-
15Reflections on Emotions,
Imagination, and Moral ReasoningTous ard, an Inte grated,,
Multldts cipli,narA App ro achto Moral Cogni,ti,on
WAYNE CHRISTENSENKonrad Lorenz Institute for Eoolution and
Cognition Research
Beginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary
perspectiveson moral cognition, we argue that the various
disciplines have an inierest indeveloping a common conceptual
framework for n-roral cognition research.we discuss issues arising
in the other chapters in this ,roi.,*" that mightserve as focal
points for future investigation and as the basis fbr the
eventualdevelopment of such a framework. These include the role of
theory in bindingtogether diverse phenomena and the role of
philosophy in the constructionof moral theory. we discuss the
problem of disfinguishing descriptive andnormative issues and the
importance of systematic normative analysis forempirical research.
we argue that theories of cognitive architecture shouldplay an
important role as a backdrop {br investigation into specific
aspectsof moral cognition, and we consider some of the taronomic
issues thai willarise {br moral cognition research, including types
of moral agents, forms of
JOHN SUTTONMacquarie Unioersity
-
EMOTIONS, IMACINATION, AND MORAL REASONINO
moral cognition. and the nature of morality itsel[. Pirrally. wc
rlisctrsskey issues in moral development, including the importance
of uing the fine-grained structure of moral motivation and
emergingschemas and the role of active interpretation and
problem-solving as chiacquire moral skill.
INTRODUCTION
ecently, one of us (Christensen) was visiting a friend, and the
diturned to the friend's oldest child, a 9-year-old boy with some
bedifficulties. The boy is visiting a psychologist regularly, and
the d
sis is that he might have mild Asperger's. The father was
consideringpop psychology book that provides techniques for
teaching empathy toin the hope that this would help. And after all,
he said, you cannot have tooempathy. Christensen agreed that the
book might help but wasn't so sure that"cannot have too much
empathy." He has a relative with schizophrenia whoriences powerful
empathic responses when in more acute phases of herThese empathic
responses are often inappropriate-responses to perceivingers'
distress and unhappiness when there is none-but, more importantly,
forperson the strength of these empathic responses is disabling.
Fortunately,of us do not experience such strong empathic responses
to the emotionalof others, because it would be dlfficult to live
our own lives coherently if we
Clearly, emotions and empathy play a fundamental role in
mediatingrelations to others. Normal, fluid interaction with others
depends on nuresponsiveness: Based on mutual expressiveness and
sensitivity, we canconversation, gain trust, and over time develop
intimacy with a friend orner. When social emotions go awry-as they
do in individuals with schizoph?eiAspergers, and psychopathy-social
interaction can be difficult or evenous. This book, and the
workshop on which it is based, explores these issues,here we
reflect on some of the contributions and themes.
INTEGRATING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVESON MORAL COGNITION
A central concern of philosophy from its beginnings, moral
cognition is nowimportant subject of investigation for a number of
empirical disciplines, andvolume reflects the vibrancy of
contemporary research. This is an excitingphase, but it also
presents new problems. At a basic level, there is a problemmutual
understanding: The various disciplines employ diverse methods,and
research questions. Those from a philosophical background may
struggleunderstand, for instance, how a psychometric instrument
like the PsChecklist Revised (PCL-R) is devised and employed (see,
e.g., Langdon &Chapter 5; Mcllwain et al., Chapter 6). Equally,
those from a psychological orroscience background may have
difficulty following the nuances of tdiscussion of the metaphysical
noncommi,tment thesis and its relation to if pfiilosophy is to
participate effectively m the aforementioned cooperative
REFLEcTIoNgoNEMoTIoNS,IMAGINATIoN,ANDMoRALREASoNING329
fl,sr)onsibility (Mc(ltxri, Oltrtptcr l4)' The greatest
di{ficulty-may lie not with the
i;';1,;.i;; ;ri"ut,,t wl,ut is written-aut-hors have generally
done well in writ-i,,g ii;;" t",erdisciplinary audience and are
admirably clear-as with graspingif ,i.i""p".:r.gic,,oithe 1"r"rr"h,
the background context and reasoning
that go
i,,i,, .-,"'""p*ilri.rg the issues in just-this paiticular kind
of way. It can take a long
ltrrr.rrrsion in the activiti., of u 'JignUoti"g discipline'
along with some luck find-
i,,l{ .lr" right colleagues and informints, to iegin io operate
successfully within an
iil[,,, ,yrtZ. of con"cepts and assumption-s' Miny of the
chapters nr,olde substan-
ii,,l i,ri.od,r"tory discussions that tietpf"Uy present some of
the relevant context;
Ir,,wever, such discussion, "",, go o'ly
'o fui, u"d it's notable that the conceptual
lrtrrrlscape differs greatly across chapters' - r -, -^.Mutual
understandinl ^.i.".
from and contributes to mutual engagement, and
tl,,,re is a substantial amZ,t't of cross-disciplinary
engagement on show here' In
,ut,lit.r, to the fact that the volume u, u ,ihol" is
inierdisciplinary, many chap-
i,,,1,. ,,ruaat" disciplinary boundaries' Many of the moral
problems,used as stim-
,,fi t" "-porcal
sirdies'discussed here are sourced from-philosophy' Malle
and
-
EMOTIONS, IMAGINA TION, AND /VIORAL I(EASONI N(i
disciplinary matrix envisaged then respect lilr its rrrotlxrds
alrl cgrrtrilrrrtirimportant. nro.ad]r speaking, we see tfiree
possibilities lbr trre relati,rr [l*tphilosophy and the sciencei,
repracement, Lngogu^nrt, and sepctr.tisr*. rtt I,_"*:::::l.n*l *
.xpansion of empirical"s"I"r"" wrests t.orn f
nitrr,,pirytraditional suhject matter; pror"r. in (rigorou$
empirical science *ril;ill';(m,erely speculative) philoiophical
theorj,.r In the 6ngagement *oJJ_*lriqhTll o"*n"1 . philosophy
b""o*", ^a furi-fledge.l -"i.,b'". or u "ffi*tiu.,plrnary m_atrr1.
taking in{brmation from the empirical disciplines and contrilto
them. In the sepaiatism moder, phirosophy h", r.,odu*i"i.ily
Jrnl*r* ,ods and subject,matter to.the scienJes arrd oplrates
autonomously.
Separatism has been dominant in Englisir_speaking analyti"
ihilorophy, uhas conceived of the division between piiroroihy
"rri
the ,"i"i"", i, t"ro,,ilistinction between conceptuar and
empiricai questions. phirosophy isrorcerned with conceptual
que,stionr, ,iirg coiceptual onolyrir'u{ ft,,vhere conceptual
analysis involves the forinulatt"i,
"i arr"".i,*"#"".r,ingmeaning of particular concepts, llke
knouleclge, intenti,onal action, or resparts*,/r7. such theories
are evaluated by their ,r"'""r, against counterexampies-ths, cases
that fit the definition but are not instances Jf th"
"orr""pt. it
" *"thod
rotoriously dependent on intuitions: The judgment that a
particriu. "ur"
i, o, isrn instance of the concept in question is
-based on the intiritions of the philosol
:al community, and the invention of counterexamples is "ir"
r"n a,il""ilrugi,rf the philosopher.2 Philosophers, it turns
out, have very fertile imaginations,rxamples sometimes taking the
form of esoteric science fiction-like scenarios.rroblem is that it
is not clear whether we can trust our intuitions for such sases.
Another problem is that it is not clear whether the intuitions
ornignty t:|tl?.:,pl"T are representative of the broader community,
with som"e reasonhrnk that they are not. This leads directly to the
probrem that, since psychologlan and d, use empirical methods to
investigate concepts, it seems h;rjir ;; j,ft{#;f :rl-, that
philosophers do not need to] rn" fi"ld oi n*1rni*nr,rol
phila*athy.wy developed in response to these kinds of probl"*r
rrr'd uses-e*perimentEflrethods to investigate the interpretations
that lalpeopte hr""
"r:ir-r" i"rGilt
roblems that philosophers have been grappri"g #ith. Knobe (see,
e.g., 2008) trn exponent of experimental philosophy, ""i ultt" and
Gugrieimo s (6hapter is)ritical response to Knobe here is a
f'ascinating example in wfirch u t.uirtiorrrt phtl.sophical problem
(the nature of intentionalitiludgmentr) t
", nr.t r""rrtackled by
-
UOTIONS, IMAQINATION, AND MORAL REASONINQ
So, in our view, the separatism model cannot w.rk fbr
phikrs.priy becaurt;eds engagement with the sciences if it is to
place its theori& on a jefLnsiblo forg against empirical
challenges; however, the basic problem for philosophyrplies to some
extent to a1l disciplines. That is, each discipline, and indeed:1d,
makes assumptions_that might in principle be disproved by results
in otJlds and disciplines. Philosophy's struc[ural r.i,eakness lias
bee, ihat it has hadstematic mechanisms for checking its empirical
assumptions, but equallye few systematic mechanisms for ensuring
that researih within any partnprrjcal field is compatible with
results tn oiher fields and disciplirr"r. Ti.,rr,sciplilyy
engagement is an appropriate model to strive foa not simply
becwould be nice but also because it is mandated by basic scholarly
p.irr"iples,rportant to have systematic mechanisms for checking
assumptionJ.
-Some may wonder, however, whether replacementls not tll more or
ress i
rle fate ofphilosophy. The previously descirbecl case
ofpsychological research:entionality judgments, where we see
psychology intrud-ing into itraditional fl,philosophy is gristfor
such a view. And the issue of testa'bility provides furrtivation
for the replacement view. The idea that important claids should
bele is a core value for scientists, one that philosophe.s do not
always appear tory seriously. A comment we have overheard (we name
,ro rr"rn"riir, :idon,t rrrking with_philosophers as long as
they're talking about things that areperimental_philosophy applies
empirical methods to philo"sophical rt if one is thinking of doing
experimental philosophy ih" qr"rtio,
".ir"r, ,
t go allthe way and become a full-fedged piychorogisi? Aftei
all, just what ismary distinction between experimental phiiosophy
and psychology?one reason replacement might not be the inevitabre
faie'of phiiosophy is
r remorseless drive to testability and experimentation *^y .^iry
witfr it critations that are balanced by distinctive philosophical
stiengths. Testabipal can take different forms: we can dlstinguish
n n ro* undbroad. testabililrrow testability is the idea that every
imporLnt claim should be testable and,s to be taken seriously,
actually tested. Bioad testability is the idea that theruld be
assessed against available evidence, with theoiies that provide
therrall account of the evidence being preferred. Experimental
scientists focus'row testability: Their mode of operation is the
experiment, in which the manted phenomena are carefully shielded
from urrcontrolled contextual iI their primary academic currency is
the experimental journal article.losophers of science long ago gave
up o, th. idea thi narrow testability isrropriate goal for science
as a whole, and with good reason. Scientific th; can be complex and
abstract; consequently, to airive at a specific predictiony be
necessary to take into account multiple aspects of a theory (ii
some casItiple theories) and use a complex chain 6f infe-rences
that bridge between tory and the shielded experimental situation.
If an experimental result is notdicted, the fault may lie with
bridging inferences and methodological limts rather than the theory
(see, e.g., Levy & McGuire, Chapter B)."And, iflt lies with the
theory, it may be drfficult to isolate where in t^he structure
ofory the mistake lies. Narrow experimental testing of all the
individual ideasnto a theory can be not merely impractical but alio
logically impossible. He
REPLESTIONS ON EMOTIONS, IMAGIT'iATION, AND MORAL REASOI{ING
lrroad theory asscssnront rnust also focus on internal coherence
and predictive andr,xplanatory success in relation to the overall
body of evidence. Darwin's theory ofnirtural selection is a good
example: It is strongly supported by the evidence, butI lrcre are
no decisive individual tests.
Theories get their value because they can unite a variety of
seemingly disparater,irses into a coherent picture, draw subtle
distinctions between superficially similar
plrenomena, and provide deep explanations. They make difficult
phenomena trac-ttble. In the case of moral cognition, we are in
urgent need of theory because thephenomena are very complex. The
issues that arise in the investigation of moralrrrgnition include
many that are fundamental to human cognition and agency ingcneral
and hence span all of the cognitive disciplines. Many of the issues
are very
rrbstract and conceptually difficult-for instance, the question
of what it is to beir rnorally accountable agent appropriately held
responsible for one's actions. As itlrappens, philosophy has a rich
and sophisticated body oftheory on exactly theseissues (see, e.g.,
McGeer, Chapter 14). In fact, it is no accident that philosophy
hasthis body of theory: It is constitutionally interested in
high-level, synoptic issuesand conceptually difficult questions.
Thus, philosophy has distinctive strengthsthat can make a valuable
contribution to the investigation of moral cognition, andtliese
strengths are linked to the fact that it is nof focused on narrow
testability.
For this reason, although we think that experimental philosophy
is a valu-Irble addition to the philosophical toolkit, we do not
think it is the right generalrnodel for conducting philosophy.
Philosophy is concerned with more than justconcepts; it has a
broader role in theory construction on fundamental issues, suchas
thJnature of moral agency, for instance. Indeed, the theoretical
orientation ofphilosophy means that there can be problems
translating philosophical thoughtLxperiments and counterexamples
into experiments that investigate how laypeople
think. Philosophical thought experiments and counterexamples are
often designedto probe theoretical issues that are relatively
distant from everyday problems, andthe reactions of laypeople to
such problems may not be particularly relevant to the
theoretical questions being posed by philosophers. For
comparison, there is littlereason physicists should care about the
responses of layfolk to the Schrodinger'scat thought experiment,
which is an analytic tool for investigating the stnrcture ofa
theorylhat only a competent physicist can properly understand. The
problem oftranslating from a theoretical context to the
investigation of ordinary thinking iscompounded when the theory is
normative because relations between normativetheoiy and the
descriptive nature of lay responses to moral problems are
complex,as discussed in the next section. Philosophical thought
experiments such as theTrolleyProblem mayprove useful tools for
empirical researchers, (as, e.g', employed
by Langdon & Delmas, Chapter 5; Mcllwain et al., Chapter 6),
but results shouldbe interpreted with caution because the original
thought experiments were framedwith abstract theoretical concerns
in mind. They were not otiginally designed toprobe how people
actually think about moral issues, and while they might
never-ihel"r. provide useful insights in the longer run it may be
better to devise moralstimuli that specifically target real-world
moral cognition.
One of the ways that high-level synoptic theory is valuable is
that it can providea carefully framed context within which more
specific empirical questions can be
-
EMOTIONS, IMACINA I-ION, AIt D MORAL IIF,ASONI N(}
::':1::*:].^:1?,1.:n':tt'cl. otlr.r.tlrirrgs l,t'irrq r',1r*rt.
ttr. tiu.r rtrirr ir Prrr::!.::,,:Ifi.i:.:::11,i::,Jrs
art, consisk.rrt, wjrrr rtx.
-
336 EMOTIONS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASONINOmoreover' trre
most moralry admirabre indivicruars rnty be fiiirry rare. It
t5;ji.'lf J::: ffi #l*::t:i1,9::g";;t,t ti,ti"u,y,o,.ui rbrrns
orcognition are morally objectionable. Th;;;;""'aLroLruarry,ormal
tormide"ntrfy rhe ,,ril*"lli,rtributjon of forms
", *::1,": _quite distinct p
and (2) devel.,..^.*^*,-.^ ^r^_ .. ^ moral cognition in the p,lf
",.,;H:H:;,";:*ivecrassincat";;;irb"J:,#,T!T1,":H;l#"r{Dsvchonnrh.,
oc _^*^rr. :Trl and.morally objectionable, *,fu;;i;,p syc h o p
athy as m ora rI v obj
" ;, ;;i; ;;il "Jfl ;
".lll,,l;_1ll Ji"l "11,,,."r# lm5::t';1! !!1nr,rt'.p[""r
""."eptuar anarysis is
not;1#1'""r;;jl*:;11."-n,i-'.::;;:i"i#iJ:l3f,i'IJ;',,lffi"jphiloso.h_
oi r-^-+,^ ],"o-frnity attitude, f.. tf."i, ,o."1",r"""
"rll_,0Phitosophy at teast has the
;;;;";;il'rrr":ffiffiil*1lffi,if:critical scrutinv; it wi, be
" pr;i;;r" ri;;;". of objectivity obscuresof normative
irtritio.r, in empirical research. In the cesc nf ^"_,
r.-_^.appropriatenormativecras#'"',#id;;?i:l_T. jii;;j.:".Tff
ni*Ti
i: l:"::$: i,: :frl,:h i,; :*1,;, lx, t" b; i i ;;i ; ", "
",:i",r,,,gventions -o.".r.,*r1"r,,, *"^ -.^--- me-more
fine-grained aniventions -or" po-Lrful, the
"".r""i*" ,rr"# rr,i,ffiX"rr* l:llH*ff,some cases more
consequential, foi" "^urot".psychopathic or nlrll,,".,^r;^- r^---r
. . '' it-*'y be possible to pr,p syc h o p ath i c or M ac h i
au,er r ; il ";;p #; [i; jl#:l ffi f :,;,Jf
^;:"it?;fi :11ffi:1,,l,:il**1, iff :1."H l:i,*ii: ri dl JJ'Ji IJ
I I i #" ",,,,,r\J puwerruJ rntervention lechniorres become
auailable. farents, !varied knowredge and g*rr, r'iii ,"r;;';;;k"
,r,", ,i.ffiffi.:;rs may[#T,tT: :ilrj:i,I j=,9."_*]:',r, ii' l. "
"i "*r """ " d a n d dys ru nc tionar. o r]may attempr ro
detiberat{,:_j::: *" "ir",1, "i ,# "?,ilr,T[:il_rr;llx;'lffi:
B:HIff""d in a caree*u"h u. business ;,1;;i Ent'i"p,ene
In such a conrcyr ",:::f.:{ willpromulgate advice *iJ"ry.
"' """'In such a context.
"u."f,i .r,1"'-r,o ff;;!}#:Ii,1:ll *iil b" a vitar iff :
:kn:ffit :il1[,:1'-'";'.;.' ; ;" i, o',ig, n" cr as si ncar ion or
pathorbgieswill be imnnrrqn+ *^**.^u^"laro,
techniques. Normative models of irrorrt
..,rriwiltbeimportantboth*"1-"o;;;;ffiT"tr',",ffi ffi
i:ffIJlfrT:,;;::iinterventions' Again, these are reasons for close
engagement between phirosoand the empiricil ai,"rprir".
ri;dil;;ii*r,,,o,.
MORAL COGNITION AND COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE,tjfiri Ul is not a
good model also because Iarmportant implications fnr -^..r
^^^--:!j- . 1g:1
theories of cognition can hat mporr ant i m pticar ions !r r:*.t
".g^,.,.r. ",rlffi
il;ffifi lill,f#Tedge takes and the way that r,
,f,*""r'f"ir"i.)nittn is tL" t"rf.-"1.?herl.li-_ *^-_r -_ ..., p1.t
o[ underslanding moraln it ion is th e tas k o r ", b"d a i, ;
;;;H; ;;r'il.r. L:;:[::J*i-"
I"Ul:;"J;iz:::;?;:*::;lf:*:::"",.:""-'""*tervtackrethisaroneBycoEnu
ff !:f,"3;;:,;:,*ffi :,;Umi1i,*$i"fi:""#f 11"?:ffiff iiWhat are
,fr" ."i."r""irr;.,,t "-J ^-^^^ -. atter, how are the systems
related$whararetherepresentili.*j,;an;";; j:li,::[.,TJ[,,Jf
,"#:;"J""rlHaidt's appeaj to dual-process accounts i.;". "g,
zoori,, "r.rr*ple of howbroader conceptions of cognitive
architecture
"1 ,1*p" ";J;;;n proposahon the nature of morar cognition.
e""..airf* duar-process trr"".irirg, there is
REFLECTIONS ON EMOTIONS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASOT'{ING
337
6 lirst, high-capacify autornatic system and a slow,
Iow-capacity conscious system(nr,r' livans, 2008, for a review).
Mackenzie (Chapter 11) and Kennett (Chapter 12)nrgrrc that major
moral decisions induce moral reasoning that plausibly
influencestil,r'isions and that even when moral ludgments or
actions are fast and automaticI lu ,y will often have been shaped
by a prior history of moral learning that involvedIrrl ional
reflection. But, if all rapid moralludgments, and the actions thus
insti-gtrlcd, are purely automatic, as dual-process theory
suggests, our rational moralItg(rrrcy is still very limited and
somewhat robotic-for instance, we can review andlrlrrn ahead
rationally, and rationally learn new response dispositions, but in
theIrcrrt of the moment we operate on autopilot.
It is arguable, however, that an important class of cognitive
processes doesrrot fit into either pole ofthe dual-process
taxonomy. Specifically, these processesrl'r' controlled but
relatively low effort, rapid, and relatively high capacity.
Theser,lraracteristics might allow effective cognitive control of
proximal action in time-plcssured situations, contrary to
dual-process theory. If such cognitive processesr,xist, they might
support controlled moral ludgment in proximal action control.'l'lre
question then is what reasons there are to think these processes
exist. To beginwith, consider controlled cognition. Although the
paradigm form of controlled cog-rrition is reasoning-extended
linguistic deliberation-there are a variety of kindsol'controlled
cognition. Mental rotation is a nonlinguistic example (e.g.,
imagine arcd Volkswagen Beetle; now rotate the mental image 180
degrees in the horizontalplane), as is visual search (e.g.,
scanning the room for your keys). Controlled cogni-live processes
can be used to make rapid explicit judgments (e.g., a visual
compari-son to decide which of two objects is larger), and
controlled judgment processes
-
338 EMOTIONS, IMACINATION, AI\lD MORAL REASONINCI
practiced contr.lletl:""I'l:lt]:li, c-rnpl.yirrg a rich
sitrr.ti,rr rnorlerl.i't6e air.rrrlicircu mstances ( Endstc-y.
lgg5).
. . wn! these pieces in place we can now tease out the
connection to mrlrrrl r
il::1, lT:"?i,Yffi5",;: !"hp,:l,1ll and Kennett (chapter
izipoinr ,,,t,are all moratly skiled; rhrougli chitdh""J ;;J;:;;f
;:;;,,1*,Jiru, u,,,,Ill*,lf""yl::ll3: lT,-:llllcr us with astock of
p."r;n?;;1,Jg..,,,responses-we do not
"::d..o thmk through whether,.:ril;;;;r,1,;g";;",;
ffi5,-j: ::"j1:,";:jll,^:1,: ry:11d" ,,"*ith , u"ay
"il.;'^ii,,ffiag" ,",, ,draw on to make controlled. mirrt
lrdg.n"r;;; ".;;fly.
;;; ;riil::T: ffi;lY""rn_"":1,:3:l,"llg,1:11"1,,.u* rEi"g,*tful
is a complex.kilr that _,rsitimes draw on rich situational
informati8n, ililG;;#""ii,,',1" _r",i*::."::: *":1? *t\r",e to, and
tf,"r ,"-"*t experiences. We are o{ten tactlren ta(because we are
thoughtliss, urd
"o.rr"rr"ly being tactful requires thoughtLy::: il,^"I],::l
i"ticipating, choosing o.,, *o.dl "r,"f,,Iyj.'J,;;jir." trr" ,we
can shape our actions using controlj-ed eralua,r,.
ifrriir."J;;;.u"Ii rrr,.#::::*:::T1"":,iy:} In,,l*" ,,,gg"st, it is
possibl" to _*k" "o,,,;d","d moreljudgments in the heat of the
momen, iiJ .o
"r" them in prox,,,r, "."#::"tX[fiTJn this case we should reject
the apparent ,imitation on mora, reasoninfimplied by dual-process
theory because. i.,j" nru* argued. duar-process theory
hoversimplistic in negrecting the possibility of pervasive decision
making that is furtand relatively effortress but contioiled
u,ri."l'"ti r"ry,,r"r"upJrt"Jc"rrerarizirrg
from this case, the nature of cognitive ,."hit""trr" wiil impose
strong constrtrintlon many aspects of morar cognition, and
conseque"try it *iri;; iil;fu", to rerulrmoral cognition to globar
tf,eories of cognition. At this point, ii may be worthreturning to
the question of the reration"betwee, phirosophy'u.ri in"
scieneoq,Before, we claimed that phirosophrcar theories _of
ug"rr"y ""iirrr,r*sing againutempirical challenges like that of
gnidt (e.g., 200f, and we cited Rlvenscron,r(chapter 4) survev of
empiricar "ua"rr""'fE.taining - n".ru""-:. (rrns, rggz)theory of
the role of fictio; in morar
"ogritio, as an example of how such buttresn.ing might occur.
The critique we have j;ust given of duar-process theory is
anothErexample, and conceptually the iss.,e of cJgnitive
archiiecture is an appropriat.intermediate lever for theory
bridging bet#een more specific forms of.cognitiwresearch and
theories of agency. Tf,e#i", of "ogritive
arihitecture and theories of::i,y:T:l1l-::1..:ly m:sheq. both
because"ru"t, "r,o,i "og",i," "*t ,tect*rowill b e cons traints on
t he orie s of aggncy
"" J ; ; ;;; ;;;;;;3#""":;"r.*ll;
higherJevel understanding of the.i" ,ilri ""g"itive architecture
performs. If thoyare meshed it will be easier to rerate theories zl
agercy to empiricar findings aboutcognition, and chalrenges rir
-
40 EMOTIONS, IMAQII{ATION, AND MORAL REASONINQ
not ntoral frortr a gc-rreralist point o[.vit,w will ,point of
ui"*; thJrormative distinction
*,-,,,"11',1#-,1i,]'.;t'.J-i:l".apartirur,L ur vruw; rne normative
distinction trrus arlbcti.g the crescriptive*-",1L":^T"na
to fe investigated. A., "rrpt*ri, on moral rules and ofor
instance, m ay obs cure
""1"""a
-
r,,""rffi ffi J::l:';: tH.illr.,:#-
1""yil:"1,:llT:1,*,:T:,;_',"# ;rd;;;dren,as ..increasingry
deontic,lmay be right, but onlv part of th" ,tory. ih"r;t ;*;
J',H:I,HyrfiTT;i1i:?.l:: :T:TiTo,l*"j.,.",,a th" 7*.ii.",r
consequence. of ,,o,,r vioraibut atso can be more fl,id
""a "ort"r1r";:",#ililJ.t;'ffi:HfrTiJl",ifl:;il1f..:Tl *::.f
,":. crude rute r.rfo*"r, f"t sophisticated morat
interun:l]:.:*:,slupmuttiple*".-lry;;t";;;;ffi ffi
;rJ;[,:T:#T:l#Ti:::Y:_]:1qT:,.1":*p"re churchrana, zoo0, ctark
ree6, 2000). rs itIie sometimei, for instance, to protect
,o_"orl;r"". d]il;ffi; illfi,f.:T:*i:l*l."Tl::l1r r"1,g 1"1,^ii"
r"",r storep Maybe nor so much,also possibte that the"re are
individuar arn"."""", ,i:;l;i:i';"-*d#[tsome individuals tending
toward n ""i"".rrt, .ure-oriented styre ani others*,:Ty?:,::
:?li,h" emprasircs "o","**,i1,;s**;.'*-
r,/,u a,,uIf it is hard to even d6fin" trr" r"op""l??;T#;, more
specific tu*onorl
:T:;: :^:?.:l ::F,'.,.i,research 1J nol r,r"ryl.I" ,","i
"L"'..1,*. ,,n,of the morat emotions wil be "r" "f
,h;;;;id;:i:il:r:i::.Jffi,il;i"T:'::,::^:": Tl.TT1,,or in this,,or,
*".' l{r'.ote d in Langdon and M acken :introduction, defi
nitions
"1 "iprgrl "r.r;;H;;:HTi,Jfr"#Hawes. and Dadds rChapter sj d"hr"
;r"n;",}emoathtt /rhc "ho.;-^ ^r --^.r , , ' ,
Y as encompassing bothempathq (rhe sharins oirnoth".i "*oil;;
ffi).;il ffi;n ,,r";i:',f,
ffiTlXlil1Tf ;k*::.Xj"ll1U #ji_Tn et ar (chapter 6) adopt aIar
distinctio,i b"t,"", hot and, ";i;';:,^p;rhu r"
Iiii;lii1T"t"i.o*X'xl;
lfl"Ss"} I i'j':iT:* j:t:.ll l::l o'iJ "il g, *r p e r s p e c t
i a e,, r,,,1 g.Tiffi ::',tX"'l[t-ff :$1'"'"r'"ffi
;i;i:;::.""y^:r:":{;':r;"ilT{:lmore acri\/e emnn+tn;^-^",rl."irr*
lT?li""r^(,ypically sadnesr'o. "t."".r,), ;rd_more active cmpathic
role_.taking (distinct IrJ* perrp""tlu" takfng). n;llnl?i;:: ;:l:
"T,:lt ::,1""i"",,ifi
p1,i,y,.,,"1, i ng r he experience or the e nof the other;
simpty understanding the'e;"i,;;;i;i"J" ;i,ff :..*:i:fl ;and indeed
,ot iecessary, ""cordirg to nrrr*r".oft.One point to note in
assessing th""r" ,ru.io,r, usages of the term empathy is t
IH:;:::f _*fl""-"_lf"*"y il h";*;r.;;;;";;h;i;, illf, ,, *" *h
J[[ ffi .'I TrTfl::lr s o that i ";";;;;, " -1i,,,/ii?":ffi
:ilX;misht nrefe, .l^n-;*,^--3f::"_ "i" stipulate that it does. On
the othe"r hand,m ight prefer defi nition s th at are fi ner'-t;;;
;;i;d,'il""? ;ilfi "lllt;IXT;f,m*X* *:f:f oxfo.rrt Ameri".o,"
Dt"tton*r, .l^i^rn i, .tr," ubito understand and share tn" r"rmg,
oi;ffi;j;;
.;". i;,ijiiliiiJ,]irl?l;tion contagion does not couat as
stifficient for empathy on this definition beemotion contagion
r""lrr t!:. understanding component (so we disagree ,rflm;#
Ji"iT;:il:i lfl: l*: 1,9 ?, tn.orn". r,ini'-" lg*" *,.r,Rosnav and
trink lchanrer 2r rhai
".po r,1',. ; ;iil;t- l,illl;,Il,1pJl:Jl:i::theory of mind. we
think.trr" ."rirffi;;i il;p*"tion is to conceive empathy adi:::*Ay:
;?:ffi : : ::Ifl^:,: tJ :llv^*q,i,""a, emotjon m i rrori ng and
emotionknowtedge. Empathy invorves ";;;;;;
;;;;"ry#iil:d;ffiTtrJ;[T,T;
REFLECTIONS ON EMOTIOTJS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASONING
341
llrirt the experricfrrxrtl crrrotion is that of the other. In
c+II'ect, this way of deliningr,rrrpathy limits it to de Rosnay and
Finks second fbrm, in which case their firstlirrrn is better
understood as sympathy rather than empathy. Sympathy is
distinctlirrrn empathy in that the emotion may complement rather
than mirror the other;li,r'ling concerned for someone else is not
necessarily sharing their emotion, for,,xirrnple (see Goldie, 2000,
Chapter 7, for a similar view).
This way of defining empathy is consistent with the appraisal
view of emo-lions advocated by Mackenzie and the picture
articulated by de Oliveira-Souzarrrrrl Moll, which see moral
emotions and other morally relevant cognitive statesirs involving
the coordination of multiple systems and processes. They suggest
thatrrrrrral behavior involves the engagement of eoent-structured
complexes, whichirrc procedures evoked by specific contexts, and
they define psychological statesis eoent-feature-emoti.on
complexes, which involve the coordinated activation ofsocial
knowledge, emotions, and motivations. One way that the involvement
of cog-rrition in the emotional response is significant is that it
can permit higher-orderrcgulation. For example, consider a
hypothetical case involving a man who, to pun-ish his wife, seems
to forget her blrthday. In the definition of empathy proposedlrere,
if he simply knows she will be hurt and unhappy then he is using
emotionl
-
42 E/VIOTIONS, IMACINATION, AND MORAL REASONING
;n";Xfi::[:t'"r] work sit,ations: rhe person had unhappv
*,rari,rrrcf'positions the ,.,",*^. H:l*::^1jT n1"* b"'fo."- tr,rt,
i.la.tl'ii,'u t,,,,s *uriof positions th" o"..,.,, a*, "orr"";;ff;
#i""#f:J"#.;ffijlfr:f tm"';L,:;*,"::,f :Ti",1",:3^"
l,:,;1:"":Tissociarryocrd,ancry,rrr,to won der i f he m isht
n11l
", t r" u. t fffi #ffii" "#;1x?#ff1 yi i'J llempathic response
dechnes.From a normative poinr orriew the cognir ire rormat ion
o[interpr
-
14 EMOTIONS, IMACINATION, AND MORAT-. REASONIN(]
emPathyitl rnrlrlil deveftlllrncrrt,,it will Irr'-irnportaut t.
I,.k at tlrcl rriLtrrrrr.1.*::; :::.":I:,^ti.I"*,in reratiou to
.rr"I.r" of interprerive schc,rnns irrmorat evaluation and in
serfcontrol D;
R;r;;;*j'o:,rto"iJi,i,lillJ,Ij',ill,,l::,tTj::::,"::':'":::: r,lt
l:,' h" d i rection : tt, lv, t o* ir,,tr.,lIr,;j:il' rs,r' r r
rrself-concept are associa'ted with -..; ;;;;;:;:iilJlj,TJtgner
rev.rs ,lThe issue of conscience, however, ,"i.", qr"rtions
about the natur-e ,r'mojryation. The conception of the moral domiln
in terms of nhtia,.+;^-.- .,..est.ictionoi,Jm',#ffi .'ilJilf,
::ffi1'liT"ltrfl:|];:mml
Moral agents avoid actions th"y *oirld Jh";;ir" want to
perfo-rm. De R.snuylr:f:11,*tter
2) discuss-" "f
*"r"r"""" ,r'.".*. of awareness of the ,es,psychological
consequences of morar "iorutrorrl
is consistent *r,r, irrrr, ;:r-"rffiI..il:,*_1,::"':::l ::::l
T:11""1"", Morar. agents seek to "",J *",,iir iad acnrnBut some
moral agents, at least
'o,"" oi,-#i,;","J,q"r,H#';ilffil illilffif,T'l'JY"T
3}r::':*l:",'l' becau se,.h? "., ty:, r,"*. r,
","i,?.n ro tctrRring, we may need to consider l"*"-r"g r"
*frr"f,
"f.ifa.", Jir#iltilJl#Xlbeing good' as we' as Iearning in whiii
tn"y "orr"
to appreciate the negative cu,rsequences ol being bad.Another
way we may need to take an active view of morar agency relates
baukto the role orinrerpretation discussed arreadl. our,emphasis on
the controileduse ol mental moders is consistent with a strong,
role fi, i*ngrr-rrtio, in cogrtrrtion, and we agree yitl
.Mack:nzie^ (Chapter fi) tt rt ,_"!i""r,r* engagernootwith
situations wilr be an important form Jr-*:llr_l"rroningi we arso
agree wrthRavensr.rolt (Chanter 4) and Nussbru.iLsgs. j997r that
n.iio, *il play a strongrole in cultivatins'imaginative capacity-
nri nu,r"rrr"roft s ,rr"r, of th" ."sponse t0fiction strikes us is
too passive. in that he doesn.t ailow enough o[a rore for
controland interpretation' Ravenscrofr s view of the dangers of
vioience in fiction seerngstill ro regard the consumers o['fiction
as passive. noninterprerive imitators. Tltoempiricat eviden.e on
the impacr of ficrir e [1"r.= ,; ;;;i_#;ii" Ience may bomore mixed
than his su.r'eylndicates, with
ferguson rzoosi "*i-g doubt on ulink between viorent computer
games and ,riol"ri b"hr,rio, ,; b.r "
{". exampre,youth violence has decrinid subltantiart;;; as
sares.ilrri""ri.*puter gameshave been int'reasinq. From a
th".."ir"il,iandpoint. rae r,rourcr erpecr that chir.dren r'rith
sophisticated interprer'* rJ,lr"r *iiirr" .r,,lr";; o;,t;*rishing
fic-tive from real viorence ",rd
nLi" a "";.f iil former."r"tiu"ty o[ii. vo.,r,g nry*may
fantasize abour being Barman o," u 1"di *",g.,r. nri ili lrff;
realize rhat,unfortunately, the worrdt"hey ""arrtty11rr" - lp"rut",
on di{'ferent rures.Ficr ion provides chi rd ren wirh conceptrot
,..t
"*ur. ,il ; p-b;; arso reachesthem [o be sophisticaied
narigators or*r,.ftrrr sr.hemas. distinguishing
difter.-entperspectivesandactireryinrerpretinganievaluating
rr";;ili."aycurrivatingtheir own point of view. ]!e righi r.r"J'"i
p"*"tar encorragement nray promoteactive interpretation and
facihlate th" dd,"ioprrent of reflective skirs.
Activeinterpretation is a double-edged sword, h;;;;% and in
,o*"
"ur", "hrI,r."., ,ruybecome resistant to the mori m"rrng"" tt "t
iarents and other members of. societyare sending them. The generar
point'is ,rrriiiitl be important to understand thespecific
conceptuar structures ihna
"rr"rg" ir, *o.nt developrne.t and the activeprocesses of
engagement and interpretatiSn eniployed fry tfrJ"frifa. -.,.
I,II,]III ,I,,(I'IIONS ON EMOTIONS, IMACINAI'IOIj, AND MORAL
IIEASOI\INC 345
'l-h
-
EMOTIONS, IMAGINATION, AND MORAL REASONINA
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ENDNOTES
l.Theideathatsciencewillreplacephilosophyisanotuncom^montrope(see,e.g.,aN
ew f ork Tim.e s article discuising H aidt s research; B rooks'
2009 )'
2. The nature "f,fr"'iri"iii"* iria""a in philosophical
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3. Toughening .'rp u "iit[ fo. the-rigors of life is not an
uncommon parental strategy'"
i""Ei"JirrE .itra i" ,ritory ,"h#1r a traditional method,
whereas the song "A Boy
Named Sue" poignantly describes a more unconventional
approach'
+. fo. "*r*p,". a"b'fij'rr-Souza and Moll tChapter 7) say
th.at
-113.1i1 tor defining ...
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