Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion Elections, Policy Preferences and International Financial Market Constraints Thomas Sattler University College Dublin Presentation at the IPES Conference, November 12, 2010 Thomas Sattler UCD Elections and Financial Constraints
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Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Elections, Policy Preferences and InternationalFinancial Market Constraints
Thomas Sattler
University College Dublin
Presentation at the IPES Conference,November 12, 2010
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Research Question
To what extent have governments’ actual (as opposed to theirnominal) policies converged with increasing financial openness?
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Financial Openness
Cost of reallocating capital decreases⇒ Financial reaction to elections should become stronger
Cost of market-unfriendly policy increases⇒ Governments’ de facto policies should converge
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Financial Openness
Cost of reallocating capital decreases⇒ Financial reaction to elections should become stronger
Cost of market-unfriendly policy increases⇒ Governments’ de facto policies should converge
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Strong Convergence
H1a: As financial integration increases, stock market responses toelections decrease.
H1b: The negative (positive) response of stock markets to theelection of a left-wing (right-wing) party becomes smaller asfinancial integration increases.
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Strong Convergence
H1a: As financial integration increases, stock market responses toelections decrease.
H1b: The negative (positive) response of stock markets to theelection of a left-wing (right-wing) party becomes smaller asfinancial integration increases.
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Weak Convergence
H2a: As financial integration increases, stock market responses toelections do not change.
H2b: The negative (positive) response of stock markets to theelection of a left-wing (right-wing) party remains constant asfinancial integration increases.
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Weak Convergence
H2a: As financial integration increases, stock market responses toelections do not change.
H2b: The negative (positive) response of stock markets to theelection of a left-wing (right-wing) party remains constant asfinancial integration increases.
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
No Convergence
H3a: As financial integration increases, stock market responses toelections increase.
H3b: The negative (positive) response of stock markets to theelection of a left-wing (right-wing) party becomes larger asfinancial integration increases.
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
No Convergence
H3a: As financial integration increases, stock market responses toelections increase.
H3b: The negative (positive) response of stock markets to theelection of a left-wing (right-wing) party becomes larger asfinancial integration increases.
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
Difference between
Expected Return without electionActual Return after the election
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
Difference between
Expected Return without electionActual Return after the election
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Explanatory Variables
Ideology
Financial Openness
Contraints Variables:
Minority GovernmentMulti-Party GovernmentCentral Bank IndependencePolitical Constraints Index
Thomas Sattler UCD
Elections and Financial Constraints
Introduction Theory Empirical Design Results Conclusion
Size of Stock Reactions
Openness Flows Minority Multi CBI IndexOpenness -0.147