Elite Power, Manipulation and Corruption: a Demo Elite Perspective

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Elite Power, Manipulation andCorruption: A DemoElite Perspective

Eva EtzioniHalevy

Government and Opposition / Volume 24 / Issue 02 / April 1989, pp 215 -231DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.1989.tb00117.x, Published online: 28 March 2014

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0017257X00006023

How to cite this article:Eva EtzioniHalevy (1989). Elite Power, Manipulation and Corruption:A DemoElite Perspective . Government and Opposition, 24, pp215-231 doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.1989.tb00117.x

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Eua Etzioni- Haley

Elite Power, Manipulation and Corruption: A Demo-Elite Perspective

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO the continuing debate on the manner in which power is exercised in Western-style democracies from a democratic-elite - or what I prefer to term a demo-elite - perspective. This is to be done through a theoretical exposition placing this perspective in the spectrum of the main theories on the same topic, with special reference to the classical democratic-elite theories of Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, and Raymond Aron, and the contemporary pluralist- elitist theories of Robert Dahl and Giovanni Sartori.

It will further be argued that the relative autonomy of elites helps to explain not only the manner in which power is used, and frequently abused, but also the manner in which it may be limited and partly countered in Western democracies. The secondary aim of the article is to make the case for a combined analysis of both the uses and abuses of power, of overt, legitimate, and covert and non-legitimate exertions of power - or political manipulation and corruption - in Western democracies.

Today there are many theories of power and no shortage of analyses of manipulation and c~r rup t ion .~ It is also recognised that political manipulation and corruption flow from the exercise of

To be dealt with in greater detail below. 2See for instance Murray J. Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, New York, Academic

Press, 1971; C. Mueller, The Politics .f Communication, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973; T.H. Quaker, Opinion Control in the Democracies, London, Macmillan, 1985; W. Riker, The Act ofPolitical Manipulation, New Haven, The University Press, 1986.

For instance, Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden Administrative Corruption, Public Administration Review, 37, 1977, pp. 301-8; Michael Johnston, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America, Monterey, Brooks/Cole; Tevfik F. Nas, Albert C. Price and Charles T. Wever, A Policy Oriented Theory of Corruption, American Political Science Review, 80, 1986. pp. 107-19; J.G. Peters and Susan Welch, Political Corruption in America, American Political Science Review, 72, 1978, pp. 974-84

216 G O V E R N M E N T A N D OPPOSITION

power, as, for instance, the following statement by G. Caiden makes clear: ... it has been recognized that anyone put into a position o f . . .power.. . is tempted to use public office for personal gain and ad~antage.~ Frequently, however, manipulation and cor- ruption are viewed merely as aberrations in the exercise of power; their analysis, thcrcforc, is not included in the mainstream of the theories of power, while the analysis of power as such is not included in the mainstream of the theories of corruption, and the different theories have not drawn on each other sufficiently.

T H E T H E O R E T I C A L S P E C T R U M

General analyses and critiques of the currently most prominent theories on the structure and exercise of power in Western demo- cracies have been presented elsewhere5 and there is no need to reiterate them. Rather, here the endeavour is to place the present analysis in the wider spectrum of existing theories by indicating how it follows their path, and in what way it diverges from them. For this purpose the variations among the theories on the subject of power in Western democracies may be aligned along three dimen- sions, or axes. The first dimension along which the theories vary is the degree to which they have seen power, or power centres, as concerted, versus the degree to which they have seen it, or them, as dispersed in Western democracies. In conjunction with this, the second dimension is the degree to which they have been complacent or conversely critical of Western democracies, in other words, the relationship they have perceived to exist between the is and the ought.

Participatory theories of democracy, for instance,6 have implied that power in Western regimes is too concentrated, but have put the

4Gerald E. Caiden Toward a General Theory of Otficial Corrruption (unpublished),

Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, London, Rout- ledge & Kegan Paul (rev. edn), 1985; Fragile Democracy, New Brunswick, N.J., Transac- tion Books, forthcoming.

See e.g. Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984; Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970; H.T. Wilson, Political Management, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1984.

p.4.

E L I T E POWER, M A N I P U L A T I O N A N D C O R R U P T I O N 217

main emphasis on setting out what democracy ought to look like, rather than on what it does look like. Older pluralist theories such as those by Dahl and Lindblom in their early writings,' newer pluralist theories,8 and pluralist-elitist theories and, most prominent- ly, those by Dahl in his more recent (but not most recent) writings and by Sartori' have seen power as more widely dispersed than it actually is and, as a consequence, have been over complacent and satisfied with Western democracy in its present state. Thus, for them, the ought and the is are almost identical. By contrast, elitists, such as C. W. Mills, W. Domhoff (who may be classified as an elitist with Marxist affinities) T. Dye and several others," corporatists, and corporatists with Marxist affinities, such as G. Lehmbruch, C. Offe, L. Panitch, P. Schmitter, and others," and the different variants of Marxists and neo-Marxists, including for instance E. Mandel, R. Miliband and N. Poulantzas, amongst many others,12 have seen

'Robert A. Dahl, A PreJace to Democratic Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956; David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, New Haven, Yale University press, 1961; Robert A. Dahl, and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Weyare, New York, Harper, 1953.

"E.g., Nelson W. Polsby, 'Prospects for Pluralism', Society, 22, 1985, pp. 3(f34. "Robert A Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States, Chicago, Rand McNally,

1967; Polyarchy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971; Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ., Prentice Hall (3rd edn) 1976; Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class, New York, Random House, 1963; Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1962; The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatham N.J., Chatham House Publishers, 1987; David Truman, The Governmental Process, New York, Knopf (2nd edn), 1971.

"C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959; G. Williams DomhofT, W h o Rules America?, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1967; The Powers That Be, New York, Random House, 1978; W h o Rules America Now?, Englewood Cliffs, NJ., Prentice Hall, 1983; Thomas R . Dye, Who's Running America? The Reagan Years, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1983; Who's Running America! The Conser- vative Years, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice Hall, 1985; see also G.L. Field and John Higley, Elitism, London, Routledge 81 Kegan Paul, 1980; Michael Useem, The Inner Circle, New York, Oxford University Press, 1984.

"See e.g. Claus Offe, Industrial Inequality, (tr. J . Wickham), London, Edward Arnold, 1976; L. Panitch, 'Trade Unions and the Capitalist State', N e w Left Review, 125, 1981, pp. 21-43; Philip C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, Trends Toward Corporatist Intermedia- tion, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1979.

"Ernest Mandel, Late Capiralism, (trans. J. de Pres), London, New Left Books, 1975; Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977; Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, (trans. P. Camiller), London, New Left Books, 1978; see also M. Parenti, Democracyfor the Few, New York, St Martin's Press, 1980.

218 GOVERNMENT A N D OPPOSITION

power structures in Western regimes as more concerted, or else as more consensually and procedurally unified, than they actually are. As a consequence, these latter theories have, in their various ways, underemphasized the differences between power structures in democratic and non-democratic regimes. Thus for them the gulf between the ought and the is becomes insuperable, irrelevant, or to be bridged only through revolution.

The third axis along which the theories may be aligned is that of the relationship perceived between economic power and political power. On the one side are the Marxists or neo-Marxists who have seen political power in Western democracies (as in all other regimes) as ultimately derived from economic power and hence have nomi- nated the economic power holders, or capitalists, as the true rulers - albeit by proxy-of Western societies. On the other side are the elitists, the pluralists, and the pluralist-elitists, who (either explicitly or implicitly) have viewed political power as an entity in its own right, not ultimately determined by economic power. In between, albeit at various points on the continuum, are inter aha the scholars known as Marx-inspired, and/or as state-centred such as F. Block, E. Nordlinger, T. Skocpol, and C. Tilly13 as well as those known as neo-pluralists, such as Dahl and Lindblom, who previously have been amongst the most formidable adversaries of Marxism, but in their recent writ ing~~ have increasingly become its allies. For the sake of greater clarity, though at the risk of oversimplification, the first and third axes along which the various theories differ are presented in the form of a diagram as shown on p. 219.

It is apparently the possibility of aligning the divergencies bet- ween the various approaches on clear dimensions - that may also be perceived as continua - which has prompted some scholars to att-

l 3 Fred Block, Revising State Theory, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987; Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1981; Theda Skocpol, States and Revolutions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Charles Tilly, As Sociology Meets History, New York, Academic Press, 1981.

I Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmm of Pluralist Democracy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982; A Preface to Economic Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985; Charles E. Lind- blom, Politics and Markets, New York, Basic Books, 1977. See also David Held, Models of Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, p. 201, and G. McLennan, Capitalist State or Democratic Theory? in G. McLennan, D. Held, and S. Hall (eds), The Idea o f t h e Modern State, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1984, pp.80-109 (as cited in Held, ibid.).

ELITE POWER, MANIPULATION AND C O R R U P T I O N 219

Perceived Relations Between

Economic and

Political power

Two-Dimensional Diagram of Theoretical Spectrum on

Power in Western Democracy

Derived from

Economic Power

Political Power

Seen as:

Independent

Marxist and Neo-Marxist

theories

Neo-pluralist theories

Marx-inspired Participatory theories state-centred of democracy

theories

Corporatist theories

Elitist theories

Democratic- elite theories (including the present one)

Pluralist-elitist theories PIuralist Theories

Power Centres Seen as:

Dispersed Interlocking or Consensually Unified

Perceived Degree of Dispersion versus Interlocking of Power Centres

empt an integration of those approaches. For instance, Parry15 wishes to establish a common ground between participatory, plural- ist, pluralist-elitist, and elitist theories of democracy by proposing that they differ from each other in emphasis only; that - similarly -

"Geraint Parry, Political Elites, London, Allen & Unwin, 1969, p. 157.

220 G O V E R N M E N T A N D OPPOSITION

democratic regimes differ from each other and that they may therefore fit the various theories to different extents. The demo-elite perspective attempts no such integration, but may be perceived as occupying the middle ground between the theories with respect to the dispersion versus the interlocking of power, and as close to the theories which present political power as independent of economic power.

POWER, RESOURCES, A N D THE PRIMACY OF STATE ELITES

The unfolding of the demo-elite perspective and the presentation of the arguments of this article can best be based on a critique of some elementary concepts and the assumptions pertaining to them, as they appear in various theoretical approaches, beginning with the intertwined concepts of power and elites. Marxs (and the Marxist) conception of power -has the advantage of anchoring the phenomenon in the general structure of society, in objective social processes, rather than in the traits and properties of individuals.I6 But, as is now becoming increasingly recognised by scholars known as post-Marxists, in viewing all power as derived from economic power, as based in the process of production and expressed in the process of reproduction,18 this conception is simplistic, reductionist and fails to come to terms with the complexity of power in modern, including modern Western, society.

Webers definition of power as ability to carry out ones will despite resistance, that is, to impose ones will on another regardless of the basis on which this ability rests, has the advantage of overcoming such economic reductionism, and therefore has been chosen as the point of departure for the definition here adopted. But the Weberian definition is too limited in another sense: like the pluralist definition of power as the capacity to control another

16See, for instance, Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? in Anthony Giddens and David Held (eds), Classes, Power and Conj ic t , Berkeley, Univer- sity of Cahfornia Press, 1982, pp. 224-48.

For instance: Peter D. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; Barry Hindess, Marxism and Parliamentary Democracy, in Alan Hunt (ed.), Marxism and Democracy, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1980, pp. 21-54.

See Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?, op. cit., p. 244. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 152-7.

FlaviaHighlight

ELITE POWER, MANIPULATION A N D C O R R U P T I O N 221

persons responses, which by now has been severely criticized, if not discredited, it limits itself to straightforward enforcement or control, not taking account of more subtle ways of exerting power. These, as Lukes2 has convincingly pointed out, may entail not the imposition of ones will on another, but the shaping of the others will so as to make imposition unnecessary; not the control of response, but the control of dispositions - from which responses then flow as a matter of course. The Weberian definition also leaves open the question of the bases of power, which subsequently have been held by pluralists and other scholars22 to consist in the control of resources. Taking all this into account, power is here conceived of as the ability to constrain other peoples actions, beliefs, wishes or life chances, on the basis of the control of resources, or having them at ones disposal. Resources, in turn, are here conceived of broadly, as all (scarce) entities that may impinge on peoples lives, including chiefly (but not necessarily exclusively) resources of coer- cion, of organization, or pure power, material resources and symbolic resources, as specified below.

On the basis of this conception of power it becomes clear (as it should have been in any case, were it not for the Marxist argument to the contrary) that the categories of those who have substantial power include, but are not limited to, economic power-holders. It follows that the concept of power-holders cannot be subsumed under the Marxian concept of ruling ciass, inasmuch as this latter consists of people whose power derives ultimately from their control of economic resources. Hence the necessity for the term elites, which, following Laswell and K a ~ l a n ~ ~ is here defined simply as the people, or categories of people, who have a disproportionate share of power, or, in other words, have more resources than other people do.

This use of the term does not accord with the proposal made by S a r t ~ r i , ~ ~ who urges us to revert to Paretos distinction between elites which are at the top because they are endowed with certain meritorious qualities, and power minorities that are simply wield-

Dahl, A Prreface to Democratic Theory, op. cit., p. 13. 20

Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical V i e w , London, Macmillan, 1974. 22 e.g. Held, Models of Democracy, op. cit., pp. 2 7 5 4 . H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press,

Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, op. cit., p. 146. 1950.

FlaviaHighlightweber calls the subtle ways domination!

222 G O V E R N M E N T A N D O P P O S I T I O N

ers of power. This proposal is hereby rejected on the ground that there are no procedures for examining whether the people who hold power in Western democracies (as in other regimes) are, or are not, in any sense superior to other people, or excel in any way, except insofar as they (by definition) exceed others in the control of resources. Hence the distinction between elites - in the merito- rious sense -and power minorities -in the neutral sense - would add little to our analytical apparatus: it might even detract from it, by confronting us with the constant dilemma of which term it would be appropriate to use in which circumstances.

Besides detracting from the dangers of conceptual overload, the use of the term elite in an entirely neutral sense - as targeting simply those who control disproportionate resources - has several other advantages. First and foremost, it enables the analyst to explore the structure of power without any preconceptions. Unlike the Marxist term ruling class, which entails the preconception of economic power-holders having overall dominance as well, the neutral term elite enables us to examine the power structure-who holds power over whom - simply on the basis of who controls what resources. It is hereby assumed that in complex societies resources are mostly (though not exclusively) accumulated in organizations, and elites are thus mostly (though not exclusively) people who control such resources through incumbency of certain top positions in organiza- t i o n ~ . ~ ~ This, however, still leaves open the question of which organizations are the major controllers of resources. Here it is argued - in line with the Weberian perspective - that in contempor- ary society, the biggest and most formidable organization, the main accumulator and controller of resources, is the state. Thus, the elites which control the state have control of the greatest chunk of contemporary societies' resources.

T H E I N T E R L O C K I N G VERSUS DIFFUSION O F ELITE P O W E R IN A D E M O C R A C Y

The neutral use of the concept of elites has an additional advantage: it may also lead to a more realistic appraisal of the degree to which

"There are also elites which are not located in institutionalized organizations; these are mainly elites of social movements.

E L I T E POWER, M A N I P U L A T I O N A N D C O R R U P T I O N 223

the power of elites is interlocked or, conversely, diffused in Western societies than would be possible if the perjorative, yet vague, Marxist term of ruling class were to be adopted. For using the term ruling class enables Marxists to argue both that in capitalist democra- cies there is a conglomeration of power such that economic power holders invariably have the ability to make the state work in their own interests and that there is a certain dispersion of power such that the state has relative autonomy from the ruling class. This attempt to have it both ways has prompted critics26 to make the point that - given the ability of the ruling class to make the state cater to its interests-it is not at all clear where the latters relative autonomy derives from.

Interestingly, Nordlinger,* who rejects what he terms society- centred approaches, and presents his own view as state-centred, nonetheless also presents the issue as one of the degree of autonomy of the democratic state from societal preferences, arguing that the state enjoys a high dcgree of -but not total-autonomy and that when societal and state preferences diverge, public officials devise various strategies to enhance such autonomy. This, however, raises the same question that is raised by the Marxist, neo-Marxist and Marx-inspired writers, namely whether inquiring into the degree of the states autonomy from society is indeed the most fruitful way of looking at the exercise of power in democratic regimes. It raises the question whether it is not more fruitful to regard the state and its elites as the major conglomeration of power, and on that basis, to inquire into the degree of autonomy of the other elites from the state elites and in particular from the governing elite.

The degree of the autonomy of elites in this sense, and its implications for the exercise of power in Western democracies has, in fact, been the particular concern of the democratic-elite perspec- tive shared by Weber, Mosca, Schumpeter and Aron. Contrary to Marxists and their allies, these theorists recognised that economic elites were not the prime or hegemonic elites; like elitists they recognised that the elites that controlled the state were formidable elites in contemporary Western societes; like pluralists they recog- nised that elites did not form a unified conglomeration of power, and that there was a complex manoeuvring among elites; but,

E.g. Hindess, Marxism and Parliamentary Democracy, op. cir. 26

On the Autonomy .f the Democratic State, op. cit.

224 G O V E R N M E N T AND O P P O S I T I O N

unlike pluralists, they perceived it as hinging not on a multiplicity of power centres but on a balance of power between a few major elites, a balance which they also perceived as a basic factor sustaining democracy. In this respect, the earlier democratic-elitists had a more realistic view of democracy than do the newer pluralist-elitists.

Like pluralists, the pluralist-elitists still view the competition among a plurality of elites as the main mechanism whereby the power of leaders is held in check. Dahl, for instance, argues that in the democratic systems he refers to as polyarchies there are multiple centres of power which is widely shared.28 And S a r t ~ r i ~ ~ writes: '. . . democracies are characterized by diffusion of power.. . by a multiplicity of criss-crossing power groups engaged in coalitional maneuverings'. While Dahl and Sartori are right in holding that there is a multiplicity of power centres and elites, they have not sufficiently emphasized the fact that there are elites of elites, or elites that are significantly more powerful than other elites in Western democracies. For instance Sartori goes on to say:30 'the fact that the processes of leading and influencing become, in democracies, enor- mously complex and elusive.. . should not be taken to imply that power minorities have little power or that they cancel themselves out among themselves. Maybe; maybe not'. At certain points in time, continues Sartori, we may find veto groups, at other points - winning coalitions. Arguably, however, 'maybe; maybe not' is not a sufficiently accurate characterization of power and elite constella- tions in Western democracies. Instead, the existence of major elites must be clearly emphasized.

The number of elites classified as major elites is not negligible. Ostensibly, therefore, the differences between the present perspec- tive and the pluralist-elitist one is a matter of nuances only. How- ever, if no explicit distinction is made between the major elites and the elites of pressure groups, action groups, protest movements, and the like - which in present-day Western societies have proliferated into the hundreds if not into the thousands3' - this necessarily results in an unrealistically optimistic conception of the dispersion

'XPolyarchy, 1971, esp. ch. 7. '' The Theory of Democracy Revisited, op. cit., pp. 147-8. "'ibid. "See e.g. Joyce M. Muhaben, 'Cycles of Peace Protest in West Germany', West

European Politics, 8 , 1985, pp. 24-40.

ELITE POWER, M A N I P U L A T I O N A N D C O R R U P T I O N 225

of power in Western democracies. O n the other hand, if it is accepted that the joint power of the state elites exceeds that of other elites, and that the power of the major elites exceeds that of the minor elites, then not only is this a more realistic appraisal of the distribution of power in Western societies, but it also opens the way for an analysis of the strategies for the exercise of power of major elites over other elites. It opens the way in particular for the analysis of the governing elite's strategies of control, including those of manipulation and corruption, and the manner in which such stra- tegies may or may not be countered, as will be argued in greater detail below.

Thus, as pluralist-elitists consider elite power to be so widely dispersed, they have not developed an adequately systematic con- ception of both the uses and abuses of power which are so prevalent even in Western democracies. This omission, as caused by the over-optimistic view of the dispersion of power, is evident for instance in Sartori who writes: 'Yet systems exist [presumably our own] in which the people are not only protected from power abuses but actually and importantly enter the process of deciding what is to be done.. .'.32 As they underrate power abuses, the pluralist- elitists also have not developed an adequate conception of how these may be countered or partly countered in Western democracies.

Moreover, as pluralist-elitists have regarded power as widely dispersed, they have considered it to be sufficiently diffused already, so that any additional diffusion of power is not welcomed by them as beneficial for Western democracy. Thus, Sartori shows a distinct lack of enthusiasm (that, admittedly, has also been shared by Schumpeter) for greater public participation in the political process. He partakes (albeit in an attenuated form) of the view of scholars such as Berelson, Kornhauser, and Milbrath33 to the effect that a certain degree of mass apathy is functional for democracy, and also shares their trepidation that more public participation might detract from democracy. Sartori writes, for instance: 'A maximization of democracy.. . along the path that makes the people less governed.. . crucially hinges on the performance of the average citizen. This

The Theory of Democracy Revisited, op. cit., p. 34. "Bernard R . Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and W.M. McPhee, Voting, Chicago,

University of Chicago Press, 1954; A.W. Kornhauser, Problems aJ Power rn American Democracy, Detroit, Wayne State University Press; Lester Milbrath and M.L. Goel, Polifical Participation, Chicago, Rand McNally (2nd edn), 1965.

226 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

performance will not be improved by activist modes of participa- t i ~ n . ' ~ ~ And further 'In dealing.. . with referendum democracy we have encountered the finding that participation correlates with intensity and that intensity correlates, in turn, with extremism. If this be true, it would imply that the participatory ideal may have nothing to do with the enrichment and the full development of human capacities'. This lack of enthusiasm for more participation is not shared here, nor is it necessary for the present analysis, which (unlike Sartori's) is a democratic-elite, rather than an elitist one.

It follows from all this that the pluralist-elitists, and most promi- nently Sartori, share with the older and newer pluralists their over-complacency with Western democracy as it currently exists. In fact it would seem that Sartori is a self-confessed apologist for the system, for he describes his own work as one of expounding 'mainstream basics', and adds that while the task may appear unexciting, it is still a necessary one because 'we must have (and give) reasons for the institutions we have.. .'.36 Later Sartori argues that he is not, in fact, complacent about Western democracy: 'Let it be stressed in the attempt, however vain, of not being misunder- stood, that if there is ... a literature on democracy that is too complacent, that conveys that we are doing as well as human imperfection permits, this is a view that I do not share'.37 But even the most earnest attempt not to misunderstand this eminent scholar, still leaves one with the distinct impression that his ideal for the future, for all intents and purposes, still keeps the present system intact, pertaining - as it does - merely to the selection of more meritorious leaders. This becomes evident for instance from Sar- tori's normative, or prescriptive (as distinct from his descriptive) definition of democracy as follows: 'Democracy should be a pol- yarchy o j merit'.38 Though extremely dificult to achieve (especially as democracy is based precisely on the assumption that there is no consensus on who the leaders with merit might be) this is nonethe- less a modest ideal in structural terms, for it in no way transcends the structures that we currently have.

The Theory of Democracy Revisited, op. cit., p. 122. "ibid., p. 162. "ibid., p. XI. "ibid., p. 165. '"ibid., p. 169.

E L I T E P O W E R , M A N I P U L A T I O N A N D C O R R U P T I O N 227

T H E R E L A T I V E A U T O N O M Y O F ELITES A N D T H E P R I N C I P L E S OF W E S T E R N D E M O C R A C Y

The area where the present analysis most closely follows pluralist- elitism, and particularly Sartori, is first his conception which (in similarity to Schumpeter) identifies free competitive elections for the holders of government power, as the core element of demo- cracy. Secondly, it follows Sartori in that, like the classical democra- tic-elite theorists, he recognised 'the reciprocal control of leaders upon leaders',39 as leading to the restraint of elite power, and as one of the core merits of democracy. Thirdly, it follows Sartori in that he connects this restraint with competitive elections: 'The crux of the matter is, thus, that to restrain.. . leaders, the demos must have the full and unfettered power to choose them- regular elections must regularly occur.'4o

This, however, still leaves implicit the links between competitive elections, the control of leaders upon leaders, and the restraint of elite power. The present analysis attempts to explicate this link through the concept of the relative autonomy of elites as analysed, for instance, by Aron. It is argued here that the electoral principle in conjunction with the other principles of democracy generate this restraint not only, and perhaps not even chiefly, through the fear of electoral replacement enforcing responsiveness of elected power- holders to the wishes of their electors. Rather, the principles of democracy do so also, or perhaps even chiefly, by sustaining and legitimizing the relative autonomy of the other elites from the elected governing elite. Thus, it is not only, and not so much, the anticipated reaction process, but the relative autonomy process, which puts fetters on governing elite power, and which, therefore, is of the very essence of democracy.

The relative autonomy of elites, one o f the most distinctive features ofdemocracy, also poses a contradiction for it. For, it is consistent with one democratic principle, yet inconsistent with another. It is basic to the essence of democracy, yet also contravenes that essence. This con- tradiction, in turn, is inherent in the basic principles of democracy, which are both consistent and inconsistent, both necessary for each other, and also incongruous with each other.

"ibid., p. 155. "ibid.

228 G O V E R N M E N T A N D O P P O S I T I O N

Strangely enough, this consistency/inconsistency is evident in particular between the principle of freedom of association or or- ganization and the principle of free elections. On the one hand, of course, freedom of organization is a sine qua non for free elections: without such freedom, competing groups and candidates could not present their cases to the electorate. On the other hand, the principle of freedom of organization underpins the independence and power of other, countervailing, elites and this power contravenes the electoral principle. For, being generated by individual organiza- tions, these elites are not elected by the entire population. They usually acquire their power in a non-democratic manner, e.g. by appointment, self-appointment or inheritance, or else are elected by only part of the population. Therefore, if they amass power which is uncontrolled by the generally elected political elite, this con- travenes the electoral principle, whereby elites gain power on the basis of elections by the entire population. In other words, the relative autonomy, and the power of elites that countervail the power of the governing elite is essential to democracy, yet also obviates its essence.

This inherent contradiction is most clearly visible with respect to the economic elite which, in Western countries today, assumes the form of a capitalist elite. An economy - and therefore an economic elite - that has a certain immunity from state intervention is implied in the principle of freedom of organization; it serves to circumscribe state power, and therefore is of the essence of democracy. But since economic power-holders usually are not elected, or are elected only by their own shareholders (a small part of the population) their accumulation of power also contradicts the essence of democracy. An economic elite which has relative immunity from state interven- tion need not necessarily be a capitalist elite; it could equally well be an elite of cooperative enterprises. If this were to be the case, it would mitigate economic class inequalities, and extend democracy to economic enterprises as well. But even then the economic elite would still be elected only by the members of those enterprises, and thus its power beyond those would still be contrary to the essence of democracy.

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THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF ELITES AND THE UTILIZATION OF STATE RESOURCES: MANIPULATION AND CORRUPTION

The relative but incomplete autonomy of the other elites from the governing political elite in a democracy has additional consequen- ces. This relative autonomy makes it both necessary and possible for the latter to exert, and attempt to consolidate, its power through various strategies of control which are based on the utilization of non-coercive state resources and, most prominently, through a variety of inducements. In a democracy, the governing elite attains power through the electoral process and this endows it with a certain legitimacy. Nevertheless that elite cannot rely on electoral legitimation alone to sustain its power: widespread dissatisfaction, and opposition to its rule, and/or widespread non-compliance with its edicts amongst the public, might well force it out of office prematurely. Hence, it must devise means and ways, or strategies, for exerting its power in practice, for consolidating that power and, preferaby from its viewpoint, for perpetuating it into the future.

Ostensibly, the governing political elite should be able to attain at least compliance and acquiescence through its control of those state institutions which have charge of the instruments of coercion. But actual use of the means of coercion is severely restricted by democratic rules, not only through their conferring various free- doms on the public, but also because they safeguard the relative autonomy of other elites, as noted before. Also, the direct control of these means is in the hands of special, and themselves relatively autonomous, elites: those of the defence and security services. Their utilization by the governing political elite presupposes the support of the elites in charge of coercion-a support that cannot be taken for granted, unless the relevant rules are observed. In practice this signifies that, beyond narrowly defined limits, the governing elite in a democracy cannot rely on coercion to secure acquiescence to its rule. Hence its tendency to use non-coercive resources.

The state has charge of three major types of non-coercive resour- ces which, together with the attempts to use them as part of the governing elites strategies of control, may be referred to as devices, and these may be classified as symbolic devices, power devices and material devices. The governing elite may thus allot each of these resources - or various combinations thereof - to encourage support

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or acquiescence, or to withdraw such resources as a penalty for non-support or opposition.

The use of these resources may be classified in accordance with the degree of overtness or deviousness employed (devious applica- tions being referred to as manipulation). These devices may also be classified in accordance with the degree of their legitimacy in the light of the norms of the participants, with non-legitimate use of resources referred to as corruption.

Each of the devices described, as well as combinations thereof, may be resisted and countered with various degrees of determina- tion and success. The countering of these devices entails the rejec- tion of the inducements and/or the willingness to bear the penalties derived therefrom, separately or in combination. It also involves the imposition of counter-devices, or even counter penalties and these, too, may utilize symbolic, power, material, or combined resources. Material and power counter-devices, for instance, may involve work stoppages and strikes, while symbolic counter-devices may involve exposure of the governing elites manipulation and corrup- tion to public scrutiny, their demystification, so to speak, and their public condemnation. Combined power and symbolic counter- devices may involve protest rallies and demonstrations. A three-fold combination of counter-devices (with respect to corruption) may involve indictment, trial, conviction, fining and imprisonment.

The countering of the governing elites manipulation and cor- ruption is led by other elites.41 But these can be effective only if they have some autonomy in the control of resources which is more likely if they can thereby enhance them. It is here, in particular, that we may speak of the distinctiveness of Western-style democracies. For in such regimes other elites not only have a relative autonomy from the governing elite, but frequently can, in fact, enhance their resources by curbing that elites power, manipulation and corrup- tion. Thus, the economic elite can enhance its profits by blocking uncongenial government policies, while trade union leaders may depend for their position on blocking policies uncongenial to their members. The opposition can gain power only by decreasing public support for the governing elite - often through exposure of that elites abuses. The members of the media elite frequently enhance their standing in the eyes of the public by maintaining a critical

These elites may, of course, exert power and engage in manipulation and corruption of their own, but this is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

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approach to government deeds and misdeeds. Finally, there are fractions within bureaucratic and judicial elites, whose ruiron dttre is the exposure of governing elite corruption: commissions of inquiry, state and municipal comptrollers, etc.

Yet, even in Western democracies these elites are, at times, vulnerable to the governing elites power because of that elites control of the state resources on which - in the form of allocations, subsidies, congenial regulations, information, salaries and promo- tions-they may at times be dependent, and whose authority and power over themselves is not always clearly defined. All this encourages attempts by the other elites to counter the power, manipulation and corruption of the governing elite, but without unduly antagonizing that elite, and thus, not always very effective- ly.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to show the manner in which the demo-elite perspective follows - but further explicates - the classi- cal democratic-elite theory, how it parts ways with Marxism, pluralism, elitism and corporatism, and how it converges with, but also diverges from, pluralist-elitism and neo-pluralism. The article has thereby also argued that an explanation of the manner in which the governing elite exercises its power may be aided by the concep- tion of the relative autonomy of the other elites, which is protected and legitimized by the principles of democracy.

This relative (but incomplete) autonomy of elites makes it both expedient and possible for the governing elite to utilize state- controlled (symbolic, power and material) resources as part of its strategies of control, and leads it to do so through manipulation and corruption. The relative autonomy of the other elites also en- courages them to resist and counter such attempts and this has a curbing effect on these abuses which is peculiar to Western demo- cracies. However, the other elites independence, and their conse- quent ability for confrontation, is not always sufficient to render them an effective bulwark against manipulation and corruption. For whenever such independence is weakened or obviated, abuses of power tend to fluorish.