Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments Laurel Harbridge College Fellow, Department of Political Science Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research Northwestern University [email protected]Neil Malhotra Stanford Graduate School of Business
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Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress:
Does partisan conflict damage citizens‘ perceptions of Congress? If so, why has partisan
polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the
―electoral connection‖ by exploring the mass public‘s attitudes towards partisan conflict via two
survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of individual members and
Congress as a whole. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens
across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party
identification with respect to evaluations of individual members. Independents and weak
partisans are more supportive of members that espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong
partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict
in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern
helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even
though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution, and offers new insights
into our understanding of ―Fenno‘s paradox,‖ or the tendency for voters to approve of individual
members while disapproving of Congress as a whole. A paradoxical source of this
heterogeneity—beyond the common explanation that members run against Washington—is that
citizens‘ displeasure with discord in Congress as a macro-level institution is due to their support
of those same behaviors performed at the micro-level by members of that institution.
1
The rise in partisan polarization since the 1970s has been one of the most extensively
studied topics in congressional scholarship in recent years (e.g., Aldrich et al. 2002; Han and
Brady 2007; McCarty et al. 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Theriault 2008a). Most of the
literature on polarization in Congress has focused on the behavior of legislators themselves
within the framework of the institution, hoping to identify both the causes and consequences of
the increasing partisan divide (e.g. Cox and Katz 2002; McCarty et al. 2006; Roberts and Smith
2003; Stonecash et al. 2002). Less research has focused on citizens‘ attitudes towards party
conflict and whether increasing polarization is consistent with members‘ electoral incentives. In
this article, we seek to unpack the ―the electoral connection‖ via an examination of the mass
public‘s attitudes towards partisan conflict in Congress. To do so, we conducted two original
survey experiments as part of the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in
which we manipulated characteristics of individual members and Congress, and then measured
people‘s attitudes towards individual members and the institution as a whole.
We build on previous research that has used aggregate and individual-level data to show
that partisan conflict has decreased Americans‘ confidence in and approval of Congress as an
institution. In a recent paper published in this journal, Ramirez (2009) found that increases in the
proportion of party-line votes decreases aggregate measures of congressional approval.
Similarly, analyses of individual-level survey data demonstrate that Americans‘ perceptions of
acrimony and bickering between political parties have fostered negative attitudes towards
Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Durr et al. 1997).
While these findings demonstrate an important consequence of increased party conflict, they do
raise an important question: Why would members of Congress behave in a partisan manner if it
adversely affects how they are viewed by the public? Existing explanations rest on stories of
2
party pressure or members being out of step with the electorate. Conversely, we suggest that
electoral responsiveness may be compatible with these patterns. Via individual-level,
experimental data, we show that individual members—particularly those from safe districts—do
not have electoral incentives to act in a bipartisan manner and contribute to the collective good of
overall congressional approval.
Our findings also re-conceptualize previous explanations of public attitudes towards
Congress positing that the public‘s negative perception of the institution stems from members
denigrating it for electoral benefit. Early work by Fenno (1975, 1978) observed that people are
generally favorable toward their own member of Congress, but are much less positive in their
evaluations of Congress more generally, consistent with members running for Congress by
running against Congress. Subsequent work on ―Fenno‘s paradox‖ suggests that people use
different criteria for evaluating their own member than for evaluating Congress as a whole. For
instance, Parker and Davidson (1979) and Born (1990) argue that whereas Congress is judged
(poorly) on the basis of the process and output of lawmaking, individual members are judged
(favorably) on the basis of constituency service and personal characteristics. Actions such as
casework and position-taking can assist members in building a personal vote and increasing
support among their constituents (Cain et al. 1987) but may not translate into positive
evaluations of Congress as an institution. Mutz and Flemming (1999) suggest a social-
psychological processes of negative perceptual biases when making evaluations in the aggregate,
combined with positive perceptual biases when evaluating the local or personal, leading citizens
to use different criteria when evaluating Congress versus individual Congresspersons.
In contrast, our findings offer an alternative understanding of Fenno‘s paradox,
suggesting that even when citizens evaluate similar criteria, what people want from individual
3
members is different from what they want from Congress as a whole. Although the public
generally rebukes Congress in the aggregate for partisan bickering, some citizens reward
individual members for eschewing bipartisan cooperation. Hence, we present a new paradox:
voters‘ displeasure with discord in Congress as a macro-level institution is due to their support of
those same behaviors performed at the micro-level by members of that institution. Simply put,
citizens disapprove of Congress because it is comprised of officials with characteristics they like.
This paradox is explained by some voters‘ inconsistent standards of evaluating similar behaviors
by level of the institution.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we provide a theoretical basis for our
hypotheses concerning how different segments of the public respond to partisan activity in
Congress. Additionally, we present some empirical regularities on district preferences and the
degree of partisan behavior to motivate the analyses. We then present the designs of the two
experimental studies, the results, and their implications for the study of polarization and party
conflict in Congress.
Partisan Conflict and the Electoral Connection
Challenging Downs‘ (1957) prediction that politicians should converge to the position of
the median voter, scholars have recently asked, ―Whatever happened to the median voter? Rather
than attempt to move her ‗off the fence‘ or ‗swing‘ her from one party to another, today's
campaigners seem to be ignoring her‖ (Fiorina 1999). Although it is unlikely that complete
convergence occurs between candidates (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Miller and Stokes 1963),
many scholars have nonetheless suggested that members seek to be representative of their
constituents lest they face electoral defeat (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Erikson 1978; Erikson and
4
Wright 1980).
In contrast to solely focusing on electoral competition in a Downsian space, recent work
on legislative behavior has taken an alternative approach to understanding representation and
non-convergence to the median by examining the tensions members can face between their party
and constituency, particularly for cross-pressured members in competitive districts. This research
suggests that some members find it easier to converge to the median than others. Many studies of
political parties focus on the positive electoral benefits of the party brand and the need for
collective action in order to enact a legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox and
McCubbins 2005). Parties provide a number of tangible resources to members including
campaign funding, valuable committee assignments, and deal-making to shepherd legislation
introduced by the member (Smith 2007). Members who are loyal to the party and vote the party
line are much more likely to receive these benefits than are disloyal members. Much of this
research suggests that there are benefits to voting with the party even if a member‘s district
preferences lean away from the party position on a particular bill (Aldrich 1995; Rohde 1991).
Thus, partisan conflict in Congress may reflect party influence on members (Fiorina and
Levendusky 2006).
In many cases, members‘ partisan and constituent interests are reinforcing. However,
some members are pulled in opposite directions by party and constituency interests (Bond and
Fleisher 1990). These cross-pressured members may have the most to lose from engaging in
partisan behavior. Many party theorists find that members who are cross-pressured by their party
and constituency may be able to break party discipline on certain votes. As noted by Lebo et al.
(2007), party unity is a double-edged sword it increases the likelihood of legislative success but
can also expose members in moderate districts to electoral defeat. Similarly, Patty (2008) notes
5
that a ―fundamental tension occurs when [a] member‘s individual and collective interests are in
conflict‖ (640).
The rise of polarization in Congress since the 1970s has led scholars to question whether
members are following the party rather than their constituents, leading to a decline in
responsiveness to constituent interests and thus to the median voter (Fiorina and Levendusky
2006). Our analysis suggests that party polarization is not incompatible with responsiveness to a
member‘s constituents, as members may focus their actions on winning support in a narrower
constituency than the geographic constituency (Fenno 1978). In particular, we focus on the
differential preferences of strong partisans and other individuals (including weak partisans and
independents), whose electoral influence may vary by district type.
In addition to party pressure, primary competition may cause members not to adopt the
preferences of the median constituent in their districts. A member may face a competitive
primary election challenge from within his or her own party (Brady et al. 2007) and/or a strong
general election challenge from the opposing party (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002). Previous research
has found that the electoral stage at which members expect an electoral challenger affects
legislative behavior and coalition formation (Kanthak and Crisp 2005; Crisp et al. 2004). The
logic is that members who represent competitive districts (i.e., those that the opposing party has a
chance of winning), and where the challenge is likely to come in a general election, will have the
incentive to work across the aisle and engage in bipartisan collaboration. In contrast, members
who represent districts that are safely Democratic (or Republican), and thus where the challenge
is more likely to come in a primary election, may engage in partisan behavior in an attempt to
shore up support from strong partisans, who make up a larger portion of the primary electorate
(Norrander 1989; Geer 1988; Grofman 1993). While competitive primary and general elections
6
are not mutually exclusive, we can think of members as focusing on gaining support from
specific reelection constituencies, which will be related to where they anticipate challengers.
Further, even in the general election, strong partisans are more likely to turn out to vote (e.g.
Wattenberg and Brians 1999),1 and the median voter in these districts is more likely to be a
strong partisan, thereby incentivizing the member to engage in partisan legislative discord
(consistent with electorally-responsive behavior).
Hence, building on Mayhew‘s (1974) central premise that members of Congress are
―single-minded reelection seekers,‖ we argue that the electoral incentives of members influence
the level of partisan conflict in Congress.2 Following Ramirez (2009), we use the term ―partisan
conflict‖ loosely to refer to any outcome or scenario where Democrats and Republicans do not
appear to be working together to achieve common goals.3 This includes party-line voting on roll
calls, partisan composition of cosponsorship coalitions, acrimonious floor speeches and rhetoric,
and the use of procedural tactics against the opposing party.4 For instance, studies of partisan
polarization in Congress consider partisan homogeneity in roll-call voting as a sign of conflict
and a lack of bipartisan cooperation. In conceptualizing party conflict, we purposely adopt a
broad definition since citizens may have differing interpretations and reactions to various forms
of congressional behavior. We hypothesize that voters who are Independents and weak partisans
prefer that their member engage in bipartisan activities whereas strong partisans prefer partisan
1 For instance, in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, strong partisans exhibited a turnout rate
eleven percentage points higher than weak partisans and Independents (p<.001). An even larger difference of
twenty-one percentage points was observed in the 2008 American National Election Study (p<.001). 2 Although the survey experiments in this paper focus on the observable aspects of legislative behavior, it is
important to note that in the real world legislative behavior may reflect both preferences and strategies. That is,
when a member of Congress chooses a certain mix of partisan and bipartisan behaviors that reflect the preferences
of the district median, this may reflect the member‘s own preferences (in which case the voters were able to select a
member whose own positions reflect the median voter) or it may reflect a strategic choice by the member. 3 Ramirez (2009) specifically operationalizes partisan conflict as the percentage of roll call votes in which 75% of
Democrats vote against 75% of Republicans. 4 We will not be examining all of these sources of partisan conflict, but rather only those which are most empirically
tractable to test comparative statics in an experimental setting.
7
behavior as a result of their greater likelihood of agreement with, and attachment to, their
political party. Accordingly, members of Congress have incentives to exhibit a certain mix of
bipartisan and partisan behavior depending on the composition of their districts and which
electoral stage they expect competition.
Aggregate-level data show that members from competitive (general election) districts are
less likely to engage in partisan conflict and more likely behave in a manner that might be
classified as bipartisan. These behaviors include: (1) voting with opposing partisans on roll calls
with greater frequency; and (2) joining cosponsorship coalitions with members of the opposing
party. With respect to roll call voting, Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) analyze congressional elections
from 1956-1996 and find that, when controlling for district preferences (measured by the normal
presidential vote) and a range of other factors, members with more extreme voting records (i.e.,
more liberal or conservative than the district median voter) are less likely to be reelected as
compared to their colleagues whose voting behavior better represents their districts. In every
election year between 1956 and 1996, roll call extremity has a negative effect on members‘
general election vote share, even when controlling for factors such as challenger quality and
spending. Substantively, a 25-point shift in a member‘s Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA) score away from the median voter (an approximately one standard deviation shift)
decreases a member‘s vote share by 1 to 3 percentage points (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, 133).
They find that this pattern is true across types of districts. For members in both marginal and safe
seats, the extremity of a member‘s ADA score relative to his or her district‘s preferences
adversely affects the probability of reelection. Since competitive districts have more moderate
median voters, members who represent these districts will have more moderate voting records
than members of more liberal (or conservative) districts where the median voter pulls the
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member toward the ideological poles.
We find similar results using bill cosponsorship coalitions members from more centrist
districts are more likely to engage in bipartisan cosponsorship. In some ways, cosponsorship is
an even better metric than roll call votes in assessing strategic decision making on the part of
congresspersons because bill cosponsorship is in the purview of individual members and is less
likely to be subject to agenda control (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Krehbiel 1995). Whereas
previous work on cosponsorship tends to focus on the frequency of cosponsoring (Campbell
1982) or on the dyadic patterns of cosponsorship (Fowler 2006), we focus on the relative
incidence of partisan and bipartisan cosponsorship, similar to roll call analyses that examine the
extremity of a member‘s voting position.5 In Figure 1, we plot district
6 preferences (proxied by
the normal presidential vote7 in the district) against the percentage of the member‘s
cosponsorships that are bipartisan for the 103rd
-109th
Congresses. Lower values of the normal
vote indicate districts that are more competitive for the incumbent party. A member is coded as
engaging in a bipartisan cosponsorship if he or she cosponsors a bill on which at least 20% of the
bill‘s cosponsors are from the party opposite the party of the bill‘s original sponsor.8 All other
5 There is a smaller body of work that has looked more directly at the bipartisan nature of cosponsorship coalitions,
including the signaling explanation posited by Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), as well as working papers on bipartisan
cooperation and polarization (Theriault 2008b; Harbridge 2009). The latter work examines differences in patterns of
bipartisanship between cosponsorship and roll call votes. Our analysis uniquely explores the effects of district
characteristics on bipartisan cosponsorship. 6 Cosponsorship data from Fowler (2006). All districts (where data are available) are included. This includes
districts that were redistricted. Ideally, instances where a district boundary was redrawn would be omitted. However,
our data only include an indicator for whether a district is in a state that was redistricted, meaning that removing
these cases leaves minimal observations in the 103rd
(1992), and 108th
(2002) Congresses. As a result, redistricted
cases are a source of measurement error. 7 Following Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) and Levendusky et al. (2008), we operationalize the normal presidential vote
as the mean two-party presidential vote in the previous two elections by the party of the incumbent representative.
For instance, if the member is a Republican we use the mean Republican presidential vote in the last two
presidential elections and if the member is a Democrat we use the mean Democratic presidential vote in the last two
presidential elections. Hence, higher values of this variable indicate more extreme districts whereas lower values
represent more moderate, competitive districts. 8 Results are consistent when using alternate definitions of bipartisanship, including a 30%, 40%, and 50% cutoff.
Online Appendix Table A1 replicates the OLS results in Table 1 using these alternate specifications. In each case,
9
cosponsorships are considered partisan cosponsorships. As is clear from the figure, members
from moderate districts (i.e. normal votes near 50% or less) are more likely to cosponsor
legislation with members of the opposite party.
This relationship is robust to the inclusion of several member-level control variables
(majority party status, gender, age, tenure, leadership position) and Congress-level
controls divided government, majority seat share, and presidential election years.9 As shown in
the first two columns of Table 1, there exists an inverse relationship between the normal vote and
bipartisan cosponsorship activity, either estimating an OLS model or a quasi-binomial model10
to
predict the frequency of bipartisan cosponsorship. Moving from a competitive district where the
normal presidential vote is 50% to a moderately-safe district where the normal vote is 60%
corresponds to a 6.1-percent decrease in the percent of bills cosponsored by the member that are
bipartisan. Over the period of analysis, the median member cosponsored 91 bipartisan bills (out
of a total of 163 cosponsorship) so a 6.1% effect is equivalent to changing the number of
bipartisan bills by 9. Alternatively, we can consider the percentage of bills that a member
the normal presidential vote has a significant and negative effect on the frequency of bipartisan cosponsorship.
Additionally, to verify that those bills classified as bipartisan are distinct from those bills classified as partisan in the
analysis (using the 20% threshold), we focused on just those bills that receive a roll call vote and examined the
probability that each type of bill partisan and bipartisan by cosponsorship receives a bipartisan roll call vote.
That is, of all bipartisan (or partisan) cosponsored bills that face a roll call vote, what proportion end up having a
bipartisan roll call vote (as defined by the CQ measure)? Data from the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and
Jones 2000), Rohde‘s dataset of House roll call votes (2004), and the bill cosponsorship measures indicate that
between one-quarter and one-half of bills with bipartisan cosponsors that reach roll call votes result in a bipartisan
vote. The average for 1993 through 2000 (the last year in which all three data sources are available) is one-third. In
contrast, between one-twentieth and one-fifth (with an average of three-twentieths) of bills with partisan cosponsors
that reach roll call votes result in a bipartisan vote. Although it is not impossible for partisan cosponsored bills to
result in a bipartisan roll call vote, it is rare. In all years, bills with bipartisan cosponsorship coalitions are more
likely to result in a bipartisan roll call vote than bills with partisan cosponsorship coalitions. This suggests that the
cosponsorship measure is capturing important variation, and that the importance of this variation extends to voting
patterns in the chamber as a whole. 9 Data from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2008), the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (1997), Volden and Wiseman (2009), and updated by the authors. 10
The quasi-binomial model examines the number of successes that occur in a specific number of trials. Applied to
the question at hand, ―successes‖ are bipartisan cosponsorship coalitions and the number of trials is the number of
bills that a member cosponsors. A quasi-binomial, rather than a binomial, model is used to allow for over-dispersion
in the dependent variable.
10
cosponsors and its range in the data. For the period of analysis, the interquartile range is bounded
by 47% and 65% bipartisan cosponsorships, with a median of 56%. Thus, the magnitude of the
effect of the normal vote is quite substantial when considering where in the distribution it would
move a member. Looking at a few examples from California illustrates this pattern. The normal
presidential vote in Representative Jim Costa‘s (CA-20, Dem) Fresno district is 51% Democratic
and in the 109th
Congress 59% of the bills that he cosponsored were bipartisan. In contrast, the
normal presidential vote is 87% Democratic in the nearby Berkeley and Oakland areas and only
24% of the bills that Representative Barbara Lee (CA-9, Dem) cosponsored were bipartisan.
District preferences not only explain between-member variation in bipartisan activity but
also within-member variation across time. In the third and fourth columns of Table 1, we include
fixed effects for members.11
In both the OLS and quasi-binomial models, even when controlling
for member fixed effects and Congress-level variables, the normal presidential vote exerts a
significant negative effect on bipartisan cooperation. Drawing on the third model, a 10 percent
increase in the normal vote is associated with nearly a 2% decrease in bipartisan cooperation.
While significantly smaller than the effects that examine variation between members, this effect
still shows the pull of a member‘s constituency. That is, when a member‘s district becomes more
partisan, the member‘s bipartisan cooperation declines. Indeed, there have been some notable
cases of members becoming more frequent bipartisan cosponsors as their district becomes more
moderate. Consider the example of Steve Chabot (OH-1), a Republican who represented
southwestern Ohio from 1995 to 2008. Between the 104th
and 107th
Congresses12
the normal
Republican presidential vote in this district declined from 57% to 47%. Over this period, the
percent of his cosponsorship coalitions that were bipartisan increased from 41% to 55%.
11
Due to the inclusion of member fixed effects, time-invariant variables drop out of the model specifications. 12
The 108th
and 109th
Congresses are omitted from this illustration because of redistricting.
11
Certainly, district preferences are not the only factors that explain legislative bipartisanship.13
However, these patterns suggest that bipartisan cooperation, like patterns of legislative
extremism more generally, are strongly related to district preferences. Further, the propensity to
reach across the aisle is not simply a fixed characteristic of a member. Rather, it endogenously
changes in response to electoral and strategic incentives. The implication of this fact is that
district-level changes in the composition of voters—either through redistricting, mobility, or
political and demographic shifts—can significantly alter the legislative dynamics in Congress
even if the composition of the legislature remains the same.
These empirical patterns suggest that there may be a differential desire for bipartisanship
within the public. Whereas voters who are strong partisans may not want their co-partisan
representative to compromise his or her beliefs in order to reach agreement with the other party,
people less attached to or aligned with a political party may believe that compromise and
collaboration is the basis of effective government. Hence, underlying district preferences should
lead some members to engage in behavior contributing to party conflict and others to engage in
bipartisan behavior. The experiments presented in this paper explore the individual-level
dynamics that underlie this electoral connection.
Experimental Studies
To empirically evaluate whether partisan polarization affects mass perceptions of
Congress as an institution and support for individual members, we conducted two survey
experiments over the Internet as part of the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
13
Bipartisan cooperation could occur through shared features of members that are unrelated to district preferences.
A full dyadic member-to-member model specification with controls for region/state and veterans status, among other
things, is beyond the scope of the analysis (which looks at each member across all bills). However, even when we
condition on region and veterans status, the effect of the normal presidential vote on bipartisan cosponsorship
frequency is statistically significant in all specifications (see Online Appendix Tables A2 and A3).
12
(CCES) administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. Political behavior and attitude research suggests
that how voters respond to the institution versus individual members is not clear-cut. Whereas
theories of partisan cue-taking and partisan rationalization (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Rahn
1993) would predict that strong partisans will prefer conflict as a feature of both members and
the institution, previous findings from Congressional scholarship (as well as recent observational
survey data) suggest that the public should broadly be opposed to acrimony in all cases (e.g.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Ramirez 2009; Pew 2010).
The CCES pre-election wave was conducted during October 2008 and the post-election
wave was conducted two weeks following Election Day (November 4, 2008). In addition to
common content questions administered to 32,800 respondents, 1,000 respondents participated in
our experimental module.14
All experiments were conducted in the pre-election wave, and were
placed after the comment content on the questionnaire.
The CCES uses YouGov/Polimetrix‘s matched random sample methodology
(Ansolabehere 2008). This procedure uses matching to select representative samples from non-
randomly selected pools of respondents. After a target sample, or random sample from the target
population, is drawn, each member of the target sample is matched to an individual in the pool of
opt-in survey respondents. Matching is based on demographics, voter, and consumer
characteristics. The matched cases are then weighted using propensity scores. The resulting
sample is a nationally representative panel of U.S. adults. Differences between this method and
random digit dialing methods administered during the 2008 election were slight (Ansolabehere
2008). As shown in Online Appendix A4, distributions of gender, age, race, education, and
partisanship were generally similar to those in the 2008 American National Election Study,
14
Respondents participated in both experiments, thereby creating a 2x2 design. Using Transue et al.‘s (2009)
procedures, we find no spillover effects between the different experiments.
13
which was administered face-to-face to a probability sample. All of the experiments presented
actual data to respondents and required no deception, thereby enhancing the ecological validity
of the findings. Randomization was successful. As shown in Online Appendix A5, experimental
conditions were balanced on observables.
Study 1: Evaluations of Congress
Although the dominant view has been that ―members are not held individually
responsible for their collective performance in governing‖ (Jacobson 2004, 227) and Fenno
(1978) suggests that members of Congress can make up for negative evaluations of Congress by
running against Washington, there are a number of recent studies that indicate that aggregate
approval or confidence of Congress is politically important. First, approval of individual
members and approval of Congress track closely over time even if they have very different
intercepts (Kimball 2005; Born 1990; Ramirez 2009). Thus, ―an unpopular Congress may harm
the reelection chances of incumbents and members of the majority party‖ (Kimball 2005, 64).
Recent work by Jones (2010) finds that party polarization has increased the magnitude of the
relationship between congressional approval and incumbent vote shares. Second, negative
evaluations of Congress may discourage prospective politicians from serving (Hibbing and
Theiss-More 2001, 145; Kimball 2005). Third, negative evaluations may disincentivize current
politicians from tackling difficult, but important policy issues (Hibbing and Theiss-More 2001,
145). Finally, low levels of trust in government may lead the public to be less supportive of
policies that incur real costs but yield little direct benefits to some citizens, including race-
conscious and social welfare policies (Hetherington and Globetti 2002).
Design
14
To examine how perceptions of party conflict affect opinions of Congress as an
institution, we conducted a survey experiment in which we manipulated the extent to which
Congress was portrayed as being a place where members of opposite parties cooperated and
worked together. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first
―partisan‖ condition, respondents were provided the following information:
In a recent session of the United States House, about 30% of legislation that was
introduced had bipartisan support – that is, it had support from significant numbers of
both Democrats and Republicans.
In the second ―bipartisan‖ condition, respondents were shown the following blurb:
In a recent session of the United States House, about 80% of legislation that became law
had bipartisan support – that is, it had support from significant numbers of both
Democrats and Republicans.
The information in both blurbs is accurate. Note that we are able to manipulate the level of party
conflict and still remain truthful by distinguishing between bill introductions and bill passage.
Although this distinction may be substantively meaningful to some respondents, we believe that
is unlikely, especially since respondents saw only one of the two blurbs. More important,
although that technical distinction might affect their view of specific pieces of legislation, it
should not affect how they view the institution as a whole. Hence, our manipulation is able to
present respondents with two different levels of party conflict while holding other features of
Congress constant.
Measures
After the blurb about the extent of partisan conflict was presented, respondents were
asked: ―Based on this information, how much confidence do you have in the U.S. Congress?‖15
with the following five response options: ―a great deal,‖ ―a lot,‖ ―a moderate amount,‖ ―a little,‖
15
The question wording of ―confidence in Congress‖ was adapted from an item used in Harris surveys. The
polychoric correlation between confidence in Congress and approval of Congress (which was asked as part of the
common content questionnaire) is r = .70.
15
and ―none.‖ The main independent variable was a dummy indicating whether respondents were
assigned to the condition presenting Congress as bipartisan, with the partisan presentation as the
baseline. Although we did not explicitly provide a control condition,16
the common content did
include an item asking respondents about their overall approval of Congress on a four-point scale
ranging from ―strongly disapprove‖ to ―strongly approve‖ (question CC335con) which can be
used as a baseline.
Methods
In order to estimate the overall treatment effect, we estimated the following regression
model via ordinary least squares:17
Ci = + 1Bi + 2SRi + 3WRi + 4WDi + 5SDi + xi + i (1)
where i indexes respondent, Ci represents confidence in Congress, Bi represents the
bipartisanship treatment dummy, SRi, WRi, WDi, and SDi are dummy variables representing
strong Republicans, weak Republicans, weak Democrats, and strong Democrats, respectively
(with Independents as the omitted group),18
xi represents a vector of demographic controls, and i
represents stochastic error. The coefficient estimate of 1 represents the treatment effect of the
bipartisan information.
To assess the moderating effect of partisanship, we estimated the following model:
16
As Gaines et al. (2007) argue, a control condition is not necessary in this study because we are not concerned with
whether the 30% figure or the 80% figure is driving the effect. Rather, we are only interested in testing the
comparative static that increasing the perception of bipartisan activity increases confidence in Congress as an
institution. 17
For simplicity of interpretation, we estimated all regressions via ordinary least squares. However, we re-estimated
all models using ordered logistic regression and the results were statistically and substantively similar (see Online
Appendix Tables A6 and A7). Freedman (2008b, 2008a) argues that including pre-treatment control variables in a
regression framework when analyzing experimental data can produce bias in finite samples. However, Freedman‘s
concerns only apply to analyses with N < 500. Moreover, Green (2009) shows that Freedman employs non-standard
modeling assumptions to achieve his unbiasedness results and that for all practical purposes a sample size of 20 is
sufficient to estimate unbiased treatment effects and correct standard errors. 18
We used the standard question used by the ANES to assess partisanship: ―Generally speaking, do you consider
yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?‖ We considered the follow-up question which
assessed whether individuals were ―strong‖ or ―not strong‖ Republicans and Democrats to separate strong and weak
partisans. We treated those who did not answer ―Republican‖ or ―Democrat‖ as Independents.