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DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421377 2012 4: 40Emotion Review
Doris Bischof-KhlerEmpathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic
and Ontogenetic Perspective
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Emotion ReviewVol. 4, No. 1 (January 2012) 40 48
The Author(s) 2012ISSN 1754-0739DOI:
10.1177/1754073911421377er.sagepub.com
The development of empathy in small children is a rather
neglected topic in contemporary psychology. Much more attention is
directed to theory of mind, which is also referred to as common
sense mentalism. What is meant by this concept and whether or when
it can be attributed to very young chil-dren is still a matter of
debate. Some researchers assume a theory of mind already in babies
in the first year whenever their behavior shows reference to the
mental state of another, as for instance in social referencing and
shared attention; some even attribute the ability to animals below
the primate level (for a survey, see Suddendorf & Corballis,
2007). As we will see here, empathic responses, too, are sometimes
considered the outcome of theory of mind.
The problem with such a broad application of theory of mind is
that it treats mechanisms of different complexity all alike. For
example, in several studies with looking-time paradigms, babies in
their second year expected an agent to look for an objectwhich had
been transferred to another location during her absencewhere she
had seen and handled it before she left the scene. However, when in
another trial the agent was reaching for the object in its new
location, the babies looked longerthat is, they seemed to be
astonished that she knew what she could
not know having been absent during the relevant event (Onishi
& Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).
From these and similar findings (for a survey, see Caron, 2009;
Sodian, 2010) it is argued that babies already understand the
concept of false belief that has traditionally been considered
crucial for the development of a theory of mind in the fourth year
(for a survey, see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). A more
parsimonious explanation would be that the babies follow a behavior
rule that does not imply mental-state understanding. This aligns
with a proposal by Povinelli and Vonk (2003) in their debate on
chimpanzees theory of mind. According to this rule, the babies
associate an agents gaze orientation or reaching toward an object
with the objects location, and this association causes them to
anticipate where they will going to be active upon their return
(Bischof-Khler, 2011; Perner, 2009; Perner & Ruffman, 2005;
Sodian, 2010). Just the same, very young babies tendency to
interpret an agents gaze, reaching, and pointing as goal directed
can be explained by a similar behavior rule and does not
necessarily imply that they attribute intentions to the agent (for
a survey, see Sodian, 2010). Altogether, the explanatory value of
theory-of-mind attributions to young children remains equivocal. I,
personally, sympathize with a position that ascribes
Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic
Perspective
Doris Bischof-KhlerDepartment of Psychology,
Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich, Germany
Abstract
Empathy means understanding another persons emotional or
intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to
emotional contagion, empathy is characterized by the selfother
distinction of subjective experience. Empathy develops in the
second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery
set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize
their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In
experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to
empathize with a distressed playmate were investigated. Almost all
recognizers showed compassion and tried to help, whereas
nonrecognizers were perplexed or remained indifferent. Several
motivational consequences of empathy are discussed and its special
quality is outlined in comparison with theory of mind and
perspective taking.
Keywordsaltruism, empathy, selfother distinction,
self-recognition, synchronic identification, theory of mind
Corresponding author: Doris Bischof-Khler, Department of
Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich, Leopoldstr. 13,
D-80802 Munich, Germany. Email: [email protected]
421377 EMRVol. 4No.
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Bischof-Khler Empathy and Self-Recognition 41
a theory of mind only in cases where children explicitly
under-stand the representational character of representations, that
is, conceptualize mental experience as caused by mental acts
(Bischof-Khler, 2000a, 2011; Perner, 1991; see also Figure 2).
According to current knowledge, this capacity is not yet present in
the great apes or in children younger than 3 years old. Does this
mean that neither understands the mental state of others? In this
paper, I propose that empathy is the first mechanism in phy-logeny
and ontogeny that conveys insight into the subjective experience of
another, and that it can be explained without the abilities
necessary for a theory of mind.
Empathy is a process in which an observer vicariously shares the
emotion or intention of another person and thereby understands what
this other person feels or intends (Bischof-Khler, 1991). The
empathic response may be caused by the expressive behavior of the
other or by the persons situation. Although primarily an emotional
response, empathy should not be confused with emotional contagion,
in which the emotion of another person takes possession of the
observers without them being aware of the fact that the shared
emotion originates in another persons emotion. Examples of
emotional contagion are: contagious yawning, laughter, mass panic,
or breaking into tears simply by watching other people crying. In
empathy, the observers remain aware of the fact that the emotion or
intention they participate in is actually the others emotion or
intention. Thus, empathy is comprised of emotional as well as
cognitive components. It means vicarious sharing of emotion while
simultaneously recognizing that one shares the emotion without
necessarily being able to conceptualize that emotion. It is an
emotional response that mediates insight.
Empathy must further be distinguished from another mecha-nism of
social cognition, perspective-taking. This ability means imagining
oneself in another persons place and, on this basis,
conceptualizing the others point of view, thinking, and feeling.
Perspective taking is merely a rational mechanism in which
emotional participation is of no importance. In perspective
tak-ing, one can imagine the emotion of another person but that
does not imply sharing the emotion.
Empathy in the Second Year
Before going into a detailed analysis of the process of empathy,
results from our own investigations with 126 boys and girls, ages
16 to 24 months, will be presented to give an impression of what
children will do when empathizing with a person in need
(Bischof-Khler, 1988, 1991, 1994).
Empathy was investigated in two different settings:In the broken
spoon experiment, the child played with a
grown-up playmate who had already been familiarized with the
child in an earlier play session. After a while, both ate a dessert
and the playmate accidentally broke her spoon. She said she could
not eat anymore and demonstrated grief by sobbing a little (for
about 2 minutes). A third spoon was lying on the table in case the
child might offer it as a substitute. The mothers of the children
sat in the background and were instructed to intervene only upon
the childrens request.
In the teddy bear experiment, with different children of the
same age, the playmate brought a teddy bear along. After a while,
she appeared to accidentally break the teddy bear causing it to
lose its arm. After the accident, she started sobbing and mourning
and verbalized her grief: Mein Teddy ist kaputt (My teddy is
broken).
We distinguished four patterns from the childrens responses:The
helpers showed concern and compassion. All stayed
close to the playmate most of the time. In the spoon experiment,
they stopped eating. They tried to help or consoleoffering a
substitute toy or spoon. In the teddy bear experiment some
chil-dren attempted to repair the teddy bear, others went to their
mothers and tried to draw their attention to the playmate.
In a second groupthe perplexedchildren also stopped play-ing or
eating, but they did not intervene. They stayed with the play-mate
and kept their attention focused on her. They appeared not to know
what to do or to not quite understand what was going on.
In a third group, the children showed emotional contagion. They
burst out crying and sought consolation from their mothers.
A fourth group showed indifference. These children looked
momentarily startled but soon lost interest in the playmate and
went on playing or eating.
Helpers were classified as empathic; perplexed children seemed
more worried than empathic. Indifferent children and children
displaying contagion were classified as nonempathic, the latter
because their grief remained centered on themselves rather than on
the person in need.
We considered several possibilities for these behavioral
dif-ferences, for instance, the relationship to the playmate, or
inter-est in the teddy bear. They turned out to be irrelevant. We
did, however, find a strong correlation to an ability which at
first glance appeared to have little connection with empathy,
namely, the ability of children to recognize themselves in a
mirror. This was tested by another experimenter (who did not know
the results of the empathy test) with the so-called Rouge Test
(Amsterdam, 1972). First, the children were exposed to a mir-ror.
Then a mark was inconspicuously placed on their cheek and they were
placed in front of the mirror again. Children that dem-onstrated an
awareness of the mark were identified as recogniz-ers. They also
grimaced and experimented while watching their body movements in
the mirror. Nonrecognizers treated their mirror image as a playmate
whom they smiled at or tried to find behind the mirror. There was a
third group of children who showed a striking tendency to avoid
their mirror image by going away or turning their heads abruptly
when catching their own gaze. Some of them identified the mark on
their face, some did not. They appeared to be in a prestage of
self-recognition and were, therefore, called transitionals.
The results of our investigation were rather straightforward:
All empathic children recognized themselves in the mirror. Not all
nonrecognizers were empathic. Figure 1 shows the results in detail:
Indifferent children were predominantly nonrecognizers. Perplexed
and children showing contagion were mainly in the mirror
transitional stage. Helpers all recognized themselves; a few were
transitionals who identified the mark on their faces. Recognizers
that did not empathize do not contradict the results
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42 Emotion Review Vol. 4 No. 1
because self-recognition is a necessary but not sufficient
pre-condition for empathy; other variables can override the
empathic response. The correlation between self-recognition and
empathy remains consistent when age is partialed out.
Self-Recognition and EmpathyNow, to the reasons that led us to
expect a connection between self-recognition and empathy:
Self-recognition is due to the onset of mental imagery at about the
middle of the second year of life. Children now become able to
symbolically represent reality, allowing them to solve problems
using their imagination (Piaget, 1975). This process could be
compared to the use of a flight simulator. One would scarcely allow
an inexperienced student pilot to use a real airplane to try
landing. Instead, he would be seated in a flight simulator where he
can commit any blunder without really risking his neck. Mental
imagery is such a simulator. It allows for imaging behavioral goals
and figuring out the best way to reach them.
Mental imagery requires a novel form of representation as
depicted in Figure 2. It shows a person seeing an object and her
perception of this object. Additionally, at a second level, an
image of this object can be generated by imagination. This
representation can be experienced independent of reality. It
can
be generated at any time, shifted around in the imagination and
be put into relation to other objects. Under an epistemological
perspective, the perception itself also is a representation, but
its representative characteristic is not experienced. To the person
the perception is reality as such. Only on the second level is the
person aware of the representative character of the image.
Therefore, it will be called symbolic representation. Symbolic
representations are experienced as referring to reality, not as
being reality. That is, phenomenologically, they differ in quality
from perceptual representations. This qualitative differentiation
allows us to separate real experience from imagination: Even
3-year-olds know that a cookie one thinks of cannot be eaten. On
this level, the representative character of imagery need not be
reflected upon.
Conscious reflection would presuppose a theory of mind. To
understand theory of mind, let us focus on the person at the left
in Figure 2 who also perceives the object. The first person not
only perceives this second person, but can also imagine how the
second person represents the object and manipulates it in her
imagination. And, in the exact same way, the first person could
also represent her own act of perceiving and representing, as well
as other mental acts. Reflecting on mental operations is what is
meant by theory of mind; some authors call this a
meta-representation. To explain empathy, however, the
meta-representation level is not requiredthe levels of perception
and symbolic representation will do.
In primate phylogeny, there is evidence that imagery only
appears at the level of the great apes. Incidents of true mental
problem solving in apes were first documented by Wolfgang Khler
(1921) and David Premack (Premack & Premack, 1983). For
instance, chimpanzees piled boxes on top of each other and climbed
on top of them in order to reach a banana suspended from the
ceiling. In clear contrast to solving the problem by trial and
error, they acted in a straightforward fash-ion after obviously
having figured out the solution in their imagination. As this
example shows, mental problem solving could not be efficient
without a representation of the self, as well. The ape has to be
equipped with an image of himself that he can shift around
mentally, just like the images of other objects involved in the
problem. There is evidence that apes
Perplexedor ContagiousIndifferent Helpers
Nonrecognizer0
10
20
30
21
0
9
Transitionals0
10
20
30 24
8 8
Recognizer0
10
20
30
40 36
119
Figure 1. Empathy and self-recognition (Teddy-Bear and Broken
Spoon Experiment)
Figure 2. Perception, symbolic representation in imagination,
and meta-representation (theory of mind)
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Bischof-Khler Empathy and Self-Recognition 43
form a rudimentary self-representation, as demonstrated by their
ability to recognize themselves in the mirror (Gallup, 1970).
Consequently, one would expect apes to be able to empathize
comparably to a 2-year-old child.
To understand the connection between empathy and
self-recognition, we next have to ask: What does it mean to
recognize oneself?
When we try to imagine how a child in the first year
experi-ences herself, we can assume that her perceptual world is
filled with relevant objects, but she (herself as a person) is not
yet the subject of her perception. That could lead us to conclude
that something like an ego feeling is still lacking at this
developmen-tal stage. However, the baby can already well
distinguish whether an event is caused by herself or by somebody
else. Already, 3-month-old babies enjoy events much more when they
are self-created than when they are only passively observed
(Papousek & Papousek, 1977). The own ego is thus already sensed
as a kind of subject-related quality of the perceived events.
William James (1892/1961) distinguished two kinds of
self-experience: the I and the Me. The I denotes the self as the
subject of experience becoming aware of itself in a kind of
unre-flected self-sensing (Figure 3). The Me is the objectified
self giving rise to ego-conciousness. Because the I is unreflected,
it is difficult to grasp. It is embedded in carrying out
activities, in producing effects, and in having sensations. In
their first year infants are still confined to the I stage.
Although they already distinguish whether effects are internally
controlled or exter-nally caused, they are not yet able to draw
this distinction between the subjective experience of self and
others. Babies, it is true, from the first months on not only
experience distinct emotions such as joy, anger, sorrow, fear
(Izard, 1991), they also respond appropriately to the expressions
of emotions in others. And, in episodes of emotional contagion,
they share these emo-tions. Newborns join in crying as soon as they
hear other babies crying. A little later, emotional contagion can
also be evoked by other emotions, such as happiness or sadness,
prompted by the expressions of their caregivers (Hoffman, 1977;
Thompson, 1987). Some authors consider this phenomenon to be the
out-come of intersubjectivity and argue that babies already sense
others as like me, thereby giving them access to the subjective
experience of others (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001; Stern, 1985;
Tomasello, 1999; Trevarthen, 1979). This interpretation remains
questionable when we look at the origins of contagion (for a
survey, see Preston & de Waal, 2002).
Contagion is phylogenetically an old mechanism known as mood
induction from ethology. It has an important function in
synchronizing divergent motivations in the group (Bischof, 2009).
The expressive behavior of conspecifics triggers the same behavior
in the observers who, as a consequence, join together for instance
for eating, drinking, sleeping, or taking flight. Mirror neurons
may well explain this phenomenon (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia,
2008). However, they can only explain the arousal of the same
motivation in the observer. They do not explain how the observer
comes to know that their experience originates in the subjective
state of another individual. This is the case with infants, as
well; they cannot yet attribute the source of a shared emotion to
its original carrier. Phenomenologically speaking, their entire
subjective experience is colored by the emotion shared by
contagion.
SelfOther Distinction and Synchronic Identification
The cognitive changes in the second year that provide empathy
with true insight into the mental state of another are selfother
distinction and synchronic identification.
Selfother distinction in this context does not apply to a
physical boundary that is already experienced in the first months
(Stern, 1985). Some authors assume selfother distinction in 3- to
9-month-old babies because they can distinguish the mirror image of
self-created movements from the mirrored movements produced by
somebody else (Rochat & Striano, 2002). This again fails to
sufficiently explain empathy because it only refers to the babys
ability to distinguish self-produced effects from effects produced
by someone else.
Selfother distinction, prerequisite to empathy, only becomes
possible after the Me emerges. The Me (Figure 3) is a symbolic
representation of the self in the imagination. It has the character
of an object with a boundary that becomes the carrier of
attrib-utes. It can be conceived of as if it were another person.
From this perspective, one can realize that the self has an outside
appear-ance which can be encountered in ones own mirror image. At
the same time, other persons are symbolically represented as well
by the You, which also has an object-like characteristic with a
bound-ary. This condition allows for selfother distinction that
provides the cognitive component to the empathic experience.
Figure 4 demonstrates the process in a flow diagram. On the left
side, we have what the observer perceives: a person crying over a
broken teddy bear. To the right, all components playing a role in
the empathic process are represented separately in little boxes,
although in the real empathic experience they are not separate, of
course, they merge. The observer may become completely overtaken by
the distressed persons grief and respond with emotional contagion.
In a kind of fusion, this grief is not perceived as the others
emotion.
IMeYou
Figure 3. I (unreflected self sensing), Me and You (symbolic
representations)
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44 Emotion Review Vol. 4 No. 1
This state of affairs changes as soon as self-representation,
which allows one to recognize oneself in a mirror, develops. Due to
self-representation, one is aware of oneself as being some-body
separate from the other, not just physically, but on a
psy-chological level as well. Thus, self and other appear as
separate carriers of their own inner experience (selfother
distinction). This allows the empathic observer to remain aware of
the fact that the shared emotion is actually another persons
emotion.
Since the mechanism of emotional contagion is already pre-sent
at the beginning of life, it could well be the emotional basis for
empathy as soon as one is aware of a selfother distinction. This
explanation, however, does not suffice to explain situation-induced
empathy. Emotional contagion is only released when grief, or any
other emotion, is exhibited in the expressive behav-ior of a
person. Empathy may also be evoked by a persons situ-ation. A sad
story or event happening to a person can already lead to compassion
in 2- and 3-year-olds, even when the children do not know or
perceive the persons response (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, &
Kind, 1979).
Furthermore, expression-induced empathy could not explain how an
observer comes to understand the intention of another person who
tries to reach a goal, but does not succeed. What motivates us to
cooperate and to help to complete their action? To understand the
aim/the desire/the need of another and to fig-ure out a solution
for their problem, the observer has to take that persons entire
situation into consideration; their expressive behavior alone would
not convey the relevant information.
In order to explain situation-induced empathy, we have to refer
to the second cognitive requirement mentioned earlier synchronic
identification (Bischof, 1978). Identification in this context is
not to be understood in the sense it is considered in
psychoanalysis: wanting to be like another person. Synchronic
identification is a mode of perception (Figure 5) due to which two
phenomena given at the same time, but separated in space, are
perceived as being the same. Here an essential differentia-tion has
to be made. To be identical is often confounded with being equal.
That is incorrect. One egg looks just like another, yet they are
not necessarily the same: You can eat onethe
other one can still be hatchedso they are not identical.
Equality of appearance is neither a necessary nor sufficient
con-dition of identity. Rather, being identical has to be
understood in the sense of sharing the same fate.
Synchronic identification is a necessary requirement of men-tal
imagery because it connects symbolic representations with reality.
We must be able to realize that the ideal object, which we
tentatively shift in mental simulation to another place, is
identi-cal with the real objectunmoved at its original site.
Second, synchronic identification relates verbal concepts to the
facts they denote. At about 18 months, children demonstrate a kind
of word explosion in their language acquisition. They now
under-stand that objects are, in a way, the same as their names, as
Karl Bhler (1930) put it. Verbal concepts are not just associated
with facts; they represent them symbolically. Third, synchronic
iden-tification may relate two real facts in such a way that one
appears as a symbol of the other, as in the case of a photograph
and its original. In development, this is the starting point for
pretend play. Finally, synchronic identification yokes the I to the
Me, thereby allowing that I recognize my mirror image as me.
With respect to empathy, synchronic identification also changes
the mode in which the other person is perceived. Me and You appear
essentially identical (Figure 4). The subjective I then relates to
You similarly to the way it relates to Me. The I is mirrored in the
You, as it were. The others experience is, in essence, the same as
mine. Thus, the other person qualifies as an object of synchronic
identification. Consequently, everything that happens to the other
is perceived as something concerning myself, as well. I respond
emotionally to the others situation as if I were in that persons
place. I experience their problem as if it were my problem. Again,
selfother distinction prevents an emotional fusion.
It remains to be emphasized that identification needs no for-mer
experience with a similar situation as long as this situation has
the potential of becoming relevant to the observer. Nor does
empathy mean that the emotional and motivational state of the other
must be reflected upon in the sense that the child actively
considers, What would I feel if I were in her situation? Rather,
the insight lies in the quality of the vicariously felt emotion or
intention itself. They arephenomenologicallycentered in the
other.
Figure 4. Expression-induced and situation-induced empathy
Figure 5. Synchronic identity
Tim
e
SynchronicIdentity
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Bischof-Khler Empathy and Self-Recognition 45
This differentiation is missing in contemporary literature.
Instead, it is thought that empathy only conveys insight when it is
completed by a truly cognitive mechanism which is con-sidered to be
perspective taking (Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1976). It is argued
that empathizers must simultaneously repre-sent the state of the
other person beside their own state (Perner, 1991). In this respect
we have to distinguish two aspects of the empathic process. The
behavioral goal of the other person and the means to reach this
goal must be simulated in a kind of vicarious mental problem
solving that becomes possible with symbolic representation (compare
Figure 2). The desire or intention of the other need not be
represented as a mental state because it is induced by empathic
identification.
Representation of desires and intentions as mental states
(independent of the state one is in) is only available at the
fol-lowing stage of development and presupposes the ability to
con-sider several perspectives simultaneously. This ability refers
to Level II perspective taking as conceptualized by Flavell, who
distinguishes it from Level I perspective taking (Flavell, Everett,
Croft, & Flavell, 1981). The latter is based on a behavior rule
referring to gaze orientation and allows babies already in their
second year to be aware of what another person can or cannot see.
Level II perspective taking develops with the onset of a theory of
mind around the fourth birthday and allows children to imagine how
the world appears to another person from his or her perspective. It
could scarcely be a necessary component of empathy because empathy
already developed 2 years earlier. However, there are situations in
which perspective taking is a valuable supplement to empathy.
Empathy has a shortcoming. I can only empathize according to my own
reactivity. What if I, myself, would feel anxious in a given
situation but the other person, unlike me, would not? Only children
with a theory of mind can understand that desires and emotions of
other people can be different when compared to their own responses
and preferences. Or, suppose I am competing with an opponent and
the opponent wins. To imagine how he feels, it would be neces-sary
to represent his joy although I, myself, feel down at this instant.
This kind of problem can only be solved by affective perspective
taking which, in combination with empathizing, considerably
improves and enlarges the understanding of others mental states in
ongoing development.
Considering the evidence that children in their second and third
year are already rather competent at inferring another per-sons
emotions and desires (Bischof-Khler, 1988, 1994; Buttelman,
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Krtner, Keller, & Chaudhary,
2010; Trommsdorff, Friedlmeier, & Mayer, 2007; Vaish,
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006;
Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Yuill, 1984; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979;
Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992), some
authors argue that a theory of mind concerning desires and
intentionsdesire psychology precedes belief-psychology (Wellman
& Bartsch, 1994). The discrep-ancy in age could mostly be
resolved if the role of empathy were to be upgraded that allows
children (from the age of 2 upwards) to possess quite an elaborate
understanding of another
persons emotional and motivational states even though they are
not yet able to reflect on mental processes. Therefore, in many
cases, what is meant by desire psychology is actually empathy.
To exemplify this, I refer to an experiment by Repacholi and
Gopnik (1997) that is frequently cited as proof for an early onset
of desire psychology. In the experiment, a person expressed
preference for broccoli and disgust at cookies. Even 18-month-old
(but not 14-month-old) infants did not offer cookies to this
person; they understood that somebody else did not like cookies,
although they, themselves, did. The behavior can well be explained
as an empathic response. In the experi-mental setting, the other
person showed their liking and disgust by their expressive
behavior. By doing this, they offered the appropriate releaser to
empathizing, thereby informing the child of their real preference.
It is no surprise that the 14-month-olds failed. They were too
young to have formed a Me and, therefore, not yet able to
empathize.
Motivational Consequences of Empathy
Finally, I want to add some remarks on the motivational
conse-quences of empathy (Figure 6). The most common is
compas-sion, also referred to as sympathy and sometimes not
distinguished from empathy (Batson, 1987). Compassion is considered
to play a dominant causal role in prosocial intervention and
helping behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). In our experiments
we took it as the main indicator of empathy. In compassion,
empathic dis-tress motivates an urge to terminate this distressnot
by running away, but by ending the miserable state for the
other.
A further consequence of empathy is cooperation. By
identi-fication, the observer participates in the intention of the
other and thereby becomes motivated to figure out which activity is
most appropriate for reaching the goal the other is aiming at.
There are quite a few examples of empathic identification in
chimpanzees as, for instance, cooperation in hunting and food
sharing (de Waal, 2008; Goodall, 1986; Khler, 1921; Menzel,
Mirror
Express
Situation
CompetenceFamiliarity
Identification
Self-Recognition
OthersPerspective
Empathy
EmotionalContagion
MoodCosts
Cooperation
GloatingSensation Seeking
Cruelty
Guilt
SelfOtherDistinction
Compassion
I (Me)
Figure 6. Motivational consequeneces of empathy
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46 Emotion Review Vol. 4 No. 1
1972). These behaviors are considered to have played an
important role in human evolution. Their occurrence in the great
apes suggests that empathy was available at a rather early stage in
our phylogeny. Recently, helping has been proved in young
chimpanzees (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2010).
Feeling guilty is another consequence of empathy (Hoffman,
1976). In this case, a person who caused another persons dis-tress
cannot help but empathize with the victim. Already in their second
year, children show evidence of guilt feelings (Zahn-Waxler et al.,
1979). Hoffman pointed out that empathy also plays an important
role in the development of moralityparticularly with respect to its
emotional constituents like con-cern, regret, shame, feelings of
justice, existential guilt, moral aggression, and retaliation.
Compassion and identification do not necessarily turn into
prosocial intervention. Prosocial intervention is costly and the
costs may be considered to be too high. Some of the children in our
experiments did not realize that there was a substitute spoon and
considered giving their own spoon away but were inhibited from
doing so because then: How should they, themselves, eat? Further
variables influencing the outcome of empathy are auton-omy and
competency. High-ranking children are more prepared to help others
(Bischof-Khler, 2011). Feeling incompetent may be one reason why
bystanders often do not intervene (Staub, 1986). Small children
simply may not know what to do, as was the case with some of the
perplexed children in our studies.
Probably the most important determinant influencing the
motivational outcome of empathy is familiarity (Hornstein, 1978).
In animals, familiarity indicates being related. Due to kin
selection, relatives are the potential recipients of altruistic
behavior (Hamilton, 1978). In man, too, familiarity facilitates
identificationunfamiliarity counteracts it. In small children, an
unfamiliar person may evoke a stranger reaction, thus pre-venting
them from approaching this person. In adults familiarity is taken,
in a much broader sense, as an indicator of whether a person
qualifies as a recipient of help. However, personally knowing each
other will not suffice in this respect. As is known from
experiments, needy persons improve their chances of receiving help
and sympathy when they belong to the in-group, that is, when they
are relatives, or have the same religion, share the same values and
opinions, speak the same idiom, or belong to the same ethnic
group.
Finally, contrary to a common opinion, it has to be men-tioned
that empathy can also be the basis of socially negative emotions,
leading to negative consequences for others. Empathic participation
in the grief of another person does not necessarily lead to
compassion. In cases where the observer has a grudge against the
distressed person, empathy can lead to malicious gloating. In this
case, the miserable state of the other is empath-ically shared and,
at the same time, enjoyed. Sensation seeking is another example of
empathizing. In this case, the observer, without being endangered
himself, vicariously shares the thrill of the danger or catastrophe
encountered (in reality) by another. Probably the most unpleasant
negative consequences of empa-thy manifest themselves when empathy
is combined with aggression. If we define aggression as
intentionally harming a
person, then we have to keep in mind that intended harming
presupposes that the aggressor is aware of how his victim will
feel. Aggression in animals below the great apes and in small
children is, as it were, innocent because they are not yet able to
empathize. Interestingly enough, as soon as children are able to
empathize, they not only sympathize with the dis-tressed, they also
start committing aggressive acts that are obviously intended to
hurt other persons and go on doing so, even if their victims
complain (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). In sadism, participation in
the pain of the suffering victim is the very aim of the experience.
This consequence can be observed in our next relatives as well.
Jane Goodall (1977) reports behaviors occurring in chimpanzee
warfare that cannot be considered anything but cruel.
Development of Empathy
The basic capacity to empathize is an effect of maturation
rather than socialization. Empathy is a human potential that
evolves in all children as soon as they are able to mentally
represent them-selves and to synchronically identify. Along with
the refinement of social cognition by developmental processes, the
further fate of this potential depends on individual experience as
well as on social and cultural influences in general. I cannot
delve further into this, so I will leave it with a few remarks. The
basic innate understanding of emotional expressions has to be
differentiated in a social context. The first steps in this respect
are affect attunement (Stern, 1985) and the tendency of caregivers
to mir-ror the behavior of babies (Papousek & Papousek, 1977),
thereby allowing them to refine the association of inner experience
with its outside appearance.
In our subjects, only a few recognizers did not empathize. Most
tried to help and almost all showed compassion and con-cern. As we
discovered in a separate study, recognizers with nonempathic
response were frequently found to be insecurely attached
(Bischof-Khler, 2000b). Security of attachment to caregivers was
determined by Ainsworths Strange Situation Test (Ainsworth, Blehar,
Waters, & Wall, 1978). Insecurely attached children tended to
show emotional contagion or to respond indifferently in the empathy
situation.
An American study with 2- and 3-year-olds provides a hint as to
which socialization practice may encourage empathy and which one
may not (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). Children were more often
inclined to empathize and show compassion when they had mothers who
were empathic and who explained to them that it is not a good thing
to hurt somebody else because that person would feel pain and
sorrow (inductive method). The children with less empathic mothers,
who without explanation only forbade hurting others, showed less
empathy themselves.
Socialization certainly influences the degree to which per-sons
empathize. It may also be the reason why empathy declines or
disappears in some persons or even turns into an inclination for
socially negative reactions. The conditions under which
developments of this kind occur, however, are still far from being
clarified.
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Emotion ReviewVol. 5, No. 1 (January 2013) 116
The Author(s) 2013ISSN 1754-0739DOI:
10.1177/1754073912471619er.sagepub.comErratum
Doris Bischof-Khler (2012), Empathy and Self-Recognition in
Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspective, Emotion Review, 4:
4048.
(Original DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421377)
On page 41, the following error was made:
Not all nonrecognizers were empathic. should be correctly
written as: All nonrecognizers were not empathic.
SAGE apologises for this error.
471619 EMR5110.1177/17540739124716192013