Elster - Cohenmarx

8/14/2019 Elster - Cohenmarx

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R E V I E W A R T I C L E SC O H E N O N M A R X S T H E O R Y O FH I S T O R Y

J O N E L S T E R

G. A . COHENSook, Karl Marxs Theory of History: A D i l fmre sets a new stand ardfor Marxist philosophy. I t disproves the statement imputed to A . J . Ayer, as forMarxist philosoph y, it doe s not exist. I t is no t only relevant-there ha s been n o lackof relevance in Marxism-but also lucid, imaginative a nd precise. Th e au th or displays afull mastery of the technical tools of conceptual analysis, a sure grasp of the Marxistcorpus and a substantive sociological imagination.It is also in one im portant respect a m ost un satisfactory book . Th e central thesis ofthe book is that the produ ctive forces have primac y over the productive re lations, in thesense that the relations are what they are because they have the function of furtheringthe development of the forces. The whole book leads up to this thesis, but the mainargum ent for it is given in a very cursory an d unconvincing page (p . 292-3). Behind thisthesis is a more general methodological position, an attempt to vindicate functionalexplana tion in the social sciences as sui generis that is reducible neither to causal nor tointentional explanation. As will be argued below, the attempt does not succeed. Theexcellence of the bo ok emerges in spite of and not because of the central ideas that aredefende d. If we disregard the defence an d app lica tion of functiona lism, we are left witha on eptuul analysis o h e process of production in the tradition of the chapters ofCapi /a lJ on manufacture a nd machinery. These chapters are am ong the best that Marxever wrote, and Cohens book is the best modern treatment of the same range ofproblems.As the title implies, the book is both interpretat ion and substantive analysis . Theexegesis is throughout solid and convincing. I found only two passages that a re quotedout of context so as to dis tor t their meaning. (These are on p. 102, to Capitul I, p. 360,where Cohen misleadingly quotes a passage from the analysis of manufacture as if itwere valid for advanced capitalism in general; and on p. 16 where he falls for thetemptation of quot ing a passage from Cupital I p . 482 that w ould have been wonderfulevidence for Cohens interpreta tion i f i t had been asserted in the implied context.) N o rhave I found many cases where relevant texts have been omitted. It is surprising that inhis discussion (pp. 77, 79) of the individuation of economic forms C oh en doe s not referto the passage in Cupital I p. 180 where Marx proposes technological rather than socialcriteria of identity, but the oversight does not seem fateful. More controversial is histreatment of Marx and Engels as identical twins, but only in a few places (pp. 155, 187,205) doe s this tend to be (slightly) misleading. Coh en seems t o have been una wa re ofthe recent publication (in the new M E G A ) of the first third of the manu script of whichthe T/irwrii>.s f Surplus- Vriluii forms the second third. Here, for example, Coh en would

G . A . Cohen. Kt r r / MarsA T h f f Hi.ccory: A De/c nc e Lo nd on . Oxford University Press,1978). I am grateful to G . A . Cohen for reading a first draft o this review, helping me t statesome objections more forcefully and pointing ut why others were unjustified.Political Studies, Vol . X X V I I I . No 121 128)


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122 R E V I E W A R T I C L E Shave found a text that gives the lie to his statement (p. 138) that Marx frequentlyrefer[s] to correspondence of relations to forces an d never the opposite. Th us in M EG A11 3, I p. 121: Hierbei wird s ich zeigen, dass dem Ca pi ta lv er ha ltn isd am it esentwickelt auftrete-auch bestim mte Produ ctionsw eise und Entw icklung de rProduktivkrafte entspreche. I do not believe, however, that any important modifi-cations would be required by this text, which in the main rather tends to confirmCohens interpretation.

I f Cohen has any weak point, it is to be found in his sometimes uncertain grasp ofeconomic theory. His treatm ent of productivity increase (p. 56ff.) is unsatisfactory: heremore formalization would be needed, or less. Mo re impo rtantly, he states on p. 353 thatthe theses of the labour theory of value are not presupposed or entailed by anycontentio ns advanced in this b ook, an d nevertheless he does presuppose this theory inseveral places in Ch. V (pp. 116, 123, 124). Also he apparently ignores the largeliterature by economists on analogies to natural selection in the theory of the firm, inspite of the imp ortance of these analogies in his own theory.So much for general comments; now for specifics, chapter by chapter. The openingchapter On Images of History in Hegel and Marx is a very well-written andstimulating introduction to the Hegelian background of Marxism. It comparesfavourably, at least from an analytical viewpoint, with the treatment of the same topicin the first volume of Leszek Kolakowskis Main Currents of arx ism. On p. 24 thereseems t o be a slight inaccuracy in the implication that the surplus enables the forma tionof a class which doe s not work . F ro m Po lanyi an d Pearson we know tha t it is rather theother way a roun d, a s correctly s tated o n p. 94.Chapter I1 On the constitution of the productive forces then starts up the mainargument of the book. Cohen defines the productive forces both extensionally(instruments of production, raw materials and labour power, including variousattrib utes of th e latter suc h as skill an d knowledge) an d inten sionally (as a facilitycapable of use by a producing ag ent in such a way th at prod uction occurs (partly) as aresult of its use, and it is someones purpose that the facility so contr ibute toproduc tion). In his elab orat ion o f this definition C ohe n ha s to clear several well-knownhurdles, notably the inclusion of science (a mental element) am on g the materialproductive forces. Cohens solution seems to me to be the right one: the antonym ofmaterial in Marxist theory is social rather than mental. A small query, however:isnt Cohens insistence (pp. 41, 43) that productive forces be ownable hard to squarewith the inclusion of science among the productive forces?) A final section explainswhat is meant by the developmenr of the productive forces. Cohen argues, rightly 1think, that this should be understood as productivity increase, even though he alsoinvokes qualitative change, as distinct from quantitative progress, as an explanatoryvariable. (More about this later.)Ch ap ter The economic structure explains the notion of production relations interms of the ownership relation. Immediate producers are classified according to theextent to which they own their labour power and their means of production. Asownership can be total, partial or absent, this generates nine combina tions altogether.Tw o of these ar e incoherent,four correspon d to im portant historical categories, an d theremaining three are marginal or transitional classes. This may sound like sterileclassification, but-as read ers of M ax W ebe r will know-good typologies ma y be fertileindeed, and Cohens is. H e further argues tha t these produ ction relations should enterinto the definition of class, and t ha t it is a mistake to confuse th e structu ral dehn i t i on ofclass with the substantive assert ion that classes th us defined tend to become class-conscious. The ch apte r end s with some acute comments on modes o production andeconomic change. Here Cohen makes a sharp distinction between process andstructure; to o sh arp , in m y opinio n, because he forgets tha t aspects of the process maybe part of the structure. Th us on p. 85 he states tha t There is n o difference of economicstructure, despite movement w ithin the econ omy, as long as there ar e the sam e relations


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R E V I E W A R T I C L E S I23in the same frequency bou nd into the sam e network. This, in my opinio n, is exactly thesame err or for which Ed ua rd Bernstein was takzn t o task by R osa L uxem burg inSozialreform oder Revolution? Two societies may be exactly identical as regards thenature and the frequency of the economic relations at any given moment of time, andnevertheless differ in eco nom ic structure because the o ne has a very high turno ver rateand the oth er a very low o ne. Would we no t say, for example, that a caste-like societywith no social mobility was strucfurullydifferent fr om a society th at a t all times had thesame num bers of p ersons in the sa m e classes, but in w hich a good deal of upwards anddownwards mobility (exactly compensating each other) was going on?Chap te r IV on Material and social properties of society follows up the earlierobservation tha t material an d social are anto ny m s in Marxist theory . M any goodpoints are mad e in this cha pte r; others are more controversial. found the distinction(p. 103) between socially engen dered needs (e.g. the needs for deo do ra nt s) an d needsthat are social in their contents (e.g. the need for positional goods) very helpful; inparticular i t could be used fo r distinguishing between a bad an d a g oo d sense of theterm artificial need. I am less sure about th e main contention of the chapte r , tha t thereare material as well as social relations of production and that division of labour fallswithin the former. Here, as well as in Ch. V1.6, Co hen argues that work relat ions areintermediate between productive forces and production relations, determined by theformer and determining the latter. For a counter-example, consider a machine that canbe tended efficiently by three men and somewhat less efficiently by two. The choicebetween the two methods, which imply different work relations, will be determined bythe relative prices of machinery and labour, which in their turn are determined in partby the class struggle. My hunch is that Cohens thesis here is derived from thestructuralist bias that is implicit in much of Marxist reasoning that, by assuming fixedcoefficients of production, denies the reality o entrepreneurial choice.Chapter V on Fetishism is largely exegetical, with less substantive discussion th anthe other chapters. It is also the weakest chapter in the book (even if it would be ahighlight in most oth er books), belonging perhaps t o an earlier stage of composition. Ihave two main objections. (i) Cohen tends to take commodity fetishism more seriouslythan it deserves to be taken. From the history of mercantilism we know that moneyfetishism is a real and i m po rta nt phenom enon; from everyday life an d from economictheory that price fetishism is a pervasive feature of modern economies; but commodityfetishism has always seemed to me a much more strained notion, with no interestingsociological implications. (ii) The treatment of capital fetishism is unsatisfactory,because resting upon a version of the labour theory of the value that I believe to beinvalid. Also wou ld have liked t o see the link to the notio n of alien ation spelled outmore explicitly.With Chapter VI on The primacy of the productive forces we come to the core ofthe book. H ere Cohe n explains and defends the thesis that t he productive forces haveprimacy over th e production relations, not in the sense tha t the latter d o not exert aninfluence on the fo rmer, but in the sense that the latter ar e what they a re because of thekind of influence they exert on the former. We are dealing, that is, with a consequenceexplunation of the production relations in terms of what they d o for the productiveforces. The general notion of consequence explanations, including the special case offunctional explanation, is discussed at length in Ch. IX, of which more later. After a(somewhat too) long exegetical introduction, Cohen goes on to argue the substantivecase (a) for the thesis tha t the p roductive forces tend to develop throug hou t his tory an d(b) for the thesis tha t prod uction relations are to be explained in terms o f their capacityfor developing the productive forces. The argument for the first thesis is given in arather convoluted argument (p. 152ff.) that after repeated reading I did not find veryconvincing. Perhaps my dissatisfaction is due not so much to logical defects of the

See m y The Labour Theory o Value, Ma rx i s t Perspectives 1978)


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124 R E V I E W A R T I C L E Sargument, as to the absence of historical material. Thus Cohen does not mention theinstitutional an d psychological reaso ns that in many stretches of history have preventedtechnical progress, such a s lack of investm ent objects (in the absence of a patent system)o r lack of investm ent motivation (as in the non-diffusion of the wat er mill in ancientRom e). Historical materialism, in Coh en s view, asserts an u nbro ken technical progressthrougho ut history, even if proceeding at an unequal rate. An alternative view would beto say tha t the prod uctive forces were largely static u p to recent times, when the adv entof capitalism made possible a revolutionary breakthrough. This would be consistentwith the man y passages wh ere M arx stresses the conservative chara cter o f earlier mod esof production, even if inconsistent with the more general statements of the 1859Preface. Also, as a rough generalization, it might be m ore consistent with th e historicalrecord than the rough generalization of unbroken progress. True, Cohen argues onlythat the productive forces tend to develop, in the sam e sense tha t children tend to growtaller. In both cases the development might be arrested for accidental or exogenousreasons. Still there are many children, but only one history of the world, and I d o n otbelieve that Cohen really means to hedge his argument to the extent of imputing on/.vcounterfactual implications to his thesis.The primacy thesis then follows from the dev elopmen t thesis an d the adde dpremiss that for any given set of production relations there are limits to the productiveforces that can develop within them. When one set of relations reach their limit. theymust give way to another set, because otherwise stagnation would ensue and thedevelopment thesis would be false. This, again, means that the relations are what theyare because they permit a development of the productive forces. The argumentassumes (i) that progress is in the interest of humanity, (ii) that there always is somesocial class whose interests coincide with the interests of humanity in general and i i i )that this class will be able t o get the upper h and in the class struggle. Or, t o pu t it theother way aro un d, the interests which conspire to supp ort the existing o rd er . willnot be strong enough to sustain i t indefinitely (p. 158-9). For this broad statement noother argum ent is given th an th at there is a general stake in stable and thrivingproduction, so th at the class best placed to deliver it at tracts allies from othe r s tra ta insociety (p. 292). This, I submit, simply is not true; the general interests of society donot create their ow n fulfilment. I t is quite often the case that the general interest may befurthered by several different arrangemen ts, each of which gives a particular adv antag eto one particular class over an d ab ove its share in the general increase of welfare createdby the arrangement, an d t he struggle between these arrangements m ay then prevent anyof them from coming about.In the last section of the chapter Cohen confronts the problem of the technologicalconservatism of pre-capitalist mo des of production that he rightly sees as the mainobstacle to his interpretat ion. H e argues th at even if the relations of produc tion in thesesocieties d o not afford a ny direct stimulus to the productive forces, they may stimulatethem indirectly, by providing a suitable environment for their development. He drawsan analogy to constitutional monarchy promoting democracy: not by encouraging itdirectly, but by providing a stimulus for the development of democracy, e.g. byopposing it. Now this solution to my mind has two defects. First, it is unconvincing inthe absence of illustrative historical material. Seco nd, it seems to cont radict Cohen sgeneral assertion about the way in which productive forces select production relationsaccording to their capacity to promote development (p. 162), which accordin g to thestatement quoted above is mediated through the action of a class that has a dire tinterest in promoting that development.Chapter VII o n The productive forces and capitalism provides historical illustrationfor the assertions of Ch. VI. There is much that is excellent in this richly documentedchap ter: this I leave to the reader to find out for himself. Instead I would like to raisetwo questions that are alluded to but not really confronted in this chapter. First, Ibelieve that one sho uld n ot glibly talk abo ut the production relations fettering the use


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R E V I E W A R T I C L E S I25and development of the productive forces; second that o ne should n ot invoke both thequantitative progress nd the qualitative change of the productive forces in order toexplain pro duction relations. Let me put the poin t som ewh at differently. Th e crucialthesis of the 1859 Preface according to Cohen, and I think he is right, is that theproduction relations further or fetter the quan titative progress of the productive forces.T o this Cohen ad ds ano the r thesis, that with som e plausibility can als o be impu ted toMarx, that this furthering or fettering explains the em ergence or disappearance of theproduction relations. I then submit that he should not have resorted to the ad-hocstrategies of saying, first, that if the rela tions d o not fetter the develop men t of theforces, then they m ight perha ps fetter their use, an d, second th at if the relations a re notexplained by the forces in the way Cohen suggests, then perhaps they might beexplained by the forces in another manner. This is playing on words and shifting theargument. One should also remember that a crucial feature of capitalism is that thefettering of the use of the productive forces was the means for furthering theirdevelopment, through the patent system whose justification is that by slowing downthe diffusion of technical progress it ensures that there will be more progress todiffuse.Chapter VlI l on Base and superstructure, powers and rights shows Cohen at hisvery best, disentangling the logical structure of property rights and their link to theeconomic structure. From this chapter I would like to cite the following example ofCohens ability t o dispel by a simple phrase confusion that it took a hu ndred bo ok s toaccumulate. Discussing the strange architectural me tap ho r of base an d superstructure,he offers the following explanation:

Four struts are driven into the ground , each protruding the same distance above it.They are unstable. They sway and wobble in winds of force 2. Then a roof isattached to the four struts, an d now they stay firmly erect in all winds of force 6.Of this roof one can say: (i) it is supported by the struts, and (ii) it renders themmo re stable. There we have a building whose base and superstructure relate in theright way. (p. 231)

This, of course, is not the whole explanation. Cohen also offers a strictly de-metaphorized account, whose basic strategy is to match every legal right in thesuperstructure by an economic power and then claim that the right is what it is becauseof its stabilizing impact on the power. To my mind the functional explanation is muchmore nearly convincing in this case than in the correspondin g explanation of propertyrelations by their impac t on the productiv e forces. This is so because (a t least in som e ofthe cases distinguished by Cohen on p. 226-7) there usually is some group in whosedirect interest it is to legitimate an existing or a t least e mbry onic practice. N on-existingproductive forces cannot bring about new production relations, but emerging produc-t ion relations can bring abo ut a new legal order . Douglass North and Rob ert Thom as4have shown how a nd under what cond itions this ca n take place; nevertheless there canbe no presumption that it will typically happen. Here as elsewhere conditions andmechanisms must be specified if the functional explanation is to be val id, as will now beargued.Chapter IX o n Func tiona l explan ation in general is am bitio us but unsuccessful.Cohe n does not prove his case for functional explana tion being a separate exp lanatorycategory on a par with causal explanation. I d o not, of course, quarrel with the use offunctional explanation in biology. Here natural selection provides a general mechanismthat creates a presumption that beneficial consequences of structure o r behaviourexplain their ow n causes. Coh en d oe s not, however, provide any similar mechanism for

. Robinson, Thp A c c u n i u / u t i o n o Cupitul (Lon don , Macmillan, 1956), p. 87.D. Nor th and R. Thomas, t ns l i t u t ionu l Change un Anwrican Economic Growrh (Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1973).


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126 R E V I E W A R T I C L E Sfunctional explanation in the social sciences, and therefore his argument cannotsucceed.Let me first quote the important passage where he makes his claim for functionalexplanation in social science:

[Functio nal-explan atory claims] may be rationally tenable before suitable elabor-ations are available. If a Marxist says that the bourgeois media report industrialconflicts in a style which fa vou rs the capitalist class because that style of reportagehas the asserted tende ncy, he may be able to justify his exp lana tory claim evenwhen he cannot yet display how the fact that reportage in the given style favoursthe capitalist class explains the fact that industrial conflicts are reported in thatway. (p. 272)

This, presumably, m eans th at M arx was justified in implying Capitul I l l p. 600--1)that social mobility can be explained through its favourable consequences on classdomination, through the channeling of the best brains in the lower classes into theupper class ; or that the capital-logic school is justified in assuming that the needs ofcapital in general create their own fulfilment through the state. In short, the sluicesare wide open for all sorts of pseudo-explanations. I am simply at a loss to see whyfunctional explanation should be of interest over an d abov e the particular m echanismsthat may justify it in any given case.Let us take a closer look at the problem. There is, of course, a large number ofparticular mechanisms that bring it about that social phenomena may be explainedthrough their own consequences. Th e two most importan t a re probab ly intentionalchoice a nd intentional or artificial) selection,s to which may be added natural selectionand reinforcement.j No one has any quarrel with a functional explanation where themechanism is actually shown t o be at w ork. The ha rd question is whether on e can everbe justified in setting forw ard a functiona l explan ation even in the absence of a specificmechanism. In biology this question is t be answered in the affirmative, because thegeneral mechanism of natural selection creates a presumption that beneficial con-sequences explain their own causes. Now this is only a presumption, and it may turnout that the functional explanation, even if justified ex ante, is shown to be wrong expost. In a ro ughly similar man ner, ration al-choice explan ation in the social sciences hasthe same epistemological status. There is a well-grounded presumption that humanbeings act ration ally t ha t mak es it justified to assum e in any given case that they do so,even if ex post we may turn out to be wrong.Consider by contrast pre-Darwinian explanation in biology. Here the apparentadaptation of organisms to their environment made most biologists consider thatfeatures of the organisms could in fact be explained through this ecological adaptation.Darwin showed us tha t they were wrong, and tha t reproductive rather tha n ecologicaladap tat ion is the maximand. And they werg not on ly wrong bur also un jus t i f ied . Th e leapfrom the analysis of consequences to a consequence explanation was quite arbitrary.The point is even better brought out by considering the intentional explanations inphysics tha t were propo sed by Leibniz and M aupertuis. O n Cohens accoun t they werejustified in assuming that least-time and least-effort principles were evidence of someguiding intention behind the physical processes, o r at least in assum ing tha t theseconsequences of the processes had an explanatory power. Cohen would say that theywere wron g, but justified; would argu e th at they were wro ng and unjustified.Let me also point t o the kind of account tha t could have brought me a s tep closer taccepting Cohens conclusion (which is no t t o say that it would have bro ught me veryclose). This is the analysis of functional explanation proposed by Arthur Stinchcombe

See my Ulysses und fhe Sirens Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), Ch. I .For reinforcement, see P. van Parijs. Functional Explanation and the Linguistic Analogy,Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 979).


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R E V I E W A R T I C L E S 127in the Merton Festschri/r. By conceptualizing social change as a M ar ko v process withabsorbing states, he argues that there is indeed a presumption that social institutionswill be well-adapted to their environment even when this is not brought about byintentional choice or selection. To bring out the logic of his argument, consider thefollowing statement by Lewis Coser:8 Conflict within and between bureaucraticstructures provides the means for avoiding the ossification and ritualism whichthreatens their form of organization. Coser does not in any way justify his use of thephrase provides the means of avoiding instead of simply has the consequence ofreducing. O n Sinch com bes accou nt, however, such a justification is forthc om ing.Assume fo r simplicity tha t the burea ucratic struc ture of a society can be in o ne of twostates: rigid an d hierarchical, or flexible an d co nflict-permitting. Assum e, moreo ver, th atif the bur eaucr acy a t tim e t,, is in st ate R (for rigid), then the probability is p th at a t t imet,+ , it will still be in s tat e R a n d I - p t h a t i t will be in state F (for flexible); also th at if att, i t is in state F , the n at t,,, it will be in stat e R with probability q and in F withprobability 1-9. Stinchcombe then could argue as follows. A rigid hierarchicalbureaucracy will accumulate so much tension that eventually i t must explode and bereplaced by ano ther, which may then either be rigid o r flexible. In oth er words, O < p < l .By contrast a flexible structure permitting the day-to-day enactment of conflict will lettension ou t gradually an d continuously, so that n o explosion will occu r. In othe r word s,q=O. But this means that the system has exact ly one absorbing sta te F), in whicheventually i t will end up with probability I

I believe that I have seen no other mechanism that comes closer to being forsociology what natural selection is for biology, even if this is not, to repeat, to say thatit comes very close. Cohen, however, does not even attempt to provide such amechanism, which is why I believe tha t his enterprise m ust be judged to be a failure. Tocome up with a list of possible mechanisms is not to make an argument for some suchmechanism being at work . A (som ewhat unfair) analogy may help m e make the point .In the pseudo-sociology of the 19th century there was general agreement that theremust be in societies sonic analogy to the cell , the hard question being whether thisshould be taken t o be the individu al, the family, the firm and so on . Today , of course,we simply reject the presumption of there being a social cell; and in the same way weshould simply reject the pres um ption tha t beneficial con sequ ence s exp lain their causes.Chap te r X on Funct ional explanat ion: in Marxism does not add much to thediscussion of the preceding chapter; in fact it detracts from it. In the second section ofthe chapter Co hen makes o ut a good case against funct ional explanat ion, qui te s imilarto the one I have just made out against his own account . He actual ly sta tes thatSociologists often identify interesting functions, but it is ahvuys a further question,whose answer needs further evidence and argument, whether what they identifyexplains why something is so (p . 283, i talics add ed ). Yes, indeed, but does n ot thiscontradict the statement from p. 272 quoted above? The only way of m aking themcomp atible would be to show that there is som e mechanism of sufficient generality as tolicense functional ex plana tions in the absence of specific know ledge; b ut this, t o repeat,Cohen has not done.Let me try to review these two chapters in a more charitable light. Perhaps Cohenmainly intend ed to convey the notion that consequences often explain their causes, an dthat there is no single mechanism whereby they do so. Conscious choice, artificialselection, natural selection, reinforcement and absorbing Markov chains all areinstances of mechanisms that permit us to explain phenomena by their consequences.Th e term functional expla nation may then be used as an umb rella term f or these

A . Stinchcombe, Mertons Theory of Social Structu re, in L. Coser (ed.) , T / w Idru of SocicrlI L. Coser, Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change, in C. G . Smith (ed.), onfliclS/ruclure; P u p m in Honor. of Roberr M o r /o n (New York, Harcou rt Brace Jovano vich, 1974).R m h t i o n (Notre Dame. Ind: Universi ty of Notre Dame Press. 1971).


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28 R E V I E W A R T I C L E Smechanisms, and it would also be possible to oppose them en bloc to causalexplanations. (For simplicity I here disregard the non-functional consequence expla-nations.) Now to this less ambitious project there can be no strong objections, but Inevertheless believe tha t causal vs. intentional explanatio ns is a m ore fruitful dicho tom ythan causal vs. consequence explanations. First, some consequence explanations invokecausal mechanisms, so that the dichotomy is not exclusive. Second, many intentionalexplana tions of behaviour are not consequence explanations, viz. when the intendedconsequences fail to materialize: this means that the dichotomy is not exhaustive.Third, and most importantly, the proposed classification obscures the vital distinctionbetween short-term an d long-term consequence explanation^.^ The form er ar e basicallycausal, the latter basically intentional. Ta ke Cohens example (p. 280) of larger scale infirms being explained by economies of scale, which may either be sought intentionallyor realized by n atura l selection. It migh t very well be the case th at a firm first had to gothrou gh a stre tch of disecon omie s of scale before it realized th e econo mies of scale, e.g.because of so me indivisibilities in th e produc tion process. Th is wou ld be evidence for anintentional adaptation and evidence against natural selection, but it is not the kind ofevidence that fits naturally into Cohens framework. And in any case I believe thatCohens project is more ambit ious , and then the s trong objections s tated above doapply.Chap te r XI on Use-value, exchange-value, an d conte mp orary capitalism is generallygood, but does no t draw u po n Co hens specific an d un ique skills . In add ition the bookcontains two appendices, the first of which expan ds upon some themes of C h. V whilethe second c onta ins definitions of some key terms. It also ha s a supe rlative index th atwas of great help in preparing the present review.

Elster, Ulysses and r h Sirens Ch. 1. 3

Elster - Cohenmarx

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