in Kenya, refugee and immigration law in Canada and internationally, and gender-based violence in conflict settings. She has previously worked for the Library of Parliament Canada, UNICEF Kenya, and recently completed a year of teaching at the department of Social Work at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. References Cited ABDI, A. (2006) Refugees, Gender-Based Violence and Resistance: A Case Study of Refugee Women in Kenya. In: Women, Migration, and Citizenship: making local,national and transnational conections. Oxford: Ashgate, pp. 231-250. AGAMBEN, G. (2005) The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government. In: The State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-6. ALJAZEERA (2014) Human Rights Watch accuses Kenya of mistreating Somalis. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/hrw-accuses-kenya-mistreating-somalis-2014411131654103701.html [Accessed 28 April 2014]. ALLAFRICA.COM (2014) Kenyans' Long Wait for Justice. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201404081096.html [Accessed 22 April 2014].


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ALLAFRICA.COM (2014) Westgate Mall SiegeOne of Biggest Terror Attacks. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201405010492.html [Accessed 2 May 2014]. LANGAT, A. (2014) Kenyatta's First term Gets Negative Scorecard. Available at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-140106/westgate-attack-was-planned-refugee-camp [Accessed 28 April 2014]. ASYLUM ACCESS (2013) A victory for urban refugees high court quashes kenyan encampment directive. Available at: http://rtwasylumaccess.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/a-victory-for-urban-refugees-high-court-quashes-kenyan-encampment-directive/ [Accessed 25 February 2014]. ASYLUM ACCESS (2013) Urban Refugees of Kenya Await their Fates: Updates on the High court Case. Available at: http://rtwasylumaccess.wordpress.com/2013/04/23/urban-refugees-of-kenya-await-their-fate-updates-on-the-high-court-case/ [Accessed 12 February 2014]. BATHA, E. (2014) Thomson Reuters. Available at: http://www.trust.org/item/20140326181624-2b17e/ [Accessed 26 March 2014]. BBC (2014) BBC News Africa. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26748570 [Accessed 24 March 2014]. CAMPBELL, E. (2006) Urban refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration. Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(3), pp. 396-413. HAKHE, A. B. (2014) The Precarious Fate of Kenyan-Somalis. Available at: http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/kenya-somalis-refugeecounterterrorismalshababsomalia.html [Accessed 14 April 2014] HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2014) Kenya: Plan to force 50,000 refugees into camps. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/26/kenya-plan-force-50000-refugees-camps [Accessed 12 April 2014]. KUSHKUSH, I. (2014) Kenya's Wide Net Againts Terror Sweeps Up Refugees. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/world/africa/kenyas-answer-to-terrorism-sweeping-roundups-of-somalis.html?_r=2 [Accessed 25 April 2014]. MIGIRO, K. (2014) More than 1000 Somalis Rounded Up in Nairobi, Held Incommunicado. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201404081096.html [Accessed 15 April 2014]. PAVANELLO, S. E. S. & P. S. (2010) Hidden and Exposed: Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=4786&title=urban-refugees-nairobi-kenya [Accessed 24 May 2011]. RAWLENCE, B. (2014) Kenya's Anti-Terror Strategy Begins to Emerge. Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201404091135.html?page=2 [Accessed 12 April 2014]. REFWORLD (2014) Kituo Cha Sheria and Others v. the Attorney General. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/51f622294.html [Accessed 26 March 2014]. THE STAR (2014) Four killed, several injured in Likoni church attack. Available at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-159934/four-killed-several-injured-likoni-church-attack-reports [Accessed 28 March 2014]. UNHCR (2011) UNHCR Global Trends 2010. Available at: 3, 2012, from http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html [Accessed 3 January 2012] VENEY, C. (2007) Changes in official refugee policies. In: Forced migration in Eastern Africa: democratization, structural adjustment, and refugees. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 50-85. WALADA, D. & MWERE D. (2013) Westgate attack was planned in refugee camp. Available at: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-140106/westgate-attack-was-planned-refugee-camp [Accessed 14 April 2014].


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XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (2014) UNHCR Refugee Daily. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=533a4fc88v [Accessed 12 April 2014]. YARNELL, M. (2014) Refugees International. Available at: http://www.refintl.org/blog/kenyan-court-upholds-right-refugees-live-cities#sthash.RqyOaE9a [Accessed 24 March 2014].


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When Politics Dictates Persecution: The Danger of ‘Safe Lists’

By Ainslie Avery

The state policies that build and sustain the non-entrée refugee regime increas-ingly sever the link between persecution and refugeehood. When separated from this unique characteristic, refugees, and refugee policy, are viewed through a po-litico-economic lens, rather than from an humanitarian perspective. This article illustrates the role ‘designated countries of origin’ or ‘safe list’ policies can play in establishing and enhancing trade and political relationships. Based on a case study of Canada’s ‘safe list’ policies, this article argues that trade and politics in-fluence the construction of ‘safe lists’ as much as legally established measures of refugeehood, particularly a forward-looking assessment of potential persecution. Safe lists negate the individual experiences of asylum claimants and obscure the true subject of refugee status: refugees themselves.

Introduction

Refugee receiving states, particularly in the developed world, have constructed an array of policies to exclude refugees from protection. Throughout the global north, refugee policies increasingly seek ex-ternalisation and containment in ‘empty spaces’ of the global south (Chimni 1998). This occurs, for instance, by taking extreme measures to protect border crossings, and constructing expansive refugee camps in refugee-producing regions. Shifts in media and state discourse have led to the de facto crea-tion of classes of refugees, such as ‘legitimate’ versus ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Zetter 2007). The emer-gence of parallel protection regimes – for example, ‘temporary’ or ‘humanitarian’ protection – cir-cumvent refugee status determination and allow states to offer discretionary protection without dedi-cating resources to protecting rights guaranteed under the 1951 Refugee Convention. These policies are characteristic of what B.S. Chimni describes as a non-entrée regime, and signal the global north’s diminishing commitment to refugee protection. The international refugee regime is interpreted through a political lens that legitimates the ongoing victimisation of refugees. This interpretation sev-ers the link between persecution and refugeehood, and conflates refugees with other types of mi-grants (Zetter 2007). Refugee policy, as a subset of migration policy, loses touch with its defining characteristic, and as such, asylum policies act as an extension of international politics and trade.

‘Safe lists’, or lists of designated countries of origin, are an increasingly common feature of the non-entrée policy regime. Although this article highlights Canadian policy, such policies exist throughout the global north, primarily in Western Europe. Safe lists identify countries that are perceived as un-likely to produce refugees, making it more difficult for claimants from those countries to seek and ob-tain asylum. In Canada, claimants from designated countries undergo an accelerated hearing process to ‘ensure that people in need get protection fast, while those with unfounded claims are sent home quickly – through expedited processing’ (Citizenship and Immigration Canada). Safe Lists: Between Politics and Policy

Concerns regarding the potential weaknesses of due process in refugee application processing are im-portant; however, a critical lens should also be focussed on the inherent dangers of allowing politics to dictate persecution at a macro level. When safe lists are developed based on political and economic considerations, rather than solely on a realistic assessment of the likelihood of persecution, the possi-bility of persecution is perpetuated. This article argues that 'safe lists’ place refugees in harm’s way by effectively reinterpreting the protective principles of the international refugee regime. The rationale behind adopting safe lists is based on two problematic assumptions: first, that a large number of claims made by asylum seekers are unfounded; and second, that determining whether a claim is un-founded can be largely reduced to a single factor. The assumption that many asylum claims are unfounded is closely related to perceptions that asy-lum seekers claim refugee status to circumvent other immigration channels. This assumption encour-ages an ‘exclusion-first’ reading of refugee law – that is, applicants are excluded until proven includ-ed. Evaluating the exclusion of a claimant due to their country of origin before evaluating whether the refugee definition has been met is both practically imprudent and morally reprehensible.

Determining whether a claimant faces a reasonable, forward-looking likelihood of persecution re-quires consideration of a wide range of factors, including the presence, opinions and activities of state and non-state actors; the conditions in the country and region of origin; the willingness and ability of the state to offer protection in the short- and long-term; whether tests of persecution have been met; and whether persecution stems from Refugee Convention grounds, among other factors. Such an evaluation requires in-depth research and analysis, and cannot be made simply on the basis of the


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claimant’s country of origin. Legal scholar Kay Hailbronner (1991) describes criticisms claiming that safe lists detract from the principle of status determination based on individual circumstances and impose a de facto geographic limitation on the application of the Refugee Convention. Additionally, using an expedited hearing process traps claimants between tighter deadlines and arguably higher burdens of proof. That claimants from designated countries have lower success rates is likely as much related to the administra-tive burden placed on them as it is to the weakness of their claims.

Courts, scholars and advocates have struggled to define persecution, particularly against the evolving characteristics of inter- and intra-state conflict. While some standards seem well-established, such as those established by the 1984 Convention Against Torture, the realities of persecution and the relationship between persecution and displacement are much more complex. It has become clear that receiving states – primarily in the global north, and largely without input from the international community – play a signifi-cant role in determining the standards for persecution and whether persecution exists on a case-by-case basis through the refugee status determination process. This places the existence of persecution firmly in the eye of the beholder. Safe lists provide a further opportunity for negating the individual experiences of asylum claimants and obscuring the true subject of refugee status: refugees themselves. Canada’s Safe List Policy in Domestic and International Contexts

In Canada, immigration and immigration policies have historically received significant public attention. Given that immigrants form approximately one-fifth of Canada’s population, its importance in the public imagination and national identity is unsurprising. Despite an underlying humanitarian philosophy in refu-gee policy through the late 20th century, recent sporadic arrivals of ‘boat people’ fleeing conflict in South-east Asia1 – combined with dramatized media coverage of arrivals – gave the impression that the country was being ‘flooded’ or ‘swamped’ with refugees, notwithstanding the relatively low numbers arriving by sea compared to those arriving by other means. The explosion of securitisation and a ‘fracturing’ (Zetter 2007) of the refugee label through qualifiers such as ‘bogus’ or ‘illegitimate’ has solidified negative perceptions of refugees in the public imagination.

In Canada, legislation permits the addition of countries to the safe list if asylum applications are reject-ed at least 75% of the time, or are withdrawn or abandoned at least 60% of the time. However, the federal Minister of Immigration reserves the right to add countries to the list if they have a democratically elected government and an independent judiciary. The involvement of the Minister in approving and recommend-ing additions leaves ample room for politics and political relations to influence perceptions of whether per-secution exists in particular countries of origin.

Two recent examples of additions to Canada’s safe list, Hungary and Israel, illustrate the influence of political rather than humanitarian factors. Hungary is a significant source of asylum applicants to Canada. In 2010, Canada received over 3,000 applications from Hungarian Roma asylum seekers, and Hungary has consistently been one of the top sources of asylum applications in Canada for the past five years. Though the Minister of Immigration justified adding Hungary to the safe list because of the high number of abandoned cases, the Minister was also quoted as acknowledging that a combination of lengthy pro-cessing delays and unsanitary reception facilities – rather than unfounded claims of persecution – were key in influencing case abandonment (Carlson 2011). Further, there is evidence that undertaking an initial assessment may not expedite the overall process. Initial assessments were attempted in Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s; however, approximately ninety percent of cases passed this initial credibility as-sessment, with approximately eighty percent of claimants receiving refugee status after full RSD hearings (Hailbronner 1991).

The Minister also recently announced the addition of Israel to the safe list. Though Israel has not been a significant source of refugees and asylum seekers in recent years, as an ethnically-based state there is po-tential for asylum claims at any time. Simply producing few refugees to Canada should not be a determi-nant of the safety of a country. Indeed, one might ask whether an application from Israel would not be worth more attention than less, to be certain that no injustice is done inadvertently, as ethno-political ten-sions remain persistently unstable.

In both instances current events in the political relations between Canada and the new additions mean benefits to Canada beyond the purported quick review process. In the first instance, Canada and the EU have been negotiating a free trade agreement for several years. While safe country designation would not in and of itself change the outcome of those negotiations, it is a strong signal that Canada supports or ap-proves of the social, economic and political conditions in the EU. With respect to Israel, the current Cana-dian government has on numerous occasions shown its strong support for the governance strategies of that state. Additions to the safe list thus reflect Canada’s political and economic relationships as much as an assessment whether persecutory conditions actually exist. ________________________________ 1 Arrivals continued through the 1990s and 2000s, including, most recently, the arrival of the MV Ocean Lady (2009) and MV Sun Sea (2010).


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Conclusion This article has argued that safe lists are significantly influenced by domestic and international politics at the expense of the original goals of humanitarian assistance. In Canada, refugeehood is often described as a loophole in immigration policy and is thus perceived as a challenge to the state’s ability to control its bor-ders. Reliance on safe list policies is in part a response to domestic concerns that large numbers of asylum applications are unfounded. Viewed against the backdrop of an increasingly non-entrée refugee policy re-gime, it is also clear that perceptions of ‘legitimate’ refugeehood have changed. Such treatment of refugees detracts from the persecutory roots of refugeehood, conflating refugees with other types of migrants and treating asylum policy as an extension of international politics and trade.

The factors contributing to migratory decisions are increasingly complex, and the mechanisms and pol-icies used to respond have become pale imitations of their original manifestations. Although it may be im-possible to separate refugees from politics, political priorities are malleable. If countries’ politics prioritise understanding and responding to the underlying conditions leading to migration – including the role of international political and economic power imbalances – their policies will follow suit, allowing states to respond more appropriately to contemporary migration.

Ainslie Avery holds a Master of Arts in Migration and Refugee Studies from the American University in Cairo, where she conducted research on obstacles to providing legal and welfare services to urban refu-gees. She has volunteered with several organisations that work with refugees and displaced persons, in-cluding the Canadian Red Cross, the Victoria Evacuee Assistance/Emergency Social Services team, and the Victoria Immigrant and Refugee Centre Society in Canada, and St. Andrew’s Refugee Services in Egypt. In addition, she works with the Provincial government of British Columbia, where she investi-gates breaches of privacy and ensures government adheres to its obligations to protect personal infor-mation.

References Cited CHIMNI, B.S. (1998) ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South,’ Journal of Refugee Studies 11(4): 350-374. ZETTER, R. (2007) ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globaliza-tion,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20: 172-192. HAILBRONNER, K. (1991) ‘The Concept of “Safe Country” and Expedient Asylum Procedures.’ Paper presented to the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees, and Stateless Persons, Strasbourg, September 1991. CARLSON, K. (2011) ‘Record Number of Humanitarian Asylum Seekers Landing on Canada’s Doorstep,’ National Post. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA. ‘Designated Countries of Origin,’ available online from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/reform-safe.asp> (accessed September 2013).


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Religious Plurality and the Politics of Representation in Refugee Camps: Accounting for the Lived Experiences of Syrian Refugees Living in Zaatari

By Kat Eghdamian A review of existing literature in forced migration studies and of UNHCR policies on refugee camps reveals a paucity of engagement with issues of religious identi-ty, religious plurality, and religious experience in refugee camp settings. This ar-ticle asks why this is so and posits that an engagement with these issues is urgent-ly needed. Drawing on the current humanitarian crisis in Syria, it argues for the importance of accounting for the lived experiences of Syrian refugees living in the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan. An exploration of such lived experiences can re-veal necessary knowledge about the role of religion in forced migration studies for both academics and practitioners in the field, as well as give rise to more meaningful engagement with and effective protection and assistance policies for forced migrants.

Introduction

This article briefly reviews existing literature in forced migration studies on its treatment of religion, religious plurality, and the politics of representation of religion in refugee camps. In doing so, it re-veals a paucity of research on the role of religion in the lived experiences of refugees, especially reli-gious minorities. Within the context of the Syrian conflict, it is argued that it is crucial to undertake an examination and assessment of the role of religion in Zaatari camp life so that the lived experienc-es of Syrian refugees are accounted for, in all their plurality and forms. The structure of the article is as follows. First, a brief literature review will be offered on how religion in development theory and practice has been approached to date. Second, the Syrian humanitarian conflict is introduced as a case to illustrate gaps in the literature’s treatment of religion and reflect on what remains unknown about life at the Zaatari refugee camp. The article concludes with a call for taking religious identities, beliefs, and practices seriously, not only in theoretical explorations and examinations of humanitari-anism but also in policies and practices in the field. Religion in Development Theory and Practice

Academic interest and inquiry into the role of religion, religious identities, and individual and collec-tive religious practices has increased since the attacks of 11 September 2001 (‘post 9/11’). However, within international development theory and practice, the role of religion has been largely left out of academic inquiry (Deneulin & Bano 2009). It has only been in the past decade that development thinkers and researchers have contributed significant research and findings on religion, not only on the role of Islam or Christianity but also on a plurality of religious traditions in a range of develop-ment issues. These works offered a clear move away from, and critique of, the secularisation thesis that had shaped development theory and practice for decades (Deneulin & Bano 2009; Ager & Ager 2011; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & Ager 2013). While there is now extensive literature exploring the relation-ship between religion and development (Marshall 2001; Clarke 2006; Deneulin & Bano 2009), only recently has there been a growing focus on the relationship between religion and humanitarianism (Ferris 2005; De Cordier 2009). As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2011: 429) has outlined, to date, the role of religion inforced migration has been generally examined in two ways: first, as a cause of displace-ment, for instance in asylum cases based on the grounds of religious persecution (Mayer 2007; Türk 2008); and second, as a significant factor in experiences of both internal and international displace-ment (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011). These latter contributions have explored a number of ways in which religious identities and practices influence, inform, and impact the lives of refugees. Although valua-ble, they have also been limited. For instance, studies have had to marginalise minority issues in or-der to contribute initial research on Christianity and Islam (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & Ager 2013: 20).

Despite humanitarian needs having increased around the world (UNOCHA 2013), the role of reli-gion in the politics and practice of refugee protection as well as the role of religion in forced migration more generally remains understudied. Specifically, there is a lack of research on religious experiences (particularly those of religious minorities) in refugee camps. In addition, there is also a need for theo-retical contributions to forced migration literature that examine the institutional and operational as-pects of displacement in response to religious minority issues within a post-secular setting. A critical discourse analysis of different actors’ assumptions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of religious minorities in refugee camps can offer new thinking on post-9/11 secular language as it relates to hu-manitarian contexts working with multi-religious groups. It has been posited that these contexts will also raise questions on associated assumptions about religious groups, which have the potential to


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raise further reflections on the nature and operation of values, rights, and institutional responsibilities (Ngo & Hansen 2013). The next section further reflects on these issues by briefly examining the role of re-ligion for Syrian refugees living in the world’s second largest refugee camp.

Syrian Refugees and Religious Plurality in Zaatari

The Syrian humanitarian crisis has resulted in the displacement of over 2.5 million persons, with approxi-mately 120,000 people currently living in the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan (hereafter, Zaatari). Since its opening in July 2012, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has produced and disseminated a number of public reports on Zaatari refugee demographics, experiences, and needs. Whilst relatively comprehensive in relation to demographic data on the age and gender of registered refugees, as well as their material needs and health conditions, a review of these reports reveals an understating of the role of religion in camp life, overlooking the presence and experiences of religious minorities altogether.1 This is despite a number of UNHCR policies regarding appropriate treatment of the religious beliefs and practices of refugees, and its commitment to the particular needs and rights of religious minorities. These include its ‘Age, Gender and Diversity’ policy (UNHCR 2011), its increasing focus on partnering with faith-based organisations in line with the High Commissioner’s ‘Faith and Protection Dialogue’ (UNHCR 2012), and its recent ‘Welcoming the Stranger’ initiative (UNHCR 2013). In a similar vein, Western media reports continue to offer selective representations of Zaatari refugees with no accounts of religious plurality, let alone the importance of religion in camp life.2 However, reports on the Syrian conflict have highlighted increasing sectarian and religious divisions, including a rise in persecutions of Christians in Syria (Rand 2013).

According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), the rise in sectarian and religious divisions in Syria has resulted in the presence of a number of distinct religious groups among the Syrian refugee population. During a recent visit to Zaatari, the USCIRF found that reli-gious minority refugees from Syria are not registering with UNHCR out of fear they will be targeted in the camp (USCIRF 2013a). The USCIRF therefore raised concerns that if religious minorities begin fleeing Syria en masse and seek shelter in refugee camps, they could become vulnerable to reprisal attacks based on sectarian and religious lines.3 In response, UNHCR reported that it does not have the resources to de-velop a programme that would protect religious minorities in refugee camps (Ibid.: 2), despite reports of increasing refugee flows of religious minorities to Zaatari (Rand 2013; USCIRF 2013b). Subsequently, there is growing concern among minority rights advocates that religious minority refugees may not be re-ceiving the assistance and protection they need. As humanitarian response sites increasingly work with displaced communities belonging to different religious groups, UNHCR may therefore continue to face these challenges as it responds to refugee protection and assistance.

Conclusion

Taken together, then, there is much to be done to contribute to forced migration literature in its treatment of religious plurality and the politics of representation of religion in refugee camps. Primarily, there is a need to challenge language on the secularisation of forced migration to date and the ideas and assump-tions related to perceptions of refugee identities, experiences, and needs. Among its many lessons, the Syr-ian humanitarian crisis has revealed that it is not only timely to account for the lived experiences of refu-gees, but to examine the negotiated encounters between such experiences and institutional responses to them.

Kat Eghdamian ([email protected]) is a New Zealand lawyer and human rights advo-cate. She has worked and consulted with several research institutions, NGOs, government departments, and the UN for the past 7 years. She holds Law and Arts degrees from the University of Otago, a First Class Honours degree in Sociology from the University of Auckland, and a Masters in Sociology from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is currently a graduate student on the MPhil De-velopment Studies programme at Oxford University, where she focuses on the importance of incorporat-ing lived experiences into human rights analyses and development policy-making for refugee popula-tions. _______________________ 1 The Syrian general population is made up of 87% Muslims (74% Sunni, 13% Shiites, Alawites, Twelvers, Ismailis, or Zaydis), 10% Christians, 3% Druze, with no official statistics on minorities such as Jews, Baha’is, and non-religionists (Minority Rights Group International 2011). 2 See the Aljazeera video series sponsored by UNHCR entitled ‘Zaatari: A Day in the Life’. 3 Sectarian rhetoric on the civil war has included reports that the al-Assad regime is planting individuals within refugee camps to play on sectarian fears (USCIRF 2013b: 6).


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References Cited AGER, A. AND AGER, J. (2011) “Faith and the Discourse of Secular Humanitarianism”, Journal of Ref-ugee Studies 24(3): 456-472. CLARKE, G. (2006) “Faith Matters: Faith-Based Organizations, Civil Society and International Develop-ment”, Journal of International Development 18(6): 834-848. DE CORDIER, B. (2009) “The ‘Humanitarian Frontline’, Development and Relief, and Religion: What Context, Which Threats and Which Opportunities?”, Third World Quarterly 30(4): 663-684. DENEULIN, S. AND BANO, M. (2009) Religion in Development: Rewriting the Secular Script. New York: Zed Books. FERRIS, E. (2005) “Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations”, International Review of the Red Cross 87(858): 311-325. FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH, E. (2011) “Introduction: Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement”, Journal of Refugee Studies 24(3): 429-439. FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH, E. AND AGER, A. (eds.) (2013) Local Faith Communities and the Promotion of Resilience in Humanitarian Situations: A Scoping Study. Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities. RSC Working Paper: Oxford. MAYER, J.F. (ed.) (2007) “Special Issue: Religion and Refugees”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 26(2). MARSHALL, K. (2001) “Development and Religion: A Different Lens on Development Debates”, Pea-body Journal of Education 76(3-4): 339-375. MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL (2011) “Syria: Syria Overview”, October 2011. Re-trieved from http://minorityrights.org/?lid=5266. Last Accessed 14 April 2014. NGO, B. AND HANSEN, S. (2013) “Constructing Identities in UN Refugee Camps: The Politics of Lan-guage, Culture and Humanitarian Assistance”, Critical Inquiry in Language Studies 10(2): 97-120. RAND, S. (2013) “Syria: Church on Its Knees”, Open Doors Advocacy Report, May 2012. Retrieved from http://www.opendoorsuk.org/campaign/savesyria/documents/Syria_Advocacy_Report.pdf. Last Ac-cessed 23 March 2014. TÜRK,V. (ed.) (2008) “Special Issue: Reflections on Asylum and Islam”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(2). UNHCR (2011) “UNHCR Age, Gender and Diversity Policy: Working with People and Communities for Equality and Protection”, June 2011. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4e7757449.html. Last Ac-cessed 21 April 2014. UNHCR (2012) “High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges Theme: Faith and Protection”, Background Document, December 2012. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/50aa5b879.html. Last Ac-cessed 21 April 2014.

UNHCR (2013) “Welcoming the Stranger: Affirmations for Faith Leaders”, June 2013. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/51b6de419.html. Last Accessed 21 April 2014. UNOCHA (2013) “World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2013”. Retrieved from https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/WHDT_2013%20WEB.pdf. Last Accessed 21 April 2014. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013a) “Special Report: Protecting and Promoting Religious Freedom in Syria”, April 2013. Retrieved from http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Syria%20Report%20April%202013(1).pdf Last Accessed 22 March 2014.


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UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013b) “Factsheet Syria: Syria’s Refugee Crisis and its Implications”, July 2013. Retrieved from http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Syria%20Factsheet%20-%20July%2018.pdf Last Accessed 20 March 2014.


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—Law Monitor—


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Repatriation of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Voluntary?

By Valentina Hiegemann

The repatriation of Afghan refugees continues to be the world’s largest repatria-tion operation, involving more than 5.7 million Afghans who have returned home with the assistance of UNHCR mainly from Pakistan. Evidence suggests that many refuges have been pressured to leave Pakistan despite the unsafe and unfa-vorable conditions in Afghanistan . Applying relevant international legal princi-ples, this short study calls for urgent research on the repatriation efforts by the Pakistani government, the international community, and UNHCR, which could be violating international refugee rights and breaching the legal principle of non-refoulement.

Introduction

Pakistan presently hosts 1,621,525 registered Afghan refugees, one of the largest protracted refugee situations in the world.1 Although the issue of Afghan refugees is a protracted one, UNHCR has assist-ed around 5.7 million refugees to return home through its Voluntary Repatriation Programme since March 2002 (UNHCR ud), and returning refugees represent near one quarter of the total population in Afghanistan (UNCHR 2012). Previous studies have been conducted to evaluate whether the repat-riation to Afghanistan has been voluntary or not.2 Evidence demonstrates that many refugees have been pressured to leave Pakistan even though the conditions at home are unsafe and unfavorable (HRCP 2009). Based primarily on one study conducted by the Human Rights Commission of Paki-stan, and relevant international legal principle, this study aims to look at the extent to which it could be argued that the Pakistani government, the international community and the agencies allowing and/or facilitating the repatriation are violating refugee rights. Could a case be made that these actors are breaching the legal principle of non-refoulement? Afghan Refugee Flows

Large numbers of Afghans first fled their homes as a result of the internal conflict following the take-over of Afghanistan by the Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Party and later due to the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1979. By the 1980s, more than six million people sought refuge in Pakistan, Iran, India, Turkey, the United States and Western Europe. With the support of UNHCR and other organisations, camps were established in Pakistan and Iran to house migrants from Afghanistan. Hostility among Pakistani people began to increase as the country’s frontier began to experience large numbers of refugees. Repatriation efforts began in 1992, when around 1.4 million refugees returned to Afghanistan after the mujahidin overthrew the Soviet Union-supported government in Kabul. However, instability and conflict caused by the failure of the mujahidin to successfully establish a government led to the outflow of more Afghans soon after (Vincent and Refslund Sorenson 2001). During this period, further displacement occurred as the Taliban gained control of most of the state. Their extreme Islamic policies, discriminative practices, humanitarian abuses, and bias against non-Pashtuns contributed to the additional 700,000 refugees who fled to Pakistan and Iran. A severe drought starting in 2000 caused additional displacement, resulting in 172,000 refugees in that year alone. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 forces bombed the Taliban government in Ka-bul and a temporary government led by Hamid Karzai replaced it. 160, 000 Afghans had left their homes by the end of 2011 and fled to Pakistan even though the state had closed its borders. In 2012, the Afghan refugee situation alleviated as the Karzai government provided some stability to the coun-try and massive repatriation efforts began led by the UNHCR (Ghurfran, ud). Nonetheless, refugees have continued to flee their homes due to enduring deteriorating security conditions (Vincent and Refslund Sorenson 2001). Pakistan as a Host Country

As of 2014, Pakistan hosts around 1.6 million registered Afghan refugees. Most of them reside in ur-ban areas and refugee villages (UNHCR ud). In nearly thirty years of conflict, many Afghans have been born in Pakistan and integrated into society. This, together with the fact that there have been __________________________________ 1 As of October 2013, Pakistan is the host of 1,621,525 Afghan refugees. This figure only indicates registered refugees. It is difficult to accurately calculate the number of Afghans because many have returned to Pakistan and later reentered Paki-stan. In addition, a significant number reside in urban areas and do not approach UNHCR, and thus remain unregistered (UNHCR 2013). 2 E.g. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 2009. Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Push Comes to Shove.


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several waves of refugees fleeing Afghanistan and refugees returning to Afghanistan, rendered it difficult to accurately calculate the number of refugees (HRCP 2009).

Despite the fact that Pakistan hosts such a large refugee population, the local situation of the state is far from favorable. Pakistan is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the national legislation of Pakistan does not directly address refugee rights. In addition, the judiciary and police generally do not have knowledge of refugee law, making the refugees vulnerable to injustice and unfair treatment (HRCP 2009). Furthermore, refugees have lived in Pakistan without legal documents for over 28 years. Only dur-ing the 2007 registration did the Government of Pakistan begin to issue PoR3 cards that allowed refugees to stay until 2009 and protected them against deportation, arbitrary arrest and extortion (HRCP 2009). The temporary stay of Afghans was extended until 2012 and later until the end of 2015.

Non-refoulement

The most significant relevant international human rights instruments, which powerfully express the prin-ciple of non-refoulement, are the UN Convention against torture and the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention that “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any matter whatsoever to the frontier of territory where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. Although Paki-stan is not a signatory of the Convention, it is bound to respect this right, which is now customary law. Furthermore, article 3 of the CAT4 stipulates “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture (Stoyanova 2009). International law therefore binds Pakistan not to return refu-gees whose life, liberty, and safety could be in danger upon return to their home country. Voluntary or Forced Repatriation?

Due to the tense relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, security concerns, and the decrease in aid given to the country, Pakistan has pushed for repatriation by creating harsh conditions for Afghan refu-gees. It has created an environment of fear and persecution to force many refugees out (HRCP 2009). Electricity has been cut off in the villages and camps, houses have been destroyed, camps have been closed down and thousands of refugees have been pressured to leave against their will. Also, state policy has given the police power to make random arrests without warrants and refugees are often victims of harassment and beatings by the officials (HRCP 2009). Claims that refugee camps have served as recruiting grounds for armed groups have accelerated the efforts to close the camps (Witte 2009). Refugees have further suf-fered from the fact that governments and agencies have failed to differentiate between civilians in need and armed militants in camps and refugee areas because they are able to blend in with the population (HRCP 2009). Another reason that has pushed Pakistan to adopt such drastic measures has been the de-crease of international aid. The international community has significantly reduced the aid it gave to Paki-stan in previous years and it has to be acknowledged that Pakistan does not have the necessary resources to cope with the massive population of refugees without international support (HRCP 2009). The financial and political support of the United States and its allies has also further facilitated and encouraged the re-patriation of the refugees. The perceived voluntary return of refugees demonstrates the “success” of the war on terror against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and legitimizes the military actions in the country (HRCP 2009).

Repatriation efforts primarily led by UNHCR continue to occur. The UNHCR Manual on Voluntary Re-patriation of 1996 stipulates that refugees’ repatriation must be spontaneous and occur at their own pace. The Pakistani authorities have also always insisted on voluntary repatriation being their preferred solution (Zieck 1997). It is certainly true that, although some were forcibly evicted from the camps, Afghan refugees were not physically forced to leave Pakistan. However, they were forced to live in conditions that shed doubts on how the extent to which their departure was ‘voluntary’.

Situation of Afghanistan

According to the 1996 UNHCR guidelines cited above,5 another condition for voluntary repatriation is that the situation in the home country must have improved to ensure the safe return of the individual. In truth, the situation in Afghanistan has not sufficiently improved to provide accommodations and offer security for its returning population. Many refuges in Pakistan originate from the troubled areas in the south and southeast of Afghanistan where the security concerns are higher (HRCP). There are military operations, suicide attacks and armed conflicts. Suicide and improvised explosive devices have caused more civilian ________________________ 3 Proof of registration 4 Pakistan is signatory to the United Nations Convention against Torture


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deaths than any other method of attack (IDMC 2010). In addition, land mines prevent people from return-ing and restrict cultivation of the land. Statistics show that around 15 percent of Afghans live in mine-affected areas. Another significant obstacle that returning Afghans face is the lack of access to land that often results in disputes. It is stated in the SSAR6 that around 60% of returning refugees encounter diffi-culties rebuilding their lives. The country is the poorest in the region and individuals are subjected to a lack of shelter, jobs, schools, electricity, and a limited access to basic services such as potable water. As a result, many refugees return to later become internally displaced. Conclusion

Despite the principle of non-refoulement, the evidence presented above suggests that Pakistan has pres-sured refugees to repatriate to a country where the conditions are anything but favorable. The government has created an environment of persecution and fear in refugee areas and has closed down camps without proper arrangements for its residents. “Western” governments claim that Afghanistan is safer than it was before 2001 when the Taliban held power. However, it is safe to claim that the country is not capable of properly accommodating and ensuring the security of the returnees. Albeit repatriation efforts will contin-ue to occur, UNHCR predicts that security conditions in Afghanistan are likely to remain poor due in part to the withdrawal of international security forces. It also predicts additional internal displacement for the remainder of 2014 (UNHCR ud). Repatriation to Afghanistan has not taken into account the willingness of many refugees to go back or the harsh security and socio-economic conditions of the state. In such a con-text, it is doubtful how ‘voluntary’ the repatriation of Afghan refugees has been. If it has occurred involun-tarily, and if it was shown that upon return to Afghanistan, the life and freedom of the refugees are at risk, one could argue that Pakistan, with the cooperation of the international community and the agencies in-volved, may be violating international refugee rights and breaching the legal principle of non-refoulement. The answer to this question is not within the scope of this paper, but it does call for urgent research on the matter, given the seriousness and gravity that such accusation would entail.

Valentina Hiegemann is a Venezuelan national who holds a MA in Migration and Refugee Studies from the American University in Cairo and a BA in International Relations from Florida International Uni-versity. She has conducted fieldwork and research on refugee communities in Egypt, and presently works with several NGOs in the United States conducting research on immigrants from Latin America. References Cited GHURFRAN N. (undated), Afghan refugees in Pakistan Current Situation and Future Scenario, Policy Perspectives. Vol. 3 (2), Available at: http://www.ips.org.pk/the-muslim-world/1023-afghan-refugees-in-pakistan-current-situation-and-future-scenario.html#_ftn26 [accessed 27 May 2014]

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN. (2009), Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Push Comes to Shove. IDMC (2010) Armed conflict forces increasing numbers of Afghans to flee their homes. Available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/afghanistan. STOYANOVA, V. (2008), The Principle of Non-Refoulement and the Right of Asylum Seekers to Enter a Territory. CASIN. Available at: http://www.americanstudents.us/IJHRL3/Articles/Stoyanova.pdf. UNHCR (2012), Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), Geneva. 2-3 May 2012. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/afghanistan/solutions-strategy.pdf [accessed 27 May 2014] UNHCR (undated), Pakistan. UNHCR Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487016&submit=GO [accessed 27 May 2014] VINCENT, M. AND B. REFSLUND SORENSON (2001), eds. Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced. Pluto Press _____________________________ 5 UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection 1996 6 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees


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WITTE, G. (2009), ‘Pakistani Refugee Camps Seen as Recruiting Grounds for Extremists’. The Washing-ton Post, 25 May. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/24/AR2009052402963.html [accessed 27 May 2014] ZIECK, M. (1997), UNHCR and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees: A Legal Analysis. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers


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The Deficiencies of UNHCR’s RSD Procedure: The Case of Choucha Refugee Camp in Tunisia

By Ricarda Roesch, Giulia Jacovella, Annalisa Bezzi, Juliette Garms

After the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, hundreds of mainly African refu-gees moved to Tunisia and found refuge in UNHCR Choucha camp waiting for their asylum requests to be processed. According to various NGO reports, several irregularities occurred with regard to UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedure. Hence, by taking the example of Choucha refugee camp, this article explores the failures of UNHCR to comply with both human rights law and its own procedural standards. In particular, this article analyses the lack of a fair and impartial RSD procedure through the testimonies of three asylum seekers. Evidence from these testimonies clearly demonstrates UNHCR’s mal-practices and its failure to adhere to due process standards. This analysis high-lights the need for a more critical discussion on the RSD procedures and out-comes.

Introduction

After the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, hundreds of forced migrants moved to Tunisia and found refuge in UNHCR’s1 Choucha camp, where they waited for their asylum requests to be pro-cessed. According to various reports from Tunisian and human rights organisations, irregularities and malpractice in the RSD procedure occurred (Human Rights Council 2013: 3-4).2 On 30 June 2013, the camp was officially closed. However, many of the recognized refugees who could not be re-settled and about 250 refused asylum seekers remained in the camp, living under very poor condi-tions without access to basic needs and facilities.3

In 2005, UNHCR published Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UN-HCR’s Mandate (RSD Standards) to assure an efficient asylum process under its mandate (UNHCR 2005). This article explores how UNHCR has failed to provide a fair and impartial RSD procedure to many of the asylum seekers in Choucha, using concrete cases and testimonies as examples.4 First, this article assesses whether UNHCR has respected its own procedural standards in Choucha. Second, it questions whether the provisions governing the appeal mechanism and the right to receive reasons for rejection comply with the requirement of human rights law, especially with Art. 14 ICCPR. The procedural shortcomings in Choucha exemplify the urgent need for a reform of the appeal procedure and a more critical assessment of UNHCR’s performance.

The Implementation of UNHCR’s Procedural Standards in the Case of Choucha

The mandate of UNHCR was defined in 1950 through the General Assembly Resolution 428 (V).5 Ac-cording to its Statute UNHCR is responsible for ensuring the international protection of refugees under the auspices of the UN. UNHCR conducts RSD procedure mainly in countries in the Global South, which often do not have refugee legislations (Kagan 2005:3). Therefore, UNHCR’s RSD proce-dure determines the fate of a high number of forced migrants all over the world. A fair procedure in the RSD is crucial, as impartiality eliminates the appearance of arbitrariness within the process. Also, rigorous procedures are a safeguard against human mistakes (Kagan 2002:13). In the following sec-tions the implementation of some of UNHCR’s RSD Standards is analysed in the context of Choucha. ______________________________________ 1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2 See also Human Rights Watch 2011; R. Al-Abbasi and J. Hardman (Internews Network) 7-15 March 2011; Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux 2013. 3 As part of a local integration project, UNHCR, in cooperation with the Tunisian Red Crescent, tried to resettle part of the asylum seekers in the city of Medenine. However, due to massive protests among the Tunisian population, the majority of them were forced to return to Choucha. 4 The evaluation relies on three confidential testimonies (who are referred throughout the article as A, B and C) provided by the UK-based NGO Fahamu Refugee Programme. All three asylum requests were declined by UNHCR. These asylum deni-als were upheld after the appeal procedures which were however characterized by several flaws. Fahamu tried to convince UNHCR to reopen the files due to the irregularities in the RSD procedure, but UNHCR refused to do so without explanation. The cases concern a Chadian national A, who worked in the presidential guard and was tortured for refusing to kill civilians; a Pakistani national B, whose life was endangered both in Pakistan and in Libya, where he had spent most his life, because of his father’s political activities; an Ivorian national C, whose father was accused of being a spy for the current opposition party. 5 UN General Assembly, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (14 December 1950) A/RES/428(V), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3628.html [accessed 30 April 2014].


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Security and Confidentiality

According to section 2.4 of the RSD standards, UNHCR is under the obligation to provide facilities which enable petitioners to present their asylum claim without being threatened or harassed. For instance, when Chadian national A went to UNHCR’s office in Libya he saw Chadian embassy employees collecting infor-mation about asylum seekers from Chad. He also noticed that the same problem occurred in Choucha, where the Chadian Renseignements Généraux were in contact with UNHCR officials and thus scared the Chadian asylum seekers. This is clearly in breach of the security standards and of the applicants’ right to confidentiality found in section 2.1.1. When A and other fellow nationals submitted a complaint report to the UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR replied that it could not take any steps against the Chadian officials due to their protected diplomatic status.

This is very problematic, as the applicants were persecuted for different reasons in Chad. Letting Chadi-an embassy employees access private information and question asylum seekers against their will can en-danger their life and security. Moreover, the cooperation with Chadian officials also raises concerns about UNHCR’s impartiality, which deserves further investigation and assessment based on these findings. Staff Behaviour and Complaint Procedure

According to section 2.6 of the RSD Standards, procedures should be established to respond to complaints made by asylum seekers in cases of serious misbehaviour of UNHCR employees or procedural misconduct. However, the testimonies show that UNHCR in some cases ignored the complaints it received. For exam-ple, in the case of the Pakistani national B, he and his family were repeatedly pressured to go back to Paki-stan by a Pakistani UNHCR employee in Al-Hayat camp and given the impression that their asylum re-quest had no chance of success. When B informally complained about the employee’s behaviour to the manager of the Al-Hayat camp, he did not receive information about his right to complain under section 2.6 and he never got a response. The same situation then occurred in Choucha, and as a result of his past experience, B was afraid to fully disclose his story during the official asylum interview, and did not file an official complaint. Access to Trained and Qualified Interpreters

According to section 2.5.1 of the RSD Standards, asylum seekers should be granted the right to interpret-ers ‘at all stages of the RSD process’. This standard was not always respected during the asylum seekers’ interviews in Choucha. In the case of the Pakistani national B, whose first languages are Punjabi and Urdu, the interview was conducted in English due to a lack of professional interpreters. This increased his mis-trust toward UNHCR as he found it difficult to articulate his refugee claim in a non-native language and in the stressful conditions of the RSD interview. In the case of the Ivorian national C, the interview was con-ducted in French, which he could speak. However, the interviewer’s language skills were dubious, and the asylum seeker expressed concerns about his ability to be fully and correctly understood. Handling of Documents

According to section 2.2 of the RSD Standards, each camp office should establish detailed file management procedures for the handling of RSD files. These include processes for the efficient filing and retrieval of RSD files as well as securing physical storage to prevent loss or damage. However, serious irregularities appear to have taken place in Choucha. For example, in the case of the Ivorian national C, UNHCR took his passport when he first came into to the camp, even though the RSD standards only require that photo-copies of ID documents are taken. When C went to the UNHCR office in Zarzis to get his passport back, UNHCR said that they had lost it. Compliance with Art. 14 ICCPR

The right to a fair trial is prescribed in various human rights documents that stipulate that all persons shall be considered equal before courts and other legislative bodies.6 It has been argued that UN bodies are not bound by human rights obligations and that Art. 14 (1) ICCPR is not a norm of customary international law (Pallis 2005: 880-1). Nevertheless, UNHCR has instructed its employees to respect the spirit of these agreements. Moreover, where refugee law is absent and UNHCR effectively takes over the role and func-tions of the state, it should be bound by the same human rights obligations as states (ibid). UNHCR’s own practice and statements clearly demonstrate that it has accepted the applicability of the right to a due pro-cess in the RSD procedure (UNHCR 1995). However, those international human rights standards are not clearly expressed in the procedures and have not been sufficiently implemented in Choucha. ——————————————————— 6 Art. 10 UDHR; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(1): 1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law […].


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Reasons for Rejection

Section 6.2 of the RSD Standards requires that, ‘wherever possible’, applicants whose claims are rejected should be informed in writing of the reasons for the rejection. This very weak wording of the procedural guidelines is unlikely to meet the requirements of a fair procedure. Art. 14 (5) ICCPR requires that the ac-cess to ‘a duly reasoned, written’ decision be granted in all circumstances (Human Rights Committee 2007: para 49). Therefore, a reasoned rejection should be given to all asylum seekers in order to avoid un-necessary appeals and to give rejected asylum seekers the opportunity to prepare their appeal claim in the best way possible. In Choucha, though the Pakistani B and Ivorian C did receive a written rejection, they were not notified about the specific reasons for it. This serves as evidence of the weakness of this proce-dure in practice. The Right to Appeal

The right to a fair procedure under Art. 14 (5) also requires that decisions can be reviewed by a ‘higher tri-bunal’. Under section 7.1.1. of the RSD standards, the applicant should be informed of his/her right to ap-peal upon notification. Furthermore, ‘[a]ppeal applications should be determined by a qualified Protection staff member who was not involved in the adjudication or review of the RSD claim in first instance’ (7.3). In practice, appeal procedures may actually be conducted by the same group of UNHCR employees who carry out the RSD interviews, as in the Choucha context. This situation calls into question the ability of ap-peal procedures to be impartial and objective, and to comply with human rights standards. Additionally, according to section 7.5, it is only recommended, and not compulsory, to give reasons for the appeal deci-sion. Hence, the asylum seekers felt the appeal decisions were arbitrary. Final Remarks

Three different types of problems can be observed with regards to the RSD Standards. First, the language is sometimes ambiguous and leaves room for broad and loose interpretations that challenge UNHCR’s ability to provide adequate information to asylum seekers throughout the RSD process. Second, despite the fact that many rights are listed in the standards, failed implementation was a consistent issue in Choucha. The three testimonies used for this article, which are just a small example of a wider problem, give reasons to question that the UNHCR’s effective implementation of its own procedural standards. Therefore, UNHCR should re-open the relevant files, critically assess its own performance in Choucha and identify those responsible for the violations of the forced migrants’ rights.

Third, some provisions in the RSD Standards are themselves in breach of the internationally recognized right to a fair trial7 and due process.8 As highlighted above, the most critical structural deficiency is the lack of a separate, impartial appellate body which the competence to review and overrule decisions. The trans-parency of the procedure could also be greatly improved, for example, by giving reasoned decisions to all rejected asylum seekers.

In order to prevent such shortcomings in the future, more research is needed that focuses on improving the accountability of UNCHR. Moreover, as Pallis suggests, we need to acknowledge asylums seekers as rights-bearers with agency rather than as simply beneficiaries of assistance (Pallis 2005: 917). Only then situations like Choucha can be avoided and the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers truly respect-ed. The introduction and implementation of fair and impartial procedural standards could be a first neces-sary step in this direction.

Giulia Jacovella ([email protected]), Ricarda Roesch, Annalisa Bezzi and Juliette Garms are four postgraduate students in International Law at SOAS University of London. They are interested in Islam-ic law, forced migration and global administrative law. This article is a part of a project undertaken for Banyan SOAS Advocates regarding a former UNHCR refugee camp in Tunisia (Choucha). References cited AL-ABBASI, R. AND HARDMAN, J. (7-15 March 2011) Humanitarian Information Assessment at Choucha Camp on the Tunisia/Libya Border, Internews Network. Available from: /www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/HumanitarianInformationAssessment _ChouchaCamp_Tunisia_2011-03-07.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2014). ____________________________________ 7 Art. 10 UDHR. As it is indicated in the RSD Standards (7.4.1), ‘procedural fairness’. 8 Art. 14 (1) ICCPR.


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FORUM TUNISIEN POUR LES DROITS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIAUX (2013) Rapport Con-cernant la Situation des Réfugiés au Camp de Choucha. Available from: <www.ftdes.net/sites/default/files/choucha.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2014). HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (12 August 2007) General Comment No 32 CCPR/C/GC/32 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, GENERAL ASSEMBLY (28 May 2013) Report on the Rejected Asy-lum Seekers of Choucha Refugee Camp A/HRC/23/NGO/103. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2011) ‘Tunisia: Protect Migrant Camp Residents’. Available from: <www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/23/tunisia-protect-migrant-camp-residents> (accessed 26 March 2014). KAGAN, M. (2002) 'Assessment of Refugee Status Determination Procedure at UNHCR's Cairo Office 2001-2002', American University in Cairo, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies. KAGAN, M. (2005) ‘The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection Challenges Posed by UNHCR Refugee Sta-tus Determination’, Int J Refugee Law 18(1): 1-29. PALLIS, M. (2005) ‘The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms’, N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 37: 869-918. UNHCR TRAINING MODULE (1995) ‘Human Rights and Refugee Protection RLD 5’. Available from: <www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3ae6bd900.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2014). UNHCR (2005) ‘Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate’. Available from: <www.refworld.org/pdfid/42d66dd84.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2014). UNHCR (2013) ‘Populations of Concern to UNHCR’. Available from: <www.unhcr.org/50a9f81b27.html> (accessed 27 March 2014). Legal instruments 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1950 Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugee 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee


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—Field Monitor—


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Employment and Livelihoods of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo1

By Benjamin Petrini Based on fieldwork conducted in 2012, this piece focuses on the social and eco-nomic welfare of Sudanese refugees living in Cairo, Egypt. The study unveils the challenges and constraints of this community in finding sustainable livelihoods, its coping mechanisms and employment options (formal/informal type of em-ployment, gender dimensions, job search). Given the protracted nature of Suda-nese refugees’ displacement situation – a condition shared by countless refugees and IDPs communities globally – the study subscribes to a theoretical framework that focuses on long-term sustainable development solutions for forced displaced people, beyond their immediate humanitarian needs. Sudanese refugees suffer from lack of adequate livelihoods, unstable or lack of employment, and – since the 2011 Egyptian revolution – a protection deficit. Research briefly explores the rela-tionship between employment, household welfare and gender relations.

Introduction

Based on fieldwork conducted in 2012, this piece focuses on the social and economic welfare of Suda-nese refugees living in Cairo, Egypt. Within the conceptual framework of the development challenges of forced displacement and the search for durable solutions (Christensen and Harild 2009), the study unveils the challenges and constraints of this community in finding sustainable livelihoods, its coping mechanisms and employment options (formal/informal type of employment, gender dimensions, job search). Given the deteriorating status of the Egyptian economy and the deep political crisis through-out 2012-13, there is no evidence that the economic and social strains of Sudanese refugees in Cairo have been at all alleviated. If anything, the influx of 120,000 Syrian refugees in Egypt (UNHCR, Sep-tember 2013) and increasing poverty levels among Egyptians further adds reasons for concern.

Through this specific case, this article demonstrates the need for a development approach (as op-posed to a humanitarian and assistance-based one) to situations of protracted forced displacement. Such approach strives to address the long-term development needs of refugees and Internally Dis-placed Persons (IDPs), who have been in displacement for several years and who have failed to achieve a durable solution to their situation (i.e. local integration, return, or resettlement). Through a focus on the development challenges, including land access, housing, livelihoods, employment and access to services (health and education), this approach puts emphasis on individual and collective self reliance of displaced people, away from aid dependency.

Increasingly, policy makers (World Bank and donors like the Danish International Development Agency, DANIDA) are focusing more attention to the development long-term needs of displaced peo-ple beyond the humanitarian level. In fact, there is wide evidence that of the estimated 10.5 million refugees and 28.8 million IDPs globally (IDMC 2012), a large portion live in a protracted displace-ment situation in an urban environment plagued by socio-economic vulnerabilities and protection deficit. Protracted displacement warrants development responses that focus on economic self-reliance and long-term sustainability in terms of housing, livelihoods and employment, among oth-ers. In addition, the plight of protracted displacement is especially pronounced in urban contexts, where refugees and IDPs may carry on a marginal and shadow existence. In urban settings, reliable figures on forced displacement are harder to obtain and, in turn, vulnerabilities may be more exten-sive.

The one presented here is a case in point: Cairo hosts one of the largest urban refugee population globally, has an estimated eight million people living in slums, and the Sudanese refugee community is one of the oldest and most established one (Sabry 2009, cited in Feinstein International Center 2012). Since independence (1956), Sudan has been engulfed in two major civil wars (1956-1972, 1983-2005), which produced mass waves of refugees.2

___________________________________ 1 This article is the product of field research in Cairo and a succinct desk review of the literature. In January-February 2012, I conducted four focus groups with Sudanese refugees and five interviews with key informants; plus, I held a number of con-versations with Sudanese refugees and I submitted a short questionnaire to twenty-five of them. In addition, I had countless informal conversations with refugees during March-July 2011, when I volunteered as a trainer at Refugees United for Peace-ful Solutions (RUPS) in Cairo. Having had the privilege to hear their stories has been an invaluable enrichment. This article is dedicated to them. Special thanks go to Kathy Kamphoefner (Executive Director, RUPS), Enrico De Gasperis, Matteo Goz-zi, and to a number of RUPS members for their generosity, logistical support and comments. I take sole responsibility for the content of this article. 2 Until South Sudan’s independence (2011), Sudan had the largest number of IDPs globally (estimated 5.2 million) and hun-dreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees in protracted displacement spilling throughout the region. The 1983-2005 civil war caused an estimated 4 million refugees (DeRouen and Heo 2007).


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Several thousands fled to Egypt due to several factors. Geographic proximity, relatively easy access to Egypt from Sudan – via the Nile, via land, or via the Red Sea – and a common history of colonial domina-tion by Great Britain, facilitated labor migration, trade, and the establishment of a numerous community of Sudanese merchants, laborers and business owners in Egypt throughout the XX century. Such existing networks of family or community members expanded in the XXI century and acted as a catalyst for Suda-nese refugees.3

Despite this rooted history of migration and forced displacement, Sudanese refugees still lack services, struggle to make ends meet and suffer from a deficit of basic rights. In addition, these trends made it diffi-cult at times to distinguish between refugees and migrants. Contrasting figures are startling: according to UNHCR, as of June 2013 Egypt is home to 202,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Among them, those from Sudan are around 23,000. Past estimates put the figure of Sudanese refugees and economic migrants liv-ing in Cairo between 500,000 and 3 million – with a total number of Sudanese in Egypt of 2.2 to 4 million (Azzam 2006; Kagan 2002). However, a recent estimate ranges from 55,000 to 65,000 (Zohri 2012, cited in Jacobsen, Ayoub and Johnson 2014). Arguably, the most vulnerable of them are those without stable livelihoods, housing and employment. Lately, the 2011 removal of President Mubarak from office triggered a period of heightened vulnerabilities and increased protection concerns: a faltering economy and declin-ing living standards greatly affect refugees, who lack social safety nets and are more exposed to rising crime.

Profile of Sudanese refugees (2012)4

- For the majority of them Cairo was the first destination of displacement after fleeing Sudan - Level of education among participants is high: twenty-one refugees studied and/or completed univer-

sity degrees - Length of displacement: Sixteen refugees have been in Cairo for eight or more years - Geographic concentration: They do not live confined in one single neighborhood, but rather they are

scattered around the city - Housing: None of the refugees owns property in Cairo, all live in rental apartments. Refugees live with

other refugees and/or migrants, and almost never with Egyptians. Tenants include friends, co-workers or community members.

Livelihoods and poverty

All focus groups’ participants indicate a general dissatisfaction with living conditions, employment oppor-tunities and prospects for durable solutions to their displacement condition. For most Sudanese refugees, life in Egypt is harsh and they suffer from a combination of unstable and informal employment, low sala-ries, lack of rights, shrinking access to services and assistance, rising prices, discrimination and renewed security concerns. The resulting livelihoods of Sudanese refugees is unstable, even more so for vulnerable categories (children, single-mothers, elderly).

Out of twenty-five respondents to a questionnaire, 60% stated that food is “sometimes scarce” and “often scarce” in their household, and only three said that it is “always available.” None of the respondents answered that salary is sufficient to meet household’s monthly costs and expenses. And without other sources of income (aid, remittances, community assistance and solidarity), no household is able to get to the end of the month with their own means.

This situation hampers the possibility of self-reliance and increases a position of dependence upon aid organizations, relatives in resettled countries, and the community. Many participants stressed the aspect of survival: refugees only manage to survive, not live, and, as one participant stated, ‘This is not a life of dignity.’ A Sudanese refugee, who currently works as a psychosocial worker, posited that the most im-portant concern for refugees is their lack of any future vision outside of their condition of displacement: “No one has any plan for their life,’ he said, and, due to the lack of proper income and job prospects, ‘No one has any hope.’ _____________________________ 3More recently, an additional factor of Sudanese fleeing to Egypt has to do with resettlement policy. Since the mid-1990s UNHCR in Cairo has run one of the largest resettlement programs globally. More than one focus groups’ participant referred to potential resettlement as the motivating factor to reach Cairo. By many accounts, several refugees were attracted by the prospect of reset-tling in a third country (Australia, the US and Canada were primary destinations, as were European countries). As one humanitar-ian professional put it, Cairo was perceived as “the Mecca of resettlement” by Sudanese refugees. Throughout this period, a quar-ter of UNHCR-protected Sudanese refugees benefitted from resettlement. Nevertheless, in 2005, following the peace agreement between Sudan and the rebels, resettlement of Sudanese came virtually to a halt, creating unfulfilled expectations and mounting frustration with UNHCR by the refugee community. Since revolution in Egypt and war in Libya, resettlement cases have increased again. Arguably, short-term resettlement programs, while considerably improving the lives of few beneficiaries, created false ex-pectations within the refugee community at large. 4 Based on a written questionnaire submitted to twenty-five Sudanese refugees administered in February 2012.


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Employment

According to the Egyptian law, refugees have the right to a work permit, as any other foreigner. Conditions for Sudanese refugees are slightly different. Given the historic ties between Sudan and Egypt and the sev-eral waves of displacement mentioned above, the two countries signed the Wadi El Nil Treaty (1976), which allowed Sudanese refugees and migrants to enter Egypt and obtain residency without needing to file for asylum. However, the increasing number of Sudanese forced Egypt to ask UNHCR to start asylum-seeking procedures (1994). Then, in 1995, a life attempt on President Mubarak in Addis Abeba (which was attributed to Sudanese Islamist) was followed by a dramatic revert of benevolent policies toward Suda-nese, with the revocation of the treaty.

In 2004, the Four Freedoms Agreement between Sudan and Egypt stipulates Sudanese refugees’ ex-emption from seeking a residency and work permit. In reality, the agreement is not implemented, which has a negative effect on Sudanese refugees’ livelihoods and ability to find work. In fact, obtaining a work permit is a nearly impossible process (Jacobsen, Ayoub and Johnson 2014; Feinstein International Center 2012). No refugee that I spoke to has a regular work visa: no one stated to have even met a refugee with a regular work visa. One NGO coordinator stated that none of the refugees that work or volunteer for her NGO has a work visa. Thus, refugees work illegally and/or in the informal sector in basic professions re-gardless of their level of education.

Men are usually employed as unskilled laborers in construction sites on a temporary basis, and employ-ers are usually Egyptians. Not having a work visa dramatically affects refugees’ vulnerability: refugees earn a lower salary than Egyptians, and are not covered by work insurance. Although laborer’s jobs are on a temporary basis (day by day or week by week), they are relatively well regarded among Sudanese refugees since they guarantee a salary and pose little danger in terms of personal security.

Most participants referred to street vending (with watches and perfumes as the two most commonly cited items) as the second most common job for male refugees, but one that is difficult and dangerous. Margins for profits are low and uncertain, and insecurity is rampant. Refugees claim that all street vendors have to pay a bribe to the police in order not to be harassed. It is common that refugees are taken into cus-tody and brutalized, or it may also occur that their goods get confiscated. Regarding this, more than one participant admitted that because of vendors’ illegal status, police have sometimes fabricated charges of illegal drug possession or other felonies in order to arrest them.

Educated Sudanese tend to look for jobs as teachers, translators or interpreters. Usually, Egyptian schools do not hire refugees. One participant recalled his personal experience: in 2003, he was hired as an English teacher in an Egyptian school, but he was offered a lower salary than his Egyptian colleagues. Su-danese teachers are hired in Sudanese-run schools to teach English, Arabic, and literature, among other courses. One participant, for example, taught Arabic and music at the Modern Education Center for Suda-nese in 2006-2010. Nevertheless, jobs as teachers and translators are in high demand and only a few man-age to work in these capacities. Other work positions mentioned in focus groups include clerk, office work-er and cleaner, driver, gardener, maintenance and repair, tour guide and seasonal jobs in the tourist indus-try, mainly in the Sinai.

Gender relations and employment

Given men’s low salaries and difficulty in finding jobs, women – whose traditional social role confines them in the household and not on the job market – are often forced to look for employment in order to supplement household income. Unemployment rates for men are higher than for women, who can more easily find employment. Women overwhelmingly work as domestic workers, mainly as housekeepers, cleaners and/or baby-sitters for Egyptian families. Salaries are substantially higher than what men earn.

This situation poses strains on households and on gender relations. Women who work are also expected to fulfill their domestic role of caring for the children and the house – and sometimes they can’t. Some fe-male refugees are employed as cleaners and nannies living full-time with the family employing them, espe-cially during summer when Egyptian families move to holiday resorts on the Sinai or the Red Sea. All par-ticipants lamented that women are often mistreated and abused by their Egyptian family: given their refu-gee status, women do not receive benefits, insurance, and are in constant fear of losing their job. More than one account was reported of refugees not paid after work is completed and sometimes abruptly laid off.

Participants (both men and women) reported that unemployed men grow increasingly frustrated and humiliated due to their inability to find work and to the fact that their spouse is employed. Domestic vio-lence and alcoholism are therefore frequent. Regardless of their level of education, most participants in focus groups (both male and female) agreed that women’s role should be in the house, caring for children and managing the household. Evidently, this situation adds a gender dimension and further complexity to refugees’ livelihoods and household welfare: lack of employment and sufficient income put strain on Suda-


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nese household traditional social norms, and act both as a catalyst and an impediment to women’s eman-cipation.

Conclusion

Currently, the post-Mubarak era is one of economic uncertainty and rising unemployment in Egypt. Argu-ably, this situation has put more strain on refugees. Sudanese refugees admitted that rising prices and de-clining employment threatens the survival of the most vulnerable. Security has deteriorated: an increase in crime levels affects the wide community of refugees and illegal migrants in the country. Participants re-vealed episodes of sexual violence, harassment, and burglary perpetrated by Egyptians. In some previously safe neighborhoods, refugees now no longer walk at night if not in a group. According to many, the main security threat to refugees comes from the police itself due to weakening law and order and lack of ac-countability.

As of 2012, no sustainable income generation strategy was available to refugees, who not only were una-ble to plan for the future and solve their displacement situation, but also struggled to access basic services and retain their occupation. Evidence shows that these trends have not reverted as of 2014 – but may have actually worsened. The present findings resemble those of similar recent studies on refugees in Egypt in 2012-2014: in particular, they highlight the lack and/or instability of employment, the difficulty in obtain-ing work permits and the resulting employment’s informality (Feinstein International Center 2012; Gozdziak and Walter 2012; Jacobsen, Ayoub and Johnson 2014). This condition has deep negative effects psychologically and socially. The social discrimination to which refugees are subject to, their vulnerabili-ties and protection issues are reflected in all aspects of social and personal life. Therefore, a development approach to Sudanese refugees in Cairo (and not only Sudanese) is needed in light of the unviability of du-rable solutions: the prolonged stay of Sudanese refugees highlights the unlikeliness of return or resettle-ment, as well as the enormous legal and social obstacles to local integration. Thus, without development assistance, Sudanese refugees’ vulnerability is likely to continue.

Benjamin Petrini ([email protected]) is a PhD candidate at the School of Oriental and African Stud-ies (SOAS), University of London, with seven-year experience in policy-making and programs on conflict and development. He is a consultant with the World Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB), where he completed assignments on post-conflict reconstruction, fragility analysis, and forced displace-ment, among others. His PhD research focuses on social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia. References Cited AHMED, Y.M. (2008) ‘The Prospects of Assisted Voluntary Return among the Sudanese Population in Greater Cairo’ (online), Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo AZZAM, F. (2006) ‘A Tragedy of Failures and False Expectations’ (online), Forced Migration and Refu-gee Studies (FMRS), The American University in Cairo CHRISTENSEN, A. and HARILD, N. (2009) ‘Forced Displacement: The Development Chal-lenge’ (online), Conflict, Crime and Violence Issue Note, The World Bank DEROUEN JR, K. and UK H., (eds.) (2007) Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II, Santa Barbara CA, ABC-CLIO FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER (2012) ‘Refugee Livelihoods in Urban Areas: Identifying Program Opportunities. Case study Egypt’ Feinstein International Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University GOZDZIAK, E.M. and WALTER, A. (2012) ‘Urban Refugees in Cairo’ (online), Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University GRABSKA, K. (2005) ‘Living on the Margins: The Analysis of the Livelihood Strategies of Sudanese Ref-ugees with Closed Files in Cairo’ (online), Working Paper 6, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies (FMRS), The American University in Cairo INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE (IDMC) (2014) Global Figures (online). Available from: http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures (Accessed 27 April 2014)


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JACOBSEN, K., AYOUB, M. and JOHNSON, A. (2014) ‘Sudanese Refugees in Cairo: Remittances and Livelihoods’, Journal of Refugee Studies 27(1): 145-159 KAGAN, M. (2011) ‘Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee Protection’ (online), Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo. KAGAN, M. (2002) ‘Assessment of Refugee Status Determination Procedure at UNHCR’s Cairo Office, 2001–2002’ (online), Working Paper 1, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies (FMRS), The American University in Cairo SABRI, S. (2009) ‘Poverty Lines in Greater Cairo: Underestimating and Misrepresenting Poverty’, Work-ing Paper 21, International Institute for Environment and Development, London UNHCR (2014) Populations Statistics (online). Available from: http://popstats.unhcr.org (Accessed 27 April 2014) ZOHRY, A. (2012) ‘Estimating Number of Refugees and Migrants in Urban Areas: The Case of Sudanese in Cairo’, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo. Unpublished.

http://popstats.unhcr.org


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—Firsthand Monitor—


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‘We are half died’: Experiences of a Transgender Refugee in Uganda

By Anonymous

This article was written by a transgender refugee from Rwanda, now living in Uganda. The author shares their experiences of life as a transperson in Uganda, with particular reference to the recently passed ‘Anti-Homosexuality Act.’ Since the bill was signed by President Yoweri Museveni in February 2014, LGBTI people in Uganda have experienced an even greater number of human rights violations. Both their security and their liveli-hoods are gravely threatened, and at least one transgender person has been murdered in Kampala. Victims of LGBTI hate crimes are often afraid to report incidents to police and are left without legal recourse.1 The author has requested to publish this article anonymously.2

Being a trans, being a sin! After all these years old, the sun shines every day but never on us. Abused, rejected, harassed and killed - as LGBTI people, we have faced so much horrible treatment by homophobic people, but now we are tired. I am 32yrs old. When I was very young I was rejected by my dad and adopted. My mother was abused and tortured a lot because she was accused of making me the way that I am (trans). One day my mother was beaten almost to die because of me. When my parents separated because of me, I was on the streets. All these things that have hap-pened have given me ideas of suicide so many times. I had grown up being hated by people and fi-nally I came to hate myself! Sometimes friends and people supported me so that I could live where I wanted to be. But one day I found my life in danger when I was serious injured, arrested and tor-tured which caused me to leave my country [Rwanda]. I became a refugee in a homophobic place because of a lack of other options and because I was traumatised. I now live where I am not allowed to share my story with everyone, where I am not allowed to enjoy my life the way it is, where I am forced to regret why I was created. Me and people like me are in a horrible situation. In the market they change the prices because of you, in the church they preach about you, you have no access to justice, you fear police! I have no access to medical care because I fear doctors. Last year I was given the wrong medicine by a homophobic doctor. Many of us are not educated because we fear teachers. We have no refuge in any corner of life. After what happened in Uganda, the law which was signed by the president, a few days later my name was changed. I am now called Obama, not because I am the president of America, but be-cause he supports LGBTI people and rights, and I look like them! Many of us are no longer with our families, having been chased out a long time ago after this law, and others of us no longer have any-where to sleep or anything to eat. We are treated like animals by people. Recently my best friend was almost killed because of being trans. After being threatened, raped, arrested and tortured, we still have him, but it is now like a picture of him, not him. And when we see all these things, you say ‘tomorrow it will be me.’ Really, we are half died.

____________________________

1 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/uganda-anti-homosexuality-act-prompts-arrests-attacks-evictions-flight-2014-05-15

2 The author of this article speaks and writes English as a second language. Where necessary, small grammatical and

structural changes have been made to the article for purposes of improving clarity, with final approval by the author.


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Call for Papers

Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, Vol. 4, No. 2

October 2014

__________________________

Deadline: 22 August 2014

OxMo, the student journal dedicated to protecting and advancing the human rights of refugees and forced migrants,

is accepting submissions for our eighth issue. We welcome articles fitting within the following sections. For further

information and to read the latest edition of OxMo, please visit www.oxmofm.com.

OxMo Monitors

Policy Monitor: critically examines policies and practices implemented by governments, (I)NGOs and UN agencies in

all phases of forced migration. Please submit to [email protected]

Law Monitor: critically analyses national and international laws, rulings and governmental policies as well as legal de-

velopments taking shape and their possible implications for the rights of forced migrants. Please submit to

[email protected]

Field Monitor: critically explores direct experiences of working with forced migrants, including in field work or re-

search in camps, or engagements with forced migrants in your local community. Please submit to fieldedi-

[email protected]

Submissions to Monitor sections should be no longer than 1,500 words.

Academic Articles

This section provides a forum for students to explore practical and conceptual issues pertaining to forced migration.

Submissions must engage with and interrogate existing literature on forced migration, present in-depth research in a

given area, and offer original insights into a situation or trend. As OxMo recognises and values the multidisciplinary

nature of Forced Migration Studies, we encourage submissions from across academic disciplines, including but not

limited to: political science, law, anthropology, ethics and philosophy, sociology, economics and media studies.

Please submit to [email protected]. Submissions to the Academic Articles must not exceed 6,000

words (including footnotes).

First Hand

This section encourages individuals to share personal reflections on experience(s) of displacement, presenting the

opportunity to those directly affected by the laws, policies and activities of governments and agencies we monitor to

give expression to their insights and perspectives. We seek critical, balanced analyses that allow the reader to gain an

understanding of the context in which the report is written and that engages with wider implications of the situation

described.

Please submit to [email protected]. Articles for First Hand should be no longer than 1,500 words.

Closing date for submissions is Friday, 22 August 2014.

For any queries, please do not hesitate to contact us at [email protected].


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http://oxmofm.com/

[email protected]

Past Issues of OxMo __________

OxMo Vol. 3, No. 2

November 2013

OxMo Vol. 3, No. 1

May 2013

OxMo Vol. 2, No. 2

November 2012

OxMo Vol. 2, No. 1

June 2012

OxMo Vol. 1, No. 2

October 2011

OxMo Vol. 1, No. 1

February 2011

__________

OXFORD MONITOR OF FORCED MIGRATION